- Stats LLC v. Hockeyline, Inc.All claims unpatentablePTAB · Sep 15, 2015 · IPR2014-00510 · APJ Brian P Murphy · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1, 2, 8, 10–12, and 30 were held unpatentable as anticipated by Hameen-Anttila and STATS Football, and obvious over STATS Football combined with Reilly.
RulingsFinal written decision- Claim Construction › Functional claiming / §112(f) means-plus-function › Whether §112(f) applies (Williamson, nonce words)§112(f) appliesDecided for petitioner
“1. Means-plus-function Claiming Independent claim 1 of the ’107 patent includes a series of means-plus- function limitations. 35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶ 6.5 A means-plus-function limitation “shall be construed to cover the corresponding structure, material, or acts described in the specification and equivalents thereof.” Id. The claim limitations in the ’107 patent are drafted using the accepted “means for” construct followed by a specified function, without further recitation of structure to achieve the recited function. Triton Tech of Texas, LLC v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., 753 F.3d 1375, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2014); see Williamson v. Citrix Online, LLC, 792 F.3d 1339, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (en banc). “In exchange for using this form of claiming, the patent specification must disclose with sufficient particularity the corresponding structure for performing the claimed function and clearly link that structure to the function.” Triton Tech, 753 F.3d at 1378 (citation omitted). We construe the following claim limitations for purposes of this decision, in accordance with the principles stated above. 2. “display means coupled to said processor for facilitating the entry of such data by a user” The ’107 patent specification links a touch display screen, computer screen, or other electronic screen with the claimed function of “facilitating the entry of 5 Section 4(c) of the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011) (“AIA”), re-designated 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 6, as 35 U.S.C. § 112(f). Because the ’107 patent has a filing date before September 16, 2012, the effective date of section 4(c) of the AIA, we refer to the pre-AIA version of § 112, ¶ 6. such data by a user.” Ex. 1001, 2:62–67 (“In the case of a touch display screen, the screen may function both as a display means and an input means. In the case of a keyboard or mouse, the operation thereof would normally be carried out in conjunction with display means 108, and/or a computer screen or other electronic screen.”); Pet. 11. During a game, the electronic screen display prompts the device user (game scorer) to enter sports game event data related to the progress of the game. Id. at 3:7–12. The data being entered, “such data” in the claim language under consideration, has antecedent basis in the “input means . . . for inputting data related to events of said sports game in real time.” Accordingly, we conclude that the broadest reasonable interpretation of the limitation “display means coupled to said processor for facilitating the entry of such data by a user,” consistent with the ’107 patent specification, is “a touch screen, computer screen, or other electronic screen coupled to the processor for facilitating the entry of data related to events of a sports game by a user in real time, and equivalents thereof.”” slip op. at 6
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed board ownDecided for petitioner
“2. “display means coupled to said processor for facilitating the entry of such data by a user” The ’107 patent specification links a touch display screen, computer screen, or other electronic screen with the claimed function of “facilitating the entry of 5 Section 4(c) of the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011) (“AIA”), re-designated 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 6, as 35 U.S.C. § 112(f). Because the ’107 patent has a filing date before September 16, 2012, the effective date of section 4(c) of the AIA, we refer to the pre-AIA version of § 112, ¶ 6. such data by a user.” Ex. 1001, 2:62–67 (“In the case of a touch display screen, the screen may function both as a display means and an input means. In the case of a keyboard or mouse, the operation thereof would normally be carried out in conjunction with display means 108, and/or a computer screen or other electronic screen.”); Pet. 11. During a game, the electronic screen display prompts the device user (game scorer) to enter sports game event data related to the progress of the game. Id. at 3:7–12. The data being entered, “such data” in the claim language under consideration, has antecedent basis in the “input means . . . for inputting data related to events of said sports game in real time.” Accordingly, we conclude that the broadest reasonable interpretation of the limitation “display means coupled to said processor for facilitating the entry of such data by a user,” consistent with the ’107 patent specification, is “a touch screen, computer screen, or other electronic screen coupled to the processor for facilitating the entry of data related to events of a sports game by a user in real time, and equivalents thereof.”” slip op. at 6
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for petitioner
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableUnpatentable
“c. Claim 1 – “customized by the user to reflect desired data” We are further persuaded that Hameen-Anttila discloses hierarchical menu- based screen displays that may be “customized by the user to reflect desired data,” in accordance with our claim construction. We agree with Petitioner, that the setup menu in Hameen-Anttila (Fig. 4a) allows a user to select desired display menus (e.g., for golf) that will cause other menus not to be displayed (e.g., for hockey, bowling, and baseball) during a user’s input of golf-specific data in real time. Pet. Reply 7–8 (citing Ex. 1002, 5:21–24; Ex. 1014 (Dahbura Dec.) ¶¶ 20–21). As Dr. Dahbura notes, Patent Owner’s expert, Dr. Locke, agrees that choosing not to display a menu screen is a form of user customization. Ex. 1014 ¶ 21 (citing Ex. 1017, 72:19–73:3). We further agree with Petitioner that Patent Owner’s proffered distinction between Hameen-Anttila’s “mere usage” of hierarchical menu-based screen displays and “customizing” such displays is illusory and not consistent with the description of user customization in the ’107 patent. Pet. Reply 8 (citing Ex. 1014 ¶ 22). The individual drop-down arrows in Figure 4b further suggest the ability of a user to change the menu-based screen displays to permit the user to input desired data for the illustrated golf game. Therefore, we determine Hameen- Anttila discloses an action by the user to configure the hierarchical menu-based screen displays to permit desired data to be gathered for one or more sports games. d. Claim 1 – “transferring statistical information based on such inputted data” Patent Owner’s argument asserting Hameen-Anttila does not disclose the transfer of “statistical information based on such inputted data” also is off the mark. As noted above, Hameen-Anttila discloses that sports game event data is input into an electronic scorekeeping device and transmitted via a communications network to a server while the sports game is ongoing. Ex. 1002, 2:40-51, 2:57– 3:13. We are not persuaded by Patent Owner’s argument that the transfer of statistical information “based on” inputted data requires some form of calculation that necessarily excludes inputted data as part of the transferred “statistical information.” PO Resp. 17–19. Patent Owner does not offer a claim construction or request construction of quoted claim phrase at issue, even though Patent Owner’s argument presumes a specific definition of the phrase without explaining why it is consistent with the broadest reasonable interpretation standard. Pet. Reply 2. The language in claim 1 of the ’107 patent recites “a processor,” but it does not recite a calculation function performed by the processor on inputted data. Pet. Reply 11. The claim language also does not exclude inputted data from “statistical information” or limit “statistical information based on such inputted data” only to statistics calculated from the inputted data. Id. The preamble of claim 1, recites “gathering, processing and distributing statistical information.” Ex. 1001, 8:11–12 (emphasis added); see also PO Resp. 19 (citing Ex. 1001, 1:56–60 (“The present invention advantageously provides an electronic scorekeeping device for gathering, calculating and distributing statistical information.”)). Gathering statistical information, when read in light of the ’107 patent specification, refers to inputting sports game event data into the scorekeeping device for transmission to a central database as part of the statistical information transfer. Pet. Reply 11 (citing Ex. 1001, Abstract (“This [inputted] data is transferred in real-time in a system according to the invention via a communications means to a central database.”); Ex. 1014 ¶¶ 25–28). The ’107 patent does not define “statistical information” or “statistical information based on such inputted data.” The ’107 patent also does not exclude inputted data from the description of statistical information. Pet. Reply 12 (citing Ex. 1014 ¶ 27). To the contrary, and consistent with the understanding in the art, the ’107 patent uses the words “data,” “statistics,” “statistical data,” and “statistical information” interchangeably and with significant areas of overlap. Id.; see also id. at 4 (citing Ex. 2002 ¶ 30 (“The terms ‘statistics,’ ‘data,’ and ‘statistical information,’ are widely used in computer systems, but they are often used in very general ways with broad meanings in which their meanings have significant areas of overlap.”)). We further credit Dr. Dahbura’s testimony, that a person of ordinary skill in” slip op. at 18
Patent outcomesUS 6,725,107 unpatentableClaim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites KSRPatents in suitUS 6,725,107 - Mentor Graphics Corporation v. Synopsys, Inc.All claims unpatentablePTAB · Jun 11, 2015 · IPR2014-00287 · APJ Scott A Daniels · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–3, 10–13, and 20 are unpatentable as obvious over Vander Zanden and Shand; the other proposed grounds did not establish unpatentability.
RulingsFinal written decision- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITAPlain and ordinary meaningOther
“inferring” in accordance with its plain meaning, including: concluding, deciding, deducing, deriving, extrapolating, gathering, judging, making out, reasoning, understanding, and recognizing. Inst. Dec. 9–10. We did not provide a construction for any other terms. Patent Owner’s position is that the word “deducing” comes closer to the meaning of “inferring” than the words “recognizing” or “identifying” as proposed by Petitioner. PO Resp. 24, see also Pet. 14. Our construction includes from its plain meaning, a variety of words (including: deducing recognizing, and identifying) that, depending on context, provide additional understanding of the word “inferring.” Inst. Dec. 9–10. A plain meaning of the word “incorporating” is “to unite or work into something already existent so as to form an indistinguishable whole.” Incorporate, Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/incorporate (last visited May 28, 2015). For these words, we do not consider the proffered constructions to provide any clarity over the term itself. Consequently, we simply are not persuaded by either of the parties contentions and interpretations that under the broadest reasonable interpretation, in the context of the Specification and claims, that these words should be construed with respect to only the particular definitions or meanings ascribed to them by either party. slip op. at 9
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“Based on our claim construction, we are persuaded that Vander Zanden does not disclose a “resetable memory” as recited in independent claim 1. We determined that a “resetable memory” means a memory that outputs a reset value until new data is written into the memory. See section II.B.3. Vander Zanden’s “if then” statement in the code shown in Figure 3 outputs a reset value “0” only when the reset signal is high, in all other modes it outputs either a value from RGF1 or added values from RGF1. See Ex. 1003, Fig. 3; see also PO Resp. 32. In other words OUT1 does not keep, or remember, the reset value until new data is written to RGF1. We find Patent Owner’s position persuasive that the resetable flip-flop DFF6 on the output line of the circuit as described in Vander Zanden’s Figure 3, and shown in Figure 4, does not render the registers at RGF1 a “resetable memory” as properly construed because it fails to maintain OUT1 at a reset value until new data is written to a cell. Petitioner’s argument that no temporal limitation should be read into the claim is unpersuasive because, as discussed above in section II.B.3, the ’420 patent expressly differentiates the “reset” functionality of the described “resetable memory” from known resetable memories where the described, and claimed methodology in each embodiment, “causes the reset value 208 to be provided 302 as the effective memory cell output–until the cell has been written to.” Ex. 1001, 4:56–58. Vander Zanden does not disclose a “resetable memory design” for similar reasons as set forth above with respect to “resetable memory.” We are persuaded that the resetable flip-flop DFF 6 on the output line as shown in Figure 4 does not disclose a “restable memory design” as called for in the claims because Petitioner does not explain how the circuit design in Figure 4 implements the retention of a reset value until new data is written to the cell, where it only toggles between the reset mode, ADDER mode and mode which returns a value from RGF1. For the reasons provided above, Petitioner has not established by a” slip op. at 21
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundUnpatentable
“disclose the step of inferring the existence of a memory, and turns to Shand for disclosure of a “resetable memory” and a “resetable memory design” for incorporation into a semiconductor circuit. Pet. 31. Petitioner asserts that one of ordinary skill in the art would have combined Shand with Vander Zanden in order to reduce the size of the circuit design. Id. at 32 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶ 68). Patent Owner argues specifically that Petitioner’s Declarant, Mr. Detjens, admitted that one of ordinary skill in the art would not replace the memory in Vander Zanden with the circuit described in Shand. PO Resp. 55. This argument mischaracterizes Mr. Detjens testimony as well as the question. The question asked Mr. Detjens if he could identify “what memory in Vander Zanden you would replace with the Shand memory?” Ex. 2010 84:2–3 (emphasis added). Read in context, Mr. Detjens’ initial answer “No” differentiates between replacing the “memory” and replacing the “resetable memory.” See id. at 84:1–20. Mr. Detjens continued on, and answered the question with further specificity, stating that “for a resetable memory that is created through the process given in the Vander Zanden paper, you would replace it with the memory in the Shand patent.” Id. at 84:18–20 (emphasis added). Thus, we do not find Patent Owner’s argument on this point to be persuasive. Patent Owner further asserts that Shand’s resetable memory is functionally different and one of ordinary skill in the art would not utilize Shand’s resetable memory with Vander Zanden because it “would render the circuit inoperable (i.e., the synthesized circuit in Vander Zanden Figure 4 would no longer match the HDL and it would not work as the designer intended).” PO Resp. 57 (citing McGinley v. Franklin Sports, Inc., 262 F.3d 1339, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2001)). Petitioner replies that “A POSA knew how to describe a resetable memory in behavioral or RTL level terms, and how to recognize a resetable memory in such a description.” Reply 2–3 (citing Ex. 1024 ¶¶ 10–15; Ex. 1020 at 17–18, 27–28, 75–77, 84–85, 91–98). Petitioner’s position, and Dr. Detjens’ testimony, are persuasive. Neither Patent Owner’s argument that Shand fails to disclose the inferring step, nor the testimony provided in Dr. Hutchings’s Declaration alleging that Shand discloses only resetable memory circuits and not inferring a memory with reset, explains why it was not within the ordinary skill of one in the art to have modified the respective underlying HDL code, for example as shown in Vander Zanden’s Figure 3, to include code defining the respective resetable memory circuit such as disclosed in Shand. See PO Resp. 57, see also Ex. 2011 ¶¶ 85–88. As discussed above with respect to anticipation, we are persuaded that Vander Zanden discloses the “inferring” step for a memory as recited in independent claims 1 and 13, and that it would have been within the abilities of a person of ordinary skill in the art to combine Shand’s resetable memory circuit design with Vander Zanden and consequently modify the HDL code to address the functional changes imparted by the implementation of a different resetable memory in such a combination.” slip op. at 25
- ExcludeMotion to exclude, deniedDenied
“We have reviewed Mr. Detjens’ Declaration in Support of Petitioner’s Reply, (Ex. 1024) and find the Declaration, as a whole, complies with our rule, 37 C.F.R.§ 42.23(b), that a reply may only respond to arguments raised in patent owner’s response. For example, Mr. Detjens explains in the Reply Declaration that his testimony is specifically in response to Patent Owner’s argument that Vander Zanden does not disclose inferring resetable memories. Ex. 1024 ¶ 5 (citing PO Resp. 29–30). Within the context of Vander Zanden and his previous testimony, Mr. Detjens’ Reply Declaration provides appropriate elucidating evidence with respect to the level of ordinary skill in the art in addition to that in his original Declaration. Compare id. ¶¶ 6–11, with Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 35–43. The Reply Declaration does, in several paragraphs, refer to certain evidence such as Exhibits 1022 and 1023 not filed with the Petition, but overall, relies substantially upon the prior art and evidence submitted with the Petition. Patent Owner’s Motion does not apprise us that the Reply or Reply Declaration is raising a new issue or injecting improper new evidence into the proceeding. Our review of the Reply Declaration indicates that overall Mr. Detjens’ testimony is proper rebuttal evidence, timely submitted, in reply to Patent Owner’s Response. Therefore, the request to exclude Petitioner’s Reply and Mr. Detjens’ Reply Declaration (Ex. 1024) is denied.” slip op. at 36
Patent outcomesUS 6,836,420 unpatentableClaim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnessPatents in suitUS 6,836,420
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.