• Uatp IP LLC v. Slick Slide LLCSome claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Oct 2, 2026 · PGR2024-00054 · APJ Brian D Range · PGR · Final written decision

  Claims 22–26 are unpatentable based on obviousness; claims 1–17, 27, and 28 were not shown unpatentable. Patent Owner’s motion to terminate was denied.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed board ownDecided for patent owner

    “1. Mesh Layer Petitioner contends “no formal claim construction is necessary in this” slip op. at 13

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “5. Analysis On this complete record, we determine that Petitioner’s arguments do” slip op. at 31

  • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “form of nylon and some form of Teflon (and possible combinations thereof) having the specific coefficient of friction range given in limitation [1c] breaks down, because the building blocks of the obviousness argument are not sufficiently identified in Phillips alone, nor in the supporting testimony. Accordingly, we determine that Petitioner’s arguments and evidence fail to show that Phillips renders the challenged claims obvious. 6. Conclusion Based on the foregoing, we determine that Petitioner has not established by a preponderance of the evidence that claims 1–4, 6, and 7 would have been anticipated by or obvious in view of Phillips.” slip op. at 33

  • Obviousness (§103) › Objective indicia / secondary considerations › NexusObjective indicia no nexusDecided for petitioner

    “2. Products and Nexus We first consider the issue of whether certain evidence relied upon by” slip op. at 20

  Patent outcomesUS 11,998,854 mixed
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosurecites Phillips · Graham · Nautilus
  Patents in suitUS 11,998,854
• Tesla, Inc. v. Intellectual Ventures II LLCSome claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Aug 18, 2026 · IPR2025-00339 · APJ Kristen L Droesch · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 22, 23, 28, and 30 are unpatentable over Choi, Labaziewicz, and Yu; claims 1–3, 10–12, 24, 25, 32, and 33 were not shown unpatentable.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Plain and ordinary meaningOther

    “We decline Patent Owner’s invitation to construe “during a frame” of “independently controlling simultaneous data acquisition with each of the first and second channels during a frame” by importing the extraneous limitations “at some point between the beginning and the end of the exposure interval during which the image sensors capture a single image.” As pointed out by Petitioner, Patent Owner’s proposed construction is unsupported by the language of claim 22 and the ’180 Specification because Specification does not disclose an exposure interval nor suggest “during a frame” is limited to an exposure interval. Patent Owner and its expert Dr. Saber cite only extrinsic evidence (Exs. 2006, 2009) to support its argument that claim 22 should be limited to an “exposure interval during which the image sensors capture a single image.” See PO Resp. 16–17; Ex. 2020 ¶ 64. Similarly, Patent Owner relies only on extrinsic evidence (e.g., Ex. 2011, 1; Ex. 2022, 1; Ex. 2020 ¶ 66) to limit “during” to “at some point between the beginning and the end.” See id. at 18. When considered in the context of claim 22 and the ’180 Patent Specification which do not limit “during a frame” to an exposure interval, we find that we cannot rely on Patent Owner’s citations to extrinsic evidence to yield a reliable construction for “during a frame.” As demonstrated in the analysis below, we need not provide an explicit construction for “during a frame” to resolve the parties’ disputes regarding the merits of the patentability challenges. See Realtime, 912 F.3d at 1375. We apply the ordinary and customary meaning for “during a frame.” To the extent that an explicit identification of the ordinary and customary meaning may aid the understanding of our analysis, consistent with the language of claim 22 and the ’180 Patent Specification, we find that the ordinary and customary meaning for “during a frame” is “during the period of time that data for an image frame is acquired.” See Ex. 1001, code (57), 20:6–24, 25:23–35.” slip op. at 12

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “had a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering, computer science, or a related field and 2-3 years of experience in digital imaging systems,” and that “[l]ess experience may be necessary with additional education, and likewise, less education may be necessary with additional work experience.” Pet. 6 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 16–19). Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s definition. See generally PO Resp. We adopt Petitioner’s definition of a person of ordinary skill in the art because it is consistent with the level of skill reflected by the ’180 Patent Specification and the prior art of record.” slip op. at 20

  • Disclosure Requirements (§112) › Written description (Ariad)Not entitled to earlier dateDecided for petitioner

    “Owner to show that Labaziewicz is not prior art because the ’180 Patent is entitled to the earliest August 25, 2004, filing date of the ’854 Provisional Application. See Dynamic Drinkware, 800 F.3d at 1379–1380. For a claim in a later-filed application to be entitled to the filing date of an earlier application, the earlier application must provide written description support for the claimed subject matter. Anascape, Ltd. v. Nintendo of Am. Inc., 601 F.3d 1333, 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2010). To satisfy the written description requirement, “a prior application itself must describe an invention, and do so in sufficient detail that one skilled in the art can clearly conclude that the inventor invented the claimed invention as of the filing date sought.” Lockwood v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 107 F.3d 1565, 1572 (Fed. Cir. 1997); see also VasCath v. Mahurkar, 935 F.2d 1555, 1563–64 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (“[T]he applicant must . . . convey with reasonable clarity to those skilled in the art that, as of the filing date sought, he or she was in possession of the invention . . . now claimed.” (emphasis omitted)), Ariad Pharm. Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en banc) (“[I]t is the specification itself that must demonstrate possession.”). Patent Owner’s arguments fail to meet this burden of production because, aside from addressing deficiencies of written description support the ’854 Provisional Application provides written description support for all of the limitations of the claimed invention. See PO Resp. 60–64; PO Sur-reply 25–28. Specifically, Patent Owner does not address written description support in the ’854 Provisional Application for “independently controlling simultaneous data acquisition with each of the first and second channels during a frame”––limitation [22.3]––the heart of the parties’ claim construction disputes addressed above in Section II.A. See PO Resp. 60–64; PO Sur-reply 25–27. Accordingly, Patent Owner has not met its burden of production in coming forward with evidence or argument to show possession of the claimed invention in the ’854 Provisional Application. As a result, the burden of production does not shift back to Petitioner, and, therefore, the ’180 Patent is not entitled to the benefit of the August 25, 2004, filing date of the ’854 Provisional Application.” slip op. at 23

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentable

    “Petitioner does not present arguments that it would have been obvious to a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention to modify the teachings of Matsushima to acquire data for images 62A and 62B at the argues that Matsushima renders obvious this limitation. See id. at 21, 23, 30; PO Resp. 33–34 (“[T]he Petition provides no further explanation why Matsushima renders this limitation obvious.”). In the Reply for the first time, Petitioner asserts that “a POSITA would understand that Matsushima’s disclosure, including its multi-channel architecture, synchronous control of channels, and capturing two images that are scaled versions of the same scene, renders obvious simultaneous acquisition during a frame. Pet. Reply 13 (citing Ex. 1069 ¶ 49). We do not consider Petitioner’s belated argument because it exceeds the proper scope of a reply. A reply may only respond to arguments raised in the corresponding patent owner response. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.23. As explained in the Trial Practice Guide, “respond” “does not mean proceed in a new direction with a new approach as compared to the positions taken in a prior filing.” Trial Practice Guide at II.I. (December 2025)(citing 37 C.F.R. § 42.23).10 A reply that raises a new issue or belatedly presents evidence may not be considered. See id. For example, a “[p]etitioner may not submit new evidence or argument in reply that it could have presented earlier, e.g. to make out a prima facie case of unpatentability.” Id.” slip op. at 32

  Patent outcomesUS 7,916,180 mixed
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosurecites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 7,916,180
• Tesla, Inc. v. Intellectual Ventures II LLCSome claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jul 1, 2026 · IPR2025-00222 · APJ Frederick C Laney · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1, 2, 4, 5, 8–11, 13, and 14 are unpatentable over Yu and Miyazaki; claims 15, 16, and 19 were not shown unpatentable over Matsushima.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Petitioner contends that a person of ordinary skill in the art “at, and before, the earliest claimed priority date of the ’158 patent . . . would have had a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering, computer science, or a related field and 2–3 years of experience in digital imaging systems,” adding that “[l]ess experience may be sufficient with additional education, and likewise, less education may be sufficient with additional work experience.” Pet. 6–7 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 16–18). Patent Owner does not offer a competing definition or dispute Petitioner's articulation. Based on the entire record, we adopt Petitioner’s characterization of the level of skill for one of ordinary skill in the art because that characterization, we find, is consistent with the ’158 patent and the asserted prior art.” slip op. at 9

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownOther

    “We determine that the claims require a per-channel determination of integration time—that is, an integration time arrived at for each sensor or channel individually—and cannot be satisfied by a single global value merely applied uniformly across the sensors. We do not, however, read the independent claims to require that the per-channel integration times differ from one another.” slip op. at 11

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Lexicography (patentee as own lexicographer)Term construed board ownDecided for patent owner

    “We adopt the definition clearly and unambiguously set forth in the specification, which was likewise adopted by the Court in the related litigation. See Pet. 7–8, 55; Pet. Reply 1–2 (district court construing the term to mean “the time the image sensor collects and integrates signal from the scene”). The specification states that the integrated photo-charge “is directly related to the time the image sensor collects and integrates signal from the scene,” and that “[t]his is known as integration time.” Ex. 1001, 4:4–7. Accordingly, the ’158 patent demonstrates that the inventors indisputably acted as a lexicographer for the term “integration time.”” slip op. at 13

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed board ownOther

    “We construe “during a frame” to mean the period during which data for a single frame of an image is captured. The limitation is satisfied where the per-channel integration time is effectuated during the frame; it does not require that the integration time be re-determined mid-frame, nor does it require actuation of a “charge integration switch.” The specification’s only use of the phrase confirms this reading: “each camera channel is controlled during a frame under an independent integration time.” Ex. 1001, 3:45–50. Consistent with that usage, the specification describes selecting an integration time for each channel and then integrating the photo-signal “within a single frame of data,” and describes placing the charge-integration switch in a state to allow charge to accumulate for the selected period and then transferring the accumulated charge upon completion of the integration period. Id. at 4:51–54, 11:3–18. We decline Patent Owner’s proposal to require in-frame actuation of a charge-integration switch, for the same reason we decline to import that structure into “integration time.” We also decline to read the phrase to require mid-frame re-determination of the integration time, because the patent’s own embodiment selects an integration time and then integrates charge during the frame under that selected time. Ex. 1001, 4:51–54, 11:3– 18. So construed, “during a frame” is not redundant of the independentclaim limitation: it adds that the per-channel control occurs within a single frame (intrascene), as distinct from adjustment from one frame to the next (interscene).” slip op. at 15

  Patent outcomesUS 9,232,158 mixed
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 9,232,158
• Weatherford U.S., L.P v. Halliburton Energy Services, Inc.Some claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Dec 9, 2025 · IPR2024-00990 · APJ Brent M Dougal · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 11–12 and 14–20 are unpatentable; claims 1–10 and 21–23 are not shown unpatentable. Substitute claims 29–37 are unpatentable, and the motion to amend is denied as to them.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “The level of skill is uncontested. Patent Owner adopts the level of skill identified by Petitioner as: [at] the time of the alleged invention in 2018, a POSITA[2] would have had a B.S. degree in mechanical or petroleum engineering or a similar technical discipline, with at least five years of experience in oil or gas well drilling, completion, and/or subsurface production operations or in technical support of such operations including at least some experience in unconsolidated formations utilizing sand control methods and means. Also,” slip op. at 8

  • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)UnpatentableNot shown unpatentableMixed

    “on embodiments of Yeh with concentric sand screens having nine shunt tubes (six transport tubes and three packing tubes) (Yeh Figures 4A–B) and eccentric sand screens with four shunt tubes (two transport tubes and two packing tubes) (Yeh Figures 8A, 8C). See Pet. 32–37, 39, 41–43. Yet, Petitioner’s reasoning as to why “a higher-pressure shunt tube assembly necessitated greater wall thickness” rests on an unspoken one to one comparison between the shunt tubes of the different systems. See id.; see also Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 291–297 (Petitioner’s declarant comparing possible transport tubes of different pressure regions without considering or addressing any difference in the number of transport tubes). However, the embodiments relied on by Petitioner have different numbers of shunt tubes, and thus the greater wall thickness does not appear to be “necessitated” in the way inferred by Petitioner. Further, Petitioner’s analysis would seem to be most appropriate when comparing two concentric sand screens for different pressure regions, or two eccentric sand screens for different pressure regions. relies on Yeh’s teachings related to a horizontal well bore of 5000 feet for the “concentric screen → crossover tool → eccentric screen” arrangement, as well as, for why the concentric screen needs to be rated for a high pressure. Pet. 32–37, 39, 41–43. Petitioner also refers to these features for why one of skill in the art would combine the teachings of Yeh and Yeh2. Id. at 32. However, on cross-examination, Petitioner’s declarant agreed that it is concentric sand screens having a 6x3 shunt tube design that would provide the noted benefits of being rated for a higher pressure and being more robust (as relied on in the Petition), as compared to eccentric sand screens. Ex. 2013, 42:20–43:8; Sur-reply 4–5. This also exposes another issue with Petitioner’s arguments. Though Petitioner identifies that one of skill in the art would be aware that material choice, wall thickness, and pipe diameter all impact burst pressure of a pipe (Pet. 42 (citing Ex. 1017, 24 (Equation (14))), the Petition essentially ignores the fact that the claims do not require a single pipe in isolation. The claims require two shunt tube assemblies, each surrounding a base pipe within a wellbore. It is uncontested that a wellbore provides a confined space for such a system and thus any change in wall thickness of one pipe can result in a significant impact in the function of the other pipes. We find the testimony of Petitioner’s declarant (see, e.g., Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 290–297) unpersuasive when discussing wall thickness because it focusses on basic considerations of a standalone pipe, without sufficient consideration of the claimed completion assembly with its required pipe and tube structure. PO Resp. 20–26.” slip op. at 17

  • Strike new argumentNew argument disregardedDecided for patent owner

    “In response to Patent Owner’s argument concerning Yeh’s embodiments relied on in the Petition, Petitioner argues for the first time that Patent Owner’s declarant “conceded, Yeh discloses that both concentric and 47:19–48:21). Petitioner does not provide a citation to Yeh or a citation to where the Petition relies on the same number of shunt tubes between concentric and eccentric screens. The deposition cited by Petitioner discusses Yeh at column 16, lines 26 through 35. However, the Petition does not cite or rely on these teachings of Yeh. Thus, we decline to consider this late argument.4 See 35 U.S.C. § 312(a)(3) (requiring the petition to identify “with particularity . . . the grounds on which the challenge to each claim is based, and the evidence that supports the grounds”); 37 C.F.R. § 42.104(b)(5).” slip op. at 18

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundUnpatentable

    “Thus, we agree with Petitioner that the combination of Yeh and Yeh2 teaches determining the shunt tube system operating pressures associated with the distal end of the production zone, but also more generally, determining the operating pressures along the entire production zone. With this knowledge of the system operating pressures, Petitioner argues that one of skill in the art would have selected eccentric screens for the distal end of the production zone “at any point at which the slurry pressure dropped below the pressure capacity of the eccentric screen shunt tubes.” Pet. 66 (citing Ex. 1005, 30:16–20; Ex. 1003 ¶ 388). In other words, knowing that the pressure decreases as you approach the toe, Yeh’s low-pressure rated eccentric screens could be used from some point prior to and covering the toe. determined pressure.” PO Resp. 37–38. We disagree. As discussed above, the record supports Petitioner’s position that one of skill in the art would have “understood the need to determine the shunt tube system operating pressure throughout the horizontal wellbore.” Ex. 1003 ¶ 383; see also Pet. 64–65. We find convincing Petitioner’s argument that one of skill with this understanding of the system pressures would select a shunt tube system rated to not only address the distal end, but also to address the needs of the adjacent region, so long as the pressure rating supported such a selection. See Pet. 65–67; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 385–388.” slip op. at 22

  Patent outcomesUS 11,333,007 mixed
  Claim construction§ 101 eligibility§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosurecites Graham
  Patents in suitUS 11,333,007
• Comcast Cable Communications, LLC v. Entropic Communications, LLCSome claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Sep 4, 2025 · IPR2024-00430 · APJ Jon M Jurgovan · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–3, 6–10, 14–18, and 22–24 are unpatentable; claims 4–5, 11–13, and 19–21 are not shown unpatentable.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Specification disavowal / 'present invention' languageTerm construed board ownDecided for petitioner

    “We agree with Petitioner that the ’690 patent does not limit the term “probe” to channel assessment. Pet. Reply 2–4. Reviewing the intrinsic evidence, the “Technical Field” of the ’690 patent states that “some embodiments relate to channel assessment probes,” implying others do not. Ex. 1001, 1:13–14. The ’690 patent further states that “receiver determined probes may be used in a variety of applications” including to “discover hidden nodes” and “off-site network diagnosis.” Id. at 2:20–27. In addition, the ’690 patent states that probes may be used for “network maintenance procedures,” to “replicate a potential problem, reach or discover a distant or previously undetected node on the network, or assist with network admissions procedures.” Id. at 4:25–38. Turning to the claims of the ’690 patent, the evidence of record does not establish that the independent claims recite anything unique or specific to channel assessment (although their scope covers that purpose). Furthermore, dependent claim 7 of the ’690 patent recites that the “probe” is used to diagnose a network problem, and dependent claim 13 recites that the “probe” is used to identify a hidden node. Restricting the independent claims to probes used solely for channel assessment would be contradictory to these dependent claims. Littlefuse, Inc. v. Mersen USA EP Corp., 29 F.4th 1376, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2022) (construction of term in independent claims should not render dependent claims superfluous or lacking scope).” slip op. at 20

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed board ownDecided for petitioner

    “We agree with Petitioner that a “physical layer probe” is “a probe that relates to the physical layer.” The term does not appear per se in the specification of the ’960 patent, nor in the prosecution history, but only in claims 9, 17, and 19. However, the term “physical layer” is well-known and is the first layer in the Open Systems Interconnection (OSI) network model. See, e.g., Ex. 1021, 35–40, 69; Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 49–50. The physical layer is used to transmit digital bits over a network, and defines the timing, mechanical, and physical network characteristics required for transmitting the data bits. Hence, a “physical layer probe” is a probe that relates to the physical layer. We need not, and do not, construe the term further to resolve the parties’ dispute. See Realtime, Vivid Techs., supra. Having decided proper constructions for the disputed terms, we proceed in our analysis to consider the parties’ arguments concerning the challenge grounds. In the following sections, we apply the plain meaning of the claim terms, and as necessary, specify what the plain meanings are.” slip op. at 23

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “C. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art Petitioner contends as follows: A POSITA8 would have had a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering, or a similar discipline, and three to four years of experience working in signal processing and/or communication systems/networks. Additional education may substitute for experience, and significant work experience may substitute for formal education. Pet. 6 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 115–120). Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s proposed level of skill in the art. We adopt and apply Petitioner’s proposed skill level because it is consistent with the problems and solutions identified in the ’690 patent and the prior art references asserted by Petitioner. In addition, we find the adopted skill level consistent with the education and experience that a POSITA would have had. See In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (citing Custom Accessories, Inc. v. Jeffrey-Allan Indus., Inc., 807 F.2d 955, 962 (Fed. Cir. 1986)) (citing factors to consider when determining level of ordinary skill in the art).” slip op. at 25

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableNot shown unpatentableMixed

    “Hence, we determine that Petitioner has shown by preponderant evidence that the Ranging Request (“probe request”) message includes CID and SS MAC address and other parameters (“first plurality of parameters”) which at least specify the CID (“content payload of the probe”) and the SS MAC address (“second node”) of the Ranging Response.12 We thus proceed to consider Petitioner’s contentions for the remaining limitations of claim 1, which are undisputed, and determine that claim 1 is anticipated by IEEE-802.16.” slip op. at 29

  Patent outcomesUS 8,284,690 mixed
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 8,284,690
• LG Electronics, Inc. / LG Electronics U.S.A., Inc. et al. v. Multimedia Technologies Pte. Ltd.Some claims unpatentable
  PTAB · May 19, 2025 · IPR2024-00699 · APJ St John Courtenay III · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1, 2, 6–11, and 14–18 are unpatentable under § 103; claims 3–5, 12, and 13 were not shown unpatentable.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “contends that an ordinarily skilled artisan for the ’805 patent “would have been someone knowledgeable about and familiar with the television display technology that is pertinent to the ’805 patent. A POSITA would have had a bachelor’s degree in Electrical Engineering, Software Engineering, or Computer Engineering, or equivalent training, and approximately two years of experience working in the field of television systems and networking, human-computer interaction, or related technologies. Lack of work experience can be remedied by additional education, and vice versa.” Pet. 9 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 18–20). In its Preliminary Response Patent Owner indicated it “adopts Petitioner’s definition of a person of ordinary skill in the art (‘POSITA’) for the purposes of [its] Preliminary Response.” Prelim. Resp. 28. We note Patent Owner does not dispute or otherwise disavow Petitioner’s definition of a POSITA in its Response or Sur-reply. See generally PO Resp.; PO Surreply. level of ordinary skill in the art. On the present record, we are satisfied that this definition comports with the level of skill necessary to understand and implement the teachings of the ’805 patent and the asserted prior art. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (explaining that the prior art itself can reflect appropriate level of ordinary skill in art).” slip op. at 10

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner

    “We disagree with Patent Owner. Id. We see nothing in the preamble 1.0, or “receiving” step 1.1.1, or “wherein” clause 1.1.2 that defines a data format prior to organizing step 1.2.1, and we decline to read limitations from the specification into the claim, i.e., a “pre-defined format” being defined prior to organizing step 1.2.1, as argued by Patent Owner. 5 PO Resp. 20. Preamble 1.0 is silent regarding any mention of a data format: “A method of providing content for a television (TV), the method comprising: . . . .” Although step 1.1.1 requires “receiving, by a processor, data relevant to one or more scheduled events from one of a corresponding subservice of a plurality of subservices,” at best this merely requires a type of data that is “relevant to one or more scheduled events” and does not require a particular data format to be used for “data relevant to one or more scheduled events,” nor the “pre-defined” format argued by Patent Owner. PO Resp. 20–21. (emphases added). Nor do we read step 1.1.2 as defining a particular data format used by the three recited types of subservices: “[1.1.2] wherein the plurality of subservices comprises a video-on-demand (VOD) subservice, electronic programming guide (EPG) subservice, and a media subservice.” 5 We emphasize that patentability is based upon the claims. “It is the claims that measure the invention.” SRI Int’l v. Matsushita Elec. Corp. of America, 775 F.2d 1107, 1121 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (en banc). A basic canon of claim construction is that one may not read a limitation into a claim from the written description. Renishaw PLC v. Marposs Societa' per Azioni, 158 F.3d 1243, 1248 (Fed. Cir. 1998). according to a pre-defined format corresponding to each of the plurality of subservices.” (emphases added). However, we find Patent Owner’s contention unavailing that the term “pre-defined format” recited in step 1.2.1 requires three different data model pre-defined formats because claim 1 is silent regarding the argued term “different.” See PO Sur-reply 9 (regarding Patent Owner’s response to the question of “whether element [1.2.1] and the term ‘pre-defined format’ requires three different data models.” Patent Owner responds: “For the above reasons, they do.”). Moreover, we note the term “data model” is not introduced until subsequent “wherein” clause 1.2.2, which merely requires that “the predefined format comprises one of a VOD data model, an EPG data model and a media data model.” (emphasis added).” slip op. at 20

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededDecided for petitioner

    “Regarding the claim 1 term “uniform format” Petitioner replies that Patent Owner “does not dispute that the prior art teaches a ‘uniform format’” in step 1.2.4. Pet. Reply 8 (citing generally PO Resp.). Therefore, Petitioner argues “for the purposes of this proceeding, the term “uniform format” does not require express construction.” Pet. Reply 8 (citing Nidec (Fed. Cir. 2017)). Nevertheless, at the Board’s request (Dec. 29), Petitioner proceeds to address the scope of the claim 1 term “uniform format.” Pet. Reply 8. Petitioner notes that the ’805 patent uses the term “uniform format” in column 33: “The data models provide uniform formats for the respective subservices (i.e., VOD subservice 1420, EPG subservice 1424, and media subservice 1428) and/or the internal content provider modules 1416 which interface with applications 416.” Pet. Reply 8 (quoting Ex.1001, 33:25–30). Petitioner further notes that Dr. Lippmann explains, “the ’805 patent does not appear to ascribe any specific meaning to the term ‘uniform format’ and the passage does not limit the scope of this term to require a plurality of uniform formats.” Pet. Reply (quoting Ex. 1020 ¶ 13).” slip op. at 22

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Prior-art status of a reference › Printed publication / public accessibilityReference is prior artDecided for petitioner

    “Patent Owner’s arguments are not persuasive because on January 14, 2025, the Federal Circuit in Lynk Labs Inc. v. Samsung Electronics Co. Ltd., (125 F.4th 1120, 1132 (Fed. Cir. 2025)) held that Title 35 U.S.C. sections “311(b) and 102(e)(1) permit IPR challenges based upon published patent applications, and such published patent applications can be deemed prior art in IPRs as of their filing date.” (emphasis added). Accordingly, we conclude both Melnychenko and Choi are prior art for the purpose of this IPR pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 311(b) under the holding of Lynk Labs.” slip op. at 6

  Patent outcomesUS 10,419,805 mixed
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 10,419,805
• LG Electronics, Inc. / LG Electronics U.S.A., Inc. et al. v. Multimedia Technologies Pte. Ltd.Some claims unpatentable
  PTAB · May 19, 2025 · IPR2024-00354 · APJ St John Courtenay III · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1, 2, 6–11, and 14–18 are unpatentable as obvious; claims 3–5, 12, and 13 were not shown unpatentable.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Prior-art status of a reference › Printed publication / public accessibilityReference is prior artDecided for petitioner

    “Patent Owner’s arguments are not persuasive because on January 14, 2025, the Federal Circuit in Lynk Labs Inc. v. Samsung Electronics Co. Ltd., (125 F.4th 1120, 1132 (Fed. Cir. 2025)) held that Title 35 U.S.C. sections “311(b) and 102(e)(1) permit IPR challenges based upon published patent applications, and such published patent applications can be deemed prior art in IPRs as of their filing date.” (emphasis added). Accordingly, we conclude both Melnychenko and Choi are prior art for the purpose of this IPR pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 311(b) under the holding of Lynk Labs.” slip op. at 6

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for patent owner

    “Relying upon the declaration testimony of Dr. Lippman, Petitioner contends that an ordinarily skilled artisan for the ’805 patent “would have been someone knowledgeable about and familiar with the television display technology that is pertinent to the ’805 patent. A POSITA would have had a bachelor’s degree in Electrical Engineering, Software Engineering, or Computer Engineering, or equivalent training, and approximately two years of experience working in the field of television systems and networking, human-computer interaction, or related technologies. Lack of work experience can be remedied by additional education, and vice versa.” Pet. 9 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 18–20). In its Preliminary Response Patent Owner indicated it “adopts Petitioner’s definition of a person of ordinary skill in the art (‘POSITA’) for the purposes of [its] Preliminary Response.” Prelim. Resp. 28. We note Patent Owner does not dispute or otherwise disavow Petitioner’s definition of a POSITA in its Response or Sur-reply. See generally PO Resp.; PO Surreply. level of ordinary skill in the art. On the present record, we are satisfied that this definition comports with the level of skill necessary to understand and implement the teachings of the ’805 patent and the asserted prior art. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (explaining that the prior art itself can reflect appropriate level of ordinary skill in art).” slip op. at 10

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner

    “We disagree with Patent Owner. Id. We see nothing in the preamble 1.0, or “receiving” step 1.1.1, or “wherein” clause 1.1.2 that defines a data format prior to organizing step 1.2.1, and we decline to read limitations from the specification into the claim, i.e., a “pre-defined format” being defined prior to organizing step 1.2.1, as argued by Patent Owner. 5 PO Resp. 20. Preamble 1.0 is silent regarding any mention of a data format: “A method of providing content for a television (TV), the method comprising: . . . .” Although step 1.1.1 requires “receiving, by a processor, data relevant to one or more scheduled events from one of a corresponding subservice of a plurality of subservices,” at best this merely requires a type of data that is “relevant to one or more scheduled events” and does not require a particular data format to be used for “data relevant to one or more scheduled events,” nor the “pre-defined” format argued by Patent Owner. PO Resp. 20–21. (emphases added). Nor do we read step 1.1.2 as defining a particular data format used by the three recited types of subservices: “[1.1.2] wherein the plurality of subservices comprises a video-on-demand (VOD) subservice, electronic programming guide (EPG) subservice, and a media subservice.” 5 We emphasize that patentability is based upon the claims. “It is the claims that measure the invention.” SRI Int’l v. Matsushita Elec. Corp. of America, 775 F.2d 1107, 1121 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (en banc). A basic canon of claim construction is that one may not read a limitation into a claim from the written description. Renishaw PLC v. Marposs Societa' per Azioni, 158 F.3d 1243, 1248 (Fed. Cir. 1998). according to a pre-defined format corresponding to each of the plurality of subservices.” (emphases added). However, we find Patent Owner’s contention unavailing that the term “pre-defined format” recited in step 1.2.1 requires three different data model pre-defined formats because claim 1 is silent regarding the argued term “different.” See PO Sur-reply 9 (regarding Patent Owner’s response to the question of “whether element [1.2.1] and the term ‘pre-defined format’ requires three different data models.” Patent Owner responds: “For the above reasons, they do.”). Moreover, we note the term “data model” is not introduced until subsequent “wherein” clause 1.2.2, which merely requires that “the predefined format comprises one of a VOD data model, an EPG data model and a media data model.” (emphasis added).” slip op. at 20

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededDecided for petitioner

    “Regarding the claim 1 term “uniform format” Petitioner replies that Patent Owner “does not dispute that the prior art teaches a ‘uniform format’” in step 1.2.4. Pet. Reply 8 (citing generally PO Resp.). Therefore, Petitioner argues “for the purposes of this proceeding, the term “uniform format” does not require express construction.” Pet. Reply 8 (citing Nidec (Fed. Cir. 2017)). Nevertheless, at the Board’s request (Dec. 29), Petitioner proceeds to address the scope of the claim 1 term “uniform format.” Pet. Reply 8. Petitioner notes that the ’805 patent uses the term “uniform format” in column 33: “The data models provide uniform formats for the respective subservices (i.e., VOD subservice 1420, EPG subservice 1424, and media subservice 1428) and/or the internal content provider modules 1416 which interface with applications 416.” Pet. Reply 8 (quoting Ex.1001, 33:25–30). Petitioner further notes that Dr. Lippmann explains, “the ’805 patent does not appear to ascribe any specific meaning to the term ‘uniform format’ and the passage does not limit the scope of this term to require a plurality of uniform formats.” Pet. Reply (quoting Ex. 1020 ¶ 13). In its Sur-reply, Patent Owner notes that “Petitioners do not appear to” slip op. at 22

  Patent outcomesUS 10,419,805 mixed
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 10,419,805
• LG Electronics, Inc. / LG Electronics U.S.A., Inc. et al. v. Multimedia Technologies Pte. Ltd.Some claims unpatentable
  PTAB · May 19, 2025 · IPR2024-00694 · APJ Robert L Kinder · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1, 4–6, 11, 14–16, 21, and 22 are unpatentable over the stated obviousness grounds; claims 2, 3, 12, and 13 were not shown unpatentable.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Based on the final record before us, we determine the knowledge level of a person of ordinary skill in the art. Relying on the testimony of Dr. Lippman, LG argues the following: [a] Person of Ordinary Skill in The Art . . . in August of 2012 would have been someone knowledgeable and familiar with the interactive media guide arts that are pertinent to the ’040 patent. A [person of ordinary skill in the art] would have had a bachelor’s degree in Electrical Engineering, Software Engineering, or Computer Engineering, or equivalent training, and approximately two years of experience working in the field of television systems and networking, human-computer interaction, or related technologies. Lack of professional experience can be remedied by additional education, and vice versa.” slip op. at 13

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Prior-art status of a reference › Printed publication / public accessibilityReference is prior artPrinted publication establishedDecided for petitioner

    “under 35 U.S.C. § 311(b) because they were not published before the ’040 patent’s priority date of August 17, 2012. PO Resp. 13–14. Multimedia referenced a case pending at the Federal Circuit, Lynk Labs, Inc. v. Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd., as pertinent to addressing whether applications for patent published after the priority date of the challenged patent are permissible “printed publications” in IPRs. Id. Multimedia’s arguments are not persuasive because on January 14, 2025, the Federal Circuit in Lynk Labs Inc. v. Samsung Electronics Co. Ltd., clarified that inter partes review challenges may be based upon published patent applications, and such published patent applications can be deemed prior art in IPRs as of their filing date. 125 F.4th 1120, 1127 (Fed. Cir. 2025). As such, both Choi and Kim are prior art pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 311(b).” slip op. at 16

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundDecided for petitioner

    “Turning to rationale to combine, LG contends that it would have been obvious to a person of ordinary skill in the art to implement Kim’s EXTERNAL DEVICE card object 1380 to include Choi’s specific symbols representing external devices connected to the input ports of smart TV 100 to inform the user which external devices are actually connected to the smart TV versus those that are not connected. Pet. 42–44 (citing Ex. 1005, Fig. 19 (modifying card object 1380); Ex. 1003 ¶ 137); see also id. at 14 (arguing the same). LG argues this proposed combination is merely combining prior art elements (i.e., Choi’s specific symbols representing external devices connected via input ports, with Kim’s EXTERNAL DEVICE card object 1380) according to known methods to yield the predictable result of “informing the user which external device is connected to an input port.” Id. at 45; see also id. at 14–15 (arguing the same). LG also argues that this proposed combination represents the use of a known technique (i.e., Choi’s specific symbols representing external devices connected via input ports) to improve a similar device (i.e., Kim’s smart TV 100) in the same way (i.e., “to inform the user which external device is connected to an input port”). See id. at 45 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 130); see also id. at 15 (arguing the same). LG asserts that there would have been a reasonable expectation of success in making this proposed combination because both Kim and Choi disclose “similar televisions” with “external devices connected via an input port,” and implementing Kim with Choi’s thumbnail icons that have specific symbols representing input ports would have been “a matter of routine software programming.” Id. at 15 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 61).” slip op. at 22

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of success › HindsightMotivation not foundDecided for patent owner

    “Limitation [2.1] requires identifying a user associated with the “received indication,” which is the selection of a home key button or go-tohome button to invoke the home screen, as alleged by LG. See Pet. Reply 20–21. Both Kim and Lee-2 allow a distinct procedure wherein a user can login, but LG has not explained persuasively how these distinct procedures are associated with Kim’s home key button such that a user is identified through its selection. For example, Lee-2’s Favorite Channel List (Figure 39B) is displayed based on the user’s selection of the favorite channel object 2019 on a home screen, but not related to the user’s selection of the home key button to invoke the home screen. See Ex. 1010, 41:41–43 (“Referring to FIG. 39B, upon selection of the favorite channel object 2019 [in FIG. 39A], a favorite channel list screen including a favorite channel list is displayed fullscreen.”).” slip op. at 62

  Patent outcomesUS 9,510,040 mixed
  § 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 9,510,040
• LG Electronics, Inc. / LG Electronics U.S.A., Inc. et al. v. Multimedia Technologies Pte. Ltd.Some claims unpatentable
  PTAB · May 19, 2025 · IPR2024-00351 · APJ Robert L Kinder · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1, 4–6, 11, 14–16, 21, and 22 are unpatentable as obvious; claims 2, 3, 12, and 13 were not shown unpatentable.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Prior-art status of a reference › Printed publication / public accessibilityReference is prior artDecided for petitioner

    “6. Whether Choi and Kim Are Printed Publications Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 311(b) Multimedia contends that Choi and Kim are not printed publications under 35 U.S.C. § 311(b) because they were not published before the ’040 patent’s priority date of August 17, 2012. PO Resp. 13–14. Multimedia referenced a case pending at the Federal Circuit, Lynk Labs, Inc. v. Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd., as pertinent to addressing whether applications for patent published after the priority date of the challenged patent are permissible “printed publications” in IPRs. Id. Multimedia’s arguments are not persuasive because on January 14, 2025, the Federal Circuit in Lynk Labs Inc. v. Samsung Electronics Co. Ltd., clarified that inter partes review challenges may be based upon published patent applications, and such published patent applications can be deemed prior art in IPRs as of their filing date. 125 F.4th 1120, 1127 (Fed. Cir. 2025). As such, both Choi and Kim are prior art pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 311(b).” slip op. at 15

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Based on the final record before us, we determine the knowledge level of a person of ordinary skill in the art. Relying on the testimony of Dr. Lippman, LG argues the following: [a] Person of Ordinary Skill in The Art . . . in August of 2012 would have been someone knowledgeable and familiar with the interactive media guide arts that are pertinent to the ’040 patent. A [person of ordinary skill in the art] would have had a bachelor’s degree in Electrical Engineering, Software Engineering, or Computer Engineering, or equivalent training, and approximately two years of experience working in the field of television systems and networking, human-computer interaction, or related technologies. Lack of professional experience can be remedied by additional education, and vice versa. Pet. 8–9 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 18–20). In its Response, “Patent Owner accepts the Petitioner’s definition of the POSITA” and Multimedia and its expert, Dr. Surati, “find that definition to be reasonable.” PO Resp. 7 (citing Ex. 2011 ¶¶ 43, 44). Accordingly, we adopt LG’s assessment of the level of skill in the art because it is consistent with the ’040 patent and the asserted prior art.” slip op. at 13

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededDecided for petitioner

    “Based on the final record, including the parties’ contention that no claim term requires express construction, there is no readily discernible controversy between the parties that requires us to construe any claim terms, and thus we do not construe any claim terms except as discussed below with respect to limitation 1.6. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (noting that “we need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 10

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITAPlain and ordinary meaningDecided for petitioner

    “highlighted when a user selects this content source in some manner. Ex. 1001, 30:27–51. At that juncture, after a user selects the content source and it is highlighted, the content source is then associated with the first content information, “801 – CNXN,” which is displayed on the right panel of Figure 15B. See id. We do not understand the ’040 patent as requiring the display “801 – CNXN” to cause the corresponding highlighting of Live TV 1504A as suggested by Multimedia. The claim language requires the two elements “being associated with”5 one another, but it does not require that one element’s display (first content information) causes the highlighting of the other element (content source). Our view is supported by the only description of highlighting a content source found in the specification of the ’040 patent. In regard to Figure 15B, the specification describes that “global panel 1404 may include one or more sources represented by icons and text, or shortcuts, 1504A-E.” Ex. 1001, 30:27–28. The specification describes how highlighting the source is user directed: Global panel 1404 may additionally indicate a source that is selected or highlight [sic] using indicator 1512; for example, indicator 1512 may comprise a box positioned around Live TV 5 As the Federal Circuit has explained, “the plain meaning of associating relates to a mere commonality.” Apple Inc. v. Motorola, Inc., 757 F.3d 1286, 1306 (Fed. Cir. 2014), overruled by Williamson v. Citrix Online, LLC, 792 F.3d 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (on unrelated grounds). 801 CNXN. Although illustrated as a box, other methods or configurations which provide for icon selection and/or identification may be used. For example, instead of a box, indicator 1512 may comprise adjusting the background of an icon and text, such as 1504A for example, such that the color, shade, or hue is different. Id. at 30:41–49 (emphasis added). Highlighting, as the specification describes, occurs when a user selects a source using indicator 1512 and that source is boxed or differentiated by color or shading. Id. The specification, in relation to Figure 15C, further describes a user moving indicator 1512 to another source such that the “the content or a preview of the content may be displayed in active content area 1408.” Id. at 32:9–17 (“For example, FIG. 15C illustrates an image or video associated with Skyfalls being displayed in content area 1408.”). Thus, the specification is clear that the highlighting function results from user selection of the source and the corresponding association of the first content information with that source flows from that user selection. See also id. at 2:30–31 (describing a purpose of the ’040 patent as “an Intelligent TV with intuitive user interfaces and with seamless user interaction capability”), 32:35–43 (“[t]he user . . . move[s] the focus box”). This supports our understanding that the claim language does not require that the display of first content to cause the highlighting of a displayed source identifier.” slip op. at 29

  Patent outcomesUS 9,510,040 mixed
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 9,510,040
• Lifecore Fitness, LLC D/B/A Assault Fitness v. Woodway USA, Inc.Some claims unpatentable
  PTAB · May 6, 2025 · IPR2024-00083 · APJ Meredith C Petravick · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–4, 6, 7, 9–13, 15, and 16 are unpatentable as obvious over Socwell, Magid, and Sclater; claim 8 was not shown unpatentable.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Real party in interest / privityRpi dispute resolved for petitionerDecided for petitioner

    “Prior to institution, Patent Owner argued that we should dismiss the Petition because it identifies the Petitioner as the California Corporation and not the Delaware Corporation. Paper 6, 23–24 (Preliminary Response); Paper 9, 1 (Preliminary Sur-Reply); Paper 12 (Conference Call Transcript); Paper 18 (Request for Director Review). In our Decision on Institution, we found Patent Owner’s argument, as applied to the facts of this proceeding, to be unpersuasive and corrected the caption to correctly reference Petitioner as the California Corporation, essentially replacing the “Inc.” with “LLC” in Petitioner’s name. Paper 13, 14–17; see also Paper 21 (Decision Denying Director Review).” slip op. at 3

  • BurdenOther

    “We find Dr. Giachetti’s testimony, alone, insufficient to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that a POSA, given Tollkien and Sclater, would have been motivated to look to one-way sprag-type clutches to solve the problem of unexpected forward motion of the running belt of a treadmill. Without a reference, like Magid, teaching that it was known to use a one-way clutch mechanism on a treadmill to prevent unexpected forward motion, we are persuaded by Patent Owner that Petitioner’s combination is impermissibly based in hindsight. See PO Resp. 42–47. After considering Petitioner’s evidence and analysis, and taking into account Patent Owner’s arguments and evidence, we determine that Petitioner has failed to show by a preponderance of the evidence that claim 1 is unpatentable over Tollkien and Sclater.” slip op. at 42

  • ExcludeMotion to exclude, deniedGranted in part

    “Declaration of Robert Giachetti, Ph.D. P.E) under FRE 401–402. Mot. 4 (citing FRE 401–402 in the heading). Patent Owner’s Motion, however, includes no substantive arguments directed to whether Giachetti Declaration is relevant admissible evidence or irrelevant inadmissible evidence. Mot. 4– 7. In its Reply, Patent Owner states: “While the Motion to Exclude does not expressly detail Exhibit 1036’s lack of relevance under FRE 401–402, the irrelevance is plain. Petitioner’s provision of new arguments in Reply, which is not allowed, renders such arguments irrelevant.” PO Reply to Mot., 1, n.1. Patent Owners argument is unpersuasive because it is a mere assertion without adequate explanation. The party moving to exclude evidence bears the burden of proving that it is entitled to the relief requested—namely, that the material sought to be excluded is inadmissible under the Federal Rules of Evidence. See 37 C.F.R. §§ 42.20(c), 42.62(a). Patent Owner’s mere assertion does not meet Patent Owner’s burden to show that Exhibit 1036 is irrelevant inadmissible evidence.” slip op. at 52

  • Strike new argumentNew argument consideredDecided for petitioner

    “8 Patent Owner argues that we should not consider Petitioner’s Reply and Exhibits 1036 and 1051 because the Reply and Exhibits relate to new arguments which should have been made in the Petition. PO Sur-Reply 4–5. We do not agree. Petitioner may rely upon Exhibits 1036 and 1051 to response to arguments raised in the Patent Owner’s Response. See PO Resp. (a ); Axonics, Inc. v. Medtronics, Inc., 75 F.4th 1374, 1380–1382 (Fed. Cir. 2023) (“we have continued to recognize that a petitioner is entitled under the APA to respond to new claim construction arguments made by a patent owner.”)” slip op. at 16

  Patent outcomesUS 11,465,005 mixed
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 11,465,005

Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.