- Shenzhen Tuozhu Technology Co. Ltd. v. Stratasys, Inc.Institution deniedPTAB · Oct 6, 2025 · IPR2025-00585 · APJ Lilan Ren · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution on claims 1–6, 10–19 because claim 1’s scope is ambiguous and the petition did not show a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on any asserted obviousness ground.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“review. See 35 U.S.C. § 314 (2024); 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a) (2024). Institution of an inter partes review requires that “the information presented in the petition . . . and any response . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). For the reasons set forth below, we determine that the scope of claim 1 is ambiguous and that there is not a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner will prevail with respect to at least one challenged claim, and we deny inter partes review.1” slip op. at 2
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed board ownOther
“distinguishes and contrasts build material property from operational parameters. The diagnostic test passage therefore only describes a diagnostic test of the build material property but does not describe a subsequent diagnostic test to assess whether an operational parameter is suitable for the printer. Based solely on the diagnostic test passage and the prosecution history, a possible interpretation may be that the operational parameter determination in claim element 1b encompasses the diagnostic testing in claim element 1c. That is, “performing a diagnostic test to determine whether the operational parameter is suitable for the three-dimensional printer” in claim element 1c is subsumed as part of “determining an operational parameter of a fabrication process using the three-dimensional printer based upon the data, the operational parameter including at least one of a build platform temperature, a build volume temperature, an infill requirement, a rafting requirement, a support structure requirement, and a cooling requirement” in claim element 1b.” slip op. at 15
- Disclosure Requirements (§112) › Written description (Ariad)Not entitled to earlier dateOther
“benefit of the filing date of an earlier filed application only if the disclosure of the earlier application provides support for the claims of the later application, as required by 35 U.S.C. § 112.” PowerOasis, Inc. v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., 522 F.3d 1299, 1306 (Fed. Cir. 2008); see also Research Corps. Techs. v. Microsoft Corp., 627 F.3d 859, 871–72 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (holding that claims of the later-filed application, which were not limited to a “blue noise mask,” were “not entitled to claim the benefit of their parent applications’ filing dates”); ICU Med., Inc. v. Alaris Med. Sys., 558 F.3d 1368, 1377–78 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (holding that “spikeless” claims “added years later during prosecution” were not supported by the specification which “describe[d] only medical valves with spikes”); Tronzo v. Biomet, Inc., 156 F.3d 1154, 1158–60 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (holding the generic shaped cup claims of the later-filed child application were not entitled to the filing date of the parent application that “disclosed only a trapezoidal cup and nothing more”). “To satisfy the written description requirement the disclosure of the prior application must convey with reasonable clarity to those skilled in the art that, as of the filing date sought, [the inventor] was in possession of the invention.” PowerOasis, 522 F.3d at 1306 (emphasis omitted; alteration in original). The sufficiency of written description support is based on “an objective inquiry into the four corners of the specification from the perspective of a person of ordinary skill in the art.” Ariad Pharm., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en banc).” slip op. at 20
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner contends that a person of ordinary skill in the art in the field in the relevant time frame would have had “(1) at least a bachelor’s degree in Mechanical Engineering, Computer Engineering, Chemical Engineering, Materials Science, or a related field, and (2) at least two years of research or industry experience in 3D printing or materials used for 3D printing.” Pet. 5 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 20). Petitioner also contends that “[a]dditional experience could substitute for a formal degree or formal training (and vice versa).” Id. (citing the same). Patent Owner contends that an ordinarily skilled artisan “would have had a bachelor’s degree in Mechanical Engineering, Computer Engineering, Electrical Engineering, Chemical Engineering, Materials Science, or a comparable field and at least two years of experience related to 3D printing, with additional experience potentially being a substitute for a formal degree or training (and vice versa).” Prelim. Resp. 12. For purposes of this decision, we adopt Petitioner’s definition of the level of ordinary skill in the art as it appears unopposed and consistent with the disclosures of the ’464 patent and the prior art of record. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001).” slip op. at 9
Claim construction§ 112 disclosurecites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,167,464 - PTAB · Oct 6, 2025 · IPR2025-00531 · APJ Mitchell G Weatherly · IPR · Institution
Instituted IPR of claims 1–15 on all grounds; found a reasonable likelihood that claims 1–6 and 8–15 are obvious over Warren.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“filed a Preliminary Response. Paper 8 (“Prelim. Resp.”). Institution of an inter partes review is authorized by statute when “the information presented in the petition filed under section 311 and any response filed under section 313 shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). Based on our review of the record,1 we conclude that Petitioner is reasonably likely to prevail with respect to at least one of the challenged claims.” slip op. at 2
- BurdenInstituted
“limitations set forth in claim 1. Pet. 16–23 (citing Ex. 1004 ¶¶ 7–14, 58–63, 93, 230–324, 390–446, Figs. 18, 22A, 23A; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 72–92). Patent Owner counters that “Warren does not teach one or more sensors configured to detect a current contact force.” Prelim. Resp. 25. The “current contact force” is detected by “one or more sensors” as recited in limitation 1b and limitation 1c requires “detecting the current contact force based on a sensor signal from the one or more sensors.” Ex. 1001, 12:40–45. Patent Owner does not currently contest Petitioner’s showing relating to Warren’s teaching of the other limitations recited in the method of claim 1. See Prelim. Resp. 25–27.” slip op. at 10
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundInstituted
“Petitioner cites portions of Warren and Dr. Wolfe’s testimony to support these reasons. Id. (citing Ex. 1004 ¶¶ 93, 226–252, 283–318, 331, 332; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 65–71). Patent Owner has yet to submit expert testimony, so Dr. Wolfe’s testimony relating to the motivations of an ordinarily skilled artisan is largely unrebutted.” slip op. at 9
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Prior-art status of a reference › Printed publication / public accessibilityPrinted publication establishedInstituted
“available because Petitioner’s showing impermissibly incorporates argument by reference. Id. at 29–30. Although Petitioner’s showing is somewhat brief, see Pet. 2, we have no concerns about the sufficiency of that showing, which is based on direct testimony from a witness with undeniable personal knowledge of the history of the RepRap online forum in which RepRap20208 appears, Adrian Bowyer. Nor do we find it necessary to “piece together” arguments based on Mr. Bowyer’s testimony, which we find to be clear, concise, and probative on the nature of the RepRap forum and who frequented that forum during the relevant time period. Patent Owner is entitled to test the probative value of Mr. Bowyer’s testimony at trial if it desires.” slip op. at 13
§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · GrahamPatents in suitUS 9,168,698 - PTAB · Oct 6, 2025 · IPR2025-00532 · APJ Mitchell G Weatherly · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on all challenged claims, 1–16, and all asserted grounds; it found a reasonable likelihood that claims 1–6 and 9–16 are obvious over Warren.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“filed a Preliminary Response. Paper 8 (“Prelim. Resp.”). Institution of an inter partes review is authorized by statute when “the information presented in the petition filed under section 311 and any response filed under section 313 shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). Based on our review of the record,1 we conclude that Petitioner is reasonably likely to prevail with respect to at least one of the challenged claims.” slip op. at 2
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundInstituted
“Petitioner identifies four motives for adding a transducer 3740 and vibration sensor 3730 used in connection with Warren’s vibro-capillary dispenser 3700 to Warren’s through-nozzle dispenser 100. Pet. 11–14. Petitioner cites portions of Warren and Dr. Wolfe’s testimony to support these reasons. Id. (citing Ex. 1004 ¶¶ 93, 226–252, 283–318, 331, 332; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 66–72). Patent Owner has yet to submit expert testimony, so Dr. Wolfe’s testimony relating to the motivations of an ordinarily skilled artisan is largely unrebutted.” slip op. at 7
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Prior-art status of a reference › Printed publication / public accessibilityPrinted publication establishedInstituted
“First, that Petitioner fails to establish that RepRap20208 was publicly available because Petitioner’s showing impermissibly incorporates argument by reference. Id. at 27–28. Although Petitioner’s showing is somewhat brief, see Pet. 2, we have no concerns about the sufficiency of that showing, which is based on direct testimony from a witness with undeniable personal knowledge of the history of the RepRap online forum in which RepRap20208 appears, Adrian Bowyer. Nor do we find it necessary to “piece together” arguments based on Mr. Bowyer’s testimony, which we find to be clear, concise, and probative on the nature of the RepRap forum and who frequented that forum during the relevant time period. Patent Owner is entitled to test the probative value of Mr. Bowyer’s testimony at trial if it desires.” slip op. at 12
- Skill levelOther
§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,556,381 - Valve Corporation v. Immersion CorporationAll claims unpatentablePTAB · Aug 11, 2025 · IPR2024-00557 · APJ Christopher L Ogden · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–8, 11, 12, and 15–21 are unpatentable as anticipated by Rogers and obvious over Rogers.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“The parties’ proposed levels of ordinary skill appear to be substantially the same, are both supported by testimonial evidence, and appear to be consistent with the asserted prior art and the types of problems and solutions addressed in the ’067 patent. See, e.g., Ex. 1001, 1:7–53. Although Patent Owner’s proposed level is more specific about the nature of the practical or industry experience, neither party has argued that the differences between the parties’ proposed levels of ordinary skill would affect the outcome. We adopt Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill for this decision.” slip op. at 7
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Specification disavowal / 'present invention' languageDisclaimer not foundDecided for petitioner
“inside” it, the evidence does not support Patent Owner’s position. First, the plain language of independent claim 1 states that the proxy object “compris[es]” the one or more haptic output devices. Ex. 1001, 10:42–43. This is broader than the “within” language of the non-entered amendment. See Ex. 1002, 258. Not only does the evidence fail to show clear disclaimer (see United States v. Telectronics, Inc., 857 F.2d 778, 782–83 (Fed. Cir. 1988)), the adoption of broader “comprising” language shows an intent for the claims not to be limited to systems in which the proxy object contains haptic output devices “inside” it. We also do not agree with Patent Owner that the applicant’s attempts during prosecution to distinguish Gonzales are a clear disclaimer of claim scope. The applicant argued that Gonzales’s AR glove, which contained haptic output actuators in it (see, e.g., Ex. 1008 ¶¶ 80–82, Fig. 3B), was not a “proxy object” as recited in the claims because “the virtual objects and/or visible alterations to the vehicle [the user is sitting in while wearing the 6 Once again, Patent Owner mistakenly references Exhibit 2001. glove] are not overlaid on the AR glove . . . [a]nd the physical portions of the vehicle were visible alterations are overlaid do not include any feedback devices.” Ex. 1002, 287. Thus, the issue raised during prosecution was not whether the AR glove comprised haptic output devices—which it clearly did even under Patent Owner’s proposed construction—but whether the AR glove had modified visual effects displayed on it as per limitation 1D3. slip op. at 11
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“For the above reasons, we decline to adopt Patent Owner’s proposed construction of “a proxy object comprising one or more haptic output devices” as meaning “a physical object that acts as a proxy for a virtual object and that itself contains inside a haptic output device, e.g., an actuator.” PO Resp. 10. Instead, we conclude that no explicit construction is necessary beyond the ordinary and customary meaning.” slip op. at 12
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundUnpatentable
“Alternatively, we find persuasive Petitioner’s argument that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had used both the camera data and the inertial sensor data in determining the “reloading” haptic effect. Pet. 77; Pet. Reply 19–22; Ex. 1003 ¶ 318; Tr. 31:3–10. This is evident in light of Rogers’s disclosures (1) that both sets of data are used to determine the pointing direction of interface object 104 in at least some contexts (Ex. 1010 ¶ 106); and (2) that the “reloading” haptic effect is based on the pointing direction (Ex. 1010 ¶ 105). See Intel Corp., v. PACT XPP Schweiz AG, 61 F.4th 1373, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2023) (“[If] there’s a known technique to address a known problem using prior art elements according to their established functions, then there is a motivation to combine.” (internal quotation omitted)). Thus, Petitioner has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that Rogers discloses limitation 1D2, and alternatively that limitation 1D2 would have been obvious based on Rogers’s disclosures.” slip op. at 28
Patent outcomesUS 10,665,067 unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,665,067 - Cisco Systems, Inc. v. Portsmouth Network Corp.No claims unpatentablePTAB · Aug 4, 2025 · IPR2024-00503 · APJ Charles J Boudreau · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–18 were not shown unpatentable because the asserted obviousness combinations did not cure the failure to show the claimed request and routing steps.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner contends that a person of ordinary skill in the art in the field of the ’279 patent in January 2001 “would have had a working knowledge of the network communication technologies that are pertinent to the ’279 patent, including network flow allocation in a ring topology.” Pet. 12. More specifically, Petitioner argues, a person of ordinary skill in the art “would have had a master’s degree in computer science, computer engineering, or an equivalent, and two years of professional experience relating to network communications and resource allocations,” where “[a]dditional work experience can substitute for specific educational background, and vice versa.” Id. (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 20). Patent Owner represents that it “does not dispute Petitioner’s definition” for the purposes of its Response. PO Resp. 5. We find Petitioner’s proposal is consistent with the evidence of record, including the asserted prior art and the ’279 patent, and, therefore, we likewise adopt Petitioner’s proposed definition of the level of ordinary skill in the art for purposes of this Decision.” slip op. at 11
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached
“Neither party contends that any formal claim construction is necessary. See Pet. 12 (“Petitioner submits that, for the purposes of this proceeding and the grounds presented herein, no claim term requires express construction.”); PO Resp. 4 (“Here, at this stage in the proceeding, Patent Owner will apply the ordinary and customary meaning to the ’279 Patent’s claim terms.”). Patent Owner notes, however, that Petitioner had asserted specific constructions in the Cisco litigation for the term “predetermined,” as recited in claims 1, 10, 14–16, and 18, and for the term “quantum.” PO Resp. 4. Specifically, according to Patent Owner, Petitioner proposed that “predetermined” be construed as “determined before the data flow request” and that “quantum” be construed as “an amount of a requested resource by which to increase or decrease.” Id. (citing Ex. 2007). Patent Owner contends asserted prior art combinations disclose or render obvious the challenged claims under these constructions. Id. Because our conclusion that Petitioner has not demonstrated that any of the challenged claims are unpatentable does not turn on the construction of either “predetermined” or “quantum,” there is no need for us to construe those terms. See Realtime Data, 912 F.3d at 1375.” slip op. at 12
- Strike new argumentNew argument disregardedDecided for patent owner
“We again are not persuaded by Petitioner’s argument. As an initial matter, we find no argument with respect to “best effort data traffic” or dropped packets in the Petition. See Tr. 12:10–21 (conceding that “the phrase ‘best effort’ was not in the Petition” but arguing that it was raised in response to the Patent Owner Response). Moreover, we are unable to identify any argument in the Patent Owner Response to which this line of argument is properly responsive, and Petitioner does not identify any such line of argument. Instead, Petitioner’s argument appears to advance belatedly a new theory. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.23(b); Patent Trial and Appeal Board Consolidated Trial Practice Guide (Nov. 2019), 73–74, available at” slip op. at 43
- Expert testimonyPatent owner expert creditedPetitioner expert discountedMixed
“We credit the supporting testimony of Dr. Olivier on the points discussed above, as it is explained sufficiently and consistent with the testimony simply mirrors the Petition and does not explain sufficiently why a person of ordinary skill in the art would have understood Kovvali in the manner Petitioner asserts. See Pet. 35; Reply 17–18; Ex. 1003 ¶ 83.” slip op. at 44
Patent outcomesUS 7,035,279 not shown unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 7,035,279 - Cisco Systems, Inc. v. Portsmouth Network Corp.Some claims unpatentablePTAB · Aug 4, 2025 · IPR2024-00505 · APJ Justin T Arbes · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1, 2, 4–7, 9, 10, 13, 14, 16–19, 21, and 22 are unpatentable as obvious over Gai under theory 1B; claims 11, 12, 23, and 24 were not shown unpatentable.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“patent, we look to “1) the types of problems encountered in the art; 2) the prior art solutions to those problems; 3) the rapidity with which innovations are made; 4) the sophistication of the technology; and 5) the educational level of active workers in the field.” Ruiz v. A.B. Chance Co., 234 F.3d 654, 666–67 (Fed. Cir. 2000). “Not all such factors may be present in every case, and one or more of them may predominate.” Id. at 667.” slip op. at 10
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITAPlain and ordinary meaningOther
“The most common type of MAC bridge is a switch, which has multiple ports connecting it to LANs, other switches, host computing systems, or other network elements. Switches can be roughly classified as access switches or core switches. An access switch has ports that connect to LANs and/or to other network endpoints, such as user computer systems. Core switches interconnect the access switches into a Wide Area Network (WAN), by direct connection between the core switch and access switches and/or by connection to other core switches. Core switches that are directly connected to access switches are referred to herein as edge switches. Ex. 1001, col. 1, ll. 27–38. Both parties refer to this disclosure when arguing whether particular switches in the asserted prior art (Gai) qualify as an “access switch” or “edge switch.” See Pet. 5, 22, 27–28 (“edge switches are ‘[c]ore switches that are directly connected to access switches’”), 71; PO Resp. 31–32 (“The ’986 patent discloses that ‘[a]n access switch has ports that connect to LANs and/or to other network endpoints.’ . . . The ’986 patent also discloses that edge switches are ‘[c]ore switches that are directly connected to access switches.’”); Reply 20, 22. Dr. Houh and Dr. Olivier do so as well. See Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 39, 66–67, 82–83, 166, 171, 193; Ex. 2001 ¶ 80. Based on the full trial record, we agree and conclude that the descriptions of “access switch” and “edge switch” in the ’986 patent reflect what was understood to be the plain and ordinary meanings of these terms at the time of the invention. Accordingly, we interpret “access switch” to mean a switch with ports that connect to LANs and/or to other network endpoints, such as user computer systems, and interpret “edge switch” to mean a core switch that is directly connected to an access switch.” slip op. at 12
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)UnpatentableNot shown unpatentableMixed
“and conclude that Petitioner has not shown sufficiently that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to designate switch 117 as the root switch when implementing the network reconfiguration method of Gai. The only mention of an access switch connected to port 7 of switch 114 is at column 13, lines 59–63 of Gai. While that sentence establishes that such an access switch may exist in the network, it does not state or imply that it would be the root switch. Instead, when discussing the operation of the Figure 1 network, Gai only identifies switches 120 and 121 as the root switch. See Ex. 1005, col. 10, ll. 37–41, col. 11, ll. 60–64, col. 14, ll. 16–20, col. 15, ll. 27–29, 38–51, col. 16, ll. 42–45. To be sure, Gai does disclose that “execution of the spanning tree algorithm causes the switches to elect a single switch, among all the switches within each network, to be the ‘root’ switch,” where “[e]ach switch has a unique numerical identifier (switch ID) and the root is the switch having the lowest switch ID numeric value,” such that an access switch can be the root switch if it has the lowest switch ID. See Ex. 1005, col. 2, ll. 42–47, col. 10, ll. 29–36. As Patent Owner and Dr. Olivier explain in detail, though, Gai expressly cautions against doing so. Gai discloses that [d]epending on the configuration of a given network, the location of the root can significantly affect the distance that messages must travel. For example, many networks include a plurality of switches designated as access switches that provide connectivity to LANs, end stations, etc., and a plurality of backbone switches that, in turn, interconnect the various access switches. If the root is located at an access switch and the principal server utilized by the end stations (i.e., clients) is coupled to a backbone switch, the average distance between end stations and the primary server may be quite high, resulting in inefficient network operation. In addition, the backbone switches may become partitioned as ports between them are blocked. Id. at col. 3, ll. 17–29; see also id. at col. 10, ll. 26–29 (the “location of the root may affect the average distance (i.e., the average number of hops) a message travels and/or cause undesirable partitioning of backbone switches”). Thus, the location of the root is not an unimportant consideration—it affects the distance messages must travel and can cause backbone switches to be partitioned. See id. Gai, therefore, discloses that “[t]o reduce the average distance and avoid partitioning of the backbone switches, it is desirable to locate the root at a backbone switch.”10 Id. at col. 3, ll. 29–31 (emphasis added). Switch 117 in Petitioner’s modified Figure 1 is an access switch, not a backbone switch. See id. at col. 6, ll. 10–12 (“Access switches are preferably coupled to entities (e.g., LANs, end stations, etc.) whereas backbone switches provide the interconnections between access switches.”).” slip op. at 44
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundMotivation not foundMixed
“We agree with Petitioner. For purposes of claim 1, which does not recite “downstream” communication of dummy traffic (unlike claims 11, 12, 23, and 24), the only modification to Figure 1 is the addition of switch 117 and server 112e—otherwise, in Petitioner’s analysis, Gai’s method operates exactly as described when a failure occurs at root port 3 of switch 114. See Pet. 69–73, 81–85; Tr. 47:20–48:2. That modification is expressly supported by Gai, which discloses the following: Rapid reconfiguration entity 234 similarly generates one or more separate multicast messages 400 for each remaining entity directly coupled to access switch 114 (i.e., entities or end stations on LANs 102–104). In each message 400, entity 234 loads SA field 414 with the address of the corresponding entity. Each of these messages are similarly forwarded by access switch 114 through the new forwarding port (i.e., port number four). In addition, entity 234 generates and transmits one or more multicast messages 400 for entities reachable through switch 114 on ports other than its root port. For example, if port number seven at switch 114 were coupled to another access switch, entity 234 would transmit multicast messages 400 carrying the source address of entities directly coupled to this additional access switch as well. Thus, at least one multicast message 400 is generated and transmitted for each entity directly coupled to or downstream of access switch 114 (relative to the root). As set forth above, upon receipt of these multicast messages 400, the other devices within network 100 update their corresponding filtering databases with the new destination ports, as necessary. Ex. 1005, col. 13, l. 50–col. 14, l. 3 (emphasis added). Gai thus expressly contemplates the addition of “another access switch” coupled to port 7 of switch 114. Switch 117 in the modified Figure 1 is such a switch. See PO Resp. 30 (Patent Owner arguing that “a [person of ordinary skill in the art] would understand that switch 117 is an access switch”); Ex. 1018, 84:14–85:9 (Dr. Olivier agreeing that switch 117 is an “access switch”). And because an “access switch” has “ports that connect to LANs and/or to other network endpoints, such as user computer systems,” and the above disclosure mentions “entities directly coupled to th[e] additional access switch,” switch 117 would be directly connected to a device like server 112e as well. See Ex. 1001, col. 1, ll. 31–33; Ex. 1005, col. 13, ll. 59–63; supra Section II.B. We credit Dr. Houh’s testimony that Gai in its written description expressly discloses the particular “variation of the topology” of Figure 1 that Petitioner asserts. See Ex. 1003 ¶ 165. Third, Patent Owner argues that Petitioner has not established that a person of ordinary skill in the art “would have had a reasonable expectation of success in modifying Gai to meet the claims.” PO Resp. 14–16 (citing Ex. 2001 ¶¶ 47–49). Patent Owner’s arguments are primarily directed to Petitioner’s asserted modification for its “1A” theory. See id. To the extent Patent Owner’s arguments apply to claim 1 and “1B,” we disagree, as Gai expressly describes the asserted modification to Figure 1 (i.e., adding an access switch connected to port 7 of switch 114). Thus, we are persuaded that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had a reasonable expectation of success in achieving the method of claim 1 based on Gai’s full disclosure.” slip op. at 33
Patent outcomesUS 6,917,986 mixedClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 6,917,986 - Valve Corporation v. Immersion CorporationAll claims unpatentablePTAB · Jul 31, 2025 · IPR2024-00508 · APJ Christopher L Ogden · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–18, 21–24, and 26–29 are unpatentable as anticipated by Rosenberg; the Board did not reach the alternative Brock grounds.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner argues that a person of ordinary skill in the art “would have a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer science, or a related field, plus at least two years of industry experience or graduate-level academic experience with human-computer interaction.” Pet. 7 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 40–45). This level of skill appears reasonable in view of the disclosures in the ’546 patent and asserted prior art. We adopt Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill for this Decision.” slip op. at 5
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“Petitioner argues that we need not construe any claim terms explicitly because “the Petition’s prior art discloses each element of the challenged claims under any plausible construction.” Pet. 8. We agree with Petitioner that, for this Decision, we do not need to construe any of the terms explicitly. See Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))). To the extent that we discuss specific claim language, we do so below in the context of the prior art. See, e.g., infra Section III.C.2(e).” slip op. at 6
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableUnpatentable
“To show anticipation under § 102, a petitioner must locate every element in a claim, arranged as recited in the claim, in a single prior art reference. See Net MoneyIN, Inc. v. VeriSign, Inc., 545 F.3d 1359, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2008). The limitations may be present in the reference “either explicitly or inherently.” In re Schreiber, 128 F.3d 1473, 1477 (Fed. Cir. 1997). In making this determination, we consider the reference “together with the knowledge of one of ordinary skill in the pertinent art.” In re Paulsen, 30 F.3d 1475, 1480 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (citing In re Samour, 571 F.2d 559, 562 (CCPA 1978)).” slip op. at 6
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)UnpatentableUnpatentable
“A claim is unpatentable for obviousness under § 103(a) if the differences between the claimed subject matter and the prior art are “such that the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains.” KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 406 (2007). When a ground in a petition is based on a combination of references, we consider “whether there was an apparent reason to combine the known elements in the fashion claimed by the patent at issue.” Id. at 418 (citing In re Kahn, 441 F.3d 977, 988 (Fed. Cir. 2006)). We base our obviousness inquiry on factual considerations including (1) the scope and content of the prior art, (2) any differences between the claimed subject matter and the prior art, (3) the level of skill in the art, and (4) any objective indicia of obviousness or non-obviousness that may be in evidence.4 See Graham, 383 U.S. at 17–18.” slip op. at 7
Patent outcomesUS 9,116,546 unpatentableClaim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 9,116,546 - Valve Corporation v. Immersion CorporationAll claims unpatentablePTAB · Jul 28, 2025 · IPR2024-00556 · APJ Michael R Zecher · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–18 are unpatentable as obvious over Astala and Shahoian; claims 1, 6–9, 13, 14, and 18 also over Keely and Kolmykov-Zotov; claims 2–5, 10–12, and 15–17 also over those references with Shahoian.
RulingsFinal written decision- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Plain and ordinary meaningOther
“As we explained in the Institution Decision, we have reviewed the Board’s prior decision in IPR2016-01777 and we disagree with Valve that the previous Board panel actually construed the “determining a press” limitation. See Dec. on Inst. 9–10. The previous Board panel was merely making the point that the three conditions in the “determining a press” limitation had to be related in some way, and pointed to Figure 3 of the ’507 patent as an example of that relationship. IPR2016-01777, Paper 7 at 14–15 (Ex. 1023) (explaining that the interval in Figure 3 is “an integral part of the ‘determining a press imitation’”). The prior Board decision in IPR2016-01777 did not contain a claim construction because, in its Decision on Rehearing, the previous Board panel stated that it “did not expressly construe the ‘determining a press limitation’ or interpret[] the limitation to require the first two conditions recited in the limitation to be maintained for the duration of the first interval.” Apple Inc. v. Immersion Corp., IPR2016- 01777, Paper 9 at 3 (PTAB Apr. 27, 2017) (Decision Denying Petitioner’s Request for Rehearing). Thus, the prior Board decision outcome was not reliant on any particular claim interpretation or characterization of Figure 3; instead, it faulted the petitioner in that case for not considering the three conditions as a whole in the manner required by the claims. Id. at 3–4 (explaining that the petitioner needed to show the “‘first interval has elapsed’ condition as a part of the ‘determining a press limitation’” (emphasis added)). Notwithstanding, and for the sake of clarity, to the extent the prior Board decision in IPR2016-01777 characterized Figure 3 of the ’507 patent to require the pressure and change in pressure conditions to be met during the entire interval, we agree with Valve that such a reading of Figure 3 is incorrect. As Valve points out in its analysis, with which we agree, the flowchart in Figure 3 allows for both the pressure and change in pressure conditions to be met during some but not all of the entire time interval in certain circumstances. Pet. 12–14.3 In summary, we agree with Valve that the three conditions of the “determining a press” limitation are independent insofar as satisfaction of one condition is not predicated on the satisfaction of another condition. In our view, however, that point is merely reciting what the claim already requires—namely, that “determining a press” is defined as the satisfaction of the three conditions. Nothing more is required. Thus, we do not see the need to construe independent claim 1 beyond its plain language.” slip op. at 8
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Relying on the testimony of Mr. Ward, Valve argues the following: [a] person of ordinary skill in the art . . . on November 26, 2003 would have had a Bachelors’ degree in computer science, electrical engineering, or a related field, plus at least two years of industry or graduate level experience with software engineering, haptics programming, and/or human-computer interaction, including experience with user-interfaces and applications involving touchscreens, touchpads, and related technologies. Pet. 7 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 47–51). Accordingly, we maintain our preliminary determination regarding the level of ordinary skill in the art. See Dec. on Inst. 8. That is, we adopt Valve’s proposed assessment of the level of ordinary skill in the art because (1) it is consistent with the ’507 patent and the asserted prior art; and (2) it is supported by the testimony of Mr. Ward. We apply this assessment of the level of ordinary skill in the art in our obviousness evaluations below.” slip op. at 12
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundUnpatentable
“Turning to rationale to combine, Valve contends that, because Shahoian recognizes that “[o]ne problem with existing touchpads is that there is no haptic feedback provided to the user” to “assist and inform the user” when interpreting gestures, a person of ordinary skill in the art would have recognized that Astala’s input touch screen 70 was ready for the improvement that Shahoian provides—namely, “haptic feedback associated with touchpad/touchscreen input gestures.” Pet. 17–18 (quoting Ex. 1006 ¶ 6) (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 158–160). Valve argues that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have recognized that incorporating Shahoian’s haptic feedback into Astala’s input touch screen 70 would have introduced certain benefits taught by Shahoian, including, but not limited to, using haptic feedback to inform users of touchpad gestures by “assist[ing] users in noisy environments . . . where sound may not be easily heard by the user.” Id. at 18 (quoting Ex. 1006 ¶ 178) (citing Ex. 1006 ¶¶ 6, 187, 188, 193; Ex. 1003 ¶ 161). Valve also argues that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to use Shahoian’s pressure-sensing components in Astala’s input touch screen 70 because, among other reasons, using actual pressure sensors in a touchpad would have provided more accurate determinations of user input. Id. at 19 (citing Ex. 1006 ¶ 41; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 164–166). Valve asserts there was a reasonable expectation of success in making the proposed combination because it involves “us[ing] Shahoian’s haptic feedback and pressure sensors for their intended use.” Pet. 19–20 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 180, 181). In addition, Valve asserts that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have reasonably expected Shahoian’s haptic feedback and pressure sensors to succeed in Astala because “Shahoian demonstrates that algorithms for haptic feedback were known and predictable.” Id. at 20 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 182). In summary, upon reviewing Valve’s unrebutted arguments and evidence explaining how the combined teachings of Astala and Shahoian account for all the limitations of independent claims 1, 9, and 14, we agree with and adopt Valve’s analysis. See Pet. 17–31, 38–41. Accordingly, Valve has demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that the subject matter of these independent claims would have been obvious over the combined teachings of Astala and Shahoian.” slip op. at 19
Patent outcomesUS 8,749,507 unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 8,749,507 - PTAB · Jul 22, 2025 · IPR2025-00255 · APJ Charles J Boudreau · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–27 and all petition grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that claims 1, 23, and 27 are obvious over Wilcox, Londergan, Raskin, and Wu.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“c) Summary For the reasons discussed above, Petitioner has made sufficient showings at this stage of the proceeding that the Wilcox-Londergan-Raskin- Wu combination teaches or suggests every limitation in claims 1, 23, and 27 of the ’139 patent, that one of ordinary skill in the art would have had reason to combine those teachings and suggestions to arrive at the inventions recited in claims 1, 23, and 27, and that one of ordinary skill in the art would have had a reasonable expectation of success. Accordingly, Petitioner has demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on its challenges to claims 1, 23, and 27 based on the combination of Wilcox, Londergan, Raskin, and Wu. Accordingly, institution of an inter partes review is appropriate under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a).” slip op. at 33
- Skill levelSkill level patent owner adoptedDecided for patent owner
“Patent Owner does not comment on Petitioner’s formulation or offer any competing formulation in its Preliminary Response. See generally Prelim. Resp. Mr. Haeberli, however, testifies as follows in his Declaration: 29. In my opinion, the POSITA at the time of the alleged invention of the Asserted Patents would have had a (1) a Bachelor’s degree in a pertinent discipline, such as computer science, electric engineering, computer engineering, or a related field and (2) have 2–4 years of experience in working with computing devices and have an understanding of indexed search systems utilized by such computing devices. 30. I am aware that Dr. Terveen has provided its own definition . . . . 31. I believe Dr. Terveen’s definition is not meaningfully different from my definition of a POSITA. My opinions would not change regardless of which definition of POSITA is applied. Ex. 2001 ¶¶ 29–31. We find Mr. Haeberli’s formulation to be consistent with the evidence of record at this stage of the proceeding, including the asserted prior art and the ’139 patent, and, accordingly, we adopt and apply that definition for purposes of this Decision. B.” slip op. at 8
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed board ownOther
“missing in the prior art. Prelim. Resp. 29–34. Limitations [1.4], [23.5], and [27.4] each recite: “wherein the first and second partial search strings are separated by a string separator character in the first search field.” Ex. 1001, 29:47–49, 31:33–35, 32:29–31. Petitioner asserts that both of the Lotus Notes references teach receiving a first search string and a second search string in a single search field, separated by “a string separator character (e.g., a Boolean AND operator and/or a comma).” Pet. 25–26 (footnote omitted). We are not fully persuaded by Petitioner’s argument. In particular, the evidence does not support Petitioner’s argument that a Boolean operator such as “AND” is a string separator character. Patent Owner has pointed to intrinsic and extrinsic evidence demonstrating that a string separator character consists of just one character.17 Consequently, based on the 17 As Patent Owner argues, the intrinsic evidence does not support this interpretation of the claim language. Prelim. Resp. 31–32. “First, the ’139 patent distinguishes between string separator characters (such as space, comma, etc.) and ‘modifiers’ (such as AND, OR, NOT, etc.).” Id. at 31; compare Ex. 1001, 30:19–22 (claim 6, “string separator character”), with id. at 31:22–26 (claim 22, Boolean “modifiers”). Moreover, Patent Owner persuasively argues that “a POSITA would not understand Boolean operators such as ‘AND’ to function as string separator characters” and “would have known that the operator AND is a search syntax instruction rather than a string separator.” Prelim. Resp. 31 (citing Ex. 1059, 162; Ex. 2001 ¶ 110). Even Petitioner acknowledges in a footnote that it may not be appropriate to include the Boolean AND operator in the definition of “string separator character.” Petitioner argues:” slip op. at 28
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundInstituted
“one of ordinary skill in the art would have considered “reverting some of the changes that had been made to Lotus Notes R5’s ‘Search Builder’ to make it more similar to Lotus Notes earlier 3.0’s ‘Query Builder.’” Prelim. Resp. 16. The issue, however, is not whether “over the years Lotus Notes moved away from a unified search field[,]” as Patent Owner suggests. Id. at 14. The issue is what “inferences and creative steps” a person of ordinary skill in the art would have employed, based on Wilcox and Londergan, when designing a new method and system for search indexing. KSR, 550 U.S. at 418. Petitioner’s argument is that one of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to consider Wilcox and Londergan together in order to “obtain a more complete and comprehensive understanding of the Lotus Notes system,” which in turn would have inspired certain inferences and creative steps that would have resulted in the portions of the claimed invention allegedly disclosed in Wilcox and/or Londergan. Pet. 22. We do not agree with Patent Owner that this argument can only be the result of improper hindsight bias. See Prelim. Resp. 16–17. At this stage of the proceedings and based on the current record, we determine that Petitioner has sufficiently shown that a POSITA would have been motivated to combine Wilcox and Londergan.” slip op. at 20
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSRPatents in suitUS 9,633,139 - PTAB · Jul 22, 2025 · IPR2025-00254 · APJ Lisa A Murray · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–20 and all asserted grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that claims 1–20 are unpatentable under § 103(a).
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“We may institute an inter partes review when “the information presented in the petition . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) (2018). If we institute an inter partes review, the trial must encompass all claims and grounds identified in the Petition. 37 C.F.R. § 42.108(a) (2025) (“When instituting inter partes review, the Board will authorize the review to proceed on all of the challenged claims and on all grounds of unpatentability asserted for each claim.”). For the reasons set forth below, we conclude that there is a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner will prevail in establishing the unpatentability of all challenged claims. We, therefore, institute an inter partes review of claims 1–20 on the grounds asserted in the Petition. B.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level patent owner adoptedDecided for patent owner
“Patent Owner does not comment on Petitioner’s formulation or offer any competing formulation in its Preliminary Response. See generally Prelim. Resp. Mr. Haeberli, however, testifies as follows in his Declaration: 29. In my opinion, the POSITA at the time of the alleged invention of the Asserted Patents would have had a (1) a Bachelor’s degree in a pertinent discipline, such as computer science, electric engineering, computer engineering, or a related field and (2) have 2–4 years of experience in working with computing devices and have an understanding of indexed search systems utilized by such computing devices. 30. I am aware that Petitioner has provided its own definition . . . . 31. I believe Petitioner’s definition is not meaningfully different from my definition of a POSITA. My opinions would not change regardless of which definition of POSITA is applied. Ex. 2001 ¶¶ 29–31. We find Mr. Haeberli’s formulation to be consistent with the evidence of record at this stage of the proceeding, including the asserted prior art and the ’490 patent, and, accordingly, we adopt and apply that definition for purposes of this Decision. B.” slip op. at 8
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed board ownDecided for patent owner
“art. Prelim. Resp. 30–34. Limitation [1.10] reads, “wherein the first and second partial search strings are separated by a string separator character in the first search field.” Ex. 1001, 30:8–10. Petitioner asserts that both of the Lotus Notes references teach receiving a first search string and a second search string in a single search field, separated by “a string separator character (e.g., a comma and/or a Boolean AND operator).” Pet. 23–24 (footnote omitted). We are not fully persuaded by Petitioner’s argument. In particular, the evidence does not support Petitioner’s argument that a Boolean operator such as “AND” is a string separator character. Patent Owner has pointed to intrinsic and extrinsic evidence demonstrating that a string separator character consists of just one character.16 Consequently, based on the current record, for the purposes of this Decision we preliminarily construe the term “string separator character” to mean “a single-character string separator.” The parties are invited to address the appropriateness of this construction in future briefing. If Boolean modifiers are excluded from the definition of a “string separator character,” then the Londergan Search Bar and Search Builder features, which accept only Boolean operators, do not teach or suggest 16 As Patent Owner argues, the intrinsic evidence does not support this interpretation of the claim language. Prelim. Resp. 31–32. “First, the ’490 patent distinguishes between string separator characters (such as space, comma, etc.) and ‘modifiers’ (such as AND, OR, NOT, etc.).” Id. at 32; compare Ex. 1001, 31:14–17 (claim 12, “string separator character”), with id. at 32:19–23 (claim 20, Boolean “modifiers”). Moreover, Patent Owner persuasively argues that “a POSITA would not understand Boolean operators such as ‘AND’ to function as string separator characters” and “would have known that the operator AND is a search syntax instruction rather than a string separator.” Prelim. Resp. 32 (citing Ex. 1059, 162; Ex. 2001 ¶ 110). Even Petitioner acknowledges in a footnote that it may not be appropriate to include the Boolean AND operator in the definition of “string separator character.” Petitioner argues: To the extent Patent Owner argues the Boolean AND operator is not a string separator character (which Petitioner does not acquiesce is appropriate), it would have been obvious to a POSITA when implementing Raskin’s teachings to perform the search incrementally to use a single-character string separator character, such as a plus sign, as was known in the art (e.g., EX1057, 60, 109, 129, 151), or a comma, as described by the Lotus Notes references (EX1059, 159-165), at least because a POSITA knew that a goal of the incremental search is to minimize the number of characters the user has to enter before obtaining the desired search results. Pet. 24 n.7. limitation [1.10].17 See Ex. 1061, 140–42. The Wilcox Search Bar similarly is limited to strings separated by a Boolean operator. See Ex. 1059, 160–62. The Wilcox Query Builder, however, does teach multiple search strings separated by a string separator character, specifically a comma. Id. at 163 (“If you want to search for documents that contain all of several words, type them in this box, separated by commas.”). Thus, while we do not accept all of Petitioner’s reasoning, there is evidence to support Petitioner’s overall argument that the proposed combination discloses multiple search strings separated by a string separator character, as we have preliminarily construed the term.” slip op. at 28
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundDecided for petitioner
“extreme technical difficulties with even using incremental searches.” Prelim. Resp. 21, 25 (citing Ex. 1021, 126). Patent Owner argues that “[a] POSITA is not motivated to undertake a modification of the prior art with something that the art teaches would be difficult or impossible to do.” Id. at 21 (citing Natera, Inc. v. NeoGenomics Labs., Inc., 106 F.4th 1369, 1377–78 (Fed. Cir. 2024)). We do not interpret Raskin in this manner. Patent Owner points to a passage in Raskin stating, “almost all interface-building tools make it easy to implement delimited searches and difficult or impossible to implement incremental searches.” Ex. 1021, 126. There is a difference, however, between “difficult to implement” and “difficult to use.” For the end-user, Raskin concludes that “[f]rom the point of view of interface engineering, the advantages of incremental searching are so numerous and the advantages of delimited searches so few that I can see almost no occasions when a delimited search would be preferred.” Id. at 126 & n.7 (“A search is either incremental or excremental.”). It is reasonable to conclude that one of ordinary skill would have been motivated to choose a search method that offered numerous advantages to end-users. Finally, Patent Owner argues that “Raskin’s entire philosophy to user interfaces was incompatible with Lotus Notes.” Prelim. Resp. 22–25. According to Patent Owner, “Lotus Notes is all about centralized collaboration around documents, files, and file structures[,]” while Raskin “goes in a completely different direction, espousing the elimination of filenames and ‘hierarchical file structures’ including directories and folders.” Id. at 23 (citing Ex. 1021, 119). Patent Owner claims that modifying the Lotus Notes references with Raskin would “effectively render[] Lotus Notes’ functionality of hierarchical viewing of and responding to documents unusable.” Id. Petitioner, however, does not propose to incorporate Raskin’s views on hierarchical file structures into the combination of Wilcox and Londergan. It is not necessary for the entirety of Raskin’s teachings to be physically compatible with the Lotus Notes systems described in Wilcox and Londergan. Orthopedic Equip., 702 F.2d at 1013 (“Claims may be obvious in view of a combination of references, even if the features of one reference cannot be substituted physically into the structure of the other reference.”); In re Sneed, 710 F.2d at 1550. Raskin is cited for one purpose: its teachings regarding incremental search. On the current record, we find Petitioner has demonstrated that one of ordinary skill would have been motivated to modify the combination of Lotus Notes references according to those teachings in Raskin. slip op. at 23
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites PhillipsPatents in suitUS 10,552,490
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.