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  • PTAB · Aug 26, 2024 · IPR2024-00462 · APJ Frederick C Laney · IPR · Institution

    The Board denied institution because the Petition did not show a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on claims 1–3, failing to support a motivation to combine Carhart and Grube.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied

      “A. Legal Standard Petitioner has the burden of proof. Harmonic Inc. v. Avid Tech., Inc., 815 F.3d 1356, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“In an IPR, the petitioner has the burden from the onset to show with particularity why the patent it challenges is unpatentable.”).” slip op. at 9

    • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentable

      “bandwidth, we agree with Patent Owner that this contention is unsubstantiated. Although there is sufficient evidence that Grube’s common bit-loading scheme improves upon and benefits infrastructures utilizing telephone lines, Petitioner provides no basis, or minimal at best, to bridge those advantages obtained in the context of Grube’s system to Carhart’s BCN. The evidence Petitioner cites from Grube and Dr. Williams (Ex. 1010, 2:48–3:17, 3:34–42, 4:18–26, 6:54–67, 7:13–8:14, 14:33–46, 34:45– 52, 57:29–38, Fig. 8; Ex. 1004 ¶¶ 92–111) either describes how Grube’s bitloading scheme works in an infrastructure utilizing telephone lines or it represents that the bit-loading scheme is able to satisfy the need for a one-tomany and/or many-to-one communication system within an infrastructure that utilizes existing telephone wires. Dr. Williams’s testimony provides little, if any, persuasive information to bridge the gap between how Grube’s bit-loading scheme’s usefulness within a telephone line infrastructure translates to a skilled artisan into adding similar value within a BCN infrastructure; instead, Dr. Williams largely mirrors the naked assertions Petitioner makes and cites to the same evidence without further substantive reasoning. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.65(a) (“Expert testimony that does not disclose the underlying facts or data on which the opinion is based is entitled to little or no weight.”). Likewise, no underlying support or reasoning from either Petitioner or Dr. Williams is provided to substantiate the claim that “Grube represents a suitable, known technique for orchestrating digital communication between a central unit and multiple remote units in networks like Carhart’s” (Pet. 16). Grube suggest that its technique eliminates high data rate transmission path requirements to expand the usefulness and areas in which communications systems may be established. Ex. 1010, 57:29–38. Petitioner offers no basis for us to determine Grube’s technique for eliminating high data rate transmission path requirements would have been a known technique by skilled artisans for orchestrating digital communication between nodes within a network like Carhart’s that necessarily depend on the high data rate transmission paths that a BCN provides. Left unfulfilled is any clear explanation for why or how Grube’s bit- loading scheme would have actually improved or benefited Carhart’s system, which Petitioner admits already teaches a network with a centralized computer that uses existing coaxial cables to communicate with remote stations (Pet. 10). For example, Petitioner does not identify a single known shortcoming with Carhart’s one-to-many and/or many-to-one communication system infrastructure that a skilled artisan would recognize may be overcome with Grube’s bit-loading scheme. To the contrary, as Patent Owner notes, rather than needing a technique Grube teaches to address the lack of “adequate bandwidth” provided by telephone wires (Ex. 1010, 2:1–3), Carhart teaches that its BCN provides excess unused bandwidth (Ex. 1009, 8:36–38). Nor does Petitioner explain why or how a skilled artisan would have viewed Grube’s bit-loading scheme to be superior to the schemes Carhart utilizes to form a multi-casting infrastructure. Moreover, Petitioner’s admission Carhart teaches that teaches a BCN with a centralized computer that communicates with remote stations, further weakens Petitioner’s position because it shows Carhart’s infrastructure already accomplishes the same goal that Petition proposes a skilled artisan would have sought to achieve through the proposed modification. In re NTP, Inc., 654 F.3d 1279, 1299 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (stating that the Board’s” slip op. at 26

    • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of success › HindsightNot shown unpatentableDecided for patent owner

      “The last point we make about Petitioner’s reasoning is that it lacks any substantive support for why a skilled artisan would have chosen to configure Carhart’s node to have the functionality Grube describes for its primary site. Here again, Petitioner simply concludes that a skilled artisan would have found it obvious to have Carhart’s nodes act as Grube’s primary site without any evidence that such a correlation was known by skilled artisans or any analysis regarding the roles Carhart’s nodes and Grube’s primary site play within their respective infrastructures that would have led to that choice. Pet. 20–21. We are mindful that “[c]are must be taken to avoid hindsight reconstruction by using ‘the patent in suit as a guide through the maze of prior art references, combining the right references in the right way so as to achieve the result of the claims in suit.’” Grain Processing Corp. v. American–Maize Prods. Co., 840 F.2d 902, 907 (Fed.Cir.1988) (quoting Orthopedic Equip. Co. v. United States, 702 F.2d 1005, 1012 (Fed. Cir. 1983)). Petitioner’s failure to provide any clear explanation backed by supporting evidence for why a skilled artisan would have selected Carhart’s nodes to modify and perform as the primary site when implementing Grube’s bit-loading scheme suggests Petitioner improperly relied on hindsight reasoning to piece together elements to arrive at the claimed invention. For the above reasons, we are not persuaded that Petitioner has shown with sufficient particularity why it would have been obvious to modify a node in Carhart, in view of Grube, to transmit a probe signal to the other respective nodes and determine a common bit-loading modulation scheme from the various bit-loading modulation schemes determined and provided by each of the other respective nodes that received a probe signal. And as a result, we find Petitioner has not demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of proving that one of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to combine Carhart and Grube as proposed. This failing undermines Petitioner’s showing as to independent claims 1–3 for all grounds.” slip op. at 28

    • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedOther

      “B. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art Petitioner asserts that a person of ordinary skill in the art (a skilled artisan) would have had a degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering, or a related field and experience working in signal processing and/or communication systems/networks, e.g., a bachelor’s and three or more years of experience; a master’s and at least one year of experience; or a doctorate and some work experience. Pet. 9 (citing Ex. 1004 ¶¶ 24–25). Patent Owner does not contest Petitioner’s proposed definition of the level of ordinary skill in the art. See generally Prelim. Resp. For purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s proposal as reasonable and consistent with the ’759 patent specification and the prior art.” slip op. at 11

    Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 7,889,759
  • PTAB · Aug 26, 2024 · IPR2024-00578 · APJ Jon M Jurgovan · IPR · Institution

    The Board denied institution on all grounds because Petitioner did not show a reasonable likelihood that claims 1–4, 6, 8, and 9 were obvious.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied

      “Under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), an inter partes review may not be instituted unless the information presented in a petition and the preliminary response “shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” Upon consideration of the Petition and Preliminary Response, and accompanying exhibits and evidence, we determine Petitioner has not established a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail with respect to at least one challenged claim in the inter partes review. Therefore, we deny institution of an inter partes review as to all of the challenged claims of the ’826 patent on all challenges in the Petition.” slip op. at 2

    • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

      “B. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art Petitioner contends as follows: The ’826 Patent describes and claims aspects and functionality of cable and satellite television signal processing and communication systems. As of the alleged September 8, 2011 priority date, a person of ordinary skill in the art (“POSITA”) of the ’826 Patent would have had at least: i) a Bachelor of Science in electrical engineering or an equivalent subject and three or more years of experience working in the field of cable and/or satellite signal processing and communication systems; ii) a Master’s in electrical engineering or an equivalent subject and one or more years of experience working in the field of cable and/or satellite television signal processing and communication systems; or iii) a Ph.D. in electrical engineering or an equivalent subject and at least some experience working in the field of cable and/or satellite television signal processing and/or communication systems. Additional education may substitute for professional experience, and significant work experience may substitute for formal education. Pet. 9 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 30–31) (internal citation omitted). Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s proposed level of skill in the art, which is consistent with the prior art references asserted by Petitioner. Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1354–55 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (the applied prior art may reflect an appropriate level of skill). Accordingly, we agree with and will use Petitioner’s proposed level for this Decision.” slip op. at 8

    • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

      “The parties indicate that the district court in the Charter case (2:22-cv-00125) construed “network management messages” in the claims of the ’826 patent to mean “messages which report on the network based on the measured characteristics.” Pet. 10 (citing Ex. 1009, 29); Prelim. Resp. 10. Petitioner contends this construction is consistent with the ordinary and customary meaning of the claim language. Pet. 25. Patent Owner asserts that, in the Cox case (2:23-cv-01049), the parties agreed that “network management messages” should be given its plain and ordinary meaning. Prelim. Resp. 10 (citing Ex. 2001, 2). Patent Owner asserts that its arguments “do not turn on the construction of ‘network management messages’ so there is no need to construe that, or any other, term of the ’826 Patent claims at this stage of the proceeding.” Id. As there is no controversy between the parties regarding any claim language that we would need to resolve in order to render our decision in this case, we apply the ordinary and customary meaning of the claim terms without specific construction. See Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (only claim terms in controversy need to be construed, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy).” slip op. at 10

    • BurdenNot shown unpatentable

      “While Petitioner mentions portions of Renken that it considers relevant to limitation 1h, Petitioner does not explain how it reads each aspect of limitation 1h on Renken. For example, Petitioner does not identify what in Renken corresponds to the “network management messages,” what corresponds to the “measured characteristic of the received signal” that “is different than said network management messages,” and what discloses that the “measured characteristic” is the basis for “controlling transmission of the network management messages” from the “receiver” “back to the headend.” b) Conclusion for Claim 1 Accordingly, Petitioner has not shown a reasonable likelihood to prevail in demonstrating that Renken in view of the general knowledge of a POSITA discloses limitations 1a and 1h of claim 1.7 Thus, we do not reach the parties’ contentions concerning other claim limitations or Renken’s priority date.” slip op. at 14

    Claim construction§ 103 obviousness
    Patents in suitUS 9,825,826
  • PTAB · Aug 21, 2024 · IPR2024-00555 · APJ Barbara A Parvis · IPR · Institution

    The Board denied institution because the petition did not show a reasonable likelihood that claims 1–6 and 12 were unpatentable as obvious over the asserted combinations.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied

      “Under 35 U.S.C. § 314, an inter partes review may not be instituted unless the information presented in the petition and any response “shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” For the reasons provided below, we determine that Petitioner has not demonstrated a reasonable likelihood that it will prevail in showing the unpatentability of at least one challenged claim. Accordingly, we do not institute inter partes review of the ’566 patent.” slip op. at 2

    • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

      “Pet. 10 (citing Ex. 1004 ¶¶ 1–13, 68, 69). Patent Owner does not contest Petitioner’s proposed definition of the level of ordinary skill in the art. See generally Prelim. Resp. For purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s proposal, because we find, based on the preliminary record before us, that Petitioner’s proposed definition is reasonable and consistent with the level of skill reflected in the specification of the ’566 patent and the asserted prior art references.” slip op. at 11

    • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentable

      “We find that Petitioner has not demonstrated sufficiently that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have combined the teachings of Cleveland and Hayashino in the manner recited in claim 1. More specifically, Petitioner has not shown sufficiently that its proposed combination teaches or suggests limitation [1c].” slip op. at 30

    § 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 8,320,566
  • PTAB · Aug 20, 2024 · IPR2024-00442 · APJ Jon M Jurgovan · IPR · Institution

    The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–18 and all petition grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that at least one challenged claim would have been obvious under § 103.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

      “Under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), an inter partes review may not be instituted unless the information presented in a petition and the preliminary response “shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” Upon consideration of the Petition and Preliminary Response, and accompanying exhibits and evidence, we determine Petitioner has established a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail with respect to at least one challenged claim in the inter partes review. Therefore, we grant institution of an inter partes review as to all of the challenged claims of the ’826 patent on all challenges in the Petition.” slip op. at 2

    • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

      “B. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art Petitioner contends as follows: A person of ordinary skill in the art (a “POSITA”) at the time of the alleged invention would have had a degree in electrical engineering or a similar discipline, and three-to-four years of experience working with television signal processing and communication systems. Additional education may substitute for professional experience and significant work experience may substitute for formal education. Pet. 24 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 44–46). Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s proposed level of skill in the art, which is consistent with the prior art references asserted by Petitioner. Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1354–55 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (the applied prior art may reflect an appropriate level of skill). Accordingly, we agree with and will use Petitioner’s proposed level for this Decision.” slip op. at 10

    • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededPlain and ordinary meaningDecided for petitioner

      “As there is no controversy between the parties regarding any claim language that we would need to resolve in order to render our decision in this case, we apply the ordinary and customary meaning of the claim terms without specific construction. See Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (only claim terms in controversy need to be construed, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy).” slip op. at 11

    • Claim Construction › Functional claiming / §112(f) means-plus-function › Whether §112(f) applies (Williamson, nonce words)§112(f) does not applyDecided for petitioner

      “The word “means” does not appear in the claims of the ’826 patent. When this is the case, there is a presumption that the claims do not recite means-plus-function limitations under § 112 ¶ 6. Williamson v. Citrix Online, LLC, 792 F.3d 1339, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (en banc in relevant part). Since neither party offers any argument or evidence to contravene this presumption, we do not construe any claim term as means-plus-function in rendering our decision.” slip op. at 12

    Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR
    Patents in suitUS 9,825,826
  • PTAB · Aug 19, 2024 · IPR2024-00452 · APJ Frederick C Laney · IPR · Institution

    The Board denied institution because Petitioner did not show a reasonable likelihood of proving the challenged claims obvious over the asserted combinations.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied

      “A. Legal Standard Petitioner has the burden of proof. Harmonic Inc. v. Avid Tech., Inc., 815 F.3d 1356, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“In an IPR, the petitioner has the burden from the onset to show with particularity why the patent it challenges is unpatentable.”).” slip op. at 9

    • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentable

      “have viewed Grube’s common bit-loading scheme as providing improvements over and benefits to the Gurantz system’s ability to multi-cast information, we agree with Patent Owner that this contention is unsubstantiated. Although there is sufficient evidence that Grube’s common bit-loading scheme improves upon and benefits infrastructures utilizing telephone lines, Petitioner provides no basis, or minimal at best, to bridge those advantages obtained in the context of Grube’s system to Gurantz’s BCN. The evidence Petitioner cites from Grube and Mr. Bertonis (Ex. 1009, 4:43–51, 17:20–40; Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 135–136) either describes how Grube’s bitloading scheme works in an infrastructure utilizing telephone lines or it represents that the bit-loading scheme is able to satisfy the need for a one-tomany and/or many-to-one communication system within an infrastructure that utilizes existing telephone wires. Moreover, Mr. Bertonis’s testimony provides little, if any, persuasive information to bridge the gap between how Grube’s bit-loading scheme’s usefulness within a telephone line infrastructure translates to a skilled artisan into adding similar value within a BCN infrastructure; instead, Mr. Bertonis largely mirrors the naked assertions Petitioner makes and cites to the same evidence without further substantive reasoning. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.65(a) (“Expert testimony that modulation scheme from a plurality received response signals that each include a respective bit-loading modulation scheme determined by a separate node. To be clear, “we accept” these contentions about what Grube discloses without making a determination about whether the evidence of record supports such a finding in order to focus our analysis on the dispositive issue, which is whether, in view of Grube, Petitioner demonstrates sufficiently a rationale with a rational underpinning for modifying the nodes in Gurantz’s BCN system in the manner claimed.” slip op. at 24

    • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedOther

      “a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering, or a similar discipline, and three to four years of experience working in signal processing and/or communication systems/networks. Additional education may substitute for experience, and significant work experience may substitute for formal education. Pet. 17–18 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶ 84). Patent Owner does not contest Petitioner’s proposed definition of the level of ordinary skill in the art. See generally Prelim. Resp. For purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s proposal as reasonable and consistent with the ’759 patent specification and the prior art.” slip op. at 11

    • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

      “37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b). Under that standard, we generally give claim terms their ordinary and customary meaning, as would be understood by a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention, in light of the language of the claims, the specification, and the prosecution history. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312–14 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). “The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)).” slip op. at 11

    Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 7,889,759
  • PTAB · Aug 8, 2024 · IPR2024-00562 · APJ Barbara A Parvis · IPR · Institution

    The Board denied institution because Petitioner did not show a reasonable likelihood that any challenged claim was unpatentable, principally failing to show the required clock adjustment based on estimated propagation delay.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied

      “Under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), an inter partes review may not be instituted unless the information presented in the petition and any response “shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” For the reasons provided below, we determine that Petitioner has not demonstrated a reasonable likelihood that it will prevail in showing the unpatentability of at least one challenged claim. Accordingly, we do not institute inter partes review of the ’681 patent.” slip op. at 2

    • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

      “Pet. 9 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 1–11, 16, 17). Patent Owner does not contest Petitioner’s proposed definition of the level of ordinary skill in the art. See generally Prelim. Resp. For purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s proposal as reasonable and consistent with the ’681 patent specification and the prior art.” slip op. at 10

    • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert discountedDecided for patent owner

      “understood that “to compensate for propagation delay . . . at least one of the nodes’ clocks would have to be adjusted.” Id. (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 114–120). Petitioner relies on Dr. Acton’s testimony that in his opinion “local clocks would have to be adjusted” to compensate for propagation delay. Ex. 1003 ¶ 116 (emphasis added). Patent Owner argues that IEEE802.3ah does not teach or suggest “any adjusting of a clock based on a propagation delay” and “the Petition improperly relies on expert testimony to bridge the gap of the lacking disclosure.” Prelim. Resp. 32 (citing Patent Trial and Appeal Board Consolidated Trial Practice Guide (2019), https://www.uspto.gov/TrialPracticeGuideConsolidated (“Consolidated Practice Guide” or “CTPG”) 36). Consistent with Patent Owner’s argument, we find that IEEE802.3ah does not describe adjusting a local clock time that results in “compensating” for round trip time. Ex. 1005, 439. We are not persuaded by the Petition or Dr. Acton’s testimony that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have understood from IEEE802.3ah’s disclosure of “ranging for compensating” for round trip time that “local clocks would have to be adjusted.” Pet. 39; Ex. 1003 ¶ 116 (emphasis added). Dr. Acton’s Declaration does not disclose underlying facts or data that support sufficiently that compensating requires adjusting a local clock. 37 C.F.R. § 42.65(a) (“Expert testimony that does not disclose the underlying facts or data on which the opinion is based is entitled to little or no weight.”).” slip op. at 22

    • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

      “Consistent with Patent Owner’s argument, we find that IEEE802.3ah does not describe adjusting a local clock time that results in “compensating” for round trip time. Ex. 1005, 439. We are not persuaded by the Petition or Dr. Acton’s testimony that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have understood from IEEE802.3ah’s disclosure of “ranging for compensating” for round trip time that “local clocks would have to be adjusted.” Pet. 39; Ex. 1003 ¶ 116 (emphasis added). Dr. Acton’s Declaration does not disclose underlying facts or data that support sufficiently that compensating requires adjusting a local clock. 37 C.F.R. § 42.65(a) (“Expert testimony that does not disclose the underlying facts or data on which the opinion is based is entitled to little or no weight.”).” slip op. at 23

    § 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 8,363,681
  • PTAB · Aug 5, 2024 · IPR2024-00364 · APJ Kristen L Droesch · IPR · Institution

    The Board denied institution because Petitioner did not show a reasonable likelihood of proving claim 8 or substitute claims 44–47, 49, and 50 unpatentable on any asserted ground.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied

      “We have authority to determine whether to institute review under 35 U.S.C. § 314 and 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a). An inter partes review may not be instituted unless it is determined that “the information presented in the petition filed under section 311 and any response filed under section 313 shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) (2024). For the reasons provided below, after considering the Petition and the Preliminary Response, we determine, based on the record before us, there is not a reasonable likelihood Petitioner would prevail in showing at least one of the challenged claims is unpatentable.” slip op. at 2

    • Skill levelSkill level patent owner adoptedDecided for patent owner

      “B. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art Petitioner asserts that a person of ordinary skill in the art “in the field of the ’096 patent would have had a Bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering, or a related field, and around two years of experience in the design or development of wireless communication systems, or the equivalent.” Pet. 16 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶ 57). In turn, Patent Owner submits a slightly different description: that a person of ordinary skill in the art “in the technical field of the ’096 patent would have had at least a master’s degree in computer engineering or electrical engineering, or equivalent work experience, along with at least 1 year of experience related specifically to wireless communications, including knowledge of MIMO [(Multiple-Input Multiple-Output)] and OFDM.” Prelim. Resp. 22 (citing Ex. 2001 ¶ 18). For the purpose of determining whether to institute trial, we adopt Patent Owner’s definition of a person of ordinary skill in the art because it is consistent with the level of skill reflected by the ’096 Patent Specification and the asserted prior art but our conclusions would be the same under Petitioner’s definition.” slip op. at 11

    • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

      “Of note, the numerous claim terms construed in the Apple Litigation and referenced by the parties include the terms “data” and “non-data.” See Pet. 8 (citing Ex. 1005); Prelim. Resp. 23 (citing Ex. 1005). Both parties agree that “data” and “non-data” are to be given their plain and ordinary meanings. See Pet. 8 (citing Ex. 1005); Prelim. Resp. 23 (citing Ex. 1005). As demonstrated in the analysis below, for the purpose of determining whether to institute review, we need not construe any claim terms and phrases to resolve the controversy before us. See Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 13

    • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Not shown unpatentable

      “We agree with Patent Owner that the Joint Proposal’s legacy signal field (L-SIG) does not disclose data as recited in limitation 8[a]. Both parties agree that the term “data” should be construed according to its plain and ordinary meaning. See Pet. 16–18; Prelim. Resp. 22–23. The ’096 Patent utilizes the term “data” in accordance with its plain and ordinary meaning. See Ex. 1001 generally. We find that the Joint Proposal likewise utilizes the term “data” in accordance with its plain and ordinary meaning, to describe data fields that include the PHY sub-layer Service Data Unit, and shown in each of the legacy PLCP packet format, Mixed Mode PLCP packet format, and Green Field PLCP packet format that include the PHY sub-layer Service Data Unit. See Ex. 1008, 11:11–13, Fig. 1. Indeed, in addressing limitation 8[b], Petitioner identifies the Joint Proposal’s data field in the Mixed Mode PLCP format as disclosing “data configured in a second format compatible with a second communication system,” as recited in limitation 8[b]. See Pet. 26–27. Petitioner, however, does not direct us to where the Joint Proposal discloses or describes the legacy signal field (L- SIG) as “data” according to its plain and ordinary meaning. See Pet. 25–26. Petitioner’s citations to the Joint Proposal fail to provide sufficient support for Petitioner’s position that L-SIG discloses “data” in accordance with its plain and ordinary meaning. See Ex. 1008, 11:4–6, 11:18–23. Petitioner further does not provide sufficient explanation why the Joint Proposal’s L- SIG otherwise constitutes “data,” according to the plain and ordinary meaning. See Pet. 25–26. The testimony of Dr. Hansen, cited by Petitioner to support its arguments, is no more illuminating. Compare Pet. 25–26, with Ex. 1002 ¶ 177.” slip op. at 18

    Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 8,265,096
  • PTAB · Jul 15, 2024 · IPR2024-00314 · APJ James J Mayberry · IPR · Institution

    The Board denied institution because Petitioner did not show a reasonable likelihood that Wong, alone or with Minn and Lehne, rendered any challenged claim obvious.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied

      “For institution, “[t]he ‘reasonable likelihood’ standard is a somewhat flexible standard that allows the Board room to exercise judgment.” Patent Trial and Appeal Board Consolidated Trial Practice Guide 53 (Nov. 2019), available at https://www.uspto.gov/TrialPracticeGuideConsolidated.” slip op. at 11

    • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for patent owner

      “Accordingly, we understand the term pre-equalization parameter to encompass a parameter used for pre-equalization, that is, to account for properties of a propagation path between a transmitter and a receiving device, where the parameter is based on at least one multipath transmission delay identified from a reverse path data signal received from the receiving device and where a forward path data signal is modified based on the parameter.” slip op. at 15

    • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

      “We are not persuaded that Petitioner has shown that Wong teaches the recited pre-equalization parameter because Petitioner’s analysis does not address the term “pre-equalization” sufficiently. As Patent Owner argues, Wong discloses that it uses the magnitude of the channel gain in its iterative process of assigning bits to subcarriers in an OFDM system to minimize the total amount of power used for a transmission. The magnitude of the channel gain is used to calculate the required transmit power for a kth user over an nth subcarrier, as seen in Equation 1 in Wong. Ex. 1005, 1749. 9 To the extent that Petitioner contends that employing the time-domain option would have been “obvious to try” under obviousness case law merely because there are only two options, this contention shortcuts the obvious to try analysis. See, e.g., Grunenthal GmbH v. Alkem Labs. Ltd., 919 F.3d 1333, 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“To prove obviousness under an obvious to try theory, [the challenger] must show (1) a design or market need to solve a particular problem, and (2) that ‘there are a finite number of identified, predictable solutions’ that would lead to an expectation of success.” (quoting KSR Int’l Co., 550 U.S. at 421)). Wong’s process iterates over the k users and n subcarriers such that the sum of the transmit power is minimized. Id. Nowhere in Wong does it explain that its power minimization approach pre-equalizes the transmit signal. Accordingly, we agree with Patent Owner that Petitioner’s unpatentability analysis reads out the term “pre-equalization” from claim 1. See Prelim. Sur-reply 1–2.” slip op. at 23

    • Obviousness (§103) › KSR rationalesDecided for patent owner

      “can be determined by one of two ways—a time-domain option or a frequency domain option—“the epitome of ‘obvious to try.9’” Id. at 23. Petitioner then employs the time-domain approach, eventually getting to a relationship between channel gain and channel frequency response, apparently contending that the amplitude of the channel frequency is the same as the magnitude of the channel gain. See id. at 26–27; Ex. 1003 ¶ 311 (“[T]hus the ‘magnitude of the channel gain’ as used in the methods described in Wong is simply this amplitude term within this estimated ‘channel frequency response.’” (emphasis in original)). We are not persuaded that Petitioner has shown that Wong teaches the recited pre-equalization parameter because Petitioner’s analysis does not address the term “pre-equalization” sufficiently. As Patent Owner argues, Wong discloses that it uses the magnitude of the channel gain in its iterative process of assigning bits to subcarriers in an OFDM system to minimize the total amount of power used for a transmission. The magnitude of the channel gain is used to calculate the required transmit power for a kth user over an nth subcarrier, as seen in Equation 1 in Wong. Ex. 1005, 1749. 9 To the extent that Petitioner contends that employing the time-domain option would have been “obvious to try” under obviousness case law merely because there are only two options, this contention shortcuts the obvious to try analysis. See, e.g., Grunenthal GmbH v. Alkem Labs. Ltd., 919 F.3d 1333, 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“To prove obviousness under an obvious to try theory, [the challenger] must show (1) a design or market need to solve a particular problem, and (2) that ‘there are a finite number of identified, predictable solutions’ that would lead to an expectation of success.” (quoting KSR Int’l Co., 550 U.S. at 421)).” slip op. at 23

    Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 7,177,369
  • PTAB · Jul 9, 2024 · IPR2024-00120 · APJ Brian D Range · IPR · Institution

    The Board instituted IPR on claims 1, 2, 6, 9, 11, and 26–34 on all asserted grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on the § 103 challenges.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

      “unless the information presented in the petition “shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” The following findings of fact and conclusions of law are not final, but are made for the sole purpose of determining whether Petitioner meets the threshold for initiating review. Any final decision shall be based on the full trial record, including any response timely filed by Patent Owner. Any arguments not raised by Patent Owner in a timely-filed response may be deemed waived.” slip op. at 2

    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Not reached

      “2 While the ’230 patent is currently involved in a parallel district-court case, Petitioner argues that “[i]nstitution is appropriate under Fintiv . . . .” Pet. 157. Petitioner also states that “if this proceeding is instituted, Petitioner stipulates not to pursue in the district court the grounds in the Petition or any ground that reasonably could have been raised in the Petition.” Id. Patent Owner does not challenge Petitioner’s argument. Accordingly, and in view of Petitioner’s stipulation, it is not necessary to reach Petitioner’s discretionary denial arguments. See Sotera Wireless, Inc. v. Masimo Corp., IPR2020-01019, Paper 12 at 18–19 (PTAB Dec. 1, 2020) (precedential as to section II.A)).” slip op. at 3

    • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

      “would have had a bachelor’s degree (B.S.) in mechanical engineering, industrial engineering, or a closely related field and one year of experience working with connectors.” Pet. 7 (citing Ex. 1004 ¶¶ 5–17, 79–84). For purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s proposal as reasonable and consistent with the ’230 patent specification and the prior art. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (the prior art may reflect an appropriate level of skill in the art). slip op. at 11

    • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

      “For purposes of this Decision, we do not discern a need to construe explicitly any claim language because doing so would have no effect on our analyses below of Petitioner’s asserted grounds. See Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’”) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)).” slip op. at 12

    Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Graham
    Patents in suitUS 10,191,230
  • PTAB · Jul 9, 2024 · IPR2024-00119 · APJ Brian D Range · IPR · Institution

    The Board instituted review of claims 1–17 on all asserted grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood of success on at least one claim despite finding Wong was not shown to be prior art.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

      “unless the information presented in the petition “shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” The following findings of fact and conclusions of law are not final, but are made for the sole purpose of determining whether Petitioner meets the threshold for initiating review. Any final decision shall be based on the full trial record, including any response timely filed by Patent Owner. Any arguments not raised by Patent Owner in a timely-filed response may be deemed waived. For the reasons stated below, we determine that Petitioner has established a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail with respect to at least one claim. We hereby institute an inter partes review as to claims 1–17 of the ’760 patent based upon Petitioner’s asserted grounds of unpatentability.” slip op. at 2

    • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

      “Pet. 5 (citing Ex. 1007 ¶¶ 36–42). Patent Owner does not dispute the level of ordinary skill in the art. Prelim Resp. 8. For purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s proposal as reasonable and consistent with the ’760 patent specification and the prior art. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (the prior art may reflect an appropriate level of skill in the art).” slip op. at 9

    • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for patent owner

      “Prelim. Resp. 9 (citing Ex. 1001, 3:15–17, 7:49–51, 8:6–8, 9:10–12). We agree with Patent Owner that “slidably” in claim 1 requires that some continuous surface-to-surface contact must occur. Patent Owner further argues, however, that the figures, such as Figure 12A of the ’760 Patent, provide minimal clearance between the remote/latch release. Prelim. Resp. 10–11. These figures merely depict embodiments of an optical fiber connector after final assembly. See, e.g., Ex. 1001, 4:51–57 (stating that Figure 12A depicts “one embodiment” and that Figure 12B is a top view of the Figure 12A connector). We do not discern anything about the word “slidably” or claim 1 that requires minimal clearance after assembly. We also do not discern anything about claim 1 that requires that, for example, the inner portion of the groove slide against the lower portion of the latch release. Rather, the inner portion of the groove must be above to “receive” the lower portion of the latch release. How does it receive it? It does so “slidably.” The recitation is met so long as the inner portion of the groove is configured such that it can receive the lower portion of the latch release via any sliding. Neither the inner portion nor the lower portion, in particular, must have sliding surface-to-surface contact. In a similar way, neither the outer portion of the groove nor the narrower portion of the latch release must have sliding surface-to-surface contact. Thus, rather than importing a minimal clearance requirement into claim 1’s “slidably” recitations and rather than requiring that specific components must slide (when the claim does not state as much), we understand, for example, “the inner portion of the groove being configured to slidably receive the lower portion of the latch release” to mean that the inner portion of the groove has structure capable of receiving the lower portion of the latch release via a sliding motion. Such sliding could include any degree of surface-to-surface contact between parts; for example, the bottom surface of the latch release could slide along the upper surface of the groove. Similarly, “the outer portion of the groove being configured to slidably receive the narrower portion of the latch release” means that the outer portion of the groove has structure capable of receiving the narrower portion of the latch release via a sliding motion.” slip op. at 12

    • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundInstituted

      “connectors. Pet. 14–16. Petitioner argues that Raven teaches a connector that includes two ferrules and that Kuffel teaches an MPO connector that contains MT ferrules. Id. at 15–17 (citing, e.g., Ex. 1003, Fig. 1; Ex. 1004, 5:16–27; Ex. 1007 ¶¶ 150–151). Petitioner argues that a person having ordinary skill in the art would have understood that Kuffel’s MPO connectors (which contain MT ferrules) would be used to increase density within data transmission networks. Id. at 16 (citing, e.g., Ex. 1004, 4:8–14; Ex. 1007 ¶ 147; Ex. 1015; Ex. 1025; Ex. 1027). Petitioner argues that a person having ordinary skill in the art would have modified Raven’s two ferrule connector to use an MT ferrule (as Kuffel teaches) and argues that such a modification would improve Raven’s device in the same way as described in Kuffel. Id. at 17–18 (citing Ex. 1007 ¶¶ 152–154). Petitioner argues that there would have been a reasonable expectation of success in making this modification. Id. at 19 (citing Ex. 1007 ¶ 155). Petitioner argues that the modification (1) is supported by the disclosures of Kuffel and Raven, (2) represents a simple substitution, and (3) would enable Raven to incorporate a multi-fiber connector. Id. at 20–23 (citing, e.g., Ex. 1007 ¶¶ 159–169). Based on the evidence presented, Petitioner adequately establishes that a person having ordinary skill in the art would have had reason to combine the teachings of Raven and Kuffel with a reasonable expectation of success.” slip op. at 20

    Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 11,415,760

Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.