- Apple Inc. v. Theta IP, LLCAll claims unpatentablePTAB · Nov 24, 2025 · IPR2024-00820 · APJ Aaron W Moore · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–3, 5–6, and 8–11 are unpatentable as obvious over Behbahani and Tan; Patent Owner’s motion to strike is denied.
RulingsFinal written decision- ExcludeMotion to exclude, deniedDenied
“Under 37 C.F.R. § 42.23(b), a reply “may only respond to arguments raised in the corresponding . . . patent owner response.” We agree with Petitioner, for the reasons stated in the Opposition, that the arguments and declaration testimony are responsive to arguments raised in the Patent Owner Response. See Opp Mot. 7–10 (explaining the positions taken in the Petition, Patent Owner’s arguments in Response, and the arguments presented in Reply); Corephotonics, Ltd. v. Apple Inc., 84 F.4th 990, 1008– 1009 (Fed. Cir. 2023). Petitioner does not provide a new theory of unpatentability; instead, Petitioner appropriately responds and elaborates on the theory presented in the Petition to explain why Patent Owner’s arguments are incorrect. See, e.g., Chamberlain Grp., Inc. v. One World Techs., Inc., 944 F.3d 919, 925 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“Parties are not barred from elaborating on their arguments on issues previously raised.”); Belden Inc. v. Berk-Tek LLC, 805 F.3d 1064, 1081–82 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (reasoning that rebuttal evidence should be responsive such that it is offered “to explain, repel, counteract, or disprove the evidence of the adverse party”). “[T]he introduction of new evidence in the course of the trial is to be expected in [IPR] trial proceedings” and is permissible “as long as the opposing party is given notice of the evidence and an opportunity to respond to it.” Genzyme Therapeutic Prods. Ltd. P’ship v. Biomarin Pharm. Inc., 825 F.3d 1360, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2016).” slip op. at 11
- Skill levelSkill level patent owner adoptedDecided for patent owner
“Petitioner thus proposes a Master’s degree with two years of experience, while Patent Owner proposes a Bachelor’s degree with five years of experience. At the institution stage, we did not see a material difference in the proposals given that both parties also indicate that more education could substitute for less experience and vice versa, and we thus adopted Patent Owner’s proposal. See Inst. Dec. 14. We requested that the parties address during trial if either believed that the choice of one proposal over the other would make a difference in the patentability analysis. Id. Neither party has done so. Accordingly, because nothing in the record persuades us that our preliminary finding in the Institution Decision was incorrect, and because neither party has challenged our finding, we maintain our adoption of Patent Owner’s proposed level of ordinary skill in the art.” slip op. at 15
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITAPlain and ordinary meaningPrior construction adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Revvo Techs., Inc. v. Cerebrum Sensor Techs., Inc., IPR2025-00632, Paper 20 at 3–5 (Director Nov. 3, 2025) (precedential), addressing situations where a petitioner takes different claim construction positions before the Board and a district court. In Revvo, the petitioner advanced its own proposed claim construction in a related district court litigation but adopted in the IPR a different proposed construction, which was advanced by the patent owner in the district court litigation. Revvo at 2. The Director acknowledged that “a petitioner is not necessarily precluded from arguing different claim construction positions before a district court and the Board,” but that if the petitioner does so, it “should explain sufficiently why the different positions are warranted.” Id. at 5. “For example,” the Director explained, “if a party advances a narrow construction in the district court and the district court declines to adopt the narrow construction, the party would have sufficient reason for advancing the broader, court-adopted construction in a proceeding before the Board.” Id. Here, as in the Director’s example, Petitioner advanced a narrower construction of “signal path” before the district court, which the district court declined to adopt. See Pet. 9; Ex. 2015. Instead, the district court adopted a “plain-and-ordinary meaning” construction, which Patent Owner proposed. See PO Resp. 38, 41; Ex. 2015; Ex. 2025, 5–14. In the Petition, Petitioner proposed applying the plain and ordinary meaning constructions that had already been preliminarily adopted by the district court. Compare Pet. (filed May 1, 2024) with Ex. 2015 (preliminarily adopting plain and ordinary meaning construction on March 25, 2024). Applying Revvo, we find that Petitioner had a sufficient reason for advancing the broader, courtadopted construction in this IPR. Thus, the parties do not dispute the meanings of “signal path,” and we adopt the district court’s construction of plain and ordinary meaning, as agreed by the parties. The “signal path” dispute concerns the application of this and the surrounding claim language (i.e., “in the receiver signal path”) to the disclosures in Behbahani. See PO Resp. 41–43. Therefore, we will provide further discussion in the context of the parties’ arguments regarding Behbahani below. However, we agree with Patent Owner that “plain language [of the claims] requires adjusting the impedance (or bias) of a circuit or component in the signal path.” PO Resp. 49. The parties also address the meaning of the terms “dynamically increasing/decreasing,” which Petitioner refers to as the “dynamic limitation.” See Pet. 9; PO Resp. 37–41. Petitioner proposes that the Board accept Patent Owner’s proposed construction, which was adopted by the district court in the related litigation, both preliminarily and following the Markman hearing. See Pet. 9–10; Ex. 2015, 2–3; Ex. 2025, 40. At Institution, we adopted the district court’s construction, that the term should be given its plain and ordinary meaning which is “varying during operation based, at least in part, on information gained during operation,”4 because there was no dispute between the parties. See Inst. Dec. 16. We continue to do so for purposes of this Decision, for the same reasons as set forth above. That is, applying Revvo, we find that Petitioner had a sufficient reason for advancing the broader, court-adopted construction in this IPR.” slip op. at 18
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successUnpatentableMotivation foundDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner further argues that Tan “provides an example of circuitry used to detect signals at various points in the low-pass filter signal path as a means of implementing a prefilter automatic gain control.” Pet. 29 (citing Ex. 1006, 481); Ex. 1003 ¶ 85. The example in Tan is a peak detector circuit. See Pet. 29–30; Ex. 1003 ¶ 85; Ex. 1006, Fig. 8. Dr. Abidi testifies that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to use Tan’s signal strength measurement circuitry to measure nodes AI and AO, as well as to use comparable circuity to measure nodes DI and DO. See Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 85–90. In response to Patent Owner’s argument that it is not possible to measure signal strength with Tan’s peak detectors (see PO Resp. 65–68), Dr. Abidi provides testimony explaining how Tan’s peak detector circuit provides a measure of the signal strength, which we find persuasive, and which is unrebutted by Patent Owner. See Ex. 1042 ¶ 15.” slip op. at 34
Patent outcomesUS 11,638,210 unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,638,210 - PTAB · Nov 10, 2025 · IPR2025-00878 · APJ Carl M Defranco · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted review of claims 1–3 and 11 after finding a reasonable likelihood that claim 1 is anticipated by Cleveland or obvious over Nakagawa.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“contentions, the cited portions of Cleveland, and the testimony of Clearwater’s expert), we find, preliminarily, that Cleveland discloses each claim element in the manner recited by claim 1. Thus, on the current record, Clearwater demonstrates a reasonable likelihood that challenged claim 1 is unpatentable as anticipated by Cleveland.” slip op. at 6
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Prior-art status of a reference › Patents / published applications (effective date, provisional support)Reference is prior artDecided for petitioner
“5 Clearwater argues that Cleveland qualifies as prior art under 35 U.S.C. § 102(e)(1) “based on both its provisional and non-provisional filing dates.” Pet. 17. In support, Clearwater asserts that Cleveland’s provisional (Ex. 1006) is “virtually identical” to Cleveland itself (id. at 18) and submits claim charts to demonstrate that the Cleveland provisional provides written support for: (1) at least claim 1 of Cleveland (id. at 18–21); and (2) the subject matter relied upon in Cleveland (id. at 21–40 (citing Ex. 1006 throughout)). Based on our review of the Cleveland provisional, as well as Clearwater’s claim charts, we are persuaded that the current record demonstrates that Cleveland is prior art to the challenged patent. See Dynamic Drinkware, LLC v. Nat’l Graphics, Inc., 800 F.3d 1375, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2015).” slip op. at 4
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Instituted
“satisfies each claim element as identified above in Section I.D, i.e., elements [1.pre]–[1.6]. See id. at 22–40. Clearwater also submits annotated Figure 3 of Cleveland, reproduced below, to further illustrate the specific laminate structure of Cleveland’s coffee cup. See id. at 39.” slip op. at 5
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successInstituted
“protective layers have “a coat weight of from 5 to 30 lbs/3000 ft2,” Clearwater submits the declaration of its expert, who explains that, because Nakagawa identifies the specific polymers and the thickness of the coat used for the plastic layers and one skilled in the art “would recognize that the disclosed polymers have a given density,” then “[w]ith these known parameters, the coat weight is easily calculated to be 23.04 lbs./ 3000 ft2 — falling squarely within the claimed range.” Pet. 53–54 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 132–133; Ex. 1008 ¶ 24; Ex. 1024, at 4). At this stage, we find that testimony credible and supported by the evidence presently of record. After reviewing the preliminary record (including Clearwater’s contentions, the cited portions of Nakagawa, and the testimony of Clearwater’s expert), we find, preliminarily, that Nakagawa discloses or otherwise suggests each claim element in the manner recited by claim 1. Thus, on the current record, Clearwater demonstrates a reasonable likelihood that challenged claim 1 is unpatentable as obvious over Nakagawa. We need not decide Clearwater’s challenge of the dependent claims based on Nakagawa alone nor its challenge of claims 1–3 based on Nakagawa and Tanner. Our analysis of these challenges, in our view, is best left for trial after full development of the record.” slip op. at 8
Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites PhillipsPatents in suitUS 8,637,126 - Ascend Elements, Inc. v. Duesenfeld GmbHInstitution deniedPTAB · Oct 10, 2025 · PGR2025-00037 · APJ Kevin W Cherry · PGR · Institution
The Board denied institution of PGR on claims 1–14 because Petitioner did not show that any challenged claim was more likely than not unpatentable.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“information presented in the petition filed under [35 U.S.C. §] 321 . . . demonstrates that it is more likely than not that at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition is unpatentable.” 35 U.S.C. § 324(a). For the reasons set forth below, we determine that Petitioner has failed to demonstrate that it is more likely than not that at least one of claims 1–14 of the ’463 patent is unpatentable. Accordingly, we deny institution of a postgrant review of claims 1–14 based on the grounds set forth in the Petition.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner contends that one of ordinary skill in the art “would have had at least a Bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, material science, chemical engineering, or an equivalent field, as well as at least 2 to 3 years of academic or industry experience in the recycling or processing of lithiumion batteries. Additional formal education focusing on processing of lithium batteries may substitute for practical experience and additional practical experience can substitute for less education.” Pet. 10–11. Patent Owner does not contest this definition of a person of skill in the art. See Prelim. Resp. 11. For purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s assessment of the level of ordinary skill in the art, as, on the present record, it appears consistent with the ’463 patent and the asserted prior art. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001).” slip op. at 8
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert discountedPatent owner expert creditedDecided for patent owner
“distinct from “comminute[ion],” Petitioner offers only the testimony of its expert, Mr. Juzkow, who equates Tomioka’s “cutting” with “comminute[ion].” See Ex. 1003 ¶ 121. However, Mr. Juzkow provides insufficient reasoning to support his conclusion, particularly given the intrinsic and extrinsic evidence discussed above. In contrast, Patent Owner’s expert, Mr. Dantam, provides extensive reasoning, supported by citations to other evidence, to support his conclusion that Tomioka’s “dismantling” is not the claimed “comminution.” Thus, we give more weight to Mr. Dantam’s testimony than Mr. Juzkow’s testimony. Weighing this evidence all together, we find that Petitioner has failed to show that it is more likely than not that Tomioka’s teaches the claimed comminution under Petitioner’s first theory.” slip op. at 15
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundTeaching away not foundNot shown unpatentable
“obvious. Pet. 34–35. However, we agree with Patent Owner that Petitioner has also failed to show that it is more likely than not that Tomioka renders this limitation obvious. See Prelim. Resp. 28–31. To begin with, Petitioner’s contentions lack sufficient reasoning explaining why a person of ordinary skill would have modified Tomioka in the manner proposed. “[R]ejections on obviousness grounds cannot be sustained by mere conclusory statements; instead, there must be some articulated reasoning with some rational underpinning to support the legal conclusion of obviousness.” In re Kahn, 441 F.3d 977, 988 (Fed. Cir. 2006). Petitioner merely asserts that a person of ordinary skill in the art could use the roller system in place of the dismantling disclosed for the embodiments in Figures 19 and 20. On this record, we find this bare contention insufficient. actual disclosure of Tomioka. The rollers in Tomioka are used to separate the “battery body” from the “resin package enclosing the battery body,” and Tomioka specifically discloses that this technique is designed to “avoid damaging the battery body.” Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 25, 26, 29; Ex. 2011 ¶¶ 72–73. Thus, there is a significant difference between what Tomioka teaches and what Petitioner proposes to use the roller system to do. In addition, as Patent Owner points out, Tomioka specifically discloses there are risks associated with mechanically crushing battery packs, such as “risk of sparking due to residual voltage if the battery units are damaged in the process.” Ex. 1005 ¶ 5. Although we do not agree with Patent Owner that this amounts to a “teaching away,” see In re Gurley, 27 F.3d 551, 553 (Fed. Cir. 1994), we do believe that this teaching suggests a trade off that should be weighed in determining whether to make the modification, see Medichem S.A. v. Rolabo S.L., 437 F.3d 1157, 1165 (Fed. Cir. 2006). However, Petitioner has failed to account adequately, if at all, for this trade off. Thus, we find that Petitioner has failed to show that it is more likely than not that Tomioka accounts for the claimed “comminuting.”” slip op. at 15
§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosurecites Phillips · Graham · NautilusPatents in suitUS 12,119,463 - Cradlepoint, Inc. / Honeywell International, Inc. et al. v. Sisvel S.P.A.No claims unpatentablePTAB · Sep 29, 2025 · IPR2021-00580 · APJ Monica S Ullagaddi · IPR · Remand
On remand, the Board held claims 1–10 not shown unpatentable under the Sachs anticipation and obviousness grounds because Sachs did not disclose the required timer stopping, and the new theories were not considered.
RulingsRemand decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Whether Mr. Bates is a Person of Ordinary Skill in the Art In the Final Written Decision, we adopted Petitioner’s definition because “there does not appear to be a dispute that needs to be resolved.” FWD 8. Here, where Mr. Bates’ qualifications are challenged, we have reviewed the complete record including the parties’ arguments on remand and we find that Mr. Bates does not meet the requirements for a person of ordinary skill in the art according to Petitioner’s definition for level of ordinary skill in the art, which we adopted (see FWD 8). Notably, the panel adopted Petitioner’s definition of the level of ordinary skill in the Institution Decision (Paper 16, 8), and neither party challenged that determination during the trial, although Patent Owner did offer its own definition (PO Resp. 9). Mr. Bates has one degree: “a bachelor’s degree in Business Management.” Ex. 2001 ¶ 7. A degree in Business Management is not “a degree in electrical engineering or a similar discipline.” Pet. 35 (emphasis added). Accordingly, we disregard the testimony of Mr. Bates in rendering our findings and conclusions in this Decision. We note that, even if we did consider Mr. Bates’s testimony, the findings and conclusions rendered in this Decision would not change.” slip op. at 12
- Expert testimonyPatent owner expert discountedDecided for petitioner
“cover for his lack of education.” Pet. Remand Br. 4. Patent Owner disagrees and argues, inter alia, that “Mr. Bates was a pioneer in the cellular telecommunications field with more than five decades of practical and teaching experience.” PO Remand Resp. 5 (citing Ex. 2001 ¶¶ 8–23) (emphasis omitted); see id. at 3–4, 6. Whether Mr. Bates is a Person of Ordinary Skill in the Art In the Final Written Decision, we adopted Petitioner’s definition because “there does not appear to be a dispute that needs to be resolved.” FWD 8. Here, where Mr. Bates’ qualifications are challenged, we have reviewed the complete record including the parties’ arguments on remand and we find that Mr. Bates does not meet the requirements for a person of ordinary skill in the art according to Petitioner’s definition for level of ordinary skill in the art, which we adopted (see FWD 8). Notably, the panel adopted Petitioner’s definition of the level of ordinary skill in the Institution Decision (Paper 16, 8), and neither party challenged that determination during the trial, although Patent Owner did offer its own definition (PO Resp. 9). Mr. Bates has one degree: “a bachelor’s degree in Business Management.” Ex. 2001 ¶ 7. A degree in Business Management is not “a degree in electrical engineering or a similar discipline.” Pet. 35 (emphasis added). Accordingly, we disregard the testimony of Mr. Bates in rendering our findings and conclusions in this Decision. We note that, even if we did consider Mr. Bates’s testimony, the findings and conclusions rendered in this Decision would not change.” slip op. at 12
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITAPlain and ordinary meaningDecided for patent owner
“C. Claim Construction The Federal Circuit determined that “the plain and unambiguous language of claim 1 requires that a method, to come within the claim, must perform both limitations 1[c] and 1[d] where their preconditions apply.” Sierra Wireless, 130 F.4th at 1022. We interpret the claims and analyze Petitioner’s unpatentability arguments under the Federal Circuit’s determination.” slip op. at 13
- Strike new argumentNew argument disregardedDecided for patent owner
“Petitioner was on notice, when Patent Owner’s Response was filed at the latest, that claim 1 could be construed as unconditionally requiring both limitations 1[c] and 1[d]. Indeed, Petitioner contended that it had shown both limitations “in single references.” Pet. Reply 5. Petitioner now seeks to shift its unpatentability contentions for limitation 1[c] from Figure 5 of Sachs to Figures 6 and 7. Petitioner’s new reliance on Figures 6 and 7 of Sachs is “a meaningfully distinct contention” from its position in both the Petition and the Reply. See Ariosa Diagnostics v. Verinata Health, Inc., 805 F.3d 1359, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2015). We therefore find that Petitioner impermissibly presents new theories of unpatentability on remand. 3. Independent Claim 1 We decline to address Petitioner’s new theories of unpatentability proposed on remand concerning Sachs’s Figure 7. See Pet. Remand Br. 15– 20. Although Petitioner cites pages 59–61 of the Petition as discussing Figure 7 of Sachs (see Pet. Remand Br. 15), the cited discussion concerns dependent claims 5 and 10, not independent claims 1 and 8.” slip op. at 17
Patent outcomesUS 7,869,396 not shown unpatentableClaim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 7,869,396 - Comcast Cable Communications, LLC v. Entropic Communications, LLCSome claims unpatentablePTAB · Sep 5, 2025 · IPR2024-00431 · APJ Jon M Jurgovan · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1, 3, and 4 are unpatentable as obvious over Afshary and Mirfakhraei; claim 2 was not shown unpatentable over either asserted combination.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level board ownDecided for petitioner
“Patent Owner’s proposal to limit a POSITA’s education and experience to “broadband networks over coaxial cables” is too narrow. Although Patent Owner points to various parts of the ’518 patent as supporting its restrictive proposal, other parts of the patent are not so limited. For example, the patent’s technical field and summary are not limited to coaxial cable, and the patent discusses twisted pair wiring and satellite communications as media that can be used. See, e.g., Ex. 1001, 1:27–29, 3:33–35, 3:49–50, 3:67–4:3, 5:61–6:3, 8:20–23, 9:28–33. Accordingly, we adopt the following level of ordinary skill in the art for use in this Decision: A POSITA would have a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering, or a related field, and two to four years of experience with broadband communication networks. Additional professional experience could substitute for education, and additional education could substitute for professional experience. We find that this skill level is consistent with the problems and solutions identified in the ’518 patent and the prior art references asserted by Petitioner. In addition, we find the adopted skill level consistent with the education and experience that a POSITA would have had. See In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (citing Custom Accessories, Inc. v. Jeffrey-Allan Indus., Inc., 807 F.2d 955, 962 (Fed. Cir. 1986)) (citing factors to consider when determining level of ordinary skill in the art).” slip op. at 15
- Expert testimonyDecided for petitioner
“We determine that Mr. Bertonis and Mr. Garrett had at least the skill level of a POSITA at the time they submitted their declarations and testimony in this case. Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 4–15, Appx. A; Ex. 2001 ¶¶ 8–12, Appx. A; cf Osseo Imaging, LLC v. Planmeca USA Inc., 116 F.4th 1335 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2024) (“An expert need not have acquired that skill level prior to the time of the invention to be able to testify from the vantage point of a person of ordinary skill in the art.”). Accordingly, we see no reason to disregard the testimony of either on the basis that they do not have a POSITA’s skill level.” slip op. at 45
- Claim Construction › Functional claiming / §112(f) means-plus-function › Whether §112(f) applies (Williamson, nonce words)§112(f) appliesTerm construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner
“Because an assessment of whether the prior art discloses a means- plus-function limitation depends not only on the presence of the recited function but also the structure that performs that function as described in the patent’s specification, we address Petitioner’s undisputed contentions for the means-plus-function limitations below.” slip op. at 12
- Obviousness (§103) › Analogous artAnalogous artDecided for petitioner
“We conclude that Petitioner has shown by preponderant evidence that Mirfakhraei is in the same field of endeavor as the ’518 patent, i.e., “broadband communication networks.” Mirfakhraei is thus analogous art because it is in the same field of endeavor as the ’518 patent.” slip op. at 27
Patent outcomesUS 7,295,518 mixedClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites GrahamPatents in suitUS 7,295,518 - Comcast Cable Communications, LLC v. Entropic Communications, LLCSome claims unpatentablePTAB · Sep 4, 2025 · IPR2024-00430 · APJ Jon M Jurgovan · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–3, 6–10, 14–18, and 22–24 are unpatentable; claims 4–5, 11–13, and 19–21 are not shown unpatentable.
RulingsFinal written decision- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Specification disavowal / 'present invention' languageTerm construed board ownDecided for petitioner
“We agree with Petitioner that the ’690 patent does not limit the term “probe” to channel assessment. Pet. Reply 2–4. Reviewing the intrinsic evidence, the “Technical Field” of the ’690 patent states that “some embodiments relate to channel assessment probes,” implying others do not. Ex. 1001, 1:13–14. The ’690 patent further states that “receiver determined probes may be used in a variety of applications” including to “discover hidden nodes” and “off-site network diagnosis.” Id. at 2:20–27. In addition, the ’690 patent states that probes may be used for “network maintenance procedures,” to “replicate a potential problem, reach or discover a distant or previously undetected node on the network, or assist with network admissions procedures.” Id. at 4:25–38. Turning to the claims of the ’690 patent, the evidence of record does not establish that the independent claims recite anything unique or specific to channel assessment (although their scope covers that purpose). Furthermore, dependent claim 7 of the ’690 patent recites that the “probe” is used to diagnose a network problem, and dependent claim 13 recites that the “probe” is used to identify a hidden node. Restricting the independent claims to probes used solely for channel assessment would be contradictory to these dependent claims. Littlefuse, Inc. v. Mersen USA EP Corp., 29 F.4th 1376, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2022) (construction of term in independent claims should not render dependent claims superfluous or lacking scope).” slip op. at 20
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed board ownDecided for petitioner
“We agree with Petitioner that a “physical layer probe” is “a probe that relates to the physical layer.” The term does not appear per se in the specification of the ’960 patent, nor in the prosecution history, but only in claims 9, 17, and 19. However, the term “physical layer” is well-known and is the first layer in the Open Systems Interconnection (OSI) network model. See, e.g., Ex. 1021, 35–40, 69; Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 49–50. The physical layer is used to transmit digital bits over a network, and defines the timing, mechanical, and physical network characteristics required for transmitting the data bits. Hence, a “physical layer probe” is a probe that relates to the physical layer. We need not, and do not, construe the term further to resolve the parties’ dispute. See Realtime, Vivid Techs., supra. Having decided proper constructions for the disputed terms, we proceed in our analysis to consider the parties’ arguments concerning the challenge grounds. In the following sections, we apply the plain meaning of the claim terms, and as necessary, specify what the plain meanings are.” slip op. at 23
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“C. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art Petitioner contends as follows: A POSITA8 would have had a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering, or a similar discipline, and three to four years of experience working in signal processing and/or communication systems/networks. Additional education may substitute for experience, and significant work experience may substitute for formal education. Pet. 6 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 115–120). Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s proposed level of skill in the art. We adopt and apply Petitioner’s proposed skill level because it is consistent with the problems and solutions identified in the ’690 patent and the prior art references asserted by Petitioner. In addition, we find the adopted skill level consistent with the education and experience that a POSITA would have had. See In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (citing Custom Accessories, Inc. v. Jeffrey-Allan Indus., Inc., 807 F.2d 955, 962 (Fed. Cir. 1986)) (citing factors to consider when determining level of ordinary skill in the art).” slip op. at 25
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableNot shown unpatentableMixed
“Hence, we determine that Petitioner has shown by preponderant evidence that the Ranging Request (“probe request”) message includes CID and SS MAC address and other parameters (“first plurality of parameters”) which at least specify the CID (“content payload of the probe”) and the SS MAC address (“second node”) of the Ranging Response.12 We thus proceed to consider Petitioner’s contentions for the remaining limitations of claim 1, which are undisputed, and determine that claim 1 is anticipated by IEEE-802.16.” slip op. at 29
Patent outcomesUS 8,284,690 mixedClaim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 8,284,690 - Comcast Cable Communications, LLC v. Entropic Communications, LLCAll claims unpatentablePTAB · Sep 3, 2025 · IPR2024-00441 · APJ Aaron W Moore · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–18 are unpatentable over Kamieniecki and Konstantinos; Petitioner did not show claims 1–18 unpatentable over Renken or Renken and Cholas because Renken is not prior art.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Level of Ordinary Skill in The Art Petitioner contends that a person having ordinary skill in the art “would have had a degree in electrical engineering or a similar discipline, and three-to-four years of experience working with television signal processing and communication 1 Because the challenged claims have an effective filing date before the effective date of the AIA, we apply the pre-AIA version of 35 U.S.C. § 103. 2 US 2005/0114879 A1, published May 26, 2005 (Ex. 1009). 3 US 2010/0120386 A1, published May 13, 2010 (Ex. 1010). 4 US 2010/0303181 A1, published Dec. 2, 2010 (Ex. 1016). 5 US 2008/0313691 A1, published Dec. 18, 2008 (Ex. 1017). 6 US 8,649,421 B2, issued Feb. 11, 2014 (Ex. 1011). systems,” and that “[a]dditional education may substitute for professional experience and significant work experience may substitute for formal education.” Pet. 30 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 40–42). “Patent Owner accepts the Petition’s [description of a person of ordinary skill] solely for purposes of responding to the Petition in this proceeding.” PO Resp. 11. Based on our review of the record before us, we determine that Petitioner’s stated level of ordinary skill in the art is reasonable because it appears consistent with the evidence of record, including the asserted prior art. Accordingly, we apply Petitioner’s definition in this Decision. B.” slip op. at 8
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“On the present record, we do not discern a need to construe explicitly any claim language because doing so would have no effect on our analyses and will not assist in resolving the present controversy between the parties. See Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’”) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). C.” slip op. at 9
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundDecided for petitioner
“We agree that the record provides sufficient evidence that one of ordinary skill in the art would have found it advantageous to add a multi-channel receiver to improve monitoring, as Petitioner argues. Having the ability to monitor without waiting for idle or disturbing users would be a clear advantage.” slip op. at 18
- Obviousness (§103) › Objective indicia / secondary considerations › NexusObjective indicia no nexusDecided for petitioner
“We conclude that Patent Owner has not shown a sufficient nexus between the claimed invention and any product embodying the claimed invention that was successful, praised, or solved a long-felt need. Patent Owner identifies five elements allegedly required “[t]o implement MaxLinear’s Remote Spectrum Monitoring in CPE.” See PO Resp. 65. To support this, Patent Owner cites pages 5–7 of Exhibit 2009. See id.7 That exhibit, however, describes requirements for “Full Band Capture,” not MaxLinear’s “Remote Spectrum Monitoring.” To” slip op. at 31
Patent outcomesUS 8,792,008 unpatentableClaim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnessPatents in suitUS 8,792,008 - Comcast Cable Communications, LLC v. Entropic Communications, LLCAll claims unpatentablePTAB · Aug 29, 2025 · IPR2024-00446 · APJ Aaron W Moore · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–20 are unpatentable as obvious over the asserted combinations of Rabenko, Gaspar, and Kim, with additional references for certain dependent claims.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“the invention “would have had at least a degree in computer or electrical engineering, computer science, information systems, or a similar discipline, along with three-to-four years of experience with the design and/or implementation of cable modems within network-based content delivery systems” and that “[a]dditional education may substitute for professional experience, and significant work experience [could have] substitute[d] for formal education.” Pet. 12 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 40–45). Patent Owner does not challenge the level of ordinary skill in the art proposed by Petitioner and its expert, so we adopt Petitioner’s proposal, which we find to be reasonable and consistent with the ’775 patent’s specification and the cited prior art. B.” slip op. at 9
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner
“Despite some disagreement during the briefing about the meaning of “DOCSIS controller,” the parties now appear to agree that Patent Owner’s suggested construction is generally correct. See PO Resp. 13 (“[T]he claimed DOCSIS controller must control DOCSIS functions. This does not mean that it must control all DOCSIS functions or all DOCSIS functions identified in the specification.”); Sur-reply 1 (“Under its plain meaning, a ‘DOCSIS controller’ must control or implement one or more DOCSIS functions.”); Tr. 66:19–21 ([Q]: “And as long the controller performs one of those functions that of, for DOCSIS, it qualifies as a DOCSIS – [Petitioner’s Counsel]: “It’s a DOCSIS function [sic, controller] in our point of view.”). We accordingly construe “DOCSIS controller” to mean “a physical or functional controller that controls, implements, or performs a DOCSIS function.” It is not limited to a certain number or category of DOCSIS functions.” slip op. at 17
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successUnpatentableMotivation foundUnpatentable
“We do not agree with Petitioner’s obvious to try theory because Petitioner does not show that the “few finite options” were known in the prior art. However, we nevertheless agree with Petitioner that it would have been obvious for the cable modem engine to have been configured to enable upgrades to its software in a manner that is independent of upgrades to the software of the data networking engine. This is primarily because this limitation appears to require little more than that a software update could change the cable modem functionality (e.g., the PacketCable or DOCSIS functionality) without changing the data networking engine functionality (e.g., the CableHome functionality). See Ex. 1001, 3:49–62. Gaspar, for example, shows that one of ordinary skill would recognize that the evolution of standards in this field requires controller upgrades, and a software update addressing only a change in the PacketCable standard (because only that standard had changed, for example) would be an upgrade to the cable modem software that would be independent of any upgrades to data networking engine software. We credit Dr. Kiaei’s testimony that one of ordinary skill “would have understood that two different engines performing two different functions and using two different protocols (DOCSIS and PNA) should be separately upgradeable to address protocol changes independently.” Ex. 1002 ¶ 123.” slip op. at 27
- Obviousness (§103) › Analogous artUnpatentableAnalogous artUnpatentable
“We agree with Petitioner that use of these ARM processors would have been an obvious design choice, given that they were known to be useful in applications “that demand the highest levels of performance with small size, low cost, and low power consumption.” Ex. 1016 ¶ 8. 5 Put another way, we conclude that claims limiting an otherwise obvious system to off-the-shelf hardware of the type generally suitable for the purpose does not make the subject matter non-obvious. Regarding whether Klein and Kim ʼ678 are analogous art, we find that they are pertinent to the problem confronting the ’775 patent inventors who would have been looking for processors suitable for implementation of the invention, and Klein and Kim ʼ678 indicate that these processors would be suitable in applications that, though different, also implicated similar size, cost, and power consumption considerations. For these reasons, having carefully considered the fully developed record, we conclude that the Petition has established that the combination of Rabenko, Klein, and Kim ʼ678 teaches or suggests use of the claimed ARM processors.” slip op. at 31
Patent outcomesUS 8,223,775 unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnessPatents in suitUS 8,223,775 - Comcast Cable Communications, LLC v. Entropic Communications, LLCSome claims unpatentablePTAB · Aug 15, 2025 · IPR2024-00442 · APJ Jon M Jurgovan · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–4, 9–13, and 18 are unpatentable as obvious; claims 5–8 and 14–17 were not shown unpatentable over the asserted grounds.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Patent Owner “accepts” Petitioner’s proposed level of skill in the art “solely for purposes of responding to the Petition.” PO Resp. 11. We adopt and apply Petitioner’s proposed skill level because it is consistent with the problems and solutions identified in the ’826 patent and the prior art references asserted by Petitioner. In addition, we find the adopted skill level consistent with the education and experience that a POSITA would have had. See In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (citing Custom Accessories, Inc. v. Jeffrey-Allan Indus., Inc., 807 F.2d 955, 962 (Fed. Cir. 1986)) (citing factors to consider when determining level of ordinary skill in the art).” slip op. at 10
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Plain and ordinary meaningDecided for patent owner
“As there is no controversy between the parties regarding any claim language that we would need to resolve in order to render our decision in this case, we apply the ordinary and customary meaning of the claim terms without specific construction. See Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (only claim terms in controversy need to be construed, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy).” slip op. at 12
- Claim Construction › Functional claiming / §112(f) means-plus-function › Whether §112(f) applies (Williamson, nonce words)§112(f) does not applyDecided for petitioner
“In addition, Petitioner contends that the ’826 patent’s claims are not recited in means-plus-function form under § 112 ¶ 6. Pet. 25. Because the word “means” does not appear in the claims of the ’826 patent, there is a presumption that the claims do not recite means-plus-function limitations under § 112 ¶ 6. Williamson v. Citrix Online, LLC, 792 F.3d 1339, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (en banc in relevant part). Since neither party offers any argument or evidence to contravene this presumption, we do not construe any claim term as means-plus-function in rendering our decision.” slip op. at 12
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundDecided for petitioner
“Although Patent Owner argues that adding Konstaninos’s multi- channel functionality to Kamieniecki’s single-channel device would increase costs and complexity, Patent Owner overlooks that multi-channel functionality would also increase the STB’s capabilities. In any case, “a given course of action often has simultaneous advantages and disadvantages, and this does not necessarily obviate a motivation to combine.” General Elec. Co. v. Raytheon Tech. Corp., 983 F.3d 1334, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2020) (citing Medichem, S.A. v. Rolabo, S.L., 437 F.3d 1157, 1165 (Fed. Cir. 2006)). Furthermore, Petitioner presents preponderant evidence that the market demand was such that customers would have desired an STB with multi-channel functionality even though it would cost more than a basic STB. Pet. Reply 6–8 (citing Ex. 1010 ¶¶ 1, 11, 16, 102–104; Ex. 1032 ¶¶ 5–6; Ex. 1033, 27:6–29:23; Ex. 2013 ¶¶ 70, 108). Konstantinos expressly teaches that the “evolving market for data and programming services will demand that receivers have the capability of multi-channel tuning.” Ex. 1010 ¶ 1. Petitioner has thus established that there was market demand that would have led a POSITA to improve Kamieniecki with Konstantinos’s multi-carrier capability. See KSR, 550 U.S. at 418 (“Often, it will be necessary for a court to look to interrelated teachings of multiple patents; the effects of demands known to the design community or present in the marketplace; and the background knowledge of a [POSITA], all in order to determine whether there was an apparent reason to combine the known elements in the manner claimed by the patent at issue.” (emphasis added)). Moreover, we agree with Petitioner that Konstantinos addresses the cost and complexity issues that Patent Owner asserts are problematic. Pet. 35–36; Pet. Reply 8–9 (citing Ex. 1010 ¶¶ 102, 105–106). For example, Konstantinos teaches that breaking up the original signal into smaller subsignals decreases the required sampling rate for each band since interleaved lower-rate samplers can be used, which reduces power consumption and interference, and enables conventional digital channel selection methods to be used for fine selection of one channel from a band of channels. Ex. 1010 ¶¶ 102, 104105. In addition, Konstantinos teaches reducing cost and complexity through a single chip solution. Ex. 1002 ¶ 150; Ex. 1010 ¶ 44. Hence, we do not see the cost or complexity issues that Patent Owner mentions as barriers that would have prevented a POSITA from making the combination. Similarly unavailing is Patent Owner’s stance that Kamieniecki is satisfactory for the applications for which it is designed such that a POSITA would not seek to improve it with Konstantinos. PO Sur-Reply 8–11. Konstantinos recognizes the market demand for multi-channel functionality, so adding this capability to Kamieniecki’s single-channel device would have been a natural thing for the POSITA to pursue in light of the advantages afforded thereby. Ex. 1010 ¶ 1; KSR, 550 U.S. at 420 (“any need or problem known in the field of endeavor at the time of the invention and addressed by the patent can provide a reason for combining the elements in the manner claimed”).” slip op. at 17
Patent outcomesUS 9,825,826 mixedClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites GrahamPatents in suitUS 9,825,826 - Luminex International Co., Ltd. / Menard, Inc. v. Signify Holdings B.V.Some claims unpatentablePTAB · Aug 13, 2025 · IPR2024-01469 · APJ Steven M Amundson · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–7, 9–15, and 18–20 are unpatentable; claims 8, 16, and 17 are not determined unpatentable under the asserted prior-art grounds.
RulingsFinal written decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › §315(b) time barNot time barredDecided for petitioner
“G. Analysis 1. REAL PARTY IN INTEREST Based on the record before us and for the reasons explained below, we disagree with Patent Owner that Menard is a “real party in interest” under § 315(b). See Resp. 77–82; Sur-reply 27–28. First, the circumstances here differ materially from the circumstances in Ventex. There, two agreements defined the relationship between Ventex (the petitioner and manufacturer of Heatwave fabric) and Seirus (the alleged real party in interest and purchaser of Heatwave fabric). Ventex, IPR2017- 00651, Paper 152 at 7 & n.8. First, a 2013 Supplier Agreement “prevented Ventex from selling to Seirus competitors” and included an indemnity provision requiring Ventex to indemnify Seirus for losses arising from Ventex’s failure to perform certain obligations. Id. at 7, 14. Second, a 2016 Exclusive Manufacturing Agreement provided that Ventex would manufacture the Heatwave fabric only for Seirus in exchange for Seirus’s payment of an exclusivity fee. Id. at 7. Columbia (the patent owner) accused Seirus products incorporating the Heatwave fabric of infringing the patent at issue, and Columbia served Seirus with a complaint alleging patent infringement in 2014 more than two years before Ventex filed a petition in 2017. Id. at 5, 7. When determining that Seirus was a “real party in interest” under § 315(b), the Board reasoned that “Ventex and Seirus had a specially structured, preexisting, and well established business relationship with one another, including indemnification and exclusivity arrangements.” Ventex, IPR2017-00651, Paper 152 at 10; see id. at 12. Additionally, the Board noted that certain evidence “suggest[ed] that” slip op. at 32
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Real party in interest / privityRpi dispute resolved for petitionerDecided for petitioner
“G. Analysis 1. REAL PARTY IN INTEREST Based on the record before us and for the reasons explained below, we disagree with Patent Owner that Menard is a “real party in interest” under § 315(b). See Resp. 77–82; Sur-reply 27–28. First, the circumstances here differ materially from the circumstances in Ventex. There, two agreements defined the relationship between Ventex (the petitioner and manufacturer of Heatwave fabric) and Seirus (the alleged real party in interest and purchaser of Heatwave fabric). Ventex, IPR2017- 00651, Paper 152 at 7 & n.8. First, a 2013 Supplier Agreement “prevented Ventex from selling to Seirus competitors” and included an indemnity provision requiring Ventex to indemnify Seirus for losses arising from Ventex’s failure to perform certain obligations. Id. at 7, 14. Second, a 2016 Exclusive Manufacturing Agreement provided that Ventex would manufacture the Heatwave fabric only for Seirus in exchange for Seirus’s payment of an exclusivity fee. Id. at 7. Columbia (the patent owner) accused Seirus products incorporating the Heatwave fabric of infringing the patent at issue, and Columbia served Seirus with a complaint alleging patent infringement in 2014 more than two years before Ventex filed a petition in 2017. Id. at 5, 7. When determining that Seirus was a “real party in interest” under § 315(b), the Board reasoned that “Ventex and Seirus had a specially structured, preexisting, and well established business relationship with one another, including indemnification and exclusivity arrangements.” Ventex, IPR2017-00651, Paper 152 at 10; see id. at 12. Additionally, the Board noted that certain evidence “suggest[ed] that” slip op. at 32
- Skill levelOther
“C. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art Factors pertinent to determining the level of ordinary skill in the art include (1) the educational level of the inventor; (2) the type of problems encountered in the art; (3) prior-art solutions to those problems; (4) the rapidity with which innovations are made; (5) the sophistication of the technology; and (6) the educational level of workers active in the field. Envtl. Designs, Ltd. v. Union Oil Co., 713 F.2d 693, 696–97 (Fed. Cir. 1983). Not all factors may exist in every case, and one or more of these or other factors may predominate in a particular case. Id. These factors are not exhaustive, but merely a guide to determining the level of ordinary skill in the art. Daiichi Sankyo Co. v. Apotex, Inc., 501 F.3d 1254, 1256 (Fed. Cir. 2007). Moreover, the prior art itself may reflect an appropriate skill level. Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001). Petitioner asserts that a person of ordinary skill in the art at the ’336 patent’s effective filing date would have had “a bachelor’s degree in mechanical engineering, electrical engineering, optics, or physics with at least three years of experience working in the design of LED lights or lighting fixtures; a master’s degree in one of the above disciplines with at least two years of experience; or equivalent experience.” Pet. 14 (citing Ex. 1004 ¶¶ 26–29). Dr. Eden’s testimony supports Petitioner’s assertion. See Ex. 1004 ¶¶ 27–28. Patent Owner “adopts for purposes of this proceeding only” Petitioner’s description of an ordinarily skilled artisan. Resp. 10 (citing Pet. 14). We adopt Petitioner’s description of an ordinarily skilled artisan because it comports with the technology and claims of the ’336 patent as” slip op. at 40
- Obviousness (§103) › Objective indicia / secondary considerationsObjective indicia no nexusDecided for petitioner
“Alleged Objective Indicia of Nonobviousness (i) General Principles Before reaching a conclusion about obviousness, we consider evidence concerning objective indicia of nonobviousness. See Apple, 839 F.3d at 1048. For such evidence to have substantial weight, “its proponent must establish a nexus between the evidence and the merits of the claimed invention.” ClassCo, Inc. v. Apple, Inc., 838 F.3d 1214, 1220 (Fed. Cir. 2016); see Ancora Techs., Inc. v. Roku, Inc., 140 F.4th 1351, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2025) (noting that the Board did not err by requiring “a nexus to the challenged claims as opposed to the patent as a whole”). “[T]here is no nexus unless the evidence presented is ‘reasonably commensurate with the scope of the claims.’” ClassCo, 838 F.3d at 1220 (quoting Rambus Inc. v. Rea, 731 F.3d 1248, 1257 (Fed. Cir. 2013)). The patentee “bears the burden of showing that a nexus exists.” WMS Gaming, Inc. v. Int’l Game Tech., 184 F.3d 1339, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 1999). A rebuttable presumption of nexus arises “when the patentee shows that the asserted objective evidence is tied to a specific product and that product ‘embodies the claimed features, and is coextensive with them.’” Fox Factory, Inc. v. SRAM, LLC, 944 F.3d 1366, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (quoting Polaris Indus., Inc. v. Arctic Cat, Inc., 882 F.3d 1056, 1072 (Fed. Cir. 2018)). Whether a rebuttable presumption of nexus arises “turns on the nature of the claims and the specific facts.” Teva Pharms. Int’l GmbH v. Eli Lilly & Co., 8 F.4th 1349, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2021). The presumption analysis should consider the unclaimed features in the product tied to the objective evidence to assess their significance and impact on the correspondence between the patented invention and the product. Quanergy Sys., Inc. v. Velodyne Lidar USA, Inc., 24 F.4th 1406, 1418 (Fed. Cir. 2022). When, “for example, the patented invention is only a small component of the product tied to the objective evidence, there is no presumption of nexus.” Henny Penny Corp. v. Frymaster LLC, 938 F.3d 1324, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2019). Absent a presumption of nexus, the patentee may prove nexus by” slip op. at 76
Patent outcomesUS 10,299,336 mixed§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,299,336
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.