• Tesla, Inc. v. Autonomous Devices, LLCSome claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jan 6, 2025 · IPR2023-01169 · APJ Barbara A Parvis · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1, 2, and 4–20 are unpatentable over Thomas; claim 3 is not shown unpatentable. Substitute claims 22–36 are unpatentable, and substitute claim 21 is not reached.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • BurdenFwd mixedMixed

    “g) Conclusion—Claim 1 Based on the arguments and evidence of record, we determine that” slip op. at 28

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableNot shown unpatentableMixed

    “g) Conclusion—Claim 1 Based on the arguments and evidence of record, we determine that” slip op. at 28

  • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)UnpatentableNot shown unpatentableMixed

    “with the computer program 110.” Ex. 1005, 3:54–55. Thomas describes that (1) the “collected data is then stored in the database 130,” (2) the collected “data is stored in a data structure, generally referred to as a user’s profile,” and (3) the collected “data is logically linked to an event, or situation, that initiated the user’s input.” Id. at 3:56–61. Thomas describes creating or establishing a user profile by simulator 120 recording “the user’s decision/input” and storing “the user’s input in the field or sub-profile associated with the particular situation and/or event.” Id. at 4:67–5:5, Fig. 6. Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s showing for element [1.3]. Also, contrary to Patent Owner’s arguments, we must consider what Thomas discloses rather than whether Thomas uses the exact claim term “instruction sets.” Cf. Gleave, 560 F.3d at 1334 (a reference does not have to satisfy an ipsis verbis test to disclose a claimed element). For these reasons, we are not persuaded by Patent Owner’s argument that Thomas does not “mention instruction sets” or “anything related to an instruction set.” PO Resp. 36–37; PO Sur-reply 17.” slip op. at 42

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Motions to amend / substitute claimsMotion to amend, deniedDenied

    “C. Indefiniteness Petitioner argues that proposed substitute claims 22–36 are indefinite.” slip op. at 72

  Patent outcomesUS 10,607,134 mixed
  § 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham · Nautilus
  Patents in suitUS 10,607,134
• Tesla, Inc. v. Autonomous Devices, LLCSome claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jan 3, 2025 · IPR2023-01172 · APJ Robert J Weinschenk · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–9, 11–14, 16–24, 26, 28, 29, and 31–34 are unpatentable as anticipated by Grotmol; claim 15 was not shown unpatentable because Grotmol does not disclose its required sequence.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “B. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art Petitioner argues that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had “(1) a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering, computer science, systems engineering, or equivalent course work with two to three years of work experience in computer vision, image/video processing, and/or machine learning; or (2) a master’s degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering, computer science, systems engineering, or equivalent course work with a focus in computer vision, image/video processing, and/or machine learning.” Pet. 3–4 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 41). Petitioner’s description of the level of ordinary skill in the art is supported by the testimony of Petitioner’s declarant, Dr. Jason Janet. Ex. 1003 ¶ 41. Patent Owner “adopts” Petitioner’s description of the level of ordinary skill in the art. PO Resp. 4–5. We also adopt Petitioner’s description for the purposes of this Decision.” slip op. at 5

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached

    “The parties appear to agree that the term “connection” refers to a relationship, but dispute whether it includes a link. PO Resp. 7; Pet. Reply 23. We need not resolve this claim construction issue in order to resolve the parties’ disputes about the asserted ground of unpatentability. Specifically, as discussed below, even if we assume for the purposes of this Decision that the term “connection” means a “relationship that includes a link,” the asserted prior art still discloses the disputed claim limitation. See Section II.D.23.” slip op. at 6

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner

    “We agree with Patent Owner that claim 15 requires modifying the first instruction set before determining the modified first instruction set based on an at least partial match between the new digital picture and the first digital picture. Claim 15 recites “modifying: the first one or more instruction sets” and “determining the modified the first one or more instruction sets . . . based on the at least partial match between the new one or more digital pictures and the first one or more digital pictures.” Ex. 1001, 162:65–163:15 (emphasis added). The phrase “the modified . . . instruction sets” in the determining limitation indicates an order because it refers back to the instruction sets modified in the modifying limitation. Id. Further, the phrase “based on the at least partial match” indicates that a partial match between the new picture and the first picture returns the modified first instruction set. Id. In order for a partial match to return the modified first instruction set, it is logical that the first instruction set previously was modified and correlated to the first picture. Id. Thus, claim 15 indicates that the modifying limitation is performed before the determining limitation. See Altiris, Inc. v. Symantec Corp., 318 F.3d 1363, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (“First, we look to the claim language to determine if, as a matter of logic or grammar, [the recited steps] must be performed in the order written.”).” slip op. at 8

  • Claim Construction › Functional claiming / §112(f) means-plus-function › Whether §112(f) applies (Williamson, nonce words)§112(f) appliesDecided for petitioner

    “3. Means-plus-function limitations Petitioner contends that the corresponding structure for the “means for receiving or generating a first one or more digital pictures,” the “means for receiving or generating a first one or more instruction sets for operating the first device,” and the “means for learning the first one or more digital pictures correlated with the first one or more instruction sets for operating the first device” in claim 34 is “one or more processor circuits.” Pet. 4 (citing Ex. 1001, 16:8–60). Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s proposed construction. PO Resp. 11. We adopt Petitioner’s proposed construction for purposes of this Decision. D. Anticipation of Claims 1–9, 11–24, 26, 28, 29, and 31–34 by Grotmol Petitioner argues that claims 1–9, 11–24, 26, 28, 29, and 31–34 are” slip op. at 10

  Patent outcomesUS 11,055,583 mixed
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation
  Patents in suitUS 11,055,583
• Tesla, Inc. v. Autonomous Devices, LLCSome claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Dec 12, 2024 · IPR2023-01054 · APJ Russell E Cass · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 4 and 11 are unpatentable over Grotmol and Hickman; claims 5 and 7 are not shown unpatentable. Substitute claims 21 and 24–26 are unpatentable; claims 22 and 23 are not reached.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “B. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art Petitioner asserts that a person of ordinary skill in the art, 3 Patent Owner does not present objective evidence of nonobviousness in this proceeding. would have [had] at least: (1) a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering, computer science, systems engineering, or equivalent course work with two to three years of work experience in computer vision, image/video processing, and/or machine learning; or (2) a master’s degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering, computer science, systems engineering, or equivalent course work with a focus in computer vision, image/video processing, and/or machine learning. Pet. 4 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 40–42). Patent Owner adopts Petitioner’s definition of a person of ordinary skill in the art. PO Resp. 6. Considering the subject matter of the ’974 patent, the background technical field, and the asserted prior art, we agree with Petitioner’s proposed qualifications for the person of ordinary skill in the art, except we decline to adopt “at least,” as that language is vague and open-ended. Otherwise, Petitioner’s proposed definition is consistent with the level of skill reflected in the specification of the ’974 patent and the asserted prior art references. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001). Accordingly, except as noted above, we adopt Petitioner’s assessment” slip op. at 11

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “1. “connection” Claim 7 recites, in pertinent part, that “a first connection is generated” slip op. at 14

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMixed

    “c) Conclusion—Claim 7 After consideration of the contentions and the evidence of record, we” slip op. at 52

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Motions to amend / substitute claimsMotion to amend granted in partGranted in part

    “7 We recognize that our conclusion here differs from the preliminary determination made in our Preliminary Guidance. After considering the full trial record, including Patent Owner’s MTA Reply, Petitioner’s MTA Sur-reply, Patent Owner’s Sur-sur-reply, and the arguments made at the oral hearing, we find that Petitioner has satisfied its burden of showing that this claim limitation would have been obvious over the Grotmol-Hickman combination. When issuing our Preliminary Guidance, we emphasized that the views expressed therein were “preliminary,” “subject to change upon consideration of the complete record,” and “not binding on the Board when reaching a final written decision.” See Prelim. Guid. 3.” slip op. at 99

  Patent outcomesUS 10,452,974 mixed
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 10,452,974
• Sierra Wireless, Inc. / Thales Dis Ais Deutschland GmbH v. Sisvel International S.A.Some claims unpatentable
  PTAB · May 28, 2024 · IPR2020-01099 · APJ Monica S Ullagaddi · IPR · Remand

  On remand, claims 5–7 and 10 are unpatentable as obvious over Chen; claim 8 was not shown unpatentable over the asserted grounds.

  RulingsRemand decision

  • RemandOther

    “with the Federal Circuit. Paper 53. Petitioner subsequently filed a Notice of Cross-Appeal. Paper 54. The Federal Circuit rendered its Decision on October 6, 2023 (Paper 58) and entered its mandate on November 29, 2023 (Paper 57). In its Decision, the Federal Circuit vacated our conclusion regarding the “means for detecting” limitation recited in claims 5 and 10. Sisvel, 82 F.4th at 1364, 1370. The Court ordered that, on remand, we “must conduct the analysis appropriate for Noah group two, including whether any of the protocols are clearly linked or associated with ‘the function recited in the claim,’[ ] and whether they are ‘adequate structure for performing this function.’” Id. at 1370 (citing Noah Systems, Inc. v. Intuit Inc., 675 F.3d 1302, 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2012)). The Court further held that “the Board should have considered the knowledge of a skilled artisan,” and specifically, Dr. Kakaes’s expert testimony, “to assess whether the protocol name sufficiently discloses an understood algorithm corresponding to the means-plus-function limitation.” Id. at 1369. The Court also held that we “must either (1) determine whether the claim[s] [are] indefinite and then whether such indefiniteness renders it impossible to adjudicate a prior-art challenge on the merits, or (2) resolve the prior art challenge to the patentability of the claims despite the potential indefiniteness of the means-plus-function term.” Id. at 1370. After the Federal Circuit issued its mandate, we ordered the parties to brief these issues including “the supported construction of the ‘means for detecting’ claim term, as well as the attendant patentability issues of indefiniteness and impossibility as relevant to this claim term.” Paper 59, 3. Petitioner filed an Opening Brief on Remand (Paper 63, “Rem. Pet. Br.”). Patent Owner thereafter filed a Response to Petition (Paper 64, “Rem. PO” slip op. at 4

  • Skill levelSkill level patent owner adoptedDecided for patent owner

    “In its Patent Owner’s Response, Patent Owner states: [A] person having ordinary skill at the time of invention— September 10, 1999—in the relevant art would be one with a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering or computer sciences and telecommunications networks, along with at least three or more years of practical experience in the field. A combination of more experience in the field and less education or more education and less experience in the field would also suffice. PO Resp. 7 (citing Inst. Dec. 9; Ex. 2001 ¶ 27). In our original Final Written Decision, we determined that: Although there are differences between the contentions of the parties as to the level of ordinary skill in the art, the parties have not informed us of a dispute that needs to be resolved. We do not find it necessary to resolve the differences between the contentions of the parties as to the appropriate level of ordinary skill in the art because the findings and conclusions rendered in this Decision do not turn on either proposed definition. We determine, on this record, that the level of ordinary skill proposed by Patent Owner is consistent with the ’561 patent and the asserted prior art. As such, we adopt Patent Owner’s proposed definition for a person of ordinary skill in the art. Final Dec. 10. Based on our review of the entire record, we are not apprised of nor can we ascertain any reason to deviate from this determination. As such, in this Final Written Decision on remand, we maintain the definition of level of ordinary skill in the art from the original Final Written Decision.” slip op. at 12

  • Claim Construction › Functional claiming / §112(f) means-plus-function › Whether §112(f) applies (Williamson, nonce words)§112(f) appliesDecided for petitioner

    “Claim limitations that include the terms “means” or “means for” are presumed to invoke 35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶ 6. See Williamson v. Citrix Online, LLC, 792 F.3d 1339, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (en banc in relevant part). Claims subject to 35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶ 6 are construed in a “two-step process,” whereby we “first identify the claimed function,” and then “determine what structure, if any, disclosed in the specification corresponds to the claimed function.” Id. at 1351. Accordingly, the rules governing this inter partes review require that Petitioner “identify the specific portions of the specification that describe the structure, material, or acts corresponding to each claimed function.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.104(b)(3). It is well established that “the corresponding structure for a § 112 ¶ 6 claim for a computer-implemented function is the algorithm disclosed in the specification.” Aristocrat Techs. Austl. Pty Ltd. vs. Int’l Game Tech., 521 F.3d 1328, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (quoting Harris Corp. v. Ericsson Inc., 417 F.3d 1241, 1249 (Fed. Cir. 2005)); see also EON Corp. IP Holdings, LLC v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 785 F.3d 616, 623 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (“A microprocessor or general purpose computer lends sufficient structure only to basic functions of a microprocessor. All other computer-implemented functions require disclosure of an algorithm.”). The Federal Circuit has held that “[t]he specification can express the algorithm ‘in any understandable terms including as a mathematical formula, in prose, or as a flow chart, or in any other manner that provides sufficient structure.’” Noah, 675 F.3d at 1312 (citing Finisar Corp. v. DirecTV Grp., Inc., 523 F.3d 1323, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (internal citation omitted)).” slip op. at 13

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedDecided for petitioner

    “For example, with respect to the CRC protocol, Dr. Kakaes testifies that “CRCs are often referred to as ‘error detecting codes’ as they are typically used[] to detect whether a received data message is or is not erroneous.” Ex. 1002 ¶ 88. Dr. Kakaes further testifies that [t]o use a CRC, the transmitter runs a polynomial division of the data block (before forward error correcting code has been applied, if any) to calculate a “remainder” consisting of a predetermined number of bits, for example 16, which are also called “parity bits,” or “check bits,” or “checksum bits,” or “CRC bits” that are attached to the block to be encoded and then transmitted, in whichever way it may or may not be encoded, punctured, etc. After reception and channel decoding (recall that means determining the “maximum likelihood” message), the receiver then runs the same polynomial division of the received decoded data block (which includes the parity bits) and, if the result does not match the “remainder,” i.e., the “parity bits” are not consistent with the determined message, the decoded data block “fails” the “check,” i.e., is declared as being erroneous. As it turns out such a determination is never wrong. In other words, the “false negative” rate is 0. Id. (emphasis added). With regard to the ARQ protocol, Dr. Kakaes testifies that “[i]n an ARQ scheme, the receiver automatically requests retransmission of a data packet if it is detected to be erroneous, such as through the use of CRC, as discussed above.” Id. ¶ 91.” slip op. at 20

  Patent outcomesUS 6,529,561 mixed
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 6,529,561
• Google LLC v. Nobots LLCSome claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Nov 29, 2023 · IPR2022-00940 · APJ Josiah C Cocks · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–17 and 20 are unpatentable; claims 18 and 19 were not shown unpatentable, because the asserted grounds failed to establish the required limitations for those claims.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Petitioner contends that a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention of the ’008 patent “would have had a bachelor’s degree in computer science or a related field with coursework relating to computer science, plus two years’ academic and/or industry experience in computer security. More education could substitute for experience, and vice versa.” Pet. 4 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 36–40). Patent Owner does not dispute this proposed level of skill. PO Resp. 2. We adopt Petitioner’s proposal as reasonable and consistent with the prior art. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (the prior art may reflect an appropriate level of skill in the art).” slip op. at 8

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner

    “In considering Patent Owner’s explanation, and upon further reflection, we agree with Patent Owner’s reading of the pertinent sentence. In that regard, consistent with the remainder of the Specification of the ’008 patent, it follows that the noted sentence does not alter the contours of “acquired” data to also encompass “passive” data where that premise is entirely absent from other portions of the Specification. Rather, as Patent Owner explains, the sentence is consistent with the understanding that it is “active data” that is connected to the word “acquired” and “passive data” that is connected to the word “available.” See, e.g., id. Patent Owner’s explanation alleviates the ambiguity that was postulated in the Institution Decision. We have considered Petitioner’s views to the contrary (see, e.g., Pet. Reply 21–25) but find them unavailing. In particular, Petitioner does not reconcile its position that, although acknowledging that “acquired data” is defined in the ’008 patent, the term “acquiring” is not so defined and should be regarded as an “individual word” whose meaning is somehow entirely unconnected to “acquired.” See, e.g., Pet. Reply 21. We note, as we did in the Institution Decision, that the ’008 patent states that “acquired data” and “its equivalents and verb forms” is “a type of active data.” See Inst. Dec. 30 (citing Ex. 1001, 3:25–32). We are not persuaded by Petitioner’s view (see, identifiable as a verb form of “acquired.” See PO Sur-reply 8. We determine that, in the context of the ’008 patent, it clearly is. Having considered the competing views of Petitioner and Patent Owner, we conclude that Patent Owner’s construction of the term “acquiring interest data” is consistent with, and supported by, the Specification of the ’008 patent. In that regard, we conclude that, as is advanced by Patent Owner, “acquiring interest data” must encompass the retrieval of some active data.” slip op. at 16

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableUnpatentable

    “1–3 and 6–17 are found in Willner. Pet. 9–26. During trial, Patent Owner presented no arguments challenging Petitioner’s proposed ground of unpatentability of claims 1–3 and 6–17 based on Willner. During oral argument, upon questioning, counsel for Patent Owner expressed that “We did not present any arguments on Claims 1 to 3, 6 to 17 on Ground 1.” Tr. 30:3–4. We determine that Petitioner, via its Petition, has established adequately where all the features of claims 1–3 and 6–17 are present in Willner. See Pet. 9–26. Given that determination, and in the absence of any argument during trial challenging Petitioner’s ground of unpatentability based on Willner as to those claims, we conclude that Petitioner has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that claims 1–3 and 6–17 are unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 102 based on Willner.” slip op. at 19

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundDecided for petitioner

    “Here, we conclude that: (1) the parties’ recognized level of ordinary skill in the art (see Pet. 4; PO Resp. 2); (2) the knowledge of a skilled artisan as set forth by record evidence, including the teachings of Willner and Kitts; and (3) the nature of the problem addressed in both of those references, i.e., click fraud detection, all support a determination that a skilled artisan would have had adequate reasons to combine Willner and Kitts, and would have had a reasonable expectation in doing so. To that end, we find persuasive Petitioner’s arguments in the Petition as to the proposed reasoning to combine Willner and Kitts, and also credit Dr. Lopresti’s supporting testimony. See Pet. 28–29; Ex. 1003 ¶ 118. We are mindful of the contrasting testimony referenced by Patent Owner’s declarant, Dr. Russ. See, e.g., PO Resp. 38 (citing Ex. 2011 ¶¶ 107–110). Dr. Russ testifies that, in his view, there are “practical” and “technical” “considerations” in combining Willner and Kitts that a “POSA would have had to consider in determining whether a reasonable expectation of success exists, none of which are addressed or discussed in the Petition.” See Ex. 2011 ¶¶ 107–110. The example considerations listed by Dr. Russ are reproduced below: 1. How Kitts’ passive data could be collected and stored in conjunction with the mouse vector data already being collected by Willner; 2. How to collectively analyze fundamentally different types of data—Willner’s mouse vector data on one hand, and Kitts’ passive data on the other; 3. How to generate a useful confidence score that is more accurate than the scores already generated by Willner, again taking into consideration that passive data is a fundamentally different type of data than active data; assessment using the complex statistical model of Kitts; and 5. To what extent additional computer hardware would be necessary to enable the combined system to effectively operate and whether such hardware could be reasonably implemented, taking into consideration both cost and feasibility. Ex. 2011 ¶ 108. Those considerations are generally directed to collection and use of” slip op. at 36

  Patent outcomesUS 9,595,008 mixed
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 9,595,008
• Qualcomm Incorporated v. Fedex Corporate Services, Inc.Some claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Oct 6, 2023 · IPR2022-00586 · APJ Christopher L Ogden · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–15 and 26–30 are unpatentable as obvious over Lau and Benson; claim 28 also relies on Harring. Qualcomm did not show claims 16–25 unpatentable.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Exclude

    “We do not rely on Exhibits 1010, 1014, 1026, or 1027 for any determinations or findings in this decision. See infra note 10 (noting the context in which Ex. 1014 has been cited). When we use the phrase “evidence of record” or other similar terms or phrases, we are referring to the evidence of record except that evidence that is the subject of FedEx’s Motion to Exclude, that is, Exhibits 1010, 1014, 1026, 1027, and 2049. Accordingly, Patent Owner’s Motion to Exclude as to Exhibits 1010, 1014, 1026, and 1027 is dismissed as moot.” slip op. at 7

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Dr. Almeroth essentially agrees with Qualcomm’s articulation of the level of ordinary skill as expressed above. See Ex. 2200 ¶¶ 45–46. Because Qualcomm’s uncontroverted articulation of the level of ordinary skill in the art is supported by testimonial evidence by both parties and appears consistent with the types of problems and solutions in the ’231 patent, we adopt it for this decision. See, e.g., Ex. 1001, 1:16–2:37 (“Field of the Disclosure” and “Background” sections of the ’231 patent, describing background knowledge about methods for tracking packages using wireless sensor devices). Qualcomm also contends that an ordinarily skilled artisan “would have been familiar with the field of technology described [on pages 7–13 of 6 Qualcomm argues that this is “at least” the level of ordinary skill in the art. Pet. 7. As we did in our instituting decision, we disregard this qualification to avoid vagueness. Dec. 19 n.6; Dr. Almeroth agrees. Ex. 2200 ¶ 46. the Petition].” Id. (citing Ex. 1002 ¶ 41). The “Field of Technology” section of the Petition refers to background knowledge of RFID technology and hierarchical sensor networks. See Pet. 7–13. Because whether this subject matter is part of the background knowledge in the art is not determinative of our decision, we need not adopt this part of Qualcomm’s articulation of the level of ordinary skill.” slip op. at 8

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedPatent owner expert discountedMixed

    “Although the ’231 patent does appear to describe these as two separate embodiments, the embodiments both include smartphone 200. See Ex. 1001, 110:13–14, 19–20, 23–26. We find persuasive Qualcomm’s argument that the only apparent difference between the two embodiments is that in the second one, smartphone 200 has an app that allows it to use hardware capable of directly communicating with the server. In other words, the distinction is a matter of programming: the smartphone 200 is both “unable” and “not operable to” communicate with a server when it is not presently configured that way through software. This is inconsistent with Dr. Almeroth’s opinion that a device would not be “unable to directly communicate with the server” if it “ha[s] the circuitry components necessary to communicate with a server but simply lack the programming to do so presently.” Ex. 2200 ¶ 54. Thus, we do not find his testimony credible on this point.” slip op. at 12

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITANo construction needed

    “Although the ’231 patent does appear to describe these as two separate embodiments, the embodiments both include smartphone 200. See Ex. 1001, 110:13–14, 19–20, 23–26. We find persuasive Qualcomm’s argument that the only apparent difference between the two embodiments is that in the second one, smartphone 200 has an app that allows it to use hardware capable of directly communicating with the server. In other words, the distinction is a matter of programming: the smartphone 200 is both “unable” and “not operable to” communicate with a server when it is not presently configured that way through software. This is inconsistent with Dr. Almeroth’s opinion that a device would not be “unable to directly communicate with the server” if it “ha[s] the circuitry components necessary to communicate with a server but simply lack the programming to do so presently.” Ex. 2200 ¶ 54. Thus, we do not find his testimony credible on this point. Regarding FedEx’s term-differentiation argument, we agree with Qualcomm that, based on the above evidence in the ’231 patent disclosure, there does not appear to be any meaningful difference between “unable to” and “not operative to” as those terms appear in the claims. Thus, we disagree with FedEx’s proposed construction of “unable to directly communicate with the server.” Our prior-art analysis below will be informed by the discussion above, but we need not explicitly construe this term to resolve the issues raised in the Petition. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“[W]e need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy’ . . . .” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 12

  Patent outcomesUS 9,182,231 mixed
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 9,182,231
• Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. / Samsung Electronics America, Inc v. Power2b Inc.Some claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jul 14, 2023 · IPR2022-00405 · APJ John D Hamann · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–19 and 21 are unpatentable over the instituted obviousness grounds; claim 20 was not shown unpatentable over Bird, Ishii, and Geva.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for petitioner

    “4. Extrinsic Evidence Patent Owner extensively cites to the testimony of Dr. Cairns in” slip op. at 19

  • Skill levelSkill level board ownOther

    “II. LEVEL OF ORDINARY SKILL IN THE ART To determine whether an invention would have been obvious at the” slip op. at 8

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successUnpatentableUnpatentable

    “9. Input Circuitry Petitioner argues that Bird teaches “input circuitry receiving the output indication and providing an electronic input representing at least one of two-dimensional position, three-dimensional position and orientation of the input object,” as recited in claim 1. Pet. 42–44. More specifically, Petitioner argues that Bird’s “Figure 10 discloses ‘detection circuitry 40’ as input circuitry.” Id. at 42 (citing Ex. 1009, 8:2–7, Fig. 10). According to Petitioner, Bird states that the “[i]nput information to the light sensing array [] is detected by the associated detection circuit, here referenced at 40, which detects X-Y position and twist of the pen and provides outputs accordingly to a central processing unit 42 via an input/output interface 41.” Id. (quoting Ex. 1009, 8:2–7). Petitioner adds that “Ishii similarly discloses circuit 61 for determining output indication and providing an input to character- recognizing section 64.” Id. (quoting Ex. 1010 ¶ 62, citing Fig. 11). In addition, Petitioner argues that “Bird discloses an electronic input representing both a two-dimensional position and orientation of said input object.” Id. at 43 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶ 111). Petitioner argues, for example, that “Bird discloses that ‘[t]he X-Y position of the light spot on the array . . . [is] detectable.” Id. (quoting Ex. 1009, 2:40–44). In addition, Petitioner argues that “Bird also teaches determining ‘orientation’ when it senses that . . . ‘the direction of rotation of the beam [is] determined’ by monitoring the sensing elements outputs.” Id. at 44 (quoting Ex. 1009, 5:65–6:5) (second alteration in original). According to Petitioner, “Bird explains that the sensing elements provide[] an output of the ‘rotation of the pen/light beam around its axis’ which ‘can readily be detected by virtue of different sensing elements 14.’” Id. (quoting Ex. 1009, 6:46–48). Petitioner argues that “[t]he Bird-Ishii combination also detects the X and Y positions of the light incident on the display surface and orientation, which is same as the position of the input object on the surface.” Id. (citing Ex. 1010 ¶¶ 53, 58–60). According to Petitioner, one of ordinary skill in the art “would have adapted the input circuitry of Bird to respond to the sensor configuration of Ishii.” Id. (citing Ex. 1002 ¶ 113). After reviewing Petitioner’s arguments and evidence, which are not” slip op. at 48

  • BurdenFwd mixedNot shown unpatentable

    “E. Challenged Claim 20 Claim 20 recites “[a] method for making an electronic input device according to claim 17, the method further comprising detecting thresholds of intensity of the electromagnetic radiation pattern on the input area, and generating control signals by the input circuitry.” Ex. 1001, 10:20–24. Patent Owner argues that Petitioner ignores the “generating control signals by the input circuitry” claim language, and “does not reference, discuss, or argue any disclosure of Bird, Ishii, or Geva discloses or suggests this recital.” PO Resp. 67 (citing Pet. 54–56). We agree with Patent Owner. Petitioner does not address where “generating control signals by the input circuitry” is taught in Bird, Ishii, or Geva, or by their combination. See Pet. 54–56; Pet. Reply 21–22. Hence, the Petition is deficient as to claim 20 for this ground. 37 C.F.R. § 42.104(b)(4) (“The petition must specify where each element of the claim is found in the prior art patents or printed publications relied upon for each ground.”). Accordingly, we determine that Petitioner does not show by a” slip op. at 70

  Patent outcomesUS 8,547,364 mixed
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 8,547,364
• Microsoft Corporation v. D3d Technologies, Inc.Some claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Feb 13, 2023 · IPR2021-01325 · APJ Jameson Lee · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 70–73, 75–80, 84, 89–92, 94–97, 99, 103, and 107 are unpatentable as obvious; claims 74 and 93 were not shown unpatentable.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level board ownDecided for petitioner

    “In the Decision to Institute, we adopted Petitioner’s articulation of the level of ordinary skill in the art, sans the qualifier “at least” for the level of education and for the amount of experience, to keep the level from being vague and overbroad and extending into the level of an expert. Inst. Dec. 11. Post institution, neither party disputes our adopted level of ordinary skill in the art. That level is consistent with what is reflected by the content of the applied prior art references. Cf. Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1354–55 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (the applied prior art may reflect an appropriate level of skill). Accordingly, we adhere to the level of ordinary skill in the art as adopted in the Decision to Institute, i.e., one of ordinary skill in the art would have had a Bachelor’s degree in an academic area emphasizing electrical engineering, computer science, or a similar discipline, and two years of experience in the field working with, teaching, or researching stereoscopic and/or virtual/augmented reality (VR/AR) display technologies. C.” slip op. at 11

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner

    “Pet. 8 (footnote omitted). Patent Owner has not proposed a construction for either “cursor,” “3D cursor,” or “three-dimensional cursor.” Nor did Patent Owner express disagreement in its Preliminary Response with Petitioner’s proposed construction. In the Decision to Institute, we agreed with and adopted Petitioner’s proposed construction. Inst. Dec. 13. Post institution of review, Patent Owner has not objected to or disagreed with the construction we adopted. Accordingly, we adhere to our preliminary construction that “three-dimensional cursor” means “three-dimensional indicator movable within a three-dimensional image, image space, and volume.”9” slip op. at 15

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert discountedDecided for patent owner

    “known term of art (Reply 15),10 Petitioner does not specifically articulate what that meaning is as an established term of art. In that regard, Petitioner cites to paragraph 17 of the second declaration of Dr. Fuchs (Ex. 1039), which states, in its entirety: Based on my experience, a POSITA would have understood “measurement markings” to mean markings that are used for measurements. The measurements can be of various types, e.g., distances, locations, orientation. MS-1001, 6:47–7:8. This would be the plain and ordinary meaning of the term according to a POSITA. Ex. 1039 ¶ 17. That testimony does not support treating “measurement markings” as an established term of art having a common meaning to those of ordinary skill in the art. Dr. Fuchs cites to no examples of how the term 10 Petitioner also states that the term should be construed according to its plain and ordinary meaning. Reply 15. common and specific meaning across those patents and publications, and in particular with the broad meaning urged by Petitioner. We accord very little weight to his testimony with regard to Petitioner’s assertion that “measurement markings” is a term of art. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.65 (“Expert testimony that does not disclose the underlying facts or data on which the opinion is based is entitled to little or no weight”). The general testimony also does not comport with or match the more narrow usage within the disclosure of the ’457 patent as discussed above. See Wi-Lan, Inc. v. Apple Inc., 811 F.3d 455, 462 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (extrinsic evidence “is generally of less significance than the intrinsic record” in matters of claim construction). Dr. Fuchs also does not state that “measurement markings” is an established term of art with a common meaning to those of ordinary skill in the art.” slip op. at 23

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundDecided for petitioner

    “[A] POSITA would have combined Avila’s display interface that shows orthogonal cross-sectional imaging slices and a selected 3D ROI on the same display screen (see Avila’s FIG. 10) with Acosta’s teachings so that a viewer (e.g., a physician) could see a 3D image of an anatomical structure and corresponding 2D orthogonal cross-sectional imaging slices in areas of interest. MS-1003, ¶[61]. In other implementations, the 3D sampling probe/cursor can be displayed along with background portions of the 3D volume and 2D cross-sectional imaging slices. MS-1007, 6:12–67; MS-1005, ¶[0096]. In this manner, the viewer would have multiple views of the selected 3D ROI by itself or within a 3D image (options disclosed by Acosta) along with relevant slice views. MS-1005, ¶[0096]; MS-1003, ¶[61]. Pet. 17. Acosta and Avila such that orthogonal cross-sectional imaging slices would be displayed in Acosta’s system has evidentiary support and rational underpinning. Patent Owner presents no argument regarding the alleged reasoning to combine teachings. We are persuaded by Petitioner’s articulation of the reasoning to combine such that orthogonal cross-sectional imaging slices as taught by Avila would be displayed in Acosta together with the 3D cursor.” slip op. at 46

  Patent outcomesUS 10,795,457 mixed
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 10,795,457
• Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. / Samsung Electronics America, Inc. v. Power2b, Inc.Some claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jan 24, 2023 · IPR2021-01266 · APJ John D Hamann · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1, 5, 8, and 12–13 are unpatentable over Reime; claim 11 is unpatentable over Reime and Hinckley. The remaining challenged claims were not shown unpatentable.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “In our Decision on Institution, we adopted the following definition for one having ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention of the ’093 patent: one who “would have had a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering, computer science, or a related field, and . . . two years of experience in the research, design, development, and/or testing of touch and/or proximity sensors, human-machine interaction and interfaces, and related firmware and software, or the equivalent, with additional education substituting for experience and vice versa.” Dec. on Inst. 22 (quoting Pet. 10 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶ 47)). This definition mirrors what Petitioner proposed, except we excised the phrase “at least” which modified the years of experience as that language is vague and open-ended. Id. Patent Owner proposes a different definition for one of ordinary skill in the art, but does not specifically address any deficiencies in Petitioner’s Petitioner’s obviousness arguments “are not affected [by] differences in the definitions.” Id. (citing Ex. 2056 ¶ 10). Because Petitioner’s definition of the level of skill in the art (excluding “at least”) is consistent with the ’093 patent and the asserted prior art, we maintain it for purposes of this Final Written Decision. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001); GPAC, 57 F.3d at 1579; In re Oelrich, 579 F.2d 86, 91 (CCPA 1978). Our analysis herein, however, does not turn on which of the parties’ definitions we adopt.” slip op. at 8

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITAPlain and ordinary meaningDecided for petitioner

    “We agree with Petitioner and conclude that Patent Owner incorrectly attempts to exclude touching from the claims. Patent Owner incorrectly focuses on the term “propinquity” itself and ignores the surrounding claim language. That is, whether propinquity and touching are mutually exclusive, as Patent Owner argues, is inapposite. The claims do not recite having a of propinquity,” without reciting a lower bound. E.g., Ex. 1001, 67:48–51 (emphasis added). The plain meaning thus includes a degree of propinquity, and being closer. The Specification supports this conclusion by disclosing detecting a user’s fingers when they touch, or are located in propinquity to, a surface. See, e.g., id. at 48:48–52 (“[A] position of a user’s fingers is detected by means of a touch responsive input functionality and/or propinquity responsive input functionality.”), 49:49–52 (“When the user’s fingers touch, as in FIG. 20B, or is located in propinquity to, as in FIG. 20A, plate 1508, the light reflected from the fingers is detected by one or more of detector elements 1504 . . . .”), 50:25–28 (“When the user’s fingers touches, as in FIG. 21B, or is located in propinquity to, as in FIG. 21A, plate 1508, the light reflected from the fingers is detected by one or more of detector elements 1504 . . . .”), 50:58–61 (“When the user’s fingers touch, or are located in propinquity to, plate 1508, the light reflected from the fingers is detected by one or more of detector elements 1504 . . . .”). In other words, the Specification discloses that the fingers are sensed when they are within the degree of propinquity, or are closer (e.g., touching). Id.” slip op. at 11

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot shown unpatentableMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentable

    “Patent Owner that Petitioner does not demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that one of ordinary skill in the art would have found it obvious to modify Reime’s teachings to distinguish between an object’s directions of motion. In re Nuvasive, Inc., 842 F.3d 1376, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (holding that we must consider whether a person of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to combine the prior art to achieve the claimed invention). First, we find that Reime’s teachings about tracking the up/down movement of an object (as opposed to left/right movement) relate to two-dimensional movement, rather than three-dimensional movement. Ex. 1010 ¶ 108. Second, we find that Reime’s teaching that “the sensitivity and the optical response of the light receivers . . . may vary from one application to another” does not suggest tracking three-dimensional movement. Id. ¶ 111. Rather, this passage relates to at what distance from a touchpad device Reime’s sensors detect an object (i.e., when is the object adjacent to the surface). Id. ¶¶ 74, 111. Hence, we find that Reime’s teachings do not provide sufficient reasoning to modify Reime in the manner Petitioner does. which in our view, and taken as a whole, uses impermissible hindsight to reconstruct the invention of claim 11. See Ex. 1002 ¶ 97; Ex. 1035 ¶¶ 57– 58; Metalcraft of Mayville, Inc. v. The Toro Co., 848 F.3d 1358, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“[W]e cannot allow hindsight bias to be the thread that stitches together prior art patches into something that is the claimed invention.”); In re Fritch, 972 F.2d 1260, 1266 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (“It is impermissible to use the claimed invention as an instruction manual or ‘template’ to piece together the teachings of the prior art so that the claimed invention is rendered obvious.” (citation omitted)). In addition, we find that Dr. Bederson’s cited testimony is conclusory, and lacks the underlying factual support to guard against impermissible hindsight. See Ex. 1002 ¶ 97; Ex. 1035 ¶¶ 57–58. In sum, we find that Petitioner does not show that one of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to modify Reime in the manner Petitioner does. Hence, we determine that Petitioner does not demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that claim 11 would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art over Reime.” slip op. at 43

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of success › HindsightNot shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “First, we find that Reime’s teachings about tracking the up/down movement of an object (as opposed to left/right movement) relate to two-dimensional movement, rather than three-dimensional movement. Ex. 1010 ¶ 108. Second, we find that Reime’s teaching that “the sensitivity and the optical response of the light receivers . . . may vary from one application to another” does not suggest tracking three-dimensional movement. Id. ¶ 111. Rather, this passage relates to at what distance from a touchpad device Reime’s sensors detect an object (i.e., when is the object adjacent to the surface). Id. ¶¶ 74, 111. Hence, we find that Reime’s teachings do not provide sufficient reasoning to modify Reime in the manner Petitioner does. which in our view, and taken as a whole, uses impermissible hindsight to reconstruct the invention of claim 11. See Ex. 1002 ¶ 97; Ex. 1035 ¶¶ 57– 58; Metalcraft of Mayville, Inc. v. The Toro Co., 848 F.3d 1358, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“[W]e cannot allow hindsight bias to be the thread that stitches together prior art patches into something that is the claimed invention.”); In re Fritch, 972 F.2d 1260, 1266 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (“It is impermissible to use the claimed invention as an instruction manual or ‘template’ to piece together the teachings of the prior art so that the claimed invention is rendered obvious.” (citation omitted)). In addition, we find that Dr. Bederson’s cited testimony is conclusory, and lacks the underlying factual support to guard against impermissible hindsight. See Ex. 1002 ¶ 97; Ex. 1035 ¶¶ 57–58. In sum, we find that Petitioner does not show that one of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to modify Reime in the manner Petitioner does. Hence, we determine that Petitioner does not demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that claim 11 would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art over Reime.” slip op. at 43

  Patent outcomesUS 9,569,093 mixed
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 9,569,093
• Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. / Samsung Electronics America, Inc. v. Power2b, Inc.Some claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jan 19, 2023 · IPR2021-01239 · APJ John D Hamann · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 31 and 41 are unpatentable as obvious over Yamaguchi; claims 15–18, 21, 22, 26, and 30 were not shown unpatentable on the other grounds.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “In our Decision on Institution, we adopted the following definition for one having ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention of the ’850 patent: one who “would have had a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering, computer science, or a related field, and . . . years of experience in the research, design, development, and/or testing of touch and/or proximity sensors, human-machine interaction and interfaces, and related firmware and software, or the equivalent, with additional education substituting for experience and vice versa.” Dec. on Inst. 20–21 (quoting Pet. 8–9 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶ 44)). This definition mirrors what Petitioner proposed, except we excised the phrase “at least” which modified the years of experience as that language is vague and openended. Id.” slip op. at 8

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner

    “We agree with Petitioner and conclude that Patent Owner incorrectly attempts to exclude touching from the claims. Patent Owner incorrectly focuses on the term “propinquity” itself and ignores the surrounding claim language. That is, whether propinquity and touching are mutually exclusive, as Patent Owner argues, is inapposite. The claims do not recite having a particular propinquity. Rather, they recite “ha[ving] at least a predetermined degree of propinquity,” without reciting a lower bound. E.g., Ex. 1001, 67:2–4 (emphasis added). The plain meaning thus includes a degree of propinquity, and being closer. user’s fingers when they touch, or are located in propinquity to, a surface. See, e.g., id. at 47:28–31 (“[A] position of a user’s fingers is detected by means of a touch responsive input functionality and/or propinquity responsive input functionality.”), 48:26–29 (“When the user’s fingers’ touch, as in FIG. 20B, or is located in propinquity to, as in FIG. 20A, plate 1508, the light reflected from the fingers is detected by one or more of detector elements 1504 . . . .”), 49:1–4 (“When the user’s fingers touches, as in FIG. 21B, or is located in propinquity to, as in FIG. 21A, plate 1508, the light reflected from the fingers is detected by one or more of detector elements 1504 . . . .”), 49:33–36 (“When the user's fingers touch, or are located in propinquity to, plate 1508, the light reflected from the fingers is detected by one or more of detector elements 1504 . . . .”). In other words, the Specification discloses that the fingers are sensed when they have at least the degree of propinquity, or are closer (e.g., touching). Id.” slip op. at 11

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Specification disavowal / 'present invention' languageDisclaimer not foundDecided for petitioner

    “Having reviewed the parties’ arguments, we agree with Petitioner and conclude that the claims do not require a detector assembly to be physically separate from (i.e., not interspersed with) a pixel array. See, e.g., Ex. 1001, 66:65–67:11. This is not to say that a detector assembly (e.g., detector elements) and the pixels of a pixel array are not distinct components, because they are in that they are separate components and perform different functions. See, e.g., id. at 4:44–54 (disclosing that detector elements detect electromagnetic radiation), 9:50–55 (disclosing display devices including a pixel array operative to provide a visually sensible output), 36:41–46 (disclosing discrete single-element detector elements that are commercially available). Rather, the gravamen of the parties’ dispute is whether claim 15 covers embodiments of the ’850 patent where detector elements are interspersed (at least along an edge) with pixels in a pixel array. Nothing in the claim language or Specification precludes claim 15 from covering those embodiments. Id. In addition, claim 15 recites the location of a detector assembly as being “arranged at least one edge of a viewing plane defining plate.” Id. at by including being behind, about, or along an edge within its scope. Ex. 1001, 42:61–67. Moreover, the ’850 patent illustrates that detector elements can be located, inter alia, along and behind an edge while being interspersed in a pixel array. See id. at Fig. 18F (showing detector elements 1324 along and behind an edge of plate 1328); cf. In re Aslanian, 590 F.2d 911, 914 (CCPA 1979) (considering drawings for what they reasonably disclose to one of ordinary skill in the art). We find unavailing Patent Owner’s reliance on Becton. First, unlike in Becton where the same structure was relied upon, detector elements and a pixel array are separate components that perform separate functions. Becton, 616 F.3d at 1255 (accused infringer asserting “that the spring means and the hinged arm can be the same structure”); Ex. 1001, 4:44–54, 9:50–55, 36:41–46. Second, in Becton, the claims required one claim element to be “connected to” another claim element, which would be nonsensical if they were the same structure. See Becton, 616 F.3d at 1255. Here, claim 15 recites a location of a detector assembly (i.e., “arranged at least one edge of a viewing plane defining plate”), which is compatible with the detector assembly being interspersed in a pixel array. See, e.g., Ex. 1001, Fig. 18F.” slip op. at 22

  • Expert testimonyPatent owner expert discountedDecided for petitioner

    “In addition, we have reviewed the testimony of the parties’ experts that Patent Owner cites, but we give it little, if any, weight in light of the clear disclosure of the intrinsic evidence. See Wi-LAN, Inc. v. Apple Inc., 811 F.3d 455, 462 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (finding extrinsic evidence “is generally of less significance than the intrinsic record” in matters of claim construction); Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1583 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (finding that when “an analysis of the intrinsic evidence alone will resolve any ambiguity in a disputed claim term[,] . . . it is improper to rely on extrinsic evidence”). Lastly, our conclusion to not include “and does not include touching”” slip op. at 14

  Patent outcomesUS 8,624,850 mixed
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 8,624,850

Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.