- Apple Inc. v. Geoscope Technologies Pte. Ltd.All claims unpatentablePTAB · May 7, 2025 · IPR2024-00031 · APJ Annette R Reimers · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 16–20, 24, 26, and 27 are unpatentable: claims 16, 19, 20, 24, and 27 are anticipated by Bhattacharya, and all challenged claims are obvious over Bhattacharya and Spain.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level patent owner adoptedDecided for patent owner
“We agree with Patent Owner for the following reasons. First, Patent Owner’s definition is consistent with our determination in IPR2023-01210, which involved the same ’358 patent, and Petitioner does not explain sufficiently why we should adopt a different definition. See generally Pet. Reply.” slip op. at 8
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedDecided for petitioner
“Sundaresan Declaration, Dr. Sundaresan implied agreement with the POSITA definition based on its inclusion in a signed declaration.” Pet. Reply 15. We agree with Petitioner. Although Dr. Sundaresan does not state explicitly that the proposed definition of the ordinary skill in the art is his opinion, we are persuaded that the manner in which the definition is set forth in his declaration indicates that he agrees with the definition. In this case, Patent Owner attempts to make much of Dr. Sundaresan’s statement that he had been informed of the qualifications of a person of ordinary skill in the art. See PO Resp. 42–44. Dr. Sundaresan’s testimony, however, set forth this understanding of the requisite level of skill in the art (Ex. 1003 ¶ 8). In his supplemental declaration, Dr. Sundaresan further testifies that: I agreed with this POSITA definition when preparing the Declaration, and I continue to hold the opinion that the POSITA definition is both correct and appropriate based on the disclosures of the ’358 patent and the prior art analyzed in the Declaration. Ex. 1055 ¶ 17. Dr. Sundaresan further testifies that “[i]f I did not agree with the POSITA definition, then it would not have been included [] in paragraph 8 of the Declaration.” Id. ¶ 18. Dr. Sundaresan’s inclusion of the definition of the level of ordinary skill in his original declaration indicates that he” slip op. at 13
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner
“explained below, we agree with Petitioner that Patent Owner’s additional requirement of evaluating the calibration data to determine the boundaries of the area represented by a grid point should not be included in the construction of either “grid point” or “non-uniform grid point.” Instead, based on the full record, we discern no reason to alter our prior construction of “grid point” as “a point associated with representative calibration data for an area” and maintain that construction for this Final Written Decision. The construction of “grid point” we adopt is supported by the Specification of the ’358 patent. Namely, the ’358 patent discloses that “[i]n general, a non-uniform grid point (NUG) may represent the signal characteristics and/or calibration data over a given region,” and “NUGs district court identified the second quoted passage, which is identically recited in the ’104 patent (see Ex. 2018, 3:50–60) as “provid[ing] a clear indication of the meaning of ‘grid point.’” Ex. 2012, 19 (emphasis added). We agree with the district court’s analysis. Although the ’358 patent does not explain how a generic “grid point” might differ from the described “nonuniform grid point,” we do not find this distinction pertinent to construing “grid point” in this case because neither party raises this issue. Also, based on the claim wording “non-uniform grid point,” a “non-uniform grid point” is a type of grid point. See Pet. Reply 4 (explaining why that plain meaning supports Petitioner’s proposed construction). Furthermore, the district court construed “grid point” only, not “non-uniform grid point.” Ex. 2012, 18–20.” slip op. at 26
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableUnpatentable
“Based on the entire trial record, we agree with Petitioner’s analysis with supporting evidence and credit Dr. Sundaresan’s testimony supporting Petitioner’s position. See Pet. 20–37. Thus, we determine that Bhattacharya discloses the recitations of claim 15. b. Remaining Claims 16, 19, 20, 24, and 27 Claims 16, 19, 20, 24, and 27 depend from claim 15. Ex. 1001, 13:19–21, 12:30–36, 12:52–55; 12:63–67. Petitioner accounts for the limitations recited in each of claims 16, 19, 20, 24, and 27. Pet. 37–42. Patent Owner does not offer any arguments specifically addressing the limitations of claims 16, 19, 20, 24, and 27. See PO Resp. passim. Petitioner shows, by a preponderance of the evidence, that each element of claims 16, 19, 20, 24, and 27 is disclosed by Bhattacharya.” slip op. at 41
Patent outcomesUS 8,400,358 unpatentableClaim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 8,400,358 - Apple Inc. v. Geoscope Technologies Pte. Ltd.All claims unpatentablePTAB · May 7, 2025 · IPR2024-00259 · APJ Sheila F Mcshane · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1, 7, 9, 32, 38, and 40 are unpatentable as obvious over Bhattacharya and Yost.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level patent owner adoptedDecided for patent owner
“In determining the level of ordinary skill in the art, various factors may be considered, including the “type of problems encountered in the art; prior art solutions to those problems; rapidity with which innovations are made; sophistication of the technology; and educational level of active workers in the field.” In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (citation omitted). The key difference between Petitioner’s and Patent Owner’s proposed qualifications for a person of ordinary skill at the time of the invention is that Patent Owner asserts that experience in “wireless networks, cellular radio systems, mobile communication devices and radio navigation systems,” as well as a background in radio frequency communications and/or navigation system technology with two years of industry experience working in the same, would be required. PO Resp. 23. The ’753 patent is directed to locating a wireless mobile device in a geographic region. Ex. 1001, 1:15–23. Bhattacharya is directed to estimating the geographic location of a wireless terminal. Ex. 1004, code (57), ¶¶ 1, 13. Yost is directed to a method for locating the concentration of mobile radio traffic in a coverage area. Ex. 1008, code (57), 2:17–19. We find that there is support in the ’753 patent and prior art consistent with Patent Owner’s assertion that the qualifications of a person of skill would include knowledge of radio navigation and mobile communications technology. Accordingly, we adopt Patent Owner’s proposed qualifications for a person of ordinary skill.” slip op. at 8
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedDecided for petitioner
“We do not agree with Patent Owner that Dr. Sundaresan’s declaration is substantively deficient and therefore should not be afforded weight. Patent Owner attempts to make much of Dr. Sundaresan’s statement that he had been informed of the qualifications of a person of ordinary skill in the art. See PO Resp. 47–28. Dr. Sundaresan’s testimony, however, set forth this understanding of the requisite level of skill in the art (Ex. 1003 ¶ 8). In his supplemental declaration, Dr. Sundaresan further testifies that: I agreed with this POSITA definition when preparing the Declaration, and I continue to hold the opinion that the POSITA definition is both correct and appropriate based on the disclosures of the ’753 patent and the prior art analyzed in the Declaration. Ex. 1027 ¶ 14. Dr. Sundaresan further testifies that “[i]f I did not agree with the POSITA definition, then it would not have been included [] in paragraph 8 of the Declaration.” Id. ¶ 15. Dr. Sundaresan’s inclusion of the definition of the level of ordinary skill in his original declaration indicates that he agrees with the definition, as confirmed by his cited subsequent testimony. We note that, even with Patent Owner’s arguments, the record is clear that Patent Owner was on notice of Petitioner’s proposed definition of the level of ordinary skill at the time of the Petition. Pet. 6–7.” slip op. at 11
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner
“We agree with Petitioner that Patent Owner’s proposed additional requirements of determining the boundaries of the area from an evaluation of calibration data should not be imported into the construction of “grid point.” See Pet. Reply 1, 5. The construction of “grid point” we adopt is supported by the disclosures of the ’753 patent. Patent Owner’s support and arguments for its proposed construction rely, in large part, on specific example methods of generating non-unform grid points (NUGs). See PO Resp. 27–32. We agree with Petitioner, however, that the intrinsic record supports that the term “grid point” encompasses both uniform and non-uniform grid points. See Pet. 8–13. The ’753 patent Specification identifies “grid points” as “NUGs or UGs” and further indicates that a “NUG” is a type of a grid point. Ex. 1001, 25:31–34, 26:32–35, 13:7–8 (“a grid point, such as a NUG”). Accordingly, the claims and Specification disclose embodiments where grid points are not limited to non-uniform grid points, and they may be uniform grid points.9 Patent Owner’s proposed construction would impermissibly read out embodiments of the ’753 patent that use uniform grid points rather than non-uniform grid points.” slip op. at 23
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)UnpatentableUnpatentable
“The evidence supports that Petitioner has sufficiently demonstrated that Bhattacharya and Yost teach limitation [1b]. Bhattacharya discloses that empirical measurement of signal strengths are used to generate “expected signal-strength functions E(1,x,y,t), E(2,x,y,t), and E(3,x,y,t),” with a grid overlaid onto a geographic region where the center of each square represents a location. Ex. 1004 ¶¶ 106, 115–117; see also Pet. 35. Petitioner asserts, and we agree, that Bhattacharya discloses associating the expected signal-strength function with locations in a region, and that data is stored in the “Expected Signal-Strength Database.” Pet. 35–36 (citing Ex. 1004 ¶ 85). We also agree that this association of location (point) with calibration data (signal strength) is sufficient for the teaching of a “grid point,” which is disclosed by Bhattacharya. Pet. 35–36; Ex. 1004 ¶¶ 85, 105–117, 120, 123; Ex. 1003 ¶ 77; Pet. Reply 14–15; Ex. 1027 ¶¶ 44– 45. We also agree that Bhattacharya teaches the generation of “grid points” by, at least, populating the Expected Signal-Strength Database with locations and expected signal strength data, which includes interpolating the locations between sampled locations. Ex. 1004 ¶¶ 85, 119, 120, 123; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 77– 78; Ex. 1027 ¶ 45; see also Pet. 35–36; Pet. Reply 15–16. Petitioner further asserts, and we agree, that Yost teaches collecting empirical measurements within the grid square surrounding the geographic point and averaging these measurements. Pet. 37 (citing Sections V.2–3; Ex. 1008, 7:28–44; Ex. 1003 ¶ 79). Further, because it is supported by the teachings of Bhattacharya and Yost, we credit Dr. Sundaresan’s testimony that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have found that Yost’s small areas of predetermined size are similar to the grids and grid points in Bhattacharya. Ex. 1003 ¶ 79; Ex. 1008, 7:50–51; Ex. 1004 ¶ 106, Fig. 6. Yost discloses that by averaging the empirical signal strengths the effects of fast fading can be removed (Ex. 1008, 7:50–56), so we also credit Dr. Sundaresan’s testimony in this regard on the advantages of averaging the multiple empirical measurements in a grid square (Ex. 1003 ¶ 80). Petitioner further asserts, and we agree, that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have found it obvious that expected signal-strength functions of {E(1,x,y,t), E(2,x,y,t), and E(3,x,y,t)} for a given grid point of Bhattacharya “may represent an average of calibration data from multiple locations within the grid square, and not simply represent the storage of the calibration data itself” in view of Yost because Petitioner’s assertion is supported by the evidence. Pet. 37–38 (citing Ex. 1008, 7:50–56; Ex. 1003 ¶ 80). Accordingly, we agree with Petitioner that the combination of Bhattacharya and Yost teaches that the average of the calibration data is “representative calibration data for an area.” See Pet. 37–38; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 79–80; Pet. Reply 16; Ex. 1027 ¶ 46. Thus, we agree with Petitioner that the evidence of record supports that Bhattacharya and Yost teach generating sets of grid points for the calibration data, where the grid points are points associated with representative calibration data for an area.” slip op. at 40
Patent outcomesUS 8,406,753 unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 8,406,753 - Apple Inc. v. Geoscope Technologies Pte. Ltd.All claims unpatentablePTAB · May 7, 2025 · IPR2024-00032 · APJ Brian D Range · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 2–5, 9, 11, 12, 14–16, 18–22, 27, 29, 31, and 32 are unpatentable over the asserted anticipation and obviousness grounds; claims 1, 25, and 35 were disclaimed.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level patent owner adoptedDecided for patent owner
“The ’494 patent is directed to locating a wireless mobile device in a geographic region. Ex. 1001, 1:20–27; PO Resp. 45. Bhattacharya is directed to estimating the geographic location of a wireless terminal. Ex. 1005, code (57), ¶¶ 1, 13; PO Resp. 44–45. Spain is directed to a method for locating the concentration of mobile radio traffic in a coverage area. Ex. 1006, code (54), ¶¶ 1, 11; PO Resp. 45. We find that there is support in the ’494 patent and prior art consistent with Patent Owner’s assertion that the qualifications of a person of skill would include knowledge of radio navigation and mobile communications technology. Accordingly, we adopt Patent Owner’s proposed qualifications for a person of ordinary skill.” slip op. at 9
- BurdenDecided for petitioner
“Patent Owner, however, has not identified any language in the Petition that explicitly incorporates by reference Dr. Sundaresan’s testimony. See generally PO Resp.; PO Sur-Reply. Nevertheless, to the extent that the Petition purportedly incorporates by reference Dr. Sundaresan’s testimony, we do not find such incorporation sufficiently extensive to merit disregarding the testimony. Typically, an incorporation by reference is deemed improper in instances in which large portions of a declaration are incorporated—particularly where the incorporation serves to circumvent a word-count limit. See, e.g., Cisco Systems, Inc. v. C-Cation Techs., LLC, IPR2014-00454, Paper 12 at 10 (PTAB Aug. 29, 2014) (informative). In this case, however, Dr. Sundaresan’s testimony describing the level of ordinary skill in the art is short. Ex. 1003 ¶ 8. The amount of testimony is not extensive and, thus, its purported incorporation into the Petition presents little or no imposition on Patent Owner or the Board.” slip op. at 12
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedDecided for petitioner
“In reply, Petitioner argues that “under any reasonable read of the Sundaresan Declaration, Dr. Sundaresan implied agreement with the POSITA definition based on its inclusion in a signed declaration.” Pet. Reply 15. We agree with Petitioner. Although Dr. Sundaresan does not state explicitly that the proposed definition of the ordinary skill in the art is his opinion, we are persuaded that the manner in which the definition is set forth in his declaration indicates that he agrees with the definition. Patent Owner attempts to make much of Dr. Sundaresan’s statement that he had been informed of the qualifications of a person of ordinary skill in the art. See PO Resp. 41–43. Dr. Sundaresan’s testimony, however, set forth this understanding of the requisite level of skill in the art (Ex. 1003 9 Dr. Sundaresan has a doctoral degree in electrical and computer engineering and has extensive experience in wireless communications. Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 75–78. Dr. Sundaresan also has experience with navigation and geolocation systems such as development of wireless tracking systems, as evidenced by his experience in companies such as NavigateIO Inc. Id. at ¶¶ 77–78. Patent Owner does not argue that Dr. Sundaresan fails to meet requirements for the level of qualifications of one of ordinary skill in the art under its proposed qualifications, which we adopt here. See generally PO Resp.; PO Sur-reply. Based on a review of his qualifications, we determine that Dr. Sundaresan qualifies as a person of ordinary skill at the time of the invention. ¶ 8). In his supplemental declaration, Dr. Sundaresan testifies: I agreed with this POSITA definition when preparing the Declaration, and I continue to hold the opinion that the POSITA definition is both correct and appropriate based on the disclosures of the ’358 patent and the prior art analyzed in the Declaration. Ex. 1055 ¶ 17. Dr. Sundaresan further testifies that “[i]f I did not agree with the POSITA definition, then it would not have been included [] in paragraph 8 of the Declaration.” Id. ¶ 18. Dr. Sundaresan’s inclusion of the definition of the level of ordinary skill in his original declaration indicates that he agrees with the definition, as confirmed by his cited subsequent testimony. We note that, even with Patent Owner’s arguments, the record is clear that Patent Owner was on notice of Petitioner’s proposed definition of the level of ordinary skill at the time of the Petition. Pet. 6; cf. Corephotonics, Ltd. v. Apple Inc., 84 F.4th 990, 1006 (Fed. Cir. 2023) (holding that Petitioner is not required to anticipate all arguments in its Petition and allowing consideration of reply where patent owner had sufficient notice of petitioner’s position and adequate opportunity to respond).” slip op. at 13
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner
“explained below, we agree with Petitioner that Patent Owner’s additional requirement of evaluating the calibration data to determine the boundaries of the area represented by a grid point should not be included in the construction of either “grid point” or “non-uniform grid point.” Instead, based on the full record, we discern no reason to alter our prior construction of “grid point” as “a point associated with representative calibration data for an area” and maintain that construction for this Final Written Decision.” slip op. at 27
Patent outcomesUS 8,786,494 unpatentableClaim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 8,786,494 - Beone Medicines USA, Inc. / Beigene, Ltd. v. Pharmacyclics LLCAll claims unpatentablePTAB · May 1, 2025 · PGR2024-00009 · APJ Sheridan K Snedden · PGR · Final written decision
Claims 1–8, 12, and 20 are unpatentable for lack of written description under § 112(a); the Board did not reach the enablement, anticipation, or obviousness grounds.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level patent owner adoptedDecided for patent owner
“type of problems encountered in the art, the prior art solutions to those problems, the rapidity with which innovations are made, the sophistication of the technology, and the educational level of active workers in the field. Custom Accessories, Inc. v. Jeffrey-Allan Indus., Inc., 807 F.2d 955, 962 (Fed. Cir. 1986).” slip op. at 10
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Preamble limiting or notPreamble limitingDecided for patent owner
“used to construe the claim in a civil action under 35 U.S.C. § 282(b). 37 C.F.R. § 42.200(b). Under that standard, claim terms “are generally given their ordinary and customary meaning” as understood by a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312–13 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). Moreover, “claim terms need only be construed ‘to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” See Wellman, Inc. v. Eastman Chem. Co., 642 F.3d 1355, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). The parties agree that the preamble of the claims should be limiting and that the terms “optionally substituted fused heterocyclic ring system” and “irreversible” BTKIs should be construed consistent with the definitions provided in the Specification. Pet. 42–45; see also id. at 42 (citing Ex. 1001, 19:57–20:7 (defining “optionally substituted” or “substituted”), 14:51–52 (defining “fused”), 15:66–16:21 (defining “heterocycle”), 14:36–44 (defining “ring” and “ring system”), 26:23–25 (defining “irreversible Btk inhibitor”); PO Resp. 26.” slip op. at 14
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededDecided for petitioner
“used to construe the claim in a civil action under 35 U.S.C. § 282(b). 37 C.F.R. § 42.200(b). Under that standard, claim terms “are generally given their ordinary and customary meaning” as understood by a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312–13 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). Moreover, “claim terms need only be construed ‘to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” See Wellman, Inc. v. Eastman Chem. Co., 642 F.3d 1355, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). The parties agree that the preamble of the claims should be limiting” slip op. at 14
- Disclosure Requirements (§112) › Written description (Ariad)Written description inadequateNot entitled to earlier dateUnpatentable
“To satisfy written description for the claimed genus of iBTKIs, the Specification must describe either a representative number of members of the genus or structural features common to the members of the genus with enough precision that a POSA can visualize or recognize the members of the genus. See Ariad, 598 F.3d at 1350. Patent Owner concedes that the Specification does not describe a representative number of members of the genus, stating “this is a common structural features case.” Tr. 65:25–66:3. We, therefore, focus our analysis on whether the Specification adequately describes common structural features of the genus. We find that it does not.” slip op. at 30
Patent outcomesUS 11,672,803 unpatentableClaim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosurecites PhillipsPatents in suitUS 11,672,803 - Aardevo North America, LLC v. Agventure B.V.Institution deniedPTAB · May 1, 2025 · IPR2025-00136 · APJ Jeffrey N Fredman · IPR · Institution
Institution of inter partes review was denied for claims 1–10 because Petitioner did not establish a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on any asserted ground.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“Accordingly, we find that on the current record Petitioner has not shown that it has a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail on these obviousness grounds. XII. DISCRETIONARY DENIAL – 35 U.S.C. § 325(d) In view of our determination that the Petitioner does not meet the threshold for instituting review on the merits, we need not address the parties’ dispute about whether the Board should exercise its discretion to deny institution under 35 U.S.C. § 325(d). Pet. 74–75; Prelim. Resp. 38–54; Pet. Reply 1–5; PO Sur-Reply 1–5. XIII. CONCLUSION After reviewing the information presented in the Petition and the Preliminary Response, we determine that, based on the evidence of record, Petitioner has not established a reasonable likelihood that claims 1–10 of the ’841 patent are unpatentable. XIV. ORDER Accordingly, it is ORDERED that, pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), institution of an inter partes review of all challenged claims on all grounds presented in the Petition is denied.” slip op. at 35
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element) › Inherent disclosureNot shown unpatentableInherency not foundNot shown unpatentable
“However, neither Petitioner nor Dr. Jansky provide specific data on the record before us showing the actual measured homozygosity of either of the inbred lines, US-W 5309 and US-W 5315. And Phumichai experimentally demonstrates that Dr. Jansky’s assumption that theoretical heterozygosity reduction of 50% per generation is not necessarily accurate, stating the “observed average percentage of reduction of heterozygosity per generation (38.4% or 38.5%) was lower than the theoretically expected value of 50%.” Ex. 1005, 982. Indeed, Phumichai disclosed that the “SOPH [Section-based observed percentage of heterozygosity] decreased steadily from the original 100% in 99H2–1 (S0) to the family means of 62.4% in 3H2 (S1), 37.9% in 3H3 (S2).” Id. at 981. That is, Phumichai experimentally shows that in an S2 generation of a potato line, the heterozygosity was 37.9%, resulting in homozygosity of about 62.1%, below the 75% theoretically expected and the 75% required by claim 1 of the ’841 patent. Therefore, the evidence of record does not show that the S2 generation of potato lines in Jong necessarily satisfies the homozygosity recitation in claim 1 of the ’841 patent, and so cannot establish on the record before us that Jong inherently teaches this limitation.” slip op. at 15
- Obviousness (§103) › Objective indicia / secondary considerationsObjective indicia outweighedNot shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“Owner is telling. Petitioner does not refute Patent Owner’s evidence of objective indicia. On the current record, the objective indicia evidence is compelling. As to long felt need, Patent Owner cited evidence on record before the Examiner that showed a persistent need recognized by ordinarily skilled artisans. In re Gershon, 372 F.2d 535, 538 (CCPA 1967). For example, Dr. Huang states “This research is the breakthrough we have been waiting for since nearly a century . . . This is crucial for the potato breeding worldwide.” Ex. 2009, 687. There is no evidence that this long-felt need was satisfied by another before Appellant’s invention. See Newell Companies, Inc. v. Kenney Mfg. Co., 864 F.2d 757, 768 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (“[O]nce another supplied the key element, there was no long-felt need or, indeed, a problem to be solved . . . .”). Lastly, Dr. Lindhout explains that this invention satisfies the long-felt need, stating “I have discovered, and disclosed in the present application for patent, how a fertile homozygote in” slip op. at 33
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsNot reached
“XII. DISCRETIONARY DENIAL – 35 U.S.C. § 325(d) In view of our determination that the Petitioner does not meet the threshold for instituting review on the merits, we need not address the parties’ dispute about whether the Board should exercise its discretion to deny institution under 35 U.S.C. § 325(d). Pet. 74–75; Prelim. Resp. 38–54; Pet. Reply 1–5; PO Sur-Reply 1–5.” slip op. at 35
Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,140,841 - PTAB · Apr 25, 2025 · IPR2024-01419 · APJ Susan L C Mitchell · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR of claims 1–9 on all asserted grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that claim 1 is anticipated by Chee.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“We analyze the asserted grounds of unpatentability in accordance with these principles to determine whether Petitioner has met its burden to establish a reasonable likelihood of success at trial.” slip op. at 13
- BurdenDecided for petitioner
“Having considered the parties’ positions and evidence of record, summarized above, we determine that the information presented in the Petition establishes that Petitioner has shown sufficiently a reasonable likelihood of succeeding with respect to at least claim 1 challenged in Ground I. Petitioner provides sufficient support on the record before us to provide a reasonable likelihood of succeeding in showing that claim 1 is anticipated by Chee.” slip op. at 18
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed petitioner constructionNo construction neededDecided for petitioner
“tags,” and “locus of origin” need be addressed at this stage of the proceeding. We determine that no express construction of “consensus base call” is necessary to determine whether to institute inter partes review. Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“[W]e need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))). 1. “Set of [Unique] Differentiator Tags” Petitioner asserts that both “set of differentiator tags” as used in claim 1 and “set of unique differentiator tags” as used in claim 9 should be given the same construction—“set of prepared tags where each tag includes a unique sequence as compared to the other tags.” See Pet. 16 (citing Ex. 1005 ¶ 89; Ex. 1001, 28:25–29, 28:53–57). Petitioner further asserts that “[t]hese unique differentiator tags are associated with target nucleic acids so that each nucleic acid is uniquely identifiable.” Pet. 16. Petitioner also points to the prosecution history of the ’730 patent in which Petitioner asserts the Patent Owner argued and the Board acknowledged that each differentiator tag is unique. Id. at 16–17. Petitioner concludes that “[a]n interpretation of ‘differentiator tags’ to include non-unique tags is not possible, and if it were, Applicant disclaimed any interpretation that would allow non-unique tags.” Id. at 17.” slip op. at 7
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Instituted
“Having considered the parties’ positions and evidence of record, summarized above, we determine that the information presented in the Petition establishes that Petitioner has shown sufficiently a reasonable likelihood of succeeding with respect to at least claim 1 challenged in Ground I. Petitioner provides sufficient support on the record before us to provide a reasonable likelihood of succeeding in showing that claim 1 is anticipated by Chee.” slip op. at 18
Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,840,730 - PTAB · Apr 11, 2025 · IPR2024-01498 · APJ Sheridan K Snedden · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–19, finding a reasonable likelihood of unpatentability on multiple obviousness grounds, while declining institution under Ground 9 at the preliminary merits stage.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“To institute an inter partes review, we must determine that the information presented in the Petition shows “a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) (2018). The Supreme Court has held that a decision to institute under 35 U.S.C. § 314 may not institute on less than all claims challenged in the petition. SAS Inst., Inc. v. Iancu, 138 S. Ct. 1348, 1359–60 (2018). After considering the information presented by the parties, we determine that Petitioner has demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of success in proving that at least one of claims 1–19 of the ’752 patent is unpatentable.” slip op. at 2
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundInstituted
“summarized above, we determine that Petitioner has established a reasonable likelihood of prevailing in showing that claims 1 and 4–14 are obvious over the combination of Native and Bianchi ’254. In particular, we are persuaded by Petitioner that the combination of Native and Bianchi ’254 discloses a deodorant stick comprising each element of claims 1 and 4–14. Pet. 41–50. We also find that Petitioner has shown sufficiently on the record before us that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had a reasonable expectation of success to implement Bianchi ’254’s hardness range in Native’s formula. Here, we credit Dr. Michniak-Kohn’s testimony that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have understood how to adjust hardness using the structurants in a deodorant composition. Ex. 1002 ¶ 41, 191–192.” slip op. at 20
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Prior-art status of a reference › Printed publication / public accessibilityPrinted publication not establishedNot shown unpatentable
“biased testimony from an employee” and the Petition therefore lacks sufficient evidence to establish the images provided in the Squatch declaration as containing prior art printed publication material. Id. at 27–28 (citing Finnigan Corp. v. ITC, 180 F.3d 1354, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (“[T]he law has long looked with disfavor upon invalidating patents on the basis of mere testimonial evidence absent other evidence that corroborates that testimony.”); Nobel Biocare Services AG v. Instradent USA, Inc., 903 F.3d 1365, 1377-78 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (“corroboration is required of any witness whose testimony alone is asserted to invalidate a patent, regardless of his or her level of interest.”). 3. Discussion Having considered the parties’ positions and evidence of record, summarized above, we find Patent Owner to have, at this stage of the proceeding, the better position.. Accordingly, we determine that there is insufficient evidence to indicate a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner will prevail in establishing that that claims 15–19 would have been obvious over the combination of Squatch and Sturgis for the reasons set forth in the Preliminary Response and summarized above. However, we will make our final determination on these issues on the full record developed during this proceeding. See Hulu LLC v. Sound View Innovations, LLC, IPR2018- 01039, Paper 29, 11 (PTAB Dec. 20, 2019) (precedential) (“To prevail in a final written decision in an inter partes review, the petitioner bears the burden of establishing by a preponderance of the evidence that a particular document is a printed publication.”).” slip op. at 30
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsDecided for petitioner
“35 U.S.C. § 325(d). Prelim. Resp. 29–38. In determining whether to deny institution under § 325(d), we use the following two-part framework: (1) whether the same or substantially the same art previously was presented to the Office or whether the same or substantially the same arguments previously were presented to the Office; and (2) if either condition of [the] first part of the framework is satisfied, whether the petitioner has demonstrated that the Office erred in a manner material to the patentability of challenged claims. Advanced Bionics, LLC v. MED-EL Elektromedizinische Geräte GmbH, IPR2019-01469, Paper 6, 8 (PTAB Feb. 13, 2020) (precedential). The Becton, Dickinson factors provide useful insight into how to apply the framework under 35 U.S.C. § 325(d). Id. at 9 (referencing Becton, Dickinson & Co. v. B. Braun Melsungen AG, IPR2017-01586, Paper 8, 17– 18 (PTAB Dec. 15, 2017) (precedential as to § III.C.5, first paragraph)).” slip op. at 32
§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,844,752 - PTAB · Apr 10, 2025 · IPR2024-01431 · APJ Brian D Range · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted review of claims 2–6, 28, and 33–37 based on all petition grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that Haddad138 renders claims 2–6 and 33–37 obvious and Yap anticipates or renders claim 28 obvious.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Denied
“arguments, and evidence presented in the parallel proceeding.” Fintiv at 12 (emphasis added). Here, due to Petitioner’s stipulation, the record does not 9 To the extent Patent Owner’s argument emphasizes that the parties have completed substantial work regarding references asserted in the petition here (PO Fintiv Surreply 1–3), this argument addresses to Fintiv factor three rather than factor four. support that the Petition’s invalidity grounds have been or will be presented to the ITC for consideration on the merits. The record also does not support that the ITC will ever adjudicate the invalidity grounds raised here10 and does not support that the ITC will ever address the dependent claims at issue here. This is, therefore, not a situation where the ITC Investigation will “resolve key issues in the petition.” Fintiv at 13. Thus, this factor weighs against discretionary denial. 7. Fintiv Factor Five: Overlapping Parties Petitioner is the same party as the respondent in the ITC investigation,” slip op. at 15
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“Under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), an inter partes review may not be instituted unless the information presented in the petition “shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” The following findings of fact and conclusions of law are not final, but are made for the sole purpose 1 Petitioner calls “IPR2024-01431 (‘Petition B’).” See Paper 3 (PETITIONER’S EXPLANATION OF PARALLEL PETITIONS CHALLENGING U.S. PATENT NO. 11,069,737), 1. of determining whether Petitioner meets the threshold for instituting review. Any final decision shall be based on the full trial record, including any response timely filed by Patent Owner. Any arguments not raised by Patent Owner in a timely filed response may be forfeited. For the reasons stated below, we determine that Petitioner has established a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail with respect to at least one claim. We hereby institute an inter partes review as to claims 2–6, 28, and 33–37 of the ’737 patent based upon Petitioner’s asserted challenges to patentability.” slip op. at 2
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundInstituted
“Patent Owner argues11 that Petitioner “offers no motivation to modify Haddad138.” Prelim. Resp. 7–8. Patent Owner specifically argues that 11 Patent Owner also argues that Petitioner does not establish that Haddad138 anticipates claim 2. Prelim. Resp. 5–7. We do not address the anticipation challenge at this time. “Petitioner does not offer any showing on any motivation to modify Figure 9 of Haddad138 to change the configuration from a FSI to BSI architecture.” Id. at 8. On this record, Patent Owner’s argument does not undermine Petitioner’s persuasive showing. As Petitioner argues (Pet. 29), Haddad138 teaches that its “present disclosure” (which would include the Figure 9 disclosure) can be adapted for a front side illumination (FSI) or back side illumination (BSI) configuration. Ex. 1012 ¶ 48. The express teaching of Haddad138 provides motivation to modify Figure 9 of Haddad138. Patent Owner also argues that Petitioner “offers no showing that a POSITA would be able to modify the embodiment of Figure 9 to be back side illuminated with a reasonable expectation of success.” Prelim. Resp. 9. Patent Owner’s argument again does not undermine Petitioner’s persuasive showing. Petitioner cites Haddad138 expressly teaching a FSI or BSI configuration. Pet. 29 (citing Ex. 1012 ¶ 48). Haddad138’s teaching is sufficient, on this record, to establish a reasonable likelihood of Petitioner establishing a reasonable expectation of success at trial. Conclusion as to claim 2” slip op. at 23
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner asserts that a person of ordinary skill in the art (POSITA) would have had a Bachelor’s degree in engineering, physics, or a related or equivalent field, and two or more years of experience researching, developing, designing, and/or evaluating image sensors using photonics. Ex-1004 ¶50. A person with less or different education but more relevant practical experience, or vice versa, may also meet this standard. Ex-1004 ¶50. Pet. 9. Patent Owner does not dispute the level of ordinary skill in the art at this time. For purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s proposal as reasonable and consistent with the prior art. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (the prior art may reflect an appropriate level of skill in the art).” slip op. at 8
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,069,737 - Sterlite Technologies Inc. v. Afl Telecommunications, LLC.Institution deniedPTAB · Apr 9, 2025 · IPR2025-00127 · APJ Josiah C Cocks · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution because Petitioner did not show a reasonable likelihood that claims 1–4, 8, or 13 were unpatentable over either proposed obviousness ground.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“At this preliminary stage, we determine whether the information presented shows a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail in establishing that at least one of the challenged claims would have been unpatentable over the proposed prior art. We analyze the asserted grounds with the above-noted principles in mind.” slip op. at 10
- Skill levelOther
“B. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art As noted above, resolving the question of obviousness requires determination of the level of ordinary skill in the art. Graham, 383 U.S. at 17–18. Here, however, as Patent Owner observes (Prelim. Resp. 10), 8 Patent Owner does not present arguments or evidence of secondary considerations in its Preliminary Response. Therefore, secondary considerations do not constitute part of our analysis herein. Petitioner has provided no assessment as to the level of ordinary skill to be considered in evaluating the grounds of obviousness that are advanced by Petitioner. The absence of such assessment calls into question the fundamental adequacy of Petitioner in carrying its burden to show a reasonable likelihood of success of unpatentability of the challenged claims that necessarily must take into account the level of ordinary skill in the art.” slip op. at 10
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“In any event, we do not discern that there is any apparent dispute between the parties as to the meaning of any claim term. In considering the record at hand, we determine that it is unnecessary to make explicit, or further address, any claim term in deciding whether or not to institute trial. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (holding that only claim terms in controversy need to be construed, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the 9 Throughout their briefings, the parties refer to the limitations designated [1.1] through [1.7] using the term “element,” e.g., “element [1.7]” (see, e.g., Pet. 23; Prelim. Resp. 23). For consistency with the parties’ chosen nomenclature, we do the same in this Decision. controversy (citing Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 12
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundReasonable expectation not foundNot shown unpatentable
“A POSITA would have been motivated to modify Summers’ fiber optic cable 50 to include Kaji’s intermittently-fixed optical fiber tape 2A to obtain the predictable result of enabling a higher density of optical fibers to be packed in Summers’ fiber optic cable 50, as contemplated by Kaji. *** a POSITA would have had a reasonable expectation of success because such modification would amount to nothing more than a simple substitution of Summers’ four-fiber ribbons 52 with Kaji’s intermittently-fixed optical fiber tape 2A by known methods of cable manufacturing. ***” slip op. at 20
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,287,591 - Uatp IP LLC v. Slick Slide LLCInstitutedPTAB · Apr 8, 2025 · PGR2024-00054 · APJ Julia Heaney · PGR · Institution
The Board instituted PGR on claims 1–17 and 22–28 and all asserted grounds, finding a sufficient likelihood that at least one challenged claim is unpatentable.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“Institution of a post-grant review is authorized by statute when “the information presented in the petition . . . would demonstrate that it is more likely than not that at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition is unpatentable.” 35 U.S.C. § 324(a) (2018). Upon consideration of the parties’ submissions and the evidence of record, we determine that Petitioner has demonstrated that it is more likely than not that at least one claim challenged in the Petition is unpatentable. Further, Patent Owner has not persuaded us that it is appropriate to exercise our discretion not to institute review. Accordingly, we institute a post-grant review of all claims and all grounds asserted in the Petition.1” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level patent owner adoptedOther
“On this record, we do not find Patent Owner’s proposed experience level of at least five years in measurement and analysis of coefficient of friction to be supported. As to the necessity of experience in textile engineering and fiber science, Patent Owner’s position, although not supported by declarant analysis of the factors listed above, is consistent with the disclosure of the ’854 patent, which describes features of a mesh layer in textile and fiber terms. See e.g., Ex. 1001, 10:17–11:14, 12:65–13:8, 14:20–24. On the whole, however, we do not discern on this record how specific experience in textile engineering and fiber science of a person of ordinary skill would materially alter the outcome at this stage of the proceeding. For purposes of this decision only, we apply Patent Owner’s proposed definition of a person of ordinary skill in the art, except for the requirement of five years of experience in measurement and analysis of coefficient of friction. The level of skill in the art remains an open issue in this proceeding. Further submissions by the parties may include argument and evidence that would assist in the resolution of this issue at the close of trial.” slip op. at 8
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached
“Petitioner contends “no formal claim construction is necessary in this proceeding.” Pet. 10; Reply 1, 4. Patent Owner contends the terms “mesh layer” and “coefficient of friction” require construction. Prelim. Resp. 14–16; Sur-reply 2–5. We have considered the parties’ arguments and discuss them below with regard to each of the terms Patent Owner contends should be construed. Because our determination that Petitioner demonstrates at least one challenged claim meets the threshold for institution (see SAS Inst., 138 S. Ct. at 1359–60) is not based on construing the term “mesh layer” or “coefficient of friction,” we determine we need not construe either claim term at this stage of the proceeding. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (citing Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (“[O]nly those terms need be construed that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.”)). As further discussed below, we invite the parties to address claim construction at trial.” slip op. at 9
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Specification disavowal / 'present invention' languageDisclaimer not foundDecided for petitioner
“We agree with Petitioner that the ’854 patent specification does not include clear and explicit lexicography or a disclaimer that would support requiring “coefficient of friction” to be determined by a specific ASTM test method. The portion of the specification Patent Owner asserts as a definition of “coefficient of friction” (see Ex. 1001, 11:31–42) is a description of an embodiment; we find it does not express patentee intent to redefine the term. Further, the statement that “the coefficient of friction … may be determined using the … ASTM D1894 standard test method” (id. at 11:32–35) indicates that use of that specific test method is optional. Accordingly, in the absence of patentee lexicography or disavowal, we do not limit the scope of the term “coefficient of friction” to require that it be measured by a specific ASTM standard. Luminara Worldwide, LLC v. Liown Elecs. Co., 814 F.3d 1343, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“Absent lexicography or disavowal, we do not depart from the plain meaning of the claims.”); In re Am. Acad. Of Sci. Tech Ctr., 367 F.3d 1359, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (“We have cautioned against reading limitations into a claim from the preferred embodiment described in the specification, even if it is the only embodiment described, absent clear disclaimer in the specification.”). We note that the ’854 patent specification sets forth a definition for the coefficient of friction between the surfaces of the mesh material and the slide surface. Ex. 1001, 4:38–46. As stated above, however, we do not expressly construe any claim term at this stage of the proceeding. Should the parties address the construction of “coefficient of friction” at trial, we will make a determination after the close of evidence and any hearing.” slip op. at 13
Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosureDiscretionary denialcites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,998,854
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.