• Yealink (USA) Network Technology Co., Ltd. / Yealink Network Technology Co., Ltd. v. Barco NVNo claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Oct 5, 2026 · IPR2025-00598 · APJ David C Mckone · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–31 were not shown unpatentable under either § 103 ground because the asserted combinations did not teach required claim limitations.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedOther

    “admissions by Patent Owner in litigation, contends that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had “a Master of Science (M.S.) degree in electrical engineering or computer science, and five years of work experience in a related field” and that “[a]dditional educational experience could substitute for some of the work experience.” Pet. 5 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 36–37). “Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s proposed level of skill in the art (Petition, 5) at this time.” PO Resp. 6. On the complete record, we adopt Petitioner’s description of the level of ordinary skill in the art, as it is uncontested and is consistent with the technology described in the ’347 patent and the asserted prior art. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001).” slip op. at 8

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “In the Preliminary Response, “Patent Owner accept[ed] the Petition’s claim construction.” Prelim. Resp. 6. However, in the Patent Owner Response, Patent Owner argues that “the claims of the ’347 Patent require no construction as they are valid under their plain and ordinary meaning.” PO Resp. 6. Based on the complete record, we do not find it necessary to provide express claim constructions of any claim terms. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (noting that “we need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy’”) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)).” slip op. at 9

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert discountedDecided for patent owner

    “Beel actually discloses the following: [0321] On the peripheral device 32 the video packets are received at the corresponding plug and play port, e.g. the USB port 11, read by the Human Interface Driver (HID) interface handler 13, unpacked to remove HID protocol headers in an unpacker 20 and then transmitted to the communications network by a transmitter 21. The network can be wireless for example WiFi or LiFi network. [0322] Having been routed over a communications network to the base unit 33, the incoming stream is read from the communications interface such as a WiFi access point 22, unpacked in an unpacker 25, decoded in a decoder 26 and then inserted into a suitable composition such as an OpenGL based composition in the compositor 29 for display on a central display device. Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 321–322 (emphasis added to portions quoted by Petitioner). Patent Owner notes that “[t]he Petition mistakenly cites to ¶ 322 of Beel but quotes ¶ 321.” PO Resp. 20 n.3. However, it appears that Petitioner has grafted together a portion of paragraph 321 that introduces peripheral device 32 with a portion of paragraph 322, which discusses features of base unit 33. However, this grafting has been done in such a way as to convey (incorrectly) that peripheral device 32, not base unit 33, includes unpacker 25, decoder 26, and compositor 29 that process the first processed video data received by the first peripheral device to generate second video data. Dr. Almeroth’s testimony, which copies Petitioner’s incorrectly altered quotation to paragraph 322 of Beel, is unreliable as to this claim limitation and is entitled to no weight.4 Thus, Petitioner has no expert testimony on which to rely for this claim limitation.” slip op. at 19

  • Strike new argumentNew argument disregardedDecided for patent owner

    “5 At the oral argument, when challenged on its reliance on paragraph 322, Petitioner argued that paragraph 321 of Beel teaches this limitation. Tr. 22:26–23:24. Petitioner did not make this argument in the Petition and, instead, raised it for the first time during oral argument; thus, it will not be considered. See Dell Inc. v. Acceleron, LLC, 884 F.3d 1364, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (“Unless it chose to exercise its waiver authority under 37 C.F.R. § 42.5(b), the Board was obligated to dismiss Dell’s untimely argument given that the untimely argument in this case was raised for the first time during oral argument.”). Even if we were to consider this new argument, it would not be persuasive. As Patent Owner observes (PO Resp. 20), any processing performed by peripheral device 32 in paragraph 321 is on data received from the processing device and destined for the base station via the network, rather than data flowing in the direction of the first processed video data of claim 1.” slip op. at 22

  Patent outcomesUS 11,966,347 not shown unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 11,966,347
• Apple Inc. v. Proxense, LLCAll claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Sep 17, 2026 · IPR2025-00562 · APJ Thu A Dang · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–20 are unpatentable as obvious over Giobbi ’157, Giobbi ’139, and Dua; the Board also finds the claims unpatentable under the Broadcom grounds.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Claim Construction › Functional claiming / §112(f) means-plus-function › Whether §112(f) applies (Williamson, nonce words)§112(f) does not applyDecided for petitioner

    “IPR2024-00783, Ex. 1001, 22:36–49. As the Federal Circuit stated, when a disputed claim limitation does not employ “means for” language, the presumption is that each of the terms conveys sufficiently definite structure or act and, thus, is not subject to § 112 ¶ 6. See Dyfan, 28 F.4th at 1367. Based on the record before us, this presumption that each of the terms is not subject to § 112 ¶ 6 is not overcome.” slip op. at 17

  • Skill levelOther

    “differences between the claimed subject matter and the prior art are such that the subject matter, as a whole, “would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains.” KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 406 (2007). The question of obviousness is resolved on the basis of underlying factual determinations including: (1) the scope and content of the prior art; (2) any differences between the claimed subject matter and the prior art; (3) the level of ordinary skill in the art; and (4) objective evidence of non-obviousness. See Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kansas City, 383 U.S. 1, 17–18 (1966).” slip op. at 25

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedDecided for petitioner

    “We find persuasive Dr. Wolfe’s supporting testimony that a POSITA would have understood the terms “PDK” and “RDC” to have “definite structure.” Ex. 1013 ¶¶ 35–56. In particular, we find persuasive Dr. Wolfe’s testimony that the term “PDK,” for example, “encompasses at least ‘a collection of circuit components that includes an antenna, a transceiver, and a controller and memory for storing information particular to a user.’” Id. ¶ 35. Dr. Wolfe’s testimony is consistent with the Specification of the ’188 patent. See Ex. 1001, 5:42–6:7, 3:48–62. In particular, the Specification of the ’188 patent describes a microchip that stores information in memory and responds through an antenna when probed, which is consistent with Dr. Wolfe’s testimony. Id.; Ex. 1001, 1:30–62.” slip op. at 19

  • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)UnpatentableUnpatentable

    “differences between the claimed subject matter and the prior art are such that the subject matter, as a whole, “would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains.” KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 406 (2007). The question of obviousness is resolved on the basis of underlying factual determinations including: (1) the scope and content of the prior art; (2) any differences between the claimed subject matter and the prior art; (3) the level of ordinary skill in the art; and (4) objective evidence of non-obviousness. See Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kansas City, 383 U.S. 1, 17–18 (1966).” slip op. at 25

  Patent outcomesUS 9,049,188 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 9,049,188
• Intel Corporation v. Advanced Cluster Systems, Inc.All claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Sep 1, 2026 · IPR2025-00914 · APJ Brian P Murphy · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–19 are unpatentable as obvious over Menon, Trefethen, RS6000, and POEref.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “In determining the level of ordinary skill in the art, various factors may be considered, including the “type of problems encountered in the art; prior art solutions to those problems; rapidity with which innovations are made; sophistication of the technology; and educational level of active workers in the field.” In re GPAC, Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (citing Custom Accessories, Inc. v. Jeffrey-Allan Indus., Inc., 807 F.2d 955, 962 (Fed. Cir. 1986)). “These factors are not exhaustive but are merely a guide to determining the level of ordinary skill in the art.” Daiichi Sankyo Co. v. Apotex, Inc., 501 F.3d 1254, 1256 (Fed. Cir. 2007). There is uncontested evidence in the record before us that reflects the knowledge and We adopt the Petition’s formulation of the level of ordinary skill in the art, which is consistent with the ’679 patent, the prior art of record, and the testimony of both experts.” slip op. at 10

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “The Petition relies on the ordinary and customary meaning of the claim terms consistent with the Phillips standard. Pet. 12–13 (citing 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b)). The Petition also addresses the construction of “peer-to-peer architecture” recited in independent claim 1 of the ’679 patent, a limitation we need not construe to resolve the parties’ dispute in this proceeding. Id. at 13; see, e.g., Wellman, Inc. v. Eastman Chem. Co., 642 F.3d 1355, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (“[C]laim terms need only be construed ‘to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’”) (quoting Vivid Techs., Owner relies on the ordinary and customary meaning of the claim terms consistent with the Phillips standard without further analysis. Resp. 7.” slip op. at 11

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundUnpatentable

    “RS6000 with Menon, namely because RS6000 provides an overview of the IBM SP2 multiprocessor and Menon teaches the use of “IBM SP2, a modern high performance distributed memory multiprocessor” used in the MultiMATLAB system. Id. at 24–25 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 142–145; Ex. 1005, 5–6, 14; Ex. 1007, 1, 11). The Petition also explains why POEref pertains to the field of cluster computing in a parallel operating environment. Id. at 26 (citing Ex.1008, 11 (“PE Software is designed to run on an … RS/6000 network cluster”)); (further citing Ex. 1001, 1:14–15; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 146–149). The Petition contends that a POSITA would have been motivated to combine the teachings of POEref with Menon “because Menon suggests the combination by teaching that MultiMATLAB uses ‘POE, IBM's Parallel Operating Environment.’” Id. at 26–27 (citing Ex. 1005, 6); (further citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 150–153; Ex. 1005, 14; Ex. 1008, 11, 46). We agree with Petitioner’s analysis. We find the Petition’s argument and evidence of a motivation to combine the asserted prior art references in the manner claimed to be compelling, persuasive, consistent with the disclosures in the references, which include internal cross-references to each other, and supported by the expert testimony of Dr. Bajaj.” slip op. at 19

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of success › Teaching awayTeaching away not foundDecided for petitioner

    “skill, upon reading the reference, would be discouraged from following the path set out in the reference, or would be led in a direction divergent from the path that was taken by the applicant.” In re Gurley, 27 F.3d 551, 553 (Fed. Cir. 1994). Patent Owner argues that Menon teaches away from a combination with Trefethen because “Menon expressly states that Trefethen’s first-generation architecture is inadequate for the objectives that motivated the newer design.” Resp. 35–37. The evidence does not support Patent Owner’s position. First, Patent Owner’s teaching away argument is inconsistent with the strong evidence of a motivation to combine Menon and Trefethen discussed above. Second, Patent Owner’s teaching away argument is contrary to the evidence of record for the reasons given in Petitioner’s Reply. Reply 13–15 (e.g., “Menon explicitly cites Trefethen and explains that Menon builds on the teachings of Trefethen.”) (citing Pet. 22; Ex. 1003 ¶ 70; Ex. 1005, 1–3; Ex. 1163 ¶¶ 47–53). We are further persuaded by Dr. Bajaj’s reply testimony: the “MultiMATLAB teachings in Trefethen. In fact, Menon describes enhancing the system of Trefethen. For example, Menon describes a list of “goals” already achieved by MultiMATLAB and then states that the architecture has been “redesigned to achieve two further goals.” One of these two “further goals” is “extensibility,” which Menon achieves by its description of adding “MEX routines” to the system of Trefethen. Far from showing an “incompatibility” between Menon and Trefethen as the POR argues, Menon’s addition of the “MEX routines” to MultiMATLAB shows that such a modification was within the capabilities of a POSITA, because the authors of the Menon paper actually implemented the modification. Ex. 1163 ¶ 49 (citing Ex. 1005, 1–3). Dr. Bajaj’s testimony is unrebutted, credible, and supported by the record. We agree with Dr. Bajaj’s reasoning, which is based on direct quotes in Menon. We further agree with Dr. Bajaj’s conclusion that Menon does not teach away from the combination with Trefethen. Id. ¶¶ 50–52. Menon’s description of building on and enhancing the teachings of Trefethen—the earlier work of the same research group at Cornell—by adding MEX routines to achieve high-performance parallel computing and extensibility for MATLAB, demonstrates a classic motivation for a POSITA to combine the teachings of Menon and Trefethen. RS6000 and POEref are specifically referenced in Menon-Trefethen and add operational details of the parallel operating platform that teach a POSITA how to implement the MultiMATLAB system with a reasonable expectation of success. Such facts are inconsistent with Patent Owner’s teaching away and lack of motivation arguments.” slip op. at 24

  Patent outcomesUS 12,021,679 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 12,021,679
• Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. / Samsung Electronics America, Inc. v. Manufacturing Resources International, Inc.All claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Aug 31, 2026 · IPR2023-00254 · APJ Jameson Lee · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–3, 5–9, 11–13, 15–18, and 20 are unpatentable as obvious over Karppanen and over Yare.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “art. This determination of the level of ordinary skill in the art is consistent with what is reflected by the content of the applied prior art references. Cf. Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1354–55 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (the applied prior art may reflect an appropriate level of skill). Further, our obviousness conclusions would be no different even if Patent Owner’s articulation of the level of ordinary skill in the art is adopted. B.” slip op. at 15

  • Expert testimonyPatent owner expert creditedDecided for patent owner

    “Accordingly, we do not discount Mr. Smith-Gillespie’s testimony” slip op. at 33

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “1. “closed loop” The term “closed loop” is recited in each independent claim. Petitioner asserts that in the Delaware action , the district court construed “closed loop” as “gas pathway within a display housing containing gas that is essentially isolated from external air.” Pet. 11 (citing Ex. 1026, 1). Petitioner asserts that the district court’s construction is the proper construction, in light of the specification and the prosecution history of the ’740 patent. Id. at 11–12. Petitioner explains: The ’740 patent refers to the gas/air, circulating through a closed loop as the circulating gas/air and also as the “isolated gas.” (Ex. 1001, 9:64–10:3, 10:7–9, 10:56–58, 11:30–12:6 (claims reciting circulating gas/air), 3:30–[39], 3:50–52 (specification referring to gas in the closed loop as “circulating gas” and “isolated gas”), FIG. 1.) Moreover, as noted above, the Applicant distinguished the claims from the Thielemans prior art based on the argument that the closed loop must be separate from and in addition to the open loop. (Ex. [1031], pp. 44-45, 160 (Responses filed on 01/07/2019 and 08/15/2019).) The Court’s “closed loop” construction should apply here, though Applicant notes that this claim construction does not affect the applicability of the prior art in this Petition because the art teaches the separate loops. Id. at 12. Petitioner’s characterization of the prosecution history with respect to the Thielemans reference is inaccurate. Our review of the cited portions of the prosecution history reveals that the Applicants did not argue to the Examiner that the closed loop and the open loop must be isolated from each other and cannot mix. Rather, the Applicants argued that Thielemans discloses having an open loop or a closed loop, not both an open loop and a closed loop. Ex. 1031, 44–45, 160. The Applicants also argued that Thielemans’s closed loop is not “about” and is not “encircling” the electronic image assembly. Id. at 160. The cited prosecution history does not support Petitioner’s assertion. Patent Owner explains that the ITC in the related investigation” slip op. at 16

  • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)UnpatentableUnpatentable

    “whether there was an apparent reason to combine the known elements in the fashion claimed by the patent at issue.” KSR, 550 U.S. at 418 (citing In re Kahn, 441 F.3d 977, 988 (Fed. Cir. 2006)). “[T]here must be some articulated reasoning with some rational underpinning to support the legal conclusion of obviousness.” Kahn, 441 F.3d at 988.” slip op. at 34

  Patent outcomesUS 10,506,740 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 10,506,740
• Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. / Samsung Electronics America, Inc. v. Manufacturing Resources International, Inc.All claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Aug 31, 2026 · IPR2023-00221 · APJ Jameson Lee · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–15 are unpatentable as obvious over Karppanen and Larson; the Board found the evidence of obviousness outweighed the evidence of nonobviousness.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “art. This determination of the level of ordinary skill in the art is consistent with what is reflected by the content of the applied prior art references. Cf. Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1354–55 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (the applied prior art may reflect an appropriate level of skill). Further, our obviousness conclusions would be no different even if Patent Owner’s articulation of the level of ordinary skill in the art is adopted. B.” slip op. at 15

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “1. “closed loop” The term “closed loop” is recited in each independent claim.” slip op. at 16

  • Obviousness (§103) › Objective indicia / secondary considerations › NexusObjective indicia no nexusDecided for petitioner

    “for outdoor displays, no one (including Samsung, despite having begun attempting to develop outdoor displays at least by 2005) was successful until Mr. Dunn and Mr. Hubbard conceived of their invention.” PO Resp. 65. Patent Owner cites no evidence for this proposition. Thus, Patent Owner’s assertions regarding Mr. Dunn’s and Mr. Hubbard’s invention satisfying the alleged need are based on unsupported attorney argument. Accordingly, “we conclude that the nexus between the claimed invention and the purported long-felt, unmet need is too attenuated to provide a persuasive rationale for nonobviousness.” In re Karpf, 758 F. App’x 960, 965 (Fed. Cir. 2019).” slip op. at 62

  • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)UnpatentableObjective indicia outweighedUnpatentable

    “and against obviousness, and weighed the evidence accordingly. The evidence of obviousness outweighs the evidence of nonobviousness. Petitioner has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that claim 1 would have been obvious over Karppanen and Larson.” slip op. at 74

  Patent outcomesUS 11,013,142 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 11,013,142
• Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. / Samsung Electronics America, Inc. v. Manufacturing Resources International, Inc.All claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Aug 31, 2026 · IPR2023-00199 · APJ John A Hudalla · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1, 4, 7, and 8 are unpatentable as obvious over Na and Kim (claim 1) and Na and Hong (claims 4, 7, and 8); other grounds were not reached.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

    “Manufacturing Resources International, Inc. (“Patent Owner” or “MRI”) filed a Preliminary Response. Paper 7 (“Prelim. Resp.”). Taking into account the arguments presented by Patent Owner in the preliminary record, we determined that the information presented in the Petition established that there was a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail with respect to its unpatentability challenges. Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 314, we instituted this proceeding on June 20, 2023, as to all challenged claims and all grounds of unpatentability presented in the Petition. Paper 9 (“Dec. on Inst.”).” slip op. at 2

  • ExcludeMotion to exclude, deniedDenied

    “Petitioner’s Motion to Strike Petitioner moves to strike Exhibits 2055, 2056, and 2058–2061 as being improper new evidence filed by Patent Owner with its Sur-reply in contravention of 37 C.F.R. § 42.23(b). Exclude Mot. 1–5. We have not relied on any of these exhibits in rendering this Decision. Accordingly, we dismiss as moot Petitioner’s Motion to Strike.” slip op. at 73

  • Skill levelSkill level board ownDecided for patent owner

    “record, we adopted the following definition of the level of ordinary skill in our Decision on Institution: [A] POSITA would have had a bachelor’s degree in a pertinent discipline, such as mechanical engineering, physics, applied physics, product design, or a related field, and would also have had 2–4 years of experience working with electronic displays, including the thermal management, product design issues, and failure modes, associated with such displays, or 5–7 years of experience in the field working with electronic displays and would have developed a similar understanding of thermal management, product design issues, and failure modes, associated with electronic displays. Dec. on Inst. 11. The parties’ positions have not changed since the time of institution, and we discern no reason to change the definition. Thus, we apply the same definition. We are satisfied that this definition comports with the level of skill necessary to understand and implement the teachings of the ’595 patent and the asserted prior art. Notwithstanding, we note that our analysis would not change if we adopted either party’s proposed definition in toto.” slip op. at 12

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedPatent owner expert discountedDecided for petitioner

    “appear nowhere outside of the claims in the ’595 patent. This fact alone tends to undermine Patent Owner’s suggestion that the “posterior surface” must be distinct from the “rear side.” In addition, Patent Owner’s cited portions of the Specification merely refer to the “posterior surface” as being the surface opposite that on which the LEDs are mounted to which heat from the LEDs is transferred. See Ex. 1001, 4:53–55, 4:57–60. They are inconclusive as to whether the “posterior surface” must be distinct from the “rear side.” Further, Mr. Gershowitz’s testimony in support of a “distinct” construction is based on his interpretation of the words “on the” in claim 4’s recited “posterior surface on the rear side of the PCB.” Ex. 2006 ¶ 128. Specifically, he testifies that “[i]f the posterior surface was the rear side of the PCB, the claim would have said so.” Id. He does not cite any support in the Specification of the ’595 patent for his interpretation. See id. Given that his testimony amounts to speculation divorced from the context of the Specification, Mr. Gershowitz’s testimony is entitled to little weight. We also have considered Mr. Smith-Gillespie’s testimony in support of Petitioner’s contention that an ordinarily skilled artisan “would have understood that the rear outermost surface of the PCB is the recited ‘posterior surface.’” Pet. Reply 20 (citing Pet. 83; Ex. 1002 ¶ 243). He cites a passage in the Specification of the ’595 patent that states: “The PCB may comprise a metal core PCB and the posterior surface of the PCB may be metallic so that air within the constricted convection channel may cool the metallic posterior surface (and subsequently the backlight assembly) more easily and efficiently.” Ex. 1002 ¶ 243 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Ex. 1001, 4:60–65). We accord Mr. Smith-Gillespie’s testimony more weight than Mr. Gershowitz’s testimony given that Mr. Smith-Gillespie’s testimony is rooted in disclosures about metal core PCBs in the ’595 patent. It also gives some credence to the notion that the “posterior surface” and the “rear side” could be one and the same. Based on the record before us, we do not agree with Patent Owner that” slip op. at 19

  Patent outcomesUS 8,854,595 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 8,854,595
• Intel Corporation v. Advanced Cluster Systems, Inc.All claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Aug 26, 2026 · IPR2025-00913 · APJ Brian P Murphy · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–30 are unpatentable: claims 1–25, 27–28, and 30 as obvious over Menon, Trefethen, RS6000, and POEref; claims 26 and 29 over those references plus MPIref.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “may be considered, including the “type of problems encountered in the art; prior art solutions to those problems; rapidity with which innovations are made; sophistication of the technology; and educational level of active workers in the field.” In re GPAC, Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (citing Custom Accessories, Inc. v. Jeffrey-Allan Indus., Inc., 807 F.2d 955, 962 (Fed. Cir. 1986)). “These factors are not exhaustive but are merely a guide to determining the level of ordinary skill in the art.” Daiichi Sankyo Co. v. Apotex, Inc., 501 F.3d 1254, 1256 (Fed. Cir. 2007). There is uncontested evidence in the record before us that reflects the knowledge and experience of a POSITA. We adopt the Petition’s formulation of the level of ordinary skill in the art, which is consistent with the ’034 patent, the prior art of record, and the testimony of both experts.” slip op. at 11

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed petitioner constructionOther

    “processor,” “multi-core” processor, or “singular ‘hardware processor’ that ‘comprises’ (or ‘with’) multiple ‘processing cores’” as Patent Owner contends. Resp. 11–12, 21; see also Ex. 1163 ¶ 22 (“The claim does not recite ‘single chip,’ ‘single package,’ ‘single die,’ or ‘single multi-core microprocessor.’”). Nor do the claims recite a plurality of processing cores “within” a single-chip package or read as “multi-core within a processor” as argued by Patent Owner. Resp. 12–14; Sur-Reply 2; see Reply 6 (citing Ex. 1163 ¶ 23 (“Thus, the phrase ‘with a plurality of processing cores’ identifies the required processing resources associated with the hardware processor; it does not import a packaging limitation.”)). The claims do recite a hardware processor “with” a plurality of processing cores; a critical distinction even Patent Owner reads as open-ended, i.e., as a hardware processor that “comprises” a plurality of processing cores. See Resp. 11 (“the claims require a singular ‘hardware processor’ that ‘comprises’ (or ‘with’) multiple ‘processing cores’”). Consequently, the claim language does not support Patent Owner’s proposed construction of “a . . . hardware processor with a plurality of processing cores” as a single multi-core processor. cores it contains” in reliance on a parsed description in the ’034 patent specification: The specification explains: “Each processor can contain one or more processor cores that are capable of single-threaded execution. Processor cores are generally independent microprocessors, but more than one can be included in a single-chip package.” Id. at 1212 (partially quoting Ex. 1001, 5:11–16); Sur-Reply 2. The quoted description does not support Patent Owner’s contention that the claimed “a . . . hardware processor with a plurality of processing cores” must be limited to a “single multi-core processor” that “locates multiple cores within a ‘single-chip package,’” i.e. limited to a single multi-core microprocessor such as “a Core 2 Duo is one processor package with two cores.” Resp. 12– 13, 21 (citing Ex. 1001, 7:15–25). The description quoted above from column 5, moreover, describes a “processor” that “can contain one or more processor cores” each of which can be an independent microprocessor. Reply 2–3 (citing Ex. 1001, 5:11–16; Ex. 1163 ¶¶ 10–14). As Petitioner emphasizes, the specification distinguishes a “processor” from a “microprocessor” and describes a “processor” that “can be one or more general purpose single-core or multi-core microprocessors,” rather than limiting a “processor” to a single multi-core microprocessor. Reply 3–5 (citing Ex. 1001, 7:14–36, Fig. 1; Ex. 1163 ¶¶ 15–18).” slip op. at 13

  • Obviousness (§103) › Analogous artAnalogous artDecided for petitioner

    “art because they pertain to the same “field of cluster computing” as the ’034 patent and “are reasonably pertinent to the problem of the ’034 patent, namely, executing a single program on multiple nodes.” Pet. 22 (citing Ex. 1001, 1:14–15; Ex. 1003, ¶¶ 65–69; Ex. 1005, 2; Ex. 1006, Abstract). The Petition emphasizes that Menon expressly cites and builds on the MultiMATLAB system taught by Trefethen. Id. (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 71; Ex. 1005, 1–2). The Petition contends that: combination of prior art elements according to known methods (executing MATLAB code on a multiprocessor system) to yield the predictable result discussed in both papers: the MultiMATLAB system executing MATLAB in parallel to perform mathematical calculations. Id. at 22–23 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 70; Ex. 1005, Abstract; Ex. 1006, 2–7). The Petition further contends that a POSITA would have found it predictable to combine Trefethen with Menon with a reasonable expectation of success “because researchers had a strong desire to parallelize MATLAB.” Id. at 23–24 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 73; Ex. 1005, 2; Ex. 1006, 11–12.)” slip op. at 27

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundDecided for petitioner

    “A POSITA would have had an especially strong reason to read these references together because they address the same project, the same MATLAB-based parallel-computing problem, and the same MultiMATLAB command environment. Menon expressly identifies Trefethen’s MultiMATLAB work and then describes a redesigned architecture that preserves the same user-level objective––parallel MATLAB computations—while improving implementation details and extensibility. A POSITA therefore would not view the references as mutually exclusive alternatives. Rather, a POSITA would understand Trefethen as teaching specific MultiMATLAB commands and examples, including Eval, Send, Recv, and the architecture was implemented and improved in a later version. Ex. 1163 ¶¶ 71–72 (emphases added). We find the above reasoning persuasive and adopt it as our own. Petitioner and Dr. Bajaj demonstrate a sound technical motivation for a POSITA—someone having a bachelor’s degree in computer science, computer engineering, or electrical engineering and two years of experience working in the field of cluster computing or parallel processing—to combine Menon and Trefethen: to improve MATLAB’s operational performance and extensibility in a parallel operating environment. Menon builds on Trefethen to improve and extend the parallel processing capabilities of MultiMATLAB: “This system will enable users to access high-performance parallel routines from within the MATLAB environment, to extend the environment with new parallel routines, and to use these routines to develop parallel applications with the MATLAB language.” Ex. 1005 Abstract. Menon is intended to be read in conjunction with Trefethen, as would be expected from two references generated by the same research group at the same university addressed to the same technical subject matter about a year apart. Ex. 1005, 1; Ex. 1006, Ex. 1086 ¶¶ 65, 101, 102. The very first citation in Menon is to Trefethen. Ex. 1005, 2, 16.” slip op. at 30

  Patent outcomesUS 11,570,034 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 11,570,034
• Apple Inc. v. Ferid AllaniAll claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Aug 25, 2026 · IPR2025-00857 · APJ Jeffrey S Smith · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–27 are unpatentable: claims 24 and 26 over Rossmann and Himmel; claims 1–2, 4–6, 10–23, 25, and 27 over Rossmann, Himmel, King, and Adar; claims 3 and 7–9 over those references and Boyle.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “we consider the type of problems encountered in the art, the prior art solutions to those problems, the rapidity with which innovations are made, the sophistication of the technology, and the educational level of active workers in the field. See Custom Accessories, Inc. v. Jeffrey-Allan Industries, Inc., 807 F.2d 955, 962 (Fed. Cir. 1986); see Orthopedic Equip. Co. v. United States, 702 F.2d 1005, 1011 (Fed. Cir. 1983).” slip op. at 6

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITAPlain and ordinary meaningDecided for patent owner

    “meaning of “icon” as claimed, including the dependent claims, the specification, the prosecution history, and the extrinsic evidence including expert testimony and dictionary definitions, we determine that the plain meaning of “icon” is readily apparent from the claims themselves. See Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1314 (“In some cases, the ordinary meaning of claim language as understood by a person of ordinary skill in the art may be readily apparent even to lay judges.”). We find that the plain meaning of “icon” as claimed encompasses at least “textual elements” because claim 20 recites “the icons comprise textual elements.” See id. (“Other claims of the patent in question, both asserted and unasserted, can also be valuable sources of enlightenment as to the meaning of a claim term.”). We highlight that the additional intrinsic evidence cited by the parties is consistent with the plain meaning. For example, Figures 1 and 2 of the specification show icons comprising textual elements. As another example, during prosecution of the ’058 patent, the Examiner found that the claimed icons were taught by textual hyperlinks. Ex. 1002, 586, 592. In order to overcome the Examiner’s rejection and obtain an allowance (id. at 641–50), applicant subsequently amended the claims to recite “specifically designed,” thus implicitly conceding to the Examiner’s interpretation of icon as encompassing textual hyperlinks. Id. at 625–640; see PO Resp. 43–44 (citing Ex. 1002, 626–27, 645–46) (acknowledging that the Examiner allowed the claims because applicant amended the claims to recite “specifically designed for containing a set of icons.”).” slip op. at 11

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Prosecution history disclaimer / disavowalTerm construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner

    “Requiring an element to be "specifically designed" for another element narrows the claim because it requires more than the first element being merely capable of being used with the second element. The term "configured to" is generally construed narrowly to mean "made to" and "designed to" rather than broadly to require merely "capable of". See In re Giannelli, 739 F. 3d 1375, 1379-80 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (the phrase "configured to" requires more than "mere capability." Rather, that term is synonymous with "made to" and "designed to."). However, rather than use "configured to", in order to avoid any confusion as to the narrower scope of the claims as amended, Applicant herein directly and explicitly requires "designed to." In re Giannelli at 1379-80 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (reversing an obviousness rejection because (1) the claims were properly construed narrowly to mean "designed to" and not broadly to encompass merely "capable of", and (2) the USPTO had not explained the motivation for modifying the prior art to meet the "design to" requirement) See also MPEP 2111.04, citing to In re Giannelli, for the proposition that a claim can be narrowed to require that it be "designed and constructed to be used" in a specific manner (as a rowing machine in the case of In re Giannelli). Logan has not been specifically designed and constructed in the required manner, so it does not cure all deficiencies of the primary reference Iki (which lacks any tree menu structure). Logan describes only "remote web" pages 90, 95 that are merely pages retrieved from Web browsing and stored in a web computer 25. Iki as modified by Logan would result on in a tree menu structure wherein not all levels of the tree included the required selection pages specifically designed for containing the claimed set of icons. Ex. 1002, 626–27 (emphasis omitted).” slip op. at 14

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundUnpatentable

    “Petitioner contends that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have modified Rossmann to include several advantages expressly taught by Himmel: Himmel’s consumer hot list bookmark set for the benefits of providing a user with a consistent user interface when accessing a website; to simplify navigation for the user by providing an additional navigation aid; to provide more immediate access to commonly used web actions; to reduce the network traffic required to navigate through webpages to arrive at a particular web function; and to reduce usage charges and data usage. Pet. 22–23 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 94–99; Ex. 1004, 2:38–56, 12:24–34, 14:35–44; Ex. 1005, 18:63–65, 20:11–16). Petitioner contends that modifying Rossmann’s Figures 4A through 4G to include Himmel’s consumer hot list bookmark set yields each selection page including both selection icons for navigating to other local pages along with direct access icons such as on sale today to directly navigate to a predetermined web site to perform a common web action. Id. at 23–25 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 96–100; Ex. 1004, Figs. 4D–F). Petitioner contends that the selection page of Rossmann as modified by the bookmark set of Himmel teaches a first locally stored page specifically designed to include a direct access icon because the selection page is “used to include” a direct access icon, such as on sale today, and that during use, this selection page is programmed to display the set of direct access icons for selection by the user. Pet. 25 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 96–100); see id. at 21–24. Petitioner contends that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had a reasonable expectation of success because technology for bookmarking websites and web actions was known at the time of invention, modifying Rossmann to utilize known bookmark manager software would have been straight forward, Rossmann already includes hardware and programming instructions to access a web server, and Himmel teaches that known prior art methods utilized both selection and direct access icons on a single page. Id. at 25–26 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 101–103; Ex. 1004, 2:38–41, 14:21–44; Ex. 1005, Fig. 6A, 21:27–34).” slip op. at 19

  Patent outcomesUS 10,943,058 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips
  Patents in suitUS 10,943,058
• Yealink (USA) Network Technology Co. Ltd. / Yealink Network Technology Co., Ltd. v. Barco N.V.All claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jul 28, 2026 · IPR2025-00491 · APJ Frederick C Laney · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–18 are unpatentable as obvious over Beel and Dinka, with or without Christison; the Kaplan, Van de Laar, and Christison ground fails for lack of motivation to combine.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Pet. 9–10 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 36–37). “Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s proposed level of skill in the art.” PO Resp. 6. On the complete record, we adopt Petitioner’s proposed definition of a person of ordinary skill in the pertinent art, as it is consistent with the ’972 patent and the asserted prior art. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001).” slip op. at 10

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededPlain and ordinary meaningDecided for patent owner

    “Rather than addressing Petitioner’s proposals, Patent Owner states “the claims of the ’972 Patent require no construction as they are valid under their plain and ordinary meaning.” PO Resp. 6. Our decision in this matter does not turn on resolving any particular differences between the parties’ constructions. Therefore, because only those terms in controversy need to be construed, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy, we determine that no claim term requires express construction in this proceeding and that the ordinary and customary meaning of the claim terms apply. See Realtime Data LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019).” slip op. at 11

  • Expert testimonyPatent owner expert discountedDecided for petitioner

    “device. The ’972 patent expressly defines endpoints broadly “as data sources or sinks.” Ex. 1001, 7:64–67. And the ’972 patent admits that Beel’s Figure 11 discloses the same endpoints depicted in the ’972 patent’s own Figure 4. Id. at 4:28–33, 16:44–67. Beel’s Figure 11 and accompanying description disclose a “[m]ass storage device 12,” a “USB audio device 14,” and a “USB HID device 13” on the peripheral device. Ex. 1005, Fig. 11, ¶¶ 320–323. Patent Owner’s own declarant conceded that a mass storage device is “a type of endpoint” (Ex. 1034, 43:19–21), and that “audio devices are endpoints” (id. at 57:5–61:4). We give reduced weight to Patent Owner’s contrary position to the extent it rests on the premise that a reference cannot disclose an endpoint unless it uses the word “endpoint” (Ex. 2030 ¶ 94; Ex. 1034, 43:19–44:16, 72:18–73:12); a premise that is inconsistent with the ’972 patent’s own broad definition and with the ’972 patent’s admission regarding Beel’s Figure 11. As additional support not separately emphasized by the parties in this connection, we note Dr. Almeroth’s technical explanation that, for data to pass from a functional device to a peripheral device, “both the functional device and the peripheral device must have ‘endpoints’”—a data source and a data sink—reasoning consistent with the ’972 patent’s definition. Ex. 1002 ¶ 125.” slip op. at 27

  • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)UnpatentableUnpatentable

    “First, we agree with Patent Owner that, under the ordinary meaning of the claim language, the endpoint is an endpoint of the peripheral device, and that it must be “a data source or a data sink which is able to store or emit data, of the functional device exposed or made available on the first peripheral device.” Ex. 1001, 23:11–17. The limitation thus identifies a structure—an endpoint, residing on the peripheral device, that is a source or sink and that corresponds to (is “of”) the functional device—through which the communication recited in subsequent element (g) is carried out. By its terms, it imposes no requirement as to the direction in which data flows; it requires only that the endpoint be a data “source” or a data “sink” that is able to “store or emit” data. The operative transmit-and-receive communication “from the functional device to the processing device via the . . . endpoint” is recited in subsequent element (g), which we take up separately below. The disputed question under this limitation is therefore the structural one: whether Beel discloses, on the peripheral device, an endpoint that is “of the functional device.” Because the inquiry is structural and non-directional, we are not persuaded that the audio-out orientation of Beel’s described embodiment, on which Patent Owner relies, is dispositive of this limitation. device. The ’972 patent expressly defines endpoints broadly “as data sources or sinks.” Ex. 1001, 7:64–67. And the ’972 patent admits that Beel’s Figure 11 discloses the same endpoints depicted in the ’972 patent’s own Figure 4. Id. at 4:28–33, 16:44–67. Beel’s Figure 11 and accompanying description disclose a “[m]ass storage device 12,” a “USB audio device 14,” and a “USB HID device 13” on the peripheral device. Ex. 1005, Fig. 11, ¶¶ 320–323. Patent Owner’s own declarant conceded that a mass storage device is “a type of endpoint” (Ex. 1034, 43:19–21), and that “audio devices are endpoints” (id. at 57:5–61:4). We give reduced weight to Patent Owner’s contrary position to the extent it rests on the premise that a reference cannot disclose an endpoint unless it uses the word “endpoint” (Ex. 2030 ¶ 94; Ex. 1034, 43:19–44:16, 72:18–73:12); a premise that is inconsistent with the ’972 patent’s own broad definition and with the ’972 patent’s admission regarding Beel’s Figure 11. As additional support not separately emphasized by the parties in this connection, we note Dr. Almeroth’s technical explanation that, for data to pass from a functional device to a peripheral device, “both the functional device and the peripheral device must have ‘endpoints’”—a data source and a data sink—reasoning consistent with the ’972 patent’s definition. Ex. 1002 ¶ 125. Third, we find that the endpoint Beel discloses is a data source or a data sink that is “able to store or emit data, of the functional device.” We begin with the words of the limitation. The endpoint need only be “able to store or emit data”—language of capability, not a requirement that particular data actually traverse the endpoint in operation, and still less in a particular direction. And the endpoint is defined by the character of the data it handles: it is “a data source or a data sink,” which the ’972 patent instructs An audio endpoint, so understood, is characterized as an audio source or sink; its structure is not tied to any single instance of an audio device. On that understanding, Beel’s disclosure establishes the required capability directly. Beel discloses that “audio data is captured through a virtual sound card interface added as a logical device over the physical interface provided in the peripheral device,” Ex. 1005 ¶ 43, that the peripheral device “acts as a composite device comprising for instance a (virtual) audio speaker device,” id. ¶ 317, and that “audio data is captured at this interface . . . internally in the peripheral device 32” and streamed over the communications network, id. ¶ 319. Beel thus shows the endpoint on the peripheral device actually storing and emitting audio—and, correspondingly, video—data, which is the very type of data produced and consumed by the audio/visual functional devices connected to the base unit, including the microphones, cameras, speakers, and displays. Id. ¶ 120. An endpoint shown to store or emit audio and video data is necessarily one that is “able to store or emit” such data; the capability the limitation requires is thus established by Beel’s disclosure.” slip op. at 26

  Patent outcomesUS 10,684,972 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 10,684,972
• Amazon.Com, Inc. / Amazon.Com Services LLC et al. v. Soundclear Technologies LLCAll claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jul 27, 2026 · IPR2025-00565 · APJ Michael R Zecher · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–5 are unpatentable because Amazon showed they are anticipated by Shin; the Board did not reach Amazon’s contingent obviousness ground over Shin.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • BurdenOther

    “Written Decision under 35 U.S.C. § 318(a) as to the patentability of claims 1–5 of the ’337 patent. For the reasons we identify below, we hold that Amazon has demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that these claims are unpatentable.” slip op. at 2

  • Skill levelOther

    “2. Level of Skill in the Art In determining whether an invention would have been obvious, we” slip op. at 18

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableUnpatentable

    “1. Principles of Law To establish anticipation, “all of the elements and limitations of the” slip op. at 17

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successUnpatentableNot shown unpatentableMixed

    “1. Principles of Law To establish anticipation, “all of the elements and limitations of the” slip op. at 17

  Patent outcomesUS 11,069,337 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 11,069,337

Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.