- PTAB · May 12, 2025 · IPR2025-00019 · APJ Miriam L Quinn · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–20 on all asserted § 103 grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that at least one challenged claim is unpatentable.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Decided for petitioner
“WITHOUT PREJUDICE to refiling of the same within fourteen (14) days following the PTAB’s institution decision on the last of the pending IPRs” (Ex. 2008, 3), we decline to speculate whether the District Court will grant a stay. Thus, we find that factor 1 is neutral. slip op. at 10
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“Based on the evidence and arguments currently of record, for purposes of institution, we determine that Petitioner demonstrates a reasonable likelihood that independent claim 1 is unpatentable over Sheha, Smith, and Carey.” slip op. at 24
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“bachelor’s degree in computer science, computer engineering, electrical engineering, or a similar degree, with one or two years of experience with wireless networks and devices, such as cellphones and personal digital assistants (“PDAs”) as well as wireless positioning technologies, such as GPS or triangulation.” Pet. 4. (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 50-54). Petitioner further contends that “[m]ore education could compensate for less practical experience, and vice versa.” Id. Patent Owner does not propose a level of ordinary skill. The level of ordinary skill in the art usually is evidenced by the references themselves. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001); In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995); In re Oelrich, 579 F.2d 86, 91 (CCPA 1978). As Petitioner’s description of a person of ordinary skill appears commensurate with the subject matter before us, we apply Petitioner’s definition for purposes of this Decision.” slip op. at 14
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for petitioner
“We disagree with Patent Owner on this record. The language of claims 1, 8, and 15, quoted above, recite that the “wireless” telephonic “device is operable to assign location access right to” one other wireless telephonic devices (claims 1 and 8) and that the “first wireless device is operable to assign a second permission to said second wireless device” (claim 15). The claim language does not limit the location access rights to be assigned only to the one other device, at the exclusion of other devices. Nor does the language regarding assigning a “permission” limit that assignment to a single (and only to the) second wireless device. The ordinary and customary meaning of “assigning . . . to said one of said plurality of wireless devices, “assigning . . . to said first wireless telephonic device” or “assign a second permission to said second wireless device” encompasses a right or permission that allows other devices, in addition to the recited device, to access location information. The disclosure in the written description is consistent with the ordinary and customary meaning. Although the written description states that an object of the invention is to provide a security feature which allows a user to limit or deny access to a particular user, the written description discusses other purposes served by the assignment of access rights or permissions. For example, the written description discloses that “[u]sers may be added, individually or in groups, to a list of users with location access rights to a specific user by that specific user. A specific user may, at any time, modify, delete, or add users allowed to access his or her location.” Ex. 1001, 3:22-26. The written description further discloses that “a user may organize his/her user list into groups and assign access rights to that group (e.g., family member user group, close friend user group).” Id. at 12:56−58. The fact that the written description of the ’283 patent sets forth multiple objectives to be served by the access rights or permission confirms that these terms should not be construed as limited to a single target device. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1327. Further, because the written description here includes an embodiment where a user assigns access rights to a group, we are persuaded that the scope of the disputed claim terms encompasses a group permission. Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1583 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (holding that interpreting a claim to exclude an embodiment disclosed in the written description “is rarely, if ever, correct and would require highly persuasive evidentiary support, which is wholly absent in this case.”). At this stage, we interpret the scope of the “assign access rights” and” slip op. at 17
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialPatents in suitUS 9,204,283 - PTAB · Apr 29, 2025 · IPR2025-00180 · APJ Scott B Howard · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR of claims 1–20 on all asserted grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that Comcast would prevail on at least one challenged claim.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“determine whether to institute an inter partes review. 35 U.S.C. § 314 (2024); 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a) (2024). Inter partes review may not be instituted unless “the information presented in the petition filed under [35 U.S.C.] section 311 and any response filed under [35 U.S.C.] section 313 shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). “When instituting inter partes review, the Board will authorize the review to proceed on all of the challenged claims and on all grounds of unpatentability asserted for each claim.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.108(a). For the reasons set forth below, upon considering the briefing and the evidence of record, we determine that the information presented in the Petition establishes a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner will prevail with respect to at least one of the challenged claims. Accordingly, we institute inter partes review on all of the challenged claims based on all of the grounds identified in the Petition.” slip op. at 2
- Parallel petitionsDenied
“We do not agree with Patent Owner that Petitioner’s filing of three parallel petitions is grounds to deny all three petitions on that basis alone. Petitioner has complied with our guidance by filing a statement ranking the petitions. See Practice Guide, 59–60. For reasons discussed in our concurrent Decisions Denying Institution in IPR2025-00181 and IPR2025- meaning does not resolve the parties’ dispute.”). Claim construction arguments should not be relegated to patentability arguments on the facts. warranted. Given our Decisions to Deny Institution in IPR2025-00181 and IPR2025-00182 and the official guidance we have received in the Practice Guide, we have no option but to deny Patent Owner’s request that we exercise our discretion to deny institution on all three of the petitions challenging the ’275 patent. Accordingly, we do not exercise our discretion to the deny institution in the instant proceeding. E. Anticipation of Claim 1 by Zhang” slip op. at 10
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Patent Owner does not address the level of skill. See Prelim. Resp. Because Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill in the art is consistent with the field of the invention of the ’275 patent and not disputed by Patent Owner, for purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s formulation of the person having ordinary skill in the art.7 7 If Patent Owner disagrees with this formulation of the level of skill in the art, it must raise that disagreement in its Response. If a different level of skill would affect the outcome in this case, the parties must brief that issue as well. The failure of Patent Owner to describe how a different level of skill in the art is determinative will be a forfeiture of that argument. If there is a dispute regarding the level of ordinary skill in the art, then the parties are also encouraged to submit evidence, other than conclusory expert testimony, that supports their position. See 37 C.F.R § 42.65(a) (“Expert testimony that does not disclose the underlying facts or data on which the opinion is based is entitled to little or no weight.”).” slip op. at 8
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached
“Petitioner states that all of the limitations “should be given their ordinary and customary meaning to a” person having ordinary skill in the art. Pet. 19. Although Petitioner argues that none of the limitations are means-plus-function terms, Petitioner provides constructions to the extent that there are means-plus-function terms. Pet. 19–20. Patent Owner does not respond. See Prelim. Resp. For the purposes of this Decision, we need not expressly construe any claim terms.8 See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor 8 If either party intends to argue a claim construction at trial, including what is the plain and ordinary meaning of a term, they should do so in a clearly designated section of their briefing. See Patent Trial and Appeal Board Consolidated Trial Practice Guide (Nov. 21, 2019) (“Practice Guide”), 46, 49 (available at https://www.uspto.gov/TrialPracticeGuideConsolidated); O2 Micro Int’l Ltd. v. Beyond Innovation Tech. Co., 521 F.3d 1351, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (“A determination that a claim term ‘needs no construction’ or has the ‘plain and ordinary meaning’ may be inadequate when a term has more than one ‘ordinary’ meaning or when reliance on a term’s ‘ordinary’ construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))). D. Parallel Petitions” slip op. at 9
Claim construction§ 102 anticipationDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,785,275 - SAP America, Inc. v. Cyandia, Inc.InstitutedPTAB · Apr 7, 2025 · IPR2024-01433 · APJ Jason W Melvin · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted review of claims 1–7, 10, 11, 13, 18, 19, 23, 29, 35, and 36 based on the PCT publication and Austin-Lane under § 103.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Denied
“Petitioner’s Sotera stipulation will eliminate the overlap between this proceeding and invalidity at the district court. Unlike the other, related IPRs for which we discretionarily deny review (e.g., IPR2024-01432, -01495, & -01496), this proceeding does not involve references that fundamentally convey the same information as may be presented as system art in the Texas litigation. In light of the stipulation and nature of the asserted ground, we conclude that this ground strongly favors institution.” slip op. at 12
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“We conclude that the claim language reads on Austin-Lane’s disclosure of determining “a presentation method of the notification” such as “using an instant message to the notebook computer” (Ex. 1105 ¶¶ 39, 46), in combination with teachings regarding the device to which the notification is sent and the protocol used to deliver it. We further conclude that Petitioner has provided an adequate reason that skilled artisans would have looked to Austin-Lane’s teachings and combined them with the system described in the PCT publication, as discussed. We have further reviewed the uncontested aspects of the challenge to claim 1 (Pet. 43–58) and determine that Petitioner is reasonably likely to prevail proving obviousness of claim 1. IV. CONCLUSION For the reasons discussed above, we conclude that Petitioner has shown a reasonable likelihood of prevailing with respect to unpatentability of at least one claim. Accordingly, we institute inter partes review. V. ORDER Accordingly, it is ORDERED that, pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), inter partes review of claims 1–7, 10, 11, 13, 18, 19, 23, 29, 35, and 36 of the ’948 patent is instituted on the grounds raised in the Petition; and” slip op. at 26
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“of filing “would have had a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer science, or equivalent, with two or more years of experience developing and implementing graphical user interfaces for controlling server-based applications, including handling asynchronous notifications generated by those applications and web services, such as portal systems, or an equivalent amount of relevant work or research experience” and “would have been familiar with common approaches for presenting information on a graphical user interface, including various layouts for presenting multiple elements, such as icons, widgets, windows, etc.” Pet. 14–15. Petitioner describes further capabilities that such a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had. Id. at 15–16. Patent Owner asserts that a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of filing “would have had a Bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer science, or the like, and/or four or more years of experience in server-based applications” and that “[a]dditional experience may make up for a lack of education and vice versa.” Prelim. Resp. 14. Because Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill in the art appears to be consistent with the challenged patent and prior art, we adopt it and use “skilled artisans” to refer to people with such skill at the time the invention was filed. We do not perceive a substantive distinction between the parties’ definitions, but note that Petitioner’s definition provides more detail about the capabilities of skilled artisans. Should either party believe that the definition of ordinary skill in the art affects a disputed issue in the trial, it should point out how and identify any potential dispute about the level of skill.” slip op. at 14
- Disclosure Requirements (§112) › Written description (Ariad)Not entitled to earlier dateDecided for petitioner
“We do not agree. Petitioner notes that certain disclosures added to the April 2011 CIP application describe a “notification manager” to “determine the best alert notification method.” Pet. 27 (quoting Ex. 1110 ¶ 131; citing id. ¶¶ 90–93, 130–132, 145–147, 160). That does not mean that Petitioner construes the claim language to require determining the best method, only that disclosing a mechanism that “determine[s] the best alert notification method” provides written-description support for a requirement to “determin[e] a notification method.” Petitioner is clear in its position that the May 2009 application “does not describe how to determine a notification method or how to use ‘session data’ in the manner required by this claim limitation.” Pet. 27–28. Patent Owner asserts that the May 2009 application discloses “determining a notification method” through a channel alert server that can “determine the active devices of the subscriber . . . to provide a visual or auditory alert in the channel.” Prelim. Resp. 32 (quoting Ex. 1106 ¶ 39). That disclosure appears to address the claim language requiring an alert “based on the current state of the at least one external device indicated by the session data.” It does not, however, address the claim language “determining a notification method.” Patent Owner recognizes that Petitioner asserts disclosures in the prior art for “determining which devices to send the alert to, the protocols used to send the alert, and how alerts are presented.” Id. at 34 (emphasis omitted). But when Patent Owner asserts that the May 2009 application discloses determining how alerts are presented, it points to paragraphs that do not support the assertion. Id. at 35 (citing Ex. 1106 ¶¶ 23, 39). The first, paragraph 23, states that a “trigger may cause the information channel to change its appearance or to take other actions that may be implemented by the developer” and that “one action that may be implemented is to provide a notification to the user.” Ex. 1106 ¶ 23. Nothing about that indicates the system determines how an alert is presented. The second, paragraph 39, states that the channel alert server may “provide a visual or auditory alert in the channel” and that the “alert can appear as defined on other platforms.” Nothing about that indicates the system determines how an alert is presented. Patent Owner has not shown how the May 2009 application discloses a determining a notification method, as claimed. In Patent Owner’s view, Petitioner admits that the May 2009 application (which is the same as the asserted PCT publication) describes determining a delivery mechanism because Petitioner compares it to Austin-Lane, stating that the PCT publication “already includes a channel alert server that determines the active devices of the user and delivers an alert to the user’s device” and “discloses setting the same type of alert (stock alert) and presenting it in the same way (visually) as Austin-Lane.” Prelim. Resp. 35 (quoting Pet. 54) (emphasis omitted). But simply delivering an alert does not necessarily mean the notification method for that alert was determined. We conclude that Petitioner’s statement does not show the PCT publication discloses “determining a notification method” as claimed.” slip op. at 20
Claim construction§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosureDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · GrahamPatents in suitUS 8,751,948 - Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. / Samsung Electronics America, Inc. v. Mullen Industries LLCInstitutedPTAB · Mar 31, 2025 · IPR2024-01472 · APJ Jeffrey S Smith · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–39, finding a reasonable likelihood that the challenged claims are unpatentable under the asserted obviousness grounds.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Decided for petitioner
“We agree with Petitioner that much work remains in the district court case as it relates to invalidity because discovery is in its early stages and a Markman hearing has not yet occurred. We also agree with Petitioner, that Petitioner’s diligence in filing its Petition (a) less than five months after receiving Patent Owner’s infringement contentions and (b) prior to the parties briefing claim construction issues weighs against exercising discretionary denial.” slip op. at 10
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“information presented in the petition . . . and any response . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314; see 37 C.F.R. § 42.4. Upon consideration of the Petition, the Preliminary Response, and the evidence of record, we determine that Petitioner has established a reasonable likelihood of prevailing with respect to the unpatentability of claims 1–39 of the ’633 patent. Accordingly, we grant the Petition and institute an inter partes review.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Pet. 7 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 25–29). Patent Owner does not challenge Petitioner’s definition of a person of ordinary skill in the art. Prelim. Resp. 14. Petitioner’s description of a person of ordinary skill appears commensurate with the subject matter before us. For purposes of this Decision, we apply Petitioner’s statement as our definition of a person of ordinary skill in the art.” slip op. at 12
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Not reached
“to resolve the issues in the Petition. Pet. 8. In contrast, Patent Owner contends that the claim term “said first event and said second event,” and the claim term “said device includes motion sensing operable to distinguish between a plurality of different types of motion” require express construction. Prelim. Resp. 5–14. We do not need to resolve this dispute, because even under Patent Owner’s narrower constructions, Petitioner has shown a reasonable likelihood of success that at least one claim is unpatentable, as discussed below. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“[W]e need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’”).” slip op. at 12
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialPatents in suitUS 11,190,633 - PTAB · Jan 28, 2025 · IPR2024-01084 · APJ Jeffrey S Smith · IPR · Institution
Instituted IPR on claims 1–4, 8–18, 22–30, and 34–39; Petitioner showed a reasonable likelihood that Shiplacoff, alone or combined with Nan, renders at least one challenged claim obvious.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“purposes of institution, we are sufficiently persuaded that Petitioner has demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of prevailing in showing that Shiplacoff renders obvious claim 1.” slip op. at 25
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsInstitution denied 325dDecided for petitioner
“Advanced Bionics, LLC v. MED-EL Elektromedizinische Geräte GmbH, IPR2019-01469, Paper 6 at 8 (PTAB Feb. 13, 2020) (precedential) (“Advanced Bionics”). With respect to the first issue, previously presented art includes, among other things, “art provided to the Office by an applicant, such as on an Information Disclosure Statement (IDS), in the prosecution history of the challenged patent.” Id. at 7–8. With respect to the second issue, institution generally will be denied if a “petitioner fails to make a showing of material error,” and “[i]f reasonable minds can disagree regarding the purported treatment of the art or arguments, it cannot be said that the Office erred in a manner material to patentability.” Id. at 8–9. “[T]his framework reflects a commitment to defer to previous Office evaluations of the evidence of record unless material error is shown.” Id. at 9.” slip op. at 29
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundDecided for petitioner
“2. Reasons to Combine Shiplacoff and Nan Petitioner contends that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have implemented the touch gestures of Nan in Shiplacoff’s device that includes a touch screen for the benefits of avoiding latency and not displaying on-screen controls. Pet. 43–44. Petitioner contends that using the gestures of Nan, which include factors such as length, speed, hold time, and number of fingers, to execute a change from one of Shiplacoff’s display modes to another, does no more than yield predictable results. Id. at 43, 45. We are sufficiently persuaded that Petitioner has shown a reason to use the edge gestures of Nan to switch from one of Shiplacoff’s display screens to another.” slip op. at 26
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“have had a bachelor’s degree in computer science, computer engineering, electrical engineering, human-computer interaction, or a comparable field and at least two years of professional experience in the design and development of graphical user interfaces (GUIs), human-computer interfaces, or equivalents thereof. Pet. 4 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 22). Petitioner’s declarant, Loren Terveen, Ph.D., testifies that “[s]uch experience could be obtained through research and study in a graduate program or through comparable exposure through industry employment, and additional years of experience could substitute for the advanced-level degree.” Ex. 1003 ¶ 22. Patent Owner notes that it does not agree with Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill, “but does not believe that resolving the level is necessary to resolve the issues raised in this preliminary response.” Prelim. Resp. 7.” slip op. at 5
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,649,578 - PTAB · Jan 28, 2025 · IPR2024-01083 · APJ Jeffrey S Smith · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted inter partes review of claims 1–3, 7, 9, 10, and 101 on the asserted §103 ground over Ahn, Chaudhri, and Hinckley.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), the Director may not authorize an inter partes review unless the information in the petition and preliminary response “shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” For the reasons that follow, we institute an inter partes review as to claims 1–3, 7, 9, 10, and 101 of the ’413 patent on the ground of unpatentability asserted in the Petition.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“through industry employment, and additional years of experience could substitute for the advanced-level degree.” Ex. 1003 ¶ 30. Patent Owner notes that it does not agree with Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill, “but does not believe that resolving the level is necessary to resolve the issues raised in this preliminary response.” Prelim. Resp. 6. As Petitioner’s description of a person of ordinary skill appears commensurate with the subject matter before us, we apply Petitioner’s definition for purposes of this Decision. Also, the level of ordinary skill in the art can be evidenced by the references cited, and we find it commensurate with the cited references in this proceeding. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001); In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995); In re Oelrich, 579 F.2d 86, 91 (CCPA 1978).” slip op. at 8
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“We construe only those claim terms that require analysis to determine whether to institute inter partes review. See Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (holding that “only those terms need be construed that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy”). Petitioner and Patent Owner contend that no claims need to be construed in order to resolve a controversy. Pet. 4– 5; Prelim. Resp. 6–7. We agree with the parties that no terms need to be construed expressly for this Decision. We discuss claim interpretation to the extent necessary in the context of analyzing the asserted grounds to determine whether to institute trial. We highlight that for the term “a magnitude of the blurring,” Patent Owner contends that “the amount of surface area that a translucent menu is displayed over a screen is not a magnitude of the blurring,” but provides no further construction of the term, other than a statement that even under Petitioner’s interpretation of “blurring,” the grounds are deficient. Prelim. Resp. 32–33 & n.4. On the present record, Petitioner’s proposed construction appears correct, and for purposes of institution, we apply this proposed construction of “a magnitude of the blurring” as discussed below in our analysis of limitation [1.d.ii]; the construction of this term may be addressed by the parties as this inter partes review proceeds.” slip op. at 9
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundDecided for petitioner
“For purposes of this Decision, we find Petitioner cites sufficient evidence to support its contention that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had a reason to combine the teachings of Ahn and Chaudhri.” slip op. at 20
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,642,413 - PTAB · Jan 27, 2025 · IPR2024-01085 · APJ Barbara A Benoit · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–4, 6–10, 17, 19, 22–26, 28–30, 32, 33, 36, 41, 48, 58–62, 64, 65, 67, 69, 70, 73, 77, 82, and 83 on all asserted obviousness grounds.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“Applying the standard set forth in 35 U.S.C. § 314, which requires demonstration of a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail with respect to at least one challenged claim, we institute an inter partes review.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Patent Owner indicates it “does not necessarily agree with all aspects of Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill, but does not believe that resolving that level is necessary to resolve the issues raised in this preliminary response.” Prelim. Resp. 4. Dr. Davis indicates that his opinions provided in his declaration in support of Patent Owner’s Preliminary Response are “provided from the perspective of the POSITA” proposed by Dr. Cockburn. Ex. 2001 ¶ 24 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 26). We are persuaded, on the present record, that Petitioner’s proposal is consistent with the level reflected by the ’580 patent and the prior art of record. See In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995); Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001). Accordingly, we adopt Petitioner’s definition of the level of ordinary skill for purposes of this Decision.” slip op. at 9
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner contends “no claim terms need be construed to resolve issues of controversy in the present Petition.” Pet. 2. Similarly, Patent Owner indicates that no formal constructions are necessary at this point in the proceeding. Prelim. Resp. 3. We agree with the parties that no terms need to be construed expressly for this Decision. We discuss claim interpretation to the extent necessary in the context of analyzing the asserted grounds to determine whether to institute trial.” slip op. at 10
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundDecided for petitioner
“Patent Owner contends that “Petitioner’s alleged motivation for modifying Ramos’ Zlider to be transparent is superficial and conclusory.” Prelim. Resp. 24; see generally Prelim. Resp. 24–26. As noted above, Petitioner relies on evidence from Ording itself and Dr. Cockburn’s testimony that relies on evidence to support its conclusion. Thus, we do not agree with Patent Owner that Petitioner’s motivation is insufficient for institution. Patent Owner also argues, relying on Dr. Davis’ declaration testimony, that the Vernier on a semitransparent Zlider widget would be “completely illegible” in some circumstances “rendering the very core of Ramos’ work unusable.” Prelim. Resp. 24–25 (citing Ex. 2001 ¶ 88); see Ex. 2001 ¶ 88 (not adding reasoning or evidence beyond that in the Patent Owner Preliminary Response). On this preliminary record, it would appear that when the Zlider widget and the portion of the image underlying the Zlider widget are the same color, the semitransparent Zlider widget may not work as well as when the Zlider widget and the underlying image are different colors. That does not outweigh, for purposes of determining whether to institute trial, the prior art evidence that Petitioner offers of the from Ording and other prior art references on which Dr. Cockburn’s declaration testimony relies. Ex. 1003 ¶ 66 (citing Ex. 1025 ¶¶ 77, 94, 101; Ex. 1026 ¶¶ 153, 162); see Intel Corp. v. Qualcomm Inc., 21 F.4th 784, 799– 800 (Fed. Cir. 2021) (determining that a showing of the obviousness in predictable use of prior art elements according to their established functions requires only a showing that the combination be a suitable option, rather than a showing that it is the best option). Petitioner also contends, relying on declaration testimony from Dr. Cockburn, that one of ordinary skill would have had a reasonable expectation of success in combining the references in the manner proposed by Petitioner. Pet. 33–34. Petitioner contends that implementing the Zlider widget “described in the Ramos Paper and Ramos Video in a device, as taught by Ording, would have required only routine knowledge well within the skill of a POSITA” and would involve “combining prior art elements according to known methods to yield the predictable results” described by Petitioner’s proposed combination of the references. Id. (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 67). Petitioner’s support for reasons one of ordinary skill would have made” slip op. at 20
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSRPatents in suitUS 10,649,580 - PTAB · Jan 14, 2025 · IPR2024-01087 · APJ Barbara A Benoit · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–13, 15–35, and 37–43 on all asserted grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that Apple would show at least one challenged claim unpatentable.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“We determine Petitioner’s showing discussed above regarding Limitations [1.i–1.l] to be sufficient for institution. Petitioner’s showing in large measure relies on Hackborn’s straightforward description of changing the appearance of grass displayed in “live” wallpaper in response to a finger swipe in combination with Westerman’s disclosures of interpreting user input on touch screens as swipes. See, e.g., Pet. 22–23; Ex. 1004 ¶¶ 28, 33; Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 18–19. With regard to the contested Limitations [1.i and 1.k], we note particularly that Petitioner’s combination relies on Westerman’s disclosure of interpreting user inputs that exceed various thresholds as “a swipe event.” This showing is sufficient for institution to show the threshold determination required by Limitation [1.j]. See, e.g., Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 19; Pet. 22 (citing Ex. 1005 ¶ 19). Petitioner’s combination relies on Hackborn’s animation of the grass on the wallpaper “that makes the grass blades look as if the finger is actually contacting them as it drags across the screen of the device.” Ex. 1004 ¶ 33; see Pet. 23 (quoting Ex. 1004 ¶ 33). On this preliminary record, Petitioner’s position that “the farther the swipe, the more extreme the grass movement expected from Hackborn” naturally follows from Hackborn’s description. Pet. 23. As such, we determine Petitioner’s showing that the proposed combination of Hackborn and Westerman changes the grass appearance based at least in part of the magnitude of the swipe to be sufficient for institution for Limitation [1.k].” slip op. at 23
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“asserts that a person of ordinary skill in the art “would have had at least a bachelor’s degree in computer science, computer engineering, electrical engineering, human-computer interaction, or a related field, and would have had at least two years of relevant work experience in the design and development of graphical user interfaces (GUIs), human-computer interfaces, or equivalents thereof.” Pet. 9 n.2 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 26); Ex. 1003 ¶ 26. Dr. Cockburn also indicates that “[l]ess work experience may be compensated by a higher level of education and vice versa.” Ex. 1003 ¶ 26.” slip op. at 7
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“At this stage, we agree with the parties that no terms need to be construed expressly. We discuss claim interpretation to the extent necessary in the context of analyzing the asserted grounds.” slip op. at 9
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundDecided for petitioner
“Hackborn’s mobile device with a touch screen able to display “live” wallpaper and Westerman’s techniques for interpreting swipe gesture inputs, including distinguishing between tap and swipe gestures using predetermined thresholds. Pet. 9–11, 12–13; see Pet. 9–14 (describing Petitioner’s “Hackborn-Westerman Combination”). Petitioner contends that “[a] POSITA reviewing Hackborn would have naturally looked to Westerman to better understand how to implement Hackborn’s teachings, for example, how to discern between different user inputs (e.g., tap or swipe).” Pet. 12–13 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 52). Petitioner contends that one of ordinary skill would have had a reasonable expectation of success in combining the references in the manner Petitioner proposes. Pet. 13–14. Specifically, Petitioner asserts that, because “recognizing predetermined touch inputs was known, and Hackborn and Westerman both describe the use of touchscreen devices and would have reasonably understood the combination of Hackborn and Westerman to be successful with no unexpected results.” Pet. 14 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 53; Ex. 1004 ¶ 28, Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 18, 19, 25, 41, 59, 61–64).” slip op. at 14
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSRPatents in suitUS 10,656,755 - PTAB · Jan 14, 2025 · IPR2024-01091 · APJ Barbara A Benoit · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR of claims 1, 27, 30, 32, 34, 59, 62, and 64 on all asserted grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that at least one challenged claim is unpatentable.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“d. Conclusion Regarding Asserted Obviousness over Kim In sum, for the reasons discussed above, Petitioner’s showing regarding claim 1 is sufficient for institution. Accordingly, having reviewed the Petition, Preliminary Response, and evidence cited therein, we determine that Petitioner has established a reasonable likelihood that Kim renders obvious claim 1. As such, Petitioner’s showing is sufficient to institute an inter partes review on all challenged claims on all asserted grounds. 37 C.F.R. § 42.108(a) (“When instituting inter partes review, the Board will authorize the review to proceed on all of the challenged claims and on all grounds of unpatentability asserted for each claim.”); see SAS Inst. v. Iancu, 138 S. Ct. 1348, 1359–60 (2018). Notwithstanding, we address other claims and other grounds below, particularly in response to Patent Owner’s preliminary arguments.” slip op. at 29
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“asserts that a person of ordinary skill in the art “would have had at least a bachelor’s degree in computer science, computer engineering, electrical engineering, human-computer interaction, or a related field, and would have had at least two years of relevant work experience in the design and development of graphical user interfaces (GUIs), human-computer interfaces, or equivalents thereof.” Pet. 10 n.4 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 26); Ex. 1003 ¶ 26. Dr. Cockburn also indicates that “[l]ess work experience may be compensated by a higher level of education and vice versa.” Id. Patent Owner indicates it “does not necessarily agree with all aspects of Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill, but does not believe that resolving that level is necessary to resolve the issues raised in this preliminary response.” Prelim. Resp. 4. Dr. Surati indicates that his opinions provided in his declaration in support of Patent Owner’s Preliminary Response are “provided from the perspective of the POSITA” proposed by Dr.Cockburn. Ex. 2001 ¶ 38 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 26). consistent with the prior art of record. Accordingly, we adopt Petitioner’s definition of the level of ordinary skill for purposes of this Decision.” slip op. at 9
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Lexicography (patentee as own lexicographer)Term construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner
“standards for finding lexicography in a specification are exacting. Hill-Rom Services, Inc. v. Stryker Corp., 755 F.3d 1367, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2014). “To act as its own lexicographer, a patentee must clearly set forth a definition of the disputed claim term other than its plain and ordinary meaning and must clearly express an intent to redefine the term.” Id. (internal quotations omitted). As Patent Owner correctly notes, the specification states: In various embodiments, the contact pressure level may be represented by a touch state. In the context of the present description, a touch state refers to a predefined subset of the range of measurable contact pressures. For example, in one embodiment, contact pressure levels may be represented as one of four predefined touch states: no touch, light touch, medium touch, and heavy touch. Ex. 1001, 19:35–41; Prelim. Resp. 27 (quoting Ex. 1001, 19:35–41). Patent Owner, however, has not identified any words of manifest exclusion or restriction in that passage that indicate an intent to redefine the claim term. Rather than indicating the claims are to be restricted, the specification indicates how that the term “touch state” is to be understood in the descriptions presented in the specification. Ex. 1001, 19:36–37.” slip op. at 17
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundInstituted
“would have been obvious over Kim and Bowens to be sufficient for institution. Petitioner generally relies on Kim’s description as discussed above. Pet. 62–68. Specifically, in its combination, Petitioner relies on Kim’s hold event and scaling operation for Limitations [1.g and 1.h]. Pet. 64–67. Petitioner additionally relies on Bowen as providing details on recognizing and acting on specific gestures on a user interface. See, e.g., Pet. 55. Petitioner provides reasons one of ordinary skill would have combined the references in the manner proposed by Petitioner. See, e.g., Pet. 53–62. Petitioner also provides reasons one of ordinary skill would have reasonable expectation of success in combining the references in the manner proposed by Petitioner. Pet. 60–61.” slip op. at 30
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSRPatents in suitUS 10,936,114 - Netflix, Inc. v. VL Collective IP LLCAll claims unpatentablePTAB · Jan 7, 2025 · IPR2023-00891 · APJ Karl D Easthom · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–22 are unpatentable, including as anticipated by Comps; the majority finds Comps’s Tracks 1 and 3 example meets the claim limitations.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“the prior art and supported by the testimony of Dr. Bederson. See Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 28–30. Dr. Goodrich testifies that “Dr. Bederson and Petitioner offer a slightly different definition of the POSITA, which is similar to my definition” and that his “opinions would not change were” he “to adopt the definition of POSITA offered by Petitioner.” Ex. 2011 ¶ 54. Accordingly, we adopt Petitioner’s proposal, which is materially the same as Patent Owner’s proposal for purposes of this Final Written Decision, as Dr. Goodrich testifies. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (the prior art may reflect an appropriate level of skill in the art).” slip op. at 8
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownOther
“1. content-related data segments Claim 1 recites “content-related . . . data segments.” Patent Owner construes this phrase as “segments of content data that have a syntactical meaning within the respective data file.” PO Resp. 12. As Patent Owner notes, the ’794 patent specification states that “[t]he term ‘content-related’ is understood to mean that first and second data segments have a syntactical meaning within the respective data file, such as e.g. a plurality of succeeding second data segments represent the speech signal of a specific speaker within a dialog sequence.” Id. at 12–13 (quoting Ex. 1001, 4:9–22); Ex. 1001, 4:9–22 (second emphasis added). The ’794 specification supports Patent Owner’s position that the emphasized sentence essentially defines the term “content-related . . . data segments.” PO Resp. 13–15. However, as Petitioner argues, nothing in the sentence restricts “content-related data segments” to “content” only, for example, “sampled audio,” instead of also including information relating to the content. See Reply 3 (arguing that “the phrase ‘content data’ appears nowhere in the ’794 patent and was not part of the ‘inventors’ express lexicography’ for ‘content-related . . . data segments,’ as P[atent] O[wner] incorrectly contends”). Petitioner points out that Patent Owner’s reliance on the specification refers to “content-related . . . data segments” and “contentbased data segments.” Id. (emphasis by Petitioner) (quoting Ex. 1001, 4:9– 22). Petitioner also contends that the specification refers to describing data, contradicting Patent Owner’s position that the data segments must include content. Id. at 7 (“[A]ccording to at least one embodiment of the invention, media data, in particular video or audio data, and/or metadata, in particular encoded according to the XML standard, are described by way of the first and/or second data file.”) (emphasis by Petitioner) (quoting Ex. 1001, 3:4– 10). Moreover, as Petitioner argues, “the word ‘data’ should be given its plain and ordinary meaning,” so that “even if the [unrecited] phrase ‘content data’ is included in the Board’s construction . . . . the term ‘content data’ would include any information relating to the content.” Id. at 4. As noted above, both parties point to the specification’s definition of “content-related . . . data segments”: “The term ‘content-related’ is understood to mean that first and second data segments have a syntactical meaning within the respective data file, such as e.g. a plurality of succeeding second data segments represent the speech signal of a specific speaker within a dialog sequence.” Ex. 1001, 4:9–22. This passage indicates that data segments are content-related or include content, such as a “speech signal,” and that these segments “have a syntactical meaning” with respect to the source of the signal, such as a speaker. See Inst. Dec. 9 & n.8, 17 (observing that “[t]he term ‘content-related’ is somewhat subjective because there is not much guidance in the ’794 patent specification as to what a ‘syntactical meaning’ encompasses”). In context, one plain meaning of the term “syntax” is “[t]he way in which words are put together to form phrases and sentences.” Ex. 3002 (THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE, 1305 (1976)). However, as indicated above, the ’794 patent refers to video images and audio sounds with a syntactical meaning, showing that it embraces broader subject matter than the plain meaning of “syntax.” Patent Owner’s argument that the ’794 patent refers to “content-” slip op. at 9
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableUnpatentable
“segments.’”). Comps supports Petitioner and states that “two syllables represented by the fields TEXT[1] and TEXT[2] must be presented to the user.” Ex. 1004, 3:39–40 (emphasis added). Accordingly, Petitioner persuasively maps each of these text fields to an “associated one of the content-related first data segments [Nf3 and Nf4, respectively] on the basis of an assignment rule [the SYNCH process],” as claim 1 requires.” slip op. at 34
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successUnpatentableUnpatentable
“1. Claim 6 Petitioner identifies particular passages in Comps and Wan as teaching or suggesting the subject matter additionally recited in claim 6 and provides reasons for combining the teachings. Pet. 50–51. The record supports Petitioner’s showing. See id. Patent Owner does not provide separate arguments for claim 6. See generally PO Resp. Based on the full record, we determine that Petitioner shows by a preponderance of evidence that Comps and Wan render claim 6 unpatentable. 2. Claims 7, 8, and 22 Claim 7 recites “[t]he method as claimed in claim 1, further” slip op. at 68
Patent outcomesUS 8,605,794 unpatentableClaim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 8,605,794
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.