• Jiangsu Favored Nanotechnology Co., Ltd. v. P2i Ltd.All claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Apr 11, 2025 · IPR2024-00380 · APJ Sheldon M Mcgee · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–5, 7, and 9–14 are unpatentable as obvious over Cohen and Legein or Francesch and Legein; Petitioner’s motion to strike is denied as moot.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level board ownDecided for petitioner

    “The parties agree that a person of ordinary skill in the art in the field of the ’087 patent in June 20154 “would have had at least a bachelor’s degree in a field such as chemistry, physics, or chemical engineering, as well as at least two years of experience with plasma-polymerization techniques.” Pet. 20 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 22–29); PO Resp. 13 (Patent Owner stating that it “does not dispute this characterization of the level of ordinary skill in the art.”); see also PO Sur-reply 1–2 (noting both parties’ agreement on the education and experience level of the ordinarily skilled artisan).” slip op. at 7

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “On the fully developed trial record, we determine that no claims need an express construction. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co. Ltd., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (holding that only claim terms in controversy need to be construed, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy (citing Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 9

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedPatent owner expert discountedDecided for petitioner

    “Because of Patent Owner’s shifting definitions of the education and experience level of the ordinarily skilled artisan, it is unclear on the complete record what precise definition Patent Owner and Dr. Senkevitch are applying when arguing the skilled artisan’s capabilities. PO Resp. 13, 22–27, 31–32, 34–40; PO Sur-reply 1–6, 11–13; Ex. 2007 ¶¶ 30, 31, 33, 34, 37, 40, 52–55, 60, 68, 74, 76, 77, 80–86, 89, 91, 94, 95, 100, 102–105, 108, 110, 111, 113–116, 118–120, 122, 124, 127–134. We, therefore, give Dr. Senkevitch’s testimony regarding the capabilities of a person of ordinary skill in the art minimal weight, which leaves us with Patent Owner’s insufficiently supported arguments regarding the skilled artisan’s capabilities. PO Resp. 13, 22–27, 31–32, 34–40; PO Sur-reply 1–6, 11–13. Moreover, as Petitioner correctly points out, the ʼ087 patent expressly teaches that the precise conditions for forming a protective polymeric coating “will vary depending upon factors such as, without limitation, the nature of the monomer compound, the crosslinking agent, the substrate, as well as the desired properties of the coating” and that such “conditions can be determined using routine methods.” Ex. 1001 15:1–15:5 (emphasis added); Pet. Reply 17. Where the patent itself leaves to the judgment of an ordinarily skilled artisan the assessment of these factors to ascertain suitable conditions for forming the protective coating, we find persuasive Petitioner’s view that it would have been well within the level of ordinary skill to ascertain such suitable conditions.” slip op. at 20

  • Obviousness (§103) › Analogous artAnalogous artDecided for petitioner

    “We disagree with Patent Owner. Although the claims of the ʼ087 patent recite obtaining the protective cross-linked polymeric coating “by exposing the device or component to a plasma,” the field of endeavor analysis in an analogous art inquiry does not exclusively turn on the claims at issue, but rather takes account of the entirety of a patent’s disclosure. See In re Bigio, 381 F.3d 1320, 1326 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (explaining that “the PTO must show adequate support for its findings on the scope of the field of endeavor in the application’s written description and claims” (emphasis added)); In re Mettke, 570 F.3d 1356, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (rejecting an argument that the field of endeavor was limited to a claimed “Internet terminal” when “the specification describes various communication media, including facsimile machines and email, as related to the invention.”). This is significant here because the ʼ087 patent discloses that “[t]he … invention relates to protective coatings” and specifically “relates to protective coatings for electronic or electrical devices and components thereof, and methods of forming such coatings.” Ex. 1001, 1:14–17. Based on this disclosure, we find that the ʼ087 patent’s field of endeavor relates to “protective coatings for electronic or electrical devices and components thereof” broadly, not just those formed on such devices or components via a plasma polymerization process as asserted by Patent Owner. Id. Although Cohen does not explicitly disclose that its crosslinked polymers constitute a “protective coating,” Cohen does disclose that its “copolymerizable mixture can be cast into films” (Ex. 1004, 2:61–62), that the polymerization can “effected in situ,” and that the polymers may be used in “numerous” electrical applications (id. at 5:17–25). Tr. 8:9–10:2, 27:2– 21; see Pet. Reply 5 (explaining how “Cohen described insulating polymers that could be applied as films and be used to protect substrates including cables and electrical coils.” (citing Ex. 1004, 2:60–63, 5:13–25)). These disclosures suggest strongly that Cohen’s crosslinked polymers––if cast into a film or formed in situ on an electrical device or component––would serve as a protective coating on that electrical device or component, even though Cohen does not expressly refer to its crosslinked polymers ipsis verbis as a “protective coating.” Thus, we find that Cohen is within the field of endeavor of the ʼ087 patent.” slip op. at 15

  Patent outcomesUS 11,041,087 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 11,041,087
• Google LLC v. DH International Ltd.Instituted
  PTAB · Mar 24, 2025 · IPR2024-01322 · APJ Brian P Murphy · IPR · Institution

  The Board instituted IPR of claims 1–20 on all grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that claims 1, 10–12, and 19 are obvious over Mooney and over Mooney in view of Lee.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

    “inter partes review may not be instituted “unless . . . there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” Under § 314, the Board may not institute review on fewer than all claims challenged in the petition. SAS Inst., Inc. v. Iancu, 138 S. Ct. 1348, 1359–60 (2018). If the Board institutes a review, it will institute “on all of the challenged claims and on all grounds of unpatentability asserted for each claim.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.108(a). Upon consideration of the Petition, the Preliminary Response, the Pre-Institution Reply, Pre-Institution Sur-Reply, and the evidence of record, for the reasons set forth below, we conclude the Petition demonstrates a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail in showing the unpatentability of at least one challenged claim in the ’294 patent. Accordingly, we institute an inter partes review of claims 1–20 of the ’294 patent.” slip op. at 2

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner

    “the claims nor the specification of the ’294 Patent require such a narrow reading of the term ‘activation cue’” as that proposed by Patent Owner. Reply 1 (citing Prelim. Resp. 9–10). Operative claim language—“a cue receiver operatively linked to said electronic circuit for receiving an activation cue from a source external to said cellular phone”—does not limit “activation cue” to a predetermined bit sequence or predetermined indicator as argued by Patent Owner. Claim 1 further recites the “data conveyance switching element . . . being assigned a first state upon an activation cue having been received by said cue receiver,” which also does not limit “activation cue” to a predetermined bit sequence or predetermined indicator. Both parties, moreover, cite the same description of the structure and function of the “activation cue” in the ’294 patent: “This activation cue is in the form of a data communication of a specific type which will be recognized by electronic device 10 as an activation cue, for example a predetermined bit sequence.” Prelim. Resp. 22 (citing Ex. 1001, 9:24–27); Reply 1 (citing Ex. 1001, 9:24–27); Sur-Reply 1 (citing same). The recited “activation cue,” when read in context and in view of the” slip op. at 13

  • Claim Construction › Functional claiming / §112(f) means-plus-function › Whether §112(f) applies (Williamson, nonce words)Term construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner

    “for the recited “data conveyance switching element” pursuant to §112, sixth Petition characterizes the corresponding structure as “a physical structure, a virtual program, or both because the ’294 patent explains that a switching element ‘can be any type of device allowing data to be conveyed according to alternate data conveyance operations,’ such as ‘a series of instructions programmed onto [a] microchip’ or a ‘decisional logical circuit,’ and ‘can be a physical structure, a virtual program, or both.’” Id. (citing Ex. 1001, 9:28– 31, 9:40–41; Lipoff Decl. Ex. 1003 ¶ 64). The Petition identifies the claimed function as switching between inactive and activated states based on whether or not the cellular phone receives an activation cue. Id. (citing Ex. 1001, 2:4–9, 4:18–23, 5:48–53; Ex. 1003 ¶ 64).” slip op. at 14

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached

    “construction of an “external data exchange device” as a data transceiver coupled to a circuit that carries out the function of exchanging data. Prelim. Resp. 11 (citing Ex. 1001, 9:4–6, 12:62, 13:28, Figs. 1, 3, 4; Ex. 2001 ¶ 48); see Pet. 7–8 (citing Ex. 1001, 2:14–17, 4:7–14, 9:3–6; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 67–68). Patent Owner states that “[a]n external data exchange device is not a transceiver but a device with a transceiver.” Prelim. Resp. 11 (citing Ex. 2001 ¶ 48). On this preliminary record, we need not construe “external data exchange device” to decide whether or not to institute. To the extent there is a dispute over the plain meaning of “external data exchange device,” the parties are invited to address it in detail in their briefs following institution. On the present record, we determine that no further construction of claim terms is necessary to determine whether to institute a trial in this case. See, e.g., Wellman, Inc. v. Eastman Chem. Co., 642 F.3d 1355, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (“[C]laim terms need only be construed ‘to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’”) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). The parties are free to address any further claim construction issues bearing on this inter partes review following institution.” slip op. at 16

  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 9,022,294
• Motorola Solutions, Inc. v. Stellar, LLCInstituted
  PTAB · Mar 18, 2025 · IPR2024-01285 · APJ Nabeel U Khan · IPR · Institution

  The Board instituted review of claims 1–18 on all asserted grounds after finding a reasonable likelihood that claims 1 and 1 were obvious over the Yerazunis–Fiedler and Ely–Fiedler combinations, respectively.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Decided for petitioner

    “1. whether the court granted a stay or evidence exists that one may be granted if a proceeding is instituted; 2. proximity of the court’s trial date to the Board’s projected statutory deadline for a final written decision; 3. investment in the parallel proceeding by the court and the parties; 4. overlap between issues raised in the petition and in the parallel proceeding; 5. whether the petitioner and the defendant in the parallel proceeding are the same party; and 6. other circumstances that impact the Board’s exercise of discretion, including the merits. Apple Inc. v. Fintiv, Inc., IPR2020-00019, Paper 11 at 5–6 (PTAB Mar. 20, 2020) (precedential) (“Fintiv”). In evaluating these factors, we “take[] a holistic view of whether efficiency and integrity of the system are best served by denying or instituting review.” Id. at 6. With these factors and guidance in mind, we consider parties’ contentions.5 1.” slip op. at 6

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

    “information presented in the petition . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). “When instituting inter partes review, the Board will authorize the review to proceed on all of the challenged claims and on all grounds of unpatentability asserted for each claim.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.108(a). Having considered the arguments and evidence presented by Petitioner and Patent Owner, we determine that Petitioner has demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on at least one of the challenged claims of the ’752 patent. We exercise our discretion to institute inter partes review and, as required, we do so as to all the challenged claims of the ’752 patent on all the grounds of unpatentability set forth in the Petition.” slip op. at 2

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Patent Owner does not contest Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill. See generally Prelim. Resp. For purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill, which is supported by Dr. Sarhan’s testimony, except that we find that the phrase “at least” in Petitioner’s proposed definition creates a vague, open-ended upper bound for the level of ordinary skill, and we therefore do not adopt that aspect of the proposal.” slip op. at 13

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “ordinary and customary meaning as would have been understood by a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention and in the context of the entire patent disclosure. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1312–13. “In determining the meaning of the disputed claim limitation, we look principally to the intrinsic evidence of record, examining the claim language itself, the written description, and the prosecution history, if in evidence.” DePuy Spine, Inc. v. Medtronic Sofamor Danek, Inc., 469 F.3d 1005, 1014 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (citing Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1312–17). Only claim terms in controversy require express construction, “and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.” Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017); see also Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (“[O]nly those terms need resolve the controversy.”). Having reviewed the parties’ arguments, we determine no terms require express construction to resolve the disputes at this stage of the proceeding.8 A final determination as to claim construction will be made at the close of the proceeding, after any hearing, based on all the evidence of record. The parties are expected to assert all their claim construction arguments and evidence in the Petition, Patent Owner’s Response, Petitioner’s Reply, Patent Owner’s Sur-reply, or otherwise during trial, as permitted by our rules.” slip op. at 13

  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 8,928,752
• Motorola Solutions, Inc. v. Stellar, LLCInstituted
  PTAB · Mar 18, 2025 · IPR2024-01284 · APJ Nabeel U Khan · IPR · Institution

  The Board instituted inter partes review of claims 1–19 on all asserted grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that at least one challenged claim is unpatentable.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

    “An inter partes review may not be instituted “unless . . . the information presented in the petition . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). Per Board practice, if the Board institutes trial, it will institute “on all of the challenged claims and on all grounds of unpatentability asserted for each claim.” See 37 C.F.R. § 42.108(a). Having considered the arguments and evidence presented by Petitioner and Patent Owner, we determine that Petitioner has demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on at least one of the challenged claims of the ’540 patent. We exercise our discretion to institute inter partes review and, as required, we do so as to all the challenged claims of the ’540 patent on all the grounds of unpatentability set forth in the Petition.” slip op. at 2

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Denied

    “issued an order temporarily staying all deadlines and hearings scheduled in the matter.6 Ex. 1058, 1–2. The District Court’s order notes that Patent Owner asserts 8 patents in the litigation, that IPRs have been instituted on 4 of those patents covering 10 of the 14 claims asserted in the litigation, and that further consideration of a stay will depend upon whether IPRs are instituted on patents including the 4 remaining claims. Id. at 1, 3. The District Court also ordered the parties to update their positions on a stay within one week of a decision on institution. It is unclear if, and when, a new trial date would be set. In light of this stay, we determine that this factor weighs strongly against discretionary denial. 2.” slip op. at 9

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “or undergraduate training in an equivalent field and at least two years of relevant experience in electronics technology.” Ex. 1051 ¶ 30. Dr. Sarhan further opines that “[a]dditional graduate education could substitute for professional experience, and significant work experience could substitute for formal education.” Id. Patent Owner does not contest Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill. See generally Prelim. Resp. For purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill, which is supported by Dr. Sarhan’s testimony, except that we find that the phrase “at least” in Petitioner’s proposed definition creates a vague, open-ended upper bound for the level of ordinary skill, and we therefore do not adopt that aspect of the proposal.” slip op. at 15

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached

    “Having reviewed the parties’ arguments we determine, as explained further below in our analysis of claim 1 (§ III.D.4.a), that an express construction of the term “file” is not necessary at this stage of the proceeding. A final determination as to claim construction will be made at the close of the proceeding, after any hearing, based on all the evidence of record. The parties are expected to assert all their claim construction arguments and evidence in the Petition, Patent Owner’s Response, Petitioner’s Reply, Patent Owner’s Sur-reply, or otherwise during trial, as permitted by our rules.” slip op. at 17

  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 8,310,540
• Motorola Solutions, Inc. v. Stellar, LLCInstituted
  PTAB · Mar 18, 2025 · IPR2024-01314 · APJ Brian J Mcnamara · IPR · Institution

  The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–20 and all asserted grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that Motorola would prevail on at least one obviousness challenge.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Decided for petitioner

    “February 24, 2025, the District Court ordered all deadlines and hearings stayed pending further order of the court. See Ex. 1066. The District Court’s order notes that Patent Owner asserts 8 patents in the litigation, that IPRs have been instituted on 4 of those patents covering 10 of the 14 claims asserted in the litigation, and that further consideration of a stay will depend upon whether IPRs are instituted on patents including the 4 remaining claims. Id. at 1, 3. The District Court also ordered the parties to update their positions on a stay within one week of a decision on institution. It is unclear if, and when, a new trial date would be set. Thus, factors 1 and 2 weigh against exercising discretion to deny institution. The subject matter of the challenged claims is closely related to the subject matter of the claims of the patents in the previously instituted IPRs and the remaining pending petitions, as evidenced by the overlap of the asserted references and arguments advanced in these cases. As detailed in the substantive sections of this Decision, the Petition meets the standard for institution, i.e., there is a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the Petition. Under Fintiv factor 6, these circumstances weigh against exercising discretion to deny institution. In view of these circumstances, we determine that factors 1, 2, and 6 strongly weigh against exercising discretion to deny institution.” slip op. at 5

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “ordinarily skilled artisan”) as having at least a Bachelor’s Degree in electrical engineering, computer science, or computer engineering, or undergraduate training in an equivalent field and at least two years of relevant experience in electronics technology. Pet. 7 (citing Ex. 1062, Sarhan Decl. ¶¶ 26–30). Petitioner adds that additional graduate education could substitute for professional experience, and significant work experience could substitute for formal education. Id. Patent Owner does not comment specifically on the level of ordinary skill in the art. The level of ordinary skill in the art usually is evidenced by the references themselves. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001); In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995); In re Oelrich, 579 F.2d 86, 91 (CCPA 1978). As Petitioner’s description of an 4U.S. Patent Publication No. 2004/0008255 A1 (Ex. 1019) 5 U.S. Patent Publication No. 2002/0191952 A1 (Ex. 1009) 6 U.S. Patent 5,982,418 (Ex. 1020) 7 Another Declaration of Dr. Sarhan has also been made of record in this proceeding. See Ex. 1003. This Decision distinguishes references to the Sarhan Declarations by Exhibit number. ’910 patent and the references, we apply it for purposes of this Decision. slip op. at 11

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached

    “A. A computer processor configured to Petitioner notes that in the parallel litigation Patent Owner contends that this term is not a means plus function limitation. Pet. 9. Petitioner states that for purposes of the petition it has applied means plus function and non-means plus function interpretations to this limitation. Id. For purposes of this Decision, we need not construe this claim limitation. B. File In this proceeding, Petitioner does not propose a construction of the term “file.” See Pet. 9. Patent Owner does not propose a construction of “file” but, nonetheless, states that “Petitioner’s vague and unduly broad definition of ‘file’ is not only contradicted by the prosecution history, but also the extrinsic evidence it relies upon.” Prelim. Resp. 5 (citing Pet. 10– 12). Patent Owner reserves the right to present claim constructions arguments if trial is instituted. Id. at 6. For purposes of this Decision, we address the meaning of “file” in the context of the parties’ substantive arguments and do not articulate a specific construction. A final determination as to claim construction will be made at the close of the proceeding, after any hearing, based on all the evidence of record. The parties are expected to assert all their claim construction arguments and evidence in the Petition, Patent Owner’s Response, Petitioner’s Reply, Patent Owner’s Sur-reply, or otherwise during trial, as permitted by our rules.” slip op. at 13

  • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Instituted

    “c) Claim 1 Analysis Petitioner has demonstrated that, contrary to Patent Owner’s arguments, Yerazunis discloses write protecting a segment of the buffer. Yerazunis explicitly states that “[upon] a firing event, specified frame data associated with that firing event both before and after the event is preserved and cannot be overwritten as a result of further use of the gun or subsequent of memory to a second portion of memory to avoid overwriting the data in the first portion of memory upon the occurrence of a second trigger event is an effective approach to designating the first portion of memory as write protected. As Petitioner points out, an ordinarily skilled artisan would have understood from Yerazunis that retrieving video data for gun firing events necessitates the ability to locate the relevant video data within the buffer and that using pointers in a table to index the data allows for its later retrieval. Pet. 25 (citing Ex. 1062, Sarhan Decl. ¶ 372). We find unavailing Patent Owner’s argument that Yerazunis’ disclosure of a purge button to erase the contents of the circular buffer is further evidence that that entire buffer contents is protected and unprotected as a whole. Prelim. Resp. 30 (citing Ex. 1017, 9:47–51). It is unclear how providing an “optional” purge feature that erases the contents of the circular buffer and captured still images a “user does not desire to retain” supports Patent Owner’s argument that Yerazunis does not disclose write protecting segments of the buffer associated with a trigger event. Ex. 1017, 9:49–53. Inclusion of this feature further supports Petitioner’s argument, as the segments of a circular buffer associated with an event are not overwritten, unless the user invokes the purge feature to erase the contents of the circular buffer. Also unavailing is Patent Owner’s argument that video data preservation in Yerazunis “is a step that occurs after, not as part of, the step of ‘continu[ing] to record for a brief interval.’” See Prelim. Resp. 30–31. Claim 1 is an apparatus claim and does not recite “continuing to record for a brief interval.” See Ex. 1060, 12:19–47 (claim 1). Claim 1 recites “a computer processor configured to . . . continuing to record the sensor data in designated for saving.” Ex. 1060, 12:22, 34–36. Yerazunis discloses that upon detection of a trigger event a predetermined number of frames, e.g., 2 frames, are stored in successive frame locations within the circular buffer. Ex. 1017, 8:26–32; 12:14–28. Yerazunis further discloses that “any desired percentage of frames may be captured prior to or after the trigger event by specifying how many frames are to be captured and stored after the trigger event.” Id. at 8:39–42.” slip op. at 21

  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 10,965,910
• Tennant Company v. Oxygenator Water Technologies, Inc.No claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Feb 28, 2025 · IPR2021-00625 · APJ Kristina M Kalan · IPR · Remand

  Claims 13, 14, and 17–27 were not shown unpatentable because Tennant did not establish that Wikey or Davies inherently disclosed the claimed microbubbles and nanobubbles.

  RulingsRemand decision

  • RemandOther

    “The Federal Circuit vacated and remanded our anticipation determinations as to claims 13, 14, and 17–27. Tennant, 11.1 The Federal Circuit further stated: “Because we vacate and remand to the Board to consider Tennant’s anticipation argument, we do not reach Tennant’s obviousness arguments (which depends on its contention that either Wikey or Davies produce nanobubbles).” Id. at 11. On September 19, 2024, we authorized the parties to file supplemental briefing, stating also that the “parties are not authorized to present new factual assertions, provide additional exhibits, or raise new arguments beyond those directed to the issues raised in the remand.” Ex. 3001. Pursuant to this authorization, Petitioner filed an Opening Brief on Remand (Paper 61; “Pet. Br. Rem.”) in support of its contentions. Patent Owner filed a Lead Brief on Remand (Paper 62; “PO Br. Rem.”) in support of its contentions. Petitioner filed a Reply Brief on Remand (Paper 66; “Pet. Reply Br. Rem.”). Patent Owner filed a Responsive Brief on Remand (Paper 65; “PO Resp. Br. Rem.”).” slip op. at 3

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element) › Inherent disclosureInherency not foundNot shown unpatentable

    “Accordingly, and in line with our previous determination that “Wikey appears to disclose each limitation of claim 13 except ‘microbubbles and nanobubbles having a bubble diameter of less than 50 microns’” (Final Dec. 20), we determine that Petitioner has not demonstrated that Wikey inherently discloses microbubbles or nanobubbles. Accordingly, Petitioner has not demonstrated that Wikey discloses every limitation of claim 13.” slip op. at 56

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot reached

    “The Federal Circuit vacated and remanded our anticipation determinations as to claims 13, 14, and 17–27. Tennant, 11.1 The Federal Circuit further stated: “Because we vacate and remand to the Board to consider Tennant’s anticipation argument, we do not reach Tennant’s obviousness arguments (which depends on its contention that either Wikey or Davies produce nanobubbles).” Id. at 11.” slip op. at 3

  Patent outcomesUS RE45,415 not shown unpatentable
  § 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
• Google LLC v. 138 East LCD Advancements LimitedInstituted
  PTAB · Jan 10, 2025 · IPR2024-00956 · APJ Brian P Murphy · IPR · Institution

  The Board instituted IPR of claims 1–12 on all asserted grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that Yano and Terashita render claims 1–12 obvious.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

    “We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 314, which provides that an inter partes review may not be instituted “unless . . . there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” Under § 314, the Board may not institute review on fewer than all claims challenged in the petition. SAS Inst., Inc. v. Iancu, 138 S. Ct. 1348, 1359– 60 (2018). If the Board institutes a review, it will institute “on all of the challenged claims and on all grounds of unpatentability asserted for each claim.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.108(a). Upon consideration of the Petition, the Preliminary Response, and the evidence of record at this stage of the proceeding, for the reasons set forth below, we determine Petitioner has demonstrated a reasonable likelihood it would prevail in showing the unpatentability of at least one challenged claim in the ’574 patent. Accordingly, we institute inter partes review of claims 1–12 of the ’574 patent.” slip op. at 2

  • Skill levelSkill level board ownOther

    “considered, including the “type of problems encountered in the art; prior art solutions to those problems; rapidity with which innovations are made; sophistication of the technology; and educational level of active workers in the field.” In re GPAC, Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (citing Custom Accessories, Inc. v. Jeffrey-Allan Indus., Inc., 807 F.2d 955, 962 (Fed. Cir. 1986)). “These factors are not exhaustive but are merely a guide to determining the level of ordinary skill in the art.” Daiichi Sankyo Co. v. Apotex, Inc., 501 F.3d 1254, 1256 (Fed. Cir. 2007). There is uncontested evidence in the record before us that reflects the knowledge and experience of a POSITA. We determine that no express finding is necessary, on the present record, and that the level of ordinary skill in the art is reflected by the prior art of record. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001); In re GPAC, 57 F.3d at 1579; In re Oelrich, 579 F.2d 86, 91 (CCPA 1978).” slip op. at 14

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “B. Claim Construction For purposes of this proceeding, Petitioner and Patent Owner both advocate for the “plain and ordinary meaning” of the claim terms without further analysis. Pet. 19; Prelim. Resp. 15–16. On the present record, we determine that no explicit construction of claim terms is necessary to determine whether to institute an inter partes review in this case. See, e.g., Wellman, Inc. v. Eastman Chem. Co., 642 F.3d 1355, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (“[C]laim terms need only be construed ‘to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’”) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)).” slip op. at 14

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundInstituted

    “for generating a digital color image to be processed, but relies on Hibi to fill the gap. Id. (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 114). A determination of obviousness, however, requires more than a mere showing that the prior art includes separate references covering each separate limitation in a claim under examination. Unigene Labs., Inc. v. Apotex, Inc., 655 F.3d 1352, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2011). “Often, it will be necessary for a court to look to interrelated teachings of multiple patents . . . and the background knowledge possessed by a person having ordinary skill in the art, all in order to determine whether there was an apparent reason to combine the known elements in the fashion claimed by the patent at issue.” KSR, 550 U.S. at 418. A party who petitions the Board for a determination of obviousness must show that “a skilled artisan would have been motivated to combine the teachings of the prior art references to achieve the claimed invention, and that the skilled artisan would have had a reasonable expectation of success in doing so.” Procter & Gamble Co. v. Teva Pharms. USA, Inc., 566 F.3d 989, 994 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (quoting Pfizer, Inc. v. Apotex, Inc., 480 F.3d 1348, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2007)). We assess Petitioner’s evidence and argument according to the above-referenced standard. Hibi discloses the use of a programmable personal computer to process an image “taken with a digital camera.” Pet. 23–24 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 114; Ex. 1006 ¶¶ 14, 47–48). Hibi’s apparatus and method includes a recognition unit that recognizes “people and faces” in the image by applying “known techniques, such as detecting skin color areas and facial structures.” Id. at 24 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 115; Ex. 1006 ¶ 15). The Petition also relies on Mr. Parulski’s Declaration testimony that a POSITA would have been motivated to apply Luo-250’s image processing method to an image generated by a digital camera, as disclosed in Hibi, “because such images were ubiquitous at the time, and applying Luo-250’s image processing would have improved the image enhancement ‘depending on detecting different objects or subject matters contained within the image.’” Id. at 24 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 116; Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 16–17). The Petition further argues that a POSITA would have had a reasonable expectation of success in applying Luo-250’s belief map image processing technique to an image generated by a digital camera as disclosed in Hibi. Id. at 25 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 118). Petitioner cites to Terashita as evidence that such a combination “would have required applying only conventional techniques for transferring image data from a digital camera to a personal computer (e.g., using a memory card) that were well within the skill of a POSITA.” Id. (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 118; Ex. 1007 ¶¶ 4, 38–39).” slip op. at 21

  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 8,355,574
• Google LLC v. 138 East LCD Advancements LimitedInstitution denied
  PTAB · Jan 8, 2025 · IPR2024-00955 · APJ Brian P Murphy · IPR · Institution

  The Board denied institution because Petitioner did not show a reasonable likelihood of proving any of claims 1–33 unpatentable on the asserted obviousness grounds.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied

    “1. Legal Standards “In an [inter partes review], the petitioner has the burden from the onset to show with particularity why the patent it challenges is unpatentable.” Harmonic Inc. v. Avid Tech., Inc., 815 F.3d 1356, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (citing 35 U.S.C. § 312(a)(3) (requiring inter partes review petitions to identify “with particularity . . . the evidence that supports the grounds for the challenge to each claim”)). This burden of persuasion never shifts to the patent owner. See Dynamic Drinkware, LLC v. Nat’l Graphics, Inc., 800 F.3d 1375, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2015). A patent claim is unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103 if the differences between the claimed subject matter and the prior art are such that the subject matter, as a whole, would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains. KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 406 (2007) (hereafter cited as “KSR”). The question of obviousness is resolved on the basis of underlying factual determinations including: (1) the scope and content of the prior art; (2) any differences between the claimed subject matter and the prior art; (3) the level of ordinary skill in the art; and (4) objective evidence of nonobviousness, if made available in the record, which has not happened here. See Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17–18 (1966).” slip op. at 17

  • BurdenDecided for patent owner

    “To be sure, the pixel belief values used in the Luo-250 device are based on color. The Luo-250 device determines pixel probabilities “by assigning to each pixel a belief value as belonging to the subject matter region based on color and texture features.” Id. ¶ 42. However, using probability values or binary 1s and 0s to map the probability or “belief” that a pixel or area of pixels in an image either is, or is not, a subject matter target, is not the same as designating “certain pixels as certain colors” as asserted by Petitioner. Thus, we are not persuaded that the Petition has adequately supported or explained how the Luo-250 device designates “certain pixels as certain colors.” We also are not persuaded the Petition has established that Luo-250 discloses, teaches, or suggests a device or method that “determines the color range exhibited by the pixel data groups” as recited in Limitation 1[b]. Pet. 17–18 (citing Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 34–39). First, as indicated above, we are not persuaded the Petition has established that Luo-250 “designates certain pixels as certain colors,” which is foundational to Petitioner’s argument that the Luo-250 method determines a “color range exhibited by the pixel data groups.” Second, the evidence cited by Petitioner when attempting to map the quoted claim language regarding “color range” to Luo-250, refers to the designation of individual pixels as “either skin-tone or non skin-tone” in a binary belief map, not a range of colors. Id. at 18 (citing Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 35–39). Petitioner’s argument—that “[b]y analyzing the pixels to designate each as ‘either skin-tone or non skin-tone,’ Luo-250’s device determines ‘[r]egions of skin-tone colored pixels’ in the image” (id.)—is not persuasive evidence of “determin[ing] a color range exhibited by the pixel data groups” as recited in Limitation 1[b]. The Petition does not adequately explain how Luo-250 discloses, teaches, suggests, or otherwise renders obvious the determination of color ranges for pixel data groups in an image. We are further persuaded by Patent Owner’s argument and evidence that the Petition has not adequately explained how the Luo-250 device would “determine[] a color range” based on a determination of probability values for each pixel, rather than a range of colors. Prelim. Resp. 26–27 (citing Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 32, 34, 36, and 38). Dr. Papanikolopoulos’s Declaration testimony further supports Patent Owner’s position. Ex. 2001 ¶¶ 78–81. Dr. Papanikolopoulos testifies, in particular, that Mr. Parulski asserts only “that Luo-250 considers the color of individual pixels. He does not assert that Luo-250 anywhere ‘analyzes the image data . . . and determines the color range, as claimed.’” Id. ¶ 80. We agree.” slip op. at 22

  • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “To be sure, the pixel belief values used in the Luo-250 device are based on color. The Luo-250 device determines pixel probabilities “by assigning to each pixel a belief value as belonging to the subject matter region based on color and texture features.” Id. ¶ 42. However, using probability values or binary 1s and 0s to map the probability or “belief” that a pixel or area of pixels in an image either is, or is not, a subject matter target, is not the same as designating “certain pixels as certain colors” as asserted by Petitioner. Thus, we are not persuaded that the Petition has adequately supported or explained how the Luo-250 device designates “certain pixels as certain colors.” We also are not persuaded the Petition has established that Luo-250 discloses, teaches, or suggests a device or method that “determines the color range exhibited by the pixel data groups” as recited in Limitation 1[b]. Pet. 17–18 (citing Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 34–39). First, as indicated above, we are not persuaded the Petition has established that Luo-250 “designates certain pixels as certain colors,” which is foundational to Petitioner’s argument that the Luo-250 method determines a “color range exhibited by the pixel data groups.” Second, the evidence cited by Petitioner when attempting to map the quoted claim language regarding “color range” to Luo-250, refers to the designation of individual pixels as “either skin-tone or non skin-tone” in a binary belief map, not a range of colors. Id. at 18 (citing Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 35–39). Petitioner’s argument—that “[b]y analyzing the pixels to designate each as ‘either skin-tone or non skin-tone,’ Luo-250’s device determines ‘[r]egions of skin-tone colored pixels’ in the image” (id.)—is not persuasive evidence of “determin[ing] a color range exhibited by the pixel data groups” as recited in Limitation 1[b]. The Petition does not adequately explain how Luo-250 discloses, teaches, suggests, or otherwise renders obvious the determination of color ranges for pixel data groups in an image. We are further persuaded by Patent Owner’s argument and evidence that the Petition has not adequately explained how the Luo-250 device would “determine[] a color range” based on a determination of probability values for each pixel, rather than a range of colors. Prelim. Resp. 26–27 (citing Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 32, 34, 36, and 38). Dr. Papanikolopoulos’s Declaration testimony further supports Patent Owner’s position. Ex. 2001 ¶¶ 78–81. Dr. Papanikolopoulos testifies, in particular, that Mr. Parulski asserts only “that Luo-250 considers the color of individual pixels. He does not assert that Luo-250 anywhere ‘analyzes the image data . . . and determines the color range, as claimed.’” Id. ¶ 80. We agree.” slip op. at 22

  • Skill levelSkill level board ownOther

    “In determining the level of ordinary skill in the art, various factors may be considered, including the “type of problems encountered in the art; prior art solutions to those problems; rapidity with which innovations are made; sophistication of the technology; and educational level of active workers in the field.” In re GPAC, Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (citing Custom Accessories, Inc. v. Jeffrey-Allan Indus., Inc., 807 F.2d 955, 962 (Fed. Cir. 1986)). “These factors are not exhaustive but are merely a guide to determining the level of ordinary skill in the art.” Daiichi Sankyo Co. v. Apotex, Inc., 501 F.3d 1254, 1256 (Fed. Cir. 2007). There is uncontested evidence in the record before us that reflects the knowledge and experience of a POSITA. We determine that no express finding is necessary, on the present record, and that the level of ordinary skill in the art is reflected by the prior art of record. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001); In re GPAC, 57 F.3d at 1579; In re Oelrich, 579 F.2d 86, 91 (CCPA 1978).” slip op. at 15

  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 7,668,365
• ROKU, Inc. v. Videolabs, Inc.Instituted
  PTAB · Dec 9, 2024 · IPR2024-01025 · APJ Karl D Easthom · IPR · Institution

  The Board instituted IPR on claims 100–109 and 111 on all petitioned grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood of success on anticipation by Russ and obviousness over Russ with Robert or Eskicioglu.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

    “partes review may not be instituted “unless . . . there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” Under § 314, the Board may not institute review on fewer than all claims challenged in the petition. SAS Inst., Inc. v. Iancu, 138 S. Ct. 1348, 1359–60 (2018). If the Board institutes a review, it will institute “on all of the challenged claims and on all grounds of unpatentability asserted for each claim.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.108(a). Upon consideration of the Petition, the Preliminary Response, Reply, Sur-Reply, and the evidence of record, for the reasons set forth below, we conclude Petitioner has demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of prevailing with respect to at least one challenged claim in the ’236 patent. Accordingly, we institute an inter partes review of claims 100–109 and 111 on all grounds set forth in the Petition. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.108(a).1” slip op. at 2

  • Parallel petitionsDecided for petitioner

    “1 Petitioner filed a Notice Ranking Petitions and Explaining Material Differences. Paper 3. Petitioner states that it filed three parallel IPR petitions challenging three different claim sets of the ’236 patent “solely for word count purposes that preclude all claims from being challenged in [a] single petition,” “there is no duplicative overlap of the same claims across petitions,” and there is a “need to set” slip op. at 2

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “someone having “a bachelor’s degree in computer science, electrical engineering, or a related field, and approximately two or more years of experience in multi-media content distribution and management. Additional education could substitute for professional experience, and vice versa.” Pet. 13. Patent Owner applies Petitioner’s proposed definition for purposes of its Preliminary Response. Prelim. Resp. 5 (citing Malek Dec. Ex. 2001 ¶ 38).7” slip op. at 7

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached

    “on claim construction and disregard everything else.8 The parties direct our attention in particular to the proper construction of an “independent” second root of trust in context of the recited claim limitation: “a second authentication process which is independent of the first authentication process and wherein the second authentication process uses a second root of trust which is independent of and different than the first root of trust.” We refer to this disputed claim limitation hereafter as the “independent authentication” limitation.” slip op. at 9

  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips
  Patents in suitUS 8,291,236
• ROKU, Inc. v. Videolabs, Inc.Instituted
  PTAB · Dec 9, 2024 · IPR2024-01026 · APJ Brian P Murphy · IPR · Institution

  The Board instituted IPR of claims 5–8 and 16–19 on all petition grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood of success on at least one challenged claim.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

    “partes review may not be instituted “unless . . . there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” Under § 314, the Board may not institute review on fewer than all claims challenged in the petition. SAS Inst., Inc. v. Iancu, 138 S. Ct. 1348, 1359– 60 (2018). If the Board institutes a review, it will institute “on all of the challenged claims and on all grounds of unpatentability asserted for each claim.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.108(a). Upon consideration of the Petition, the Preliminary Response, Reply, Sur-Reply, and the evidence of record, for the reasons set forth below, we conclude Petitioner has demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of prevailing with respect to at least one challenged claim in the ’304 patent. Accordingly, we institute an inter partes review of claims 5–8 and 16–19 of the ’304 patent on all grounds set forth in the Petition. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.108(a).” slip op. at 2

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “On the present record, we determine that no explicit construction of claim terms is necessary to determine whether to institute an inter partes review in this case. See, e.g., Wellman, Inc. v. Eastman Chem. Co., 642 F.3d 1355, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (“[C]laim terms need only be construed ‘to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’”) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). The parties are ordered to propose and support a specific plain meaning or other construction of the “independent authentication” limitation in their briefs, with reference to the following claim language: 5[a] receiving, at a second conditional access client of the second conditional access server, an authentication through a second authentication process which is independent of the first authentication process and wherein the second authentication process uses the second root of trust for the second security domain which is independent of and different than the first root of trust. The parties are ordered to analyze the relevant claim language, and cite to the specification and prosecution history in support of their claim construction where applicable. The parties are further ordered to address the question of whether an “independent” “second authentication process” and “second root of trust” requires a conditional access server that manages a secondary subscriber management system where a “client” of the conditional access server does not subscribe to the primary subscriber management system. See Ex. 1001, 8:3–38 (e.g., “authentication methods used by the secondary CA server in the secondary subscriber management system are independent from those used by the primary CA server”).” slip op. at 9

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedOther

    “considered, including the “type of problems encountered in the art; prior art solutions to those problems; rapidity with which innovations are made; sophistication of the technology; and educational level of active workers in the field.” In re GPAC, Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (citing Custom Accessories, Inc. v. Jeffrey-Allan Indus., Inc., 807 F.2d 955, 962 (Fed. Cir. 1986)). “These factors are not exhaustive but are merely a guide to determining the level of ordinary skill in the art.” Daiichi Sankyo Co. v. Apotex, Inc., 501 F.3d 1254, 1256 (Fed. Cir. 2007). There is uncontested evidence in the record before us that reflects the knowledge and experience of a POSA. We adopt Petitioner’s proposal for purposes of institution, which the prior art of record supports. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001); In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995); In re Oelrich, 579” slip op. at 7

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Instituted

    “Anticipation under 35 U.S.C. § 102 requires “the presence in a single prior art disclosure of all elements of a claimed invention arranged as in the claim.” Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 593 F.3d 1325, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2010); Net MoneyIN, Inc. v. VeriSign, Inc., 545 F.3d 1359, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2008). To anticipate a patent claim under 35 U.S.C. § 102, “a reference must describe, either expressly or inherently, each and every claim limitation and enable one of skill in the art to practice an embodiment of the claimed invention without undue experimentation.” American Calcar, Inc. v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 651 F.3d 1318, 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (citing In re Gleave, 560 F.3d 1331, 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2009)). “[E]xtrinsic evidence may be considered when it is used to explain, but not expand, the meaning of a reference.” In re Baxter Travenol Labs., 952 F.2d 388, 390 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (citing Scripps Clinic & Research Foundation v. Genentech, Inc., 927 F.2d 1565, 1576–77 (Fed. Cir. 1991)). We conclude that, at this stage of the proceeding and based on the present record, Petitioner has provided sufficient evidence and argument to establish a reasonable likelihood that Russ anticipates the challenged claims of the ’304 patent.” slip op. at 11

  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips
  Patents in suitUS 8,667,304

Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.