- Masimo Corporation v. Apple Inc.No claims unpatentablePTAB · Sep 11, 2024 · IPR2023-00664 · APJ Robert L Kinder · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–24 were not determined unpatentable because the cited combinations failed to teach or suggest the claimed selectable widget functionality and lacked a coherent rationale to combine.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner contends that: A POSITA [person of ordinary skill in the art] of the ’352 patent would have had at least a bachelor’s degree in a discipline related to human-computer interaction, such as Human Factors, Computer Science, Computer Engineering, or an equivalent discipline, and at least two years of experience working with touchscreen user interfaces. More education could substitute for less work experience, and vice-versa. Pet. 12 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 34).” slip op. at 7
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“In our Decision to Institute, we construed “input that is directed to a portion of” a user interface. Paper 8, at 9; see also Pet. 24–25. Because this interpretation is not necessary for our final determination, we do not repeat it here.” slip op. at 9
- Expert testimonyPatent owner expert creditedPetitioner expert discountedDecided for patent owner
“Chae’s annotated Figure 6(b) “illustrates unlocking the second SIM (SIM2) according to the method for operating a mobile terminal.” Ex. 1005 ¶ 19. Ex. 1005, Fig. 6(b). Although Figure 6(b) “displays different items” (Ex. 1005 ¶ 109) such as the depictions of people (Lauran and Chris) and partly cloudy weather, Chae does not suggest that selecting these graphics causes display of an application. See PO Resp. 21. Petitioner contends that an ordinary artisan would have understood that selecting one of Chae’s graphics items must cause display of an application (see Pet. 55; Pet. Reply 11), but Chae does not teach or suggest this feature. As Dr. Cockburn persuasively testifies, “nothing in Chae indicates that the icons displayed in Figure 6(b) are dynamic or change in any way in response to content in the corresponding applications, and that the icons when selected causes display of the corresponding applications.” Ex. 2003 ¶ 46. The mere possibility that Chae’s generic graphical objects could perform a function is speculation because nothing in Chae teaches that selecting that graphical object would display a corresponding application. See id. The display of icons in Figure 6(b) does not inform the person of ordinary skill in the art whether the item has to indicate or contain content from an underlying application, and also whether it is selectable to get to that corresponding application as required by the claims. See Tr. 32:21–33:3. Petitioner’s reliance of the testimony of Dr. Rosenberg (see Ex. 1003 ¶ 91) is unpersuasive because Dr. Rosenberg merely restates the Petitioner’s assertions without reliance on persuasive evidence of record. See Xerox Corp. v. Bytemark, Inc., IPR2022-00624, at 5 (Feb 10, 2023) (Vidal, Dir.) (“[T]he Board was correct in giving little weight to Petitioner’s expert because the expert declaration merely offered conclusory assertions without underlying factual support and repeated, verbatim, Petitioner’s conclusory arguments.”). When addressing Chae’s three graphics in Figure 6(b) during cross-examination, Dr. Rosenberg testifies that “[t]hey’re not a numbered element, so they’re not spoken about specifically those three ones”). Ex. 2005, 56:9–14, 54:21–22 (“Chae doesn’t talk about the weather icon”). Further, the final record does not support Dr. Rosenberg’s testimony that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have understood that “part of the well-known functionality of widgets was that selecting a widget would cause ‘display of an application corresponding to the respective user interface object.’” Ex. 1003 ¶ 91. None of the references relied upon by Petitioner discloses this alleged “well-known functionality of widgets,” nor does the evidence of record support any industry standard usage of the term widget in the appropriate timeframe. See Ex. 2003 ¶¶ 46–48. Petitioner has also not persuasively shown that selections of Chae’s SIM card icons result in the display of an application as claimed. See Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 152–154, Fig. 22; see also Tr. 43:14–17 (“the claimed interface object causes display of the corresponding application, but selection of this paragraph 152, Figure 22 widget causes selection of something different, a sim environment.”). We find Patent Owner’s position more persuasive, when Chae uses the word widget, it is not using that word to refer to something that launches into an application, but instead Chae’s widgets show use-state information related to a SIM environment. See Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 152–154; Tr. 33:3–12. Specifically, Chae discloses “widgets that show use-state information of the first and second SIMs (SIM1 and SIM2),” and “when a user selects one of [the] widgets,” it “unlocks the SIM corresponding to the dragged widget.” Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 152, 153, Fig. 3 (unlocking SIM displays home screen customized to unlocked SIM). Chae does not support that these widgets relate to the graphic items in its Figure 6(b), nor does Chae explain how its widgets could be understood as the claimed “user interface objects” of the widget screen user interface. As explained persuasively by Dr. Cockburn, “the only widgets that are described in Chae are widgets relating to the use state of the multiple SIM cards,” and “[t]hese widgets described in Chae do not correspond to applications and thus do not cause display of applications when the widgets are selected.” Ex. 2003 ¶ 46 (quoting Ex. 1005 ¶ 152).” slip op. at 25
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“Based on the final record before us, we conclude that Petitioner has not persuasively shown that the combination of prior art teaches the required widget limitation of “a respective user interface object . . . when selected, causes display of an application corresponding to the respective user interface object” as recited in claim 1. Petitioner relies on Chae’s Figure 6(b), which is reproduced below: Chae’s annotated Figure 6(b) “illustrates unlocking the second SIM (SIM2) according to the method for operating a mobile terminal.” Ex. 1005 ¶ 19. Ex. 1005, Fig. 6(b). Although Figure 6(b) “displays different items” (Ex. 1005 ¶ 109) such as the depictions of people (Lauran and Chris) and partly cloudy weather, Chae does not suggest that selecting these graphics causes display of an application. See PO Resp. 21. Petitioner contends that an ordinary artisan would have understood that selecting one of Chae’s graphics items must cause display of an application (see Pet. 55; Pet. Reply 11), but Chae does not teach or suggest this feature. As Dr. Cockburn persuasively testifies, “nothing in Chae indicates that the icons displayed in Figure 6(b) are dynamic or change in any way in response to content in the corresponding applications, and that the icons when selected causes display of the corresponding applications.” Ex. 2003 ¶ 46. The mere possibility that Chae’s generic graphical objects could perform a function is speculation because nothing in Chae teaches that selecting that graphical object would display a corresponding application. See id. The display of icons in Figure 6(b) does not inform the person of ordinary skill in the art whether the item has to indicate or contain content from an underlying application, and also whether it is selectable to get to that corresponding application as required by the claims. See Tr. 32:21–33:3.” slip op. at 24
Patent outcomesUS 11,106,352 not shown unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,106,352 - PTAB · Sep 6, 2024 · IPR2024-00431 · APJ Jon M Jurgovan · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–4 under § 103 over Ashfary and Mirfakhraei, and claim 2 over Ashfary, Mirfakhraei, and Welles.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“Under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), an inter partes review may not be instituted unless the information presented in a petition and the preliminary response “shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” Upon consideration of the Petition and Preliminary Response, and accompanying exhibits and evidence, we determine Petitioner has established a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail with respect to at least one challenged claim in the inter partes review. Therefore, we grant institution of an inter partes review as to all of the challenged claims of the ’518 patent on all challenges in the Petition.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s proposed level of skill in the art, which is consistent with the prior art references asserted by Petitioner. Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1354–55 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (the applied prior art may reflect an appropriate level of skill). Accordingly, we agree with and will use Petitioner’s proposed level for this Decision.” slip op. at 10
- Claim Construction › Functional claiming / §112(f) means-plus-function › Whether §112(f) applies (Williamson, nonce words)§112(f) appliesTerm construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner
“1. “means for determining signal activity” Petitioner contends that the claimed function of “determining signal activity” does not require further construction. Pet. 24 (citing Ex. 1001, claim 2; Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 108–109). As to the corresponding structure, Petitioner asserts that the ’518 patent describes different approaches for determining signal activity. Id. Petitioner states that one approach is to perform a Fast Fourier Transform (FFT) on data samples from an analog-to-digital converter (ADC) using the same receiver signal path that is used for data communication. Id. at 24–25 (citing Ex. 1001, 8:51–9:27, 11:7–23; Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 109–110). Petitioner contends that another approach is to measure received signal power with an envelope detector. Id. at 25 (citing Ex. 1001, 11:23–29; Ex. 1002 ¶ 110). Petitioner asserts that the envelope detector is another corresponding structure for “determining signal activity.” Id. (citing Ex. 1002 ¶ 110).” slip op. at 10
- Obviousness (§103) › Analogous artAnalogous artDecided for petitioner
“We do not agree with Patent Owner’s argument that Mirfakhraei is not in the same field of endeavor, and therefore not analogous, to the ’518 patent. Mirfakhraei’s title, abstract, “Field of the Invention,” and claims describe its bit loading process for multicarrier communications generally, and do not limit its modems or receivers to using telephone lines as the communication medium. Ex. 1006, codes (54, 57), ¶ 1, claims 1–18. Although telephone lines are mentioned in the “Description of the Related Art” and “Detailed Description of the Preferred Embodiments” sections, Mirfakhraei cautions that “[a]lthough the invention has been described with reference to particular embodiments, the description is only an example of the invention’s application and should not be taken as a limitation.” Id. ¶ 36. Accordingly, we do not agree with Patent Owner’s argument that Mirfakhraei’s field of endeavor is limited to telephone lines or DSL, as Patent Owner argues.” slip op. at 20
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessPatents in suitUS 7,295,518 - PTAB · Sep 6, 2024 · IPR2024-00430 · APJ Jon M Jurgovan · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–24 on all asserted grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on at least one claim.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“Under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), an inter partes review may not be instituted unless the information presented in a petition and the preliminary response “shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” Upon consideration of the Petition and Preliminary Response, and accompanying exhibits and evidence, we determine Petitioner has established a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail with respect to at least one challenged claim in the inter partes review. Therefore, we grant institution of an inter partes review as to all of the challenged claims of the ’690 patent on all challenges in the Petition.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“A POSITA6 would have had a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering, or a similar discipline, and three to four years of experience working in signal processing and/or communication systems/networks. Additional education may substitute for experience, and significant work experience may substitute for formal education. Pet. 6 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 115–120). Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s proposed level of skill in the art, which is consistent with the prior art references asserted by Petitioner. Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1354–55 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (stating that the applied prior art may reflect an appropriate level of skill). For this stage of the proceeding, we agree with and will use Petitioner’s proposed level for this Decision.” slip op. at 12
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“Since the parties apply what they contend is the plain and ordinary meaning of the claim terms in their briefs, and have stipulated in the Cox case that the plain and ordinary meaning applies, and Patent Owner argues that the district court’s construction in the Charter case is the plain and ordinary meaning, there is no controversy concerning claim terms that we need to resolve in this Decision. Pet. 6; Prelim. Resp. 10; Ex. 1005, 104–105; Ex. 2001, 2. See Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’”) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). At this stage of the proceeding, therefore, we apply the plain and ordinary meaning to the claim terms consistent with their ordinary and customary meaning under 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b). We note, however, that Patent Owner seems to consider the court’s construction in the Charter case to require that the claimed “probe” must be of a type that can be compared with a reference signal. Prelim. Resp. 10. We question whether all of the different types of probes mentioned and claimed in the ’690 patent would require comparison with a reference signal. See, e.g., Ex. 1001, 2:7–19. However, this is a matter best resolved, if necessary, on a full record at trial.” slip op. at 14
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Not shown unpatentableUnpatentableMixed
“Prelim. Resp. 23 (citing Ex. 1013, 37) (annotated in red by Patent Owner). IEEE-802.16’s Table 5 shows that the CID is a field of a generic MAC header. Petitioner does not show sufficiently that the CID, located in the header, specifies content payload of a MAC message, as required by limitation 1A. Petitioner alternatively relies on IEEE-802.16’s ranging code index that it contends is another example of data that is in a ranging request parameter and is used for the ranging response payload. Pet. 15 (citing Ex. 1013, 49–51, 204–213, 576–579, 665–66; Ex. 1002 ¶ 149). Patent Owner asserts that the portions of IEEE-802.16 that Petitioner cites do not disclose that the ranging code index is sent as part of a ranging request message. Prelim. Resp. 25. Although the parts of IEEE-802.16 that Petitioner cites disclose that the ranging code index is sent from the SS to the BS and is included in a ranging response (Ex. 1013, 49–51, 204–213, 576–579, 665–66), the cited parts do not disclose that the SS sends the ranging code index to the BS in a ranging request. Consequently, Petitioner has not established that IEEE- 802.16 anticipates a ranging code index that is a parameter of a ranging request specifying the content payload of the ranging response corresponding to limitation 1A. For the foregoing reasons, on this record, we determine that Petitioner has not shown a reasonable likelihood to prevail in showing that claim 1 is anticipated by IEEE 802.16.” slip op. at 18
Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites KSRPatents in suitUS 8,284,690 - PTAB · Sep 5, 2024 · IPR2024-00441 · APJ Patrick R Scanlon · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–18 and all petitioned grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood of success on at least one challenged claim.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“We have authority to determine whether to institute an inter partes review. See 35 U.S.C. § 314 (2018); 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a) (2022). To institute an inter partes review, we must determine that the information presented in the Petition shows “a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). For the reasons set forth below, we determine that Petitioner has demonstrated a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail with respect to at least one challenged claim. Accordingly, we institute an inter partes review of the challenged claims on the grounds set forth in the Petition.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner contends that a person having ordinary skill in the art “would have had a degree in electrical engineering or a similar discipline, and three-to-four years of experience working with television signal processing and communication systems,” and “[a]dditional education may substitute for professional experience and significant work experience may substitute for formal education.” Pet. 30 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 40–42). Patent Owner does not address the level of ordinary skill in the art in its Preliminary Response. Based on our review of the record before us, we determine that Petitioner’s stated level of ordinary skill in the art is reasonable because it appears consistent with the evidence of record, including the asserted prior art. Accordingly, we adopt Petitioner’s definition for the purposes of this Decision.” slip op. at 8
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“On the present record, we do not discern a need to construe explicitly any claim language because doing so would have no effect on our analyses below of Petitioner’s asserted grounds and will not assist in resolving the present controversy between the parties. See Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’”) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)).” slip op. at 9
- Obviousness (§103) › Objective indicia / secondary considerationsObjective indicia no nexusDecided for petitioner
“persuaded on the current record that Patent Owner provides sufficient evidence to establish the failure of others. Patent Owner makes much of Broadcom and CableLabs allegedly failing to “realize the possibility of remote spectrum monitoring” prior to the ’008 patent. See Prelim. Resp. 50–52. The mere failure to “realize the possibility” of a certain technique or device, however, is not sufficient to show the failure of others. Rather, the failure of others as an indicium of nonobviousness generally 8 DOCSIS refers to “Data Over Cable System Interface Specification.” Ex. 1011, 1:42–43. relates to situations where others failed while attempting to address a particular problem. See In re Cyclobenzaprine Hydrochloride Extended- Release Capsule Pat. Litig., 676 F.3d 1063, 1081 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (“Evidence that others tried but failed to develop a claimed invention may carry significant weight in an obviousness inquiry. . . . [E]vidence of failed attempts by others could be determinative on the issue of obviousness.” (emphases added)); see also Volvo Penta of the Americas, LLC v. Brunswick Corp., 81 F.4th 1202, 1213 (Fed. Cir. 2023) (“Indeed, we have found that ‘[o]bjective considerations such as failure by others to solve the problem . . . may often be the most probative and cogent evidence of nonobviousness.’” (emphasis added)). In this case, Patent Owner does not show sufficiently that any alleged failure experienced by Broadcom or CableLabs (or any other party) occurred attempting to address a pertinent problem.” slip op. at 15
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites GrahamPatents in suitUS 8,792,008 - Comcast Cable Communications, LLC v. Entropic Communications, LLCInstitution deniedPTAB · Aug 26, 2024 · IPR2024-00578 · APJ Jon M Jurgovan · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution on all grounds because Petitioner did not show a reasonable likelihood that claims 1–4, 6, 8, and 9 were obvious.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“Under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), an inter partes review may not be instituted unless the information presented in a petition and the preliminary response “shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” Upon consideration of the Petition and Preliminary Response, and accompanying exhibits and evidence, we determine Petitioner has not established a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail with respect to at least one challenged claim in the inter partes review. Therefore, we deny institution of an inter partes review as to all of the challenged claims of the ’826 patent on all challenges in the Petition.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“B. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art Petitioner contends as follows: The ’826 Patent describes and claims aspects and functionality of cable and satellite television signal processing and communication systems. As of the alleged September 8, 2011 priority date, a person of ordinary skill in the art (“POSITA”) of the ’826 Patent would have had at least: i) a Bachelor of Science in electrical engineering or an equivalent subject and three or more years of experience working in the field of cable and/or satellite signal processing and communication systems; ii) a Master’s in electrical engineering or an equivalent subject and one or more years of experience working in the field of cable and/or satellite television signal processing and communication systems; or iii) a Ph.D. in electrical engineering or an equivalent subject and at least some experience working in the field of cable and/or satellite television signal processing and/or communication systems. Additional education may substitute for professional experience, and significant work experience may substitute for formal education. Pet. 9 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 30–31) (internal citation omitted). Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s proposed level of skill in the art, which is consistent with the prior art references asserted by Petitioner. Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1354–55 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (the applied prior art may reflect an appropriate level of skill). Accordingly, we agree with and will use Petitioner’s proposed level for this Decision.” slip op. at 8
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“The parties indicate that the district court in the Charter case (2:22-cv-00125) construed “network management messages” in the claims of the ’826 patent to mean “messages which report on the network based on the measured characteristics.” Pet. 10 (citing Ex. 1009, 29); Prelim. Resp. 10. Petitioner contends this construction is consistent with the ordinary and customary meaning of the claim language. Pet. 25. Patent Owner asserts that, in the Cox case (2:23-cv-01049), the parties agreed that “network management messages” should be given its plain and ordinary meaning. Prelim. Resp. 10 (citing Ex. 2001, 2). Patent Owner asserts that its arguments “do not turn on the construction of ‘network management messages’ so there is no need to construe that, or any other, term of the ’826 Patent claims at this stage of the proceeding.” Id. As there is no controversy between the parties regarding any claim language that we would need to resolve in order to render our decision in this case, we apply the ordinary and customary meaning of the claim terms without specific construction. See Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (only claim terms in controversy need to be construed, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy).” slip op. at 10
- BurdenNot shown unpatentable
“While Petitioner mentions portions of Renken that it considers relevant to limitation 1h, Petitioner does not explain how it reads each aspect of limitation 1h on Renken. For example, Petitioner does not identify what in Renken corresponds to the “network management messages,” what corresponds to the “measured characteristic of the received signal” that “is different than said network management messages,” and what discloses that the “measured characteristic” is the basis for “controlling transmission of the network management messages” from the “receiver” “back to the headend.” b) Conclusion for Claim 1 Accordingly, Petitioner has not shown a reasonable likelihood to prevail in demonstrating that Renken in view of the general knowledge of a POSITA discloses limitations 1a and 1h of claim 1.7 Thus, we do not reach the parties’ contentions concerning other claim limitations or Renken’s priority date.” slip op. at 14
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessPatents in suitUS 9,825,826 - PTAB · Aug 20, 2024 · IPR2024-00442 · APJ Jon M Jurgovan · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–18 and all petition grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that at least one challenged claim would have been obvious under § 103.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“Under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), an inter partes review may not be instituted unless the information presented in a petition and the preliminary response “shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” Upon consideration of the Petition and Preliminary Response, and accompanying exhibits and evidence, we determine Petitioner has established a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail with respect to at least one challenged claim in the inter partes review. Therefore, we grant institution of an inter partes review as to all of the challenged claims of the ’826 patent on all challenges in the Petition.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“B. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art Petitioner contends as follows: A person of ordinary skill in the art (a “POSITA”) at the time of the alleged invention would have had a degree in electrical engineering or a similar discipline, and three-to-four years of experience working with television signal processing and communication systems. Additional education may substitute for professional experience and significant work experience may substitute for formal education. Pet. 24 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 44–46). Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s proposed level of skill in the art, which is consistent with the prior art references asserted by Petitioner. Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1354–55 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (the applied prior art may reflect an appropriate level of skill). Accordingly, we agree with and will use Petitioner’s proposed level for this Decision.” slip op. at 10
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededPlain and ordinary meaningDecided for petitioner
“As there is no controversy between the parties regarding any claim language that we would need to resolve in order to render our decision in this case, we apply the ordinary and customary meaning of the claim terms without specific construction. See Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (only claim terms in controversy need to be construed, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy).” slip op. at 11
- Claim Construction › Functional claiming / §112(f) means-plus-function › Whether §112(f) applies (Williamson, nonce words)§112(f) does not applyDecided for petitioner
“The word “means” does not appear in the claims of the ’826 patent. When this is the case, there is a presumption that the claims do not recite means-plus-function limitations under § 112 ¶ 6. Williamson v. Citrix Online, LLC, 792 F.3d 1339, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (en banc in relevant part). Since neither party offers any argument or evidence to contravene this presumption, we do not construe any claim term as means-plus-function in rendering our decision.” slip op. at 12
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSRPatents in suitUS 9,825,826 - Lululemon USA Inc. v. Nike, Inc.InstitutedPTAB · Aug 9, 2024 · IPR2024-00460 · APJ Josiah C Cocks · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–21 on all petition grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that claims 1–8 and 12–18 are anticipated by Nishida.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“IV. CONCLUSION For the reasons set forth above, we conclude that Petitioner has shown a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail with respect to at least one of the challenged claims. At this stage of the proceeding, the Board has not made a final determination on the construction of any claim term or the patentability of any challenged claim V. ORDER In consideration of the foregoing, it is hereby: ORDERED that, pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), inter partes review of claims 1–21 of the ’749 patent is instituted with respect to all grounds set forth in the Petition; and” slip op. at 27
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsInstitution denied 325dDenied
“arguments that Nishida-US does not disclose the “simultaneously knitting” limitation of the claims of the ’749 patent constitutes “error.” Pet. 86. In our view, whether error or not, there is clear inconsistency on the record before us as to assessment of Nishida’s and Nishida-US’s teachings pertaining to the pertinent “simultaneously knitting” requirement. In that regard, as discussed above, in accounting for that requirement, the Petition unambiguously relies on disclosure in Nishida specifically stating that “when the strip of material (1) is manufactured, the patterns (2) of the uppers are produced, at the same time as the strip of material.” Pet. 25 (citing Ex. 1005, Abstract (emphasis added by Petitioner)). At the very least, there is a reasonable case to be made that such disclosure conveys that the material (1) and the patterns (2) are created simultaneously. The record is devoid of any indication that the Examiner considered or apprehended the extent of that disclosure.15 “[M]isapprehending or overlooking specific teachings of the relevant prior art where those teachings impact patentability of the challenged claims,” as seemingly occurred here, does not lend itself to a conclusion that the exercise of discretion to deny institution is appropriate. See Advanced Bionics, IPR2019-01469, Paper 6 at 8–9 n.9.” slip op. at 23
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Instituted
“account for limitation 1[a], on this record, is difficult to follow. Nishida makes clear that its shoe making method involves production of material web 1 by knitting and which is “provided with a single or a plurality of unwound web part(s) 2.” Ex. 1005, 5. Nishida’s disclosure also, at this time, appears unequivocal in describing that “patterns (2)” and web material 1 (or “strip of material (1)”) are manufactured or produced “at the same time.” Id. at code (57) (Abstract). Nishida also unambiguously describes its material web 1 as including “surface areas 1.1.” Id. at 7. As is evident from, for instance, Nishida’s Figure 2, surface areas 1.1 surround unwound web parts (or patterns) 2.” slip op. at 18
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successInstituted
“2. Proposed Ground of Obviousness Based on Nishida (Grounds 2 and 6) Petitioner contends that claims 9, 10, 19, and 20 would have been obvious to a person of ordinary skill in the art based on Nishida’s teachings taken with the general knowledge of a skilled artisan. Pet. 50–54. Petitioner supports its contention with citation to Dr. Brookstein’s testimony (Ex. 1003) as well as various record exhibits (e.g., Exs. 109, 1010, 1012, 1023). Id. Patent Owner does not challenge Petitioner recourse to a person of ordinary skill in the art’s general knowledge in accounting for claims 9, 10, 19, and 20. Rather, Patent Owner simply contends that the arguments it advanced in connection with Ground 1 also applies to Ground 2. As discussed above, at this time, we do not agree with Patent Owner’s arguments. Petitioner also contends that claims 11 and 21 would have been unpatentable over Nishida and Zuckerman (Ground 6). Pet. 81–84. Patent Owner also contends that the arguments it advances in conjunction with Ground 1 apply to Ground 6. Prelim. Resp. 37. We do not find those arguments availing. On the record before us, we determine that Petitioner has shown a reasonable likelihood of success in its patentability challenge to claims 9, 10, 19, and 20 based on Nishida (ground 2), and its challenge to claims 11 and 21 based on Nishida and Zuckerman (ground 6).” slip op. at 19
§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 8,266,749 - Global Shade Corporation v. With-U E-Commerce (Shanghai) Co., Ltd.All claims unpatentablePTAB · Aug 7, 2024 · IPR2023-00580 · APJ Patrick R Scanlon · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1, 2, 4, 13, and 14 are unpatentable under § 103; proposed substitute claims 15–19 are unpatentable over Rousselle, Tsai, Ohnishi, Hoober, and Seo, so the revised motion to amend is denied.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level board ownOther
“Although not identical, the parties’ definitions are substantially similar. Accordingly, for purposes of this Decision, we determine that no reflected by the prior art of record. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001). We note, however, that our obviousness analysis in this Decision would not differ if we adopted either Petitioner’s or Patent Owner’s definition.” slip op. at 11
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“Petitioner asserts construction is unnecessary and does not propose any term for construction. Pet. 7 (citing Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co. Ltd., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017)). Patent Owner does not propose any specific claim construction for any term of the challenged claims. PO Resp. 14. On the full record, we do not discern a need to construe explicitly any claim language because doing so would have no effect on our analyses below of Petitioner’s asserted grounds and will not assist in resolving the present controversy between the parties. See Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe necessary to resolve the controversy.’”) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)).” slip op. at 12
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundUnpatentable
“points to any teaching, suggestion, or motivation in either reference” to replace Tsai’s leg locks with Rousselle’s central lock. PO Resp. 44 (citing Pet. 36; Ex. 1002 ¶ 103). Petitioner disagrees, arguing that the Petition cites “voluminous disclosure” from Rousselle identifying the benefits of a central lock. Reply 18 (citing Pet. 35). We agree with Petitioner. The Petition provides several rationales, supported by Dr. Stein’s testimony, for making the alternative modification. Pet. 35–37. For instance, Petitioner argues that one of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to make this modification because Rousselle discloses the benefits of a central lock over Tsai’s individual leg locking system, such as making the canopy easier and more convenient for a single user to operate. Id. at 35–36 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 102–103; Ex. 1003, 3:38–47; Ex. 1005, 4:29–5:5, 8:5–33, Figs. 1, 2, 18, 19). Petitioner also argues that the proposed modification is the simple addition of one known element to another known element to obtain predictable results and uses a known technique to improve a similar device and yield predictable results. Id. at 36–37 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 105–107; KSR, 550 U.S. at 417). We have reviewed Petitioner’s arguments and evidence and find the reasons to combine persuasive. In sum, we determine that Petitioner’s proposed reasons to combine Rousselle and Tsai in accordance with the alternative modification are realistic, have rational underpinning, and are supported by expert testimony, which we find persuasive and credit. Thus, Petitioner’s evidence shows that a skilled artisan would have had reasons to combine the teachings of in doing so. slip op. at 32
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of success › Teaching awayTeaching away not foundDecided for petitioner
“We agree with Petitioner that Tsai’s disclosure of pulling the poles or legs apart to unfold the frame does not disparage central activation to the extent of discouraging one of ordinary skill in the art from investigating or considering Rousselle’s central lock in connection with Tsai’s shelter frame. See DePuy Spine, 567 F.3d at 1327 (holding a reference does not teach away “if it merely expresses a general preference for an alternative invention but does not ‘criticize, discredit, or otherwise discourage’ investigation into the manually pulling the four poles 1 outwardly.” Ex. 1005, 10:28–29 (emphasis added). As such, Tsai “merely expresses a general preference” for this technique (see DePuy Spine, 567 F.3d at 1327) and does not specifically require it. We agree with Petitioner that Tsai’s general preference for this technique does not teach away from any other method for unfolding the frame. Furthermore, Tsai’s statement that the shelter frame of Figures 16 and 17 is “somewhat difficult to unfold in that an extra person is sometimes needed to push the center strut C upwardly to its completely extended position” (Ex. 1005, 2:19–22) does not disparage all other center lock configurations, in particular the configuration taught by Rousselle. As Petitioner points out, Rousselle discloses that its collapsible shelter/tent with the central lock arrangement can be erected by a single person. Ex. 1003, 13:59–65. So, instead of requiring “an extra person,” the shelter frame of the combination of Tsai and Rousselle could be erected by a single person. Similarly, Tsai’s statement that the shelter frame of Figures 16 and 17 reduces headroom in the tent (Ex. 1005, 2:17–19) does not disparage all other center lock configurations. We agree with Petitioner that the inner units of both Rousselle and Tsai’s Figure 1 embodiment are different than the inner units shown in Figures 16 and 17, which are large scissors-type linkages located well below the canopy’s roof supported by center strut C. See Reply 11. In contrast, Rousselle discloses shelter/tent 10 in which collapsible frame 100 supports sheet-material cover 200. Ex. 1003, 6:30–32; Fig. 1(A). Unlike the shelter frame of Tsai’s Figures 16 and 17, Rousselle’s frame does not include an upwardly extending center strut propping up the sheet-material cover. Instead, sheet-material cover 200 rests directly on frame in which canopy supporting rods 3 (i.e., the “inner units”) form a canopy support for supporting the canopy material. Ex. 1005, 4:11–25, 7:15–20. Accordingly, neither Rousselle’s or Tsai’s frames present the headroom issue that Tsai identifies with respect to the prior art shelter frame of Figures 16 and 17.” slip op. at 27
Patent outcomesUS 10,669,738 unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSRPatents in suitUS 10,669,738 - Next Step Group, Inc. v. Deckers Outdoor CorporationInstitution deniedPTAB · Aug 6, 2024 · IPR2024-00525 · APJ Kimberly Mcgraw · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution because Petitioner did not show a reasonable likelihood of proving the challenged design claim unpatentable on any of its ten asserted grounds.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“We have authority under 35 U.S.C. § 314, which provides that inter partes review may not be instituted unless the information presented in the Petition shows that “there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a); see also 37 C.F.R § 42.4(a) (“The Board institutes the trial on behalf of the Director.”). After considering the Parties’ papers and the evidence of record, we determine that Petitioner has not demonstrated a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail with respect to the one claim challenged in the Petition. Thus, we do not institute an inter partes review.” slip op. at 2
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Prior-art status of a reference › Printed publication / public accessibilityPrinted publication not establishedNot shown unpatentable
“December 15, 2015”). The date that a product was listed as first available on a website, however, is not sufficient evidence that the content of the listing, including the photographs depicted therein, were published at that time. See Ex parte Basulto, Appeal 2020-00129, 2021 WL 1264902, at *2 (PTAB Apr. 2, 2021) (stating “the date [a] product was listed on Amazon.com is not compelling evidence that the content of [the] listing itself as shown in the document, and the photographs relied on within it were published at that time”). Selling products online is dynamic. Id. Product listings may be updated and photographs of the products may change. Id. While a statement on a commercial website as to when a product was “first available” might constitute evidence as to when the product was first offered for sale, such a statement is not sufficient evidence that the listing itself, or any photograph depicted therein, has not changed over time. See Ex parte Zhang, Appeal 2021-000087, 2021 WL 633718 at *3 (PTAB Feb. 16, 2021) (stating “while the [webpage] date indicates that the product information was last updated on [date], there is no additional evidence to corroborate that the picture was publicly accessible on that date”). We have also reviewed the customer reviews that Petitioner asserts show “the listing were [sic] public, printed publications.” Reply 17 (citing Ex. 1009, 6; Ex. 1015 ¶ 17–18. None of the reviews dated prior to the critical date of November 8, 2019, however, contain any images of the UGG Neumel Boot. See Ex. 1009, 6). Thus, Petitioner does not provide sufficient evidence that any of the images on pages 1–9 of Exhibit 1009 were available on the website prior to the critical date.” slip op. at 14
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for patent owner
“Here, the pull-tab does serve a useful purpose as it can be used to pull the footwear onto the foot. Based on the evidence presented, however, we disagree with Petitioner that the pull tab is primarily functional and should be removed entirely from the construction of the claimed design. Petitioner presents a number of arguments to support its position that the pull tab is functional, not ornamental. Petitioner asserts that the pull tab is “obviously not ornamentation but instead is a functional element that is used to pull the footwear on to the foot, an important function and part of the Patent Owner’s marketing message.” Pet. 18–19 (citing Ex. 1011 ¶¶ 64–67; possible, the type of pull tab shown in the ’161 patent “is the kind that is generally used in shorter shaft, lower ankle height footwear to make it easier to pull up and put the boot on the foot.” Pet. 19 (citing Ex. 1009, the UGG Neumel Boot). Petitioner further asserts that the pull tab is “securely attached for actual use, countering that it is ornamental” and that “[a]ny other pull tab (e.g., not at the top of the footwear as in the UGG Neumel Boot) would not be as efficient and hence not an acceptable alternative.” Id. (citing Ex. 1011 ¶¶ 64–67; Ex. 1013, 25–27). We are not persuaded by these arguments. The “marketing material” relied on by Petition, as discussed by Mr. Holden, merely states that Ultra Mini Ugg Boots “have a slightly lower ankle to make it easier for you to slip on,” that the UGG boots are “fantastic” for those who “may struggle with pulling on other styles,” and the boots “are fantastic for those who may struggle with pulling on other styles and are looking for more comfort and durability.” See Ex. 1011 ¶ 66 (citing Ex. 1003). None of the marketing material cited by Petitioner even mentions a pull tab. Nor does the present record support Petitioner’s contentions that,” slip op. at 27
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“Petitioner’s arguments are not persuasive. First, the images of the Emu Stinger Micro Boot that Petitioner relies upon are from pages 1–6 of Exhibit 1002, which as noted above, Petitioner has not sufficiently shown to constitute a printed publication prior art. Thus, Petitioner’s arguments are based on images in a reference that does not qualify as prior art to the claimed design. The images found on pages 8 and 9 of Exhibit 1002 are not the same images as those relied upon in the Petition. Compare Ex. 1002, 8– 9, with Pet. 35–36. Thus, for at least this reason, Petitioner fails to demonstrate a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail in showing the ’161 patent is anticipated by the Emu Stinger Boot. Second, even if we were to consider any of these images of the Emu Stinger Micro Boot depicted in Exhibit 1002, Petitioner’s arguments are not persuasive because the arguments fail to adequately address differences between the claimed design and the prior art as viewed by an ordinary observer. See Door-Master Corp., 256 F.3d at 1313 (stating for anticipation to be found, the claimed design and the prior art design must be substantially the same). For example, the Figures of the ’161 patent depict (1) a stitch pattern design that includes a wavy line on the back heel of the boot (see Figs. 1–3, 5), (2) a pull tab that extends over the top part of the back of the boot and opening for insertion of the foot that appears to constitute more than 50% of the length of the boot (Figs. 2, 3, 6), and (4) a backward sloping top line. Petitioner does not address the differences between (1) the stitch pattern (2) the pull tab, or (3) the size of the opening for the foot at all in its anticipation argument. See Pet. 35–38.” slip op. at 37
Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Graham - PTAB · Jul 26, 2024 · IPR2024-00393 · APJ Jon M Jurgovan · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1 and 3 on all asserted grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that the Amit, Jacobsen, and Isaksson combination renders them obvious.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“unless the information presented in a petition and the preliminary response “shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” Upon consideration of the Petition and Preliminary Response, and accompanying exhibits and evidence, we determine Petitioner has established a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail with respect to at least one challenged claim in the inter partes review. Therefore, we grant institution of an inter partes review as to all of the challenged claims of the ’518 patent on all challenges in the Petition.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“B. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art Petitioner contends as follows: A POSITA [(person of ordinary skill in the art)] would have a degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering, or a related field and experience working in signal processing and/or communication systems/networks, e.g., a bachelor’s and three or more years of experience; a master’s and at least one year of experience; or a doctorate and some work experience. Additional education could substitute for professional experience, or vice versa..” slip op. at 8
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Plain and ordinary meaningOther
“Only claim terms in controversy need to be construed, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy. See Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999). Petitioner contends that the challenged claims are “obvious under any reasonable interpretation,” so “no express constructions are required.” Pet. 3. Patent Owner does not offer construction of any claim term, so there is no dispute over claim construction that we need to resolve. We apply the ordinary and customary meanings consistent with 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b).” slip op. at 9
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundInstituted
“and Jacobsen. Prelim. Rep. 36–41. Specifically, Patent Owner argues that Amit already identified and solved the reflection problem so there would be no need to make an additional modification to Amit. Id. at 36–37 (citing Ex. 1014, 19:65–20:43). This argument does not negate, however, Petitioner’s contention that a POSITA would have recognized that Jacobsen’s multicarrier modulation would improve upon Amit’s single-carrier modulation by mitigating distortion on the cable network, adapting to channel degradation, and providing increased computational efficiency. Pet. 49–50 (citing Ex. 1016, 312; Ex. 1004 ¶ 173); see KSR, 550 U.S. at 422 (motivation to combine established when POSITA would have appreciated the benefits achieved by the combination).” slip op. at 17
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSRPatents in suitUS 7,295,518
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.