- Apple, Inc. v. Corephotonics Ltd.No claims unpatentablePTAB · Nov 8, 2021 · IPR2020-00905 · APJ John F Horvath · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–16, 18, 23–38, and 40 were not shown unpatentable because the asserted obviousness combinations did not establish a fused image with both Wide perspective and position POV.
RulingsFinal written decision- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner
“In a dual-aperture camera image plane, as seen by each sub-camera (and respective image sensor), a given object will be shifted and have different perspective (shape). This is referred to as point-of-view (POV). The system output image can have the shape and position of either sub-camera image or the shape or position of a combination thereof. If the output image retains the Wide image shape then it has the Wide perspective POV. If it retains the Wide camera position then it has the Wide position POV. The same applies for Tele images position and perspective. As used in this description, the perspective POV may be of the Wide or Tele sub-cameras, while the position POV may shift continuously between the Wide and Tele sub-cameras. In fused images, it is possible to register Tele image pixels to a matching pixel set within the Wide image pixels, in which case the output image will retain the Wide POV ("Wide fusion"). Ex. 1001, 5:10–26.” slip op. at 10
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundDecided for petitioner
“We find Petitioner sets forth sufficient reasoning with rational underpinning to combine the teachings of Parulski and Konno. Parulski lenses, but fails to give lens prescription data for the two camera lenses. Konno discloses lens prescription data for a dual-lens camera utilizing two thin lenses. The combination, therefore, is one of familiar elements according to known methods to obtain predictable results or a substitution of one element for another known in the field to obtain a predictable result. See KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 416 (2007).” slip op. at 17
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“We agree with Patent Owner. As we explain in § II.D.1, supra, claims 1 and 23 require generating a fused image having a Wide perspective POV and a Wide position POV. Petitioner’s only argument for how the combination of Parulski and Konno teaches this limitation is Parulski’s teaching of generating a fused image having a Wide position POV, i.e., having the field of view (FOV) of the Wide camera. See Pet. Reply 13 (“Parulski teaches . . . producing an output image that maintains the Wide position POV or the field of view of the Wide camera when the image was captured.”). Petitioner fails to demonstrate how Parulski’s image fusion method would also maintain the Wide perspective POV as required by independent claims 1 and 23. Accordingly, for the reasons discussed above, Petitioner has failed to demonstrate by a preponderance of evidence that claims 1 and 23 are unpatentable as obvious over the combination of Parulski and Konno.” slip op. at 21
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert discountedDecided for patent owner
“Patent Owner argues that Petitioner and Dr. Durand have failed to demonstrate that Parulski teaches “the ‘fused image with a point of view (POV) of the Wide camera’ limitation” because their “sole argument that Parulski meets this limitation is based on the output [image] having the ‘wide image’s field of view.’” PO Resp. 29 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 51). Patent Owner further argues that “[n]othing in Parulski suggests that whatever image data from the tele image that might be ‘fused’ into the output would be modified to have the shapes and positions from the wide image POV” and “nothing in Dr. Durand’s declaration even attempts to establish [that] this admitted during his deposition that he had not provided an opinion about whether Parulski generates a fused image having both a Wide perspective POV and a Wide position POV. See PO Sur-Reply 5 (citing Ex. 2041, 52:25–54:20). We agree with Patent Owner. As we explain in § II.D.1, supra, claims 1 and 23 require generating a fused image having a Wide perspective POV and a Wide position POV. Petitioner’s only argument for how the combination of Parulski and Konno teaches this limitation is Parulski’s teaching of generating a fused image having a Wide position POV, i.e., having the field of view (FOV) of the Wide camera. See Pet. Reply 13 (“Parulski teaches . . . producing an output image that maintains the Wide position POV or the field of view of the Wide camera when the image was captured.”). Petitioner fails to demonstrate how Parulski’s image fusion method would also maintain the Wide perspective POV as required by independent claims 1 and 23.” slip op. at 20
Patent outcomesUS 10,225,479 not shown unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSRPatents in suitUS 10,225,479 - Xactware Solutions, Inc. v. Pictometry International Corp.No claims unpatentablePTAB · Aug 28, 2017 · IPR2016-00593 · APJ Garth D Baer · IPR · Final written decision
The Board held that claims 12–15, 21–23, 25–27, 33–38, 44, and 45 were not shown unpatentable because Pictometry was not established as a publicly accessible printed publication.
RulingsFinal written decision- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Prior-art status of a reference › Printed publication / public accessibilityPrinted publication not establishedNot shown unpatentable
“Version 2.7 (“EFS 2.7 User Guide,” “Pictometry,” or “User Guide”) and, as the name suggests, is a user guide for the Pictometry software product. See Ex. 1004, xiii. Patent Owner argues that Petitioner does not demonstrate that Pictometry is prior art. PO Resp. 5–10. In our Final Written Decision in IPR2016-00594, we considered substantively the same arguments and evidence Patent Owner and Petitioner raise in this case. See IPR2016-00594 FWD 17–29; compare IPR2016-00594 Paper 31, 13–20 with PO Resp. 6– 13; and compare IPR2016-00594 Paper 33, 3–9 with Reply 4–11. In IPR2016-00594, we found Pictometry’s limited dissemination to some governmental entities subject to licensing restrictions was not sufficient to show public dissemination or public accessibility. IPR2016-00594 FWD 17–29. We adopt that same finding here. For the reasons explained in IPR2016-00594, we find that Petitioner has not established by a preponderance of the evidence that Pictometry was publicly accessible so as to render it a printed publication under 35 U.S.C. §§ 102(b) and 311(b).” slip op. at 6
- ExcludeMotion to exclude, grantedMotion to exclude, deniedGranted in part
“substantively the same as the arguments made in IPR2016-00594. In IPR2016-00594, we denied Patent Owner’s motion to exclude Exhibit 1004 (Pictometry), Exhibit 1011 (a Merriam-Webster Dictionary Definition “database” copied from a web page), Exhibit 2010 (Cohasset Town Report 2008), 2011 (LARIAC1 Pictometry Training), Exhibit 2012 (LAR-IAC2 Product Guide), Exhibit 2020 (“GIS: Pictometry: Oblique Imagery training), Exhibit 2021 (“Pictometry License Guidelines”), and Exhibit 2022 (“Pictometry – April 19, 2007”). IPR2016-00594 FWD 5–17. We granted Patent Owner’s motion to exclude Exhibit 2013 (article titled “Los Angeles County Extends its License Agreement with Pictometry for New Oblique Aerial Photos”), Exhibit 2014 (“Pictometry Administrative Training”), Exhibit 2015 (“Information about TXWILM Administrative Training”), Exhibit 2016 (“Pictometry Administrative Training”), Exhibit 2019 (“GIS Working Group Meeting Minutes”), Exhibit 2023 (“Welcome to Your End User Training”), Exhibit 2024 (“Electronic Field Study Getting Started Guide”), Exhibit 2025 (“Pictometry Announces Technical Advancements for GIS Professionals1”), and Exhibit 2026 (“Pictometry Announces Technical Advancements for GIS Professionals2”). Id. We adopt the same findings and conclusions here. For the reasons explained in IPR2016-00594, we deny the motion to exclude Exhibits 1004, 1011, 2010, 2011, 2020, 2021, and 2022, but grant the motion to exclude Exhibits 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016, 2019, 2023, 2024, 2025, and 2026. See id.” slip op. at 5
Patent outcomesUS 8,823,732 not shown unpatentable§ 102 anticipationPatents in suitUS 8,823,732 - Xactware Solutions, Inc. v. Pictometry International Corp.No claims unpatentablePTAB · Aug 24, 2017 · IPR2016-00594 · APJ Bryan F Moore · IPR · Final written decision
Petitioner did not prove claims 1–10 and 13–20 unpatentable because it failed to establish that Pictometry was a publicly accessible printed publication.
RulingsFinal written decision- ExcludeMixed
“Mot. Reply 3. Given the sequence of events, there is no prejudice to Petitioner, who introduced these documents and was served objections at an early stage. Patent Owner apparently cited to the documents in its Patent Owner Response to preserve the right to substantively respond to these documents rather than wait to see if they were presented in Petitioner’s Reply. Pursuant to our discretion under 37 C.F.R. § 42.5(c)(3), we do not dismiss Patent Owner’s Motion to Exclude due to allegedly untimely filed objections.” slip op. at 6
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Prior-art status of a reference › Printed publication / public accessibilityPrinted publication not establishedNot shown unpatentable
“are also prohibited. Id. The MAPC Agreement states under “Confidentiality of Licensed Products” that the Licensed Products are commercially valuable, proprietary products owned by Pictometry and are treated by Pictometry as confidential and contain substantial trade secrets of Pictometry. Ex. 2009, 16, Article 8.4. The licensee agrees that it will not disclose, provide a copy of, or disseminate the Licensed Products and that its personnel will protect the Licensed Products from unauthorized use, disclosure, copying, and dissemination, and that access to the Licensed Products and each part thereof will be strictly limited. Id. We acknowledge that these represent significant limitations on the dissemination of the User Guide.” slip op. at 21
- BurdenDecided for patent owner
“involving the EFS software and provides no evidence that the EFS software and the EFS 2.7 User Guide were actually maintained confidential by the parties of the MAPC Agreement, or that the EFS software and the EFS 2.7 User Guide were inaccessible to those of ordinary skill in the art.” Reply 9. However, this improperly puts the burden to disprove public accessibility on Patent Owner. Although Patent Owner challenges whether Pictometry is a printed publication, the burden remains on Petitioner to demonstrate unpatentability. See Dynamic Drinkware, LLC v. Nat’l Graphics, Inc., 800 F.3d 1375, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (citing Tech. Licensing Corp. v. Videotek, Inc., 545 F.3d 1316, 1326–27 (Fed. Cir. 2008)) (discussing the burden of proof in an inter partes review). Petitioner must demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that the challenged claims are unpatentable, and one aspect of such a showing is that the references relied upon are patents or printed publications. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 311(b) 316(e).” slip op. at 22
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“preponderance of the evidence that Pictometry was publicly accessible so as to render it a printed publication under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b). C. Anticipation of Claims by Pictometry Petitioner asserts that claims 1–10 and 13–20 are unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) as anticipated by Pictometry. Pet. 16. As noted above, we determine that Petitioner has not shown that Pictometry is a printed publication under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b). Thus, Petitioner has not established by a preponderance of the evidence that that claims 1–10 and 13–20 are unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) as anticipated by Pictometry.” slip op. at 29
Patent outcomesUS 8,542,880 not shown unpatentable§ 102 anticipationPatents in suitUS 8,542,880 - Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. / Micron Technology, Inc. et al. v. Elm 3ds Innovations, LLCNo claims unpatentablePTAB · Aug 22, 2017 · IPR2016-00770 · APJ Glenn J Perry · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 12, 13, 24, 36, 37, 38, 83, 86, 87, and 132 were not shown unpatentable over the asserted combinations because the evidence did not establish substantial flexibility or motivation for the proposed dielectric substitutions.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner, with support of its declarant Paul D. Franzon, Ph.D., contends that one of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the inventions of the challenge patents “would have had at least a B.S. degree in electrical engineering, material science, or equivalent thereof, and at least 3–5 years of experience in the relevant field, e.g., semiconductor processing.” Pet. 7 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 52–53). Dr. Franzon’s testimony as to the level of 12 ordinary skill is based on “the type of problems encountered in the art, prior art solutions to those problems, the rapidity with which innovations are made, the sophistication of the technology, and the educational level of active workers in the field.” Ex. 1002 ¶ 53. Patent Owner did not propose expressly a particular level of ordinary skill. See generally PO Resp. At the oral hearing, Petitioner indicatedthat there did not seem to be any dispute as to the correct level of ordinary skill. Tr. 112:11–14 (“I don’t think there was any dispute about whether [Dr. Franzon’s proposed level of ordinary skill] was the correct level of skill, although Patent Owner can correct me.”). Having reviewed the prior art asserted in these proceedings (see, e.g., Exs. 1004–07, 1009, 2160), we determine that the level of ordinary skill proposed by Petitioner’s declarant is consistent with the challenged patent and the referenced prior art, and we adopt Petitioner’s proposed definition of the level of ordinary skill in the art for the purposes of the analysis below.” slip op. at 12
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for patent owner
“In the context of the Elm 3DS family, we find that the broadest reasonable interpretation of “substantially flexible” is the same as our construction under the Philips standard, which was the standard applied in IPR2016-00386. Under the broadest reasonable construction standard, we presume a claim term carries its ordinary and customary meaning, which “is the meaning that the term would have to a person of ordinary skill in the art in question” at the time of the invention. In re Translogic Tech., Inc., 504 F.3d 1249, 1257 (Fed. Cir. 2007). As discussed in detail in the Final Written Decisions in IPR2016-00386, IPR2016-00387, and IPR2016- 00388, the ordinary and customary meaning of “substantially flexible” is “largely able to bend without breaking.” Also as discussed extensively in” slip op. at 14
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot shown unpatentableMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentable
“same as set forth in IPR2016-00708. Each of the challenged claims in this review require the use of a dielectric having a stress of less than 5 x 108 dynes/cm2 tensile. The evidentiary record in this case with regard to dielectric substitution adds nothing further to the evidentiary record established in IPR2016-00708. For the same reasons set forth in our Final Written Decision in IPR2016-00708, we determine that Petitioner has not met its burden to demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have made the proposed dielectric substitution.” slip op. at 21
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“As noted in our claim construction section, above and as referenced in our Final Written Decision in IPR2016-00386, a preponderance of the evidence establishes that, in the context of semiconductor substrates, mere thinning is not the same as flexibility—being able to bend without breaking. 20 Although Petitioner presents arguments attempting to demonstrate thinning, there are no arguments that this thinning necessarily results in flexibility. Thus, we determine that Petitioner has not met its burden to demonstrate that the required “substantial flexibility.” This reason alone sufficiently supports our conclusion. However, we also conclude, as set forth below that for a second, independent reason, Petitioner has not established that the challenged claims are unpatentable. Petitioner has not sufficiently established that one of ordinary skill would have substituted the dielectric material of Leedy ’695 for the various layers proposed for substitution in Hsu. Therefore we do not credit Leedy ’695 as providing any potential “substantial flexibility” to Hsu.” slip op. at 20
Patent outcomesUS 8,907,499 not shown unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSRPatents in suitUS 8,907,499 - Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. / Micron Technology, Inc. et al. v. Elm 3ds Innovations, LLCNo claims unpatentablePTAB · Aug 8, 2017 · IPR2016-00708 · APJ Glenn J Perry · IPR · Final written decision
Claim 1 was not shown unpatentable because the evidence did not establish substantial flexibility or a reason and reasonable expectation of success for the proposed dielectric substitutions.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner, with support of its declarant Paul D. Franzon, Ph.D., contends that one of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the inventions of the challenge patents “would have had at least a B.S. degree in electrical engineering, material science, or equivalent thereof, and at least 3–5 years of experience in the relevant field, e.g., semiconductor processing.” Pet. 5 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 52–53). According to Dr. Franzon, his testimony as to the level of ordinary skill is based on considering “the type of problems encountered in the art, prior art solutions to those problems, the rapidity with which innovations are made, the sophistication of the technology, and the educational level of active workers in the field.” Ex. 1002 ¶ 59. Patent Owner did not propose expressly a particular level of ordinary skill. See, e.g., generally PO Resp. At the oral hearing, however, Petitioner indicated” slip op. at 11
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner
“In the context of the Elm 3DS family, we find that the broadest reasonable interpretation of “substantially flexible” is the same as our construction under the Philips standard. Under the broadest reasonable construction standard, we presume a claim term carries its ordinary and customary meaning, which “is the meaning that the term would have to a person of ordinary skill in the art in question” at the time of the invention. In re Translogic Tech., Inc., 504 F.3d 1249, 1257 (Fed. Cir. 2007). As discussed in detail in the Final Written Decisions in IPR2016–00386, IPR2016-00387, and IPR2016–00388, the ordinary and customary meaning of “substantially flexible” is “largely able to bend without breaking.” Also as discussed extensively in those Final Written Decisions, the inventor did not give the term “substantially flexible” a particular meaning in the specification with “reasonable clarity, deliberateness, and precision.” In re Paulsen, 30 F.3d 1475, 1480 (Fed. Cir. 1994). The claim at issue here uses the term “substantially flexible” as a modifier of “structure” in the preamble of the claim and as a modifier of “monocrystalline semiconductor layer” in the body of the claim. Thus, a 13 “substantially flexible” structure is a structure that is able to bend without breaking; and a “substantially flexible monocrystalline semiconductor layer” requires a monocrystalline semiconductor layer that is able to bend without breaking.” slip op. at 13
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert discountedPatent owner expert creditedDecided for patent owner
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundReasonable expectation not foundNot shown unpatentable
“Similarly, in view of the complex technology involved in integrated circuit fabrication and, particularly and the agreement of both experts that dielectrics have different properties and different methods of forming dielectrics in integrated circuit fabrication result in dielectrics having different properties (as discussed previously), we determine that Petitioner’s contentions and Dr. Franzon’s broad conclusions (Pet. 45–47; Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 111, 113–14) that one of ordinary skill in the art would have reasonable expectation of success to be insufficient to meet its burden, which requires a preponderance of evidence. For example, as discussed previously, we find Petitioner’s contention that Leedy ’695 thus discloses that its dielectrics can be easily used in place of other dielectrics to be insufficiently supported by the evidence of record. 27 Accordingly, having considered the Petition, Patent Owner’s Response, and Petitioner’s Reply, as well as the relevant evidence discussed in those papers, we determine that Petitioner has not met its burden to demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have reason to combine the asserted references to arrive at the claimed invention or that a person of ordinary skill would have had a reasonable expectation of success in making the combination proposed by Petitioner.” slip op. at 27
Patent outcomesUS 8,907,499 not shown unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSRPatents in suitUS 8,907,499 - Arista Networks, Inc. v. Cisco Systems, Inc.No claims unpatentablePTAB · May 25, 2017 · IPR2016-00306 · APJ Miriam L Quinn · IPR · Final written decision
Claim 63 was not shown unpatentable because Spinney does not disclose performing the selecting and determining steps in parallel.
RulingsFinal written decision- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert discountedDecided for patent owner
“First, we give no credit to Dr. Chao’s opinion in this regard because it is not supported by Spinney. Specifically, we give no weight to Dr. Chao’s opinion that “Spinney makes clear that the CAM lookup and the hashing function (i.e., the forwarding lookup) take place at the same time.” Ex. 1002 ¶ 53. Instead, we find that the parallel operations in Spinney are confined to (1) applying the hash function to the 48-bit address and (2) performing a CAM lookup of the same 48-bit address. For example, Spinney discloses in Figure 8 that incoming address field 85 is subjected to hash function 86 to produce another 48-bit value. See id. at Fig. 8, 15:21−24; 16:16−19 (“The 48-bit destination address 61 from an incoming packet is simultaneously subjected to the hash function 86 and a CAM match” (emphasis added)), 16:44−46 (“this compare in the CAM is done in parallel with the hash function” (emphasis added)). The application of the hash function and the performance of the hash lookup are two different operations that produce different results. The hash function application produces a hashed 48-bit value, while the hash lookup results in pointing to an entry in the translation table that includes the gigaheader information, for processing the packet. See id. at Fig. 8 (identifying hash function 86 applied to input address 85, resulting in hashed address 89); 15:60−63. Spinney further discloses that the hash lookup is performed only if a CAM match is not found and, therefore, must occur after the CAM lookup is performed. Id. at 16:20–26 (“[I]f a CAM match is found in CAM 23, an index into the translation table 94 is immediately generated as indicated by the line 100. If not, the 16-bit field 88 of the hashed address 87 is used to index into the hash table 89 . . . .” (emphasis added)).” slip op. at 14
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“is not supported by Spinney. Specifically, we give no weight to Dr. Chao’s opinion that “Spinney makes clear that the CAM lookup and the hashing function (i.e., the forwarding lookup) take place at the same time.” Ex. 1002 ¶ 53. Instead, we find that the parallel operations in Spinney are confined to (1) applying the hash function to the 48-bit address and (2) performing a CAM lookup of the same 48-bit address. For example, Spinney discloses in Figure 8 that incoming address field 85 is subjected to hash function 86 to produce another 48-bit value. See id. at Fig. 8, 15:21−24; 16:16−19 (“The 48-bit destination address 61 from an incoming packet is simultaneously subjected to the hash function 86 and a CAM match” (emphasis added)), 16:44−46 (“this compare in the CAM is done in parallel with the hash function” (emphasis added)). The application of the hash function and the performance of the hash lookup are two different operations that produce different results. The hash function application produces a hashed 48-bit value, while the hash lookup results in pointing to an entry in the translation table that includes the gigaheader information, for processing the packet. See id. at Fig. 8 (identifying hash function 86 applied to input address 85, resulting in hashed address 89); 15:60−63. Spinney further discloses that the hash lookup is performed only if a CAM match is not found and, therefore, must occur after the CAM lookup is performed. Id. at 16:20–26 (“[I]f a CAM match is found in CAM 23, an index into the translation table 94 is immediately generated as indicated by the line 100. If not, the 16-bit field 88 of the hashed address 87 is used to index into the hash table 89 . . . .” (emphasis added)).” slip op. at 14
Patent outcomesUS 7,023,853 not shown unpatentable§ 102 anticipationPatents in suitUS 7,023,853 - Ericsson Inc. / Telefonaktiebolaget LM Ericsson v. Intellectual Ventures II LLCNo claims unpatentablePTAB · Feb 15, 2017 · IPR2015-01872 · APJ David C Mckone · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–4, 7, 11–14, 17, and 20–25 were not shown unpatentable because Lu did not teach providing resources to queued users of packet data.
RulingsFinal written decision- Claim Construction › Functional claiming / §112(f) means-plus-function › Whether §112(f) applies (Williamson, nonce words)§112(f) appliesDecided for petitioner
“1. Means-plus-function Terms Claims 11–14 and 17 recite several terms in means-plus-function format. Claim 24 recites several terms in the form of “logic for” performing the functions of parallel terms recited in claim 11. In the Institution Decision, we adopted Petitioner’s proposed constructions, set forth at pages 10–15 of the Petition, as our constructions for the means-plus-function terms of claims 11–14 and 17. Dec. 17–18. We also determined to treat the “logic for” terms of claim 24 as means-plus-function terms, see Williamson v. Citrix Online, LLC, 792 F.3d 1339, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2015), and adopted Petitioner’s statement of the structure corresponding to the “logic for” terms (Pet. 10–13). Id. at 18. Patent Owner does not dispute these constructions. PO Resp. 8. On the complete record, we maintain these constructions.” slip op. at 8
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner
“Read in light of the Specification, “providing said communication resource to queued packet data users on a tier-by-tier basis,” as recited in claim 1, means providing the communication resource to queued users of packet data on a tier-by-tier basis. We are persuaded by Patent Owner that this is the only reasonable reading that is consistent with the Specification. Petitioner provides no examples in the Specification consistent with its reading. Although the preamble of claim 1 recites a “method of processing queued data packets,” this is consistent with the Specification’s general statement that the invention pertains to “an improved packet data queueing algorithm,” Ex. 1001, 9:3. We do not read this general statement in the preamble of claim 1 (or the similar preamble recitations in claims 11 and 24) to provide a basis for construing more specific language in the body of the claim in a manner inconsistent with the description in the Specification. In sum, the only reasonable reading of “queued packet data users,” in the context of the dependent claims, and in light of consistent description in the Specification, is queued users of packet data, not users of queued packet data.” slip op. at 14
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot reached
“such as initial class queues 416–438, organized into high, medium, and low classes, are “a plurality of individual packet data queues.” Pet. 19–20. As to claim element 1[b], “determining a total number of data packets that can use an available communication resource,” Petitioner points to Lu’s description of using a weight-based scheduling scheme to transfer packets from one level queue to another. Id. at 23–24. Petitioner identifies the transmission capacity of the output link (e.g., 209) as the “available communication resource,” and contends that such weighted transfer during a cycle includes determining a total number of data packets that can be transferred for a cycle.5 Id. at 24. Petitioner further contends that Lu’s description of using subscriber weights based on subscriber volumes for particular classes teaches “allocating different weights to each tier of service based on a number of users requiring access to the available communication resource,” as recited in claim element 1[c]. Id. at 28–30. Regarding claim element 1[d], Petitioner argues that “[b]ecause the weights of Lu vary with the 4 We refer the claim elements 1[a]–1[e] as identified in Section I.E, above. 5 Patent Owner contends that Lu does not teach claim element 1[b]. PO Resp. 12–23. Because we decide that Petitioner has not shown that Lu teaches claim element 1[e], as detailed below, we do not decide whether Petitioner has shown that Lu teaches claim element 1[b]. available capacity (which in turn would affect the ‘total number of data packets that can use an available communication resource’), the weights of Lu consistently indicate how much (i.e., ‘proportion’) of the capacity (‘total number of data packets’) each class (i.e., ‘tier of service’) will receive.” Id. at 32.” slip op. at 22
- Strike new argumentNew argument disregardedDecided for patent owner
“Petitioner’s Reply argument is not simply rebuttal to the Patent Owner Response. Rather, it is an attempt to formulate a new prima facie case of obviousness. The Office has instructed that such improper Reply argument will not be considered: A reply may only respond to arguments raised in the corresponding opposition. [37 C.F.R.] § 42.23. While replies can help crystalize issues for decision, a reply that raises a new issue or belatedly presents evidence will not be considered and may be returned. . . . Examples of indications that a new issue has been raised in a reply include new evidence necessary to make out a prima facie case for the patentability or 6 In the Institution Decision, we considered Petitioner’s argument and evidence (including Mr. Lanning’s testimony, Ex. 1006 ¶¶ 96–97) and determined that Petitioner did not present evidence sufficient to show a reason to modify Lu and, accordingly, declined to institute as to claims 5 and 15. Dec. 26–27. unpatentability of an original or proposed substitute claim, and new evidence that could have been presented in a prior filing. Office Patent Trial Practice Guide, 77 Fed. Reg. 48,756, 48,767 (Aug. 14, 2012); see also Intelligent Bio-Sys., Inc. v. Illumina Cambridge Ltd., 821 F.3d 1359, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (The “Board did not err in refusing the reply brief as improper under 37 C.F.R. § 42.23(b) because IBS relied on an entirely new rationale.”). Accordingly, we do not consider Petitioner’s Reply argument for claim element 1[e]. For the same reasons, we do not consider the argument Petitioner made for the first time at the oral argument (Tr. 22:17–23:2). Office Patent Trial Practice Guide, 77 Fed. Reg. at 48,768 (“A party may rely upon evidence that has been previously submitted in the proceeding and may only present arguments relied upon in the papers previously submitted. No new evidence or arguments may be presented at the oral argument.”); see also Dell Inc. v. Acceleron, LLC, 818 F.3d 1293, 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“In this case, the Board denied Acceleron its procedural rights by relying in its decision on a factual assertion introduced into the proceeding only at oral argument, after Acceleron could meaningfully respond.”).” slip op. at 25
Patent outcomesUS 7,385,994 not shown unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 7,385,994 - Smart Modular Technologies Inc. v. Netlist, Inc.No claims unpatentablePTAB · Mar 9, 2016 · IPR2014-01374 · APJ Linda M Gaudette · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1, 2, 4–6, 9–11, 14–17, and 20 were not shown unpatentable under § 102(b) over Averbuj because its BIST controller did not generate the claimed address signals.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedPetitioner expert creditedDecided for petitioner
“Sechen believes a person of ordinary skill in the art would have additional experience, education, or a combination of the two, beyond that proposed by Dr. Bagherzadeh. Both experts have been employed as professors since the mid 1980s. Dr. Bagherzadeh also has some experience working with engineers in the industry by virtue of his employment with AT&T Bell Labs from 1980–1984 (Ex. 1009 ¶ 6; id. Appx. A). Both experts were awarded bachelors and masters degrees in electrical engineering. Dr. Bagherzadeh was awarded a doctorate in computer engineering, while Dr. Sechen was awarded a doctorate in electrical engineering. Based on a comparison of Dr. Bagherzadeh’s and Dr. Sechen’s declarations (Exs. 1009, 2019), we find Dr. Bagherzadeh has a broader range of educational and work experience, and, therefore, accord greater weight to his opinion as to the level of ordinary skill in the art. Dr. Bagherzadeh’s opinion is consistent with our finding as to the level of ordinary skill in the art in our Final Written Decision in IPR-971. We, therefore, adopt our finding in IPR-971 as to the level of ordinary skill in the art: [A] person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the ’501 patent would have a Bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering, or in a related field and at least one year of work experience relating to memory systems, and would be familiar with the design of memory devices, memory modules, and BIST.” slip op. at 10
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert discountedMixed
“We are not persuaded by Dr. Bagherzadeh’s testimony because it is devoid of specific facts and analysis as to what led him to conclude that a person of ordinary skill in the art would interpret the claim term “generate” in the manner Petitioner proposes. See id. Dr. Bagherzadeh does not explain how the IEEE definition supports an interpretation of generate as “cause or initiate transmission,” terms that do not appear in the IEEE definition. See id. Nor does Dr. Bagherzadeh identify other extrinsic evidence which he believes to be consistent with an interpretation of “generate” as meaning “cause or initiate transmission.” See id. Likewise, Dr. Bagherzadeh has not explained why he believes the ’501 patent “describe[s] generating as initiating or transmitting” (Ex. 1009 ¶ 28), as these terms do not appear in the cited portions of the ’501 patent. See Ex. 1008, 6:8–10, 11:4–11:6, 6:19–22.1 Accordingly, Dr. Bagherzadeh’s testimony does not persuade us to accept Petitioner’s interpretation of “generate” as meaning “cause.”” slip op. at 15
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner
“We are not persuaded by Dr. Bagherzadeh’s testimony because it is devoid of specific facts and analysis as to what led him to conclude that a person of ordinary skill in the art would interpret the claim term “generate” in the manner Petitioner proposes. See id. Dr. Bagherzadeh does not explain how the IEEE definition supports an interpretation of generate as “cause or initiate transmission,” terms that do not appear in the IEEE definition. See id. Nor does Dr. Bagherzadeh identify other extrinsic evidence which he believes to be consistent with an interpretation of “generate” as meaning “cause or initiate transmission.” See id. Likewise, Dr. Bagherzadeh has not explained why he believes the ’501 patent “describe[s] generating as initiating or transmitting” (Ex. 1009 ¶ 28), as these terms do not appear in the cited portions of the ’501 patent. See Ex. 1008, 6:8–10, 11:4–11:6, 6:19–22.1 Accordingly, Dr. Bagherzadeh’s testimony does not persuade us to accept Petitioner’s interpretation of “generate” as meaning “cause.”” slip op. at 15
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed board ownDecided for patent owner
“arranged” or “prepared.” Reply 9–10. Responsive to this Board panel’s questioning during the oral hearing, however, Petitioner agreed that “designed to, adapted to, or arranged to” was an acceptable definition for the claim term “configured to.” See Tr. 22:7–17. Patent Owner contends the phrase “configured to generate” should be construed as “programmed to generate.” PO Resp. 9. Patent Owner does not propose a separate construction for the term “configured.” See generally id. at 9–17. In support of its proposed construction, Patent Owner relies on language in the ’501 patent and the testimony of its expert, Dr. Sechen. See id. Dr. Sechen testifies as to the meaning of “configured to generate,” but does not provide a separate discussion of the meaning of “configured to” outside the context of “configured to generate.” See Ex. 2019 ¶¶ 42–57. As explained in our Final Decision in IPR-971, the term “configured to” is used in the ’501 patent in conjunction with numerous terms, such as “provide” and “selectively input,” and there is a presumption that the term “configured to” should carry the same meaning in each instance. See IPR- 971 FWD, 18–19. The evidence relied on by Patent Owner in support of its proposed construction of the term “configured to” in the present inter partes review does not differ materially from the evidence relied upon by Patent Owner in IPR-971. Compare PO Resp. 9–17 with IPR-971, Paper 19, 14– 19. Accordingly, we determine the broadest reasonable construction of “configured to” is “designed to, adapted to, or arranged to” for the reasons stated above and in our Final Written Decision in IPR-971. We adopt and incorporate by reference our analysis and construction of the term “configured to” in our Final Written Decision in IPR-971 (IPR-971 FWD, 18–22). slip op. at 18
Patent outcomesUS 8,359,501 not shown unpatentableClaim construction§ 102 anticipationPatents in suitUS 8,359,501 - Toshiba Corporation v. Optical Devices, LLCNo claims unpatentablePTAB · Mar 9, 2016 · IPR2014-01446 · APJ Glenn J Perry · IPR · Final written decision
Toshiba did not prove claims 1, 2, 6, 7, 11, 13, 14, and 16 unpatentable over Baird and Yoshimoto, or that combination with the ST Datasheet, which was not established as prior art.
RulingsFinal written decision- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for patent owner
“As we seek to give the term “DSP” its ordinary and customary meaning, as would have been understood by one of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention, we take into account the Microsoft and IBM dictionary definitions submitted by Optical Devices. We note that each of those dictionaries define a DSP as designed for “high speed” manipulation of data/digital signals. Ex. 2002; Ex. 2003. Optical Devices, however, has not directed our attention to evidence establishing what “high speed” encompasses. We note that one of the submitted dictionary definitions characterizes such digital signal manipulation as “real-time.” Ex. 2003. However, the Specification’s disclosure describes that some embodiments can execute real time digital servo algorithms on a DSP. We determine that Optical Devices has not established persuasively that the broadest reasonable interpretation of a DSP requires “high speed” processing achieving this “real time” feature. Indeed, Patent Owner’s “basic” construction for a DSP does not include a “real time” requirement for “real time” processing. See PO Resp. 10 (providing a minimal definition for a DSP). We are persuaded that the broadest reasonable interpretation of the term “digital signal processor,” consistent with the Specification, is “an integrated circuit structured and arranged for manipulation of digital signals in accordance with programmed commands, and in a manner that operates faster than a microprocessor.” We do not adopt Optical Devices’ proposal to further characterize further an integrated circuit as “specialized.” We find that proposed modification is superfluous in that our construction describes that the integrated circuit is structured and arranged to achieve a specific function, i.e., manipulation of digital signals and operating faster than a microprocessor.” slip op. at 8
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Optical Devices asserts that one of ordinary skill in the art would have “a Bachelor of Science in Mechanical or Electrical Engineering and at least two years of experience in control systems technology.” PO Resp. 6 (citing Ex. 2008 ¶¶ 9–11) (emphasis added). Based on our consideration of the record, we find that the evidence as a whole supports Toshiba’s description of the level of ordinary skill in the art. Accordingly, we adopt Toshiba’s statement of the ordinary skill in the art.” slip op. at 12
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert discountedDecided for patent owner
“that Toshiba has established by a preponderance of the evidence that Baird inherently discloses a DSP configured to determine a FES and a TES from digital signals received by the SCP. In particular, Toshiba’s primary contention with respect to inherency is that one of ordinary skill in the art would have understood that Baird must determine a FES and TES in order for the SCP to operate focus and tracking control loops. Pet. Reply 14 (citing Ex. 1006 ¶ 81). However, neither Toshiba nor Toshiba’s declarant, Dr. Zech, provides any explanation why that is true. When asked for an explanation during his deposition, Dr. Zech responded in a manner that relied upon a probability that Baird’s SCP determines FES and TES. For example, the following is an excerpt from Dr. Zech’s deposition: Q Can you explain to me why it is your opinion that it is inherent that a servo control processor in Baird determines a focus error signal and a tracking error signal? A Well, because the way he designed it, it does. And I can’t imagine why somebody, an engineer at Cirrus Logic, would swim against the current and come up with something entirely new. The chip surely would not sell. I know that from pretty broad experience in sales and marketing. Once you tell me optical disk drive -- I’ve explained to you the statistics of it -- 99 percent plus are probably using continuous composite servoing. When you use continuous composite servoing, you need to have a tracking error and a focus error signal. So it’s not much of a leap for me to conclude that that’s what’s going on here. Ex. 2001, 151, 3–20 (emphases added). Dr. Zech’s deposition testimony describes what functions and systems optical disk drives “are probably using” and that “it’s not much of a leap” for him to conclude what is occuring in Baird with respect to whether error signals are determined Id.; See MEHL/Biophile Int’l Corp. v. Milgraum, 192 F.3d 1362, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (inherency is not to be established by probabilities or possibilities). Moreover, both in his declaration and at the deposition, Dr. Zech bases his opinion regarding that issue on assumptions unsupported by evidence. See Office Patent Trial Practice Guide 77 Fed. Reg. 48, 756, 48,763 (Aug. 14, 2012) (“Affidavits expressing an opinion of an expert must disclose the underlying facts or data upon which the opinion is based. . . . Opinions expressed without disclosing the underlying facts or data may be given little to no weight.”) (citations omitted). Thus, we do not afford Dr. Zech’s unsupported opinions persuasive weight.” slip op. at 21
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element) › Inherent disclosureInherency not foundNot shown unpatentable
“Having considered the arguments and evidence, we are not persuaded that Toshiba has established by a preponderance of the evidence that Baird inherently discloses a DSP configured to determine a FES and a TES from digital signals received by the SCP. In particular, Toshiba’s primary contention with respect to inherency is that one of ordinary skill in the art would have understood that Baird must determine a FES and TES in order for the SCP to operate focus and tracking control loops. Pet. Reply 14 (citing Ex. 1006 ¶ 81). However, neither Toshiba nor Toshiba’s declarant, Dr. Zech, provides any explanation why that is true. When asked for an explanation during his deposition, Dr. Zech responded in a manner that relied upon a probability that Baird’s SCP determines FES and TES. For example, the following is an excerpt from Dr. Zech’s deposition: Q Can you explain to me why it is your opinion that it is inherent that a servo control processor in Baird determines a focus error signal and a tracking error signal? A Well, because the way he designed it, it does. And I can’t imagine why somebody, an engineer at Cirrus Logic, would swim against the current and come up with something entirely new. The chip surely would not sell. I know that from pretty broad experience in sales and marketing. Once you tell me optical disk drive -- I’ve explained to you the statistics of it -- 99 percent plus are probably using continuous composite servoing. When you use continuous composite servoing, you need to have a tracking error and a focus error signal. So it’s not much of a leap for me to conclude that that’s what’s going on here. Ex. 2001, 151, 3–20 (emphases added). Dr. Zech’s deposition testimony describes what functions and systems optical disk drives “are probably using” and that “it’s not much of a leap” for him to conclude what is occuring in Baird with respect to whether error signals are determined Id.; See MEHL/Biophile Int’l Corp. v. Milgraum, 192 F.3d 1362, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (inherency is not to be established by probabilities or possibilities). Moreover, both in his declaration and at the deposition, Dr. Zech bases his opinion regarding that issue on assumptions unsupported by evidence. See Office Patent Trial Practice Guide 77 Fed. Reg. 48, 756, 48,763 (Aug. 14, 2012) (“Affidavits expressing an opinion of an expert must disclose the underlying facts or data upon which the opinion is based. . . . Opinions expressed without disclosing the underlying facts or data may be given little to no weight.”) (citations omitted). Thus, we do not afford Dr. Zech’s unsupported opinions persuasive weight.” slip op. at 21
Patent outcomesUS 7,196,979 not shown unpatentableClaim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · GrahamPatents in suitUS 7,196,979 - Toshiba Corporation v. Optical Devices, LLCNo claims unpatentablePTAB · Mar 9, 2016 · IPR2014-01445 · APJ Erica A Franklin · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–10 were not shown unpatentable: Baird did not disclose the required FES and TES determination, and the ST Datasheet was not established as prior art.
RulingsFinal written decision- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner
“Ex. 1001, 13:50–61. From this disclosure, we recognize that the Specification suggests that a DSP operates faster than a microprocessor and, in some embodiments, real time digital servo algorithms can be executed on a DSP. Id. at 53–55. The Specification, however, does not expressly define the term “digital signal processor.” We note the competing views of Dr. de Callafon, on behalf of Patent Owner, and Dr. Zech, on behalf of Petitioner. We also note issues regarding the testimony of each declarant. For example, in some respects, Dr. de Callafon bases his proposed construction of a DSP on features that he asserts one of ordinary skill in the art would have understood that “most DSP processors have,” as opposed to features that all DSP processors require. Ex. 2008 ¶ 21(a). Dr. Zech’s deposition testimony describing the design of a DSP, also relied upon by Patent Owner, is unreliable because Dr. Zech testified that he had “no expertise” as to design elements distinguishing a DSP from a general processor. See, e.g., Ex. 2001, 35:12–13, 44:12–14. As we seek to give the term “DSP” its ordinary and customary meaning, as would be understood by one of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention, we take into account the Microsoft and IBM dictionary definitions submitted by Patent Owner. We note that each of those dictionaries define a DSP as being designed for “high speed” manipulation of data/digital signals. Ex. 2002; Ex. 2003. Patent Owner, however, has not directed our attention to evidence establishing what “high speed” encompasses. We note also that only one of the submitted dictionary definitions additionally characterizes such digital signal manipulation as “real-time.” Id. at 2003. The Specification, however, discloses that only some embodiments can execute real time digital servo algorithms on a DSP. We determine that Patent Owner has not established persuasively that the broadest reasonable interpretation of a DSP requires “high speed” processing achieving this “real time” feature. Indeed, Patent Owner’s “basic” construction for a DSP does not include a requirement for “real time” processing. See PO Resp. 20 (providing a minimal definition for a DSP). Thus, we are persuaded that that the broadest reasonable intepretation of the term “digital signal processor,” consistent with the Specification, is “an integrated circuit structured and arranged for manipulation of digital signals in accordance with programmed commands, and in a manner that operates faster than a microprocessor.” Patent Owner’s proposal to characterize further an integrated circuit as “specialized” is not well taken. Indeed, we find that proposed modification to be superfluous in that our construction describes that the integrated circuit is structured and arranged to achieve a specific function, i.e., manipulation of digital signals and operating faster than a microprocessor. 2.” slip op. at 8
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“Patent Owner proposes constructions for additional claim phrases without providing any discussion or reference to the Specification in support of those proposed constructions. PO Resp. 12–13. Based on our analysis, we determine that no express claim construction is necessary for any remaining claim term. Thus, we are not persuaded to adopt those proposed constructions.” slip op. at 10
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner asserts that one of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the filing of the ’729 patent as having: (1) a Bachelor’s of Science Degree in Electrical Engineering, Mechanical Engineering, Physics or a related field and at least two years of additional experience in control system technology, optical disk servo technology, magnetic disk servo technology, or related technologies, either in industry or research[,] or (2) at least a Master’s of Science Degree in Electrical Engineering, Mechanical Engineering, Physics or a related field with coursework in control system technology, optical disk servo technology, magnetic disk servo technology, or related technologies. Pet. 36–37 (citing Ex. 1006 ¶¶ 65–66) (emphases added). Patent Owner asserts that one of ordinary skill in the art would have “a Bachelor of Science in Mechanical or Electrical Engineering and at least two years of experience in control systems technology.” PO Resp. 5 (citing Ex. 2008 ¶¶ 9–11) (emphasis added). Based on our consideration of the record, we find that the evidence as a whole supports Petitioner’s broader description of the level of ordinary skill in the art. Accordingly, we adopt Petitioner’s statement of the ordinary skill in the art.” slip op. at 11
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“Having considered the arguments and evidence, we are not persuaded that Petitioner has established by a preponderance of the evidence that Baird inherently discloses a DSP configured to determine a FES and a TES from digital signals received by the SCP. In particular, Petitioner’s primary contention with respect to inherency is that one of ordinary skill in the art would understand that Baird must determine a FES and TES in order for the SCP to operate focus and tracking control loops. Pet. Reply 14 (citing Ex. 1006 ¶ 82). However, neither Petitioner, nor Petitioner’s declarant, Dr. Zech, provides any explanation why that is true. When asked for an explanation during his deposition, Dr. Zech responded in a manner that relied upon a probability that Baird’s SCP determines FES and TES. For example, the following is an excerpt from Dr. Zech’s deposition: Q Can you explain to me why it is your opinion that it is inherent that a servo control processor in Baird determines a focus error signal and a tracking error signal? A Well, because the way he designed it, it does. And I can’t imagine why somebody, an engineer at Cirrus Logic, would swim against the current and 0 come up with something entirely new. The chip 1 surely would not sell. I know that from pretty broad experience in sales and marketing. Once you tell me optical disk drive -- I’ve explained to you the statistics of it -- 99 percent plus are probably using continuous composite servoing. When you use continuous composite servoing, you need to have a tracking error and a focus error signal. So it’s not much of a leap for me to conclude that that’s what’s going on here. Ex. 2001, 151:3–20 (emphases added). Dr. Zech’s deposition testimony describes what functions and systems optical disk drives “are probably using” and that “it’s not much of a leap” for him to conclude what is occuring in Baird with respect to whether error signals are determined Id.; see MEHL/Biophile Int’l. Corp., 192 F.3d at 1365 (inherency is not established by probabilities or possibilities). Moreover, both in his declaration and at the deposition, Dr. Zech bases his opinion regarding that issue on assumptions unsupported by evidence. See Office Patent Trial Practice Guide 77 Fed. Reg. 48,756, 48,763 (Aug. 14, 2012) (“Affidavits expressing an opinion of an expert must disclose the underlying facts or data upon which the opinion is based. . . . Opinions expressed without disclosing the underlying facts or data may be given little to no weight.”) (citations omitted). Thus, we do not afford Dr. Zech’s opinions persuasive weight.” slip op. at 20
Patent outcomesUS 7,839,729 not shown unpatentableClaim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · GrahamPatents in suitUS 7,839,729
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.