- Flex Logix Technologies, Inc. v. Venkat KondaRehearing deniedPTAB · Sep 16, 2020 · IPR2020-00261 · APJ Jo-Anne M Kokoski · IPR · Rehearing
The Board denied Patent Owner’s rehearing requests, leaving institution of review of claims 1–7, 11, 15–18, 20–22, 32, and 47 in place.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied
“believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked, and the place where each matter was previously addressed in a motion, an opposition, or a reply. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d). Patent Owner, as the party challenging the Decisions, has the burden of showing that the Decisions should be modified. Id. When rehearing a decision on a petition, the Board reviews the decision for an abuse of discretion. Id. § 42.71(c). An abuse of discretion may arise if a decision is based on an erroneous interpretation of the law, if a factual finding is not supported by substantial evidence, or if an unreasonable judgment is made in weighing relevant factors. In re Gartside, 203 F.3d 1305, 1315–16 (Fed. Cir. 2000).” slip op. at 2
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedDecided for petitioner
“in our Decision on Institution. In the Decision, we directly addressed Patent Owner’s arguments that Dr. Baker is not qualified to testify in this proceeding because he is neither a person of ordinary skill in the art, nor an expert in the relevant art. See Dec. 7–8. In particular, we explained that there is no requirement “that the expert’s experience perfectly match the relevant field, or that the expert is a person of ordinary skill in the art.” Id. at 7. We also explained that Dr. Baker testifies as to his education and qualifications and provides his curriculum vitae. See Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 3–12; Ex. 1003. At this preliminary stage, we cannot say that Dr. Baker’s scientific, technical, and other specialized knowledge will not be helpful in understanding the evidence. See Fed. R. Evid. 702(a). On this record, we are not persuaded that Dr. Baker’s testimony should be disregarded. Id. at 8. Therefore, even if Dr. Baker were not a person of ordinary skill in the art as Patent Owner contends, it does not follow that he is unqualified to testify in these proceedings. Nothing was misapprehended or overlooked in considering Dr. Baker’s testimony.” slip op. at 6
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“(Ex. 2001). In the Preliminary Response, Patent Owner cited the Konda Declaration when discussing the experience and qualifications of the named inventor of the ’523 patent. Prelim. Resp. 8–9. The education level of the inventor, however, is just one of several factors that we may consider in determining the level of ordinary skill in the art. See Daiichi Sankyo Co., Ltd. v. Apotex, Inc., 501 F.3d 1254, 1256 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (enumerating six factors that “may be considered in determining the level of ordinary skill in the art” (quoting Evt’l Designs, Ltd. v. Union Oil Co., 713 F.2d 693, 696 (Fed. Cir. 1983))). And, as Patent Owner noted in the Preliminary Response, “these factors are merely a guide to determining the level of ordinary skill in the art.” Prelim. Resp. 7–8 (citing Daiichi Sankyo, 501 F.3d at 1256). In any event, in the Decision we also considered Petitioner’s and Patent Owner’s proposed definitions of the level of ordinary skill in the art, noted the differences between them, and stated that “[o]ur determination regarding Petitioner’s challenge does not turn on the differences between Petitioner’s and Patent Owner’s definitions.” Dec. 7. Therefore, our evaluation of Petitioner’s challenges and Dr. Baker’s testimony in support thereof would have been the same under Petitioner’s and Patent Owner’s proposed definitions of the level of ordinary skill in the art. See id. (“[W]e note that our conclusions would be same under either definition.”).” slip op. at 7
- Disclosure Requirements (§112) › Written description (Ariad)Not entitled to earlier dateNot reached
“Moreover, in the Decision, we directly addressed Patent Owner’s argument with respect to whether the ’394 provisional and ’605 PCT provided support for the claim limitation “said routing network comprising a plurality of stages y, in each sub-integrated circuit block, starting from the lowest stage of 1 to the highest stage of y, where y≧1” when y=1. Dec. 14. In particular, we found that Patent Owner’s arguments, as we understand them, are directed only to the disclosure of a network with only one stage (y=1). [Prelim. Resp.] at 15–39. Patent Owner does not address the other limitations of claim 1, and does not point to any disclosures in the priority applications that describe a sub-integrated circuit block with only one stage that also comprises pluralities of forward connecting links and backward connecting links as required by claim 1. Id. Thus, we did not overlook Patent Owner’s arguments, but rather evaluated the disclosures in the ’394 provisional and ’605 PCT and determined, on the record at this stage of the proceeding, that they do not provide sufficient written description support for the challenged claims. The parties will have the opportunity to further develop the record on these issues during trial, and the Board will evaluate the fully-developed record at the close of the evidence. D. Public Availability of the ’394 provisional” slip op. at 9
§ 102 anticipation§ 112 disclosurePatents in suitUS 8,269,523 - Flex Logix Technologies, Inc. v. Venkat KondaRehearing deniedPTAB · Sep 16, 2020 · IPR2020-00260 · APJ Jo-Anne M Kokoski · IPR · Rehearing
The Board denied the Patent Owner’s rehearing requests, leaving institution in place for claims 1–7, 11, 15–18, 20–22, 32, and 47.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied
“believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked, and the place where each matter was previously addressed in a motion, an opposition, or a reply. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d). Patent Owner, as the party challenging the Decisions, has the burden of showing that the Decisions should be modified. Id. When rehearing a decision on a petition, the Board reviews the decision for an abuse of discretion. Id. § 42.71(c). An abuse of discretion may arise if a decision is based on an erroneous interpretation of the law, if a factual finding is not supported by substantial evidence, or if an unreasonable judgment is made in weighing relevant factors. In re Gartside, 203 F.3d 1305, 1315–16 (Fed. Cir. 2000).” slip op. at 2
- Strike new argumentNew argument disregardedOther
“Consolidated Trial Practice Guide, 90. The Consolidated Trial Practice Guide goes on to state that “[a]bsent a showing of ‘good cause’ prior to filing the request for rehearing or in the request for rehearing itself, new evidence will not be admitted.” Id. (citing Huawei, Paper 19 at 4).” slip op. at 4
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedDecided for petitioner
“Dr. Baker testifies as to his education and qualifications and provides his curriculum vitae. See Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 3–12; Ex. 1003. At this preliminary stage, we cannot say that Dr. Baker’s scientific, technical, and other specialized knowledge will not be helpful in understanding the evidence. See Fed. R. Evid. 702(a). On this record, we are not persuaded that Dr. Baker’s testimony should be disregarded. Id. at 8. Therefore, even if Dr. Baker were not a person of ordinary skill in the art as Patent Owner contends, it does not follow that he is unqualified to testify in these proceedings. Nothing was misapprehended or overlooked in considering Dr. Baker’s testimony.” slip op. at 6
- Skill levelOther
“(Ex. 2001). In the Preliminary Response, Patent Owner cited the Konda Declaration when discussing the experience and qualifications of the named inventor of the ’523 patent. Prelim. Resp. 8–9. The education level of the inventor, however, is just one of several factors that we may consider in determining the level of ordinary skill in the art. See Daiichi Sankyo Co., Ltd. v. Apotex, Inc., 501 F.3d 1254, 1256 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (enumerating six factors that “may be considered in determining the level of ordinary skill in the art” (quoting Evt’l Designs, Ltd. v. Union Oil Co., 713 F.2d 693, 696 (Fed. Cir. 1983))). And, as Patent Owner noted in the Preliminary Response, “these factors are merely a guide to determining the level of ordinary skill in the art.” Prelim. Resp. 7–8 (citing Daiichi Sankyo, 501 F.3d at 1256). In any event, in the Decision we also considered Petitioner’s and Patent Owner’s proposed definitions of the level of ordinary skill in the art, noted the differences between them, and stated that “[o]ur determination regarding Petitioner’s challenge does not turn on the differences between Petitioner’s and Patent Owner’s definitions.” Dec. 7. Therefore, our evaluation of Petitioner’s challenges and Dr. Baker’s testimony in support thereof would have been the same under Petitioner’s and Patent Owner’s proposed definitions of the level of ordinary skill in the art. See id. (“[W]e note that our conclusions would be same under either definition.”).” slip op. at 7
§ 102 anticipation§ 112 disclosurePatents in suitUS 8,269,523 - PTAB · Sep 16, 2020 · IPR2018-00754 · APJ Hyun J Jung · IPR · Rehearing
The Board denied Patent Owner’s rehearing request and left in place its determination that claim 9 was unpatentable over White and Lee under § 103(a).
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied
“The party filing a request for rehearing of a final written decision has the burden of showing a decision should be modified, and the request for rehearing must specifically identify all matters the party believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked and the place where each matter was previously addressed in its papers. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d); see also Req. Reh’g 1 (quoting from the rule). Therefore, Patent Owner bears the burden of establishing that we misapprehended or overlooked the matters that it requests that we review.” slip op. at 3
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededDecided for petitioner
“In our Final Written Decision, we explained that the Specification does not support Patent Owner’s proposed interpretation of the term “token” as being disk-shaped, and determined that “we need only determine that the term ‘token’ does not include an ‘action figure.’” Final Dec. 11–12. The full record indicated to us that, even if we adopted Patent Owner’s proposed interpretation of “token” as an “item required to begin play of a game,” Petitioner had still shown by a preponderance of the evidence that claim 9 is unpatentable over White and Lee. As described in our Final Written Decision, we found that “the teachings of White related to tag 5 in base portion 4a of character 4 used in the toy of Figure 1 support Petitioner’s argument that character 4 teaches a ‘game piece with built-in IC chip.’” Final Dec. 32. We understood that “Petitioner is proposing to modify White so that tag 5 is detachable and results in a ‘token with built-in IC chip,’” so that “the modified White character 4 would have base 4a with detachable tag 5 received in recessed portion 3.” Id. at 37 (citing Pet. 65–66; Dec. to Inst. 23; Pet. Reply 24); see also id. at 41–42 (determining that” slip op. at 6
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successUnpatentableMotivation foundUnpatentable
“We also found that “Lee . . . supports Petitioner’s declarant testimony that one of ordinary skill in the art would have modified White so that its tag 5 is detachable in the same manner as Lee so that ‘various action figures can be used with the token.’” Final Dec. 42 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶ 150). Petitioner, thus, showed by a preponderance of the evidence that Lee teaches or suggests a method of attaching a component to a figure that one of ordinary skill in the art would have applied to White’s tag 5 for the reason asserted by Petitioner.” slip op. at 9
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessPatents in suitUS 7,001,276 - PTAB · Sep 15, 2020 · IPR2020-00282 · APJ Christopher L Ogden · IPR · Rehearing
The Board denied Samsung’s rehearing request, leaving in place the denial of institution because the petition did not show a reasonable likelihood of proving any challenged claim unpatentable.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied
“a party requests rehearing on a decision on whether to institute inter partes review, we “review the decision for an abuse of discretion.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(c) (2019). There is an abuse of discretion if we have made “a clear error of judgment in weighing relevant factors or in basing [our] decision on an error of law or on clearly erroneous factual findings.” Bayer CropScience AG v. Dow AgroSciences LLC, 851 F.3d 1302, 1306 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (quoting Mentor Graphics Corp. v. Quickturn Design Sys., Inc., 150 F.3d 1374, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 1998)). In a request for rehearing, “[t]he burden of showing a decision should be modified lies with the party challenging the decision,” and “[t]he request must specifically identify all matters the party believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked, and the place where each matter was previously addressed” in the record. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d).” slip op. at 2
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“We disagree. Nowhere in the cited passages in the Petition does Samsung argue that we should construe the term “row wrap-around connections” according to the explicit construction that Samsung now suggests for the plain and ordinary meaning. See Pet. 10–11, 25–30. Rather, Samsung argued that “Petitioners do not believe any term requires explicit construction.” Pet. 10–11. In the Reply, Samsung argued that all of the terms in the challenged claims should be construed according to their plain and ordinary meaning. See Reply 1, 4–5. However, apart from arguing that Samsung had proposed construing limitation 1C in the co-pending district court proceeding according to its plain and ordinary meaning,3 Samsung did not propose any specific construction for the phrase “row wrap-around connection,” or point to any evidence as to what the ordinary and customary meaning of that phrase was to a person of ordinary skill in the art. Therefore, we decline to adopt Samsung’s new proposed construction on rehearing.” slip op. at 6
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentable
“We determined that Samsung had not provided sufficient evidence of its proposed motivation to combine the two references. See Dec. 16 (“[N]either Samsung nor Dr. Wolfe supports this conclusion with any evidence on the preliminary record.” (citing In re Magnum Oil Tools Int’l, Ltd., 829 F.3d 1364, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2016); 35 U.S.C. § 322(a)(3))). In particular, we found that “Dr. Wolfe does not explain how or why the combination of Barkan and Tagg would minimize RC delay or allow for the use of lengthier columns and rows of electrodes, or cite to any facts, data, or authorities to support that opinion.” Dec. 17. We stated that “there is no evidence in the record suggesting that RC delay was a recognized problem . . . or that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have understood that a connection to both sides of a row of electrodes would be a solution to that problem.” Id. We also stated that Dr. Wolfe does not “provide any detail as to how a person of ordinary skill in the art would have modified Barkan’s leads 160 to incorporate external connections such as those in Tagg.” Id. (citing Personal Web Techs., LLC v. Apple, Inc., 848 F.3d 987, 994 (Fed. Cir. 2017)).” slip op. at 13
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessPatents in suitUS 7,821,502 - Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. v. Ibex PT Holdings Co., Ltd.Rehearing deniedPTAB · Aug 27, 2020 · IPR2018-00011 · APJ Kimberly Mcgraw · IPR · Rehearing
The Board denied the Patent Owner’s rehearing request, leaving claims 1–5 unpatentable over WD5 and Lin under § 103(a).
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied
“II. ANALYSIS The party challenging a decision in a request for rehearing bears the burden of showing the decision should be modified. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d). A request for rehearing “must specifically identify all matters the party believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked, and the place where each matter was previously addressed.” Id.” slip op. at 2
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Prior-art status of a reference › Printed publication / public accessibilityPrinted publication establishedDecided for petitioner
“evidence because it did not establish that enough interested and ordinarily skilled artisans actually obtained the WD4 reference was . . . erroneous.” Id. The Federal Circuit explained that “the standard for public accessibility is whether a person of ordinary skill in the art could, after exercising reasonable diligence, access a reference” and that the Board “departed from this well- 6 Samsung Elec. Co., Ltd. v. Infobridge Pte. Ltd., IPR2017-00099, Paper 32 (PTAB Apr. 23, 2018), and Samsung Elec. Co., Ltd. v. Infobridge Pte. Ltd., IPR2017-00100, Paper 30 (PTAB Apr. 23, 2018). 7 Cited by the Federal Circuit as “Final Written Decision, 2018 WL 19040480 at *9.” established principle by repeatedly faulting Samsung for not proving that the WD4 reference was ‘generally’ or ‘widely’ disseminated.” Id. Rather than requiring Samsung to prove that persons of ordinary skill actually received the listserv email, the Federal Circuit stated the Board should have considered whether Samsung’s evidence established that an ordinarily skilled artisan could have accessed the WD4 reference, after exercising reasonable diligence, based on the listserv email. See id. at 1374–75.” slip op. at 6
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedDecided for petitioner
“Evidence to prove personal knowledge may consist of the witness’s 8 Although Patent Owner did object to the admissibility of Mr. Bross’s supplemental declaration (Ex. 1106) under Fed. R. Evid. 602 (see Paper 16, 1– 3), Patent Owner did not seek to exclude Mr. Bross’s supplemental declaration under 37 C.F.R. § 42.64(c), which provides that a “motion to exclude evidence must be filed to preserve any objection” to the admissibility of the evidence. own testimony.” Fed. R. Evid. 602. We credit Mr. Bross’s testimony that he has “personal knowledge and recollection that people subscribed to that list from academia, from companies have been approved by the moderator.” Dec. 28–29 (citing Ex. 2008, 83:53–84:3; Ex. 1002 ¶ 184; Ex. 1058, 2). Mr. Bross testified that, as co-chair and lead author of the Working Drafts of the JCT-VC, he was familiar with the procedures for making JCT-VC documents publicly available, including through the JCT-VC reflector listserv (see Ex. 1002 ¶ 177) and that based on his knowledge and recollection, all communications between members related to the development of the HEVC standard were to be conducted via the JCT-VC reflector (jct-vc@lists.rwth-aachen.de) (see Ex. 1002 ¶ 184). See also Ex. 1058, 2 (stating the JCT-VC “reflector [is] to be used for discussions by the JCT-VC and all its AHGs [Ad Hoc Groups]”); id. at 228–229. slip op. at 17
§ 102 anticipationcites GrahamPatents in suitUS 8,654,855 - Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. v. Ibex PT Holdings Co., Ltd.Rehearing deniedPTAB · Aug 27, 2020 · IPR2018-00092 · APJ Kimberly Mcgraw · IPR · Rehearing
The Board denied Patent Owner’s rehearing request, leaving intact the decision that claims 1–3 were unpatentable under §103(a) over WD5 and Lin.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied
“II. ANALYSIS The party challenging a decision in a request for rehearing bears the burden of showing the decision should be modified. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d). A request for rehearing “must specifically identify all matters the party believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked, and the place where each matter was previously addressed.” Id.” slip op. at 2
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Prior-art status of a reference › Printed publication / public accessibilityPrinted publication establishedDecided for petitioner
“evidence because it did not establish that enough interested and ordinarily skilled artisans actually obtained the WD4 reference was . . . erroneous.” Id. The Federal Circuit explained that “the standard for public accessibility is whether a person of ordinary skill in the art could, after exercising reasonable diligence, access a reference” and that the Board “departed from this well- 6 Samsung Elec. Co., Ltd. v. Infobridge Pte. Ltd., IPR2017-00099, Paper 32 (PTAB Apr. 23, 2018), and Samsung Elec. Co., Ltd. v. Infobridge Pte. Ltd., IPR2017-00100, Paper 30 (PTAB Apr. 23, 2018). 7 Cited by the Federal Circuit as “Final Written Decision, 2018 WL 19040480 at *9.” established principle by repeatedly faulting Samsung for not proving that the WD4 reference was ‘generally’ or ‘widely’ disseminated.” Id. Rather than requiring Samsung to prove that persons of ordinary skill actually received the listserv email, the Federal Circuit stated the Board should have considered whether Samsung’s evidence established that an ordinarily skilled artisan could have accessed the WD4 reference, after exercising reasonable diligence, based on the listserv email. See id. at 1374–75.” slip op. at 6
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedDecided for petitioner
“Evidence to prove personal knowledge may consist of the witness’s 8 Although Patent Owner did object to the admissibility of Mr. Bross’s supplemental declaration (Ex. 1106) under Fed. R. Evid. 602 (see Paper 16, 1– 3), Patent Owner did not seek to exclude Mr. Bross’s supplemental declaration under 37 C.F.R. § 42.64(c), which provides that a “motion to exclude evidence must be filed to preserve any objection” to the admissibility of the evidence. own testimony.” Fed. R. Evid. 602. We credit Mr. Bross’s testimony that he has “personal knowledge and recollection that people subscribed to that list from academia, from companies have been approved by the moderator.” Dec. 28–29 (citing Ex. 2008, 83:53–84:3; Ex. 1002 ¶ 184; Ex. 1058, 2). Mr. Bross testified that, as co-chair and lead author of the Working Drafts of the JCT-VC, he was familiar with the procedures for making JCT-VC documents publicly available, including through the JCT-VC reflector listserv (see Ex. 1002 ¶ 177) and that based on his knowledge and recollection, all communications between members related to the development of the HEVC standard were to be conducted via the JCT-VC reflector (jct-vc@lists.rwth-aachen.de) (see Ex. 1002 ¶ 184). See also Ex. 1058, 2 (stating the JCT-VC “reflector [is] to be used for discussions by the JCT-VC and all its AHGs [Ad Hoc Groups]”); id. at 228–229. slip op. at 17
§ 102 anticipationcites GrahamPatents in suitUS 9,025,668 - Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. v. Ibex PT Holdings Co., Ltd.Rehearing deniedPTAB · Aug 27, 2020 · IPR2018-00093 · APJ Kimberly Mcgraw · IPR · Rehearing
The Board denied Patent Owner’s rehearing request, leaving intact its finding that claims 1–5 are unpatentable under §103(a) over WD5 and Lin.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied
“II. ANALYSIS The party challenging a decision in a request for rehearing bears the burden of showing the decision should be modified. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d). A request for rehearing “must specifically identify all matters the party believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked, and the place where each matter was previously addressed.” Id.” slip op. at 2
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Prior-art status of a reference › Printed publication / public accessibilityPrinted publication establishedDecided for petitioner
“evidence because it did not establish that enough interested and ordinarily skilled artisans actually obtained the WD4 reference was . . . erroneous.” Id. The Federal Circuit explained that “the standard for public accessibility is whether a person of ordinary skill in the art could, after exercising reasonable diligence, access a reference” and that the Board “departed from this well- 6 Samsung Elec. Co., Ltd. v. Infobridge Pte. Ltd., IPR2017-00099, Paper 32 (PTAB Apr. 23, 2018), and Samsung Elec. Co., Ltd. v. Infobridge Pte. Ltd., IPR2017-00100, Paper 30 (PTAB Apr. 23, 2018). 7 Cited by the Federal Circuit as “Final Written Decision, 2018 WL 19040480 at *9.” established principle by repeatedly faulting Samsung for not proving that the WD4 reference was ‘generally’ or ‘widely’ disseminated.” Id. Rather than requiring Samsung to prove that persons of ordinary skill actually received the listserv email, the Federal Circuit stated the Board should have considered whether Samsung’s evidence established that an ordinarily skilled artisan could have accessed the WD4 reference, after exercising reasonable diligence, based on the listserv email. See id. at 1374–75.” slip op. at 6
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedDecided for petitioner
“Evidence to prove personal knowledge may consist of the witness’s 8 Although Patent Owner did object to the admissibility of Mr. Bross’s supplemental declaration (Ex. 1106) under Fed. R. Evid. 602 (see Paper 16, 1– 3), Patent Owner did not seek to exclude Mr. Bross’s supplemental declaration under 37 C.F.R. § 42.64(c), which provides that a “motion to exclude evidence must be filed to preserve any objection” to the admissibility of the evidence. own testimony.” Fed. R. Evid. 602. We credit Mr. Bross’s testimony that he has “personal knowledge and recollection that people subscribed to that list from academia, from companies have been approved by the moderator.” Dec. 28–29 (citing Ex. 2008, 83:53–84:3; Ex. 1002 ¶ 184; Ex. 1058, 2). Mr. Bross testified that, as co-chair and lead author of the Working Drafts of the JCT-VC, he was familiar with the procedures for making JCT-VC documents publicly available, including through the JCT-VC reflector listserv (see Ex. 1002 ¶ 177) and that based on his knowledge and recollection, all communications between members related to the development of the HEVC standard were to be conducted via the JCT-VC reflector (jct-vc@lists.rwth-aachen.de) (see Ex. 1002 ¶ 184). See also Ex. 1058, 2 (stating the JCT-VC “reflector [is] to be used for discussions by the JCT-VC and all its AHGs [Ad Hoc Groups]”); id. at 228–229. slip op. at 17
§ 102 anticipationcites GrahamPatents in suitUS 8,774,279 - Parrot S.A. / Parrot Drones S.A.S. et al. v. Qfo Labs, Inc.Rehearing deniedPTAB · Aug 11, 2020 · IPR2018-01690 · APJ Hyun J Jung · IPR · Rehearing
The Board denied Patent Owner’s rehearing request, leaving claims 13–17 unpatentable and the motion to amend granted for claims 1–10 but denied for substitute claims 21–23.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied
“II. ANALYSIS The party challenging a decision in a request for rehearing bears the burden of showing the decision should be modified as set forth in 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d), which provides in relevant part: A party dissatisfied with a decision may file a single request for rehearing without prior authorization from the Board. The burden of showing a decision should be modified lies with the party challenging the decision. The request must specifically identify all matters the party believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked, and the place where each matter was previously addressed in a motion, an opposition, or a reply. See also Req. Reh’g. 4 (quoting, in part, 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d)). With this in mind, we address Patent Owner’s arguments below.” slip op. at 2
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for petitioner
“Owner’s Motion to Amend in its Rehearing Request. Compare Mot. 11–12, with Req. Reh’g. 7. We considered these arguments in our Decision, and Patent Owner’s arguments express disagreement with our interpretation of “orientation control scheme” but do not show how an argument was overlooked or misapprehended. See Final Dec. 74, 84–86. Patent Owner supplements its prior arguments with contentions that we construed “position” as a verb, not a noun. See Req. Reh’g. 6. Patent Owner does not identify where these additional contentions were previously presented, as required under 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d). Thus, Patent Owner has failed to show that we misapprehended or overlooked these arguments. See id. Even if the additional contentions had been previously presented, our Decision considered Patent Owner’s proposed interpretation of “orientation control scheme.” See Final Dec. 85 (“Even under Patent Owner’s proposed interpretation of ‘orientation control scheme’ (Mot. 11–12), Petitioner persuades us that Louvel and Nagamitsu teach the final recitation of proposed substitute claim 21.”). Patent Owner’s arguments do not show how an argument was overlooked or misapprehended. In any event, we remain convinced that “Patent Owner’s proposed interpretations are not the broadest reasonable interpretation in view of the Specification of the ’292 patent because the Specification does not use these terms or describe state vectors.” See Final Dec. 74.” slip op. at 4
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedDecided for petitioner
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Constitutional / APA (Arthrex, Oil States, due process)Decided for petitioner
“We decline to consider Patent Owner’s constitutional challenge because the issue has been addressed by the Federal Circuit in Arthrex, 941 F.3d at 1328 (expressly limiting its holding “to those cases where final written decisions were issued (prior to Arthrex)”). See also Caterpillar Paving Prod. Inc. v. Wirtgen Am., Inc., 957 F.3d 1342, 1342–1343 (May 6, 2020) (“The court in Arthrex considered and rejected that argument, expressly limiting its holding ‘to those cases where final written decisions were issued.’”) (quoting 941 F.3d at 1340). Our Decision was entered February 20, 2020, after the Federal Circuit issued its October 2019 decision in Arthrex (see 941 F.3d at 1320).” slip op. at 10
Claim constructionPatents in suitUS 9,904,292 - Solvay USA Inc. v. Worldsource Enterprises, LLC, Eco Agro Resources LLC, And Eco World Group LLCRehearing deniedPTAB · Aug 10, 2020 · PGR2019-00046 · APJ Sheldon M Mcgee · PGR · Rehearing
The Board held claims 1–20 unpatentable as obvious over the stated combinations and denied Patent Owner’s rehearing request.
RulingsRehearing decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“In light of the complete record now before us, we adopt Petitioner’s definition of one of ordinary skill in the art. In addition to the academic requirements associated with obtaining a bachelor’s degree in chemistry or chemical engineering, Petitioner’s definition includes at least two years of experience specific to chemical formulations used in the agricultural industry. Pet. 8. Patent Owner’s “definition” is generic to “formulation chemistry.” Sur-Reply 4. Patent Owner does not explain, nor do we discern, why the skilled artisan would not have had at least some work experience in developing chemical formulations in the relevant field, i.e., the agrochemical industry. Indeed, some of Patent Owner’s arguments are directed to solvent delivery systems used in the agricultural market. PO Resp. 57–78.” slip op. at 7
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“filing date, we apply the claim construction standard articulated in Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). Under Phillips, claim terms are afforded “their ordinary and customary meaning.” Id. at 1312. “[T]he ordinary and customary meaning of a claim term is the meaning that the term would have to a person of ordinary skill in the art in question at the time of the invention.” Id. at 1313. Only terms that are in controversy need to be construed, and then only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy. Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999). Neither party offers a construction for any claim term. Pet. 11; see also PO Resp., generally. On the complete record, we determine that no claim limitations need an express construction to resolve the controversy.” slip op. at 6
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundDecided for petitioner
- Obviousness (§103) › Analogous artAnalogous artDecided for petitioner
“analogous art. PO Resp. 47; Sur-Reply 8, 15–16. Patent Owner incorrectly frames the analogous art inquiry by comparing whether the prior art references are analogous to each other. See PO Resp. 47 (“not all three references are in the same field of endeavor”); Sur-Reply 16 (asserting that CN400 “is not analogous art with Iannotta [] and/or Kolc” because CN400’s NBPT is purportedly “not dissolved in any solvent”). Our reviewing court has stated, however, that “[a] reference qualifies as prior art for a determination under § 103 when it is analogous to the claimed invention.” Innovention Toys, LLC v. MGA Entertainment, Inc., 637 F.3d 1314, 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (citing In re Clay, 966 F.2d 656, 658 (Fed. Cir. 1992). Quoting In re Bigio, 381 F.3d 1320, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2004), the court stated Two separate tests define the scope of analogous art: (1) whether the art is from the same field of endeavor, regardless of the problem addressed, and (2) if the reference is not within the field of the inventor’s endeavor, whether the reference still is reasonably pertinent to the particular problem with which the inventor is involved. Innovention Toys, 637 F.3d at 1322. Regarding whether the CN400 patent is in the same field of endeavor as the ʼ108 patent, we must consider the scope of the ʼ108 patent as a whole and not just the claims. In re Mettke, 570 F.3d 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (rejecting appellant’s attempt to rely on the claimed subject matter to define the relevant “field of endeavor” when the specification described a broader one). Significantly, the ʼ108 patent discloses both solutions and suspensions of NBPT. See Ex. 1001, 5:20–52, 6:5–12, 6:39–40 (disclosing various solutions of NBPT), and 13:24–36 (setting forth an embodiment that formed “a suspension of NBPT in the aqueous mixture” that may “be solved by agitation”). Therefore, regardless of whether CN400’s process set forth in its claim 1 results in a solution or suspension of NBPT, CN400 is from the same field of endeavor as defined by the ʼ108 patent itself––“solvent formulations for the urease inhibitor . . . NBPT.” Ex. 1001, 1:15–18. Even if CN400 was not in the same field of endeavor as the ʼ108 patent, we find it is reasonably pertinent to the particular problem with which the inventor was involved. The ʼ108 patent identifies NBPT formulation toxicity as problematic to the environment, animals, and possibly humans (id. at 2:60–62, 4:8–33), and expressly states “it is desirable to develop formulations/fertilizers that are less toxic to the environment and to animals and humans” (id. at 4:34–36). The skilled artisan would have been aware of this toxicity problem with NBPT-containing formulations (Ex. 1025, 1; Ex. 1007 ¶ 6), and CN400 was also concerned with this problem (Ex. 1006, 1 (Abstract), ¶¶ 2, 5; see also Ex. 2006, 461 (machine translation of CN400 abstract noting how use of its fertilizer formulation will not pollute the environment), 462 ¶ 2, 463 ¶ 5. Notably, Patent Owner does not address this second test in its briefing. Tr. 39:6–11 (Patent Owner’s counsel acknowledging “[w]e did not address the other prong in the briefing”). Thus, on several bases, we find CN400 is analogous art to the ʼ108 patent and may be properly relied on in our obviousness determination.” slip op. at 24
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,221,108 - Weber, Inc. v. Provisur Technologies, Inc.Rehearing deniedPTAB · Aug 5, 2020 · IPR2019-01463 · APJ Mitchell G Weatherly · IPR · Rehearing
The Board denied Weber’s rehearing request, finding no error or abuse of discretion in denying institution on claims 1–22.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied
“When rehearing a decision on petition, the Board will review the decision for an abuse of discretion. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(c). An abuse of discretion may be determined if a decision is based on an erroneous interpretation of law, if a factual finding is not supported by substantial evidence, or if the decision represents an unreasonable judgment in weighing relevant factors. See Arnold P’ship v. Dudas, 362 F.3d 1338, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2004). The party challenging the decision has the burden of showing a decision should be modified, and the request for rehearing must specifically identify all matters the party believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked and the place where each matter was previously addressed in its papers. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d).” slip op. at 2
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for patent owner
“First, the plain language of claim 1 unambiguously recites a causal link between the roller and the movement of the end of the conveying surface of the belt. Specifically, claim 1 recites: “an endless circulating belt having an upper conveying surface.” Ex. 1001, 6:33–34. The claim requires that the belt is “circulated to move [articles] . . . to an end of said conveying surface.” Id. at 6:40–41. The claim recites a “roller” that controls “a belt accumulation region” of the belt. Id. at 6:35–36. The claimed roller must also cause the end of the conveying surface of the belt to move because the “position of said end is moveable . . . by longitudinal positioning of said roller.” Id. at 6:45–49 (emphasis added). The phrase that “end is moveable by longitudinal positioning of said roller” unambiguously requires longitudinally positioning the roller to cause the end of the conveying surface to move. The Specification bolsters our plain reading of claim 1 where it states: “Movement of the pulley 42 controls the extension or retraction of the top region 34, and the position of an end 50 of the top region 34.” Ex. 1001, 4:13–15. Figure 3 (reproduced below) illustrates the manner in which the movement of pulley 42 controls the longitudinal movement of the end 50 of the conveying surface (i.e., top region 34). In the embodiment illustrated below, roller 42 constitutes the claimed roller, top region 34 constitutes the claimed conveying surface, and end 50 constitutes the claimed end of the conveying surface.” slip op. at 4
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“an interpretation of “roller.” Patent Owner argued that the roller of claim 1 must both control the accumulation region of the belt and move longitudinally to cause movement of the end of the conveying portion of the belt. Prelim. Resp. 11. Patent Owner conceded that Rheon’s roller 11 met the first requirement of the claimed roller, namely, controlling the accumulation region of the belt. Id. at 23, n.6. However, Patent Owner also argued, id. at 24–26, and we agreed, that movement of Rheon’s roller 11 did not cause movement of the end of the conveying surface, Dec. 8–11. We need not repeat our analysis here because Petitioner identifies no error in our understanding of the manner in which Rheon operates. See Reh’g Req. 11–14 (arguing only errors in our claim interpretation). III. CONCLUSION For the reasons expressed above, we determine that Petitioner has failed to demonstrate error or an abuse of discretion in our Institution Decision. Accordingly, we deny Petitioner’s Request for Rehearing.” slip op. at 6
Claim constructionPatents in suitUS 6,669,005
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.