- PTAB · Apr 25, 2025 · IPR2025-00015 · APJ Zhenyu Yang · IPR · Institution
Instituted IPR of claims 1–3 and 5–22 on all asserted grounds; Meyer anticipation of claim 1 met the reasonable-likelihood threshold.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsDecided for petitioner
“the ’785 application. See generally Ex. 1016. Also, the Examiner did not issue any anticipation rejection during prosecution of the ’785 application. Id. Instead, the Examiner rejected claims as obvious over Jones 2005 in combination with other prior art. Id. at 190–96. The Examiner specifically acknowledged that Jones 2005 “does not teach massively parallel sequencing as required by” the claim that issued as independent claim 1. Id. at 192. Thus, contrary to Patent Owner’s assertion, Jones 2005 could not have “disclosed the same elements that Petitioner claims Meyer discloses.” See Prelim. Resp. 40. As a result, Petitioner’s anticipation challenge based on Meyer is not the same or substantially the same as the Examiner’s obviousness rejections based on Jones 2005.” slip op. at 10
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“On this record and for purposes of institution, we find Petitioner has shown sufficiently that Meyer discloses enrichment of the 3′ end fragments, which include the broken chain T primer sequence.” slip op. at 29
- Skill levelSkill level patent owner adoptedDecided for patent owner
“We do not see a material difference in the parties’ proposed levels of education and work experience. Indeed, although Petitioner asserts that a POSA “would have a PhD or equivalent training,” it allows more work experience to compensate for less education. Pet. 25 (stating that a POSA could have “commensurately less education and more work experience”). We, nevertheless, adopt Patent Owner’s proposal in this aspect because it specifies the years of experience needed. Patent Owner also disputes Petitioner’s proposal that a POSA would have had experience with “implementing and designing library preparation methods 454 and Illumina, the leading NGS platforms in 2012.” Id. at 16 (quoting Pet. 25, emphasis added by Patent Owner removed). According to Patent Owner, “[t]his level of skill inappropriately requires the POSA to be an inventor of library preparation methods.” Id. On this record, we agree with Patent Owner that “experience with implementing and designing library preparation methods 454 and Illumina” is above ordinary skill. We, however, find insufficient Patent Owner’s proposal that “the POSA would have had experience with DNA sequencing methods.” Id. (citing Ex. 2021 ¶¶ 65–68). As Patent Owner recognizes, the challenged claims relate to sequencing methods using a next-generation sequencing (“NGS”) platform. See id. at 13; see also Ex. 1001, 35:56–57 (claim 1 reciting “sequencing the enriched nucleic acid sequence of interest on a massively parallel sequencing platform”). Also, as Patent Owner recognizes, [c]ompared to traditional, Pre-NGS sequencing methods, NGS sequencing utilized a new design that no longer relied upon disassembling and then piecing together a single original template DNA strand. Instead, NGS sequencing now allowed for hundreds of thousands of original template strands to be sequenced in the same reaction. With NGS, a user could perform massively parallel sequencing, allowing for elements of the genome to be sequenced in a fast, scalable manner. Prelim. Resp. 4. As such, we disagree with Patent Owner that a POSA only need to “have had experience with DNA sequencing methods” (id. at 16) because an artisan with experience with only pre-NGS sequencing methods would not qualify as a POSA. Instead, for purposes of this Decision, we find a POSA would have” slip op. at 13
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner proposes that we construe the terms “sequence of interest” and “barcode.” Pet. 26–27. According to Petitioner, the ’012 patent defines “sequence of interest,” which is used interchangeably with terms “target nucleic acid sequence” and “target sequence,” as “a polynucleotide sequence of interest, for which enrichment is desired.” Id. at 26 (citing Ex. 1001, 21:1–3, 21:6–9). Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s proposed construction of this term.8 See Prelim. Resp. 17. On this record, we adopt Petitioner’s proposed construction of the term “sequence of interest.”” slip op. at 15
Claim construction§ 102 anticipationDiscretionary denialcites PhillipsPatents in suitUS 10,036,012 - PTAB · Apr 21, 2025 · IPR2024-01506 · APJ Georgianna W Braden · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR of claims 1–16 on all asserted challenges, finding a reasonable likelihood that Kivioja anticipates at least one challenged claim.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsDenied
“framework set forth under Advanced Bionics, LLC v. Med-El Electromedizinische Geräte GmbH, IPR2019-01469, Paper 6 at 7 (PTAB Feb. 13, 2020) (precedential) (“Advanced Bionics” or “AB”). Under the first prong of that framework, we must determine whether the same or substantially the same art or arguments previously were presented to the Office. If so, we turn to the second prong which focuses on whether the petitioner has demonstrated that the Office erred in a manner material to the patentability of the challenged claims. Id. at 8. a. Advanced Bionics Prong One: whether “the same or substantially the same art or arguments previously were presented to the Office” In evaluating whether the same or substantially the same prior art or arguments were previously presented to the Office, the Board has identified several non-exclusive factors for consideration. Becton, Dickinson & Co. v. B. Braun Melsungen AG, Case IPR2017-01586, Paper 8 at 17–18 (PTAB Dec. 15, 2017) (Paper 8) (precedential § III.C.5, first para.) (“the Becton Dickinson factors”). Specifically, we must weigh the following non-exclusive factors: (a) the similarities and material differences between the asserted art and the prior art involved during examination; (b) the cumulative nature of the asserted art and the prior art evaluated during examination; (c) the extent to which the asserted art was evaluated during examination, the overlap between the arguments made during examination and the manner in which Petitioner relies on the prior art or Patent Owner distinguishes the prior art; (e) whether Petitioner has pointed out sufficiently how the Examiner erred in its evaluation of the asserted prior art; and (f) the extent to which additional evidence and facts presented in the Petition warrant reconsideration of prior art or arguments. Becton Dickinson, at 17–18. Thus, the Becton Dickinson factors are framed as comparing the art or arguments in a petition against what was before an examiner during prosecution.” slip op. at 9
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“Construction is needed only for those terms “that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.” See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). Although Petitioner provides us with constructions for “appended,” “identifier site” and “indexing site,” the meaning of these terms are not in controversy at this stage of the proceeding and their constructions will not aid in our analysis. We acknowledge, the ’241 patent. See Ex. 1005, 4:37–40, 4:45, 4:51–53.” slip op. at 13
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITAPlain and ordinary meaningOther
“2. “identifying sequence reads with identical identifier and target sequences as duplicates” The parties do not request construction of the limitation, “identifying sequence reads with identical identifier and target sequences as duplicates.” Nonetheless, we invite the parties to address the construction of this limitation after institution. See Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (claims are construed only to the extent necessary to resolve a dispute). Specifically, the parties may wish to address whether the “same identifier and nucleic acid fragment” means that the sequences actually are identical. The ’241 patent states: “A duplicate sequencing read can be a sequencing read with the same identifier site and target sequence as another sequencing read in the population of sequencing reads.” Ex. 1003, 4:10–13. Yet, the claim does not use the exact wording used in the Specification.4 The ’241 patent goes on to disclose “apparent duplicates” and “true” slip op. at 14
- Skill levelSkill level patent owner adoptedDecided for patent owner
“We do not see a material difference in the parties’ proposed levels of education and work experience. Indeed, although Petitioner asserts that a POSA “would have a PhD or equivalent training,” it allows more work experience to compensate for less education. Pet. 20 (stating that a POSA could have “commensurately less education and more work experience”). We, nevertheless, adopt Patent Owner’s proposal in this aspect because it specifies the years of experience needed. Patent Owner further disputes Petitioner’s proposal that a POSA would have had experience with “implementing and designing library preparation methods for Illumina, the leading NGS platforms in 2013.” Prelim. Resp. 7–8 (quoting Pet. 20, emphasis added by Patent Owner removed). According to Patent Owner, “[t]his level of skill inappropriately requires the POSA to be an inventor of library preparation methods.” Id. at 8. We agree with Patent Owner that “experience with implementing and designing library preparation methods for Illumina” is above ordinary skill. have had experience with DNA sequencing methods and a working knowledge of how these sequencing methods functioned.” Id. As Patent Owner recognizes, the challenged claims relate to obtaining amplicons with an amplified nucleic acid fragment and an appended adaptor and then sequencing the amplicon to generate sequence reads. See Ex. 1005, 25:33– 43. Accordingly, for purposes of this Decision, we find a person of ordinary skill in the art at the critical time would have had a Ph.D. in the field of chemistry, molecular biology, or biochemistry. Alternatively, a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had a B.S. or M.S. degree with three to five years of experience working in any of those fields. The person of ordinary skill in the art would have had experience with NGS sequencing methods and a working knowledge of how those methods functioned. This definition of a person of ordinary skill in the art is consistent with the skill level reflected in the disclosures of the ’241 patent and prior art. We further note that neither aspect of the dispute over the skill level affects our decision to institute review.” slip op. at 20
Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,725,241 - PTAB · Apr 10, 2025 · IPR2024-01431 · APJ Brian D Range · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted review of claims 2–6, 28, and 33–37 based on all petition grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that Haddad138 renders claims 2–6 and 33–37 obvious and Yap anticipates or renders claim 28 obvious.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Denied
“arguments, and evidence presented in the parallel proceeding.” Fintiv at 12 (emphasis added). Here, due to Petitioner’s stipulation, the record does not 9 To the extent Patent Owner’s argument emphasizes that the parties have completed substantial work regarding references asserted in the petition here (PO Fintiv Surreply 1–3), this argument addresses to Fintiv factor three rather than factor four. support that the Petition’s invalidity grounds have been or will be presented to the ITC for consideration on the merits. The record also does not support that the ITC will ever adjudicate the invalidity grounds raised here10 and does not support that the ITC will ever address the dependent claims at issue here. This is, therefore, not a situation where the ITC Investigation will “resolve key issues in the petition.” Fintiv at 13. Thus, this factor weighs against discretionary denial. 7. Fintiv Factor Five: Overlapping Parties Petitioner is the same party as the respondent in the ITC investigation,” slip op. at 15
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“Under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), an inter partes review may not be instituted unless the information presented in the petition “shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” The following findings of fact and conclusions of law are not final, but are made for the sole purpose 1 Petitioner calls “IPR2024-01431 (‘Petition B’).” See Paper 3 (PETITIONER’S EXPLANATION OF PARALLEL PETITIONS CHALLENGING U.S. PATENT NO. 11,069,737), 1. of determining whether Petitioner meets the threshold for instituting review. Any final decision shall be based on the full trial record, including any response timely filed by Patent Owner. Any arguments not raised by Patent Owner in a timely filed response may be forfeited. For the reasons stated below, we determine that Petitioner has established a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail with respect to at least one claim. We hereby institute an inter partes review as to claims 2–6, 28, and 33–37 of the ’737 patent based upon Petitioner’s asserted challenges to patentability.” slip op. at 2
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundInstituted
“Patent Owner argues11 that Petitioner “offers no motivation to modify Haddad138.” Prelim. Resp. 7–8. Patent Owner specifically argues that 11 Patent Owner also argues that Petitioner does not establish that Haddad138 anticipates claim 2. Prelim. Resp. 5–7. We do not address the anticipation challenge at this time. “Petitioner does not offer any showing on any motivation to modify Figure 9 of Haddad138 to change the configuration from a FSI to BSI architecture.” Id. at 8. On this record, Patent Owner’s argument does not undermine Petitioner’s persuasive showing. As Petitioner argues (Pet. 29), Haddad138 teaches that its “present disclosure” (which would include the Figure 9 disclosure) can be adapted for a front side illumination (FSI) or back side illumination (BSI) configuration. Ex. 1012 ¶ 48. The express teaching of Haddad138 provides motivation to modify Figure 9 of Haddad138. Patent Owner also argues that Petitioner “offers no showing that a POSITA would be able to modify the embodiment of Figure 9 to be back side illuminated with a reasonable expectation of success.” Prelim. Resp. 9. Patent Owner’s argument again does not undermine Petitioner’s persuasive showing. Petitioner cites Haddad138 expressly teaching a FSI or BSI configuration. Pet. 29 (citing Ex. 1012 ¶ 48). Haddad138’s teaching is sufficient, on this record, to establish a reasonable likelihood of Petitioner establishing a reasonable expectation of success at trial. Conclusion as to claim 2” slip op. at 23
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner asserts that a person of ordinary skill in the art (POSITA) would have had a Bachelor’s degree in engineering, physics, or a related or equivalent field, and two or more years of experience researching, developing, designing, and/or evaluating image sensors using photonics. Ex-1004 ¶50. A person with less or different education but more relevant practical experience, or vice versa, may also meet this standard. Ex-1004 ¶50. Pet. 9. Patent Owner does not dispute the level of ordinary skill in the art at this time. For purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s proposal as reasonable and consistent with the prior art. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (the prior art may reflect an appropriate level of skill in the art).” slip op. at 8
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,069,737 - PTAB · Mar 27, 2025 · IPR2025-00004 · APJ Georgianna W Braden · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–7, 9, 11–17, and 19, finding a reasonable likelihood of success on the asserted obviousness challenges.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“In an [inter partes review], the petitioner has the burden from the onset to show with particularity why the patent it challenges is unpatentable.” Harmonic Inc. v. Avid Tech., Inc., 815 F.3d 1356, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (citing 35 U.S.C. § 312(a)(3)); see also Intelligent Bio-Sys., 821 F.3d at 1369. This burden of persuasion never shifts to Patent Owner. See Dynamic Drinkware, LLC v. Nat’l Graphics, Inc., 800 F.3d 1375, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (discussing the burden of proof in inter partes review). Therefore, to prevail in an inter partes review, Petitioner must explain how 6 At this stage of the proceeding, Patent Owner has not presented objective evidence of non-obviousness. the proposed combination of prior art would have rendered the challenged claims unpatentable. At this preliminary stage, we determine whether the information presented in the Petition shows there is a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail in establishing that at least one of the challenged claims would have been obvious over the proposed combinations of prior art. slip op. at 10
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Here, Petitioner asserts a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention of the ’313 patent would have “had a bachelor’s degree in computer science, computer engineering, electrical engineering, or a related field, and 2–3 years of practical engineering experience relating to information security systems that employ cryptographic keys to encrypt/decrypt digital data.” Pet. 9 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 1–20, 37–41). Mr. Wechselberger supports Petitioner’s position and further testifies that “[a]dditional education could substitute for professional experience, or significant experience in the field could substitute for formal education.” Ex. 1003 ¶ 40. Patent Owner does not assert a different level of skill in the art at the time of the alleged invention and does not dispute Petitioner’s proposed level of skill. Prelim. Resp. 6. For the purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s level of ordinary skill in the art because it appears consistent with the problems addressed in the ’313 Patent and the prior art of record.” slip op. at 11
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedDecided for petitioner
“We also are persuaded based on the current record that Suzuki’s teachings bolster Peterka’s teaching of this limitation. See Ex. 1006 ¶¶ 33, 36, 43–48, 59, 72–77, 80–81, Figs. 4–6. Moreover, we are persuaded that a person of ordinary skill in the art at the critical time would have had reason to apply the teachings of Suzuki to Peterka. Specifically, we credit the testimony of Mr. Wechselberger, who testifies that (1) Peterka and Suzuki are in the same field of art and (2) both references disclose “periodically” changing keys that protect distributed content. Ex. 1003 ¶ 154 (citing Ex. 1006 ¶¶ 3, 12; Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 82, 110). Mr. Wechselberger explains that an ordinarily skilled artisan would have recognized the importance of identifiers “to differentiate amongst keys, and that providing unique values (such as key numbers) to keys would ensure that the system does not confuse keys.” Id. ¶ 153. According to Mr. Wechselberger, an ordinarily skilled artisan “would have had reasons to implement Peterka’s client in view of Suzuki to acquire and use ‘key information’ about a next key—its ‘remaining validity time’ and ‘key number’—at a set time before the expiration of the current key, and thereby facilitate timely key acquisition and use.” Id. ¶ 155 (citing Ex. 1006 ¶¶ 76–77, 80–81, 43–48) (emphasis added). At this stage of the proceeding, and crediting the testimony of Mr. Wechselberger, we are persuaded that the combined teachings of Peterka and Suzuki would have allowed a person of ordinary skill in the art “to ‘eliminat[e] the confirmation delay’ during key changes, and realize Peterka’s embodiment where “each client keeps track of the keys and their expiration times and actively requests new keys before the current keys expire so as to avoid service interruptions.” See Ex. 1006 ¶ 11; Ex. 1005 ¶ 105.” slip op. at 30
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached
“Petitioner contends “[n]o claim term requires that the Board adopt an exact outer boundary construction because the prior art relied upon herein meets the claims under any plausible interpretation as detailed [in the Petition.]” Pet. 10. Patent Owner asserts that “[t]he Petition does not raise a dispute as to any claim construction issues” and “Patent Owner does not believe the Board need resolve any claim construction issues at this stage.” Prelim. Resp. 6 (citing Pet. 9–10). Construction is needed only for those terms “that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.” See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). There are no claim terms in controversy at this stage of the proceeding. Consequently, we need not construe any terms for our analysis.” slip op. at 9
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,122,313 - PTAB · Mar 27, 2025 · IPR2025-00003 · APJ Norman H Beamer · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–8, 10, 12, 14, and 16–20 for all petitioned grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on at least one claim.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“The standard for instituting an inter partes review is set forth in 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), which provides that an inter partes review may not be instituted unless the information presented in the Petition and any preliminary response shows that “there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” For the reasons explained below, we determine that Petitioner has established a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail with respect to at least one challenged claim. Accordingly, we institute an inter partes review as to the challenged claims and grounds raised in the Petition.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedOther
“Petitioner’s expert contends that person of ordinary skill in the art (POSITA): [W]ould have had a bachelor’s degree in computer science, computer engineering, electrical engineering, or a related field, and 2–3 years of practical engineering experience relating to information security systems that employ cryptographic keys to encrypt/decrypt digital data. Additional education could substitute for professional experience, or significant experience in the field could substitute for formal education. Ex. 1003 ¶ 41. Patent Owner does not dispute the Petitioner’s proposal at this time. Prelim. Resp. 8. Based on a review of the record, we adopt Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill in the art because it is consistent with the evidence of record, including the asserted prior art and ’178 patent specification. Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001).” slip op. at 10
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for petitioner
“the special case of key changes requested for security reasons outside of any fixed duration lifespan. Ex. 1001, 10:40–42. Considering, as we must, the disclosure of the ’178 patent as a whole, the scope of the disclosure is directed broadly to key rotation in general, whether due to scheduled key expiration times or otherwise. Id. at code (57), Fig. 3, 1:63–65, 2:23–25, 3:26–28, 9:47–49; see also Superguide Corp. v. DirecTV Enter., Inc., 358 F.3d 870, 875 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (“Though understanding the claim language may be aided by explanations contained in the written description, it is important not to import into a claim limitations that are not part of the claim. For example, a particular embodiment appearing in the written description may not be read into a claim when the claim language is broader than the embodiment”).” slip op. at 21
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundOther
“combine the teachings of Peterka, Suzuki, and Bocharov. Pet. 51–53, 57– 59, 66–67. Petitioner argues that Suzuki, like Peterka, discloses clients acquiring keys for multiple media segments, and provides implementation details, not disclosed in Peterka, regarding how to keep track of keys and their expiration times, and how to determine when a new key is required. Pet. 51–52 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 161–164). Petitioner argues that, given that Peterka and Suzuki are in the same field of art, one of ordinary skill would have been motivated to use the specific details of Suzuki in implementing the disclosure of Peterka. Id. at 53, 66 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 165–167, 202–204). Petitioner also argues that Peterka indicates that video content can be streamed using various protocols and bit rates, but does not provide implementation details. Pet. 57–59, 66–67 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 179–184, 204). However, argues Petitioner, one of ordinary skill in the art would have had reason to use the manifest files of Bocharov to provide the necessary information to handle different protocols and bit rates. Id. Petitioner argues that one of ordinary skill in the art would have been so motivated because implementing Peterka’s system to use Bocharov’s manifests would have provided an effective solution for allowing clients to switch between multiple versions of a media program having different encodings/qualities/bit rates. Id. Patent Owner does not specifically address the merits of combining Peterka, Suzuki, and Bocharov. See generally Prelim. Resp. Nonetheless the burden remains on Petitioner to demonstrate unpatentability. See Dynamic Drinkware, LLC v. Nat’l Graphics, Inc., 800 F.3d 1375, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2015). For purposes of this Decision, we determine that Petitioner has provided sufficiently articulated reasoning with rational underpinnings for the proffered combined teachings of Peterka, Suzuki, and Bocharov.” slip op. at 29
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 9,313,178 - PTAB · Mar 14, 2025 · IPR2024-01324 · APJ George R Hoskins · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–57 on all petitioned challenges, finding a reasonable likelihood of success on at least one challenged claim.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), institution of review requires the information in the record to show a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail with respect to at least one challenged claim. Applying that standard on behalf of the Director (37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a)), we institute an inter partes review to determine whether Petitioner demonstrates by a preponderance of the evidence that claims 1–57 are unpatentable, considering all challenges in the Petition.” slip op. at 2
- BurdenNot reached
“deficient for failing to identify how or why Deaton would have been modified. See Prelim. Resp. 38 (section title). In Patent Owner’s view, “Petitioner tries to capture the universe of whatever reconfigurations would have been necessary ‘to meet the claimed system,’ apparently using the claimed system as a road map for the modifications.” Id. (citing Pet. 21). Patent Owner asserts “[t]his catch-all generalization flies in the face of the statutory requirements for IPRs, which must identify challenges ‘with particularity.’” Id. at 38–39 (citing 35 U.S.C. §§ 312(a)(3) & 313). We agree with Patent Owner. The Petition fails to identity “with particularity . . . the grounds on which the challenge to [claim 1] is based.” 35 U.S.C. § 312(a)(3) (emphasis added). Instead, the Petition presents a catch-all theory of obviousness that, in the event the Board finds “a particular configuration in Deaton differs from the claimed system,” it would have been obvious “to reconfigure the various components of the system in Deaton to meet the claimed system[.]” Pet. 21. That argument is deficient because it does not specify any particular limitation(s) of claim 1 that is or are at issue for obviousness, or any particular feature of Deaton that would have been modified, or any particular reason for the modification. Therefore, we conclude the preliminary record fails to show a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail with respect to challenging claim 1 as having been obvious over Deaton alone. (iii) Patent Owner’s Second Argument — Dr. Mowry is Not Qualified as an Expert Witness Regarding Coupon Processing Business or Technology” slip op. at 36
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Instituted
“Deaton’s UPC server 12 does not satisfy the Validation Limitation of claim 1 because it is performed only after Deaton’s POS terminal 36, 38, or 40 has redeemed the coupon or incentive. We conclude, based on the present record, that Deaton’s disclosure at column 10 (line 63) through column 11 (line 18) is equivocal on this point. It does refer to “verifying the price at which the product was purchased,” in the past tense, which tends to support Patent Owner’s argument. Ex. 1004, 11:8–9 (emphasis added). However, the remainder of the passage is in the present tense or perhaps an indeterminate tense, i.e., “verifying that that the product associated with the coupon is actually purchased” (id. at 11:7–8 (emphasis added)), and “the identity of the person receiving a discount may be verified” (id. at 11:9–12 (emphasis added)). We decline, on the present record, to read this passage as being limited to describing that UPC server 12 validates coupons only after the coupons have been redeemed by a POS terminal 36, 38, or 40. That seems like an unusual limitation to place on Deaton’s validation process, and Patent Owner’s position on this issue at this time does not appear to be supported by sufficient expert witness testimony or persuasive explanation as to why Deaton might be so limited.” slip op. at 25
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not found
“deficient for failing to identify how or why Deaton would have been modified. See Prelim. Resp. 38 (section title). In Patent Owner’s view, “Petitioner tries to capture the universe of whatever reconfigurations would have been necessary ‘to meet the claimed system,’ apparently using the claimed system as a road map for the modifications.” Id. (citing Pet. 21). Patent Owner asserts “[t]his catch-all generalization flies in the face of the statutory requirements for IPRs, which must identify challenges ‘with particularity.’” Id. at 38–39 (citing 35 U.S.C. §§ 312(a)(3) & 313). We agree with Patent Owner. The Petition fails to identity “with particularity . . . the grounds on which the challenge to [claim 1] is based.” 35 U.S.C. § 312(a)(3) (emphasis added). Instead, the Petition presents a catch-all theory of obviousness that, in the event the Board finds “a particular configuration in Deaton differs from the claimed system,” it would have been obvious “to reconfigure the various components of the system in Deaton to meet the claimed system[.]” Pet. 21. That argument is deficient because it does not specify any particular limitation(s) of claim 1 that is or are at issue for obviousness, or any particular feature of Deaton that would have been modified, or any particular reason for the modification. Therefore, we conclude the preliminary record fails to show a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail with respect to challenging claim 1 as having been obvious over Deaton alone. (iii) Patent Owner’s Second Argument — Dr. Mowry is Not Qualified as an Expert Witness Regarding Coupon Processing Business or Technology” slip op. at 36
Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 9,098,855 - PTAB · Mar 14, 2025 · IPR2024-01323 · APJ George R Hoskins · IPR · Institution
Instituted IPR of claims 1–35 on all petitioned grounds; Paul and Brown showed a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on at least claim 1.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), institution of review requires the information in the record to show a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail with respect to at least one challenged claim. Applying that standard on behalf of the Director (37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a)), we institute an inter partes review to determine whether Petitioner demonstrates by a preponderance of the evidence that claims 1–35 are unpatentable, considering all challenges in the Petition.” slip op. at 2
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for patent owner
“meaning “active” and “available,” because this construction is contradicted by the ’133 patent disclosures cited by Petitioner and Dr. Mowry. See Pet. 30 (citing Ex. 1001, 6:29–33, 9:16–17); Ex. 1003 ¶ 144 (further citing Ex. 1001, 4:40–46, 9:19–24).” slip op. at 23
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of success › HindsightMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentable
“justify institution, Petitioner’s obviousness contentions based on Paul and the general knowledge of a person of ordinary skill in the art. In particular, Petitioner and Dr. Mowry do not cite any evidence to support Dr. Mowry’s opinion that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to modify the operation of Paul’s central server 290 to check the validity of coupons retrieved from a customer’s account “before sending any coupons” to POS terminal 235, for example as part of step 520 in Figure 10. Ex. 1003 ¶ 148 (emphasis added); see Pet. 31. We appreciate that Dr. Mowry posits a reason for this modification, which is “to avoid sending invalid coupons leading to a waste of resources or improper coupon redemptions.” Ex. 1003 ¶ 148; see Pet. 31. However, in light of Dr. Mowry’s lack of education and experience in the coupon processing arts, as Patent Owner has pointed out,4 as well as Dr. Mowry’s failure to cite any evidentiary support in this particular testimony in paragraph 148, his conclusion appears on the present record to rest on improper hindsight bias. Dr. Mowry also does not explain why Paul’s existing coupon validation processes, for example in steps 530–575 of Figure 10, lead to a waste of resources or improper coupon redemptions that would be avoided by validating coupons earlier in Paul’s process.” slip op. at 31
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundInstituted
“objective evidence to support Dr. Mowry’s opinions that is missing in Petitioner’s first challenge (obviousness over Paul alone), because it shows that it was known for a server to determine the validity of coupons before transmitting the coupons to a POS terminal. Dr. Mowry then testifies as to three reasons why a person of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to modify Paul’s process, in light of Brown’s disclosure, to determine the validity of Paul’s coupons before transmitting them to a POS terminal, for example in the process of Figure 10 at step 520 rather than later at steps 530–575. Dr. Mowry’s first two reasons — to reduce message sizes exchanged between the server and the POS terminal to conserve network bandwidth, and to reduce the processing required at the POS terminal — are rooted in his computer science experience. See Pet. 20; Ex. 1003 ¶ 83 (pg. 43); id. ¶¶ 4–12 (“QUALIFICATIONS”). Patent Owner’s countervailing arguments are not supported by opposing expert testimony in the present preliminary record, and provide little reason to set aside Dr. Mowry’s experience before developing the record further regarding the merits of his testimony. We conclude that Dr. Mowry’s unrebutted testimony in this regard provides a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail per 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). It may turn out that Dr. Mowry’s testimony will not stand up to cross-examination and/or opposing expert witness testimony, but we leave those issues for trial.” slip op. at 45
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 9,070,133 - PTAB · Mar 13, 2025 · IPR2024-01467 · APJ Michael A Valek · IPR · Institution
Instituted IPR on claims 1–8 and 11–22 based on the §103(a) challenge over Xu-752 and Jones, after finding a reasonable likelihood of success on claims 16–22.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“Having reviewed Petitioner’s showing, we find that it demonstrates a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner will prevail in demonstrating that claim 16 is unpatenable over Xu-752 and Jones. Patent Owner’s arguments in the Preliminary Response are unavailing on the current record. We address those arguments below.” slip op. at 17
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundInstituted
“Having reviewed Petitioner’s showing, we find that it demonstrates a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner will prevail in demonstrating that claim 16 is unpatenable over Xu-752 and Jones. Patent Owner’s arguments in the Preliminary Response are unavailing on the current record. We address those arguments below.” slip op. at 17
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsInstitution denied 325dDecided for petitioner
“We agree with Petitioner that Oka is not cumulative of Jones. Jones discloses an impedance measuring system for measuring the impedance of each well of a multiwell plate. Ex. 1006, code (57). Moreover, Jones clearly teaches that the daughter boards in its system “may be equipped with multiple analog-to-digital converters.” Id. ¶ 18. Oka, in contrast, does not. As Patent Owner acknowledges, “Oka is a planar multielectrode array that 11 Oka et al., “A new planar multielectrode array for extracellular recording: application to hippocampal acute slice,” 93 J. of Neuroscience Methods 61– 67 (1999) (Ex. 1026) (“Oka”). measures via extracellular recording instead of impedance.” Prelim. Resp. 51 n. 10 (emphases added). This is consistent with the applicants’ arguments during prosecution that Oka does not disclose a multiwell plate, plurality of wells, or even measuring cell-substrate impedance. See, e.g., Ex. 1002, 191–193. Moreover, as Petitioner points out, Oka appears to disclose only a single ADC connected to a switch. See Ex. 1026, 63 (Fig. 2); see also Ex. 1002, 188 (applicant urging that “Oka uses a switch to connect the AD-C to different electrodes at different times” and therefore is not performing measurements for individual electrode arrays). Thus, unlike Jones, Oka does not disclose a plurality of ADCs, much less multiple ADCs arranged and operated in parallel such that impedances for multiple wells are measured at a time.12” slip op. at 28
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“of May 2009 “would have had a B.S. in electrical/mechanical/biomedical engineering or biological science, or a related field, and approximately 2 years of relevant experience or equivalent study in systems and methods for bioanalysis of cells.” Pet. 14 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 23–25). Patent Owner does not dispute or otherwise respond to Petitioner’s description of a POSA in its Preliminary Response. At this stage, we find Petitioner’s description of the level of ordinary skill in the art to be sufficiently supported by the record and apply it for purposes of this decision.” slip op. at 7
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,906,508 - Quotient Technology, LLC v. Intelligent Clearing Network Inc.Institution deniedPTAB · Feb 21, 2025 · IPR2024-01325 · APJ Lisa L Tsang · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution because Petitioner did not show a reasonable likelihood that any challenged claim would have been obvious over the asserted combinations.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“Institution of an inter partes review is authorized when “the information presented in the petition . . . and any response . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a); see also 37 C.F.R. § 42.108. Upon consideration of the Petition and the Preliminary Response, we conclude that the information presented shows there is not a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail in establishing the unpatentability of at least one challenged claim of the ’729 patent.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Patent Owner does not expressly proffer a different level of skill in the art, but faults Petitioner for relying on the testimony of a declarant who allegedly lacks experience relating to coupon processing. See Prelim. Resp. 15–21. According to Patent Owner, “[t]he Petition repeatedly contends that a POSITA would require a deep and specific understanding of various aspects of the business and technology of validating, redeeming, and clearing coupons to reach the proposed obvious determinations.” Id. at 17; see also id. at 18–19 (citing examples from the Petition that allegedly rely on 9 The current record does not include allegations or evidence of objective indicia of nonobviousness. a skilled artisan “having extensive knowledge [of] coupon processing business practices and technologies”). In this regard, Patent Owner contends that Dr. Mowry does not identify any education or experience relating to coupon processing. Id. at 20. As a consequence, Patent Owner urges us to disregard Dr. Mowry’s opinions relating to the coupon-processing industry. Id. at 21. For purposes of this Decision, we adopt the level of ordinary skill in the art as articulated by Petitioner because, based on the current record, it is not expressly disputed, and it does not impact our analysis below.” slip op. at 9
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“Petitioner and Patent Owner agree that no claim terms need construction. Pet. 4; Prelim. Resp. 12. Patent Owner further argues, however, that “in the [co-pending litigation], Petitioner has advanced numerous limiting constructions that are inconsistent with Petitioner’s invalidity theories.” Prelim. Resp. 11–12. We acknowledge that Petitioner has proposed specific claim constructions for various ’729 patent claim limitations in the co-pending litigation. See Ex. 2001, 2–14. However, Patent Owner does not advance specific arguments as to why we should apply those constructions here and how Petitioner’s challenges to the claims would fail thereunder. See Prelim. Resp. 11–12. Moreover, after reviewing the evidence and argument presented by the parties, we determine that it is not necessary to expressly construe any claim terms because doing so would not change the outcome of our analysis below. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (noting that “we need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy’”) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)).” slip op. at 10
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot reached
“1. Independent claim 1 Patent Owner contends, inter alia, that the combination of Aggarwal and Deaton does not teach or suggest limitation [1d]. Prelim. Resp. 26–29. For the reasons discussed below, we agree with Patent Owner that Petitioner has not shown sufficiently that limitation [1d] would have been taught or suggested by Aggarwal and Deaton. This issue is dispositive so we do not provide analysis on the other challenged claim limitations. (a) Limitation [1d] Limitation [1d] recites, “receiving, at the ICN server from the retail server, redeemed coupon related information indicating successful redemption of a coupon, wherein the redeemed coupon related information comprises identification information from a product purchased, customer identification information, an application identifier, and retailer identification information.” Ex. 1001, 52:52–58 (emphasis added).” slip op. at 17
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,846,729 - Charter Communications, Inc. v. Touchstream Technologies, Inc.Institution deniedPTAB · Feb 11, 2025 · IPR2024-01232 · APJ Michelle N Wormmeester · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution on all challenged claims because Petitioner did not show a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on any obviousness ground; it also found the petition time-barred.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Joinder §315(c) / SAS all-or-nothingJoinder, deniedDenied
“later than one month after we initially instituted inter partes review in the Comcast IPR. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.122(b). As discussed above, however, inter partes review is no longer instituted in the Comcast IPR. Under these circumstances, we do not grant Petitioner’s Joinder Motion because there is no pending proceeding to join. See 35 U.S.C. § 315(c) (“If the Director institutes an inter partes review, the Director, in his or her discretion, may join as a party to that inter partes review any person who properly files a petition . . . that the Director . . . determines warrants the institution of an inter partes review.”). Petitioner’s Joinder Motion is denied.” slip op. at 7
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Prosecution history disclaimer / disavowalTerm construed board ownDecided for patent owner
“least in part on a second message including at least one command in a second format.’” Pet. 4 (citing Ex. 1104, 168–173). The cited portion of the prosecution history shows that the applicant distinguished its claims from the prior art based on different first and second formats. The applicant argued in particular, Applicant submits that [the prior art] is completely silent with regard to “receiving, from the remote server device, a first message that includes at least one command in a first format, wherein the first message is received based at least in part on a second message including at least one command in a second format having been sent from the associated remote computing device.” In fact, [the prior art] never describes commands in different formats. . . . Ex. 1104, 170. Based on the applicant’s argument in this regard, we find that the prosecution history limits the scope of claim 1 to different first and second formats. In other words, the applicant’s argument during prosecution distinguishing its claims from the prior art based on different first and second formats overcomes the presumption based on claim differentiation that claim 1 encompasses first and second formats that are the same. See Fenner Invs., Ltd. v. Cellco P’Ship, 778 F.3d 1320, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (“Although claim differentiation is a useful analytic tool, it cannot . . . relieve any claim of limitations imposed by the prosecution history.”). Accordingly, claim 1 is limited to different first and second formats.” slip op. at 10
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“argument and evidence. As discussed above in the claim construction section, the recited first and second formats are limited to different formats. See supra Part IV.A. To satisfy this aspect of limitation 1D under its theory, Petitioner needs to show that in Danciu the format of the control information sent from the remote control to the server is different from the format of the control information sent from the server to the controlled device. The cited disclosures in Danciu, however, do not teach or suggest that these formats are different. Nor does Petitioner explain adequately how Danciu’s disclosures teach or suggest the two formats are different. We recognize that the control information in Danciu may be “processed” or “repackaged,” as Petitioner asserts, but it is not clear that the control information is processed or repackaged such that the format of the control information sent from the remote control to the server and the format of the control information sent from the server to the controlled device are different. Petitioner does not rely on Mahajan to teach or suggest the recited first and second formats but relies on Mahajan instead as providing “implementation details for transmission of commands for controlling a client.” Pet. 27. Petitioner contends that its proposed combination of Danciu and Mahajan would have provided a system where “Danciu’s remote control would translate commands associated with a first type of media playing application to a generic format, transmit them to the controlled device, which would translate them to a command associated with a second type of media playing application for execution.” Id. at 31. In other words, the controlled device would receive the generic commands sent from the remote control and then translate the generic commands. It is not clear how the proposed combination in this way teaches or suggests the format of a command sent from the remote control to a server is different from the format of a command sent from the server to the controlled device.” slip op. at 17
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“Aldrey and Mahajan meets limitation 1D under Petitioner’s second theory. Petitioner only alleges that it would have been obvious to an ordinarily skilled artisan that Mahajan’s RTS Media Abstraction Module could operate at a server like Aldrey’s service provider network 103. Pet. 65. The Federal Circuit has explained that “obviousness concerns whether a skilled artisan not only could have made but would have been motivated to make the combinations or modifications of prior art to arrive at the claimed invention.” Belden Inc. v. Berk-Tek LLC, 805 F.3d 1064, 1073 (Fed. Cir. 2015). Petitioner does not adequately explain why an ordinarily skilled artisan would have considered locating Mahajan’s abstraction module at a server, even if the abstraction module could operate at the server. See In re Kahn, 441 F.3d 977, 988 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (“[T]here must be some articulated reasoning with some rational underpinning to support the legal conclusion of obviousness.”). We note Petitioner further argues that combining Mahajan and Aldrey would have provided a system where “Aldrey’s end terminal would translate commands associated with a first type of media playing application to a command associated with a second type of media playing application on a STB.” Pet. 66–67; see also id. at 66 (“Mahajan’s server-command teachings could be implemented on Aldrey’s end terminal remote control.”). Arguing that Aldrey’s end terminal would translate commands seems inconsistent with Petitioner’s earlier argument for locating Mahajan’s abstraction module (which translates commands) at Aldrey’s network service provider. See id. at 65–67. Moreover, it is not readily apparent how command translation by Aldrey’s end terminal––rather than Aldrey’s network service provider–– teaches or suggests the format of a command sent from the end terminal to the network service provider is different from the format of a command sent from the network service provider to the STB. Petitioner does not close these logical gaps.” slip op. at 23
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites PhillipsPatents in suitUS 11,048,751
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.