- Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC v. Daedalus Prime LLCAll claims unpatentablePTAB · Jan 8, 2025 · IPR2023-01333 · APJ Thomas L Giannetti · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–24 are unpatentable as obvious over Sutardja, Sutardja and Rychlik, or Sutardja and Carmack; the Board did not reach the Mathieson-based grounds.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“We regarded Petitioner’s description as consistent with the prior art before us. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (prior art itself may reflect an appropriate level of skill). Thus, for the purpose of our Institution Decision, we adopted Petitioner’s proposal. Institution Dec. 14–15.” slip op. at 14
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedDecided for petitioner
“We decline to “throw out” Dr. Horst’s testimony for several reasons. First and foremost, Patent Owner has not moved or otherwise sought to exclude his testimony, or even filed an objection. Hearing Tr. 46:19–47:1. Thus, the issue of whether the testimony should be excluded is not properly before us. Further, Petitioner asserts that “[t]his distinction is irrelevant.” Pet. Reply 2. We agree. Patent Owner has not pointed to any opinion by Dr. Horst that turns on the alleged “flaw” in the definition of the person of ordinary skill. Id. at 46:19–48:3. Finally, there is no prejudice. Patent Owner’s expert used the definition proposed by Patent Owner in his analysis. See Brogioli Decl. ¶ 25. Nor could Patent Owner show us with specificity any place in the record where resolving this dispute would make a difference in this case. Hearing Tr. 46:3–47:3. For the reasons given, we do not see the need to modify our definition of a person of ordinary skill or to exclude or give little weight to Dr. Horst’s opinions.” slip op. at 15
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed patent owner constructionGranted
“operating system.” PO Resp. 12–13. Relying on the Microsoft Computer Dictionary, Patent Owner contends that “[a]n ‘operating system’ is, and would be understood by a person of ordinary skill in the art to be, ‘The software that controls the allocation and usage of hardware resources such as memory, central processing unit (CPU) time, disk space, and peripheral devices.’” PO Resp. 13 (citing Ex. 2007, 378). Dr. Brogioli’s testimony generally supports this construction, as does Dr. Horst’s. See Brogioli Dep. 8:17–22; Horst Dep. 32:3–8. Petitioner responds that the term “should be understood in accordance with its plain meaning,” and therefore does not require construction, but does not dispute Patent Owner’s proposed construction. Pet. Reply 2. For the reasons given, we adopt Patent Owner’s construction for “operating system.” However, we do not see this construction as dispositive of the central issue of whether the operating system in Sutardja controls the transition of the cores. See Section II.D.1, infra. slip op. at 16
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)UnpatentableUnpatentable
“PMS module do not ‘control’ the core switching module or the hardware on which it runs. Instead, the kernel and the PMS module only make system calls to the core switching module.” PO Resp. 27. We disagree that this is not sufficient control to meet this claim limitation. As Dr. Horst’s testimony (quoted supra) explains, the PMS module and kernel modules “trigger a transition” by generating a call to the hypervisor module or a core switching module. Horst Decl. ¶ 124. Patent Owner’s argument fails because it assumes the claims require direct control, when the claims recite no such restriction (nor have we been asked by either party to construe the claims as such).” slip op. at 28
Patent outcomesUS 10,049,080 unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSRPatents in suitUS 10,049,080 - PTAB · Dec 16, 2024 · IPR2024-00997 · APJ Christopher L Ogden · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution of IPR challenging claims 1–10, exercising its discretion under § 314(a) because the Fintiv factors favored denial.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Institution denied fintivDenied
“Based on the preliminary record, we can reasonably expect trial in the parallel district court proceedings to begin four to five months prior to the deadline for our final written decision, based on the scheduled trial date and the median time-to-trial statistics. See Fintiv Memo 8–9 & n.12 (approving the use of median time-to-trial statistics). Even if the proceedings are staggered, at least one of the proceedings would likely begin and conclude well before our decision, making it highly likely that there will be duplicate efforts in evaluating the challenged claims based on the prior art. Thus, we agree with Patent Owner that the second factor weighs substantially in favor of discretionary denial.” slip op. at 9
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied fintivInstitution denied
“and Trademark Office under 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a), we may only institute an inter partes review when “the information presented in the petition . . . and any response . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a); see also 37 C.F.R. § 42.108(c). However, institution of inter partes review is discretionary. See Harmonic Inc. v. Avid” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedOther
“ordinary skill in the art. See Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312– 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc) (the level of ordinary skill is pertinent to claim construction); Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kan. City, 383 U.S. 1, 17–18 (1966) (the level of ordinary skill is one of the factors to consider when determining obviousness). For this decision, we adopt Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill, which is “the equivalent of an undergraduate degree in Electrical Engineering, Computer Science, or Computer Engineering; familiarity with the relevant 3GPP standards as of this time; and at least two years of experience in design, development, and/or testing of cellular networks.” Pet. 15–16 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 43–44). Although Patent Owner argues for a higher level of ordinary skill (see Prelim. Resp. 7–8), our determination that the Petition lacks compelling merits would be the same under Patent Owner’s proposal.” slip op. at 15
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“The parties argue that we need not address any claim-construction issues for our analysis, and we agree. See Pet. 15; Prelim. Resp. 25. See Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 16
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,798,754 - Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC v. Yechezkal Evan SperoAll claims unpatentablePTAB · Dec 10, 2024 · IPR2023-01040 · APJ Jason W Melvin · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 48–87 are unpatentable: Alden anticipates most challenged claims, while claims 49 and 51 are obvious over Alden and Beam, and claims 52, 60, 68, 76, and 84 over Alden and Kobayashi.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“similar disciplines, along with two years of experience working with intelligent vehicle systems, automotive control systems, or lighting control systems.” Pet. 9 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 33). Patent Owner does not dispute that level of ordinary skill in the art. PO Resp. 6. We adopt the undisputed level of ordinary skill in the art and refer to people with it as skilled artisans.” slip op. at 7
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedDecided for petitioner
“enablement for Alden’s system detecting road curves. Pet. Reply 21. As Petitioner points out, Alden uses both intensity and a detected object’s location (including distance) to inform its response. Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 27–28. Petitioner’s expert testifies that the same physical system used to accommodate oncoming vehicles could be used to detect roadside reflectors and direct light into road curves. Ex. 2041, 78:16–80:24. Further, Petitioner’s expert testifies that skilled artisans would adjust the intensity and distance thresholds to distinguish roadside reflectors from oncoming vehicles. IPR2023-01039, Ex. 1003 ¶ 150. Based on Alden’s disclosures, we credit Petitioner’s expert’s testimony that Alden’s system would detect and accommodate road curvatures as claimed by the ’551 patent. Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 132–134. Although Patent Owner argues that Alden’s system could not do so while also accommodating oncoming vehicles, that position is based on the argument that “the system can’t tell the difference between signs and headlights.” PO Surreply 21–23. Patent Owner contends that “detected intensity is a function of both distance and emission intensity” so a threshold couldn’t distinguish headlights from signs. Id. at 24–25. That position ignores that Alden uses triangulation to calculate each object’s distance, as discussed, which would allow it to distinguish different types of objects using an intensity threshold. We agree with Petitioner’s expert that Alden’s system can distinguish the two, as discussed.” slip op. at 33
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“sufficiently clear to impart a requirement on “classifying” such that a system must choose from multiple classes or types of objects. The parties do not appear to dispute that “classifying the object” includes arranging or grouping the object according to some system or principle. Thus, there is no need to further construe the claims for purposes of this decision.” slip op. at 10
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableUnpatentable
“We agree with Petitioner. Alden’s system does not simply dim its headlights where it detects spots of light. Rather, it performs a multistep process in which those spots are detected, analyzed with triangulation to determine distance, and then used to determine dimming zones. Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 27–28. Alden discloses that its sensor “detects the two headlights” of an oncoming vehicle when “[e]lectrons corresponding to the position and intensity of light are categorized by a logic and CPU 71 and stored in a memory 72.” Id. ¶ 27. Petitioner’s expert noted that Alden’s description “move[s] from lights – thresholding lights to objects, and then calculate[s] distance of each thresholding object using triangulation.” Ex. 2041, 109:23–110:2. That testimony supports our view that Alden first detects lights, uses those detected lights to identify and classify an oncoming car, then dims the headlight output to prevent glare. Alden’s dimming decision particularly indicates that it classifies pairs of detected headlights as oncoming vehicles. The CPU makes “assumptions about the space that may potentially be occupied by the driver of the sensed vehicle” and identifies an area of the segmented headlight to dim that is “significantly larger than the headlight dots that were initially received.” Ex. 1005 ¶ 27. Patent Owner agrees that Alden dims “selected surrounding sectors” around detected light (PO Resp. 30), and the way Alden selects those sectors indicates that it identifies vehicles. It does not simply expand an area around each detected light; it dims an area to encompass the driver of the identified vehicle. Ex. 1005 ¶ 27, Fig. 3. By treating a pair of corresponding detected lights collectively for dimming, Alden indicates that it classifies pairs of detected lights as vehicles.” slip op. at 23
Patent outcomesUS 9,955,551 unpatentableClaim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnessPatents in suitUS 9,955,551 - Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC v. Yechezkal Evan SperoAll claims unpatentablePTAB · Dec 9, 2024 · IPR2023-01039 · APJ Jason W Melvin · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 8, 10–18, and 24–47 are unpatentable: Alden anticipates claims 24–27, 29–35, 37–43, and 45–47; the remaining claims are obvious over the stated combinations.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“undergraduate degree in mechanical engineering, electrical engineering, automotive engineering, optical engineering, applied physics, computer science, or 3 The Leahy-Smith America Invents Act (“AIA”), Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011), effective March 16, 2013, amended the applicable statutes. Because the application from which the ’551 patent issued was filed before this date, the pre-AIA versions of §§ 102 and 103 apply. 4 US 2003/0137849 A1, filed Jan. 22, 2002 (Ex. 1005). 5 US 6,049,749, issued Apr. 11, 2000 (Ex. 1006). 6 US 2002/0057572 A1, published May 16, 2002 (Ex. 1007). 7 WO 2001/70538 A2, published Sept. 27, 2001 (Ex. 1008). similar disciplines, along with two years of experience working with intelligent vehicle systems, automotive control systems, or lighting control systems.” Pet. 9 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 33). Patent Owner does not dispute that level of ordinary skill in the art. PO Resp. 6. We adopt the undisputed level of ordinary skill in the art and refer to people with it as skilled artisans.” slip op. at 7
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached
“The problem with Patent Owner’s claim-construction position is that neither the dictionary definition nor the ’551 patent’s specification establish any degree of proof, verification, or confirmation that an object has been correctly identified. The specification discloses that “techniques known in the art” may be used “to classify, identify or locate the contents” visible to a camera sensor. Ex. 1001, 44:67–45:9. That does not establish any certainty obtained by the preexisting techniques. The specification states that the system can “illuminate distant overhead and roadside signs” and can use “[i]mage recognition via a camera” so that the illumination beam may “follow the retroreflective sign as the vehicle moves.” Id. at 51:59–67. That disclosure does not speak to any degree of confirmation or certainty. The specification’s other disclosures are no different. Id. at 52:19–27 (disclosing automated control over lighting and referencing “automatic dimming of high beam due to detection of oncoming vehicles”), 52:66–53:4 (“Using color and pattern recognition techniques it is possible to determine what is a sign.”), 63:9–12 (“Using real time image processing methodologies with image and scene recognition technology known in the art, room or outdoor area elements, objects and people are identified.”), 64:46–49 (“Using machine vision technology known in the art such as neural networks training and other pattern recognition techniques the vision system has sensor, algorithmic and computation means for identifying devices or objects.”), 69:54–57 (“In a preferred embodiment of the invention the logical controller 454 receiving image input from the camera 453 and running pattern recognition software will identify what is the visual task a person is trying to perform.”), 75:48–62 (“Using programmed scene recognition algorithms, the luminaire’s computer vision system comprised of the camera sensor 496 and logical controller 494 identifies the food on the plate, looks-up in storage the recommended CCT and powers each of the different colored LED chips aimed thereon at the correct power level in order to provide the optimal color illumination.”), 76:33–39 (“[A] camera vision system has algorithmic means to identify and track the position of people and objects and the logical controller has motion control means for re-aiming the light sources towards targeted elements and changing the power level to the LED chips.”). None of those disclosures addresses a requirement for confirming or verifying an identification that the system makes; nor does any address a particular accuracy requirement in identifying an object. Based on the specification using “identify” without any requirement that identifying an object requires confirmation or verification of the object’s true identify, we do not adopt Patent Owner’s proposed construction. Although the construction itself similarly does not expressly require the confirmation or verification that Patent Owner seeks to impose, we understand that to be Patent Owner’s intent, and accordingly do not adopt the proposed construction. The parties dispute no other aspect of “identify,” and we therefore need not expressly construe the term.” slip op. at 9
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableUnpatentable
“Because Alden describes its segmented headlights as implementing a process using two-dimensional signals for two-dimensional dimming functionality, we find that Figure 5 depicts a section of an embodiment that contains more than a single row of lighting elements. Stated otherwise, Alden’s disclosures are consistent with each other and are directed to a two-dimensional approach to sensing, control, and illumination. Further, we agree with Petitioner that Patent Owner has not addressed the legal standard for lack of enablement. Pet. Reply 2. In particular, to overcome the presumption that prior-art disclosures are enabled, Patent Owner must show ordinarily skilled artisans would require undue experimentation to practice the disclosed invention. See Amgen Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc., 314 F. 3d 1313, 1354–55 (Fed. Cir. 2003); In re Antor Media Corp., 689 F. 3d 1282, 1287– 88 (Fed. Cir. 2012). We do not agree with Patent Owner that Alden lacks a presumption of enablement (see PO Surreply 7–8), because we determine that Petitioner’s contentions rely on Alden’s disclosures regarding its invention as a whole. Other than arguing that Figure 5 discloses a single-row embodiment that is unusable with Alden’s other disclosures, Patent Owner has made no attempt to show Alden lacks enablement. Patent Owner has not addressed what experimentation skilled artisans would require to practice an invention using Alden’s Figure 5 segmented headlight with the remainder of Alden’s system as disclosed in Figures 2, 3, and 4, and Alden’s corresponding textual description. We therefore determine that Patent Owner has not shown Alden to lack enablement for its disclosed invention.” slip op. at 20
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successUnpatentableMotivation foundUnpatentable
“Petitioner asserts that skilled artisans would have had reason to incorporate Kobayashi’s teachings that its controller receives “road map information” from a “road profile calculating means” and uses it to adjust the headlamp’s illumination. Pet. 63–64. Petitioner reasons that it would be obvious to “apply these teachings to Alden to use map data to identify road curvature when adapting the LEDs of Alden to ‘direct light into the corner.’” Id. at 64 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 122). And Petitioner asserts that skilled artisans had reason to do so because it would “maximize successful detection in different environments” such as where the road lack reflectors. Id. at 65 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 123). Other than as discussed above regarding Alden’s disclosures, Patent Owner does not contest Petitioner’s showing for claims 28, 36, and 44. We have considered the full record, including evidence and arguments presented by Petitioner and Patent Owner on whether the combination of Alden and Kobayashi discloses each limitation of claims 28, 36, and 44, and whether skilled artisans would have had reason to combine the references’ teachings as asserted. Based on the full record, we conclude that Petitioner has proven that claims 28, 36, and 44 would have been obvious over Alden and Kobayashi. Pet. 62–65.” slip op. at 34
Patent outcomesUS 9,955,551 unpatentableClaim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnessPatents in suitUS 9,955,551 - PTAB · Dec 3, 2024 · IPR2024-00856 · APJ Thomas L Giannetti · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–18 and all asserted grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail on at least one claim.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“review. See 35 U.S.C. § 314; 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a) (2003). Under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), we may not authorize an inter partes review unless the information in the petition and the preliminary response “shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” For the reasons stated below, we determine that Petitioner has established a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail with respect to at least one claim. We therefore institute inter partes review as to all of the challenged claims of the ’109 patent and all of the asserted grounds of unpatentability in the Petition.” slip op. at 2
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Denied
“Petitioner has stipulated as follows: Petitioners stipulate that, if the Patent Trial and Appeal Board institutes an IPR proceeding for U.S. Patent No. 8,982,109 on the grounds presented in the petition in IPR2024-00856, Petitioners will not pursue an invalidity defense in district court that the patent claims subject to the instituted IPR are invalid based on grounds that were raised or reasonably could have been raised in the IPR. Paper 13 (Updated Mandatory Notices), 1 (citing Ex. 1044). We determine that this stipulation is consistent in scope with the stipulation in Sotera Wireless cited approvingly in the Guidance Memo. Consistent with the Guidance Memo, therefore, we decline to exercise our discretion to deny institution under Fintiv in view of the parallel district court proceeding.” slip op. at 13
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“B. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art According to Petitioner, a person of ordinary skill in the art “as of December 18, 2012, would have a bachelor’s degree in electrical or computer engineering, or a closely related field such as computer science, and two years of work experience with image capture and processing systems or related fields.” Pet. 7 (citing Karam Decl. ¶¶ 65–67). Petitioner adds that “[a] person with less and/or different education, but more relevant practical experience, or vice versa, may also meet this standard. The prior art also evidences such level of skill.” Id. Patent Owner states that it “applies Petitioners’ proposed level of skill for purposes of this Preliminary Response and reserves the right to propose a different level of skill should the Board grant institution.” Prelim. Resp. 13. At this stage, we adopt the formulation of the level of ordinary skill in the art proposed by Petitioner and applied by Patent Owner as consistent with the prior art before us in this proceeding.” slip op. at 14
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededDecided for petitioner
“We construe only those claim terms and phrases necessary to our decision. See, e.g., Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“[W]e need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))). At this stage of the proceeding, we need not construe any claim terms and phrases to resolve a controversy. To the extent further clarification or explanation of any claim term is necessary for this Decision, we will do so in the context of our analysis of that term infra.” slip op. at 15
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites PhillipsPatents in suitUS 8,982,109 - PTAB · Nov 26, 2024 · IPR2024-00810 · APJ Neil T Powell · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–18 and all asserted grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that claim 1 was obvious over Rosenberg and Park.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Decided for petitioner
“Trademark Office issued a Memorandum setting forth an “Interim Procedure for Discretionary Denials in AIA Post Grant Proceedings with Parallel District Court Litigation” (“Guidance Memo”).9 The Guidance Memo states that “[c]onsistent with Sotera Wireless, Inc., the PTAB will not discretionarily deny institution in view of parallel district court litigation where a petitioner presents a stipulation not to pursue in a parallel proceeding the same grounds or any grounds that could have reasonably been raised before the PTAB.” Guidance Memo 3 (footnote and emphasis omitted).” slip op. at 10
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“Based on all of the parties’ arguments and evidence, Petitioner demonstrates a reasonable likelihood of establishing that claim 1 of the ’110 patent would have been obvious over Rosenberg and Park. Pet. 18–19, 52–73, Prelim. Resp. 6–8, 14–18. In the following sections, we discuss in detail the parties’ current disputes regarding Petitioner’s position that claim 1 would have been obvious over Rosenberg and Park.” slip op. at 22
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“December 18, 2012, would have a bachelor’s degree in electrical or computer engineering, or a closely related field such as computer science, and two years of work experience with image capture and processing systems or related fields.” Pet. 8 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 91). Petitioner adds that “[a] person with less and/or different education, but more relevant practical experience, or vice versa, may also meet this standard” and that “[t]he prior art also evidences such level of skill.” Id. Patent Owner states that it “applies Petitioners’ proposed level of skill for purposes of this Preliminary Response and reserves the right to propose a different level of skill should the Board grant institution.” Prelim. Resp. 10. At this stage, we adopt the formulation of the level of ordinary skill in the art proposed by Petitioner and applied by Patent Owner as consistent with the prior art before us in this proceeding.” slip op. at 11
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached
“We construe only those claim terms and phrases necessary to our decision. See, e.g., Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“[W]e need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))). At this stage of the proceeding, we need not construe any claim terms and phrases to resolve a controversy.” slip op. at 12
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites PhillipsPatents in suitUS 8,982,110 - Apple Inc. v. Theta IP, LLCInstitutedPTAB · Nov 26, 2024 · IPR2024-00816 · APJ Russell E Cass · IPR · Institution
Instituted IPR on claims 1–7, 9–13, 16, 23, 25, 26, 28, and 29 over Behbahani, Leete, and Tan because claim 23 showed a reasonable likelihood of unpatentability.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“review, under 35 U.S.C. § 314 and 37 C.F.R. § 42.4. An inter partes review may not be instituted unless it is determined that “the information presented in the petition filed under section 311 and any response filed under section 313 shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314 (2018); see also 37 C.F.R § 42.4(a) (2020) (“The Board institutes the trial on behalf of the Director.”). The reasonable likelihood standard is “a higher standard than mere notice pleading,” but “lower than the ‘preponderance’ standard to prevail in a final written decision.” Hulu, LLC v. Sound View Innovations, LLC, IPR2018-01039, Paper 29 at 13 (PTAB Dec. 20, 2019) (precedential). For the reasons provided below and based on the record before us, we determine that Petitioner has demonstrated a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail in showing the unpatentability of at least one of the challenged claims. Accordingly, we institute an inter partes review on all grounds set forth in the Petition.” slip op. at 2
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › General Plastic (serial petitions)Institution denied general plasticDenied
“We determine that the first General Plastic factor does not favor exercising discretion to deny institution of inter partes review. This is Petitioner’s first petition challenging the ’330 patent. Pet. 73. Patent Owner argues that “Apple’s use of prior petitions as a roadmap ‘implicitly create[s] such a relationship’” as set forth in Valve. Prelim. Resp. 54. According to Patent Owner, “Apple’s admitted attempt to improve over issues ‘that have plagued prior invalidity challenges’ ties its interests to the prior Petitioner’s aims.” Id. Under the circumstances in this case, we disagree with Patent Owner’s arguments. There is no evidence in the record that Petitioner has any significant relationship with Lenovo or Samsung—for example, that Petitioner is a co-defendant with either of them or was accused of infringing the ’330 patent based on the same product. See Valve at 9–10. That Petitioner apparently may have reviewed and considered strategies undertaken by prior petitioners on similar issues does not, in and of itself, create a significant relationship with any of the prior petitioners. For these reasons, we decline to exercise our discretion to deny institution under 35 U.S.C. § 314.” slip op. at 18
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsInstitution denied 325dDenied
“That Behbahani and Tan appeared in an initialed IDS is sufficient to satisfy the first Advanced Bionics prong. See Advanced Bionics, Paper 6 at 7–8 (“Previously presented art includes art made of record by the Examiner, and art provided to the Office by an applicant, such as on an Information Disclosure Statement (IDS), in the prosecution history of the challenged patent”). Leete was not previously presented to the Office, but we need not decide whether the reference to Leete in Behbahani (see Section II.F.1 below) or Petitioner’s obviousness arguments concerning Behbahani and Leete suffice to satisfy the first Advanced Bionics prong for purposes of this Decision. As discussed below, even if we assume that the first part of the Advanced Bionics framework is satisfied, Petitioner has demonstrated that the Office erred in a manner material to the patentability of the challenged claims in the second part of the framework.” slip op. at 22
- Skill levelSkill level patent owner adoptedDecided for patent owner
“Petitioner thus proposes a Master’s degree with two years of experience, while Patent Owner proposes a Bachelor’s degree with five years of experience. Given that both parties also indicate that more education could substitute for less experience and vice versa, we do not see a material difference in the proposals, and thus adopt Patent Owner’s version for the purposes of this Decision. If the parties believe that the choice of one proposal over the other would make a difference in the patentability analysis, they may address that during trial.” slip op. at 11
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 7,010,330 - Apple Inc. v. Theta IP, LLCInstitutedPTAB · Nov 26, 2024 · IPR2024-00819 · APJ Russell E Cass · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted review of claims 1–20 on all asserted grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that Apple would show at least one claim unpatentable over Behbahani, Leete, and Tan.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“review, under 35 U.S.C. § 314 and 37 C.F.R. § 42.4. An inter partes review may not be instituted unless it is determined that “the information presented in the petition filed under section 311 and any response filed under section 313 shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314 (2018); see also 37 C.F.R § 42.4(a) (2020) (“The Board institutes the trial on behalf of the Director.”). The reasonable likelihood standard is “a higher standard than mere notice pleading,” but “lower than the ‘preponderance’ standard to prevail in a final written decision.” Hulu, LLC v. Sound View Innovations, LLC, IPR2018-01039, Paper 29 at 13 (PTAB Dec. 20, 2019) (precedential).” slip op. at 2
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › General Plastic (serial petitions)Decided for petitioner
“We determine that the first General Plastic factor does not favor exercising discretion to deny institution of inter partes review. This is Petitioner’s first petition challenging the ’164 patent. There is no evidence in the record that Petitioner has any significant relationship with Lenovo or Samsung—for example, that Petitioner is a co-defendant with either of them or was accused of infringing the ’164 patent or any related patents dbased on the same product. See Valve at 9–10. That Petitioner apparently may have reviewed and considered strategies undertaken by prior petitioners on similar issues does not, in and of itself, create a significant relationship with any of the prior petitioners. For these reasons, we decline to exercise our discretion to deny institution under 35 U.S.C. § 314.” slip op. at 17
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsDecided for petitioner
“an inter partes review, “the Director may take into account whether, and reject the petition or request because, the same or substantially the same prior art or arguments previously were presented to the Office.” The Board uses a two-part framework when determining whether to exercise its discretion under 35 U.S.C. § 325(d), specifically: (1) whether the same or substantially the same art previously was presented to the Office or whether the same or substantially the same arguments previously were presented to the Office; and (2) if so, whether the petitioner has demonstrated that the Office erred in a manner material to the patentability of challenged claims. Advanced Bionics, LLC v. Med-El Elektromedizinische Geräte GmbH, IPR2019-01469, Paper 6 at 8 (PTAB Feb. 13, 2020) (precedential) (“Advanced Bionics”).” slip op. at 18
- Skill levelSkill level patent owner adoptedOther
“of the alleged invention would have had “a master’s degree in electrical engineering or the equivalent, and two or more years of experience with wireless communication devices.” Pet. 10 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 27–29). Petitioner further states that “[a]dditional education or experience might substitute for the above requirements.” Id. Relying on Dr. Larson, Patent Owner argues that a person of ordinary skill “would have at least a Bachelor’s Degree in Electrical or Electronics Engineering, along with ‘approximately five years of relevant experience in the design of transceiver architecture, RF systems and components, and analog and mixed signal circuits, as well as experience in control algorithms for such systems and familiarity with wireless standards.” Prelim. Resp. 27– 28 (citing Ex. 2005 ¶ 50). Patent Owner further states that “[a]dditional education could substitute for experience and vice versa.” Id.” slip op. at 8
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,564,164 - Apple Inc. v. Theta IP, LLCInstitutedPTAB · Nov 25, 2024 · IPR2024-00818 · APJ Kara L Szpondowski · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1, 2, and 4–23, finding a reasonable likelihood that claim 7 is unpatentable over Behbahani, Leete, and Tan under § 103(a).
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“Based on the present record, Petitioner has made a sufficient showing as to this limitation for purposes of institution.11 Petitioner has sufficiently shown, and Patent Owner does not appear to dispute, that Behbahani switches from its high-power filter to its low-power filter in response to signal strength measurements, and that this “filter swap” varies the impedance and/or bias current in the receiver. The only disputed issues appear to be: (1) whether the claim language excludes Behbahani’s filter” slip op. at 40
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › General Plastic (serial petitions)Denied
“We determine that the first General Plastic factor does not favor exercising discretion to deny institution of inter partes review. This is Petitioner’s first petition challenging the ’202 patent. Pet. 75. Patent Owner argues that “Apple’s use of prior petitions as a roadmap ‘implicitly create[s] such a relationship’” as set forth in Valve. Prelim. Resp. 55. According to Patent Owner, “Apple’s admitted attempt to improve over issues ‘that have plagued prior invalidity challenges’ ties its interests to the prior Petitioner’s aims.” Id. Under the circumstances in this case, we disagree with Patent Owner’s arguments. There is no evidence in the record that Petitioner has any significant relationship with Lenovo or Samsung—for example, that Petitioner is a co-defendant with either of them or was accused of infringing the ’202 patent based on the same product. See Valve at 9–10. That Petitioner apparently may have reviewed and considered strategies undertaken by prior petitioners on similar issues does not, in and of itself, create a significant relationship with any of the prior petitioners. For these reasons, we decline to exercise our discretion to deny institution under 35 U.S.C. § 314.” slip op. at 18
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsDenied
“We find that Becton, Dickinson factor (c)––the extent to which the asserted art was evaluated during examination––does not favor denying the Petition under Section 325(d) because the Examiner did not cite Behbahani or Tan in any rejection and did not specifically address either reference in any correspondence, other than initialing them in an IDS. Nor did the Examiner address Leete. For factors (e) and (f), we find that Petitioner has explained sufficiently how the Examiner allegedly erred in evaluating Behbahani and Tan, by pointing to the Proposed Grounds, which detail how the challenged claims read on these references over the combination of Behbahani, Leete, and Tan. See Pet. 18–72. We find this sufficient to identify the “specific teachings” that were overlooked, as contemplated in Advanced Bionics, and we agree with Petitioner that the facts and discussion of Behbahani, Leete, and Tan presented in the Petition warrant reconsideration of the challenged claims in view of those references. We thus find that Petitioner has satisfied the second part of the Advanced Bionics framework by demonstrating that the Examiner may have erred by not appreciating that Behbahani, Leete, and Tan teach or suggest the features of the claimed invention. For these reasons, we decline to exercise our discretion to deny institution under 35 U.S.C. § 325(d).” slip op. at 22
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“Based on the parties’ application of the prior art to the claims, it appears that there may be some disagreement concerning the meaning of “signal path” in this proceeding; however, neither party proposes an express construction of the term for this case. See Pet. 8–10; Prelim. Resp. 28–32. We will discuss the term “signal path” below in the context of the parties’ arguments applying this language to the asserted prior art. See § III.F.4.c, infra. The parties may further address the meaning of the term “signal path” during the trial.” slip op. at 12
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,524,202 - Apple Inc. v. Theta IP, LLCInstitutedPTAB · Nov 25, 2024 · IPR2024-00817 · APJ Aaron W Moore · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–8 and all asserted grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that claim 1 is obvious over Behbahani, Leete, and Tan.
RulingsInstitution decision- Skill levelSkill level patent owner adoptedDecided for patent owner
“Petitioner contends a person of ordinary skill in the art “would have had a master’s degree in electrical engineering or the equivalent, and two or more years of experience with wireless communications devices” and that “[a]dditional education or experience might substitute for the above requirements.” Pet. 10 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 39–41). Patent Owner contends that a person of ordinary skill in the art “would have at least a Bachelor’s Degree in Electrical or Electronics Engineering, along with ‘approximately five years of relevant experience in the design of transceiver architecture, RF systems and components, and analog and mixed signal circuits, as well as experience in control algorithms for such system and familiarity with wireless standards’” and that “[a]dditional education could substitute for experience and vice versa.” Prelim. Resp. 28 (Ex. 2005 ¶ 50). Petitioner thus proposes a Master’s degree with two years of experience, while Patent Owner proposes a Bachelor’s degree with five years of experience. Given that both parties also indicate that more education could substitute for less experience and vice versa, we do not see a material difference in the proposals, and thus adopt Patent Owner’s version for the purposes of this Decision. If the parties believe that the choice of one proposal over the other would make a difference in the patentability analysis, they may address that during trial.” slip op. at 10
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Plain and ordinary meaningOther
“Based on the parties’ application of the prior art to the claims, it appears that there may be some disagreement concerning the meaning of “signal path” in this proceeding; however, neither party proposes an express construction of the term in this proceeding. See Pet. 8–10; PO Resp. 29–32. We will discuss the term “signal path” below in the context of the parties’ arguments applying this language to the asserted prior art. See § III.F.4.f, infra. The parties may further address the meaning of the term “signal path” during the trial. Patent Owner also argues that we should dismiss the Petition because Petitioner is relying on a construction that it disagreed with in the related district court litigation, citing the Board’s non-precedential decisions in Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc. v. Cobblestone Wireless LLC, IPR2024-00319, Paper 16 at 13–23 (PTAB Jun. 24, 2024) and Hologic, Inc. v. Enzo Life Sciences, Inc., IPR2018-00019, Paper 21 at 5–7 (PTAB Nov. 28, 2018). Prelim. Resp. 30–32. Patent Owner, however, relies on a flawed understanding of the Samsung case. In Samsung, the Board determined that Petitioner had failed to establish a reasonable likelihood of success because it offered and relied on a claim construction that it failed to support, disagreed with, and disparaged, and that this claim construction was not agreed upon by the patent owner or adopted by a district court. Samsung, Paper 21 at 13–23. Specifically, as the Board pointed out in Samsung, the petitioner argued and submitted testimony from its expert that its proffered construction was “expressly excluded” by the specification of the challenged patent and was “contrary to [the term’s] plain and ordinary meaning.” Id. at 14–15, 19–20. In reaching its decision in Samsung, the Board expressly “distinguish[ed] this case from situations where a petitioner relies on the ordinary meaning of a claim term, offers alternative constructions of a claim term, or relies on a construction agreed upon by the parties in the proceeding at issue.” Id. at 21. Here, unlike in Samsung, Petitioner relies on the plain and ordinary meaning of the dynamic limitation, which is agreed to by the parties in this proceeding and has been adopted by district courts in parallel litigation. We similarly find the facts in Hologic distinguishable from those presented here. See Hologic at 4 (stating, for example, that “[n]early every time [p]etitioner discusses its use in the [p]etition of [p]atent [o]wner’s proposed construction, [p]etitioner affirmatively disagrees with the construction it adopts.”). Therefore, we reject Patent Owner’s argument that Samsung and Hologic support dismissal of the Petition here. Other than the terms discussed above, we determine that it is not necessary to provide an express interpretation of any other claim terms for purposes of this Decision. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017); Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (“[O]nly those terms need be construed that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.”).” slip op. at 13
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › General Plastic (serial petitions)Denied
“Director Vidal has instructed the Board that General Plastic factor 1 should not be expanded beyond Valve to apply to parties that do not have a significant relationship. See Videndum Production Solutions, Inc. v. Rotolight Limited, IPR2023-01218, Paper 12 at 6 (Director Vidal, April 19, 2024) (“The majority’s Decision in this proceeding improperly expanded the discretionary principles set forth in General Plastic and Valve to apply to petitioners that are not the same and do not have a ‘significant relationship.’”). Moreover, Director Vidal has instructed that where “the first and second petitioners are neither the same party, nor possess a significant relationship under Valve, General Plastic factor one necessarily outweighs the other General Plastic factors.” Id. We determine that the first General Plastic factor does not favor exercising discretion to deny institution of inter partes review. This is Petitioner’s first petition challenging the ’825 patent. Pet. 70. Patent Owner argues that “Apple’s use of prior petitions as a roadmap ‘implicitly create[s] such a relationship’” as set forth in Valve. Prelim. Resp. 55. According to Patent Owner, “Apple’s admitted attempt to improve over issues ‘that have plagued prior invalidity challenges’ ties its interests to the prior Petitioner’s aims.” Id. Under the circumstances in this case, we disagree with Patent Owner’s arguments. There is no evidence in the record that Petitioner has any significant relationship with Lenovo or Samsung—for example, that Petitioner is a co-defendant with either of them or was accused of infringing the ’825 patent based on the same product. See Valve at 9–10. That Petitioner apparently may have reviewed and considered strategies undertaken by prior petitioners on similar issues does not, in and of itself, create a significant relationship with any of the prior petitioners. For these reasons, we decline to exercise our discretion to deny institution under 35 U.S.C. § 314.” slip op. at 16
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsDenied
“We find that Becton, Dickinson factor (c)––the extent to which the asserted art was evaluated during examination––does not favor denying the Petition under Section 325(d) because the Examiner did not cite Behbahani or Tan in any rejection and did not specifically address either reference in any correspondence, other than initialing them in an IDS. Nor did the Examiner address Leete. For factors (e) and (f), we find that Petitioner has explained sufficiently how the Examiner allegedly erred in evaluating Behbahani and Tan, by pointing to the proposed grounds, which detail how the challenged claims read on these references over the combination of Behbahani, Leete, and Tan. See Pet. 18–68. We find this sufficient to identify the “specific teachings” that were overlooked, as contemplated in Advanced Bionics, and we agree with Petitioner that the facts and discussion of Behbahani, Leete, and Tan presented in the Petition warrant reconsideration of the challenged claims in view of those references. We thus find that Petitioner has satisfied the second part of the Advanced Bionics framework by demonstrating that the Examiner may have erred by not appreciating that Behbahani, Leete, and Tan teach or suggest the features of the claimed invention. For these reasons, we decline to exercise our discretion to deny institution under 35 U.S.C. § 325(d).” slip op. at 22
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,129,825
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.