• Genius Sports Ltd. v. Sportscastr Inc. D/B/A Panda InteractiveAll claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Aug 27, 2026 · IPR2024-01310 · APJ Stephen E Belisle · IPR · Remand

  On Director remand, the Board determined claims 1–15 unpatentable under § 103, including claims 1–11 over Ellis, Spivey, and Herzog.

  RulingsRemand decision

  • RemandOther

    “all Challenged Claims unpatentable and denying Petitioner’s Motion to Exclude. Paper 47 (“Original Final Decision”). Subsequently, Patent Owner filed a Request for Director Review and Petitioner filed an authorized Response thereto. Papers 48, 49. On July 29, 2026, the Director granted review, vacated-in-part the Original Final Decision, and remanded the case to the Board. Paper 50. In particular, the Director directed the Board “to consider Patent Owner’s arguments as to the webserver limitation in deciding whether Petitioner has established by a preponderance of the evidence that claims 1–11 are unpatentable under Petitioner’s Ground 1B.” Id. at 4. We do so in this Final Written Decision on Remand (“Remand Decision”). See infra § III.E (Ground 1B). For completeness, we repeat herein our analysis in the Original Final Decision for all other grounds.” slip op. at 2

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “C. Claim Construction We construe claims “using the same claim construction standard that would be used to construe the claim in a civil action under 35 U.S.C. 282(b), including construing the claim in accordance with the ordinary and customary meaning of such claim as understood by one of ordinary skill in the art and the prosecution history pertaining to the patent.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b); see also Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). In this context, claim terms “are generally given their ordinary and customary meaning” as understood by a person of ordinary skill in the art in question at the time of the invention. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1312–13; see CCS Fitness, Inc. v. Brunswick Corp., 288 F.3d 1359, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (There is “a ‘heavy presumption’ that a claim term carries its ordinary and customary meaning.”). “In determining the meaning of the disputed claim limitation, we look principally to the intrinsic evidence of record, examining the claim language itself, the written description, and the prosecution history, if in evidence.” DePuy Spine, Inc. v. Medtronic Sofamor Danek, Inc., 469 F.3d 1005, 1014 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (citing Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1312–17). Extrinsic evidence is “less significant than the intrinsic record in determining ‘the legally operative meaning of claim language.’” Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1317. Petitioner contends that “[t]he claim terms of the ’218 [patent] should be given their plain and ordinary meaning” as understood by the relevant artisan. Pet. 6. Petitioner argues that the relevant artisan “would have understood a ‘socket’ to be a uniquely addressable communication endpoint on a server where first event information is provided to a [viewer client device] VCD.” Pet. 26 (citing Ex. 1001 ¶ 170). Petitioner argues that the relevant artisan also would have understood an “event socket,” in turn, to be “a socket where information about one sporting event is provided to VCDs.” Id. Beyond such proposed plain meanings for “socket” and “event” slip op. at 14

  • Obviousness (§103) › Objective indicia / secondary considerationsObjective indicia no nexusDecided for petitioner

    “(6) Conclusion as to Objective Indicia of Non- Obviousness For the foregoing reasons, although we have considered Patent Owner’s evidence of objective indicia of nonobviousness, we accord it little weight, and find that it does not outweigh Petitioner’s strong countervailing evidence supporting a conclusion of obviousness.” slip op. at 53

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundUnpatentable

    “engineer with substantial experience in Internet video streaming, Internet communication, and related protocols, including an understanding of relaytype and orchestrator-type webservers, would have considered the subject matter of claim 1 as a whole, including the webserver, to be obvious in light of the combined teachings of Ellis, Spivey, and Herzog. Based on the context discussed above, and for the reasons provided above, we determine that the answer is yes. See Fleming v. Cirrus Design Corp., 28 F.4th 1214, 1222 (Fed. Cir. 2022) (“That the proposed combination of [two references]—rather than one of the individual references—discloses the disputed claim limitations does not defeat the Board’s conclusion of obviousness. In this case, it is sufficient that [the relevant artisan] would have been motivated to combine the prior art in a way such that the combination discloses the claim limitations.”).” slip op. at 78

  Patent outcomesUS 11,039,218 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 11,039,218
• Samsara Inc. v. Motive Technologies, Inc.No claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jul 29, 2026 · IPR2025-00574 · APJ Daniel J Galligan · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–7 were not shown unpatentable because the asserted combinations did not establish the claimed video overlay and transmission for manual review.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “We agree with Patent Owner that Petitioner’s contentions in this ground do not cure the issues for limitations 1D and 1E. Petitioner’s contentions in this ground involve combining Khan and Ali’s teachings of identifying a horizon line and lane lines with Choe. For example, Petitioner argues that “[u]sing predictive models for Choe’s lane and horizon prediction would have combined known elements according to known methods to yield predictable results” and that “[i]mplementing these known mathematical models in Choe’s calibration system, according to their known functions, would have yielded predictable results.” Pet. 39. Petitioner further argues that “[u]sing predictive models for Choe’s lane and horizon prediction would have used a known technique (predictive models) to improve similar devices in the same way” and that “[u]sing predictive models for Choe’s lane and horizon prediction would have also applied a known technique (predictive models) to a known device (a manual annotator device) ready for improvement.” Pet. 40. Petitioner’s proposed combination, therefore, still relies on Choe’s teachings of transmitting an overlaid image to an annotator device. We note that Petitioner asserts that, “[o]nce Khan in view of Ali identifies the horizon and lane lines, it overlays the horizon line and/or lane lines on the video, as shown in the screenshots below.” Pet. 41–42. Although Petitioner mentions Khan and Ali’s teachings with respect to video here, Petitioner does not adequately explain how the teaching of an overlaid video would be combined with Choe’s single image annotator teachings. As discussed above, Choe discloses transmitting a single overlaid image to the annotator” slip op. at 23

  • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “Thus, Petitioner has not provided sufficient evidence and argument to explain how the additional teachings of Khan and Ali teach limitations 1D and 1E in combination with Choe. Petitioner, therefore, has not demonstrated unpatentability of claims 1–5 by a preponderance of the evidence. F. Obviousness over Choe and Workman (Claims 1–4) Petitioner asserts that claims 1–4 would have been obvious over the combined teachings of Choe and Workman. Pet. 47–52; Pet. Reply 26–30. Petitioner asserts that, “if [Patent Owner] alleges that Choe does not explicitly disclose which predictive models it uses or whether it uses predictive models to identify the horizon line, a [person of ordinary skill in the art] would have searched for references that use predictive models and how such models were used,” which “would have led to Workman, which discloses predictive models to identify the horizon line.” Pet. 47. According to Petitioner, “[u]sing Workman’s predictive model to identify the horizon line would also have merely been combining known elements ([convolutional neural networks (CNNs)] and annotation for camera calibration) according to known methods to yield predictable results and used known techniques (CNNs) to improve similar devices in the same way.” Pet. 48–49. Thus, Petitioner relies on Workman to teach a predictive model to identify a horizon line. See Pet. 47–49. Choe with respect to limitations 1D and 1E. Indeed, Workman involves horizon line estimation in single images. See Ex. 1011, 10 (§ 5) (“We introduced Horizon Lines in the Wild (HLW), a new dataset for single image horizon line estimation, to address the limitations of existing horizon line detection datasets.”). Petitioner, therefore, has not demonstrated unpatentability of claims 1–4 by a preponderance of the evidence.” slip op. at 24

  • Skill levelSkill level patent owner adoptedDecided for patent owner

    “Patent Owner criticizes Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill for not requiring “any training or experience in ‘automotive systems,’ precisely what the ’580 [p]atent relates to.” PO Resp. 7. According to Patent Owner, a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had “a training and/or experience in design of software for camera/sensor systems in the automotive industry.” PO Resp. 8–9 (citing Ex. 2003 ¶ 35).” slip op. at 5

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “C. Claim Construction We need not construe expressly any claim terms to decide the issues before us. See Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 6

  Patent outcomesUS 11,875,580 not shown unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 11,875,580
• Aptiv Services US, LLC v. Microchip Technology, Inc.All claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Mar 20, 2026 · IPR2024-00646 · APJ Christopher L Ogden · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–18 are unpatentable under § 103 over Al-Shyoukh, Ivanov, and Stanescu; the Board did not reach the alternative ground.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Patent Owner’s proposal is most like Petitioner’s alternative proposal which would include a bachelor’s degree and two years of experience. However, Patent Owner does not provide a specific number of years of industry experience and Patent Owner would include mixed-signal IC design as an alternative to analog circuit design. We consider analog circuit design to be most pertinent to the problems and solution discussed in the ’074 patent. See Ex. 1001, 1:15–2:44. In addition, we find credible Petitioner’s argument that an ordinarily skilled artisan with a bachelor’s degree would have had two years of experience, whereas Patent Owner’s proposal does not provide a specific number of years. Thus, we determine that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had a bachelor’s degree and two years of experience in analog circuit design. Nevertheless, the outcome of our decision would be the same under either of the party’s proposals.” slip op. at 8

  • Prior constructionPrior construction adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Because neither party has argued that the district-court constructions should be modified or elaborated for this proceeding, and the constructions appear reasonable, we adopt these constructions for this decision. We also take judicial notice of the district court’s Memorandum supporting the claim construction order. Ex. 3001.9” slip op. at 10

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner

    “We agree with Petitioner that “gm boosting” is the only gm enhancement referred to in the ’074 patent, that the ’074 patent uses the terms “gm enhanced” and “gm-boost” synonymously, and that Patent Owner has failed to point to any credible intrinsic evidence of this alleged distinction. Although, “[i]n the absence of any evidence to the contrary, we must presume that the use of . . . different terms in the claims connotes different meanings, CAE Screenplates Inc. v. Heinrich Fiedler GmbH, 224 F.3d 1308, 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2000), in this case there is evidence to the contrary. In particular, the ’074 patent never refers to “gm enhancement” as a function separate from “gm boosting.” Indeed, the transistors (368, 370, and 382) that Patent Owner identifies as performing the function of “gm enhancement” are disclosed as part of a “gm-boost stage.” Ex. 1001, 5:8–24. Patent Owner’s alleged separation of Figure 3B into distinct “gm boosting” and “gm enhancement” is not consistent with the intrinsic evidence and is based on the conclusory testimony of Dr. Taylor. Thus, based on the evidence of record, we disagree with Patent Owner’s proposed construction distinguishing the terms “gm enhanced” and “gm-boost” in claim 1. Rather, we find persuasive Petitioner’s argument that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have regarded these terms to be synonymous. We need not otherwise construe these two terms to resolve the contested issues in this proceeding. See Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 12

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundDecided for petitioner

    “We find Petitioner’s argument persuasive that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had reason to follow Ivanov’s teachings to include an enable/disable function in Al-Shyoukh’s biasing circuit to limit that circuit’s standby current for reasons of power-efficiency. Pet. 25–26; Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 67–68. The evidence of record also suggests that an enable/disable function was well known in the art and that it would have been within the level of ordinary skill in the art to add such a function to a biasing circuit, taking into consideration any known tradeoffs. Pet. Reply 17–18; Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 60, 67–68; PO Resp. 13–14 (acknowledging that “any [person of ordinary skill in the art” would attest[ that] engineering is full of tradeoffs” and listing some of the known tradeoffs that “a [person of ordinary skill in the art] would need to consider”). We also disagree with Patent Owner’s argument that Al-Shyoukh, Rincon-Mora, or other references teach away from adding an enable/disable function to Al-Shyoukh. Patent Owner has not pointed to anything in the prior art that criticizes, discredits, or otherwise discourages investigation into the claimed invention. Meiresonne v. Google, Inc., 849 F.3d at 1382.” slip op. at 34

  Patent outcomesUS 9,471,074 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 9,471,074
• Genius Sports Ltd. v. Sportscastr Inc. D/B/A Panda InteractiveAll claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Mar 13, 2026 · IPR2024-01311 · APJ Stephen E Belisle · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 16–30 are unpatentable: claims 16–30 as obvious over Ellis and Spivey, claims 21, 22, 27, and 28 as anticipated by Herzog, and claims 25, 26, and 30 as obvious over Herzog and Ellis.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level patent owner adoptedDecided for patent owner

    “Patent Owner contends that the relevant artisan would have had “a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering, computer science, or equivalent degree and, in addition, approximately two years of work experience with Internet video streaming, Internet communication, and related protocols.” PO Resp. 12. Neither party argues that the outcome of this case would differ based on our adoption of any particular definition of the level of ordinary skill in the art. We apply Patent Owner’s definition of the relevant artisan because, based on the record, this proposal is most consistent with the ’218 patent and the asserted prior art, and is supported by the testimony of both Dr. Wicker and Dr. Rubin (see Ex. 1001 ¶¶ 72–76; Ex. 2001 ¶¶ 96–98). We note that we would reach the same determination under Petitioner’s formulation of the level of ordinary skill.” slip op. at 13

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITAPlain and ordinary meaningDecided for petitioner

    “Accordingly, Petitioner’s proposed plain meanings of “socket” and “event socket” (Pet. 32–33) are not disputed by Patent Owner. PO Resp. 2, 12. In fact, by arguing that Spivey’s topic queues are neither “uniquely addressable” nor “communication endpoints,” Patent Owner appears to adopt Petitioner’s proposed plain meaning of “socket” as a “uniquely addressable communication endpoint.” Id. As Patent Owner acknowledged during Oral Argument, “I don’t think there’s any dispute of what we mean by socket, a uniquely addressable communication endpoint.” Tr. 73:10–12. Based on the foregoing, we construe each of “socket” and “event socket” to have its plain and ordinary meaning, where the relevant artisan would have understood “socket” to mean “a uniquely addressable communication endpoint on a server,” and “event socket” to mean “a socket where information about one sporting event is provided to a viewer client device (VCD).” 2 We further address these terms below in Section III.D.3. 2 During Oral Argument, Patent Owner argued, for the first time, that the District Court’s construction of “event socket” “should be applied equally here.” Tr. 73:13–76:24 (referring to Ex. 1069). The Court adopted Petitioner’s (Defendant’s) proposed definition of “event socket” as “a socket dedicated to a particular event” (Ex. 1069, 11–15), although in its summary of constructions, labeled “event socket” as being “a socket dedicated to a single event” (i.e., “single” event versus “particular” event) (id. at 26). Regardless, in the context of this case and this Decision, we find no meaningful difference between these articulations and Petitioner’s plain” slip op. at 15

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundUnpatentable

    “As Petitioner explained during Oral Argument, Ellis “relates to the ability for the clients and the server to communicate,” which can be any system that can “provide real-time sports,” but “doesn’t discuss whether it’s a push system or a pull system,” whereas Spivey, on the other hand, “expressly indicates that it is a push type of data system which reduces latency over prior art systems that utilize push technologies.” Tr. 15:13–19. We find availing Petitioner’s contention that, “[a]s explained by Dr. Wicker, . . . [the relevant artisan] would have been motivated to implement real-time data delivery using Spivey’s data pushing technique to reduce latency.” Id. at 16:2–8. “[I]f a technique has been used to improve one device, and a person of ordinary skill in the art would recognize that it would improve similar devices in the same way, using the technique is obvious unless its actual application is beyond his or her skill.” KSR, 550 U.S. at 417. We find unavailing Patent Owner’s contention that Petitioner fails to “articulate why [the relevant artisan] would have been motivated to make the necessary modifications and proposed combination.” PO Resp. 40–41. Here, Petitioner points out that its proposed combination would have been made to improve latency issues in Ellis’s system. Pet. 23–26. In particular, Spivey discloses that its techniques “may reduce . . . delay [on the order of seconds (e.g., 30 to 45 seconds) or minutes] to an order of milliseconds (ms) (e.g., 100 ms) or less, providing a significant advantage over the conventional practices.” Ex. 1017 ¶ 28. Spivey also discloses pushing data to the “subscribed connected client devices” substantially simultaneously with the message queue server receiving the topic entry from a live data source, e.g., “with a time delay of 100 milliseconds or less,” which Spivey discloses is “at least two orders of magnitude shorter than conventional time periods of legacy devices.” Id. ¶ 96; see also id. at code (57) (disclosing pushing “the topic entry to a subscribed client device substantially simultaneously with the message queue server receiving the topic entry from a live data source”).” slip op. at 28

  • Obviousness (§103) › Objective indicia / secondary considerationsObjective indicia outweighedDecided for petitioner

    “Considering the totality of the evidence, we find Patent Owner has not demonstrated that a long-felt but unresolved need existed for the claimed invention. See Apple v. Samsung, 839 F.3d at 1056. As Petitioner points out, although Patent Owner argues that there is a long-felt need for a system that “allows broadcasters to deliver synchronized, low-latency video and audio content” (PO Resp. 65), Patent Owner does not contest Petitioner’s showing that Ellis also discloses “a video streaming system that provided event information over a separate channel, which is not hard embedded in the video stream.” Pet. Reply 25. Further, as Petitioner points out in the context of “representative claim 12,” the claim “simply requires ‘receiv[ing] the first copy via a first video communication channel between at least one media source and the first client device,’” and “[i]n no way does that claim language relate to any synchronized, low-latency, scalable, flexible, or new and improved video streaming technique.” Pet. Reply 22. In fact, during Oral Argument, although Patent Owner argues that its invention is “the synchronization and the latency improvements through that one-to-many socket architecture,” Patent Owner conceded that the claims “could be broader than that.” Tr. 44:24–46:16. We find availing Petitioner’s argument that the “claim language” does not “relate to any synchronized, low-latency, scalable, flexible, or new and improved video streaming technique.” Pet. Reply 22. Petitioner argues that we should give “no weight” to Patent Owner’s alleged “evidence” of any long-felt but unresolved needs. Pet. Reply 22. In particular, Patent Owner merely provides conclusory statements that, prior to the claimed invention, “conventional video streaming systems” included “hard-embedded event information,” and that “[t]he claimed invention satisfied the long-felt need for an innovative system.” PO Resp. 64–65. Thus, considering the totality of the evidence, we agree with Petitioner that Patent Owner has failed to establish that there was a long-felt but unresolved need for the claimed invention.” slip op. at 51

  Patent outcomesUS 11,039,218 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 11,039,218
• Genius Sports Ltd. v. Sportscastr Inc. D/B/A Panda InteractiveAll claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Mar 13, 2026 · IPR2024-01310 · APJ Stephen E Belisle · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–15 are unpatentable: claims 12–15 over Ellis and Spivey, and claims 1–11 over Ellis, Spivey, and Herzog; the other grounds were not proven.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level patent owner adoptedDecided for patent owner

    “Relying on Dr. Wicker’s testimony, Petitioner contends that the relevant artisan would have had “at least a bachelor’s degree, or equivalent, in electrical engineering, computer engineering, computer science, or a related field or an equivalent number of years of working experience, and one to two years of experience in networking environments, including at least some experience with live-streaming network architecture.” Pet. 14 (citing Ex. 1001 ¶¶ 72–76). Petitioner also states that “[a]dditional education or experience in related fields could compensate for deficits in the above qualifications.” Pet. 18. Patent Owner contends that the relevant artisan would have had “a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering, computer science, or equivalent degree and, in addition, approximately two years of work experience with Internet video streaming, Internet communication, and related protocols.” PO Resp. 12 (citing Ex. 2001 ¶ 96). Neither party argues that the outcome of this case would differ based on our adoption of any particular definition of the level of ordinary skill in the art. We apply Patent Owner’s definition of the relevant artisan because, based on the record, this proposal is most consistent with the ’218 patent and the asserted prior art, and is supported by the testimony of both Dr. Wicker and Dr. Rubin (see Ex. 1001 ¶¶ 72–76; Ex. 2001 ¶¶ 96–98). We note that we would reach the same determination under Petitioner’s formulation of the level of ordinary skill.” slip op. at 12

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITAPlain and ordinary meaningDecided for petitioner

    “Accordingly, Petitioner’s proposed plain meanings of “socket” and “event socket” (Pet. 26) are not disputed by Patent Owner. PO Resp. 2, 12. In fact, by arguing that Spivey’s topic queues are neither “uniquely addressable” nor “communication endpoints,” Patent Owner appears to adopt Petitioner’s proposed plain meaning of “socket” as a “uniquely addressable communication endpoint.” Id. As Patent Owner acknowledged during Oral Argument, “I don’t think there’s any dispute of what we mean by socket, a uniquely addressable communication endpoint.” Tr. 73:10–12. Thus, we give each of “socket” and “event socket” its plain meaning, where the relevant artisan would have understood “socket” to mean “a uniquely addressable communication endpoint on a server,” and “event socket” to mean “a socket where information about one sporting event is provided to a viewer client device (VCD).” 4 We address such terms below in Section III.D.3. After considering the arguments and information presented during trial, we determine that we do not need to otherwise expressly construe any terms in order to resolve the dispute between the parties. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (citing Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (“[O]nly those terms need be construed that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.”)).” slip op. at 15

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedPatent owner expert discountedDecided for petitioner

    “We find Petitioner’s contentions with Dr. Wicker’s supporting testimony persuasive. In particular, we find Petitioner’s reliance on Spivey for disclosing “event socket” is supported by Spivey’s disclosures that a topic queue’s address “may resemble a uniform resource locator (URL)” and that user interface 900 “allow[s] an operator 108 of a client device to view and select . . . topics available from a message queue server.” Ex. 1017 ¶¶ 82, 84, Fig. 9. In Spivey, the message flow begins “when message queue server . . . pushes data payloads to subscribers of the topics in [the] message.” See Ex. 1017 ¶ 134. As Petitioner explains, in Spivey, “the address for connecting a topic queue may resemble a URL, and client devices can select from a list of available topics and subscribe to those queues, after which the MQSD pushes the relevant data payloads to the subscribed devices.” Pet. Reply 8 (citing Ex. 1017 ¶¶ 82–84, 134). As Petitioner explains, and as supported by Dr. Wicker’s testimony, Spivey’s “topic label may be . . . ‘gamecenter.nfl.ravensteelers,’ and client devices use these topic label text strings to connect and subscribe to the MQSD’s topic queues.” Pet. Reply 8 (citing Ex. 1001 ¶¶ 353–354). We find availing that, in Spivey, since the “client devices ‘request a live data connection’ by selecting or entering the address or connection information which ‘may resemble a uniform resource locator (URL),’” Spivey’s topic queues “are not only logically but also actually implemented as uniquely addressable communication endpoints.” Id. at 9 (citing Ex. 1064 ¶¶ 11–14). We find that Dr. Rubin’s testimony that the only potential “communication endpoint” in Spivey that is “uniquely addressable” is the live data access server (Ex. 2001 ¶ 233) merely addresses particular embodiments in Spivey. That is, Dr. Rubin does not address sufficiently Spivey’s teachings as a whole as understood from the perspective of the relevant artisan, which would include other embodiments. See Sundance, Inc. v. DeMonte Fabricating Ltd., 550 F.3d 1356, 1361 n.3 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (“What a prior art reference discloses or teaches is determined from the perspective of one of ordinary skill in the art.”); In re Hedges, 783 F.2d 1038, 1041 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (noting that when evaluating claims for obviousness, “the prior art as a whole must be considered”). Dr. Rubin does not address Spivey’s disclosure that the system “may include” the LDAS (Ex. 1017 ¶ 38), but, as Petitioner points out, merely acknowledges that “there are examples in Spivey using the language [‘may’].” Pet. Reply 4 (citing Ex. 1063, 62:8–13). As Petitioner points out, in his deposition, Dr. Rubin acknowledges” slip op. at 29

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundUnpatentable

    “As Petitioner explained during Oral Argument, Ellis “relates to the ability for the clients and the server to communicate,” which can be any system that can “provide real-time sports,” but “doesn’t discuss whether it’s a push system or a pull system,” whereas Spivey, on the other hand, “expressly indicates that it is a push type of data system which reduces latency over prior art systems that utilize push technologies.” Tr. 15:13–19. We find availing Petitioner’s contention that, “[a]s explained by Dr. Wicker, . . . [the relevant artisan] would have been motivated to implement real-time data delivery using Spivey’s data pushing technique to reduce latency.” Id. at 16:2–8. “[I]f a technique has been used to improve one device, and a person of ordinary skill in the art would recognize that it would improve similar devices in the same way, using the technique is obvious unless its actual application is beyond his or her skill.” KSR, 550 U.S. at 417. We find unavailing Patent Owner’s contention that Petitioner fails to “articulate why [the relevant artisan] would have been motivated to make the necessary modifications and proposed combination.” PO Resp. 40–41. Here, Petitioner points out that its proposed combination would have been made to improve latency issues in Ellis’s system. Pet. 20–22. In particular, Spivey discloses that its techniques “may reduce . . . delay [on the order of seconds (e.g., 30 to 45 seconds) or minutes] to an order of milliseconds (ms) (e.g., 100 ms) or less, providing a significant advantage over the conventional practices.” Ex. 1017 ¶ 28. Spivey also discloses pushing data to the “subscribed connected client devices” substantially simultaneously with the message queue server receiving the topic entry from a live data source, e.g., “with a time delay of 100 milliseconds or less,” which Spivey discloses is “at least two orders of magnitude shorter than conventional time periods of legacy devices.” Id. ¶ 96; see also id. at code (57) (disclosing pushing “the topic entry to a subscribed client device substantially simultaneously with the message queue server receiving the topic entry from a live data source”). We find Patent Owner’s arguments that Petitioner fails to “explain the modifications necessary to combine such teachings” are inconsistent with the evidence of record. PO Resp. 40–47. For example, Patent Owner’s argument that the proposed combination would be inoperable because the combination “does not include the LDAS” (id. at 43–44) is not consistent with the evidence of record that Spivey does not require the LDAS to serve as intermediary between the MQSD and the user equipment. See Ex. 1017 ¶¶ 38, 46. As discussed above, Spivey states that the system “may” include an LDAS (Ex. 1017 ¶ 38), supporting Petitioner’s contention that, in Spivey, the LDAS is “optional” wherein “the MQSD may be ‘accessible to clients over the network directly.’” Pet. Reply 3. As discussed above in Section III.D.3.a, we find persuasive Petitioner’s argument that Spivey’s MQSD may push data from topic queues to the subscribers of the topics corresponding to those topic queues, which indicates that “the MQSD can deliver data directly to clients without the necessity of an LDAS.” Id. (citing Ex. 1017 ¶ 46).” slip op. at 39

  Patent outcomesUS 11,039,218 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 11,039,218
• Genius Sports Ltd. v. Sportscastr Inc. D/B/A Panda InteractiveAll claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Mar 11, 2026 · IPR2024-01307 · APJ Jon M Jurgovan · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 19–25 and 27–30 are unpatentable as obvious over Ellis and Spivey; the Board found the Herzog, Spivey, and Ellis combination did not establish obviousness.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level patent owner adoptedDecided for patent owner

    “Relying on the declaration of Dr. Wicker, Petitioner contends that a person of ordinary skill in the art (POSA) at the time of the invention of the ’687 patent would have had “at least a bachelor’s degree, or equivalent, in electrical engineering, computer engineering, computer science, or a related field or an equivalent number of years of working experience, and one to two years of experience in networking environments, including at least some experience with live-streaming network architecture.” Pet. 15 (citing Ex. 1001 ¶¶ 72–76). Petitioner also states that “[a]dditional education or experience in related fields could compensate for deficits in the above qualifications.” Id. Patent Owner contends that a POSA at the time of the invention of the ’687 patent would have had “a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering, computer science, or equivalent degree and, in addition, approximately two years of work experience with Internet video streaming, Internet communication, and related protocols.” PO Resp. 13–14 (citing Ex. 2001 ¶ 103). The parties have not addressed whether the differences in these definitions impact the unpatentability analysis before us. We apply Patent Owner’s definition of a POSA at the time of the claimed invention because, based on the record, this proposal is consistent with the ’687 patent, the asserted prior art, and is supported by the testimony of Dr. Wicker. We note that we would reach the same determination under Petitioner’s formulation of the level of ordinary skill.” slip op. at 14

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundUnpatentable

    “have viewed Spivey’s websocket connections as more advantageous for providing video content and event data to end-users than Ellis’s HTTP request-response protocol, thus motivating simple substitution of Spivey’s LDSD and MQSD for Ellis’s SCS. Pet. 23–24 (citing Ex. 1016 ¶¶ 34, 47; Ex. 1017 ¶ 34; Ex. 1001 ¶¶ 114–115). See KSR, 550 U.S. at 417 (simple substitution of one known element for another is a recognized rationale supporting a motivation to combine). For example, if server requests are frequent, a POSA would have recognized that the processing overhead of setting up and tearing down HTTP connections would exceed any latency disadvantages of Spivey’s persistent websocket connections. Ex. 1064 ¶ 35. Thus, under some circumstances, a POSA would have been motivated to make the Ellis-Spivey combination, and we do not agree with Patent Owner’s arguments to the contrary.” slip op. at 22

  • Obviousness (§103) › Objective indicia / secondary considerations › Long-felt need / failure of othersObjective indicia no nexusDecided for petitioner

    “demonstrated that a long-felt but unresolved need existed for the claimed invention. See Apple v. Samsung, 839 F.3d at 1056. As Petitioner points out, although Patent Owner argues that there is a long-felt need for a system that “allows broadcasters to deliver synchronized, low-latency video and audio content . . . ” (PO Resp. 66), Patent Owner does not contest Petitioner’s showing that Ellis also discloses “a video streaming system that provided event information over a separate channel, which is not hard embedded in the video stream.” Pet. Reply 23. Further, as Petitioner also points out, “representative claim 19 simply requires a media source to receive the video stream and distribute it.” Pet. Reply 23. In fact, during Oral Argument, although Patent Owner argues that its invention is “the synchronization and the latency improvements through that one-to-many socket architecture,” Patent conceded that the claims “could be broader than that.” Tr. 44:24–46:16. We agree with Petitioner’s argument that the “claim language” does not “relate to any synchronized, low-latency, scalable, flexible, or new and improved video streaming technique.” Pet. Reply 23. As Petitioner points out, Patent Owner does not cite to any evidence of long-felt but unresolved needs. Pet. Reply 23 (citing PO Resp. 67–68). In particular, Patent Owner merely provides conclusory statements that, prior to the claimed invention, “conventional video streaming systems” include “hard-embedded event information,” and that “[t]he claimed invention satisfied the long-felt need for an innovative system.” PO Resp. 66–68. Thus, considering the totality of the evidence, we agree with Petitioner that Patent Owner has failed to establish that there was a long-felt but unresolved need for the claimed invention.” slip op. at 60

  • Obviousness (§103) › Objective indicia / secondary considerations › Skepticism / industry praiseObjective indicia no nexusDecided for petitioner

    “We find Patent Owner has not provided sufficient evidence showing the industry praised a claimed invention or a product that embodies the patent claims. WBIP, 829 F.3d at 1334. In particular, other than Patent Owner’s mere conclusory statement that the benefits and advantages highlighted by the industry “result directly from the claims” (PO Resp. 69), we see no evidence in the record that the subject matter specifically recited by claim 1 of the ’687 patent, for example, was the object of the praise. That is, Patent Owner does not explain how the relied-upon praise particularly relates to the claims of the ’687 patent. Id. For Patent Owner’s evidence concerning objective indicia of non- obviousness to be considered, Patent Owner must establish a nexus between the evidence concerning objective indicia of non-obviousness and the merits of the claimed invention. See ClassCo, 838 F.3d at 1220. We find availing Petitioner’s argument that the evidence of industry praise submitted by Patent Owner does not “explain[] how those awards related to any embodying product, much less any relation between the award and the ’687’s claims.” Pet. Reply 23–24. For example, although Patent Owner notes that it was a finalist for “Best App,” as Petitioner argues, Patent Owner “does not explain how that award is related to the claimed ‘inventive server and memory storage architecture.’” Id. at 24. Although Patent Owner also relies on the opinion of former NBA” slip op. at 62

  Patent outcomesUS 10,805,687 unpatentable
  § 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 10,805,687
• Genius Sports Ltd. v. Sportscastr Inc. D/B/A Panda InteractiveAll claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Mar 11, 2026 · IPR2024-01305 · APJ Jon M Jurgovan · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–9 are unpatentable: claims 1, 8, and 9 as obvious over Ellis and Spivey, and claims 2–7 as obvious over Ellis, Spivey, and Herzog.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level patent owner adoptedDecided for patent owner

    “Relying on the declaration of Dr. Wicker, Petitioner contends that a person of ordinary skill in the art (POSA) at the time of the invention of the ’687 patent would have had “at least a bachelor’s degree, or equivalent, in electrical engineering, computer engineering, computer science, or a related field or an equivalent number of years of working experience, and one to two years of experience in networking environments, including at least some experience with live-streaming network architecture.” Pet. 13 (citing Ex. 1001 ¶¶ 72–76). Petitioner also states that “[a]dditional education or experience in related fields could compensate for deficits in the above qualifications.” Id. Patent Owner contends that a POSA at the time of the invention of the ’687 patent would have had “a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering, computer science, or equivalent degree and, in addition, approximately two years of work experience with Internet video streaming, Internet communication, and related protocols.” PO Resp. 13 (citing Ex. 2001 ¶ 99). The parties have not addressed whether the differences in these definitions impact the unpatentability analysis before us. We apply Patent Owner’s definition of a POSA at the time of the claimed invention because, based on the record, this proposal is consistent with the ’687 patent, the asserted prior art, and is supported by the testimony of Dr. Wicker. We note that we would reach the same determination under Petitioner’s formulation of the level of ordinary skill.” slip op. at 12

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “Patent Owner contends that the plain and ordinary meaning should apply to all terms of the challenged claims except for “event socket.” PO Resp. 12. Petitioner argues that an “event socket” should be construed as “uniquely addressable communication endpoints that transmit event information.” Pet. Reply 8–10. Patent Owner does not disagree with Petitioner’s proposal. See generally PO Sur-Reply. As the parties do not dispute the meaning of “event socket,” we need not, and do not, expressly construe the term beyond the parties agreed meaning. See Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (only claim terms in controversy need to be construed, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy).” slip op. at 10

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundDecided for petitioner

    “We agree with Petitioner’s contention that Ellis and Spivey differ in that Ellis uses HTTP request-response messages whereas Spivey uses websocket connections between the content delivery system’s server and user equipment. Pet. 18 (citing Ex. 1001 ¶¶ 106–115). As Petitioner points out, in Ellis’s HTTPS connections, a user equipment requests the server to respond with any new messages. Id. at 8 (citing Ex. 1001 ¶¶ 50, 51); Ex. 1016 ¶¶ 37, 40. We agree with Petitioner that Spivey’s websocket connections were a known alternative to HTTP requests. Id. (citing Ex. 1001 ¶¶ 52, 53, 58, 59). We further agree that such websockets constitute bidirectional, full-duplex, stateful, and persistent connections that provide instant updates from the server to the user equipment without the need for the user equipment to request them from the server (referred to as “push” technology). Id. Accordingly, we agree with Petitioner that, under some scenarios, a POSA would have viewed Spivey’s websocket connections as more advantageous for providing video content and event data to end-users than Ellis’s HTTP request-response protocol, thus motivating simple substitution of Spivey’s LDSD and MQSD for Ellis’s SCS. Pet. 21–22 (citing Ex. 1016 ¶¶ 34, 47; Ex. 1017 ¶ 34; Ex. 1001 ¶¶ 114, 115). See KSR, 550 U.S. at 417 (simple substitution of one known element for another is a recognized rationale supporting a motivation to combine). For example, if server requests are frequent, a POSA would have recognized that the processing overhead of setting up and tearing down HTTP connections would exceed any latency disadvantages of Spivey’s persistent websocket connections. Ex. 1064 ¶ 35. Thus, under some circumstances, a POSA would have been motivated to make the Ellis-Spivey combination, and we do not agree with Patent Owner’s arguments to the contrary.” slip op. at 19

  • Obviousness (§103) › Objective indicia / secondary considerations › Long-felt need / failure of othersObjective indicia no nexusDecided for petitioner

    “Considering the totality of the evidence, we find Patent Owner has not demonstrated that a long-felt but unresolved need existed for the claimed invention. See Apple, 839 F.3d at 1056. As Petitioner points out, although Patent Owner argues that there is a long-felt need for a system that “allows broadcasters to deliver synchronized, low-latency digital content, such as a video content, and audio content . . . ” (PO Resp. 64), Patent Owner does not contest Petitioner’s showing that Ellis also discloses “a video streaming system that provided event information over a separate channel, which is not hard embedded in the video stream.” Pet. Reply 23. Further, as Petitioner also points out, “claim 1 simply requires a media source to receive the video stream and distribute the video stream.” Pet. Reply 23. In fact, during Oral Argument, although Patent Owner argues that its invention is “the synchronization and the latency improvements through that one-to-many socket architecture,” Patent Owner conceded that the claims “could be broader than that.” Tr. 44:24–46:16. We agree with Petitioner’s argument that the “claim language” does not “relate to any synchronized, low-latency, scalable, flexible, or new and improved video streaming technique.” Pet. Reply 23. Furthermore, as Petitioner points out, Patent Owner does not cite to any evidence of long-felt but unresolved needs. Pet. Reply 23 (citing PO Resp. 66). In particular, Patent Owner merely provides conclusory statements that, prior to the claimed invention, “conventional video streaming systems” include “hard-embedded event information,” and that “[t]he claimed invention satisfied the long-felt need for an innovative system.” PO Resp. 64–66. Thus, considering the totality of the evidence, we agree with” slip op. at 45

  Patent outcomesUS 10,805,687 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 10,805,687
• Digital Global Systems, Inc. v. Deepsig, Inc.Some claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Mar 6, 2026 · IPR2024-01358 · APJ William V Saindon · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–3, 7–11, 15–19, 23, and 24 are unpatentable as obvious; claims 4–6, 12–14, and 20–22 were not shown unpatentable because the prior art did not teach the claimed received-signal feedback and transmitter-model update.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Petitioner asserts that: Persons of ordinary skill in the art (“POSITA”) would have a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering, or an equivalent degree and at least two years of experience working with of radio communication systems and machine learning. Additional work or research experience can substitute for less or different education, and vice-versa. Pet. 3–4 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 33–34). Patent Owner does not appear to challenge this level of skill. We use Petitioner’s definition for purposes of this Decision because it appears consistent with the level of skill reflected in the prior art and ’704 patent.” slip op. at 7

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for petitioner

    “parameters “associated with the base station.” PO Resp. 31–32. In particular, Patent Owner argues that a transmitter “implemented in a base station” is not “associated with the base station.” Id. at 31. Petitioner argues that Patent Owner offers no reason to believe that a transmitter “implemented in a base station” is not “associated with the base station.” Pet. Reply 4–5; see also id. at 3–6 (entire argument). A plain reading of a “model associated with a base station” would encompass a model that operates in a base station. We do not see anything in the ’704 specification that would indicate “associated with” has any special meaning, or has a meaning contrary to our understanding of the plain meaning. We do not see the word “associated” outside the claims, whereas we see the word “implement” throughout the specification, generally in reference to an actual use of a model (consistent with our plain reading). See, e.g., Ex. 1001, 5:35–39, 6:3–17, 10:55–11:3 (discussing “implementations” where the model or some other feature of the system is used in a particular way). Accordingly, we construe a model “implemented in a base station” to be “associated with the base station.”” slip op. at 12

  • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)UnpatentableUnpatentable

    “scenarios” (see PO Resp. 16–21), Patent Owner argues that “Jüschke does not disclose any association of the weight or bias parameters, . . . to any deployment scenario, and . . . base station” (id. at 19). For the reasons explained in our claim construction section above, we construe “deployment scenarios” to include “inline mode” models located within a base station, according to the list of deployment scenarios set out in the ’704 patent. See Ex. 1001, 2:38–65. The in-line deployment scenario depicted in Figure 6A of the ’704 patent bears a striking resemblance to the arrangement depicted in Figure 1 of Jüschke. In both figures, the analog radio signal is fed directly into the model and then the model directly outputs the signal to the amplifier. Compare Ex. 1001, Fig. 6A, with Ex. 1005, Fig. 1. As construed, the “deployment scenarios” represent the physical configurations of the device in which the model is found, such as “in-line.” Petitioner shows by a preponderance of the evidence that Jüschke’s similar in-line configuration is a “deployment scenario” as claimed because it teaches an inline model for a cellular system transmitter (i.e., base station). Pet. 26–29 (citing, e.g., Ex. 1005, Fig. 1, ¶¶ 6, 59; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 146–147); see also Ex. 1001, 2:37–41 (stating that “[t]he particular deployment scenario[] may be . . . sending a radio transmission from a cellular base station that includes the . . . model . . . in an inline mode”).” slip op. at 26

  • BurdenNot shown unpatentable

    “Based on our claim construction analysis of claim 4, above, we agree with Patent Owner that claim 4 requires an actually transmitted signal and an update of the transmitter’s model. This claim construction eliminates Petitioner’s position regarding Holt teaching a modeled signal. See, e.g., Pet. Reply 17–23. We then turn to Petitioner’s argument that Holt teaches updating a model using an actually transmitted signal. See Pet. 59–60. There, Petitioner relies on a disclosure in Holt of an “actual communication channel 302 used to train the channel model 208.” Ex. 1006, 18:1–2. This is depicted in Figure 6 of Holt, in connection with a “fourth loss function” which is used to “train the decoder model.” Id. at 18:42–48; see generally id. at 17:58–18:51 (describing Figure 6). Whether training the channel model or the decoder model, Holt here does not disclose using the actual communication channel to train the encoder, i.e., transmitter. In sum, we find that Petitioner has not shown by a preponderance of the evidence that the prior art describes the claimed step of “obtaining a received radio signal,” and even if it did, Petitioner has not shown by a preponderance of the evidence that the prior art describes the claimed step of “updating the value of the model parameters” in the manner required by claim 4. Claims 12 and 20 are nearly identical to claim 4, and Petitioner’s ground fails for similar reasons. See Pet. 76. Claims 5, 6, 13, 14, 21 and 22 depend from claims 4, 12, and 20, and Petitioner’s ground fails for similar reasons as those claims. See id. at 77–80.” slip op. at 31

  Patent outcomesUS 11,018,704 mixed
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousness
  Patents in suitUS 11,018,704
• Genius Sports Ltd. v. Sportscastr Inc. D/B/A Panda InteractiveAll claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Mar 4, 2026 · IPR2024-01309 · APJ Thu A Dang · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 19–25 and 27–30 are unpatentable as obvious over Ellis and Spivey; the Board did not find the alternative Herzog, Spivey, and Ellis ground established.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level patent owner adoptedDecided for patent owner

    “The parties have not addressed whether the differences in these definitions impact the unpatentability analysis before us. We apply Patent Owner’s definition of a POSITA at the time of the claimed invention because, based on the record, this proposal is consistent with the ’697 patent, the asserted prior art, and is supported by the testimony of Dr. Wicker. We note that we would reach the same determination under Petitioner’s formulation of the level of ordinary skill.” slip op. at 10

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached

    “And Patent Owner states that it “agree[s] with Petitioner’s construction” with respect to the MPF terms. PO Resp. 13. Although Patent Owner also contends that a “POSITA would understand the ‘means for transmitting’ to be a socket server transmitting through an event socket that implements the algorithms described in Figures 2, 3, 21A–21E and accompanying disclosures” (id.), Patent Owner’s proposed further construction is not disputed by Petitioner. See generally Pet. Reply. Furthermore, Petitioner’s proposed constructions of “socket” and “event socket” (Pet. 39) are not disputed by Patent Owner. PO Resp. 2, 13–14. In fact, by arguing that Spivey’s topic queues are neither “uniquely addressable” nor “communication endpoint[s],” Patent Owner appears to adopt Petitioner’s proposed construction of “socket” as a “uniquely addressable communication endpoint.” Id. at 2. As Patent Owner acknowledged during Oral Argument, “I don’t think there’s any dispute of what we mean by socket, a uniquely addressable communication endpoint.” Tr. 73:11–13.6 Thus, on this record, because there is no dispute between the parties regarding the terms “means for transmitting,” “event socket,” or “socket,” construction is not needed. Accordingly, we decline to provide further analysis or an express construction for these terms.” slip op. at 14

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundDecided for petitioner

    “ability for the clients and the server to communicate,” which can be any system that can “provide real-time sports,” but “doesn’t discuss whether it’s a push system or a pull system,” wherein Spivey, on the other hand, “expressly indicates that it is a push type of data system which reduces latency over prior art systems that utilize push technologies.” Tr. 15:13–19. We find availing Petitioner’s contention that, “[a]s explained by Dr. Wicker, . . . a POS[IT]A would have been motivated to implement real-time data delivery using Spivey’s data pushing technique to reduce latency.” Id. at 16:2–4. “[I]f a technique has been used to improve one device, and a person of ordinary skill in the art would recognize that it would improve similar devices in the same way, using the technique is obvious unless its actual application is beyond his or her skill.” KSR, 550 U.S. at 417. We find unavailing Patent Owner’s contention that Petitioner fails to “articulate why a POSITA would have been motivated to make the necessary modification and proposed combination.” PO Resp. 44. Here, Petitioner points out that its proposed combination would have been made to improve latency issues in Ellis’s system. Pet. 19–24. In particular, Spivey’s discloses that its techniques “may reduce . . . delay [on the order of seconds (e.g., 30 to 45 seconds) or minutes] to an order of milliseconds (ms) (e.g., 100 ms) or less, providing a significant advantage over the conventional practices.” Ex. 1017 ¶ 28. Spivey also discloses pushing data to the “subscribed connected client devices” substantially simultaneously with the message queue server receiving the topic entry from a live data source, e.g., “with a time delay of 100 milliseconds or less,” which Spivey discloses is “at least two orders of magnitude shorter than conventional time periods of legacy devices.” Id. ¶ 96; see also id. at code (57) (disclosing pushing “the topic entry to a subscribed client device substantially simultaneously with the message queue server receiving the topic entry from a live data source”).” slip op. at 51

  • Obviousness (§103) › Objective indicia / secondary considerations › Long-felt need / failure of othersDecided for petitioner

    “demonstrated that a long-felt but unresolved need existed for the claimed invention. See Apple v. Samsung, 839 F.3d at 1056. As Petitioner points out, although Patent Owner argues that there is a long-felt need for a system that “allows broadcasters to deliver synchronized, low-latency video and audio content. . . . ” (PO Resp. 66), Patent Owner does not contest Petitioner’s showing that Ellis also discloses “a video streaming system that provided event information over a separate channel, which is not hard embedded in the video stream.” Pet. Reply 22–23. Further, as Petitioner also points out, “claim 19 simply requires a media source to receive the live stream of digital content and distribute it.” Pet. Reply 23. In fact, during Oral Argument, although Patent Owner argues that its invention is “the synchronization and the latency improvements through that one-to-many socket architecture,” Patent Owner conceded that the claims “could be broader than that.” Tr. 44:24–46:16. We find availing Petitioner’s argument that the “claim language” does not “relate to any synchronized, low-latency, scalable, flexible, or new and improved video streaming technique.” Pet. Reply 23. Nevertheless, as Petitioner points out, Patent Owner does not cite to any evidence as to any long-felt but unresolved needs. Pet. Reply 23 (citing PO Resp. 67–68). In particular, Patent Owner merely provides conclusory statements that, prior to the claimed invention, “conventional video streaming systems” include “hard-embedded event information,” and that “[t]he claimed invention satisfied the long-felt need for an innovative system.” PO Resp. 66–68. Thus, considering the totality of the evidence, we agree with Petitioner that Patent Owner has failed to establish that there was a long-felt but unresolved need for the claimed invention.” slip op. at 59

  Patent outcomesUS 10,425,697 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 10,425,697
• Genius Sports Ltd. v. Sportscastr Inc. D/B/A Panda InteractiveAll claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Mar 4, 2026 · IPR2024-01308 · APJ Thu A Dang · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–9 are unpatentable under § 103 over Ellis and Spivey, with Herzog added for claims 2–6; the alternative Herzog, Spivey, and Ellis ground fails.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). On this record, we give “socket” and “event socket” their ordinary and customary meaning. And, as to “socket,” both parties agree that the ordinary and customary meaning for “socket” is a uniquely addressable communication endpoint on a server. Pet. 37; PO Resp. 2. We decline to provide further analysis or an express construction as doing so is not needed to resolve the dispute between the parties. slip op. at 12

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITAPlain and ordinary meaningDecided for petitioner

    “Accordingly, Petitioner’s proposed constructions of “socket” and “event socket” (Pet. 37) are not disputed by Patent Owner. PO Resp. 2, 12. In fact, by arguing that Spivey’s topic queues are neither “uniquely addressable” nor “communication endpoint[s],” Patent Owner appears to adopt Petitioner’s proposed construction of “socket” as a “uniquely addressable communication endpoint.” Id. As Patent Owner acknowledged during Oral Argument, “I don’t think there’s any dispute of what we mean by socket, a uniquely addressable communication endpoint.” Tr. 73:11–13.6 6 Patent Owner also refers to the District Court’s construction of “event socket” during Oral Argument, by claiming the court’s Claim Construction Order was a part of the record as “Exhibit 1069.” Tr. 73:14–74:17. However, as there is no “Exhibit 1069” in this proceeding, we will not “The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). On this record, we give “socket” and “event socket” their ordinary and customary meaning. And, as to “socket,” both parties agree that the ordinary and customary meaning for “socket” is a uniquely addressable communication endpoint on a server. Pet. 37; PO Resp. 2. We decline to provide further analysis or an express construction as doing so is not needed to resolve the dispute between the parties.” slip op. at 11

  • Skill levelSkill level patent owner adoptedDecided for patent owner

    “person of ordinary skill in the art (POSITA) at the time of the invention of the ’697 patent would have had “at least a bachelor’s degree, or equivalent, in electrical engineering, computer engineering, computer science, or a related field or an equivalent number of years of working experience, and one to two years of experience in networking environments, including at least some experience with live-streaming network architecture.” Pet. 13 (citing Ex. 1001 ¶¶ 72–76). Petitioner also states that “[a]dditional education or experience in related fields could compensate for deficits in the above qualifications.” Id. Patent Owner contends that a POSITA at the time of the invention of the ’697 patent would have had “a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering, computer science, or equivalent degree and, in addition, approximately two years of work experience with Internet video streaming, Internet communication, and related protocols.” PO Resp. 13. The parties have not addressed whether the differences in these definitions impact the unpatentability analysis before us. We apply Patent Owner’s definition of a POSITA at the time of the claimed invention because, based on the record, this proposal is consistent with the ’697 patent, the asserted prior art, and is supported by the testimony of Dr. Wicker. We note that we would reach the same determination under Petitioner’s formulation of the level of ordinary skill.” slip op. at 9

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successUnpatentableMotivation foundUnpatentable

    “ability for the clients and the server to communicate,” which can be any system that can “provide real-time sports,” but “doesn’t discuss whether it’s a push system or a pull system,” wherein Spivey, on the other hand, “expressly indicates that it is a push type of data system which reduces latency over prior art systems that utilize push technologies.” Tr. 15:13–19. We find availing Petitioner’s contention that, “[a]s explained by Dr. Wicker, . . . a POS[IT]A would have been motivated to implement real-time data delivery using Spivey’s data pushing technique to reduce latency.” Id. at 16:2–4. “[I]f a technique has been used to improve one device, and a person of ordinary skill in the art would recognize that it would improve similar devices in the same way, using the technique is obvious unless its actual application is beyond his or her skill.” KSR, 550 U.S. at 417. We find unavailing Patent Owner’s contention that Petitioner fails to “articulate why a POSITA would have been motivated to make the necessary modification and proposed combination.” PO Resp. 41. Here, Petitioner points out that its proposed combination would have been made to improve latency issues in Ellis’s system. Pet. 17–21. In particular, Spivey’s discloses that its techniques “may reduce . . . delay [on the order of seconds (e.g., 30 to 45 seconds) or minutes] to an order of milliseconds (ms) (e.g., 100 ms) or less, providing a significant advantage over the conventional practices.” Ex. 1017 ¶ 28. Spivey also discloses pushing data to the “subscribed connected client devices” substantially simultaneously with the message queue server receiving the topic entry from a live data source, e.g., “with a time delay of 100 milliseconds or less,” which Spivey discloses is “at least two orders of magnitude shorter than conventional time periods of legacy devices.” Id. ¶ 96; see also id. at code (57) (disclosing pushing “the topic entry to a subscribed client device substantially simultaneously with the message queue server receiving the topic entry from a live data source”).” slip op. at 50

  Patent outcomesUS 10,425,697 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 10,425,697

Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.