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  • PTAB · Jan 17, 2018 · IPR2016-00286 · APJ Kristina M Kalan · IPR · Final written decision

    Claims 1–20 are unpatentable as obvious over Gerber and O’Donnell; claims 1–4 and 6–11 are also unpatentable as obvious over Gerber and Barrie.

    RulingsFinal written decision
    • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

      “We adopt Petitioner’s contention that a person of ordinary skill in the art would be a physician specializing in urology or oncology, or holding a Ph.D. in pharmacology, biochemistry or a related discipline. Additional experience could substitute for the advanced degree. To the extent necessary, one of skill in the art may collaborate with one or more other persons of skill in the art for one or more aspects with which the other person may have expertise, experience and/or knowledge that was obtained through his or her education, industrial or academic experiences. For example, one of skill may consult with an enzymologist and/or molecular biologist and thus may rely on the opinions of such specialists in evaluating the claims. Pet. 7 (citations omitted). Patent Owner does not appear to dispute Petitioner’s definition in its Patent Owner Response. See generally PO Resp. The level of ordinary skill in the art in this case is further demonstrated by” slip op. at 9

    • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedOther

      “Regarding the interpretation of O’Donnell’s Synacthen test, we do not agree with Patent Owner that the results “lack any significance.” See PO Resp. 20. We are persuaded that one of ordinary skill in the art would understand the results of this test to be an indicator that something was amiss with the O’Donnell Study C patients’ cortisol levels following administration of abiraterone acetate. Results of the Synacthen test led O’Donnell to conclude that further studies were needed to determine whether glucocorticoid replacement would be necessary. Ex. 1003, 2323. We understand Patent Owner’s position that the “Synacthen test results in O’Donnell do not give a complete picture of a patient’s glucocorticoid production.” PO Resp. 21. We, however, do not perceive that a complete picture of a patient’s glucocorticoid production is required for one of ordinary skill in the art to be motivated to explore whether glucocorticoid replacement therapy was necessary. Petitioner’s experts opine that O’Donnell’s results for the Study C patients were “unquestionably abnormal” and implied that abiraterone acetate could result in chronic cortisol deficiency “for which glucocorticoid replacement therapy could be required.” Reply 6– 7 (citing Ex. 1093, 22, 68; Ex. 1023, 1245). We credit this testimony as supporting Petitioner’s argument that one of ordinary skill in the art, upon reviewing O’Donnell’s Synacthen test results and statement regarding impact on adrenal reserve, would not conclude that they lack any significance; rather, they would conclude that they are significant enough to merit further investigation of administration of abiraterone acetate with glucocorticoids.” slip op. at 19

    • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundDecided for petitioner
    • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of success › Teaching awayTeaching away not foundDecided for petitioner

      “We find that the prior art does not discourage or teach away from administration of prednisone to mCRPC patients. The teachings of the references do not rise to the level of teaching away from Petitioner’s proposed combination—they do not criticize, discredit, or otherwise discourage the solution claimed, but rather, as Petitioner argues, encourage exploration of such a combination. In re Fulton, 391 F.3d 1195, 1201 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (explaining “[t]he prior art’s mere disclosure of more than one alternative does not constitute a teaching away from any of these alternatives because such disclosure does not criticize, discredit, or otherwise discourage the solution claimed”). Although glucocorticoids have certain risks, we are not persuaded that those risks outweigh the positive effects in seriously ill patients with limited life expectancy, such that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have been dissuaded from administering glucocorticoids to a mCRPC patient. We have sufficient evidence before us that the risks of glucocorticoid therapy were known, that the longevity of mCRPC patients was short, that glucocorticoid therapy was reasonably well tolerated in the short term, and that any long-term side effects would have been viewed by one of ordinary skill in the art in light of the same. Thus, we are persuaded that one of ordinary skill in the art would not have been dissuaded from administering abiraterone acetate with prednisone, but rather, would have been motivated to co-administer prednisone with abiraterone acetate.” slip op. at 23

    Patent outcomesUS 8,822,438 unpatentable
    § 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 8,822,438
  • PTAB · Jan 11, 2018 · IPR2016-00084 · APJ Christopher L Crumbley · IPR · Final written decision

    Claims 1–3 and 8–10 were not proven unpatentable because the proposed obviousness analysis did not show that the choices leading to everolimus were finite, small, or easily traversed.

    RulingsFinal written decision
    • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot shown unpatentableMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentable

      “The facts of the case at hand provide a stark contrast. As we have found above, while the prior art recognized rapamycin as a promising immunosuppressant, it was only one among many possible lead compounds. Furthermore, the prior art shows that chemists were pursuing a number of avenues to increase solubility, including making derivatives but also other approaches such as formulation techniques or prodrugs. And most tellingly, in contrast to Bristol-Myers Squibb where the experts agreed on the type and location of the potential substituents, here the experts diverge significantly. As discussed above, we credit the testimony of Novartis’ experts over Par’s, and find that the options of substituent and substituent position would not have been as narrow as those proposed by Par. In sum, we find that the person of ordinary skill in the art at the time the invention was made would have been faced with a large number of decision points along the lead compound analysis proposed by Par. The number of potential compounds encompassed by this decision tree is unclear, but would be far larger than the three compounds Dr. Jorgensen discusses. Only by making the “right” choice at each step would the skilled artisan arrive at everolimus, the compound of claim 10 and the basis of Par’s obviousness challenge. In light of these facts, we cannot conclude that the options faced would have been—in the words of the Federal Circuit—finite, small, or easily traversed. We, therefore, cannot conclude that the compound of claim 10, and by extension, the compounds of claims 1–3, would have been obvious to one of skill in the art as of October 1992.” slip op. at 35

    • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedOther

      “Par contends, supported by the testimony of Dr. Jorgensen, that a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention would generally have a Ph.D. in organic chemistry or medicinal chemistry or physical chemistry or a related field, or a Masters or Bachelor degree in chemistry or a related field and at least three years’ experience in drug discovery and design. Pet. 16 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 45). Novartis’ experts, with insubstantial exceptions, agree with Dr. Jorgensen’s recitation. Ex. 2092 ¶ 22 (Klibanov); Ex. 2093 ¶¶ 47–48 (Roush). We adopt the level of skill recited by the parties for purposes of our analysis herein.” slip op. at 13

    • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert discountedPatent owner expert creditedDecided for patent owner

      “Based on our review of the entirety of the record, we cannot conclude, as Par contends, that the C40 hydroxyl group would be the obvious, optimal, or preferred location for substitutions to rapamycin. Dr. Jorgensen’s testimony to that effect is premised on his assertion that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have first narrowed the group of possible substitution positions to the C10, C28, or C40, because those are the hydroxyl groups of rapamycin. Ex. 1003 ¶ 142 (“person of ordinary skill in the art would have focused on hydroxyl groups on rapamycin as initial targets for modification.”). This statement, however, is based only on Dr. Jorgensen’s statement that the reactions of hydroxyl groups are “among the most fundamental and elementary reactions taught in beginning organic chemistry courses.” Id. Dr. Jorgensen provides no objective, documentary evidence that would indicate that starting with hydroxyl groups was an accepted rule followed by medicinal chemists in the field. To the contrary, Dr. Roush testifies that Dr. Jorgensen’s focus on rapamycin’s hydroxyl groups is inconsistent with the prior art as a whole, and provides multiple citations to the documentary evidence in the record supporting his testimony. Ex. 2093 ¶¶ 197, 206–216 (citing prior art modifications at the C9, C26, C27, C28, and C32 positions). For example, Ondeyka14 discloses demethylation of the methoxy group at rapamycin’s C29 position, while Caulfield15 discloses oxime substitutions at C32.16 We have weighed the testimony of Drs. Jorgensen and Roush on this point, and find Dr. Roush’s to be the more credible. While we agree with Par that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have considered rapamycin’s C40 position as a candidate for substitution, that site must be evaluated as one potential substitution site among many that were being modified in the field at the time of the invention.” slip op. at 24

    • Obviousness (§103) › Objective indicia / secondary considerationsNot reached

      “obviousness challenge. In light of these facts, we cannot conclude that the options faced would have been—in the words of the Federal Circuit—finite, small, or easily traversed. We, therefore, cannot conclude that the compound of claim 10, and by extension, the compounds of claims 1–3, would have been obvious to one of skill in the art as of October 1992. With respect to the second ground of unpatentability, pertaining to the method of treatment claims 8 and 9, Par’s obviousness arguments are premised on the conclusion that everolimus would have been obvious. See Pet. 48–51 (“claims 8 and 9 would have been obvious to a person of ordinary skill in the art in view of the art that makes the 40-O-2- hydroxyethyl-rapamycin derivative obvious”). As we conclude that everolimus has not been shown to be obvious, we reach the same conclusion as to the methods of claims 8 and 9. The addition of Hughes to the ground of unpatentability does not provide any of the teachings we found lacking from the art asserted in the first ground of unpatentability. As we have concluded that Par’s articulated lead compound analysis is insufficient to establish the obviousness of any of the challenged claims, we need not reach, and do not evaluate, the objective indicia of obviousness submitted by Novartis. PO Resp. 60–68.” slip op. at 36

    Patent outcomesUS 5,665,772 not shown unpatentable
    § 103 obviousness
    Patents in suitUS 5,665,772
  • PTAB · Jan 8, 2018 · IPR2016-01284 · APJ Lora M Green · IPR · Final written decision

    Claims 44–46 and 53 are unpatentable under § 103(a) over Schnur combined with either OSI’s 10-K or Gibbs.

    RulingsFinal written decision
    • Skill levelSkill level patent owner adoptedDecided for patent owner

      “Given that claim 44 encompasses cancers in addition to non-small cell lung cancer, we adopt Patent Owner’s statement of the level of ordinary skill in the art. Because the claim’s requirement to treat cancers in addition to non-small cell lung cancer, we find that the ordinary artisan would be a medical oncologist who would hold an M.D. degree and would have completed several years of practice in the field of oncology. Moreover, we note that the level of ordinary skill in the art in this proceeding is reflected by the prior art of record. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001); In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995). In addition, during oral hearing, counsel for both parties opined that the outcome of the obviousness analysis would be the same under either parties’ definition of the ordinary artisan. Tr. 22:3‒8, 37:9‒11. Thus, our analysis would be the same under either Petitioner’s or Patent Owner’s definition of the ordinary artisan.” slip op. at 9

    • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedPatent owner expert discountedDecided for petitioner

      “Gibbs, however, explicitly teaches: The EGF receptor is also the target for the development of inhibitors of the intracellular tyrosine kinase domain. ZD-1839 and CP-358,774, competitive inhibitors of ATP binding to the receptor’s active site, are currently in clinical trials (12, 13). Their mechanism of action has led to some concern about safety, given the variety and physiological significance of protein kinases and other enzymes that bind ATP. However, these compounds appear to have good anti-cancer activity in preclinical models, with an acceptable therapeutic index, particularly in patients with non-small cell lung cancer. Ex. 1010, 10 (emphasis added). As erlotinib (i.e., CP-358,774) is one of only two compounds mentioned, and as Gibbs clearly states “these compounds,” the clear inference is that erlotinib has anti-cancer activity against non-small cell lung cancer. We credit the testimony of Dr. Giaccone, who testified that the statement in Gibbs “is a pretty strong and precise statement saying, there is activity in non-small cell lung cancer patients.” Ex. 2020, 115:12‒20. In addition, Dr. Giaccone testified further that statement by Dr. Gibbs would have been based on the information he had at the time, and that as Dr. Gibbs was a reputable pharmacologist, and as the statement was made in “a peer-reviewed journal of high impact,” he would have trusted that Dr. Gibbs “was saying something very important.” Ex. 2020, 115:12‒20. Moreover, Dr. Gibbs testified: Q Dr. Gibbs, let’s go back to Exhibit 1010. So you never attempted to offer any sort of correction for this publication. Isn’t that correct? A That is correct. Q And you state in your declaration that you have written over 128 articles. Isn’t that correct? A That is correct. Q And so you have -- you would agree with me that you have experience in writing articles such as this Gibbs reference. Isn’t that correct? A That is correct. Q And of the 128 articles, have you ever asked that an article be retracted? A I have not. Q And according to your C.V., one of your areas of expertise is that you have extensive journal editorial experience. Isn’t that correct? A Yes. Ex. 1049, 29:18‒30:16 (objections omitted). Given the testimony that Dr. Gibbs was an experienced editor, and never attempted to correct or retract the Gibbs reference, we decline to afford his Declaration (Ex. 2022) much weight in this regard.” slip op. at 39

    • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundUnpatentable

      “Patent Owner’s arguments are unavailing. That is, we find that the ordinary artisan would have combined Gibbs or OSI 10-K with Schnur and had a reasonable expectation of success of achieving the invention of challenged claims 44 and 53. In that regard, we agree with Petitioner (Pet. 26) that Schnur discloses all of the elements of claims 44 and 53, except for specifically teaching the treatment of non-small cell lung cancer. Specifically, Schnur teaches a genus of compounds that encompasses erlotinib (Ex. 1009, 1:9‒11) in which the synthesis of erlotinib is specifically disclosed (id. at 22:30‒49 (Example 20)), and erlotinib is specifically claimed (id. at 39:33 (claim 8)). In addition, Schnur discloses the treatment of hyperproliferative disorders such as cancer (id. at 1:9‒11), and specifically claims treating lung cancer with the genus of compounds (id. at 14:1‒13). Thus, as Schnur specifically discloses and claims erlotinib, and specifically discloses and claims treatment of lung cancer, we conclude that Schnur suggests the treatment of lung cancer with erlotinib. As acknowledged by Petitioner, however, Schnur does not specifically teach treatment of non-small cell lung cancer. Pet. 26.” slip op. at 25

    • Obviousness (§103) › Objective indicia / secondary considerations › NexusObjective indicia no nexusDecided for petitioner

      “We find Patent Owner’s evidence of non-obviousness to be weak as to long-felt need. All types of objective evidence of nonobviousness must be shown to have a nexus to the claimed invention. In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1580 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (nexus generally); In re Huang, 100 F.3d 135, 140 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (commercial success); Rambus Inc. v. Rea, 731 F.3d 1248, 1256 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (long-felt need). The stronger the showing of nexus, the greater the weight accorded the objective evidence of nonobviousness. See Ashland Oil, Inc. v. Delta Resins & Refractories, Inc., 776 F.2d 281, 306 (Fed. Cir. 1985). As we have discussed above, the claims are not limited to the treatment of human patients with non-small cell lung cancer, but are drawn to treatment of mammals. In addition, the claims do not require a clinically significant effect. See, e.g. Tr. 50:16‒17 (Counsel for Patent Owner stated that the claims do not require a “major clinical response, which is a higher standard than treatment as defined in the claims.”). As Patent Owner notes, 1,631 new drugs were tested in Phase II clinical trials for non-small cell lung cancer (PO Resp. 59 (citing Ex. 2008, 1)), and, thus, those compounds made it through preclinical trials. Patent Owner notes further that ZD-1839, which was also disclosed by Gibbs, successfully emerged from the clinic with FDA-approved indications for the treatment of non-small cell lung cancer. PO Resp. 60. Moreover, Patent Owner acknowledges that the FDA required it to change its label as it is only effective in treating approximately 10% of patients with non-small cell lung cancer. Id. at 12; Reply 19.” slip op. at 42

    Patent outcomesUS 6,900,221 unpatentable
    § 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 6,900,221
  • PTAB · Nov 28, 2017 · IPR2016-01034 · APJ Robert A Pollock · IPR · Rehearing

    The Board denied Patent Owner’s rehearing request, leaving claims 1–3, 5, and 6 unpatentable under Ground IV based on Akinaga and the cited supporting references.

    RulingsRehearing decision
    • RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied

      “37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d), which provides in relevant part: A party dissatisfied with a decision may file a request for rehearing, without prior authorization from the Board. The burden of showing a decision should be modified lies with the party challenging the decision. The request must specifically identify all matters the party believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked, and the place where each matter was previously addressed in a motion, an opposition, or a reply.” slip op. at 3

    • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundDecided for petitioner

      “UCN-01 alone, and in combination with the DNA damaging agent mitomycin C. See Dec. 27–28; Ex. 1004. Noting that the two compounds had 1) complementary effects in delaying cell cycle progression; and 2) synergistic cytotoxic and antitumor effects, Akinaga expressly suggests the combination of UCN-01 and DNA-damaging agents for cancer chemotherapy. Id. Seynaeve establishes that UCN-01 inhibits multiple tyrosine kinases in human breast cancer cells coincident with promoting cell cycle arrest. Dec. 28–29, 34–35; Ex. 1014. Accordingly, “Seynaeve proposes a link between UCN-01’s inhibitory effects on tyrosine kinases and its inhibitory effects on the cell cycle.” Dec. 29.8 Akinaga further suggests combining a chemotherapeutic DNA damaging agent with UCN-01 because the two compounds cause delays in different stages of the cell cycle and result in synergistic cytotoxic and antitumor effects, whereas Seynaeve examines the effects of UCN-01 on the cell cycle of human carcinoma cells and shows that UCN-01 is a tyrosine kinase inhibitor. See Dec. 37–38. Because both references 8 Considering Seynaeve teachings with respect to UCN-01, we reject Patent Owner’s contention that “there is no evidence from which one can reasonably find that Petitioner carried its burden of proving that people of ordinary skill in the art considered either staurosporine or UCN-01 to be tyrosine kinase inhibitors.” See Reh’g. Req. 6. one of ordinary skill in the art would have found reason to combine their teachings. See id.” slip op. at 4

    • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedDecided for petitioner

      “Akinaga teaches that UCN-01 inhibits v-src (as does Seynaeve), one of ordinary skill in the art would have no reason to believe that UCN-01 would inhibit its cellular homolog c-src because v-src is “found only in chickens” and “is more difficult to inhibit.” Dec. 28, 32. We instead credited the testimony of Petitioner’s expert, Dr. Eastman that “[b]ecause v-Src and c-Src have similar structures, compounds that inhibit the tyrosine kinase activity of v-Src generally inhibit c-Src as well. Thus, a person of ordinary skill would have understood that an inhibitor of v-Src would also inhibit the c-Src protein present in A431 cells and other human tumors.” Id. at 33 (quoting Ex. 1002 ¶ 202). Dr. Eastman testified that Robinson, for example, showed “that staurosporine, a molecule very similar to UCN-01, inhibited both v-Src and c-Src. . . . Thus, a person of ordinary skill in the art would have recognized that UCN-01 would inhibit tyrosine kinases in both animals and humans.” Id.” slip op. at 5

    § 103 obviousness
    Patents in suitUS 7,838,512
  • PTAB · Nov 28, 2017 · IPR2016-01096 · APJ Lora M Green · IPR · Final written decision

    Claims 1–13 and 17–23 were not shown unpatentable because Petitioner did not prove the claimed viscosity was necessarily present in either obviousness combination.

    RulingsFinal written decision
    • BurdenNot shown unpatentable

      “In that regard, we note that Petitioner must “meet a high standard in order to rely on inherency to establish the existence of a claim limitation in the prior art in an obviousness analysis—the limitation at issue necessarily must be present, or the natural result of the combination of elements explicitly disclosed by the prior art.” PAR Pharm., Inc., 773 F.3d at 1195‒ 96.” slip op. at 17

    • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

      “In the Institution Decision, we determined that none of the terms in the challenged claims require express construction at that time. Dec. Inst. 6 (citing Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (noting that only claim terms which are in controversy need to be construed, and then only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy)); see also Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co. Ltd., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017). Petitioner offers explicit constructions of several claim terms (Pet. 19‒22), as did Patent Owner in its Preliminary Response (Prelim. Resp. 9‒12). In its full Response, Patent Owner states that there is no need to expressly construe any of the claim terms. PO Resp. 13‒14. On the present record, we agree with Patent Owner and determine that none of the claim terms require explicit construction for purposes of this Decision.” slip op. at 7

    • Skill levelOther

      “We conclude that, for practical purposes, there is little difference between Petitioner’s and Patent Owner’s definitions of the ordinary artisan. Thus, our analysis would be the same under either Petitioner’s or Patent Owner’s definition. In addition, the level of ordinary skill in the art in this case is reflected by the prior art of record. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001).” slip op. at 8

    • Obviousness (§103) › Objective indicia / secondary considerationsNot reached

      “Patent Owner argues also that objective indicia of non-obviousness, such as unexpected results and commercial success support the patentability of the challenged claims. PO Resp. 59‒61. As we conclude that the preponderance of evidence of record does not support Petitioner’s obviousness challenge, we need not address Patent Owner’s evidence of secondary indicia.” slip op. at 29

    Patent outcomesUS 6,667,061 not shown unpatentable
    Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 6,667,061
  • PTAB · Nov 8, 2017 · IPR2016-01028 · APJ Christopher G Paulraj · IPR · Final written decision

    Claim 1 is unpatentable as obvious over Palermo, the Handbook, and McGinity, and also over McGinity, Joshi, Bastin, and the PDR.

    RulingsFinal written decision
    • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

      “DISCUSSION A. Level of Skill in the Art Petitioner contends that a person of ordinary skill in the art for the ’976 patent would have “a degree in one or more fields of medicine, chemical engineering, chemistry, pharmaceutical science, polymer chemistry, pharmaceutics, pharmaceutical technology, pharmacokinetics, and/or pharmacology, and/or a number of years of industry training or experience in one or more of those fields.” Pet. 22–23 (citing Ex.1009 ¶ 17). Patent Owner agrees with Petitioner’s proposed level of skill in the art. PO Resp. 25. We, therefore, apply that skill level in our analysis, with the understanding that the level of skill is also reflected in the prior art of record. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001).” slip op. at 9

    • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed board ownOther

      “The Specification teaches the following: The term “sustained release” is defined for purposes of the present invention as the release of the opioid analgesic from the oral dosage form at such a rate that blood (e.g., plasma) concentrations (levels) are maintained within the therapeutic range but below toxic levels over an extended period of time, e.g., from about 12 to about 24 hours as compared to an immediate release product. Preferably the sustained release is sufficient to provide a twice-a-day or a once-a-day formulation. Ex. 1001, 4:56–64. The use of “e.g.” in the above definition for “sustained release” plainly indicates that a 12 to about 24 hour time period is exemplary. Thus, we decline to limit the claim term as Patent Owner would have us do. Rather, we construe “extended release” as “release of the opioid analgesic from the oral dosage form at a rate such that blood (e.g., plasma) concentrations (levels) are maintained within the therapeutic range but below toxic levels over a period of time longer than that of an immediate release of the opioid analgesic.”” slip op. at 11

    • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Preamble limiting or notPreamble not limitingDecided for petitioner

      “We are unpersuaded by Patent Owner’s arguments. Claim 1 is drawn to a dosage form—a composition. Patent Owner does not point out how the recitation of “abuse deterrent” in the preamble modifies the structurally complete dosage form recited in the body of claim 1. See Catalina Mktg. Int'l, Inc. v. Coolsavings.com, Inc., 289 F.3d 801, 808 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (“[A] preamble is not limiting ‘where a patentee defines a structurally complete invention in the claim body and uses the preamble only to state a purpose or intended use for the invention.’”) (quoting Rowe v. Dror, 112 F.3d 473, 478 (Fed. Cir. 1997)). We conclude, therefore, that the term “abuse deterrent” is a goal of the invention, that is, it is merely a statement of intended use that is not entitled to patentable weight.” slip op. at 13

    • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner

      “We agree with Patent Owner that the broadest reasonable construction of “PEG applied onto the core matrix” is a “PEG coating of the core matrix.” Petitioner’s proposed construction would read “applied onto the core matrix” (emphasis added) out of the claim, which we decline to do. See Bicon, Inc. v. Straumann Co., 441 F.3d 945, 951 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (noting that claim language “should not [be] treated as meaningless”).” slip op. at 14

    Patent outcomesUS 9,060,976 unpatentable
    Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR
    Patents in suitUS 9,060,976
  • PTAB · Nov 8, 2017 · IPR2016-01027 · APJ Christopher G Paulraj · IPR · Final written decision

    Claim 1 is unpatentable as obvious over McGinity, Joshi, and Palermo.

    RulingsFinal written decision
    • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

      “DISCUSSION A. Level of Skill in the Art Petitioner contends that a person of ordinary skill in the art for the ’976 patent would have “a degree in one or more fields of medicine, chemical engineering, chemistry, pharmaceutical science, polymer chemistry, pharmaceutics, pharmaceutical technology, pharmacokinetics, and/or pharmacology, and/or a number of years of industry training or experience in one or more of those fields.” Pet. 24 (citing Ex.1009 ¶ 17). Patent Owner agrees with Petitioner’s proposed level of skill in the art. PO Resp. 26. We, therefore, apply that skill level in our analysis, with the understanding that the level of skill is also reflected in the prior art of record. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001).” slip op. at 9

    • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITAPlain and ordinary meaningDecided for petitioner

      “The Specification teaches the following: The term “sustained release” is defined for purposes of the present invention as the release of the opioid analgesic from the oral dosage form at such a rate that blood (e.g., plasma) concentrations (levels) are maintained within the therapeutic range but below toxic levels over an extended period of time, e.g., from about 12 to about 24 hours as compared to an immediate release product. Preferably the sustained release is sufficient to provide a twice-a-day or a once-a-day formulation. Ex. 1001, 4:56–64. The use of “e.g.” in the above definition for “sustained release” plainly indicates that a 12 to about 24 hour time period is exemplary. Thus, we decline to limit the claim term as Patent Owner would have us do. Rather, we construe “extended release” as “release of the opioid analgesic from the oral dosage form at a rate such that blood (e.g., plasma) concentrations (levels) are maintained within the therapeutic range but below toxic levels over a period of time longer than that of an immediate release of the opioid analgesic.”” slip op. at 11

    • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Preamble limiting or notPreamble not limitingDecided for petitioner

      “We are unpersuaded by Patent Owner’s arguments. Claim 1 is drawn to a dosage form—a composition. Patent Owner does not point out how the recitation of “abuse deterrent” in the preamble modifies the structurally complete dosage form recited in the body of claim 1. See Catalina Mktg. Int'l, Inc. v. Coolsavings.com, Inc., 289 F.3d 801, 808 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (“[A] preamble is not limiting ‘where a patentee defines a structurally complete invention in the claim body and uses the preamble only to state a purpose or intended use for the invention.’”) (quoting Rowe v. Dror, 112 F.3d 473, 478 (Fed.Cir.1997)). We conclude, therefore, that the term “abuse deterrent” is a goal of the invention, that is, it is merely a statement of intended use that is not entitled to patentable weight.” slip op. at 13

    • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Decided for patent owner

      “iv. “core matrix” The parties agree that the broadest reasonable construction of “core matrix” is “a blended mixture having: (a) PEO having a molecular weight of from about 300,000 to about 5,000,000 daltons, (b) magnesium stearate, and (c) oxycodone or a pharmaceutically acceptable salt of oxycodone.” Ex. 3001. We adopt that agreed-upon construction for purposes of this Decision. v.” slip op. at 14

    Patent outcomesUS 9,060,976 unpatentable
    Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR
    Patents in suitUS 9,060,976
  • PTAB · Nov 3, 2017 · IPR2016-00452 · APJ Michelle N Ankenbrand · IPR · Rehearing

    The Board denied Daikin’s rehearing request, leaving in place its finding that claims 1–4, 7, and 8 were not shown unpatentable over Miller and the ARI Standard.

    RulingsRehearing decision
    • RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied

      “STANDARD OF REVIEW A request for rehearing “must specifically identify all matters the party believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked, and the place where each matter was previously addressed in a motion, an opposition, or a reply.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d). The party challenging a decision bears the burden of showing that the decision should be modified. Id.” slip op. at 2

    • ExcludeOther

      “exclude all of Dr. Sun’s experiments. Paper 32. In the Motion, Petitioner urged us to exclude Dr. Sun’s experiments 1–4 from the record “because they are irrelevant to any ground upon which trial was instituted and include[] information whose probative value (if any) is substantially outweighed by a danger of confusing the issues.” Id. at 2 (emphasis added) (citing Paper 23 ¶ 6). Petitioner continued: “the compounds HCFC-123 and HFC-236ea that were used in Experiments 1–4 are not relevant to the issues in this trial. These compounds were not used in [Miller’s example 1].” Id. (citing Ex. 1066 ¶¶ 65–68). In reply to the Motion to Exclude, Petitioner further argued that Dr. Sun’s experiments 1–4 demonstrate that “HCFC-123 and HFC-236ea behave completely differently from HFC-245cb.” Paper 37, 2 (emphasis added). Petitioner made those same arguments in the Reply to Patent Owner’s Response. Reply 12–14. As we explained in the Final Decision (Final Dec. 21–22), and reiterate here, Petitioner’s reliance on Dr. Sun’s experiments 1–4, and the results thereof, is inconsistent with Petitioner’s arguments that Dr. Sun’s experiments 1–4 are irrelevant, prejudicial, and should be excluded from the record. Petitioner’s arguments to the contrary in the Request for Rehearing express mere disagreement with our determination in the Final Decision and weighing of the evidence. As we explain above, a request for rehearing is not an opportunity to reargue positions with which we disagreed in our Final Decision.” slip op. at 8

    • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot reached

      “Petitioner”) filed a Request for Rehearing (Paper 43, “Reh’g Req.”) of the Final Written Decision (Paper 42, “Final Decision” or “Final Dec.”), in which we concluded that Petitioner did not show by a preponderance of the evidence that claims 1–4, 7, and 8 of U.S. Patent No. 8,147,709 B2 (Ex. 1001, “the ’709 patent”) are unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) over the combination of Miller1 and the ARI Standard.2 slip op. at 2

    § 103 obviousness
    Patents in suitUS 8,147,709
  • PTAB · Sep 26, 2017 · IPR2016-00829 · APJ Deborah Katz · IPR · Final written decision

    Claims 1–15 are unpatentable under § 103 over the ’859 publication, Blau, and Simell; claims 3, 6, 11, 14, and 15 also rely on Brusilow ’84.

    RulingsFinal written decision
    • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedPatent owner expert discountedDecided for petitioner

      “We are not persuaded by Patent Owner’s argument that the lack of specific residency/fellowship training or certification, disqualifies Dr. Vaux from providing opinion testimony on the motivations, understandings, and actions of those of ordinary skill in the art. Dr. Vaux testifies that he is “a medical doctor with specialty training in Pediatrics and Clinical Genetics” and is currently Professor and Clinical Chief of the Division of Medical Genetics in the Department of Medicine at UC San Diego. Ex. 1002 ¶ 1. He also testifies: Since 1994, I have regularly diagnosed and treated patients with urea cycle disorders (“UCD”), and continue to do so today. In treating UCD patients, I regularly prescribe nitrogen scavenging drugs and treat patients who are maintained on therapy with nitrogen scavenging drugs. Ex. 1002 ¶ 1. Thus, Dr. Vaux has actually treated UCD patients for at least five years (a requirement recited by Patent Owner, see PO Resp. 16), including prescribing drugs. Patent Owner does not direct us to evidence that Dr. Vaux’s testimony is untruthful or that his treatment of UCD patients is ineffective, indicating that he does not understand how to treat them. Accordingly, even if Dr. Vaux does not have the specialized certificates or particular training that Patent Owner argues are necessary, he has done the job for over twenty years of one who would carry out the claimed methods. We consider this experience more relevant than certificates or training. Thus, we determine that Dr. Vaux is qualified to provide opinions about the motivations, understandings, and actions of one of ordinary skill in the art.” slip op. at 15

    • Skill levelSkill level board ownOther

      “Patent Owner and Petitioner define a person of ordinary skill in the art as having similar qualifications (compare Pet. 8–9, citing Ex. 1002 ¶ 19 with PO Resp. 15–16, citing Ex. 2006 ¶ 26), but Patent Owner argues that the ordinarily skilled artisan must additionally have “at least three years of residency/fellowship training in Medical Genetics, including Biochemical Genetics, followed by certification in Clinical Genetics and Clinical Biochemical Genetics by the American Board of Medical Genetics and Genomics.” PO Resp. 15–16, citing Ex. 2006 ¶ 26. We agree with the qualifications on which the parties agree and find that one of ordinary skill in the art would have an M.D. or equivalent degree, with a residency and specialized training in the diagnosis or treatment of inherited metabolic disorders, such as UCDs and other nitrogen retention disorders. See Pet. 8– 9; PO Resp. 15–16. We also agree with Patent Owner that one of ordinary skill in the art would have experience treating patients with nitrogen retention disorders, including UCDs. See PO Resp. 16.” slip op. at 15

    • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITAPlain and ordinary meaningDecided for patent owner

      “Nevertheless, we agree with the parties8 that the claim term “upper limit of normal” (“ULN”) means the highest value in a range of normal values. See Pet. 10; PO Resp. 21. We determine that the plain meaning and the broadest reasonable interpretation of the claim term “less than the upper limit of normal” is any value less than the highest value in the range of normal values. See Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2144–46 (2016) (upholding the use of the broadest reasonable interpretation standard); see 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b).” slip op. at 11

    • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)UnpatentableUnpatentable

      “In summary, the ’859 publication teaches that those of skill in the art would have known to use HPN-100 to treat subjects with UCDs. It also teaches that measuring plasma or blood level of ammonia was known to be useful in determining the effectiveness of a drug regimen for a particular patient and that measuring blood ammonia was a known step in adjusting drug dosages. The ’859 publication teaches that maintaining normal plasma ammonia levels was desirable in the art. Although specific measurements of 8 Patent Owner notes that the parties do not dispute the meaning of any of the claim terms. PO Resp. 2. Because the meaning of the terms in the challenged claims are evident from their ordinary meaning and not controversial, we need not provide a separate analysis of them. See Wellman, Inc. v. Eastman Chem. Co., 642 F.3d 1355, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (“claim terms need only be construed ‘to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’ Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999).”). plasma ammonia do not necessarily indicate the upper limit of normal consistently across different ways of measuring it, the ’859 publication teaches that treatment would have been considered to be effective when plasma ammonia levels were less than what is determined to be the upper limit of normal in a given case. In addition to the ’859 publication, Petitioner relies on Blau and Simell for the teaching to collect blood from UCD patients after a fast in order to measure plasma ammonia levels. Ex. 1006 at 273 (Table 11.9); Ex. 1005 at 1118; see Pet. 25–26 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 58, 59); see also id. 1002 ¶ 46, n.2 (citing Ex. 1015 at S11). Anticipating Patent Owner’s argument that Blau relates to diagnosis not treatment of UCDs, Petitioner also cites to Exhibits 1010 and 1015 as evidence that it was generally recommended to measure plasma ammonia after a fast. See Pet. 16, n.2. Exhibit 1010 is a “Lab Update” about measurement in ammonia in blood, and Exhibit 1015 is a publication entitled “Measurement of ammonia in blood.” Both state that most methods recommend collecting a sample from patients who have fasted for at least 6 hours. See Ex. 1010, 4; Ex. 1015, 1. From this evidence, we agree with Petitioner that those of skill in the art would have known that measuring fasting serum ammonia levels, as taught in at least Simell and Blau, was known to be useful with the methods taught in the ’859 publication. In regard to Ground 2, which challenges claim 3 and the claims that depend on it, Petitioner cites Brusilow ’84 for its teaching of measuring a patient’s fasting plasma ammonia level when he or she is admitted, presumably to a hospital, and, in response to elevated levels, treating with the nitrogen scavenging drugs sodium benzoate and phenylacetate. See Pet.” slip op. at 11

    Patent outcomesUS 9,095,559 unpatentable
    Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR
    Patents in suitUS 9,095,559
  • PTAB · Sep 11, 2017 · IPR2016-01034 · APJ Robert A Pollock · IPR · Final written decision

    Claims 1–3, 5, and 6 are unpatentable: claims 1–3, 5, and 6 as obvious over Akinaga, Seynaeve, Friedman, and Tam; claim 6 also over Honma.

    RulingsFinal written decision
    • Skill levelSkill level board ownDecided for patent owner

      “Person of Ordinary Skill in the Art. The parties agree that a person of ordinary skill in the art as of the effective filing date of the ’512 patent, “would have held an M.D. or Ph.D. in molecular biology, biochemistry, pharmacology, or a related field and have had several years of experience working in cancer research.” Pet. 17 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶ 19); PO Resp. 4. This level of ordinary skill is consistent with the prior art asserted in the Petition. See Chore-Time Equip., Inc. v. Cumberland Corp., 713 F.2d 774, 779 n.2 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (indicating that the prior art itself may reflect the appropriate level of ordinary skill in the art). Accordingly, we adopt the parties’ definition for the purpose of this Decision. C.” slip op. at 8

    • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Lexicography (patentee as own lexicographer)Plain and ordinary meaningTerm construed board ownDecided for patent owner

      “which defines a “therapeutically effective amount” as “an amount of a DNA damaging agent and tyrosine kinase inhibitor that, when administered to an animal in combination, is effective to kill cells within the animal.” Id. at 5. The challenged claims, however, use “therapeutically effective amount” in a context different from the express definition set forth in the Specification. As noted by Petitioner, the definition at column 4, lines 16 to 19 of the Specification refers to “a combined amount of the DNA damaging agent and the tyrosine kinase inhibitor, while the claims require that only the tyrosine kinase inhibitor be administered in a ‘therapeutically effective amount.’” See Pet. 20.” slip op. at 9

    • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for patent owner

      “Specification suggest that the inventors contemplated the induction of a differentiation pathway. See Ex. 2011 ¶ 4. To the contrary, and as discussed above in Section 1(C), the Specification focuses on the use of DNA damaging agents in combination with tyrosine kinase inhibitors to force damaged cells to override the G2 arrest checkpoint and enter mitosis before completing DNA repairs. See, e.g., Ex. 1001, 3:46–48 (“By preventing delays in G2, cells will enter mitosis before the DNA is repaired and therefore the daughter cells will likely die.”). Accordingly, we agree with Patent Owner that, in light of the Specification, one of ordinary skill in the art would not understand the terms “enhanc[ing] cell death” and “enhancing apoptosis” to encompass the a process by which cancer cells are differentiated, become mortal, and, subsequently, “live out their days and die.” See Pet. 29; Ex. 1002, ¶ 127.” slip op. at 14

    • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Preamble limiting or notPreamble not limitingDecided for petitioner

      “The parties agree that the preamble of each challenged claim, as well as the “thereby” clause of claims 1–3 (“thereby improving chemotherapeutic intervention”), are non-limiting. Pet. 17–18, 21–22; Prelim. Resp. 5, 8; Ex. 2001, 15. On the present record, we adopt the parties’ proposed Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (instructing that only those terms that are in controversy need be construed, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy). D.” slip op. at 16

    Patent outcomesUS 7,838,512 unpatentable
    Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 7,838,512

Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.