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  • PTAB · May 28, 2024 · IPR2024-00086 · APJ Kevin W Cherry · IPR · Institution

    The Board instituted IPR on claims 1, 2, 5-8, 10-15, 17, 18, 20, and 21 on all asserted grounds after finding a reasonable likelihood of success and declining Fintiv denial.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

      “In an [inter partes review], the petitioner has the burden from the onset to show with particularity why the patent it challenges is unpatentable.” Harmonic Inc. v. Avid Tech., Inc., 815 F.3d 1356, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (citing 35 U.S.C. § 312(a)(3) (requiring inter partes review petitions to identify “with particularity . . . the evidence that supports the grounds for the challenge to each claim”)). This burden of persuasion never shifts to Patent Owner. See Dynamic Drinkware, LLC v. Nat’l Graphics, Inc., 800 F.3d 1375, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (discussing the burden of proof in an inter partes review). slip op. at 10

    • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITAPlain and ordinary meaningDecided for petitioner

      “1. “wherein a user can be disposed on the top surface of the flotation device in a prone, kneeling, or standing position” With respect to the claim term “wherein a user can be disposed on the top surface of the flotation device in a prone, kneeling, or standing position,” Patent Owner points to passages of the Specification, arguing that all three positions are possible. Prelim. Resp. 19–21 (citing Ex. 1001, Abstr., 4:13–17, 4:33–40; Ex. 2006 ¶ 18). We do not agree with Patent’s Owner proposed construction because even if the Specification discloses that all three positions are possible, that is not what the plain language of the claim requires. Claim 1 recites “or,” which means that a user can be disposed on the top surface of the flotation device in any one of the three positions. See, e.g., SkinMedica, Inc. v. Histogen Inc., 727 F.3d 1187, 1199 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (“The disjunctive ‘or’ plainly designates that a series describes alternatives.”). Patent Owner does not identify any definition or disclaimer that would modify this plain meaning. See Thorner v. Sony Computer Entm’t Am. LLC, 669 F.3d 1362, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2012). Thus, we agree with Petitioner and apply the plain and ordinary meaning of the phrase “wherein a user can be disposed on the top surface of the flotation device in a prone, kneeling, or standing position,” to construe “prone, kneeling, or standing” as alternatives, and the prior art need only show one to satisfy this aspect of the claim.” slip op. at 13

    • Skill levelSkill level patent owner adoptedDecided for patent owner

      “Neither party explains how or why its particular proposal impacts the issues before us in this proceeding. We find that a bachelor’s degree with the accompanying experience proposed by Patent Owner more closely aligns with the prior art of record and the ’044 patent. We note, however, there is some overlap in the proposed levels of ordinary skill in the art because Patent Owner’s proposal includes “at least” a bachelor’s degree, which would encompass Petitioner’s master’s degree as well. Prelim. Resp. 10. Nonetheless, our determination herein would be the same under either party’s definition.” slip op. at 12

    • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Prior-art status of a reference › Printed publication / public accessibilityPrinted publication establishedInstituted

      “As the Board has held in a precedential decision, “at the institution stage, the petition must identify, with particularity, evidence sufficient to establish a reasonable likelihood that the reference was publicly accessible before the critical date of the challenged patent and therefore that there is a reasonable likelihood that it qualifies as a printed publication.” Hulu, LLC v. Sound View Innovations, LLC, IPR2018-01039, Paper 29 at 13 (PTAB Dec. 20, 2019) (precedential).” slip op. at 23

    Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 9,359,044
  • PTAB · Apr 1, 2024 · IPR2023-01457 · APJ Jon M Jurgovan · IPR · Institution

    The Board instituted IPR on claims 44–48 and 50 on all asserted grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that at least one challenged claim is unpatentable.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

      “partes review is authorized when “the information presented in the petition . . . and any response . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). Based on the current record, and for the reasons explained below, we determine that Petitioner has established a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail with respect to at least one challenged claim. Accordingly, we grant institution of inter partes review.” slip op. at 2

    • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

      “Petitioner asserts that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had an undergraduate degree in mechanical or electrical engineering or physics, plus 2–3 years of experience in LiDAR design.” slip op. at 9

    • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededPlain and ordinary meaning

      “Neither party proposes that we adopt any construction that was proposed before the ITC. The rules provide that we should consider an ITC determination on claim construction in an inter partes review proceeding. 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b). However, the ITC made no determination on claim construction before the Section 337 investigation was terminated upon Petitioner’s request for arbitration. Prelim. Resp. 3. Accordingly, the ITC case does not provide any determination on claim construction that we must consider in this proceeding. We decline to explicitly construe “field of view” since neither party advocates for a particular construction. Therefore, we apply the plain and ordinary meaning of “field of view” in the analysis of limitations 44(c) and 44(f), which is “the maximum angle of view that can be seen through a lens or optical instrument,” which may be defined by an aperture, consistent with the textbook definitions discussed above.” slip op. at 11

    • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of success › Teaching awayMotivation foundTeaching away not foundDecided for petitioner

      “discredit[s], or otherwise discourage[s] the solution claimed.” In re Fulton, 391 F.3d 1195, 1201 (Fed. Cir. 2004). At this time, Patent Owner’s evidence is insufficient to establish that Retterath “criticizes, discredits or otherwise discourages” simultaneous use of Retterath’s waveguides and macro detector lens. See Ex. 1005, Fig. 9 (waveguide layer), Fig. 10 (macro detector lens). Patent Owner may be correct that Retterath describes waveguides and a macro detector lens as alternatives to one another. Prelim. Resp. 30. However, Patent Owner does not show that Retterath (or any other prior art) “criticizes, discredits or otherwise discourages” using the waveguides and macro detector lens together. Meiresonne v. Google, Inc., 849 F.3d 1379, 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (A reference “that ‘merely expresses a general preference for an alternative invention but does not criticize, discredit, or otherwise discourage investigation into’ the claimed invention does not teach away.”)” slip op. at 23

    Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 11,190,750
  • PTAB · Apr 1, 2024 · IPR2023-01456 · APJ Kevin W Cherry · IPR · Institution

    The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–3, 5–8, and 10–17 on all asserted grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that at least one challenged claim would be unpatentable.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

      “institute an inter partes review. The standard for instituting an inter partes review is set forth in 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), which provides that an inter partes review may not be instituted unless “there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” The Supreme Court has held that the Board, in a decision to institute under 35 U.S.C. § 314(b), may not institute review on less than all claims challenged in the petition. SAS Inst. Inc. v. Iancu, 138 S. Ct. 1348, 1355–56 (2018). Moreover, in accordance with our rules, “[w]hen instituting inter partes review, the Board will authorize the review to proceed on all of the challenged claims and on all grounds of unpatentability asserted for each claim.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.108(a) (2020); see also PGS Geophysical AS v. Iancu, 891 F.3d 1354, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (interpreting the statute to require “a simple yes-or-no institution choice respecting a petition, embracing all challenges included in the petition”). Applying those standards, and upon considering the Petition, the Preliminary Response, and the evidence of record, we determine the information presented shows a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail in establishing the unpatentability of at least one of the challenged claims of the ’381 patent. Accordingly, we institute an inter partes review of all challenged claims (i.e., 1–3, 5–8, and 10–17) of the ’381 patent, based on the grounds asserted in the Petition.” slip op. at 2

    • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

      “Petitioner contends that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have “had an undergraduate degree in mechanical or electrical engineering or physics, plus 2-3 years of experience in LiDAR design.” Pet. 3. Patent Owner “adopts Petitioner’s definition of a [person of ordinary skill in the art (POSITA)] as having an undergraduate degree in mechanical or electrical engineering or physics and two to three years of experience in LiDAR design” for purposes of its Preliminary Response. Prelim. Resp. 4. Accordingly, for purposes of this Decision, we apply Petitioner’s unopposed definition of a person of ordinary skill in the art.” slip op. at 9

    • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Plain and ordinary meaningDecided for patent owner

      “construction for the term ‘field of view’” in the ITC investigation: “detection area defined by an aperture or lens tube.” Prelim. Resp. 19–20 (citing Ex. 2002, 2). Patent Owner notes that Petitioner relied, in the (now terminated) ITC proceeding, on various pieces of extrinsic evidence to support this construction. See id. at 20–22 (citing Ex. 2004, 282; Ex. 2005, 51, 54–56, 70; Ex. 2006, 28). However, Patent Owner does not appear to argue that this construction is correct or that we should adopt it. See id. at 19–22. We decline to adopt a construction at institution that neither party actually advocates. At this stage of the proceeding, we note that some of the definitions that were cited by Petitioner in the ITC proceeding are broader than the proposed construction. See Ex. 2004, 282 (defining “field of view” as “[t]he maximum angle of view that can be seen through a lens or optical instrument”). Thus, it appears that Petitioner’s ITC construction incorporates additional limitations that, at this stage of the proceeding, we are not persuaded are correct. Thus, for purposes of institution, we simply apply the plain and ordinary meaning of the term. If either of the parties believe that a construction of this term is necessary, they should address the proper construction during trial. C.” slip op. at 10

    • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundDecided for petitioner

      “been motivated to combine Retterath and Borowski with predictable results. Pet. 13–19. Petitioner asserts that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have recognized that following Borowski’s suggestions of implementing each pixel in Retterath’s detector array as a “macro-cell” having multiple SPADs would have “the predictable benefits . . . for smart averaging in time and space, enhancing image depth and acquisition speed.” Id. at 14. Petitioner contends that the combined teachings of Retterath and Borowski would “enhance the signal to noise ratio of Retterath’s detectors, and thereby improve system performance.” Id. at 15 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 134). Petitioner argues that a person of ordinary skill in the art “would have been prompted to implement Retterath’s LiDAR system using multiple SPADs per pixel (as suggested by Borowski) to achieve the performance advantages of SPADs known before September 2015, such as a high data-rate output in combination with low-power operation (and with the high signal-to-noise ratio described above).” Id. at 16 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 135). Petitioner further contends that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated “to combine Retterath and Borowski to utilize multiple SPADs for each pixel to improve detection capability and accuracy.” Id. Petitioner also argues that a person of ordinary skill in the art “would have been prompted to implement the Retterath-Borowski combination due to Borowski’s express suggestion for ‘an improved trade-off between image depth resolution and fast data acquisition for the detection of movements’. . . by ‘local averaging between adjacent detectors to optimize the tradeoff between speed and sensitivity.’” Id. at 17 (citing Ex. 1006 ¶¶ 3, 26, 83, 136–138, 220, 221, 222, 233, 237, 249, 258, 267–271; Ex. 1003 ¶ 137). Finally, Petitioner argues that a person of ordinary skill in the art “would have found it obvious to combine Retterath and Borowski because doing so was the application of known techniques (Borowski’s suggestion for multi-SPAD detectors) to a known system (Retterath’s LiDAR system that utilized an array of detectors) ready for improvement to yield predictable results.” Id. at 17–18 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 138). At this time, Patent Owner does not dispute that there was a motivation to combine Retterrath and Borowski. Accordingly, we find that Petitioner has shown a reasonable likelihood of prevailing in showing that there is a motivation to combine these references.” slip op. at 17

    Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 11,178,381
  • PTAB · Mar 28, 2024 · IPR2023-01458 · APJ Meredith C Petravick · IPR · Institution

    The Board denied institution because the petition did not show a reasonable likelihood that any challenged claim was unpatentable, including under the asserted obviousness grounds.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied

      “In an IPR, the petitioner has the burden from the onset to show with particularity why the patent it challenges is unpatentable.” Harmonic Inc. v. Avid Tech., Inc., 815 F.3d 1356, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (citing 35 U.S.C. § 312(a)(3) (requiring inter partes review petitions to identify “with particularity . . . the evidence that supports the grounds for the challenge to each claim”)); Dynamic Drinkware, LLC v. Nat’l Graphics, Inc., 800 F.3d 1375, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (discussing the burden of proof in inter partes review). slip op. at 8

    • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedOther

      “Petitioner asserts: “A [person of ordinary skill in the art (‘POSITA’)] as of August 24, 2016 would have had an undergraduate degree in mechanical engineering, electrical engineering, or physics, and two to three years of experience in LiDAR design.” Pet. 9 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 59–64). Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s definition of a POSITA. Prelim. Resp. 9. For purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s assessment of the level of ordinary skill in the art, as it is consistent with the ’236 patent and the asserted prior art. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001).” slip op. at 9

    • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

      “In this inter partes review, we apply the same claim construction standard that would be used in a civil action under 35 U.S.C. § 282(b). 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b). In applying this standard, we generally give claim terms their ordinary and customary meaning as would be understood by a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention and in the context of the entire patent disclosure. See id.; Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312–14 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). We do not need to construe any terms explicitly to reach our decision. See Realtime Data LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))); see also Pet. 10 (“[N]o formal constructions are necessary.”); Prelim. Resp. 10 (“[N]o formal constructions are necessary.”).” slip op. at 10

    • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

      “On this record, we agree with Patent Owner. With respect to Figure 22, Hall states: As shown in FIG. 22, behind each of the lenses in the cavity 174, are 16 laser emitters organized relatively horizontally, thereby combining for 32 total emitters. Behind the lens of the cavity 170 are 32 detectors that are positioned within a tube 176 of the unit 154. Ex. 1004, 6:67–7:5. Thus, Hall’s specification describes 32 detectors as being behind the lens of cavity 170. But, Annotated Figure 22 depicts 36 dark red circles, which does not match the 32 detectors described in Hall’s specification. Petitioner does not explain this discrepancy in the Petition. Petitioner cites to Dr. Hesselink’s testimony to support its assumption that Annotated Figure 22 shows the claimed arrangement of pixel columns. Pet. 20. Dr. Hesselink’s testimony is conclusory and deficient because it does not sufficiently explain why a POSITA would know the dark red circles in Annotated Figure 22 were the detectors. Ex. 1003, 65–66 (claim chart); see also id. ¶¶ 72–73. Petitioner next argues: “To the extent [Patent Owner] contends Hall does not disclose horizontal and vertical offset pixels, a POSITA would have found it obvious to arrange the pixels in this manner.” Pet. 21 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 30–36, 66–17). Petitioner’s only support for this argument is the testimony of Dr. Hesselink. Pet. 21. Petitioner, thus, attempts to substitute the testimony of Dr. Hesselink to teach the claimed arrangement of pixels. But, as explained in our Consolidated Trial Practice Guide2 (November 2019) at 36: Expert testimony, however, cannot take the place of a disclosure in a prior art reference, when that disclosure is required as part of the unpatentability analysis . . . . [I]n an obviousness analysis, conclusory assertions from a third party about general knowledge in the art cannot, without supporting evidence of record, supply a limitation that is not evidently and indisputably within the common knowledge of those skilled in the art. K/S Himpp v. Hear-Wear Techs., LLC, 751 F.3d 1362, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2014). Furthermore, because an inter partes review may only be requested “on the basis of prior art consisting of patents or printed publications,” 35 U.S.C. § 311(b), expert testimony cannot take the place of disclosure from patents or printed publications. In other words, expert testimony may explain “patents and printed publications,” but is not a substitute for disclosure in a prior art reference itself. Petitioner does not rely upon Borowski to teach the claimed arrangement of pixels. See generally Pet. 20–21. Because Petitioner fails to show sufficiently that the combination of Hall and Borowski teaches the arrangement of pixels recited by claim 1, we determine that Petitioner has not met its burden to show that claim 1 would have been obvious over Hall and Borowski.” slip op. at 16

    Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 11,422,236
  • PTAB · Mar 19, 2024 · IPR2023-01422 · APJ Jon M Jurgovan · IPR · Institution

    The Board instituted review of claims 1–2, 4–9, 11–14, 16–17, and 19–25 on all petitioned grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that claim 14 is obvious over Pacala, Johnson, Pardhan, and Zhang.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

      “In an [inter partes review], the petitioner has the burden from the onset to show with particularity why the patent it challenges is unpatentable.” Harmonic Inc. v. Avid Tech., Inc., 815 F.3d 1356, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (citing 35 U.S.C. § 312(a)(3)); see also Intelligent Bio-Sys., 821 F.3d at 1369. Therefore, to prevail in an inter partes review, Petitioner must explain how the proposed combinations of prior art would have rendered the challenged claims unpatentable. We determine whether the information presented in the Petition shows there is a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail in establishing that at least one of the challenged claims would have been obvious over the proposed combinations of prior art. slip op. at 13

    • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

      “Petitioner asserts that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had an undergraduate degree in mechanical or electrical engineering and two to three years of work experience with electro-optical and electro-mechanical devices or systems. Less work experience may be compensated by a higher level of education or vice versa. Pet. 9 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 39–41). Patent Owner adopts Petitioner’s definition of a person of ordinary skill in the art for the limited purpose of its Preliminary Response. Prelim. Resp. 10. We apply Petitioner’s proposed definition of the level of ordinary skill in the art in this decision. We determine that the undisputed level of skill is consistent with the problems and solutions identified in the ’515 patent and the prior art. Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2001). We also determine that the proposed level of skill is reflective of the education and experience a person of ordinary skill would have had.” slip op. at 13

    • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

      “Petitioner and Patent Owner each contend that no claim construction is necessary to resolve the patentability disputes in this case. Pet. 9; Prelim. Resp. 11. For purposes of this decision, given that no claim terms are in controversy on the current record, we determine that no express claim construction is necessary. See Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 14

    • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundDecided for petitioner

      “fins with Johnson’s rotor-stator structure would defeat Johnson’s objective of achieving compactness. Prelim. Resp. 23–24, 26–31. However, Petitioner contended that Pardhan’s fins would dissipate heat in the combination, thereby increasing the operating life of the LIDAR device. Pet. 53 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 252). Patent Owner’s argument does not address Petitioner’s evidence that the LIDAR device resulting from Petitioner’s combination would have increased operating life, even if some compactness is sacrificed. That there are simultaneous advantages and disadvantages in making the proposed combination does not necessarily negate the motivation to combine. See Allied Erecting and Dismantling Co. v. Genesis Attachments, LLC, 825 F.3d 1373, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2016).” slip op. at 29

    Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 11,287,515
  • PTAB · Mar 19, 2024 · IPR2023-01421 · APJ Kevin W Cherry · IPR · Institution

    The Board instituted IPR on claims 21 and 23–34 over all asserted grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that at least one challenged claim is unpatentable.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

      “institute an inter partes review. The standard for instituting an inter partes review is set forth in 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), which provides that an inter partes review may not be instituted unless “there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” The Supreme Court has held that the Board, in a decision to institute under 35 U.S.C. § 314(b), may not institute review on less than all claims challenged in the petition. SAS Inst. Inc. v. Iancu, 138 S. Ct. 1348, 1355–56 (2018). Moreover, in accordance with our rules, “[w]hen instituting inter partes review, the Board will authorize the review to proceed on all of the challenged claims and on all grounds of unpatentability asserted for each claim.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.108(a) (2020); see also PGS Geophysical AS v. Iancu, 891 F.3d 1354, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (interpreting the statute to require “a simple yes-or-no institution choice respecting a petition, embracing all challenges included in the petition”). Applying those standards, and upon considering the Petition, the Preliminary Response, and the evidence of record, we determine the information presented shows a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail in establishing the unpatentability of at least one of the challenged claims of the ’405 patent. Accordingly, we institute an inter partes review of all challenged claims (i.e., claims 21 and 23–34) of the ’405 patent, based on the grounds asserted in the Petition.” slip op. at 2

    • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

      “Petitioner contends that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have “had an undergraduate degree in mechanical or electrical engineering or physics and two to three years of experience in LiDAR design.” Pet. 12. Petitioner further contends that “[l]ess work experience may be compensated by a higher level of education or vice versa.” Id. Patent Owner “adopts Petitioner’s definition of a [person of ordinary skill in the art] as having an undergraduate degree in mechanical or electrical engineering or physics and two to three years of experience in LiDAR design” for purposes of its Preliminary Response. Prelim. Resp. 4. Accordingly, for purposes of this Decision, we apply Petitioner’s definition of a person of ordinary skill in the art.” slip op. at 10

    • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

      “constructions in a co-pending ITC case3 involving the ’405 patent; however, no “terms require construction to resolve the patentability dispute.” Pet. 12. Petitioner further argues that “Petitioner demonstrates how the prior art renders obvious the challenged claims under any proposed construction.” Id. Patent Owner argues that Petitioner “proposed the following construction for the term ‘aperture’” in the ITC case: “a small hole that defines a field of view for an individual pixel.” Prelim. Resp. 16 (citing Ex. 2001, 2). Having considered the record, we determine that no express claim construction is necessary for any claim terms. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (holding that only claim terms in controversy need to be construed, and only” slip op. at 11

    • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundDecided for petitioner

      “We find on the current record that Petitioner has shown sufficiently that there is a motivation to combine Hall, Borowski, and Spector. We note that Patent Owner does not dispute, at this time, that there is a motivation to combine Hall and Borowski. We have reviewed Petitioner’s contentions with respect to the combination of Hall and Borowski and find it sufficient. We focus our analysis on combination of Hall and Spector. To begin with, we disagree with Patent Owner’s contentions that a person of ordinary skill would not have looked to Spector because Hall already solved the problem of cross-talk. See Prelim. Resp. 32–36. Although Patent Owner is correct that Hall offers some techniques to address the problem of cross-talk, Hall is clear that those methods are not the exclusive methods or universally solve the problem of cross-talk. For the first technique identified by Patent Owner, Hall states that “[i]n some embodiments, the delay time is set to be greater than the time of flight of the measurement pulse sequence to and from an object located at a maximum range of the LIDAR device. In this manner, there is no cross-talk among any of the sixteen multi-pulse illumination systems.” Ex. 1008, 9:13–17 (emphasis added). And for the second technique, Hall states In some other embodiments, measurement pulse may be emitted from one pulsed illumination system before a measurement pulse emitted from another pulsed illumination system has had time to return to the LIDAR device. In some of these embodiments, care is taken to ensure that there is sufficient spatial separation between the areas of the sur-rounding environment [interrogated] by each beam to avoid cross-talk.” Id. at 9:18–25 (emphasis added). Thus, Hall makes clear that these options for some embodiments, and that the technique works only if certain conditions are met. Thus, on this record, we do not agree that a person of ordinary skill would have been discouraged from looking at other techniques to address the cross-talk problem. Here, Hall discloses several, non-exclusive methods, that may address the cross-talk problem in certain circumstances, but we disagree with Patent Owner that would discourage a person of ordinary skill from looking to other methods of reducing cross-talk to improve Hall’s device. See Allied Erecting and Dismantling Co. v. Genesis Attachments, LLC, 825 F.3d 1373, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“A given course of action often has simultaneous advantages and disadvantages, and this does not necessarily obviate motivation to combine.”). Patent Owner’s argument that Hall teaches away from the combination with Spector because Spector is a single-light-source device with a gimbal is also not persuasive. See Prelim. Resp. 37–39. Here, Petitioner proposes using the apertures used in Spector’s LIDAR device in Hall’s device. See Pet. 64–65. Petitioner does not propose incorporating Spector’s light source or its gimbal. Compare Pet. 65 (showing annotated version of Figure 1 of Spector showing aperture), with Prelim. Resp. 38 (showing annotated version of Figure 1 of Spector highlighting light source.). We disagree with Patent Owner that a person of ordinary skill in the art would ignore everything taught in Spector, which also discloses a LIDAR system, because Hall might criticize one component of Spector. We note that Hall does not appear to criticize Spector’s apertures or the components Petitioner seeks to rely on. “A person of ordinary skill is also a person of ordinary creativity, not an automaton.” KSR, 550 U.S. at 421. Indeed, “in many cases[,] a person of ordinary skill will be able to fit the teachings of multiple patents together like pieces of a puzzle.” Id. at 420. Thus, we disagree that Hall teaches away from incorporating Spector’s apertures, as Patent Owner contends. Finally, on this record, we do not agree with Patent Owner that Spector teaches away from the combination. See Prelim. Resp. 41–47. We note that much of Patent Owner’s argument is based on its assertions of how the modified device would operate. See id. at 43–44. However, these assertions are supported only by attorney argument, and entitled to little weight. See Icon Health & Fitness, Inc. v. Strava, Inc., 849 F.3d 1034, 1043 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“Attorney argument is not evidence.”). Moreover, we note that the proposed combination seeks to improve Hall’s device, not Spector’s, so it is unclear why a person of ordinary skill would necessarily compare the performance of Spector’s device versus the combined device. But even if we ignore these problems, we note that “[a] reference does not teach away, however, if it merely expresses a general preference for an alternative invention but does not ‘criticize, discredit, or otherwise discourage’ investigation into the invention claimed.” DePuy Spine, Inc. v. Medtronic Sofamor Danek, Inc., 567 F.3d 1314, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2009). Spector’s discussion of obtaining a “complete scan of the scene,” Ex. 1005, 5:12, does not necessarily “criticize, discredit, or otherwise discourage,” anything less than “a complete scan of the scene.” Indeed, “[i]t’s not necessary to show that a combination is ‘the best option, only that it be a suitable option.’” Intel Corp. v. Qualcomm Inc., 21 F.4th 784, 800 (Fed. Cir. 2021). At this stage, Patent Owner does not provide any evidence suggesting that Petitioner’s expert’s testimony is incorrect. See Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 185–195. Accordingly, we find that Petitioner has shown sufficiently that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to combine Hall and Spector.4 We note that this is only a preliminary finding and Patent Owner is free to develop further its various motivation to combine arguments by providing additional reasoning and evidence, and by cross examining Petitioner’s expert about his testimony.” slip op. at 23

    Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 11,175,405
  • PTAB · Mar 14, 2024 · IPR2024-00366 · APJ Brian J Mcnamara · IPR · Institution

    The Board instituted IPR on all petition grounds: claims 1–11 over Amanatides and Kohn, and claim 2 over Selzer and Fiske, based on a reasonable likelihood of success.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

      “Institution is issued pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 314, which provides that an inter partes review may not be instituted unless the information presented in the Petition “shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the Petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” A decision to institute under § 314 may not institute on fewer than all claims challenged in the petition. SAS Inst., Inc. v. Iancu, 138 S. Ct. 1348, 1359–60 (2018). In addition, per Board practice, if the Board institutes trial, it will institute “on all of the challenged claims and on all grounds of unpatentability asserted for each claim.” See 37 C.F.R. § 42.108(a). Having considered the arguments and the associated evidence presented in the Petition and in the Realtek IPR, we institute inter partes review.” slip op. at 3

    • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundDecided for petitioner

      “Reasons to Combine the Teachings of Lindholm ’685 and Lindholm ’913 Noting that Lindholm ’685 and Lindholm ’913 are both directed to a multithreaded shader and much of their Specifications and figures are the same, in the Realtek IPR Petitioner contends that a person of ordinary skill would have recognized the Lindholm references disclose different details of the same unified shader architecture. Realtek IPR Pet. 21–22. In the Realtek IPR, Petitioner also states that an ordinarily skilled artisan would have looked to the additional disclosure in Lindholm ’913 for additional details about scheduling threads for execution independent of other threads. Id. at 22. In the Realtek IPR, we agreed that a person of ordinary skill would have had reason to combine the teachings of the Lindholm references. We apply the same reasoning to this Decision do not repeat that analysis here.” slip op. at 21

    • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Priority / effective filing date / continuation supportReference not prior artNot shown unpatentable

      “Analysis in the Realtek IPR In the Realtek IPR we were persuaded that Patent Owner antedated the Lindholm references and therefore they are not prior art. Therefore, in this proceeding we are not persuaded that Petitioner will succeed on its challenge based on the Lindholm references. Realtek IPR Dec. to Inst. 23– 41. We apply the same reasoning in this Decision and do not repeat our analysis here. In the Realtek IPR, we also noted that if the Lindholm references were considered applicable prior art, we are persuaded that Petitioner has cited sufficient evidence to demonstrate that a person of ordinary skill would have been motivated to combine the teachings of Lindholm ’685 and Lindholm ’913, and that in combination, the references would have taught, or at least suggested, all the limitations of claims 1–11 to a person of ordinary skill in the art. We apply the same reasoning to this Decisions and do not repeat that analysis here. Id.” slip op. at 22

    § 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 8,760,454
  • PTAB · Feb 9, 2024 · IPR2022-01263 · APJ Michael L Woods · IPR · Final written decision

    Claims 1, 2, 4–7, 10–12, 15, 16, 21, and 22 are unpatentable as obvious over Ziff, Saito, and Ferrel.

    RulingsFinal written decision
    • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

      “Petitioner submits that a POSITA would have had, as of May 5, 2000, (1) at least an undergraduate degree in electrical engineering, computer science, a closely related scientific field, or similar advanced post-graduate education in this area; (2) a working knowledge of electronic content distribution systems; and (3) at least two years of experience with such systems. Pet. 10 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 71–74). Petitioner further submits that “[a]dditional education may substitute for lesser work experience and viceversa.” Id.” slip op. at 11

    • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedPatent owner expert discountedDecided for petitioner

      “We find Petitioner’s expert, Dr. Neuman, to be a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention. See Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 5–13 (testifying as to Dr. Neuman’s qualifications). Dr. Neuman received his S.B., M.S., and Ph.D. in Computer Science by 1992 (see Ex. 1003 ¶ 6) and has been an Associate Professor of Computer Science Practice at the University of Southern California since that same year (see id. ¶ 7). We find his testimony to be well-reasoned with extensive citations to the record evidence. In particular, we credit Dr. Neuman’s testimony that a “POSITA would have also understood that the allocations in Saito can be specifically determined by a user, particularly given that . . . distributed computing was well-known which specifically included ‘the concept of using multiple processes for receiving, storing, and editing submissions, content, or data files on separate computer components to facilitate distribution.’” Ex. 1020 ¶ 23 (quoting and citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 41–66) (emphasis added). Indeed, a POSITA would have been motivated to modify Ziff so that submitter 32 (“media submissions server subsystem”), writer 34 (“multimedia creator server subsystem”), and publisher 38 (“release subsystem”) utilize separate processors, as doing so would improve Ziff’s system by allowing it to “complete stories faster.” See, e.g., Pet. Reply 4 (citing Ex. 1020 ¶¶ 8, 9; Ex. 1004, 2:33–41). Moreover, we disagree with Mr. Zatkovich’s testimony that “a POSITA would view the teachings of Ziff and Saita [sic] as incompatible, and not find it obvious to combine them.” Ex. 2001 ¶ 67. Rather, we credit Dr. Neuman’s competing testimony. As compared to Mr. Zatkovich’s testimony, we find Dr. Neuman’s testimony to be more credible as it provides clear explanations of the evidence as it relates to the proposed combination. Specifically, we credit Dr. Neuman’s testimony that “a POSITA would have recognized that Ziff teaches a system for cooperatively executing various software applications, and would have been motivated to utilize the well-known benefits of a distributed processing architecture to implement Ziff’s subsystems, given the express teachings of Ziff.” Ex. 1003 ¶ 106. Notably, Ziff teaches the desirability of increased processing speed. See, e.g., Ex. 1004, 2:54–57 (describing the desirability of “increased speed with which a story is prepared”). Ziff further teaches that its “system may be easily integrated into a corporate Intranet computer network.” Id. at 3:4– 6. We further credit Dr. Neuman’s testimony that a “POSITA would have understood that integration into a network (including previously existing corporate Intranet networks) would have motivated a POSITA to use more than one processor, as proposed by Petitioner’s Ziff-Saito combination.” Ex. 2020 ¶ 10. We further credit Dr. Neuman’s testimony that “[o]ne processor would not be sufficient for a large corporation in this context” (id.) and that a “POSITA would have understood that Ziff’s disclosures related to corporate intranet integration would further support executing Petitioner’s proposed Ziff-Saito combination on a distributed, LAN system, which as explained above would work efficiently even at larger scales” (id. ¶ 11). Ex. 1020 ¶¶ 10, 11; see also Pet. Reply 4 (arguing the same).” slip op. at 25

    • Obviousness (§103) › Analogous artAnalogous artDecided for petitioner

      “Two separate tests define the scope of analogous art: (1) whether the art is from the same field of endeavor, regardless of the problem addressed and, (2) if the reference is not within the field of the inventor's endeavor, whether the reference still is reasonably pertinent to the particular problem with which the inventor is involved. In re Klein, 647 F.3d at 1348 (quoting In re Bigio, 381 F.3d at 1325). As to Ziff, we agree with Petitioner that Ziff is within the field of endeavor of and reasonably pertinent to problems addressed by the ’576 Patent. Pet. 16 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 81); see also supra §§ I.C, II.D.1. The ’576 patent and Ziff both relate to a process for creating media. See, e.g., Ex. 1001, 1:22–23; see also Ex. 1004, 4:66–6:43; see also Pet. 16–17 (citing the same). Furthermore, we agree with Petitioner and credit Dr. Neuman’s testimony that “like the ’576 Patent, Ziff addresses problems related to improving the speed of the processes which allow users to search for and develop media for publication.” Ex. 1003 ¶ 81; see also Ex. 1001, 3:1–15; see also Ex. 1004, 2:45–49, 9:18–19, 13:21–26; see also Pet. 17 (contending the same). Accordingly, Ziff and the invention claimed in the ’576 patent are analogous to one another. As to Saito, Saito is within the field of endeavor and reasonably pertinent to the problems addressed by the ’576 Patent. Compare supra § I.C., with id. § II.D.2. We agree with Petitioner and credit the testimony of Dr. Neuman that “[l]ike the ’576 Patent, Saito addresses the implementation and utilization of a distributed processing system to execute coordinated software routines.” Ex. 1003 ¶ 92; see also Pet. 19. Accordingly, Saito is also analogous to the claimed invention of the ’576 Patent.” slip op. at 19

    • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundDecided for petitioner

      “We further disagree with Patent Owner’s assertion that Petitioner failed to provide a motivation to combine Ziff with Saito. See PO Resp. 13; see also PO Sur-Reply 13–17 (arguing that Petitioner’s “Reply Fails to Support the Original Motivation to Combine Ziff and Saito, and Offers New and Still Deficient Motivations”). As set forth above (see supra § II.D.4), Petitioner reasons, with substantial citations to the record and testimonial support of its expert, Dr. Neuman, that a skilled artisan “would have understood that utilizing Saito’s distributed processor system to execute Ziff’s software subsystems would have allowed each subsystem to operate independently in a manner that increases parallelism, speed, and efficiency.” See, e.g., Pet. 25 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 104–114) (emphasis added). Based on the record, we find that increasing speed and efficiency are valid reasons for modifying Ziff’s system.” slip op. at 22

    Patent outcomesUS 10,339,576 unpatentable
    § 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 10,339,576
  • PTAB · Feb 5, 2024 · PGR2022-00044 · APJ Monica S Ullagaddi · PGR · Final written decision

    Claims 1–13 are unpatentable for lack of written description under § 112(a); the Board did not reach the anticipation and obviousness grounds based on HEVC265.

    RulingsFinal written decision
    • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

      “B. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art Petitioner contends that: A person of ordinary skill in the art at the priority date for the ’274 Patent (“POSITA”) would have had a bachelor’s degree in electrical or computer engineering, or a closely related scientific field such as physics or computer science, and two years of work experience with video processing. A lack of experience can be remedied with additional education (e.g., a Master’s degree), and likewise, a lack of education can be remedied with additional work experience (e.g., 4–5 years). This definition would apply at the earliest claimed priority date of the ’274 Patent as well as any later date. Pet. 12 (citing Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 50–52). Patent Owner does not dispute the level of ordinary skill in the art. See generally PO Resp. We adopt Petitioner’s definition as it appears to be consistent with the Specification of the ’274 patent and the cited reference.” slip op. at 14

    • PTAB / AIA Trials › §315(e) estoppelEstoppel appliesDecided for petitioner

      “A party is collaterally estopped from relitigating an issue if: (1) a prior action presents an identical issue; (2) the prior action actually litigated and adjudged that issue; (3) the judgment in that prior action necessarily required determination of the identical issue; and (4) the prior action featured full representation of the estopped party. VirnetX Inc. v. Apple, Inc., 909 F.3d 1375, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (citing Stephen Slesinger, Inc. v. Disney Enterprises, Inc., 702 F.3d 640, 644 (Fed. Cir. 2012)).” slip op. at 21

    • Disclosure Requirements (§112) › Written description (Ariad)Written description inadequateUnpatentable
    • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Priority / effective filing date / continuation supportDecided for petitioner

      “For the reasons that follow, we determine that the ’928 application does not provide sufficient written description support, for at least independent claim 1 of the ’274 patent, so as to “reasonably convey[] to those skilled in the art that the inventor had possession of the claimed subject matter as of the filing date” of the ’928 application. Ariad, 598 F.3d at 1351. Accordingly, we are persuaded that the ’928 application lacks sufficient written description support for the invention recited in claim 1 of the ’274 patent, and thus, claim 1 does not receive an effective filing date as early as that of the ’928 application (i.e., December 23, 2010). We further determine that Petitioner filed the Petition within the 9-month statutory period for requesting post-grant review in accordance with 35 U.S.C. § 321(c). The ’274 patent issued on September 14, 2021 (see Ex. 1001, code (45)), and the present Petition was accorded a filing date of June 9, 2022 (see Paper 5). Accordingly, the Petition was filed less than 9 months after the date of issuance of the ’274 patent. In view of the above, we are persuaded that the ’274 patent is eligible for post-grant review.” slip op. at 16

    Patent outcomesUS 11,122,274 unpatentable
    § 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosurecites Phillips · KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 11,122,274
  • PTAB · Jan 24, 2024 · IPR2023-00667 · APJ Kevin W Cherry · IPR · Final written decision

    Claims 1, 3–19 are unpatentable as obvious over Batchelder and Shin; claims 12 and 14–16 are also obvious over Batchelder, Shin, and Nakano.

    RulingsFinal written decision
    • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

      “Relying on the declaration testimony of Dr. Karamanis, Petitioner contends that an ordinarily skilled artisan for the ’362 patent would have been knowledgeable regarding liquid cooling systems for computer systems, would have earned at least a bachelor’s degree, such as an B.S. (bachelor of science), or equivalent thereof, in electrical or mechanical engineering or a closely-related field, or would have possessed at least two or three years of experience in liquid cooling systems for computer systems or in similar systems. Pet. 5–6 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 14–19). Petitioner also contends that a “person with less education but more relevant practical experience, depending on the nature of that experience and degree of exposure to liquid cooling systems for computer systems, could also qualify as a POSITA in the field of the ’362 patent.” Id. at 6. Patent Owner did not file a Patent Owner Response, so it does not dispute this level of skill in the art. We adopt Petitioner’s articulation of the level of ordinary skill in the art, which is consistent with the ’362 patent and the asserted prior art, and we apply it in our obviousness evaluations below. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (the prior art, itself, can reflect appropriate level of ordinary skill in art).” slip op. at 11

    • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

      “Petitioner identifies “reservoir,” “chamber,” “impeller,” and “radiator” as needing construction. Pet. 6–8. Petitioner submits that the other terms do not require construction. Pet. 8. Having considered the record, we determine that no express claim construction is necessary for any claim terms. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co. Matal, 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (holding that only claim terms in controversy need to be construed, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy (citing Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 12

    • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)UnpatentableUnpatentable

      “primary objective of this invention is to provide a low cost high reliability heat exchange apparatus that incorporates a composite substrate containing flow channels and a heat transfer fluid, providing low thermal resistance cooling to high density sources.” Pet. 25 (citing Ex. 1006, 2:40–45). And Shin similarly discloses or teaches that “[t]he heat generating element 1, such as an LSI chip, is installed on a wiring board 2, which is a motherboard” in a computer system. Id. (citing Ex. 1007 ¶ 24). Petitioner identifies Batchelder’s heat sink assembly as meeting limitation [1a]. Id. at 25–31 (citing Ex. 1006, 1:65, 3:49–51, 5:26–28, 7:23–26, 7:46–55, 8:4–12, 8:14–67, Figs. 2, 7; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 40, 41). Petitioner argues that the combination of Batchelder and Shin accounts for limitations [1b], [1h], and [1i]. Pet. 31–42 (citing Ex. 1007 ¶¶ 23, 25–27, Figs. 1, 3; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 43– 46; Ex. 1006, Fig. 2), 57. Petitioner contends that a person of ordinary skill in the art “would have been motivated to combine Shin with Batchelder to further increase heat management efficiency by using an external radiator that cools the heated cooling liquid after ‘snaking through the inside of the heat exchanger as shown by 28 and 29,’” because this “technique allows heat to more efficiently escape the system.” Id. at 36 (citing Ex. 1007 ¶ 25; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 47–52). Petitioner argues that Batchelder accounts for limitations [1c], [1d], [1e], [1f], and [1g]. See Pet. 43–56 (citing Ex. 1006, 3:20–23, 4:53–55, 5:11–13, 5:26–32, 6:5–7, 6:5–18, 8:14–27, 8:36–47, 9:22–10:53, Figs. 2, 7, 8, 9, 10; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 59–73). Patent Owner did not file a Patent Owner Response, so it does not offer arguments on this ground. Accordingly, Patent Owner has waived any argument regarding these contentions. See Paper 8, 9 (“Patent Owner is cautioned that any arguments not raised in the response may be deemed waived.”). We have reviewed Petitioner’s contentions regarding claim 1, which Patent Owner does not contest, and adopt them as our own. Based on those contentions and evidence, we determine that Petitioner has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that claim 1 is unpatentable as obvious over Batchelder and Shin. We reach the same conclusion regarding Petitioner’s assertions for claims 3–11, 13, and 16, which depend from claim 1. See Pet. 57–71. Independent claim 17 is a method claim that recites similar limitations as independent claim 1. See id. at 71–73. Claims 18 and 19 depend from claim 17, and recite limitations similar to claims 5 and 8. We have reviewed Petitioner’s unopposed contentions regarding claims 17–19, and adopt them as our own. Thus, we also conclude that Petitioner has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that claims 17–19 are unpatentable as obvious over Batchelder and Shin.” slip op. at 17

    Patent outcomesUS 8,240,362 unpatentable
    Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 8,240,362

Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.