- PTAB · Jul 24, 2024 · IPR2024-00465 · APJ Bart A Gerstenblith · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–24 on all petition grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that Irwin renders at least one challenged claim obvious.
RulingsInstitution decision- Other 314aInstitution denied discretionary otherDenied
“Even assuming Linq3 is a real party in interest to Petitioner and assuming we may exercise our discretion to deny institution based on unclean hands (see Kavo Dental Techs, LLC v. Osseo Imaging, Inc., IPR2020-00659, Paper 10 at 19 (PTAB June 10, 2020)), Patent Owner essentially asks us to resolve multiple factual issues related to its contract dispute with Linq3 to justify denial of institution. See, e.g., Prelim. Resp. 1– 26. Many, if not all, of these issues appear to be involved in the contract dispute, which will be resolved by the Arizona state court. We are not in a good position to make determinations about these particular issues at this stage of the proceeding, on the limited record before us. Rather, we find that the state court is better suited to address the conduct of Linq3 of which Patent Owner complains. Accordingly, we leave these matters for the state court. To the extent Patent Owner seeks to pursue its argument that Linq3 is a real party in interest to Petitioner, even though no time bar under 35 U.S.C. § 315(b) has been asserted, Patent Owner may raise the issue of real party in interest again in its Patent Owner Response, and the parties may brief and argue the issue during trial.” slip op. at 10
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › General Plastic (serial petitions)Institution denied general plasticDenied
“We disagree. First, we agree with Patent Owner that the fact pattern presented here is not the typical situation in which the factors from General Plastic are considered. In particular, this proceeding challenges claims of a different patent than the patents at issue in PGR2020-00084 and IPR2023- 01235. Challenging claims of different patents significantly distinguishes the facts here from those in General Plastic, and we decline Patent Owner’s invitation to extend General Plastic in this regard. Accordingly, we do not exercise our discretion to deny institution.” slip op. at 11
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Real party in interest / privityNot reached
“Even assuming Linq3 is a real party in interest to Petitioner and assuming we may exercise our discretion to deny institution based on unclean hands (see Kavo Dental Techs, LLC v. Osseo Imaging, Inc., IPR2020-00659, Paper 10 at 19 (PTAB June 10, 2020)), Patent Owner essentially asks us to resolve multiple factual issues related to its contract dispute with Linq3 to justify denial of institution. See, e.g., Prelim. Resp. 1– 26. Many, if not all, of these issues appear to be involved in the contract dispute, which will be resolved by the Arizona state court. We are not in a good position to make determinations about these particular issues at this stage of the proceeding, on the limited record before us. Rather, we find that the state court is better suited to address the conduct of Linq3 of which Patent Owner complains. Accordingly, we leave these matters for the state court. To the extent Patent Owner seeks to pursue its argument that Linq3 is a real party in interest to Petitioner, even though no time bar under 35 U.S.C. § 315(b) has been asserted, Patent Owner may raise the issue of real party in interest again in its Patent Owner Response, and the parties may brief and argue the issue during trial.” slip op. at 10
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“5. Weighing the Graham Factors “Once all relevant facts are found, the ultimate legal determination [of obviousness] involves the weighing of the fact findings to conclude whether the claimed combination would have been obvious to an ordinary artisan.” Arctic Cat, 876 F.3d at 1361. On balance, considering the record presently before us, Petitioner has established a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail in showing that Irwin would have rendered the subject matter of claims 1–9 and 11–24 of the ’451 patent obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention.” slip op. at 38
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,488,451 - PTAB · Feb 9, 2024 · IPR2023-01235 · APJ Bart A Gerstenblith · IPR · Institution
Instituted review of claims 1–6 on all petition grounds; the Board found a reasonable likelihood of success on obviousness over Szrek and did not reach the Llach–Szrek ground.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › General Plastic (serial petitions)Denied
“We disagree. First, we agree with Patent Owner that the fact pattern presented here is not the typical situation in which the factors from General Plastic are considered. In particular, this proceeding challenges claims of a different patent than at issue in IPR2020-00084. Second, although the parties may have gained insight as to how the Board would handle challenges based on the same references asserted in the earlier proceeding, that insight (to the extent it gives an advantage) applies to both parties. Third, the first proceeding was a post-grant review that had a specific timing requirement (see 35 U.S.C. § 321(c)), in contrast to the present proceeding in which the filing of the Petition did not have the same or similar time constraint.6 In these circumstances, we find it appropriate to give less weight to factors based on the mere passage of time such as whether Petitioner knew of the prior art at the time of filing the petition in PGR2020- 00084 (clearly Petitioner did because two of the same references are asserted here) and whether Petitioner had received Patent Owner’s preliminary response from PGR2020-00084 at the time of filing the instant Petition. Accordingly, we decline to exercise our discretion to deny institution.” slip op. at 11
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Real party in interest / privityNot reached
“Even assuming Linq3 is a real party in interest to Petitioner and assuming we may exercise our discretion to deny institution based on unclean hands (see Kavo Dental Techs, LLC v. Osseo Imaging, Inc., IPR2020-00659, Paper 10 at 19 (PTAB June 10, 2020)), Patent Owner essentially asks us to resolve multiple factual issues related to its contract dispute with Linq3 to justify denial of institution. See, e.g., Prelim. Resp. 1– 26. Many, if not all, of these issues appear to be involved in the contract dispute, which will be resolved by the Arizona state court. We are not in a good position to make determinations about these particular issues at this stage of the proceeding, on the limited record before us. Rather, we find that the state court is better suited to address the conduct of Linq3 of which Patent Owner complains. Accordingly, we do not dive headfirst into these matters that are better addressed by the state court. To the extent Patent Owner seeks to pursue its argument that Linq3 is a real party of interest to Petitioner, even though no time bar under 35 U.S.C. § 315(b) has been asserted, Patent Owner may raise the issue of real party in interest again in its Patent Owner Response and the parties may brief and argue the issue during trial.” slip op. at 10
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Pet. 2–3 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 13).7 Patent Owner does not propose a level of ordinary skill in the art in its Preliminary Response. See generally Prelim. Resp. At this stage of the proceeding and on the present record, we find that Petitioner’s uncontested level of ordinary skill in the art is consistent with the level of ordinary skill in the art reflected by the ’135 patent and the prior art of record. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001); In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995); In re Oelrich, 579 F.2d 86, 91 (CCPA 1978). Therefore, we adopt Petitioner’s level of ordinary skill in the art, as articulated above, in our consideration of the issues presently before us.” slip op. at 14
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction needed
“Additionally, only terms that are in controversy need to be construed, and these need be construed only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy. See Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’”) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). Petitioner contends that we should follow the Board’s decision in PGR2020-00084 and construe “transaction processor” and “data package” in accordance with each term’s plain and ordinary meaning. Pet. 13; see id. at 13–19. Patent Owner does not take a position as to claim construction at this stage of the proceeding. See generally Prelim. Resp. In PGR2020-00084, the Board construed “transaction processor”8 in accordance with its plain meaning as “a processor . . . that processes transactions between two devices” and specifically “decline[d] to limit processors . . . to ‘third party’ processors . . . because the intrinsic record does not justify such a modification and it would create uncertainty.” Ex. 1008, 22. And, as Petitioner indicates, the Board determined that “data package” also is understood in accordance with its plain and ordinary meaning. Id. at 22–24; see id. at 24 n.10. At this stage of the proceeding 8 In that proceeding, the Board also construed “transaction processor system.” Ex. 1008, 13–22. and on the present record, we need not construe any claim terms expressly because none are in dispute. See Realtime Data, 912 F.3d at 1375.” slip op. at 15
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 9,865,135 - Halliburton Energy Services, Inc. v. U.S. Well Services, LLCAll claims unpatentablePTAB · Jan 17, 2023 · IPR2021-01035 · APJ Sean P O’Hanlon · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–23 are unpatentable as obvious over the combinations of Coli, Birch, and the additional references specified for each ground.
RulingsFinal written decision- BurdenDecided for petitioner
“have reviewed the parties’ briefs and the evidence of record and determine that, for the reasons explained below, Petitioner has shown, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the limitations of claims 1–5, 9–14, 16, 19, 22, and 23 are disclosed by the combination of Coli and Birch and that Petitioner has set forth reasoning with rational underpinning why it would have been obvious to combine the teachings of these references to arrive at the claimed subject matter.3” slip op. at 20
- Skill levelSkill level board ownDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner contends that a person having ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention (“POSITA”) would have either “a Bachelor of Science in Mechanical Engineering, Electrical Engineering, Petroleum Engineering or an equivalent field as well as at least two years of academic or industry experience in the oil and gas industry, including well drilling, completion, or production,” or “at least four years of industry experience in the oil and gas industry, including well drilling, completion, or production.” Pet. 11. Patent Owner asserts that it “has used Petitioner’s proposed definition of [a person of ordinary skill in the art].” PO Resp. 19. Based on the arguments presented and the asserted references, we find Petitioner’s definition of the level of ordinary skill reasonable and, for purposes of this Decision, adopt it as our own.” slip op. at 9
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“2. “configured to monitor” and “monitoring” Patent Owner informs us that, in the Texas litigation, the parties agreed that the plain and ordinary meaning of “configured to[] monitor at least one of pressure and temperature of the plurality of electric pumps and the plurality of generators” as used in claim 1 is “configured to monitor at least one of pressure and temperature of the plurality of electric pumps and configured to monitor at least one of pressure and temperature of the plurality of generators.” PO Resp. 18 (citing Ex. 2044). Patent Owner similarly informs us that, in the Texas litigation, the parties also agreed that the plain and ordinary meaning of “monitoring at a centralized control unit at least one of pressure and temperature of the electrically powered pump and the generator” as used in claim 9 is “monitoring at a centralized control unit at least one of pressure and temperature of the electrically powered pump and monitoring at the centralized control unit at least one of pressure and temperature of the generator.” Id. at 18–19 (citing Ex. 2044). Petitioner does not address these terms. See generally Pet. Reply. Patent Owner does not actually argue that we should interpret these terms in any specific manner. Nor does Patent Owner rely on its claim construction to attempt to distinguish the prior art at issue in this proceeding from the challenged claims. Accordingly, we decline to construe these terms.” slip op. at 11
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed patent owner constructionDecided for petitioner
“We agree with Patent Owner that, as used in the challenged claims, “high pressure” refers to the pressure of the fracturing fluid used during the stimulation phase of a hydraulic fracturing operation. See PO Resp. 18. However, Patent Owner acknowledges that hydraulic fracturing also can be carried out at “medium pressure” (id. at 17) but does not explain the difference between “high” pressure and “medium” pressure; Patent Owner does not identify any disclosure in the ’278 patent setting forth any values for the recited “high pressure.” For the purposes of this Decision, we interpret “high pressure” as suggested by Patent Owner to mean a pressure at which the fluid pumped into the wellbore will fracture the underground formation. See PO Resp. 17–18. We take no position on the definiteness of this term, and we note that indefiniteness under § 112 is not a basis on which claims may be determined unpatentable in an inter partes review. 35 U.S.C. § 311(b).” slip op. at 11
Patent outcomesUS 9,970,278 unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 9,970,278 - Halliburton Energy Services, Inc. v. U.S. Well Services, LLCSome claims unpatentablePTAB · Jan 4, 2023 · IPR2021-01033 · APJ Sean P O’Hanlon · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–12, 15, and 17–22 are unpatentable as obvious; claim 16 was not shown unpatentable over Coli, Horikoshi, API Standard, and Stark.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“B. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art” slip op. at 8
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“1. “A/C console” Petitioner asserts that, in a litigation with a third party, Patent Owner” slip op. at 10
- BurdenMixed
“For the reasons that follow, we conclude that Petitioner has proven by a preponderance of the evidence that claims 1–12, 15, and 17–22 of the 1 Available at https://www.uspto.gov/TrialPracticeGuideConsolidated. ’601 patent are unpatentable. It, however, has failed to meet its burden of proof regarding the unpatentability of claim 16.” slip op. at 2
- Obviousness (§103) › Objective indicia / secondary considerations › NexusObjective indicia no nexusDecided for petitioner
“2. Nexus “In order to accord substantial weight to secondary considerations in an obviousness analysis, ‘the evidence of secondary considerations must have a “nexus” to the claims, i.e., there must be “a legally and factually sufficient connection” between the evidence and the patented invention.’” Fox Factory, Inc. v. SRAM, LLC, 944 F.3d 1366, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (citing Henny Penny Corp. v. Frymaster LLC, 938 F.3d 1324, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2019)). “The patentee bears the burden of showing that a nexus exists . . . .” WMS Gaming Inc. v. Int’l Game Tech., 184 F.3d 1339, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 1999). Nexus is a legally and factually sufficient connection between the objective evidence and the claimed invention, such that the objective evidence should be considered in determining nonobviousness. Demaco Corp. v. F. Von Langsdorff Licensing Ltd., 851 F.2d 1387, 1392 (Fed. Cir. 1988). A nexus is presumed when “the patentee shows that the asserted objective evidence is tied to a specific product and that product ‘embodies the claimed features, and is coextensive with them.’” Fox Factory, 944 F.3d at 1373 (quoting Polaris Indus., Inc. v. Arctic Cat, Inc., 882 F.3d 1056, 1072 (Fed. Cir. 2018)). “A finding that a presumption of nexus is inappropriate does not end the inquiry into secondary considerations,” as “the patent owner is still afforded an opportunity to prove nexus by showing that the evidence of secondary considerations is the ‘direct result of the unique characteristics of the claimed invention.’” Id. at 1373–74 (citing In re Huang, 100 F.3d 135, 140 (Fed. Cir. 1996)). Patent Owner argues that its Clean Fleet Generation I product embodies the system recited in independent claim 1. PO Resp. 29–32. Patent Owner asserts that the Clean Fleet Generation I product has “two electric powered ‘frac’ pumps mounted on a trailer and two electric motors each capable of delivering 1750 BHP” and “[t]he trailer also has two VFDs to control and power each electric motor, and the pumps are rated for 14,500 psi.” Id. at 31 (citing Ex. 2034, 38–78; Ex. 2041, 2). Patent Owner asserts that the Clean Fleet Generation I product is powered by turbine generators. Id. at 32 (citing Ex. 2041, 9; Ex. 2034, 38–78). Patent Owner argues that its Clean Fleet Generation I product embodies independent claims 8 and 22 for the same reasons advanced for claim 1 and, with respect to claim 8, also because the Clean Fleet product includes a motor having a shaft made of steel grade 4340 HT. Id. at 34 (citing Ex. 2039, 35; Ex. 2034, 38–78), 37 (citing Ex. 2034, 38–78). Petitioner argues that Patent Owner has not shown that the Clean Fleet product embodies the claims of the ’601 patent because Patent Owner and Mr. Schaaf “provide no analysis for whether or how Clean Fleet practices” the “‘high pressure’ limitation or ‘frequently performing electric motor diagnostics.’” Pet. Reply 23 (citing PO Resp. 6; Ex. 2034, 39–41). Petitioner also notes that “[Patent Owner] points to the same Clean Fleet product for non-obviousness across sixteen patents” and argues that Patent Owner’s reliance on the same evidence for all of these patents is improper because the patents recite “dozens of features” not recited in the ’601 patent, including a heater, a pump down pump, a combustible fuel vaporization system, a gas compression system, switchgear units, a tiebreaker, and a weight monitoring system. Id. at 23–25 (emphasis omitted). Petitioner also argues that Patent Owner has not established a nexus between its Clean Fleet Generation I product and the claims of the ’601 patent because Patent Owner has not tied the evidence of secondary considerations to the ’601 patent. Id. at 25–26. Rather, Petitioner asserts, Patent Owner’s evidence is tied to features known in the prior art. Id.” slip op. at 58
Patent outcomesUS 8,789,601 mixedClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 8,789,601 - Ford Motor Company v. Ethanol Boosting Systems, LLC, And Massachusetts Institute Of TechnologyRehearing grantedPTAB · Nov 21, 2022 · IPR2021-00339 · APJ Lynne H Browne · IPR · Rehearing
Granted Ford’s rehearing request and instituted IPR on claims 1, 2, 5-15, 18, 20, 21, 23, 25, 27-29, and 31 on all petition grounds.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, grantedGranted
“For the reasons discussed below, we grant Petitioner’s Rehearing Request, and institute an inter partes review. We determine, based on the information in the Petition, Rehearing Request, exhibits, and other briefing, that the information presented in the Petition shows “a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least [one] of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) (2018).” slip op. at 3
- Prior constructionPrior construction not adoptedTerm construed board ownDecided for petitioner
“C. Claim Construction Given the decision of the Federal Circuit reversing the district court’s claim construction, we now reconsider our claim construction determination in our Decision. As discussed above, on appeal the District Court’s finding that “the specification . . . makes clear that what is invented is a dual fuel engine’” was reversed. Ex. 1042, 3, 7. In other words, the Federal Circuit determined that the claims do not require a dual-fuel system. The Federal Circuit’s decision was based on several determinations. Id. at 4–7. The Federal Circuit determined that “[t]here is nothing in the claim language that requires the use of different fuels in the direct-injection system and the portinjection system.” Id. at 4. It further determined that “[t]he asserted patents’ specifications do not impose a single-fuel requirement either.” Id. at 5. Accordingly, we adopt the Federal Circuit’s claim construction as our own.” slip op. at 6
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“6. Conclusion For Claim 1 We have reviewed Petitioner’s assertions set forth in Section II.D.3 above. Based on the current record, we find these assertions to be sufficiently persuasive and supported by the cited evidence to justify institution of review.” slip op. at 13
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successInstituted
“uses portion fuel injection.” Ex. 1001, 16:65. Petitioner asserts that “Miura discloses an ECU,11 PI, and DI.” Pet. 13 (citing Ex. 1008 ¶¶ 15–16; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 156, 160). Petitioner asserts further that “A POSITA12 would have modified Schray to include a port fuel injector as well as its disclosed direct fuel injector, as is taught by Miura, to provide the engine of Schray with additional benefits relating to mixing and stable combustion at low loads.” Pet. 10.” slip op. at 10
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessPatents in suitUS 10,619,580 - Ford Motor Company v. Ethanol Boosting Systems, LLC, And Massachusetts Institute Of TechnologyRehearing grantedPTAB · Nov 21, 2022 · IPR2021-00340 · APJ Lynne H Browne · IPR · Rehearing
Rehearing was granted and IPR instituted on claims 1, 4, 6-15, 18, 20-29, 31, and 33 on all petition grounds after adopting the Federal Circuit’s fuel-term construction.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, grantedGranted
“A party dissatisfied with a decision may file a single request for rehearing, without prior authorization from the Board. The burden of showing a decision should be modified lies with the party challenging the decision. The request must specifically identify all matters the party believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked, and the place where each matter was previously addressed in a motion, an opposition, or a reply. We review our Decision under an abuse of discretion standard. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(c). An abuse of discretion may arise if a decision is based on an erroneous interpretation of law, if a factual finding is not supported by substantial evidence, or if the decision represents an unreasonable judgment in weighing relevant factors. Star Fruits S.N.C. v. United States, 393 F.3d 1277, 1281 (Fed. Cir. 2005); Arnold P’ship v. Dudas, 362 F.3d 1338, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2004); In re Gartside, 203 F.3d 1305, 1315–16 (Fed. Cir. 2000).” slip op. at 3
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“5. Analysis For Claim 113 As discussed in Section II.C above, we have determined that the claim construction in our Decision was wrong. In the Decision we determined that claim 1 required a duel-fuel system. See Dec. 18 (stating, “we construe the fuel terms consistent with the constructions applied in Ford I and Ford II.”). We now understand the claims to be applicable to single fuel systems. Accordingly, Patent Owner’s contentions that Schray and Miura are directed to single fuel systems are unavailing. 6. Conclusion For Claim 1 We have reviewed Petitioner’s assertions set forth in Section II.D.3 above. Based on the current record, we find these assertions to be” slip op. at 13
- Prior constructionPrior construction not adoptedDecided for petitioner
“district court’s construction of the fuel terms. Paper 16; Ex. 1042 (providing the Federal Circuit’s opinion). The Federal Circuit construed the fuel terms to encompass a configuration where the first fueling system and the second fueling system use the same fuel, consistent with how Patent Owner construed the claim at the district court, and how Petitioner construed the terms in the Petition. See Pet. 15 (“Petitioner adopts Patent Owner’s (“[Patent Owner] contends that the district court erred in construing the first fueling system to be limited to using fuels different than the fuel in the second system because there is no clear disclaimer of a single-fuel invention. We agree.”). C. Claim Construction Given the decision of the Federal Circuit reversing the district court’s claim construction, we now reconsider our claim construction determination in our Decision. As discussed above, on appeal the District Court’s finding that “the specification . . . makes clear that what is invented is a dual fuel engine’” was reversed. Ex. 1042, 3, 7. In other words, the Federal Circuit determined that the claims do not require a dual-fuel system. The Federal Circuit’s decision was based on several determinations. Id. at 4–7. The Federal Circuit determined that “[t]here is nothing in the claim language that requires the use of different fuels in the direct-injection system and the portinjection system.” Id. at 4. It further determined that “[t]he asserted patents’ specifications do not impose a single-fuel requirement either.” Id. at 5. Accordingly, we adopt the Federal Circuit’s claim construction as our own.” slip op. at 5
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundInstituted
“uses portion fuel injection.” Ex. 1001, 17:05. Petitioner asserts that “Miura discloses an ECU,11 PI, and DI.” Pet. 22 (citing Ex. 1008 ¶¶ 15–16; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 159, 163). Petitioner asserts further that “A POSITA12 would have modified Schray to include a port fuel injector as well as its disclosed direct fuel injector, as is taught by Miura, to provide the engine of Schray with additional benefits relating to mixing and stable combustion at low loads.” Pet. 20 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 147).” slip op. at 10
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessPatents in suitUS 10,781,760
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.