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  • PTAB · Oct 21, 2025 · IPR2025-00749 · APJ Sean P O’Hanlon · IPR · Institution

    The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–16 based on the petition’s grounds and granted ZF’s motion to join the Mobileye IPR, subject to participation limits.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

      “Because the grounds of unpatentability in the instant Petition are identical to those in the Mobileye IPR and for the same reasons stated in our Decision to Institute in the Mobileye IPR, we institute inter partes review in this proceeding on the grounds presented in the Petition. See Mobileye IPR, Paper 14 (analyzing challenges in the Mobileye Petition).” slip op. at 5

    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Joinder §315(c) / SAS all-or-nothingJoinder, grantedGranted

      “A motion for joinder should (1) set forth reasons why joinder is appropriate; (2) identify any new grounds of unpatentability asserted in the petition; (3) explain what impact (if any) joinder would have on the trial schedule for the existing review; and (4) address specifically how briefing and discovery may be simplified. See Kyocera Corp. v. Softview LLC, IPR2013-00004, Paper 15 at 4 (PTAB Apr. 24, 2013); Patent Trial and Appeal Board Consolidated Trial Practice Guide 76 (Nov. 2019).2 Petitioner’s Motion addresses each of these considerations. Mot. 4–8. According to Petitioner, “the Petition involves the same patent, challenges the same claims, relies on the same expert declaration, and is based on the same grounds and combinations of prior art submitted in the Mobileye Petition” and “does not present any new grounds of unpatentability and is substantively identical to the Mobileye Petition.” Id. at 5. Petitioner argues that, “[b]ecause the Petition is substantively identical to the Mobileye Petition, with the same grounds challenging the same claims as instituted by the Board, there are no new issues for Patent Owner to address” and, therefore, joinder with the Mobileye IPR would “not unduly burden or negatively impact the trial schedule in any meaningful way.” Id. at 6. Further, “Petitioner explicitly agrees to take an ‘understudy’ role in the joined proceeding” and “will assume the primary role only if Petitioner in the Mobileye IPR ceases to participate.” Id. at 7–8 (quoting Noven Pharms., Inc. v. Novartis AG, IPR2014-00550, Paper 38 at 5 (PTAB Apr. 10, 2015).” slip op. at 6

    None
    Patents in suitUS 9,671,328
  • PTAB · Oct 21, 2025 · IPR2025-00748 · APJ Sean P O’Hanlon · IPR · Institution

    The Board instituted review of claim 15 under § 103(a) based on Gallagher and Lumia, granted joinder in the Mobileye IPR subject to participation limits, and terminated this proceeding.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

      “Because the grounds of unpatentability in the instant Petition are identical to those in the Mobileye IPR and for the same reasons stated in our Decision to Institute in the Mobileye IPR, we institute inter partes review in this proceeding on the ground presented in the Petition. See Mobileye IPR, Paper 16 (analyzing challenges in the Mobileye Petition).” slip op. at 4

    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Joinder §315(c) / SAS all-or-nothingJoinder, grantedGranted

      “Under the circumstances outlined above, we agree with Petitioner that joinder is appropriate and will not unduly impact the ongoing trial in the Mobileye IPR. Therefore, we grant Petitioner’s Motion for Joinder.” slip op. at 7

    None
    Patents in suitUS 9,335,255
  • PTAB · Apr 22, 2025 · IPR2024-01110 · APJ Sean P O’Hanlon · IPR · Rehearing

    The Board denied Patent Owner’s rehearing request, leaving institution in place on claim 15 based on the Gallagher–Lumia obviousness challenge.

    RulingsRehearing decision
    • RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied

      “II. STANDARD OF REVIEW A party requesting rehearing bears the burden of showing that the decision should be modified. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d). The party must identify specifically all matters we misapprehended or overlooked, and the place where each matter was previously addressed in a motion, an opposition, or a reply. Id. When reconsidering a decision on institution, we review the decision for an abuse of discretion. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(c). An abuse of discretion may be determined if a decision is based on an erroneous interpretation of law, if a factual finding is not supported by substantial evidence, or if the decision represents an unreasonable judgment in weighing relevant factors. Star Fruits S.N.C. v. United States, 393 F.3d 1277, 1281 (Fed. Cir. 2005); Arnold P’ship v. Dudas, 362 F.3d 1338, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2004).” slip op. at 2

    • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for petitioner

      “or overlooked any matter. As we explained in the Institution Decision, the ’255 patent discloses that the recited characterization profile allows the system to convert the intensity values measured by the intensity sensor into luminance values based on the sensor’s ability to sense the particular color of the measured light. Inst. Dec. 21; Ex. 1001, 11:41–48. The ’255 patent states that “the light intensity sensor’s 280 ability to sense . . . a particular color” is the “the light intensity sensor’s 280 profile for [that] particular color.” Ex. 1001, 11:45–47. The ’255 patent further states that this “[l]ight intensity sensor 280 characterization is essential for high precision computations.” Id. at 11:48–49. Thus, as we stated in the Institution Decision, the recited “characterization profile” refers to a conversion factor used to convert the measured light intensity into luminance. As this conversion factor is based on the light intensity sensor’s ability to sense the particular color of light reflected by the road sign, we agree that it is empirical information. Patent Owner fails to explain adequately how the fact that the ’255 patent discloses storing multiple conversion factors for multiple colors of measured light in a digital look-up-table (see id. at 11:56–59 (“The light intensity sensor characterization 275 is empirical information about the light intensity sensor 280 that is used to create the [look-up table] 475.”)) has any bearing on our interpretation.” slip op. at 4

    • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundInstituted

      “Owner to the Institution Decision where we fully addressed Patent Owner’s contentions. See Inst. Dec. 29–31. As we explained, “Petitioner proposes to incorporate Lumia’s teaching of measuring luminance values into Gallagher’s system, and argues that an ordinarily skilled artisan would have had a reasonable expectation of success given Gallagher’s disclosure of determining calibration factors for each individual sensor in the array of sensors.” Id. at 30. In other words, Petitioner proposes to use Gallagher’s array of sensors to measure luminance in the manner taught by Lumia. We also explained in the Institution Decision how Lumia discloses using a video camera to measure the luminance of a road sign. Id. at 27–29. We further explained that, in the Petition, “Petitioner sets forth reasoning with rational underpinning to support its contentions that it would have been obvious to combine the teachings of Gallagher and Lumia” by, for example, “argu[ing] that implementing Lumia’s teaching of determining the luminance of traffic signs in Gallagher’s system would allow Gallagher’s system to calculate the retroreflectivity of road markers as a means of identifying any markers that do not meet minimum acceptable reflectance levels.” Id. at 30–30 (citing Pet. 46). We further explained that Petitioner’s arguments were supported by the testimony of it witness, Dr. Thorpe. Id. at 31 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 116).” slip op. at 7

    Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips
    Patents in suitUS 9,335,255
  • PTAB · Mar 5, 2025 · IPR2024-01111 · APJ Sean P O’Hanlon · IPR · Institution

    The Board instituted IPR of claims 1–16 on all asserted grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that claims 1 and 9 would be obvious over Gallagher and Schofield.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Decided for petitioner

      “Texas litigation, but significant work still remains to be done. See Ex. 2004. Moreover, we agree that Petitioner filed the Petition expeditiously. See 2nd Prelim. Reply 4. Accordingly, the facts underlying this factor weigh strongly against exercising our discretion to deny institution.” slip op. at 13

    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

      “h. Conclusion Accordingly, at this stage of the proceeding, we determine that Petitioner has established a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on its assertion that claim 9 would have been obvious in view of the combination of Gallaher and Schofield.” slip op. at 32

    • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededDecided for petitioner

      “The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (alteration in original) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). Neither party proposes a definition for any claim term. See Pet. 6; Prelim. Resp. 4–5. For purposes of this Decision, and based on the record before us, we determine that no construction of any term is necessary. We note that this determination does not preclude the parties from arguing their proposed constructions of the claims during trial. Indeed, the parties are hereby given notice that claim construction, in general, is an issue to be addressed at trial. A final determination as to claim construction will be made at the close of the proceeding, after any hearing, based on all the evidence of record. The parties are expected to assert all of their claim construction arguments and evidence during the trial as permitted by our rules. slip op. at 19

    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Real party in interest / privityRpi dispute resolved for petitionerDecided for petitioner

      “Patent Owner has not advanced persuasive evidence to put into dispute Petitioner’s identification of itself as the sole real party in interest. Patent Owner asserts that the two third parties it seeks to add as defendants in the Texas Litigation produce products that incorporate components manufactured by Petitioner and that Patent Owner has asserted that these Petitioner products infringe the ’328 patent in the Texas Litigation. Prelim. Sur-reply 4–5. Patent Owner also asserts that these two third parties asserted an obligation to defend Petitioner and the other third party against Patent Owner’s infringement assertions. Id. at 5. However, Patent Owner does not assert or provide any evidence that Petitioner must indemnify any of the three third parties or that any of the third parties controls any aspect of this inter partes review proceeding. See id. Moreover, Petitioner stipulates that, if we institute inter partes review in this proceeding, it will not pursue in the Texas Litigation “‘any ground that [Petitioner] raised or reasonably could have raised’ during this proceeding.” Prelim. Reply 4 (alteration in original) (citing Sotera Wireless, Inc. v. Masimo Corp., IPR2020-01019, Paper 12 at 18–19 (PTAB Dec. 1, 2020) (precedential in relevant part)). Furthermore, to the extent that the two parties Patent Owner seeks to add as defendants in the Texas Litigation should be named as real parties in interest in this proceeding, those parties have also filed a stipulation here (see Ex. 1024), alleviating any concerns of conflict with district court litigation.” slip op. at 14

    Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 9,671,328
  • PTAB · Mar 5, 2025 · IPR2024-01110 · APJ Sean P O’Hanlon · IPR · Institution

    The Board instituted IPR of claim 15 based on Gallagher and Lumia, finding a reasonable likelihood that the combination renders the claim obvious.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Denied

      “7. Holistic Assessment of the Fintiv Factors On this record, after weighing all of the factors and taking a holistic view, we determine that the facts in this case that weigh against exercising discretion outweigh the facts that favor exercising discretion. Accordingly, we determine that the circumstances presented weigh against exercising our discretion under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) to deny institution of inter partes review based on the Texas litigation.” slip op. at 16

    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Real party in interest / privityRpi dispute resolved for petitionerDecided for petitioner

      “dispute Petitioner’s identification of itself as the sole real party in interest. Patent Owner asserts that the two third parties it seeks to add as defendants in the Texas Litigation produce products that incorporate components manufactured by Petitioner and that Patent Owner has asserted that these Petitioner products infringe the ’255 patent in the Texas Litigation. Prelim. Sur-reply 4. Patent Owner also asserts that these two third parties asserted an obligation to defend Petitioner and the other third party against Patent Owner’s infringement assertions. Id. However, Patent Owner does not assert or provide any evidence that Petitioner must indemnify any of the three third parties or that any of the third parties controls any aspect of this inter partes review proceeding. See id. Moreover, Petitioner stipulates that, if we institute inter partes review in this proceeding, it will not pursue in the Texas Litigation “‘any ground that [Petitioner] raised or reasonably could have raised’ during this proceeding.” Prelim. Reply 4 (alteration in original) (citing Sotera Wireless, Inc. v. Masimo Corp., IPR2020-01019, Paper 12 at 18–19 (PTAB Dec. 1, 2020) (precedential in relevant part)). Furthermore, to the extent that the two parties Patent Owner seeks to add as defendants in the Texas Litigation should be named as real parties in interest in this proceeding, those parties have also filed a stipulation here (see Ex. 1024), alleviating any concerns of conflict with district court litigation.” slip op. at 14

    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

      “Accordingly, at this stage of the proceeding, we determine that Petitioner has established a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on its assertion that claim 15 would have been obvious in view of the combination of Gallagher and Lumia.” slip op. at 31

    • Adverse judgmentAdverse judgmentOther

      “Here, Patent Owner filed a statutory disclaimer of claims 12–14 and 17–23. Prelim. Resp. 1; Ex. 2002. Based on our review of Exhibit 2002, we determine that a disclaimer of claims 12–14 and 17–23 of the ’255 patent under 35 U.S.C. § 253(a) has been filed with the Office as of December 9, 2024. Based on the information in the public record, we find that the disclaimer complies with the above-listed requirements of 37 C.F.R. § 1.321(a). Because claims 12–14 and 17–23 have been disclaimed under 35 U.S.C. § 253(a), in compliance with 37 C.F.R. § 1.321(a), we do not reach challenges to claims 12–14 and 17–23. As a result, the remaining challenged claim is claim 15 (“the challenged claim”).” slip op. at 7

    Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 9,335,255
  • PTAB · Jan 28, 2025 · IPR2024-01084 · APJ Jeffrey S Smith · IPR · Institution

    Instituted IPR on claims 1–4, 8–18, 22–30, and 34–39; Petitioner showed a reasonable likelihood that Shiplacoff, alone or combined with Nan, renders at least one challenged claim obvious.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

      “purposes of institution, we are sufficiently persuaded that Petitioner has demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of prevailing in showing that Shiplacoff renders obvious claim 1.” slip op. at 25

    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsInstitution denied 325dDecided for petitioner

      “Advanced Bionics, LLC v. MED-EL Elektromedizinische Geräte GmbH, IPR2019-01469, Paper 6 at 8 (PTAB Feb. 13, 2020) (precedential) (“Advanced Bionics”). With respect to the first issue, previously presented art includes, among other things, “art provided to the Office by an applicant, such as on an Information Disclosure Statement (IDS), in the prosecution history of the challenged patent.” Id. at 7–8. With respect to the second issue, institution generally will be denied if a “petitioner fails to make a showing of material error,” and “[i]f reasonable minds can disagree regarding the purported treatment of the art or arguments, it cannot be said that the Office erred in a manner material to patentability.” Id. at 8–9. “[T]his framework reflects a commitment to defer to previous Office evaluations of the evidence of record unless material error is shown.” Id. at 9.” slip op. at 29

    • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundDecided for petitioner

      “2. Reasons to Combine Shiplacoff and Nan Petitioner contends that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have implemented the touch gestures of Nan in Shiplacoff’s device that includes a touch screen for the benefits of avoiding latency and not displaying on-screen controls. Pet. 43–44. Petitioner contends that using the gestures of Nan, which include factors such as length, speed, hold time, and number of fingers, to execute a change from one of Shiplacoff’s display modes to another, does no more than yield predictable results. Id. at 43, 45. We are sufficiently persuaded that Petitioner has shown a reason to use the edge gestures of Nan to switch from one of Shiplacoff’s display screens to another.” slip op. at 26

    • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

      “have had a bachelor’s degree in computer science, computer engineering, electrical engineering, human-computer interaction, or a comparable field and at least two years of professional experience in the design and development of graphical user interfaces (GUIs), human-computer interfaces, or equivalents thereof. Pet. 4 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 22). Petitioner’s declarant, Loren Terveen, Ph.D., testifies that “[s]uch experience could be obtained through research and study in a graduate program or through comparable exposure through industry employment, and additional years of experience could substitute for the advanced-level degree.” Ex. 1003 ¶ 22. Patent Owner notes that it does not agree with Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill, “but does not believe that resolving the level is necessary to resolve the issues raised in this preliminary response.” Prelim. Resp. 7.” slip op. at 5

    Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 10,649,578
  • PTAB · Jan 28, 2025 · IPR2024-01083 · APJ Jeffrey S Smith · IPR · Institution

    The Board instituted inter partes review of claims 1–3, 7, 9, 10, and 101 on the asserted §103 ground over Ahn, Chaudhri, and Hinckley.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

      “Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), the Director may not authorize an inter partes review unless the information in the petition and preliminary response “shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” For the reasons that follow, we institute an inter partes review as to claims 1–3, 7, 9, 10, and 101 of the ’413 patent on the ground of unpatentability asserted in the Petition.” slip op. at 2

    • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

      “through industry employment, and additional years of experience could substitute for the advanced-level degree.” Ex. 1003 ¶ 30. Patent Owner notes that it does not agree with Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill, “but does not believe that resolving the level is necessary to resolve the issues raised in this preliminary response.” Prelim. Resp. 6. As Petitioner’s description of a person of ordinary skill appears commensurate with the subject matter before us, we apply Petitioner’s definition for purposes of this Decision. Also, the level of ordinary skill in the art can be evidenced by the references cited, and we find it commensurate with the cited references in this proceeding. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001); In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995); In re Oelrich, 579 F.2d 86, 91 (CCPA 1978).” slip op. at 8

    • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

      “We construe only those claim terms that require analysis to determine whether to institute inter partes review. See Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (holding that “only those terms need be construed that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy”). Petitioner and Patent Owner contend that no claims need to be construed in order to resolve a controversy. Pet. 4– 5; Prelim. Resp. 6–7. We agree with the parties that no terms need to be construed expressly for this Decision. We discuss claim interpretation to the extent necessary in the context of analyzing the asserted grounds to determine whether to institute trial. We highlight that for the term “a magnitude of the blurring,” Patent Owner contends that “the amount of surface area that a translucent menu is displayed over a screen is not a magnitude of the blurring,” but provides no further construction of the term, other than a statement that even under Petitioner’s interpretation of “blurring,” the grounds are deficient. Prelim. Resp. 32–33 & n.4. On the present record, Petitioner’s proposed construction appears correct, and for purposes of institution, we apply this proposed construction of “a magnitude of the blurring” as discussed below in our analysis of limitation [1.d.ii]; the construction of this term may be addressed by the parties as this inter partes review proceeds.” slip op. at 9

    • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundDecided for petitioner

      “For purposes of this Decision, we find Petitioner cites sufficient evidence to support its contention that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had a reason to combine the teachings of Ahn and Chaudhri.” slip op. at 20

    Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 10,642,413
  • PTAB · Jan 27, 2025 · IPR2024-01085 · APJ Barbara A Benoit · IPR · Institution

    The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–4, 6–10, 17, 19, 22–26, 28–30, 32, 33, 36, 41, 48, 58–62, 64, 65, 67, 69, 70, 73, 77, 82, and 83 on all asserted obviousness grounds.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

      “Applying the standard set forth in 35 U.S.C. § 314, which requires demonstration of a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail with respect to at least one challenged claim, we institute an inter partes review.” slip op. at 2

    • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

      “Patent Owner indicates it “does not necessarily agree with all aspects of Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill, but does not believe that resolving that level is necessary to resolve the issues raised in this preliminary response.” Prelim. Resp. 4. Dr. Davis indicates that his opinions provided in his declaration in support of Patent Owner’s Preliminary Response are “provided from the perspective of the POSITA” proposed by Dr. Cockburn. Ex. 2001 ¶ 24 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 26). We are persuaded, on the present record, that Petitioner’s proposal is consistent with the level reflected by the ’580 patent and the prior art of record. See In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995); Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001). Accordingly, we adopt Petitioner’s definition of the level of ordinary skill for purposes of this Decision.” slip op. at 9

    • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededDecided for petitioner

      “Petitioner contends “no claim terms need be construed to resolve issues of controversy in the present Petition.” Pet. 2. Similarly, Patent Owner indicates that no formal constructions are necessary at this point in the proceeding. Prelim. Resp. 3. We agree with the parties that no terms need to be construed expressly for this Decision. We discuss claim interpretation to the extent necessary in the context of analyzing the asserted grounds to determine whether to institute trial.” slip op. at 10

    • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundDecided for petitioner

      “Patent Owner contends that “Petitioner’s alleged motivation for modifying Ramos’ Zlider to be transparent is superficial and conclusory.” Prelim. Resp. 24; see generally Prelim. Resp. 24–26. As noted above, Petitioner relies on evidence from Ording itself and Dr. Cockburn’s testimony that relies on evidence to support its conclusion. Thus, we do not agree with Patent Owner that Petitioner’s motivation is insufficient for institution. Patent Owner also argues, relying on Dr. Davis’ declaration testimony, that the Vernier on a semitransparent Zlider widget would be “completely illegible” in some circumstances “rendering the very core of Ramos’ work unusable.” Prelim. Resp. 24–25 (citing Ex. 2001 ¶ 88); see Ex. 2001 ¶ 88 (not adding reasoning or evidence beyond that in the Patent Owner Preliminary Response). On this preliminary record, it would appear that when the Zlider widget and the portion of the image underlying the Zlider widget are the same color, the semitransparent Zlider widget may not work as well as when the Zlider widget and the underlying image are different colors. That does not outweigh, for purposes of determining whether to institute trial, the prior art evidence that Petitioner offers of the from Ording and other prior art references on which Dr. Cockburn’s declaration testimony relies. Ex. 1003 ¶ 66 (citing Ex. 1025 ¶¶ 77, 94, 101; Ex. 1026 ¶¶ 153, 162); see Intel Corp. v. Qualcomm Inc., 21 F.4th 784, 799– 800 (Fed. Cir. 2021) (determining that a showing of the obviousness in predictable use of prior art elements according to their established functions requires only a showing that the combination be a suitable option, rather than a showing that it is the best option). Petitioner also contends, relying on declaration testimony from Dr. Cockburn, that one of ordinary skill would have had a reasonable expectation of success in combining the references in the manner proposed by Petitioner. Pet. 33–34. Petitioner contends that implementing the Zlider widget “described in the Ramos Paper and Ramos Video in a device, as taught by Ording, would have required only routine knowledge well within the skill of a POSITA” and would involve “combining prior art elements according to known methods to yield the predictable results” described by Petitioner’s proposed combination of the references. Id. (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 67). Petitioner’s support for reasons one of ordinary skill would have made” slip op. at 20

    Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR
    Patents in suitUS 10,649,580
  • PTAB · Jan 22, 2025 · IPR2024-01090 · APJ Nathan A Engels · IPR · Institution

    The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–3, 21, 29–31, 42–44, 54, and 62–65 based on the §103 combination of Blumenberg, Bhumkar, and Griffin.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

      “In an inter partes review, the petitioner must show with particularity why each challenged claim is unpatentable. Harmonic Inc. v. Avid Tech., Inc., 815 F.3d 1356, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2016); 37 C.F.R. § 42.104(b). The burden of persuasion never shifts to Patent Owner. Dynamic Drinkware, LLC v. Nat’l Graphics, Inc., 800 F.3d 1375, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2015). Patent Owner may bear a burden of production, however, to show that the Challenged Claims are entitled to the benefit of an earlier filing date. Id. at 1379–80.” slip op. at 4

    • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundInstituted

      “On this record, we preliminarily agree with Petitioner that the claim limitations amount to a combination of known elements that a POSITA could have combined to achieve predictable results. See Intel, 21 F.4th at 799–800 (determining that a showing of the obviousness in predictable use of prior art elements according to their established functions requires only a showing that the combination be a suitable option). Among other reasons, the preliminary record supports Petitioner’s arguments that combining the teachings of Blumenberg, Bhumkar, and Griffin amounts to applying known solutions in the field of computer interfaces with predictable outcomes. See Pet. 12–18. As noted above, we encourage the parties to address the scope and meaning of the “when” limitations as a matter of claim interpretation, but we do not currently understand the plain language of Limitation [1.o] to require that the “portion of the second web page” or “menu” is displayed only after expiration of the “second user-configurable predefined duration,” termed by Patent Owner the “Alternative Modification.” Again, we encourage the parties to fully address this issue as a matter of claim construction. We additionally note that, even if we were to interpret the claims to require that the recited functions of Limitation [1.o] occur only the “prerequisite elements” are satisfied, we are still preliminarily persuaded by Petitioner’s arguments that combined teachings of the prior art satisfy the claim elements as a mere combination of known elements combined according to their known functions with predictable results.” slip op. at 27

    • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached

      “scenarios. Pet. 1 (characterizing three claimed scenarios as (i) an “inadvertent” contact, (ii) a “tap” contact, and (iii) a “hold” contact), 4 (“Independent Claims 1 and 42 outline three scenarios regarding a user’s contact with a touch screen device”); Prelim. Resp. 3 (“With respect to claim 1, these three scenarios include: . . . .”); see Ex. 2001 ¶¶ 28 (“As recited in claim 1, the three different claimed functionalities are executed ‘when’ the prerequisite elements are met (described as three scenarios by Dr. Cockburn.”) (citing Ex. 1001, 102:50–103:55; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 33–35), 29–32 (describing the first, second, and third scenarios). In substance, the parties’ dispute appears to concern whether the plain language of the claims requires that a recited function must be performed only after or in response to expiration of a threshold (and other prerequisites), as opposed to requiring a function that begins before and continues after expiration of a threshold. Notably, dependent claim 3 recites: “The electronic device of claim 1, wherein the electronic device is configured such that the first feedback that is perceptible by touch is output prior to the display of the menu.” Ex. 1001, 104:1–4 (emphasis added). Given that independent claim 1 is necessarily broad enough to include claim 3, it seems on this record that the functions recited in Limitation [1.o] necessarily can happen at different times, as opposed to, for example, only responses that are triggered by the so-called “prerequisite elements.” We encourage the parties to address this issue as a matter of claim interpretation in future briefing. Based on the current record, however, we determine that it is not necessary to provide an express interpretation of any claim terms at this stage of the proceeding. See Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)).” slip op. at 11

    Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 10,725,581
  • PTAB · Jan 17, 2025 · IPR2024-01089 · APJ Sharon Fenick · IPR · Institution

    The Board instituted IPR on claims 1, 2, 9–11, 13–16, and 56–64 and 84, finding a reasonable likelihood of unpatentability under the asserted obviousness grounds.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

      “partes review. See 35 U.S.C. § 314(b); 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a). Under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), we may not authorize an inter partes review unless the information in the Petition “shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.”” slip op. at 2

    • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

      “The portion of the definition proposed by the Petitioner requiring “a bachelor’s degree in computer science, computer engineering, or a comparable field and at least two years of professional experience working with graphical user interfaces and applications for computers” (Pet. 6) appears to be consistent with the problems and solutions in the ’212 patent and prior art of record and is supported by declarant testimony. We adopt this as the definition of one of ordinary skill in the art for the purposes of this Decision. We note that since it is unclear whether the bachelor’s degree in the proposed definition is considered by Petitioner to be “an advanced-level degree” we do not adopt the portion of the definition relating to the substitution of years of experience for a degree at this time. Additionally, we do not herein adopt Petitioner’s proposed additional requirement that one of ordinary skill “would have possessed extensive background knowledge and understanding of the pertinent technologies employed by the ’212 patent.” Pet. 7.” slip op. at 9

    • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundDecided for petitioner

      “First, we determine, on the present record, that Petitioner has not improperly combined embodiments of Hotelling. Petitioner sufficiently shows that Hotelling describes a device which is “designed to recognize touch gestures applied to a touch screen” and which “recognizes the occurrence of gestures” and informs associated software agents of “the ¶ 135 (cited at Pet. 9, 24, 35). While Hotelling’s disclosed example of a touch vocabulary relates to the music player embodiment (Ex. 1004 ¶ 151, Figs. 27A–E), Hotelling generally teaches “[a] hand-held electronic device . . . designed to recognize touch gestures applied to a touch screen” and which upon receipt of gestures “executes instructions to carry out operations associated with the gestures.” Ex. 1004 ¶ 135 (cited at Pet. 8, 9, 24, 35). After considering Hotelling and the parties’ arguments and testimony, we determine that, on the present record, Petitioner has sufficiently shown that Hotelling’s general teachings regarding gestures received on a touch screen includes the recognition of touch gestures (pressing a button, sliding a finger or stylus, moving the entire device spatially) while Hotelling’s main page is being displayed. Ex. 1004 ¶¶ 84, 85, 87; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 64–66. While we agree that the “touch vocabulary” provided in the “example” of Figures 27A-E (see Ex. 1004 ¶ 151) relates to a music player, we do not, on the present record, determine that Hotelling limits its disclosed recognition of touch gestures and execution of instructions to carry out operations associated with the gestures (including via a touch vocabulary) as relating only to the music player or to the other specific functionalities of the device, rather than to all user input GUIs.” slip op. at 18

    § 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 10,671,212
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