- Palo Alto Networks, Inc. v. Centripetal Networks, Inc.Institution deniedPTAB · Feb 22, 2022 · PGR2021-00108 · APJ Aaron W Moore · PGR · Institution
Institution was denied because the petition did not show a reasonable likelihood that claims 1–20 were unpatentable, including because the asserted combination did not link rule generation to the packet correlation.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“Obviousness Analysis A claim is unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) if the differences between the claimed subject matter and the prior art are such that the subject matter, as a whole, would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the subject matter pertains. See KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 406 (2007). The question of obviousness is resolved on the basis of underlying factual determinations, primarily: (1) the scope and content of the prior art; (2) any differences between the claimed subject matter and the prior art; (3) the level of ordinary skill in the art; and (4) objective evidence of nonobviousness. Graham, 383 U.S. at 17–18.6 Petitioner asserts that claims 1–2, 7–8, 10, 12–13, and 17–18 are unpatentable under § 103 as obvious in view of Paxton and Sutton. See Pet. 6, 18–64. For the reasons described below, we are not persuaded by Petitioner’s argument and evidence.” slip op. at 14
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner asserts that a person of ordinary skill in the art “had a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering, computer science, or a related field, and approximately 2-3 years of experience in the design or development of telecommunication systems, or the equivalent” and that “[a]dditional graduate education could substitute for professional experience, or significant experience in the field could substitute for formal education.” Pet. 13–15 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 18–20). Patent Owner does not address this issue in the Preliminary Response. As Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s characterization of the level of skill in the art, and because we find it generally consistent with the disclosures of the ’797 patent and the prior art, we adopt it for purposes of this analysis. C.” slip op. at 9
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached
“Patent Owner argues that “[t]he plain and ordinary meaning of the terms “determining . . . a first plurality of log entries” and “determining . . . a second plurality of log entries” is “identifying” or “ascertaining” log entries.” Prelim. Resp. 16. Patent Owner also argues that “[t]he terms “provisioning, . . . based on the determined correlation, . . . rules configured to identify the first plurality of packets received by the network device,” and “provisioning, . . . based on the determined correlation, . . . rules configured to identify the second plurality of packets transmitted by the network device” (“provisioning rules”) . . . should be given their plain and ordinary meaning—rules configured to identify packets.” Prelim. Resp. 20. Neither party, however, argues that the prior art arguments presented in the Petition turn on the construction of these terms. Instead, it appears that they are raised as claim construction issues only because Petitioner is challenging the language under Section 112. We will discuss the Section 112 arguments below, but do not see a dispute about the constructions offered by the parties above the makes a difference in the prior art analysis and, therefore, do not construe these terms at this time. See Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999).” slip op. at 10
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“respect to this limitation for several reasons, including that Petitioner’s “alleged rule generation and provisioning” is responsive to detecting malicious activity, not “based on the determined correlation.” Prelim. Resp. 38. On this record, we agree with Patent Owner. The claims require “generating, by the computing system and based on the determined correlation, one or more rules configured to identify packets received from the first host.” We do not have sufficient argument or evidence to show that one of ordinary skill in the art would have found it obvious to generate these rules “based on” the determined correlation.” slip op. at 16
Claim construction§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosurecites KSR · Graham · NautilusPatents in suitUS 10,931,797 - PTAB · Feb 16, 2022 · IPR2021-01150 · APJ Bryan F Moore · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–18 under § 103 over Paxton, Sutton, and Ivershen, finding a reasonable likelihood of success on at least claim 1.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Decided for petitioner
“We concur with Petitioner’s assertions regarding the status of the underlying, related litigation. With respect to Fintiv factor (1), we determine this factor to be neutral. Although the parties stipulated to a trial date, the district court has yet to enter that schedule or hold a scheduling conference. The district court has continued the scheduling conference until after it decides the pending motion to stay. See Ex. 1031, Ex. 1032, 4:11–22. On this record, we are not persuaded that the district court will adhere to the previously agreed upon August 2022 trial date. Even with the arguments and evidence presented, we determine it to be speculative as to whether a stay may be granted if a proceeding is instituted. We reach the same conclusion with respect to Fintiv factor (2), given the speculative nature of the “trial date.” With respect to Fintiv factor (3), we determine that this weighs against discretionary denial; although some discovery has occurred, the parties have not invested significant resources in the district court proceeding.” slip op. at 12
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsDecided for petitioner
“Given the facts above, because Ivershen was submitted and discussed during the prosecution of the ’903 patent and in IPR2018-01654 and IPR2018-01655, Ivershen qualifies as art that was “previously presented” to the Office. Thus, we find that Ivershen, the same prior art asserted in the Petition, previously was presented to the Office. Nevertheless, Petitioner asserts that the other prior art references in” slip op. at 19
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedOther
“Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art Noting that relevant experience and education can substitute for each other, Petitioner states that a person of ordinary skill in the relevant art, at the time the ’903 patent was filed, had a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering, computer science, or a related field, and approximately 2–3 years of experience in the design or development of telecommunication systems, or the equivalent. Additional graduate education could substitute for professional experience, or significant experience in the field could substitute for formal education. Pet. 13 (citing Ex. 1003 [Declaration of Dr. Robert Akl] ¶¶ 18–20). Petitioner’s definition of a person of ordinary skill, which Patent Owner does not dispute at this stage, appears appropriate for the technology addressed by this proceeding.” slip op. at 21
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“Petitioner asserts “no terms require construction.” Pet. 13. Patent Owner asserts “no express construction of any term is required to resolve any controversy in this proceeding.” Prelim. Resp. 12. After review of the current record, we conclude that no express claim construction is necessary to determine whether to institute review of the challenged claims. See, e.g., Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng'g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)) (“[W]e need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’”).” slip op. at 22
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,530,903 - Palo Alto Networks, Inc. v. Centripetal Networks, Inc.Institution deniedPTAB · Feb 16, 2022 · IPR2021-01151 · APJ Stacey G White · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution for claims 1–24 because the petition did not show a reasonable likelihood that the challenged claims were obvious over the asserted combinations.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“respect to this limitation for several reasons including that Petitioner’s “alleged rule generation and provisioning is responsive to detecting malicious activity, not ‘responsive to the correlating.’” Prelim. Resp. 27–28. On this record, we agree with Patent Owner. The claims require that “responsive to the correlating of . . . packets transmitted by the network device with . . . packets received by the network device: generating . . . based on the correlating, one or more rules.” We do not have sufficient argument or evidence to show that one of ordinary skill in the art would have found it obvious to generate these rules “based on” and “responsive to” the correlation of packets.” slip op. at 24
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“respect to this limitation for several reasons including that Petitioner’s “alleged rule generation and provisioning is responsive to detecting malicious activity, not ‘responsive to the correlating.’” Prelim. Resp. 27–28. On this record, we agree with Patent Owner. The claims require that “responsive to the correlating of . . . packets transmitted by the network device with . . . packets received by the network device: generating . . . based on the correlating, one or more rules.” We do not have sufficient argument or evidence to show that one of ordinary skill in the art would have found it obvious to generate these rules “based on” and “responsive to” the correlation of packets.” slip op. at 24
§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,659,573 - Apple Inc. v. Corephotonics Ltd.Adverse judgmentPTAB · Feb 11, 2022 · IPR2018-01146 · APJ Monica S Ullagaddi · IPR · Adverse judgment
The Board entered adverse judgment against Patent Owner on claims 6 and 14 after their disclaimer, then terminated the proceeding.
RulingsAdverse judgment- Adverse judgmentAdverse judgmentGranted
“II. ANALYSIS Actions construed as a request for adverse judgment include “[c]ancellation or disclaimer of a claim such that the party has no remaining claim in the trial.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.73(b). Here, Patent Owner has disclaimed claims 6 and 14 (along with unchallenged claims 3–5 and 8–11) of the ’712 patent under 35 U.S.C. § 253 according to the procedures set forth in 37 C.F.R. § 1.321(a). Ex. 3002, 1. We agree with Petitioner that 37 C.F.R. § 42.73(b) provides that the Board should construe Patent Owner’s statutory disclaimer to be a request that the Board enter adverse judgment against it with respect to claims 6 and 14, the only claims at issue, in this proceeding. Ex. 3001; see also Unified Patents, LLC v. Arsus, LLC, IPR2020-00948, Paper 18 at 2 (PTAB Jan. 27, 2021) (construing statutory disclaimer of all challenged claims as request for adverse judgment), aff’d, Case No. 2021- 1648, 2021 WL 5315423 (Fed. Cir. Nov. 16, 2021). Having reviewed the Disclaimer (Ex. 3002), we determine that entry of adverse judgment against Patent Owner with respect to claims 6 and 14 of the ’712 patent is appropriate. Claims 1, 2, 7, 12, 13, 15–17, and 19 are no longer part of this IPR proceeding because we made a final judgment with regard to these claims and that judgment has not been reversed or vacated. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.2 (“A decision is final only if it disposes of all necessary issues with regard to the party seeking judicial review, and does not indicate that further action is required.” (emphasis added)). As such, these claims are not “in the trial” within the meaning of 37 C.F.R. § 42.73(b)(2). The Federal Circuit remanded the Decision as to only claims 6 and 14. As such, our determination of adverse judgment does not apply to claims 1, 2, 7, 12, 13, 15–17, and 19. Patent Owner’s Disclaimer of claims 6 and 14 means that Patent Owner has no claims remaining in the present proceeding.” slip op. at 3
NonePatents in suitUS 9,568,712 - Unified Patents Inc. v. Ideahub, Inc.All claims unpatentablePTAB · Feb 7, 2022 · IPR2020-01338 · APJ Michael T Cygan · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–9 are unpatentable; substitute claims 13–16 are denied as obvious over Chen, OAI, 3GPP, and Brueck, and claims 17–20 are withdrawn.
RulingsFinal written decision- Expert testimonyPatent owner expert discountedDenied
“B. Patent Owner’s Motion under § 42.64(c) is denied as based on untimely objections to testimony. Patent Owner styled its Motion as a “Motion to Exclude Petitioner’s” slip op. at 7
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“B. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art Petitioner offers an assessment as to the level of skill in the art as of” slip op. at 18
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundUnpatentable
“9. Rationale to combine Chen and OAI” slip op. at 39
- Obviousness (§103) › Analogous artAnalogous artDecided for petitioner
“8. Whether OAI is Analogous Prior Art Petitioner set forth reasons why OAI is analogous art in its Petition.” slip op. at 34
Patent outcomesUS 8,645,562 unpatentable§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham · NautilusPatents in suitUS 8,645,562 - Apple Inc. v. Gui Global Products, Ltd., D/B/A GweeInstitution deniedPTAB · Feb 4, 2022 · IPR2021-01289 · APJ Bryan F Moore · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution of IPR on claims 1–19 under General Plastic, finding the second petition unnecessary and inefficient; it also denied Apple’s conditional motion for joinder.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › General Plastic (serial petitions)Institution denied general plasticInstitution denied
“In none of its briefs does Petitioner explain “why the Board should exercise its discretion to institute additional petitions if it [the Board] identifies one petition that satisfies petitioner’s burden under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a),” short of saying that “Bohbot-Gundlach (470 IPR) and Kim (this Petition) offer very different disclosures.” Explanation 3; TPG 60.8 However, Petitioner does not identify any circumstances identified in the Trial Practice Guide supporting a need for a second petition, such as a large number of claims in litigation or a potential dispute about priority date. TPG 59. Accordingly, based on the record before us, we agree with Patent Owner (Prelim. Resp. 6) that this General Plastic factor weighs in favor of denying institution of the proceeding.” slip op. at 7
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied general plasticInstitution denied
“Conclusion In light of the General Plastic factors, the Uniloc decision, the guidance in the TPG, and the arguments presented for and against the exercise of discretionary denial, we conclude that it is appropriate here to exercise our discretion under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). IV. DENIAL OF MOTION FOR JOINDER As stated above, the Director may join a party to an ongoing IPR only if the filed petition warrants institution under § 314. 35 U.S.C. § 315(c). Because we exercise discretion to deny institution under § 314, we deny Petitioner’s Conditional Motion for Joinder. V. ORDER Accordingly, it is: ORDERED that, pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), the Petition is denied; and” slip op. at 11
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Joinder §315(c) / SAS all-or-nothingJoinder, deniedDenied
“IV. DENIAL OF MOTION FOR JOINDER As stated above, the Director may join a party to an ongoing IPR only if the filed petition warrants institution under § 314. 35 U.S.C. § 315(c). Because we exercise discretion to deny institution under § 314, we deny Petitioner’s Conditional Motion for Joinder. V. ORDER Accordingly, it is: ORDERED that, pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), the Petition is denied; and FURTHER ORDERED that the Conditional Motion for Joinder is denied.” slip op. at 11
Discretionary denialPatents in suitUS 10,259,020 - Apple Inc. v. Gui Global Products, Ltd., D/B/A GweeInstitution deniedPTAB · Feb 3, 2022 · IPR2021-01292 · APJ Sheila F Mcshane · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution of IPR on claims 1–13 under § 314(a), applying General Plastic to Apple's follow-on petition, and denied Apple's conditional motion for joinder.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › General Plastic (serial petitions)Institution denied general plasticInstitution denied
“1. whether the same petitioner previously filed a petition directed to the same claims of the same patent; 2. whether at the time of filing of the first petition the petitioner knew of the prior art asserted in the second petition or should have known of it; 3. whether at the time of filing of the second petition the petitioner already received the patent owner’s preliminary response to the first petition or received the Board’s decision on whether to institute review in the first petition; 4. the length of time that elapsed between the time the petitioner learned of the prior art asserted in the second petition and the filing of the second petition; 5. whether the petitioner provides adequate explanation for the time elapsed between the filings of multiple petitions directed to the same claims of the same patent; 6. the finite resources of the Board; and 7. the requirement under 35 U.S.C. § 316(a)(11) to issue a final determination not later than 1 year after the date on which the Director notices institution of review.” slip op. at 5
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Joinder §315(c) / SAS all-or-nothingJoinder, deniedDenied
“requires two different decisions.” Facebook, Inc. v. Windy City Innovations, LLC, 973 F.3d 1321, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2020). First, we “determine whether the joinder applicant’s petition for IPR ‘warrants’ institution under § 314.” Id. Second, if the petition warrants institution, we then “decide whether to ‘join as a party’ the joinder applicant.” Id. Thus, before determining whether to join Petitioner as a party to the 338 IPR, we first determine whether the petition warrants institution under § 314(a).” slip op. at 4
Discretionary denialPatents in suitUS 10,589,320 - Apple Inc. v. Gui Global Products, Ltd., D/B/A GweeInstitution deniedPTAB · Feb 1, 2022 · IPR2021-01291 · APJ Sally C Medley · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution of IPR on claims 1–13 under § 314(a), finding the General Plastic factors favored denying Apple’s second petition.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › General Plastic (serial petitions)Institution denied general plasticInstitution denied
“Factor 1: “whether the same petitioner previously filed a petition directed to the same claims of the same patent” As explained above, before us is Petitioner’s second petition challenging the claims of the ’077 patent. Pet. 74; Prelim. Resp. 6. We understand that Petitioner filed this Petition in case we did not institute review in the 472 IPR. Pet. 74; Explanation 4–5 (Petitioner “respectfully requests that the Board institute” review in the 472 IPR, but if the Board does not “the next-most efficient course of action would be for the Board to institute” in this proceeding). As stated above, we instituted inter partes review in the 472 IPR. The 472 IPR involves claims 1–5 and 7–13 of the ’077 patent and the 337 IPR involves claims 1–13. Thus, one more claim is challenged here than in the 472 IPR. Nonetheless, Petitioner provides no explanation why it is again challenging claims 1–5 and 7–13 here or why Petitioner needs two instituted inter partes reviews on the common claims. Pet. 74–75. In none of its briefs does Petitioner explain “why the Board should exercise its discretion to institute additional petitions if it [the Board] identifies one petition that satisfies petitioner’s burden under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a),” short of saying that “(Gundlach (472 IPR) and Kim (this Petition) offer very different disclosures.” Explanation 3; TPG 60.7 However, Petitioner does not identify any circumstances identified in the Trial Practice Guide supporting a need for a second petition, such as a large number of claims in litigation or a potential dispute about priority date. TPG 59. Accordingly, based on the record before us, we agree with Patent Owner (Prelim. Resp. 6) that this General Plastic factor weighs in favor of denying institution of the proceeding. Factor 2: “whether at the time of filing of the first petition the petitioner knew of the prior art asserted in the second petition or should have known of it” Petitioner argues that it “learned of the prior art in the Samsung Petition [in the 337 IPR] around the time that petition was filed.” Pet. 75. Petitioner argues that because it filed its petition in the 472 IPR five weeks after the petition was filed in the 337 IPR, it “could not have reasonably leveraged its knowledge” of the prior art involved in the 337 IPR against Patent Owner. Id. Patent Owner argues that because Petitioner admitted that it knew of the prior art asserted in the 337 IPR prior to Petitioner filing the petition in the 472 IPR, General Plastic factor two weighs in favor of 7 As discussed above, in the Explanation, Petitioner requests that we should institute inter partes review in the 472 IPR, and if we do not, then we should institute here. Explanation 3–5. In the Reply, however, Petitioner requests that we institute here, despite having instituted the 472 IPR, without explaining why we should do so. Reply 2–3. denying institution of the proceeding. Prelim. Resp. 7. We agree that this factor weighs in favor of denying institution of the proceeding because Petitioner does not explain sufficiently why it had to file the petition in the 472 IPR five weeks after the petition was filed in the 337 IPR such that Petitioner could not have “leveraged its knowledge” of the prior art involved in the 337 IPR against Patent Owner. In other words, Petitioner fails to explain sufficiently why it could not have included the claims or prior art it asserts here in the 472 IPR. Accordingly, we determine that this second General Plastic factor weighs in favor of denying institution of the proceeding.” slip op. at 6
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“claims 1–13 of U.S. Patent No. 10,562,077 B2 (Ex. 1001, “the ’077 patent”). Paper 3 (“Pet.”). Petitioner also filed a Conditional Motion for Joinder with Samsung et al. v. GUI Global Products, Ltd., IPR2021-00337 (“the 337 IPR” or “the Samsung 337 IPR”). Paper 4 (“Mot.”). GUI Global Products, Ltd., d/b/a Gwee (“Patent Owner”) filed a Preliminary Response to the Petition. Paper 10 (“Prelim. Resp.”). Patent Owner also filed an Opposition to the Conditional Motion for Joinder. Paper 8 (“Opp.”). Petitioner filed a Reply to Patent Owner’s Opposition. Paper 9 (“Reply”). We have authority under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), which provides that an inter partes review may not be instituted “unless . . . there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” For the reasons described below, we do not institute an inter partes review of the challenged claims and deny Petitioner’s Conditional Motion for Joinder.” slip op. at 2
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Joinder §315(c) / SAS all-or-nothingJoinder, deniedDenied
“To join a party to an instituted IPR, the plain language of § 315(c) requires two different decisions.” Facebook, Inc. v. Windy City Innovations, LLC, 973 F.3d 1321, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2020). First, we “determine whether the joinder applicant’s petition for IPR ‘warrants’ institution under § 314.” Id. Second, if the petition warrants institution, we then “decide whether to ‘join as a party’ the joinder applicant.” Id. Thus, before determining whether to join Petitioner as a party to the 337 IPR, we first determine whether the petition warrants institution under § 314(a). slip op. at 4
Discretionary denialPatents in suitUS 10,562,077 - Apple Inc. v. Gui Global Products, Ltd., D/B/A GweeInstitution deniedPTAB · Feb 1, 2022 · IPR2021-01290 · APJ Sally C Medley · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution of review of claims 1–19 under § 314(a), applying the General Plastic factors, and denied Apple’s conditional motion for joinder.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › General Plastic (serial petitions)Institution denied general plasticInstitution denied
“patent and the Petition here involves claims 1–19. Thus, more claims are challenged here than in the 471 IPR. Nonetheless, Petitioner provides no explanation why it is again challenging claims 1, 2, 4–10, 12, 14–17, and 19 here or why Petitioner needs two instituted inter partes reviews on the common claims. Pet. 73–74. In none of its briefs does Petitioner explain “why the Board should exercise its discretion to institute additional petitions if it [the Board] identifies one petition that satisfies petitioner’s burden under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a),” short of saying that “Gundlach (471 IPR) and Kim (this Petition) offer very different disclosures.” Explanation 3; TPG 60.8 However, Petitioner does not identify any circumstances identified in the Trial Practice Guide supporting a need for a second petition, such as a large number of claims in litigation or a potential dispute about priority date. TPG 59. Accordingly, based on the record before us, we agree with Patent Owner (Prelim. Resp. 6) that this General Plastic factor weighs in favor of denying institution of the proceeding.” slip op. at 6
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Joinder §315(c) / SAS all-or-nothingJoinder, deniedDenied
“IV. DENIAL OF MOTION FOR JOINDER As stated above, the Director may join a party to an ongoing IPR only if the filed petition warrants institution under § 314. 35 U.S.C. § 315(c). Because we exercise discretion to deny institution under § 314, we deny Petitioner’s Conditional Motion for Joinder. V. ORDER Accordingly, it is: ORDERED that, pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), the Petition is denied; and FURTHER ORDERED that the Conditional Motion for Joinder is denied.” slip op. at 11
Discretionary denialPatents in suitUS 10,259,021 - PTAB · Jan 26, 2022 · IPR2021-01152 · APJ Kevin F Turner · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–20 based on three § 103 grounds: Jungck and Bhatia; Jungck, Bhatia, and RFC2003; and Jungck, Bhatia, and Turner.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Denied
“has yet to enter a case schedule. Even with the arguments and evidence presented, we determine it to be speculative as to whether a stay may be granted if a proceeding is instituted. We reach the same conclusion with respect to Fintiv factor (2), given the speculative nature of the “trial date.” With respect to Fintiv factor (3), we determine that this weighs against discretionary denial; although some discovery has occurred, the parties have not invested significant resources in the district court proceeding. With respect to Fintiv factor (4), the existence of Petitioner’s stipulation regarding the full scope of estoppel is sufficient to suggest that overlap between the proceedings will be minimized. See Sotera Wireless, Inc. v. Masimo Corp., IPR2020-01019, paper 12 (PTAB Dec. 1, 2020) 18 (precedential) (“Petitioner’s stipulation here mitigates any concerns of duplicative efforts between the district court and the Board, as well as concerns of potentially conflicting decisions. See Sand Revolution 12. Importantly, Petitioner broadly stipulates to not pursue ‘any ground raised or that could have been reasonably raised.’ Reply 6. As noted in Sand Revolution, such a broad stipulation better addresses concerns of duplicative efforts and potentially conflicting decisions in a much more substantial way. Sand Revolution 12 n.5. Accordingly, Petitioner’s broad stipulation ensures that an inter partes review is a ‘true alternative’ to the district court proceeding. Thus, we find that this factor weighs strongly in favor of not exercising discretion to deny institution under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a).”) (underlining added). Although Patent Owner asserts that there are deficiencies in Petitioner’s stipulation, those can be addressed through additional stipulations. We determine that Fintiv factor (4) weighs against discretionary denial.” slip op. at 10
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsDenied
“2. Discretion Under § 325(d) With respect to 35 U.S.C. § 325(d), Petitioner asserts that “[n]one of the art relied upon herein was cited, discussed, or applied in the ’246’s prosecution,” and that the art cited therein is not “the same or substantially the same.” Pet. 7. Patent Owner does not argue that we should deny the Petition under this statutory basis. See Prelim. Resp. As such, we decline to exercise our discretion to deny institution of review under 35 U.S.C. § 325(d).” slip op. at 11
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“III. CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, Petitioner has demonstrated a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail in showing that at least one claim of the ’246 Patent is unpatentable. IV. ORDER Accordingly, it is: ORDERED that, pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), an inter partes review is hereby instituted as to claims 1–20 of the ’246 Patent on the following asserted grounds:” slip op. at 34
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“At this stage of the proceeding, we find Petitioner’s proposal consistent with the level of ordinary skill in the art reflected by the prior art of record, see Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001); In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995); In re Oelrich, 579 F.2d 86, 91 (CCPA 1978), and, therefore, we adopt Petitioner’s unopposed position as to the level of ordinary skill in the art for purposes of this decision.” slip op. at 12
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,091,246
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.