• Stats LLC v. Hockeyline, Inc.All claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Sep 15, 2015 · IPR2014-00510 · APJ Brian P Murphy · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1, 2, 8, 10–12, and 30 were held unpatentable as anticipated by Hameen-Anttila and STATS Football, and obvious over STATS Football combined with Reilly.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Claim Construction › Functional claiming / §112(f) means-plus-function › Whether §112(f) applies (Williamson, nonce words)§112(f) appliesDecided for petitioner

    “1. Means-plus-function Claiming Independent claim 1 of the ’107 patent includes a series of means-plus- function limitations. 35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶ 6.5 A means-plus-function limitation “shall be construed to cover the corresponding structure, material, or acts described in the specification and equivalents thereof.” Id. The claim limitations in the ’107 patent are drafted using the accepted “means for” construct followed by a specified function, without further recitation of structure to achieve the recited function. Triton Tech of Texas, LLC v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., 753 F.3d 1375, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2014); see Williamson v. Citrix Online, LLC, 792 F.3d 1339, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (en banc). “In exchange for using this form of claiming, the patent specification must disclose with sufficient particularity the corresponding structure for performing the claimed function and clearly link that structure to the function.” Triton Tech, 753 F.3d at 1378 (citation omitted). We construe the following claim limitations for purposes of this decision, in accordance with the principles stated above. 2. “display means coupled to said processor for facilitating the entry of such data by a user” The ’107 patent specification links a touch display screen, computer screen, or other electronic screen with the claimed function of “facilitating the entry of 5 Section 4(c) of the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011) (“AIA”), re-designated 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 6, as 35 U.S.C. § 112(f). Because the ’107 patent has a filing date before September 16, 2012, the effective date of section 4(c) of the AIA, we refer to the pre-AIA version of § 112, ¶ 6. such data by a user.” Ex. 1001, 2:62–67 (“In the case of a touch display screen, the screen may function both as a display means and an input means. In the case of a keyboard or mouse, the operation thereof would normally be carried out in conjunction with display means 108, and/or a computer screen or other electronic screen.”); Pet. 11. During a game, the electronic screen display prompts the device user (game scorer) to enter sports game event data related to the progress of the game. Id. at 3:7–12. The data being entered, “such data” in the claim language under consideration, has antecedent basis in the “input means . . . for inputting data related to events of said sports game in real time.” Accordingly, we conclude that the broadest reasonable interpretation of the limitation “display means coupled to said processor for facilitating the entry of such data by a user,” consistent with the ’107 patent specification, is “a touch screen, computer screen, or other electronic screen coupled to the processor for facilitating the entry of data related to events of a sports game by a user in real time, and equivalents thereof.”” slip op. at 6

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed board ownDecided for petitioner

    “2. “display means coupled to said processor for facilitating the entry of such data by a user” The ’107 patent specification links a touch display screen, computer screen, or other electronic screen with the claimed function of “facilitating the entry of 5 Section 4(c) of the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011) (“AIA”), re-designated 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 6, as 35 U.S.C. § 112(f). Because the ’107 patent has a filing date before September 16, 2012, the effective date of section 4(c) of the AIA, we refer to the pre-AIA version of § 112, ¶ 6. such data by a user.” Ex. 1001, 2:62–67 (“In the case of a touch display screen, the screen may function both as a display means and an input means. In the case of a keyboard or mouse, the operation thereof would normally be carried out in conjunction with display means 108, and/or a computer screen or other electronic screen.”); Pet. 11. During a game, the electronic screen display prompts the device user (game scorer) to enter sports game event data related to the progress of the game. Id. at 3:7–12. The data being entered, “such data” in the claim language under consideration, has antecedent basis in the “input means . . . for inputting data related to events of said sports game in real time.” Accordingly, we conclude that the broadest reasonable interpretation of the limitation “display means coupled to said processor for facilitating the entry of such data by a user,” consistent with the ’107 patent specification, is “a touch screen, computer screen, or other electronic screen coupled to the processor for facilitating the entry of data related to events of a sports game by a user in real time, and equivalents thereof.”” slip op. at 6

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for petitioner
  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableUnpatentable

    “c. Claim 1 – “customized by the user to reflect desired data” We are further persuaded that Hameen-Anttila discloses hierarchical menu- based screen displays that may be “customized by the user to reflect desired data,” in accordance with our claim construction. We agree with Petitioner, that the setup menu in Hameen-Anttila (Fig. 4a) allows a user to select desired display menus (e.g., for golf) that will cause other menus not to be displayed (e.g., for hockey, bowling, and baseball) during a user’s input of golf-specific data in real time. Pet. Reply 7–8 (citing Ex. 1002, 5:21–24; Ex. 1014 (Dahbura Dec.) ¶¶ 20–21). As Dr. Dahbura notes, Patent Owner’s expert, Dr. Locke, agrees that choosing not to display a menu screen is a form of user customization. Ex. 1014 ¶ 21 (citing Ex. 1017, 72:19–73:3). We further agree with Petitioner that Patent Owner’s proffered distinction between Hameen-Anttila’s “mere usage” of hierarchical menu-based screen displays and “customizing” such displays is illusory and not consistent with the description of user customization in the ’107 patent. Pet. Reply 8 (citing Ex. 1014 ¶ 22). The individual drop-down arrows in Figure 4b further suggest the ability of a user to change the menu-based screen displays to permit the user to input desired data for the illustrated golf game. Therefore, we determine Hameen- Anttila discloses an action by the user to configure the hierarchical menu-based screen displays to permit desired data to be gathered for one or more sports games. d. Claim 1 – “transferring statistical information based on such inputted data” Patent Owner’s argument asserting Hameen-Anttila does not disclose the transfer of “statistical information based on such inputted data” also is off the mark. As noted above, Hameen-Anttila discloses that sports game event data is input into an electronic scorekeeping device and transmitted via a communications network to a server while the sports game is ongoing. Ex. 1002, 2:40-51, 2:57– 3:13. We are not persuaded by Patent Owner’s argument that the transfer of statistical information “based on” inputted data requires some form of calculation that necessarily excludes inputted data as part of the transferred “statistical information.” PO Resp. 17–19. Patent Owner does not offer a claim construction or request construction of quoted claim phrase at issue, even though Patent Owner’s argument presumes a specific definition of the phrase without explaining why it is consistent with the broadest reasonable interpretation standard. Pet. Reply 2. The language in claim 1 of the ’107 patent recites “a processor,” but it does not recite a calculation function performed by the processor on inputted data. Pet. Reply 11. The claim language also does not exclude inputted data from “statistical information” or limit “statistical information based on such inputted data” only to statistics calculated from the inputted data. Id. The preamble of claim 1, recites “gathering, processing and distributing statistical information.” Ex. 1001, 8:11–12 (emphasis added); see also PO Resp. 19 (citing Ex. 1001, 1:56–60 (“The present invention advantageously provides an electronic scorekeeping device for gathering, calculating and distributing statistical information.”)). Gathering statistical information, when read in light of the ’107 patent specification, refers to inputting sports game event data into the scorekeeping device for transmission to a central database as part of the statistical information transfer. Pet. Reply 11 (citing Ex. 1001, Abstract (“This [inputted] data is transferred in real-time in a system according to the invention via a communications means to a central database.”); Ex. 1014 ¶¶ 25–28). The ’107 patent does not define “statistical information” or “statistical information based on such inputted data.” The ’107 patent also does not exclude inputted data from the description of statistical information. Pet. Reply 12 (citing Ex. 1014 ¶ 27). To the contrary, and consistent with the understanding in the art, the ’107 patent uses the words “data,” “statistics,” “statistical data,” and “statistical information” interchangeably and with significant areas of overlap. Id.; see also id. at 4 (citing Ex. 2002 ¶ 30 (“The terms ‘statistics,’ ‘data,’ and ‘statistical information,’ are widely used in computer systems, but they are often used in very general ways with broad meanings in which their meanings have significant areas of overlap.”)). We further credit Dr. Dahbura’s testimony, that a person of ordinary skill in” slip op. at 18

  Patent outcomesUS 6,725,107 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR
  Patents in suitUS 6,725,107
• CQG, Inc. / CQGT, LLC v. Trading Technologies International, Inc.Institution denied
  PTAB · Jul 10, 2015 · CBM2015-00057 · APJ Sally C Medley · CBM · Institution

  The Board denied institution of review of claims 1-40 of the ’304 patent and claims 1-56 of the ’132 patent because § 325(a)(1) barred the petitions.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › §315(b) time barInstitution denied time barInstitution denied

    “(1) POST–GRANT REVIEW BARRED BY CIVIL ACTION.—A post-grant review may not be instituted under this chapter if, before the date on which the petition for such a review is filed, the petitioner or real party in interest filed a civil action challenging the validity of a claim of the patent.” slip op. at 5

  Discretionary denial
  Patents in suitUS 6,766,304
• CQG, Inc. / CQGT, LLC v. Trading Technologies International, Inc.Institution denied
  PTAB · Jul 10, 2015 · CBM2015-00058 · APJ Sally C Medley · CBM · Institution

  The Board denied institution of CBM review of claims 1-56 of the ’132 patent and claims 1-40 of the ’304 patent because Petitioner was barred under § 325(a)(1).

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › §315(b) time barInstitution denied time barInstitution denied

    “the immediate continuation of the first action into the second action, including the legal positions taken by the parties, that was the dispositive factor for determining that the dismissal without prejudice of the first case did not have the effect as if the first case never existed. Apple, Case IPR2014-00319, slip op. at 3–4 (PTAB July 31, 2014) (Paper 14). In rendering the original decision, the panel relied on Brennan v. Kulick, 407 F.3d 603 (3d Cir. 2005). Apple, Paper 12, slip op. at 6. In Brennan, the court explained that prior cases are treated as if they never existed after dismissal because “[a]n order merely dismissing a complaint without prejudice could result in a significant period of delay prior to the bringing of 7 a new action.” Brennan, 407 F.3d at 607. The court further explained that with a conditional dismissal, a prior case would be treated as if it existed because “[t]he conditions specified in the order prevent a plaintiff from indefinitely extending the limitations period.” Id. Treating a case dismissed without prejudice as if it never existed, therefore, depends on the circumstances surrounding the dismissal.” slip op. at 7

  Discretionary denial
  Patents in suitUS 6,772,132
• Mentor Graphics Corporation v. Synopsys, Inc.All claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jun 11, 2015 · IPR2014-00287 · APJ Scott A Daniels · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–3, 10–13, and 20 are unpatentable as obvious over Vander Zanden and Shand; the other proposed grounds did not establish unpatentability.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITAPlain and ordinary meaningOther

    “inferring” in accordance with its plain meaning, including: concluding, deciding, deducing, deriving, extrapolating, gathering, judging, making out, reasoning, understanding, and recognizing. Inst. Dec. 9–10. We did not provide a construction for any other terms. Patent Owner’s position is that the word “deducing” comes closer to the meaning of “inferring” than the words “recognizing” or “identifying” as proposed by Petitioner. PO Resp. 24, see also Pet. 14. Our construction includes from its plain meaning, a variety of words (including: deducing recognizing, and identifying) that, depending on context, provide additional understanding of the word “inferring.” Inst. Dec. 9–10. A plain meaning of the word “incorporating” is “to unite or work into something already existent so as to form an indistinguishable whole.” Incorporate, Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/incorporate (last visited May 28, 2015). For these words, we do not consider the proffered constructions to provide any clarity over the term itself. Consequently, we simply are not persuaded by either of the parties contentions and interpretations that under the broadest reasonable interpretation, in the context of the Specification and claims, that these words should be construed with respect to only the particular definitions or meanings ascribed to them by either party. slip op. at 9

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “Based on our claim construction, we are persuaded that Vander Zanden does not disclose a “resetable memory” as recited in independent claim 1. We determined that a “resetable memory” means a memory that outputs a reset value until new data is written into the memory. See section II.B.3. Vander Zanden’s “if then” statement in the code shown in Figure 3 outputs a reset value “0” only when the reset signal is high, in all other modes it outputs either a value from RGF1 or added values from RGF1. See Ex. 1003, Fig. 3; see also PO Resp. 32. In other words OUT1 does not keep, or remember, the reset value until new data is written to RGF1. We find Patent Owner’s position persuasive that the resetable flip-flop DFF6 on the output line of the circuit as described in Vander Zanden’s Figure 3, and shown in Figure 4, does not render the registers at RGF1 a “resetable memory” as properly construed because it fails to maintain OUT1 at a reset value until new data is written to a cell. Petitioner’s argument that no temporal limitation should be read into the claim is unpersuasive because, as discussed above in section II.B.3, the ’420 patent expressly differentiates the “reset” functionality of the described “resetable memory” from known resetable memories where the described, and claimed methodology in each embodiment, “causes the reset value 208 to be provided 302 as the effective memory cell output–until the cell has been written to.” Ex. 1001, 4:56–58. Vander Zanden does not disclose a “resetable memory design” for similar reasons as set forth above with respect to “resetable memory.” We are persuaded that the resetable flip-flop DFF 6 on the output line as shown in Figure 4 does not disclose a “restable memory design” as called for in the claims because Petitioner does not explain how the circuit design in Figure 4 implements the retention of a reset value until new data is written to the cell, where it only toggles between the reset mode, ADDER mode and mode which returns a value from RGF1. For the reasons provided above, Petitioner has not established by a” slip op. at 21

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundUnpatentable

    “disclose the step of inferring the existence of a memory, and turns to Shand for disclosure of a “resetable memory” and a “resetable memory design” for incorporation into a semiconductor circuit. Pet. 31. Petitioner asserts that one of ordinary skill in the art would have combined Shand with Vander Zanden in order to reduce the size of the circuit design. Id. at 32 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶ 68). Patent Owner argues specifically that Petitioner’s Declarant, Mr. Detjens, admitted that one of ordinary skill in the art would not replace the memory in Vander Zanden with the circuit described in Shand. PO Resp. 55. This argument mischaracterizes Mr. Detjens testimony as well as the question. The question asked Mr. Detjens if he could identify “what memory in Vander Zanden you would replace with the Shand memory?” Ex. 2010 84:2–3 (emphasis added). Read in context, Mr. Detjens’ initial answer “No” differentiates between replacing the “memory” and replacing the “resetable memory.” See id. at 84:1–20. Mr. Detjens continued on, and answered the question with further specificity, stating that “for a resetable memory that is created through the process given in the Vander Zanden paper, you would replace it with the memory in the Shand patent.” Id. at 84:18–20 (emphasis added). Thus, we do not find Patent Owner’s argument on this point to be persuasive. Patent Owner further asserts that Shand’s resetable memory is functionally different and one of ordinary skill in the art would not utilize Shand’s resetable memory with Vander Zanden because it “would render the circuit inoperable (i.e., the synthesized circuit in Vander Zanden Figure 4 would no longer match the HDL and it would not work as the designer intended).” PO Resp. 57 (citing McGinley v. Franklin Sports, Inc., 262 F.3d 1339, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2001)). Petitioner replies that “A POSA knew how to describe a resetable memory in behavioral or RTL level terms, and how to recognize a resetable memory in such a description.” Reply 2–3 (citing Ex. 1024 ¶¶ 10–15; Ex. 1020 at 17–18, 27–28, 75–77, 84–85, 91–98). Petitioner’s position, and Dr. Detjens’ testimony, are persuasive. Neither Patent Owner’s argument that Shand fails to disclose the inferring step, nor the testimony provided in Dr. Hutchings’s Declaration alleging that Shand discloses only resetable memory circuits and not inferring a memory with reset, explains why it was not within the ordinary skill of one in the art to have modified the respective underlying HDL code, for example as shown in Vander Zanden’s Figure 3, to include code defining the respective resetable memory circuit such as disclosed in Shand. See PO Resp. 57, see also Ex. 2011 ¶¶ 85–88. As discussed above with respect to anticipation, we are persuaded that Vander Zanden discloses the “inferring” step for a memory as recited in independent claims 1 and 13, and that it would have been within the abilities of a person of ordinary skill in the art to combine Shand’s resetable memory circuit design with Vander Zanden and consequently modify the HDL code to address the functional changes imparted by the implementation of a different resetable memory in such a combination.” slip op. at 25

  • ExcludeMotion to exclude, deniedDenied

    “We have reviewed Mr. Detjens’ Declaration in Support of Petitioner’s Reply, (Ex. 1024) and find the Declaration, as a whole, complies with our rule, 37 C.F.R.§ 42.23(b), that a reply may only respond to arguments raised in patent owner’s response. For example, Mr. Detjens explains in the Reply Declaration that his testimony is specifically in response to Patent Owner’s argument that Vander Zanden does not disclose inferring resetable memories. Ex. 1024 ¶ 5 (citing PO Resp. 29–30). Within the context of Vander Zanden and his previous testimony, Mr. Detjens’ Reply Declaration provides appropriate elucidating evidence with respect to the level of ordinary skill in the art in addition to that in his original Declaration. Compare id. ¶¶ 6–11, with Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 35–43. The Reply Declaration does, in several paragraphs, refer to certain evidence such as Exhibits 1022 and 1023 not filed with the Petition, but overall, relies substantially upon the prior art and evidence submitted with the Petition. Patent Owner’s Motion does not apprise us that the Reply or Reply Declaration is raising a new issue or injecting improper new evidence into the proceeding. Our review of the Reply Declaration indicates that overall Mr. Detjens’ testimony is proper rebuttal evidence, timely submitted, in reply to Patent Owner’s Response. Therefore, the request to exclude Petitioner’s Reply and Mr. Detjens’ Reply Declaration (Ex. 1024) is denied.” slip op. at 36

  Patent outcomesUS 6,836,420 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousness
  Patents in suitUS 6,836,420
• Schott Gemtron Corporation v. SSW Holding Company, Inc.No claims unpatentable
  PTAB · May 26, 2015 · IPR2014-00367 · APJ Georgianna W Braden · IPR · Final written decision

  Petitioner did not prove claims 2–4, 7–10, 14–18, 22, 23, 26, 27, 29, 30, 33–40, 42–45, 48–51, 54–59, 63, and 64 unpatentable under either instituted §103 ground.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Obviousness (§103) › Analogous artNon analogous artNot shown unpatentable

    “We find that regardless of the construction of the term “spill,” Petitioner has not carried its burden to show that Angros is analogous art, because Petitioner has not shown Angros to be pertinent to the entire problem faced by the inventors of the ’561 patent.” slip op. at 23

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of success › HindsightMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentable

    “Furthermore, a patent claim “is not proved obvious merely by demonstrating that each of its elements was, independently, known in the prior art.” KSR, 550 U.S. at 401. “Rather, obviousness requires the additional showing that a person of ordinary skill at the time of the invention would have selected and combined those prior art elements in the normal course of research and development to yield the claimed invention.” Unigene Labs., Inc. v. Apotex, Inc., 655 F.3d 1352, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (citing KSR, 550 U.S. at 421). For an obviousness analysis, “it can be important to identify a reason that would have prompted a person of ordinary skill in the relevant field to combine the elements in the way the claimed new invention does.” KSR, 550 U.S. at 419. In that regard, Mr. Schechter, witness for Petitioner, testified that Angros and Picken were known in the art and that one of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to combine the teachings of the prior art so as to make a design that (i) was more simple or clean or aesthetically pleasing and (ii) had a less obtrusive hydrophobic barrier. Ex. 1121, 180:12–183:23; Ex. 1109 ¶ 31; Ex. 1010 ¶ 28. He then concluded that one of ordinary skill would know how to substitute the spill-contain border in Angros for the plastic guard in Picken. Ex. 1109 ¶ 36. Mr. Schechter, however, does not explain sufficiently why a person of ordinary skill in the art would look to the field of microscope slides to find a hydrophobic coating to act as a less obtrusive spill containment border in place of the plastic rim in Picken. Mr. Schechter’s testimony is impermissible hindsight; he opined that all of the elements of the claims disparately existed in the prior art, but fails to provide sufficient reason for why one of ordinary skill in the art at the time of filing would have combined these references. See, e.g., InTouch Techs., Inc. v. VGO Commc’ns, Inc., 751 F.3d 1327, 1348–49 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (holding expert testimony to be impermissible hindsight for failing to explaining what reason or motivation one of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention would have had to place the prior art together). In an obviousness determination, we must avoid analyzing the prior art through the prism of hindsight. Instead, we must “cast the mind back to the time the invention was made (often as here many years), to occupy the mind of one skilled in the art who is presented only with the references, and who is normally guided by the then–accepted wisdom in the art.” W.L. Gore & Assoc., Inc. v. Garlock, Inc., 721 F.2d 1540, 1553 (Fed. Cir. 1983). Petitioner attempts to imbue one of ordinary skill in the art with knowledge of the claimed invention, when no prior art reference or references of record convey or suggest that knowledge. Rather, Petitioner’s argument that Angros is analogous art and that Angros is combinable with Picken appears to be premised on Petitioner’s knowledge of the ’561 patent disclosure. Petitioner bears the burden of showing by a preponderance of evidence that the asserted prior art references are analogous art and otherwise combinable. On the record before us, we find that Petitioner has not shown that Angros qualifies as prior art under 35 U.S.C. § 103 or that, even if it did, it renders the claims unpatentable in combination with Picken. Therefore, we conclude Petitioner has not demonstrated by a preponderance of evidence that claims 2–4, 7–10, 23, 33–40, 42–45, 48–51, and 64 of the ’561 patent would have been obvious in view of Angros and Picken.” slip op. at 27

  • Skill levelSkill level board ownDecided for patent owner

    “Based on our review of the ’561 patent, the types of problems and solutions described in the ’561 patent and cited prior art, and the testimony of the parties’ declarants, we conclude that a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the claimed invention (i.e., as of June 27, 2008, as discussed above in Section II.C.1) would have had a degree in mechanical engineering or a similar discipline, and at least three years of work experience with refrigerator shelf assemblies. See, e.g., Ex. 1101, 1:16–62 (stating that the ’561 patent relates to “shelving which may be adapted for use with refrigerators,” and describing conventional refrigerator shelf assemblies that use plastic molded parts to encapsulate shelves and silicone sealants to form physical spill containment barriers around the perimeter of the refrigerator shelving); Ex. 1109 ¶¶ 1–3 (describing the background of Mr. Schechter); Ex. 2121 ¶¶ 5–7 (describing the background of Mr. Mills). Given the stated qualifications of Mr. Mills (Ex. 2121 ¶¶ 5–7 and Ex. 1110, 13:9–24:18), Patent Owner’s declarant meets the requirements of this definition. Petitioner’s witness, Mr. Schechter, however, does not qualify as a person of ordinary skill in the art. Although Mr. Schechter now testifies that he has a Master’s of Science degree in Mechanical Engineering and became a Product Development Engineer for Petitioner in December 2010, his prior declaration states that he began in his position in December 2011, compare Ex. 1109 ¶ 1, with IPR2013-00358, Ex. 1010 ¶ 1, thus indicating that Mr. Schechter may have had less than two years of experience when he signed his prior declaration on June 14, 2013, IPR2013-00358, Ex. 1010 ¶ 36.3 Furthermore, Mr. Schechter was not a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention of the ’561 patent (i.e., June 27, 2008). Indeed, at his deposition, Mr. Schechter testified that he does not qualify as one of ordinary skill in the art under the definition in his declaration. Ex. 1121, 26:2–13. Therefore, for these reasons, we accord the testimony of Mr. Schechter regarding the alleged obviousness of the claims less weight. 3 Petitioner argues that the Board “misapprehended” Mr. Schecter’s qualifications, and “committed four errors” in doing so, in the final written decision in IPR2013-00358. Reply 9–10. These arguments are improper, as they are directed to facts and determinations made in a different proceeding, and a “reply may only respond to arguments raised in the corresponding . . . patent owner response” under 37 C.F.R. § 42.23(b). Regardless, though, we disagree with Petitioner’s assertions for the reasons stated herein.” slip op. at 12

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert discountedPatent owner expert creditedDecided for patent owner

    “Given the stated qualifications of Mr. Mills (Ex. 2121 ¶¶ 5–7 and Ex. 1110, 13:9–24:18), Patent Owner’s declarant meets the requirements of this definition. Petitioner’s witness, Mr. Schechter, however, does not qualify as a person of ordinary skill in the art. Although Mr. Schechter now testifies that he has a Master’s of Science degree in Mechanical Engineering and became a Product Development Engineer for Petitioner in December 2010, his prior declaration states that he began in his position in December 2011, compare Ex. 1109 ¶ 1, with IPR2013-00358, Ex. 1010 ¶ 1, thus indicating that Mr. Schechter may have had less than two years of experience when he signed his prior declaration on June 14, 2013, IPR2013-00358, Ex. 1010 ¶ 36.3 Furthermore, Mr. Schechter was not a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention of the ’561 patent (i.e., June 27, 2008). Indeed, at his deposition, Mr. Schechter testified that he does not qualify as one of ordinary skill in the art under the definition in his declaration. Ex. 1121, 26:2–13. Therefore, for these reasons, we accord the testimony of Mr. Schechter regarding the alleged obviousness of the claims less weight. 3 Petitioner argues that the Board “misapprehended” Mr. Schecter’s qualifications, and “committed four errors” in doing so, in the final written decision in IPR2013-00358. Reply 9–10. These arguments are improper, as they are directed to facts and determinations made in a different proceeding, and a “reply may only respond to arguments raised in the corresponding . . . patent owner response” under 37 C.F.R. § 42.23(b). Regardless, though, we disagree with Petitioner’s assertions for the reasons stated herein.” slip op. at 13

  Patent outcomesUS 8,286,561 not shown unpatentable
  § 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosurecites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 8,286,561
• Greene’S Energy Group, LLC v. Oil States Energy Services, LLCAll claims unpatentable
  PTAB · May 1, 2015 · IPR2014-00216 · APJ James A Tartal · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1 and 22 are unpatentable as anticipated by Dallas ’118; the motion to amend with substitute claims 28 and 29 is denied.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableUnpatentable

    “member for connection to a wellhead of the well, and a locking member for detachably engaging the base member. Claim 22 contains a similar requirement. We agree with Petitioner that bottom flange 22 of Dallas ’118 corresponds to the base member of a first lockdown mechanism, and that bolts through the bores in lower flange 22 correspond to a locking member, as claimed in the ’053 patent. See Pet. 42. Claim 1 further requires a second lockdown mechanism having a range of adjustment adequate to ensure that the mandrel can be moved into the operative position, and locked down in the operative position while the first lockdown mechanism is in the lockdown position. Claim 22 contains a similar requirement. We agree with Petitioner that the hydraulic cylinder mechanism of Dallas ’118, which ensures a fluid tight seal between annular seal 78 and bit guide 84 by maintaining a pressure of about 1000 psi in upper chamber 36, corresponds to the recited second lockdown mechanism. See Pet. 36, 44.” slip op. at 18

  • 112 supportMotion to amend, deniedDenied

    “The determination of whether there is written description support turns on whether the original disclosure of the application relied upon reasonably conveys to a person of ordinary skill in the art that the inventor had possession of the claimed subject matter as of the filing date. Ariad Pharms., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en banc). The proposed substitute claims introduce the term “wellhead assembly,” a term that does not appear in the ’418 application or the ’053 patent. Patent Owner’s string citation to various disclosures, none of which identify a “wellhead assembly,” is insufficient to demonstrate written description support absent some explanation. The same is true with regard to the proposed addition of language requiring both an apparatus for securing the mandrel “within a tubing head spool of a wellhead assembly” and a setting tool “arranged to insert a bottom end of the mandrel through the wellhead.” A string citation does not explain how the original disclosure of the application relied upon reasonably conveys to a person the features intended to be encompassed by the proposed substitute claims. In particular, we cannot discern from Patent Owner’s conclusory discussion how the original disclosure describes both securing the mandrel within the wellhead assembly and inserting the mandrel through the wellhead, particularly where Patent Owner further argues a distinction between inserting a mandrel “into” a wellhead as opposed to “through” a wellhead. See PO Reply. 1–2. Accordingly, we conclude Patent Owner has not satisfied its burden of showing written description support for the proposed substitute claims 28 and 29.” slip op. at 26

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Motions to amend / substitute claimsMotion to amend, deniedDenied

    “patentable distinction of each proposed substitute claim over the prior art. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.20(c). This includes providing a construction of new claim terms sufficient to support the distinction of the proposed substitute claim over the prior art. Patent Owner introduces the new claim terms “wellhead assembly” and “setting tool” in the proposed substitute claims, but provides no express construction of either term. Absent any discussion of what is encompassed by the recited “wellhead assembly,” it is unclear how the term differs from the use of “wellhead,” alone, elsewhere in the claim. This is particularly problematic, as discussed above, when attempting to discern what is claimed as a setting tool “arranged to insert a bottom end of the mandrel through the wellhead,” relative to the claimed apparatus for securing a mandrel “above the casing of the well and within a tubing head spool of a wellhead assembly.” In its Motion to Amend, Patent Owner also does not provide a construction for “setting tool.” We note that Patent Owner was aware that the district court had previously suggested the term “setting tool” was “ambiguous.” District Court Markman Order, Ex. 2008, 15. In reply to Petitioner’s opposition to the Motion, Patent Owner argues that “the defining characteristics of the ‘setting tool’” are set out in the claim language as: (1) “arranged to insert a bottom end of the mandrel through the wellhead,” and, (2) “separate from” the first and second lockdown mechanisms and thus “removable.” PO Reply 1. Patent Owner proceeds to dispute the construction of “setting tool” proposed by Petitioner’s Declarant, Mr. Perkin, but fails to offer any express construction of the term itself. Petitioner’s Declarant, Mr. Perkin, defined “setting tool” as “any device that is used to align the mandrel with the wellhead so that the mandrel can be inserted without interference.” Perkin Decl., Ex. 1014 ¶ 44. Patent Owner’s Declarant, Mr. Wooley, testified that “setting tool” is “usually the name given to a device for inserting some sort of tool.” Ex. 1011, 61:17–21. Absent a clear explanation of what is claimed, Patent Owner’s assertion that a particular reference does not teach “any kind of setting tool” is conclusory and not persuasive. See Mot. 9. Patent Owner has not provided a sufficient construction of the term “setting tool” by merely pointing to other claim language or by disputing Petitioner’s proposed construction. By failing to articulate adequately a construction of “setting tool” or “wellhead assembly,” Patent Owner has not satisfied its burden of showing a patentable distinction of each proposed substitute claim over the prior art. 3. Conclusion We conclude Patent Owner has not come forward with sufficient evidence to establish proposed substitute claims 28 and 29 have adequate written description support. We further conclude Patent Owner has not supported sufficiently the distinction of the proposed substitute claims 28 and 29 over the prior art by failing to provide adequately the necessary construction of the proposed amendments to claims 1 and 22. For these reasons, we deny Patent Owner’s Motion to Amend.” slip op. at 27

  Patent outcomesUS 6,179,053 unpatentable
  § 102 anticipation
  Patents in suitUS 6,179,053
• Greene’S Energy Group, LLC v. Oil States Energy Services, LLCNo claims unpatentable
  PTAB · May 1, 2015 · IPR2014-00364 · APJ William A Capp · IPR · Final written decision

  The Board found claims 1–13, 27, and 30–32 not shown unpatentable because the proposed obviousness combinations did not establish the claimed mechanical lockdown mechanism and its required function.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for patent owner

    “The parties do not dispute that a “lockdown mechanism” maintains the mandrel in a fixed position during a fracking or well treatment operation. Thus, we will construe “lockdown mechanism” to mean “machinery for maintaining [the mandrel] in a fixed position during a fracking or well treatment operation.” This leaves us to determine what it means for a lockdown mechanism to be “mechanical” and whether the correct construction requires imposing a further definitional limitation regarding a range of adjustment. Oil States points out that the Specification differentiates a mechanical mechanism from hydraulic mechanisms. PO Resp. 12. The Specification distinguishes the instant invention from an earlier invention by the same inventor that discloses a hydraulic unit. Ex. 1001, 2:28–63. The Specification further states that: a mechanical lockdown mechanism for securing the BOP protector mandrel in an operative position is considered more reliable because a source of pressurized hydraulic fluid is not required. Id. at 2:3–6; see also id. at 3:53–56. Greene does not challenge that this language in the Specification effectively differentiates a mechanical lockdown mechanism from a hydraulic mechanism. Thus, we construe “mechanical” lockdown mechanisms as being limited to purely mechanical means such as nuts and bolts and the like. We further clarify that the principal holding force that maintains the mandrel in a fixed position is not a dynamic force such as through hydraulic, pneumatic, or electrical means or the like.” slip op. at 8

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed board ownDecided for patent owner

    “Oil States’s effort to read a “broad range of adjustment” limitation into the definition of mechanical lockdown mechanism in claim 1 renders the dependent limitation in claim 3 superfluous. Claim 2 claims an elongated spiral thread. There is no need to add a further limitation to claim 3 to provide for adjustment to compensate for variations in the distance between a top of the blowout preventer and the top of the casing of different wellheads if a “broad range of adjustment” is already contemplated in the meaning of mechanical lockdown mechanism. 8 It is well-settled that each claim does not necessarily cover every feature disclosed in the specification. See Ventana Med. Sys., Inc. v. Biogenex Labs, Inc., 473 F.3d 1173, 1181 (Fed. Cir. 2006). When a claim addresses only some of the features disclosed in the specification, it is improper to limit the claim to other unclaimed features. Id. Here, Oil States’s inclusion of adjustment limitations in claims 2 and 3 belie an intention to limit the scope of the term “mechanical lockdown mechanism” in claim 1 to mechanisms that provide a broad range of adjustment.9 Thus, we decline to adopt Oil States’s proposed construction. We construe a “lockdown mechanism” to mean “machinery for maintaining [the mandrel] in a fixed position.” In the context of lockdown mechanisms, we construe the adjective “mechanical” to mean that the lockdown mechanism is limited to purely mechanical means such as nuts and bolts and the like so that the principal holding force that maintains the mandrel in a fixed position 8 In the Summary of the Invention section of the Specification, the topic sentence of the paragraph describing an embodiment with a “significant range of adjustment,” qualifies the description of such embodiment with the word “preferably.” Ex. 1001, 3:8–27. This suggests that this passage of the Specification merely describes one embodiment and not the entire invention. 9 To the extent that claim 1 requires the mechanical lockdown mechanism to have any range of adjustment, such adjustment requirement may be found in the claim limitation directed to the lockdown mechanism being “adapted to ensure that the annular sealing body is securely seated against the top of the casing when the mandrel is in the operative position” and not in definition of “mechanical lockdown mechanism” per se.” slip op. at 11

  • Skill levelSkill level board ownOther

    “Green’s expert, Mr. Shackelford, opines that the person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention of the ’993 patent would have had a Bachelor-level degree in a recognized engineering discipline and practical job exposure of several years with oil and gas well operations. Ex. 1002 ¶ 13. Mr. Shackelford’s testimony is entirely conclusory with no supporting factual analysis. Oil States contends that the level of ordinary skill in the art is “relatively low,” but does not articulate or explain what it means by this characterization. PO Resp. 22. Oil States’s expert, Dr. Wooley, merely adopts Mr. Shackelford’s position and, like Mr. Shackelford, fails to provide any supporting factual analysis. Merely reciting a college degree and a number of years of experience provides little guidance as to the actual capabilities of a person of ordinary skill in the art. Neither party presents a detailed evidentiary showing under the factors recited in Environmental Designs, Ltd. v. Union Oil Co., 713 F.2d 693, 696–97 (Fed. Cir. 1983). 13” slip op. at 22

  • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “combine references is a question of fact. In re Constr. Equip. Co., 665 F.3d 1254, 1255 (Fed. Cir. 2011). Greene fails to persuade us that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had reason to combine Herricks and McLeod to achieve the invention claimed in claims 1 and 27 of the ’993 patent. Because the mechanical lockdown mechanism in McLeod is intended to be used with a mandrel that packs off at an indeterminate point in the casing, rather than at a fixed point and, therefore, does not disclose any range of adjustment to accommodate production trees of varying heights as would be necessary to be operable in systems designed for fixed point packoff, the proposed combination does not provide a mechanical lockdown mechanism that is adapted to securely seat a mandrel against the top of the casing as required by claim 1. Similarly, the proposed combination does not provide a method for engaging the mechanical lockdown mechanisms to lock the mandrel in the operative position such that the annular sealing body is in fluid sealing engagement with a top of a casing of the well as required by claim 27.” slip op. at 30

  Patent outcomesUS 6,289,993 not shown unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 6,289,993
• Medtronic, Inc. / Medtronic Vascular, Inc. v. Lifeport Sciences LLCNo claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Apr 21, 2015 · IPR2014-00288 · APJ Robert A Pollock · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–5, 7–13, 15, and 16 were not shown unpatentable because the cited references did not establish the claimed permanent curve.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownOther

    “Considering the teachings of the Specification, we conclude that the curve element must be permanent, as recited in the claims, rather than “resiliently flexible.” The Specification teaches that in some embodiments, the hook or protrusion “is resiliently flexible so as to form a substantially straight profile when compressed,” (Ex. 1001, Abstract) but “may be permanently-deformed into the curved configuration by heat setting the material” (id. at 6:1–4). As emphasized by Lifeport, the Specification teaches that a permanently deformed hook and frame—and, thus, a permanent curve—can be produced by heating Nitinol hook and frame combinations “at 550° for ten minutes.” Resp. 25–26 (citing Ex. 1001, 6:3– 4); see Ex. 2001 ¶ 77. When thus “permanently deformed,” “hook 20 may still be compressed into alignment with the frame 22 without losing the preset curve,” and subsequently “deployed in the curved configuration by releasing.” Ex. 1001, 6:7–9 (emphases added). We further note that the Specification makes clear that the disclosed hooks are incorporated into a variety of devices deployed in the veins of living bodies (see, e.g., Ex. 1001, 3:60–4:8), and subject to various physical forces therein. The ’662 patent, thus, discloses an embodiment having “a plurality of hooks 20 from the same incisions 40,” which “could form hooks 20 which project in opposing directions” and “provide superior resistance to radial and axial loads from the corporeal lumen and blood flow.” Ex. 1001, 5:33–37. In light of the foregoing, we refine our construction of “permanent curve” to be “a preset curve that maintains a fixed arc throughout normal use regardless of what configuration the device is in.” Insofar as Petitioners, and/or Petitioners’ expert, argue that the challenged claims are unpatentable under multiple constructions of this term, we address only those arguments relevant to this construction below.” slip op. at 10

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “Lifeport has the more persuasive position. First, we note that endoprostheses such as those disclosed in the ’662 patent are deployed and function in a living body (see, e.g., Ex. 1001, 3:60–4:8). Accordingly, our construction of permanent curve as a preset curve that maintains a fixed arc throughout normal use regardless of the configuration of the device, is not limited to sheathed and unsheathed configurations taken in isolation. Thus, whereas Dr. Loomis’s analysis of Lefebvre focuses on the force applied by a catheter sheath impinging on a single tooth of the Lefebvre device, “throughout normal use” more broadly encompasses the deployed configuration of Lefebvre Figure 3 in which teeth 6, 7 penetrate into the vein wall “one in the direction of flow of the blood and the other in the opposite direction.” See Ex. 1003, 1:64–66. Dr. Loomis addressed the compressive effects during the application of a catheter sheath. We find no evidence that Dr. Loomis addressed compressive, hemodynamic, or other forces on the Lefebvre teeth when the device is deployed and functioning in normal use.9 9 Although an analysis of the forces applied to the Lefebvre device when it is deployed in a vein is among the issues raised in Medtronic’s Motion to Exclude Evidence, we need not resort to Dr. Loomis’s contested testimony as the omission is self-evident. We also are not persuaded by Medtronic’s assertion that Figure 3 and column 3, lines 34–42, of Lefebvre demonstrate The evidence of record is, therefore, insufficient to demonstrate that Lefebvre maintains a permanent curve as properly construed.” slip op. at 18

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “Lazarus specifically teaches that by modifying hooks like those of Lefebvre to make them sharper, or to configure them as barbs or arrowheads, more secure anchoring of the device can be achieved. . . . Thus, a person of skill in the art dealing with the problem of intraluminal device migration would have been motivated to combine the teaching of Lazarus with that of Lefebvre to achieve even stronger anchoring of the device to the lumen wall. For the reasons discussed above, we find that Lefebvre fails to disclose or suggest the “permanent curve” set forth in independent claims 1 and 10, from which claims 7, 8, and 15 depend. As there is no assertion of record that the missing element is provided in Lazarus, we conclude that Petitioners have not proven by a preponderance of the evidence that the combination of Lefebvre and Lazarus renders claims 7, 8, and 15 unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a).” slip op. at 22

  • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “We do not discern, nor does Dr. Loomis adequately explain, how the angular relationship of White’s engagement members, whether in an expanded, flat, or inwardly-projection configuration, comports with our construction of permanent curve. At best, Dr. Loomis identifies changes in the shape of White’s engagement members in response to temperature or compressive forces. On their face, such changes are incompatible with a permanent curve that is a preset curve that maintains a fixed arc throughout normal use regardless of what configuration the device is in. Dr. Loomis has not convinced us of a contrary interpretation of the White reference. Accordingly, we credit Ms. Gold’s testimony that “[n]othing in the disclosure of White indicates that the engagement members 21 have a permanent curve.” Ex. 2001 ¶ 59.” slip op. at 27

  Patent outcomesUS 7,147,662 not shown unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR
  Patents in suitUS 7,147,662
• Medtronic, Inc. v. Nuvasive, Inc.All claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Apr 3, 2015 · IPR2014-00075 · APJ Francisco C Prats · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1, 2, 4, 5, 10, 15, 17, and 18 are unpatentable as obvious over Branch, Obenchain, Blewett, and Koros ’493.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed board ownDecided for petitioner

    “allow safe and reproducible avoidance of nerves along a lateral trans-psoas path in a fashion that avoids the bony posterior elements of the spinal column. Ex. 1018, 11:51–54. Claim 1, however, does not require the “trans-psoas path” to pass through any particular portion of the psoas muscle, nor does the claim require any particular degree or extent of passage through the psoas. Moreover, the ’767 patent does not expressly define “trans-psoas path.” See also Tr. 39:12–40:1, 113:5–114:3 (conceding that the claims are not limited to any particular approach through the psoas muscle). Accordingly, we conclude that the broadest reasonable construction, consistent with the ’767 patent specification, of “trans-psoas path,” encompasses a path which passes through any portion of the psoas muscle, regardless of the degree or extent of the passage.” slip op. at 9

  • Skill levelOther

    “As to the level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art, the parties, as discussed below, challenge their opposing experts’ conclusions and qualifications. Nonetheless, neither party asserts specifically that the ultimate conclusion of obviousness turns on adoption of a particular level of ordinary skill. In that regard, the parties’ experts advance slightly different opinions as to the level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art. See Ex. 1016 ¶ 11 (Watkins Decl.)); Ex. 2020 ¶ 17 (Phillips Decl.). Both experts, nonetheless, agree generally that an ordinarily skilled artisan at the critical time would have been an experienced spinal surgeon, or an experienced engineer or professional involved in the implementation or design of surgical instruments for use in spinal surgery, with significant access to orthopedic or neurosurgeons. See id. When evaluating the parties’ contentions regarding the scope and content of the prior art, and the differences between the prior art and the challenged claims, we take into consideration both parties’ assertions regarding the level of ordinary skill. We note also that the level of ordinary skill in the art may be evidenced by the cited references. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001).” slip op. at 12

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundUnpatentable

    “Given Blewett’s teachings, Petitioner persuades us that an ordinarily skilled artisan, creating initial access into a patient for spinal surgery, using guidewires and a plurality of dilators as taught by Branch, would have been prompted to equip the initial dilator with a nerve monitoring electrode, as required by claim 1 of the ’767 patent, to allow the surgeon to avoid nerves. Petitioner persuades us also that an ordinarily skilled artisan would have been prompted to equip Branch’s retractor blades with a fixation element, as claim 1 requires. Specifically, Koros ’493 discloses that, in a system for providing spinal access similar to that described by Branch, providing two fixation screws that extend distally from the retractor blades, is “advantageous to provide stability and improve support for the distractor system.” Ex. 1006, 6:57–58.” slip op. at 14

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of success › Teaching awayTeaching away not foundDecided for petitioner

    “A reference does not teach away . . . if it merely expresses a general preference for an alternative invention but does not ‘criticize, discredit, or otherwise discourage’ investigation into the invention claimed.” DePuy Spine, Inc. v. Medtronic Sofamor Danek, Inc., 567 F.3d 1314, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (quoting In re Fulton, 391 F.3d 1195, 1201 (Fed. Cir. 2004)). In the instant case, as noted above, the Obenchain reference teaches expressly the suitability of a lateral, psoas-traversing pathway when performing minimally invasive surgery on the lumbar spine. Ex. 1003, 6:22–31 (“If desired, the surgery may traverse through the psoas muscle. . . . [F]or example, where the patient has extensive abdominal adhesions, it may be preferred to use a lateral puncture of the abdomen to avoid bowel perforation, and entry into the disc space is lateral, transversing the psoas muscle . . . .”) (emphasis added). Given this express teaching, Petitioner persuades us (Reply 2, 13–14) that the Obenchain reference does not teach away from the lateral trans-psoas pathway required by claim 1 of the ’767 patent. slip op. at 16

  Patent outcomesUS 8,016,767 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 8,016,767
• Medtronic, Inc. v. Nuvasive, Inc.All claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Apr 3, 2015 · IPR2014-00034 · APJ David C Mckone · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1, 5, 7–9, 13–18, and 20 are unpatentable as obvious under §103(a) over the specified combinations of prior art.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Preamble limiting or notPreamble not limitingDecided for petitioner

    “psoas approach” and “when advanced in the trans-psoas path,” as recited in independent claims 1 and 9, are statements of intended use and are entitled to no patentable weight, beyond requiring an ability to follow a “trans-psoas path” or “trans-psoas approach.” Dec. 8–9; see also Marrin v. Griffin, 599 F.3d 1290, 1294 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (“For apparatus claims . . . generally patentability ‘depends on the claimed structure, not on the use or purpose of that structure.’”) (quoting Catalina Marketing Int’l v. Coolsavings.com, Inc., 289 F.3d 801, 809 (Fed. Cir. 2002)); In re Schreiber, 128 F.3d 1473, 1477 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (“It is well settled that the recitation of a new intended use for an old product does not make a claim to that old product patentable.”). Petitioner and Patent Owner do not dispute these constructions. In view of this, and upon consideration of the complete record developed during this trial, we maintain these constructions.” slip op. at 7

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededDecided for petitioner

    “Petitioner and Patent Owner do not dispute these constructions. We maintain these constructions based on the complete record developed during this trial. Neither Petitioner nor Patent Owner identifies any additional terms requiring construction. No other terms require express construction for purposes of this Decision.” slip op. at 8

  • ExcludeMotion to exclude, deniedGranted in part

    “Petitioner moves to exclude Exhibits 2033–36, 2042, and 2051 as hearsay. Mot. to Exclude 2–3. Patent Owner argues that Exhibits 2033, 2035, and 2036 are offered to show the declarants’ states of mind. Opp. to Mot. to Exclude 3–4 (citing FED. R. EVID. 803(3)). We agree that they are offered for non-hearsay purposes. Therefore, we deny the motion to exclude Exhibits 2033, 2035, and 2036. We do not rely on Exhibits 2034, 2042, and 2051. Therefore, Petitioner’s motion to exclude them is dismissed as moot. Petitioner moves to exclude Exhibits 2039, 2041, 2056, 2058, 2059, and 2066 as hearsay. Mot. to Exclude 4–5. Patent Owner introduces these exhibits as financial industry objective indicia of commercial success and praise. Patent Owner argues that these documents are introduced for non-hearsay purposes, such as showing industry praise and the states of mind of the declarants. Opp. to Mot. to Exclude 7–8. Petitioner contends that these exhibits are not reliable because the authors of those exhibits are not skilled artisans. Mot. to Exclude 4–5. We agree with Patent Owner (Opp. to Mot. to Exclude 8), however, that the credentials of the authors go to the weight of the evidence, not its admissibility. Accordingly, we deny Petitioner’s motion to exclude Exhibits 2039, 2041, 2056, 2058, 2059, and 2066. Petitioner moves to exclude Exhibit 2062 as being out of compliance with 37 C.F.R. § 42.53. Mot. to Exclude 5. We do not rely on Exhibit 2062. Therefore, Petitioner’s motion to exclude it is dismissed as moot. In sum, we deny-in-part and dismiss-in-part Petitioner’s Motion to Exclude.” slip op. at 9

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “We agree with Petitioner that the claims of the ’782 patent include aspects of both spine surgery and neurophysiology. We recognize that each declarant in this case has a particular expertise stronger in one aspect than the other. Nevertheless, we have considered the testimony of each of the declarants and have taken into account each’s respective expertise in weighing his testimony. Both parties argue that the other party’s declarant was unfamiliar with the legal standards for obviousness. PO Resp. 34–36; Reply 10. We have taken the parties’ arguments into account in weighing the testimony of the declarants. We recognize, however, that neither party’s declarants are attorneys.” slip op. at 13

  Patent outcomesUS 8,000,782 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 8,000,782

Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.