• Satco Products, Inc. v. Seoul Semiconductor Co., Ltd.Rehearing denied
  PTAB · Nov 9, 2020 · IPR2020-00151 · APJ Jeffrey W Abraham · IPR · Rehearing

  The Board denied Satco’s rehearing request, leaving in place the denial of institution on claims 1–7 because the petition did not adequately show Wang disclosed the different-shape limitation.

  RulingsRehearing decision

  • RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied

    “Petition or rely only on Figure 8. Rather, after considering Petitioner’s citation to and cursory discussion of Figures 8, 9, and 11 in the Petition, we determined Petitioner’s evidence suffered from deficiencies that prevented Petitioner from satisfying its burden of proof in the Petition. Notably, in its Rehearing Request, Petitioner does not direct us to any actual comparison of the shapes of top and bottom portions of Wang’s separation region that we overlooked in the Petition. Instead, Petitioner presents new images and new arguments that these images represent the shape of the top and bottom portions of Wang’s separation regions, as derived from Figures 8, 9, and 11. Req. Reh’g 8–11. A request for rehearing, however, is not an opportunity to present new arguments or evidence. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d).” slip op. at 5

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied

    “In our Decision, we determined that Petitioner failed to demonstrate adequately that Wang discloses the different shape limitation. Dec. 17–19. In particular, we noted that the images from Wang Petitioner relied upon offered insufficient information to determine whether the separation region between first and second top leads has a different shape than the separation region between the first and second bottom leads. Dec. 17–19. For example, we stated that Petitioner never presented views comparing the top and bottom portions of the separation region to demonstrate adequately that the top and bottom portions have different shapes. Dec. 19.” slip op. at 3

  • BurdenDecided for patent owner

    “Petition or rely only on Figure 8. Rather, after considering Petitioner’s citation to and cursory discussion of Figures 8, 9, and 11 in the Petition, we determined Petitioner’s evidence suffered from deficiencies that prevented Petitioner from satisfying its burden of proof in the Petition. Notably, in its Rehearing Request, Petitioner does not direct us to any actual comparison of the shapes of top and bottom portions of Wang’s separation region that we overlooked in the Petition. Instead, Petitioner presents new images and new arguments that these images represent the shape of the top and bottom portions of Wang’s separation regions, as derived from Figures 8, 9, and 11. Req. Reh’g 8–11. A request for rehearing, however, is not an opportunity to present new arguments or evidence. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d).” slip op. at 5

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITAPlain and ordinary meaningDecided for patent owner

    “Wang’s figures to the claim language itself in our Decision. In doing so, we determined that Wang’s figures provided insufficient information to determine whether Wang discloses the “different shape” limitation. Dec. 17–19. Our discussion of the figures in the ’919 patent merely highlighted the deficiencies in Petitioner’s reliance on the figures in Wang by providing an example of information that could be used to determine whether the top and bottom portions of the separation regions have different shapes. At no point did we import any specific features from the Specification into the “different shape” limitation or “require shapes similar to the ‘exemplary embodiment’ of FIG. 5A of the ’919 patent.” Req. Reh’g 4. Rather, we merely compared the type of information presented in the ’919 patent with the type of information presented in Wang to reinforce our determination that Petitioner failed to direct us to evidence in Wang that would allow a person of ordinary skill in the art to determine that Wang discloses a separation region that has a different shape between the top leads and the bottom leads. In view of the foregoing, we are not persuaded that we committed any legal errors, or that we narrowed the plain meaning of “different shape.”” slip op. at 7

  Claim construction
  Patents in suitUS 9,978,919
• Celltrion, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc.Rehearing denied
  PTAB · Aug 18, 2017 · IPR2016-01667 · APJ Erica A Franklin · IPR · Rehearing

  The Board denied Celltrion’s rehearing request, leaving institution denied for claims 1–14 because the petition did not show a reasonable likelihood of prevailing.

  RulingsRehearing decision

  • RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied

    “decision for an abuse of discretion.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(c). “The burden of showing a decision should be modified lies with the party challenging the decision. The request must specifically identify all matters the party believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked, and the place where each matter was previously addressed in a motion, an opposition, or a reply.” Id. § 42.71(d). Because Petitioner has not met its burden, as discussed below, the Rehearing Request is denied.” slip op. at 3

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied

    “evidence of record, we determined that Petitioner failed to demonstrate a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail in showing the unpatentability of at least one challenged claim. Dec. 1. In the Rehearing Request, Petitioner seeks reconsideration of that determination. Reh’g Req. 1.” slip op. at 3

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Lexicography (patentee as own lexicographer)Term construed board ownDecided for patent owner

    “Although the Specification explains that the invention, as a whole, is not limited to treating patients who have had a prior treatment with a TNFα- inhibitor, the challenged claims are directed to such a population. Petitioner relies on a broader disclosure of the invention when referring to the Specification’s description of patients who “may be considered to be prone to experience a toxicity . . . with a TNFα-inhibitor before therapy therewith has begun, or the patient may be determined to be one who is unlikely to respond to therapy with a TNFα-inhibitor.” Ex. 1001, 28:55–61. The challenged claims are directed to methods of treating rheumatoid arthritis in a patient “who experiences an inadequate response to a TNFα-inhibitor,” and as we explained in the Decision, the Specification expressly defines the term “inadequate response to a TNFα-inhibitor” as “an inadequate response to previous or current treatment with a TNFα-inhibitor because of toxicity and/or inadequate efficacy.” Dec. 7 (quoting Ex. 1001, 5:25−28).” slip op. at 4

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element) › Inherent disclosureInherency not foundNot shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “of the patients in the study had already failed treatment with TNFα- inhibitor,” Petitioner asserts that, based upon its proposed construction, the claims do not require a prior therapy step. Id. at 2–3, 8–9. Petitioner asserts also that “statistics establish that Edwards necessarily and inevitably practiced the claimed method” on at least one patient, based upon the testimony of Drs. Boers and Marais that many RA patients are inadequate responders. Id. at 3, 10–11. In the Decision, we squarely address this argument explaining that inherency may not be established by probabilities or possibilities. Dec. 7–9. Thus, Petitioner has not established that we overlooked or misapprehended its argument as to this issue. Petitioner’s assertions in the Rehearing Request concerning Patent Owner’s alleged admissions regarding the patient population in Edwards does not overcome the deficiency in the Petition insofar as it relies upon probabilities to establish inherency. See Reh’g Req. 3, 11 (citing Preliminary Resp. 24–25).” slip op. at 4

  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousness
  Patents in suitUS 7,976,838
• Monosol RX, LLC v. Arius Two, Inc.Rehearing denied
  PTAB · Dec 19, 2016 · IPR2014-00376 · APJ Christopher L Crumbley · IPR · Rehearing

  The Board denied Monosol’s rehearing request, leaving claims 1–7 not shown unpatentable because the request showed no prejudicial APA error in the Board’s multilayer construction of “bioerodable device.”

  RulingsRehearing decision

  • RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied

    “At the outset, we note that the premise of Monosol’s argument—that we changed theories in our Final Written Decision—is incorrect. Our Decision on Institution did not articulate a construction for “bioerodable device,” or even state that we were not providing an express construction because the plain and ordinary meaning of the term controlled. Rather, we noted that an explicit construction was not necessary at that stage of the proceeding, because it was not material to resolving the question before us at the time: whether Monosol had established the reasonable likelihood of success required by 35 U.S.C. § 314 to institute trial. Dec. on Inst. 10–11. In this sense, our determination in the Decision on Institution was similar to a trial court’s ruling on a motion for preliminary injunction, and the” slip op. at 6

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed board ownDecided for patent owner

    “In instituting trial, we construed various terms in the challenged claims, but determined that other terms, such as “bioerodable device,” did” slip op. at 3

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denialDecided for patent owner

    “Our denial of institution on particular grounds was based on the fact that we had determined to institute trial on other grounds, and Monosol had not explained why the grounds (such as anticipation by Heiber, or obviousness over Keith combined with Heiber or Schiraldi) were sufficiently distinctive from the instituted grounds. Dec. on Inst. 16, 20 n.2. We, therefore, exercised our discretion to deny these grounds as redundant of the instituted grounds. Id.” slip op. at 3

  • BurdenDecided for patent owner

    “construction of “bioerodable device” earlier—it would have presented evidence that the Heiber and Schiraldi references met that limitation. But Monosol could not have done so post-institution, because neither Heiber nor Schiraldi were part of any ground on which trial was instituted, and could not form any basis for our patentability determination. See Office Patent Trial Practice Guide, 77 Fed. Reg. 48,756, 48,765 (Aug. 14, 2012) (“Any claim or issue not included in the authorization for review is not part of the trial.”). Relying on non-instituted prior art in the Final Written Decision— and thereby introducing factual assertions into the proceeding at the end of trial—would trade Monosol’s alleged APA violation for an actual one. See Dell Inc. v. Acceleron, LLC, 818 F.3d 1293, 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2016).” slip op. at 10

  Claim constructionDiscretionary denial
  Patents in suitUS 7,579,019
• Bioactive Laboratories v. BTG International Inc.Rehearing denied
  PTAB · Aug 2, 2016 · IPR2015-01305 · APJ Toni R Scheiner · IPR · Rehearing

  The Board denied BioActive Laboratories’ rehearing request, leaving institution denied for claims 1–22 because the ’352 patent was not shown to be prior art.

  RulingsRehearing decision

  • RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied

    “ANALYSIS When considering a request for rehearing, the Board reviews its decision for an abuse of discretion. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(c). The party requesting rehearing bears the burden of showing that the decision should be modified, and “[t]he request must specifically identify all matters the party believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d).” slip op. at 2

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied

    “After reviewing the arguments and evidence presented in the Petition, however, we were not persuaded that Petitioner had shown that the ’352 patent fails to provide proper written description support or enablement for the claims of the ’414 patent. Accordingly, we were not persuaded that the ’352 patent is prior art to the claims of the ’414 patent and declined to institute an inter partes review on grounds based on the ’352 patent. Dec. 10–11.” slip op. at 3

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Priority / effective filing date / continuation supportPriority date awardedNot shown unpatentable

    “anticipated by, and claims 8 and 19 are unpatentable over U.S. Patent No. 4,489,352 (Ex. 1004, “the ’352 patent”). Petitioner acknowledged that the ’352 patent “is listed in the priority chain on the face of the ’414 patent” (Pet. 5), and that the specifications of the ’352 patent and the ’414 patent are identical (id. at 29), but argued that: [T]he ’352 patent is in fact prior art because not one application in the ’414 patent’s alleged priority chain complies with the requirements of 35 U.S.C. § 112. In particular, the ’414 patent’s priority applications do not describe or enable the full scope of the claimed invention. Therefore, the ’414 patent’s priority claim fails under 35 U.S.C. § 120 and the ’352 patent qualifies as prior art under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b).” slip op. at 2

  • Disclosure Requirements (§112) › Written description (Ariad)Written description adequateNot shown unpatentable

    “[T]he ’352 patent is in fact prior art because not one application in the ’414 patent’s alleged priority chain complies with the requirements of 35 U.S.C. § 112. In particular, the ’414 patent’s priority applications do not describe or enable the full scope of the claimed invention. Therefore, the ’414 patent’s priority claim fails under 35 U.S.C. § 120 and the ’352 patent qualifies as prior art under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b).” slip op. at 2

  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 112 disclosure
  Patents in suitUS 8,048,414
• Volkswagen Group Of America, Inc. v. Emerachem Holdings, LLCRehearing denied
  PTAB · Jul 13, 2016 · IPR2014-01555 · APJ James T Moore · IPR · Rehearing

  The Board denied the Patent Owner’s rehearing request, leaving claims 1, 2, 7–12, 14–17, 19, 21–24, 31–42, and 44 unpatentable, and corrected the judgment to include claim 44.

  RulingsRehearing decision

  • RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied

    “A. Rehearing Requests A rehearing request for a final decision is governed by 37 CFR § 42.71 (d), which provides that a party dissatisfied with a decision must specifically identify all matters believed to have been misapprehended or overlooked, and the place where each matter was previously addressed.5 We therefore consider Patent Owner’s request for rehearing to determine whether we misapprehended or overlooked a matter, and whether it makes a difference to our determination in the Final Written Decision.” slip op. at 5

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for petitioner

    “In our final written decision we observed that “‘intimately and entirely coated’ mean[s] exactly what it says. In other words, it means the embodiment shown in Figs. 1a through 1c of the ʼ558 patent drawings and associated discussion in the written description portion of the specification.” Paper 50, 23. In doing so, we relied principally on the intrinsic evidence of record in the specification. On rehearing, Patent Owner asserts that the claim interpretation used by the Board is not part of the record and was not presented by Petitioner. Reh’g Req. 3. We are not persuaded by this argument. First, the Patent Owner itself advocated in the Patent Owner’s response that Kinoshita did not contain oxidation catalyst species “intimately and entirely coated with an absorber.” Paper 29, 19–20. Second, the Board is not bound by the Petitioner and Patent Owner’s interpretation of the claim language, which may have inherent favoring of a particular interpretation for strategic reasons, as discussed in the final written decision. See Paper 50, 23. Patent Owner states that it has had no opportunity to address the claim construction and that it is fundamentally unfair and unreasonable that Patent Owner has not had a chance to address this claim construction. Reh’g Req. 2–3. We take such a statement seriously. However, we are unable to discern how the Board overlooked or misapprehended any fact or argument, let alone how the claim interpretation adversely affected the outcome of this proceeding for the Patent Owner.” slip op. at 8

  • BurdenDecided for petitioner

    “loading, Hoekstra has insufficient catalyst to form a continuous layer, and there is no evidence the method of Hoekstra results in all platinum being entirely covered. Id. at 11–12. As we have not interpreted claim 1 as requiring a continuous catalyst layer, we are unpersuaded by the first assertion. As to the second, we relied upon evidence from Hoekstra example 1, Dr. Crocker, and Dr. Farrauto. For example, Dr. Farrauto testified that barium oxide completely coated the platinum group metal. Ex. 1003A. More specifically, Dr. Farrauto testified: 39. Hoekstra also discloses that prior to calcining the platinum group metal-impregnated carrier material, the composite is further impregnated with a compound of an alkaline earth metal in solution with a reducing agent. Ex. 1005 at col. 3, ln. 51-55. The reducing agent prevents the leaching of the platinum group metal component from the carrier into the alkaline earth metal solution. See Ex. 1005 at col. 1, ln. 37-59; col. 3, ln. 55-59; col. 5, ln. 4-8. 40. Because the platinum group metal component does not leach from the carrier, the alkaline earth metal compound will be coated over the platinum group metal component. Ex. 1003, 11–12. We also specifically noted that Hoekstra describes this prevention of leaching. Hoekstra explicitly states in describing the result of process steps described in Example 1 that “[t]his example demonstrates that the inclusion of a reducing agent, e.g., hydrazine hydrate, obviates leaching of the platinum group metal component from the carrier material during the second impregnation step [i.e., adding a barium oxide layer].” Ex. 1005, col. 5:4–8 (italics added).” slip op. at 10

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableUnpatentable

    “evidence that claims 1, 7, 8, 12, 14, 21, 22, 32–35, and 38–42 of the ʼ558 patent are unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) and claims 9–11 and 23 of the ʼ558 patent are unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a). (Ground 2, Hoekstra). Paper 50, 78. We also determined that Petitioner established by a preponderance of the evidence that claims 33–40, 42, and 44 of the ʼ558 patent are anticipated by Kinoshita. (Ground 3, Kinoshita). Id. at 79. We additionally determined that Petitioner established by a preponderance of the evidence that claims 1, 2, 7–10, 14, 15, 17, 19, 24, 31, 33–37, 39, and 40 of the ʼ558 patent are unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b). (Ground 4, Inui). Id. We finally determined that Petitioner established that claims 1, 7, 8, 14–17, 19, and 31 of the ʼ558 patent are unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) and that claims 21–23 of the ʼ558 patent are unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a). (Ground 5, Stiles). Id.” slip op. at 4

  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation
  Patents in suitUS 5,451,558
• Allergan, Inc. / Allergan Sales, LLC v. 1474791 Ontario, Ltd.Rehearing denied
  PTAB · Jun 16, 2016 · IPR2016-00102 · APJ Sheridan K Snedden · IPR · Rehearing

  The Board denied Patent Owner’s rehearing request, leaving institution on anticipation of claims 1–4, 6, and 7 by Travell in place.

  RulingsRehearing decision

  • RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied

    “When rehearing a decision, the Board reviews the decision for an abuse of discretion. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(c). An abuse of discretion occurs when a “decision [i]s based on an erroneous conclusion of law or clearly erroneous factual findings, or . . . a clear error of judgment.” PPG Indus. Inc. v. Celanese Polymer Specialties Co., Inc., 840 F.2d 1565, 1567 (Fed. Cir. 1988). “The burden of showing that a decision should be modified lies with the party challenging the decision.” Office Patent Trial Practice Guide, 77 Fed. Reg. 48,756, 48,768 (Aug. 14, 2012). In its request for rehearing, the dissatisfied party must (1) “specifically identify all matters the party believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked” and (2) identify the place “where each matter was previously addressed.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d); Office Patent Trial Practice Guide, 77 Fed. Reg. at 48,768. We address Petitioner’s arguments with these principles in mind.” slip op. at 2

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITANot reached

    “meaning of ‘solely’” and “erred as a matter of law in allowing the effect of ‘comprising’ to override the plain meaning of ‘solely.’” Request 4 (citing Decision 8 (“[W]e find no intrinsic evidence clearly suggesting that the intended meaning of the term ‘solely’ should be construed to exclude [additional steps involving, for example,] injections to other muscle locations.”)). We have considered Patent Owner’s positions set forth in the Request and are not persuaded at this time to change our claim construction as set forth in the Decision. In its Request, Patent Owner does not direct us to any evidence that we may have misapprehended or overlooked when reaching our conclusions on claim construction. Rather, Patent Owner continues to advocate its position with regard to claim construction and expresses disagreement with our Decision, but does not persuade us that we misapprehended or overlooked any matter at this stage of the proceeding. As noted in our Decision, we have not made a final determination as to the patentability of any challenged claim or the construction of any claim term. Dec. 14. Patent Owner may present its arguments in its response to the petition and we will fully consider those arguments in view of the complete record when rendering our final written decision. IV. ORDER” slip op. at 3

  Claim construction
  Patents in suitUS 6,806,251
• Wavemarket Inc. D/B/A Location Labs v. Locationet Systems Ltd.Rehearing denied
  PTAB · Jul 29, 2015 · IPR2014-00199 · APJ Kristen L Droesch · IPR · Rehearing

  The Board denied Patent Owner’s rehearing request, finding no overlooked or misapprehended evidence supporting a different construction or exclusion of Dr. Rosenberg’s testimony.

  RulingsRehearing decision

  • RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied

    “similar arguments in Patent Owner’s Motion to Exclude Evidence, and Patent Owner’s Reply to Petitioner’s Opposition. Final Dec. 18–19; see PO Mot. Exclude 2–5; PO Reply Opp. 1–3. A request for rehearing is not an opportunity to reiterate arguments that were addressed in our Final Written Decision, and merely express disagreement. As explained in the Final Written Decision, Patent Owner does not direct us to binding authority sufficient to support its argument that in order for expert testimony to be admissible, the expert must be a person of ordinary skill in the art. Final Dec. 19. Specifically, Sundance is binding authority; however, Sundance does not support fully Patent Owner’s arguments. The court in Sundance held, in the context of the admissibility of a testimony by a technically unqualified patent attorney, “it was an abuse of discretion to permit a witness to testify as an expert on the issues of noninfringement or invalidity unless that witness is qualified as an expert in the pertinent art.” Sundance, 550 F.3d at 1363.” slip op. at 7

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner

    “that it is improper to import limitations from the specification into the claims. In re Van Geuns, 988 F.2d 1181, 1184 (Fed. Cir. 1993). The ’970 Patent does not disclose, explicitly or implicitly, that the map database performs the functions of deriving street names, and correlating between maps and location and/or positioning information. In contrast to Patent Owner’s arguments, the ’970 Patent discloses “[i]t may be linked to an SMS (simple messaging service) server (140) and supply locations as coordinates, street names derived from map databases or other location data available to mobile telephones (141), pagers (142), etc.” Ex. 1001, col. 5, ll. 45–53. The pronoun “it” refers to the subject of the preceding sentence––location determination system 1. Id. at col. 5, ll. 43– 45. The ’970 Patent also discloses the following: (1) “map server (4) is capable of correlating between maps stored in the database (5) and positioning information,” (id. at col. 4, ll. 17–20 (emphasis added)); and (2) “the at least one mobile platform location system being adapted to receive said mobile platform location information and access said map database for correlating map to said location information, so as to obtain correlated location information,” (id. at col. 8, l. 66–col. 9, l. 3 (emphasis added)). In other words, the map server (4) and at least one mobile platform location system are the subjects of the aforementioned sentences that perform the correlating between maps and positioning and/or location information. Lastly, the ’970 Patent discloses “[s]tep (e) may further comprise the step of correlating the location of each remote platform with a map database and transmitting a map having marked said remote platform location(s) to said subscriber.” Id. at col. 3, ll. 21–24. This sentence is written in passive voice; it does not include a subject.” slip op. at 4

  • ExcludeMotion to exclude, deniedDenied

    “We considered and found unpersuasive Patent Owner’s substantially similar arguments in Patent Owner’s Motion to Exclude Evidence, and Patent Owner’s Reply to Petitioner’s Opposition. Final Dec. 18–19; see PO Mot. Exclude 2–5; PO Reply Opp. 1–3. A request for rehearing is not an opportunity to reiterate arguments that were addressed in our Final Written Decision, and merely express disagreement. As explained in the Final Written Decision, Patent Owner does not direct us to binding authority sufficient to support its argument that in order for expert testimony to be admissible, the expert must be a person of ordinary skill in the art. Final Dec. 19. Specifically, Sundance is binding authority; however, Sundance does not support fully Patent Owner’s arguments. The court in Sundance held, in the context of the admissibility of a testimony by a technically unqualified patent attorney, “it was an abuse of discretion to permit a witness to testify as an expert on the issues of noninfringement or invalidity unless that witness is qualified as an expert in the pertinent art.” Sundance, 550 F.3d at 1363.” slip op. at 7

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedDecided for petitioner

    “Inc. v. DeMonte Fabricating Ltd., 550 F.3d 1356, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2008), and Morpho Detection, Inc. v. Smiths Detection, Inc., No. 211cv498, 2012 WL 6004085 at *1–2 (E.D. Va. Nov. 30, 2012) cited by Patent Owner to support its argument that Dr. Rosenberg’s testimony should be excluded as not admissible. Req. Reh’g 8–9 (citing PO Mot. to Exclude 2–5; PO Reply Opp. 1–2; Tr. 29, l. 3–30, l. 14). In the Final Written Decision, we determined Dr. Rosenberg was qualified as an expert based at least on Dr. Rosenberg’s experience, in particular, over four years of experience as founder and CEO of WhereWuz, a technology company focusing on location tracking applications for GPS enabled smartphones. Final Dec. 20. Patent Owner asserts, under the Federal Rules of Evidence and Federal Circuit case law, a declarant who is not qualified as a person of ordinary skill in the art cannot testify as to issues of invalidity, the substance and disclosure of the prior art, or how a person of ordinary skill in the art would understand the prior art. Req. Reh’g 8; see id. at 9–11. We considered and found unpersuasive Patent Owner’s substantially similar arguments in Patent Owner’s Motion to Exclude Evidence, and Patent Owner’s Reply to Petitioner’s Opposition. Final Dec. 18–19; see PO Mot. Exclude 2–5; PO Reply Opp. 1–3. A request for rehearing is not an opportunity to reiterate arguments that were addressed in our Final Written Decision, and merely express disagreement. As explained in the Final Written Decision, Patent Owner does not direct us to binding authority sufficient to support its argument that in order for expert testimony to be admissible, the expert must be a person of ordinary skill in the art. Final Dec. 19. Specifically, Sundance is binding authority; however, Sundance does not support fully Patent Owner’s arguments. The court in Sundance held, in the context of the admissibility of a testimony by a technically unqualified patent attorney, “it was an abuse of discretion to permit a witness to testify as an expert on the issues of noninfringement or invalidity unless that witness is qualified as an expert in the pertinent art.” Sundance, 550 F.3d at 1363.” slip op. at 6

  Claim construction
  Patents in suitUS 6,771,970

Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.