- Cooler Master Co., Ltd. v. Aavid Thermalloy LLCRehearing deniedPTAB · Sep 17, 2020 · IPR2019-00338 · APJ Ken B Barrett · IPR · Rehearing
The Board denied Cooler Master’s rehearing request, leaving intact the determination that claim 8 was not shown obvious over Morikawa and Takahashi because the petition did not establish the claimed top shoulder.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied
“II. ANALYSIS A party requesting rehearing bears the burden of showing that the decision should be modified. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d). “The request must specifically identify all matters the party believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked, and the place where each matter was previously addressed in a motion, an opposition, or a reply.” Id.” slip op. at 2
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“that “Petitioner has not demonstrated that Morikawa discloses the recited [top shoulder limitation].” Final Dec. 45. In other words, our determination was that Petitioner had not met its burden of proving that a limitation was taught by the prior art, and therefore had not met its burden of proving that the challenged claim is unpatentable.” slip op. at 3
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for patent owner
“In the Final Decision, we stated: Petitioner’s implied construction is that the claimed “shoulder” is the top end of a column. This is inconsistent with the claim language which recites that the “hollow column . . . has a top shoulder disposed near a top end” thus indicating that the top shoulder is not merely the top end of the column but a structure “near” and discernable from the top end of the hollow column.” slip op. at 8
- Strike new argumentNew argument disregardedDecided for patent owner
“based on a misapprehension of the arguments associated with a figure . . . [from page 57] in the Petition,” and that “the Board incorrectly inferred Petitioner’s ‘implied construction’ for the term, ‘[a top] shoulder,’ in claim 8 of the ’680 patent as ‘the top end of a column.’” Req. Reh’g 1 (citing Final Dec. 45). Petitioner further argues that it “has always and consistently pointed to the corner portions located around the top outer rim of the hollow column as meeting the limitation of ‘a top shoulder,’ as shown [in the two figures from pages 56 and 57 of Petition and reproduced above].” Id. at 5–6.” slip op. at 8
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessPatents in suitUS 7,100,680 - L’Oréal USA, Inc. v. University Of MassachusettsRehearing deniedPTAB · Nov 16, 2018 · IPR2018-00779 · APJ David Cotta · IPR · Rehearing
The Board denied rehearing and affirmed denial of institution because Petitioner did not show that the Board abused its discretion in construing the adenosine concentration limitation.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied
“Accordingly, Petitioner has not persuaded us that we have misapprehended or overlooked any matters with respect to our decision to deny institution. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d). III. CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that Petitioner has not shown that the Board abused its discretion in denying institution of the challenged claims. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d). ORDER Accordingly, it is ORDERED that Petitioner’s Request for Rehearing is denied.” slip op. at 10
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“related grounds: that claims 1–7, and 9 are anticipated by JP ’1532; that claim 4 is obvious over JP ’153; and that claims 1–7 and 9 would have been obvious over the combination of JP ’153 and DE ’1073. Pet. 6–7. We declined to institute inter partes review. Dec.” slip op. at 3
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for patent owner
“adenosine may be topically applied to the epidermal layer of the skin, but also that adenosine so applied will penetrate the epidermis to reach the dermal layer. Dec. 9 (citing Ex. 1002, 5:20–23 (“For topical application, the penetration of the adenosine into skin tissue may be enhanced by a variety of methods known to those of ordinary skill in the art.”)). Topical application of adenosine will, therefore, result in adenosine being brought into contact with both the epidermis and the dermis. As also discussed in the Decision, the specification provides examples in which a concentration of adenosine within the range recited in the claims (10-4 M) is applied directly to dermal cells (fibroblasts), suggesting that the inventors considered it desirable for the dermal cells to receive the claimed concentration of adenosine. Id. In this context, the meaning of claim 1 is clear: adenosine is first topically applied to the epidermal layer of the skin and, only after it penetrates this outer skin layer, is a specific concentration (10-4 M to 10-7 M) of the adenosine “applied” to the dermal cells.” slip op. at 6
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Prosecution history disclaimer / disavowalDisclaimer not foundDecided for patent owner
“A prosecution history disclaimer must be clear and unambiguous. “[W]hile the prosecution history can inform whether the inventor limited the claim scope in the course of prosecution, it often produces ambiguities created by ongoing negotiations between the inventor and the PTO. Therefore, the doctrine of prosecution disclaimer only applies to unambiguous disavowals.” Grober v. Mako Prods., Inc., 686 F.3d 1335, 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (citing Abbott Labs. v. Sandoz, Inc., 566 F.3d 1282, 1289 (Fed. Cir. 2009)). A “heavy presumption” exists in favor of the ordinary meaning of claim language. Bell Atl. Network Servs., Inc. v. Covad Commc’ns Grp., Inc., 262 F.3d 1258, 1268 (Fed. Cir. 2001). To overcome this presumption, the patentee must “clearly set forth” and “clearly redefine” a claim term away from its ordinary meaning. Id. The disavowal must be “unmistakable” and “unambiguous.” Dealertrack, Inc. v. Huber, 674 F.3d 1315, 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2013). This standard is “exacting.” Thorner v. Sony Computer Entm’t Am. LLC, 669 F.3d 1362, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2012).” slip op. at 7
Claim constructioncites PhillipsPatents in suitUS 6,645,513 - L’Oréal USA, Inc. v. University Of MassachusettsRehearing deniedPTAB · Nov 16, 2018 · IPR2018-00778 · APJ David Cotta · IPR · Rehearing
The Board denied rehearing, leaving institution denied for claims 1–7 and 9 because Petitioner did not show an abuse of discretion in the claim construction underlying the denial.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied
“for an abuse of discretion. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(c). An abuse of discretion may be found if a decision is based on an erroneous interpretation of law, if a factual finding is not supported by substantial evidence, or if the decision represents an unreasonable judgment in weighing relevant factors. Star Fruits S.N.C. v. U.S., 393 F.3d 1277, 1281 (Fed. Cir. 2005); Arnold P’ship v. Dudas, 362 F.3d 1338, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2004); In re Gartside, 203 F.3d 1305, 1315–16 (Fed. Cir. 2000). The party requesting rehearing has the burden of showing the decision should be modified, which includes specifically identifying all matters the party believes we misapprehended or overlooked. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d).” slip op. at 2
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Prosecution history disclaimer / disavowalDisclaimer not foundDecided for patent owner
“A prosecution history disclaimer must be clear and unambiguous. “[W]hile the prosecution history can inform whether the inventor limited the claim scope in the course of prosecution, it often produces ambiguities created by ongoing negotiations between the inventor and the PTO. . . . Therefore, the doctrine of prosecution disclaimer only applies to unambiguous disavowals.” Grober v. Mako Prods., Inc., 686 F.3d 1335, 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (citing Abbott Labs. v. Sandoz, Inc., 566 F.3d 1282, 1289 (Fed. Cir. 2009)). A “heavy presumption” exists in favor of the ordinary meaning of claim language. Bell Atl. Network Servs., Inc. v. Covad Commc’ns Grp., Inc., 262 F.3d 1258, 1268 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). To overcome this presumption, the patentee must “clearly set forth” and “clearly redefine” a claim term away from its ordinary meaning. Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). The disavowal must be “unmistakable” and “unambiguous.” Dealertrack, Inc. v. Huber, 674 F.3d 1315, 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2013). This standard is “exacting.” Thorner v. Sony Computer Entm’t Am. LLC, 669 F.3d 1362, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2012).” slip op. at 7
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for patent owner
“As discussed in the Decision, the Specification discloses not only that adenosine may be topically applied to the epidermal layer of the skin, but also that adenosine so applied will penetrate the epidermis to reach the dermal layer. Dec. 10 (citing Ex. 1001, 5:13–14 (“For topical application, the penetration of the adenosine into skin tissue may be enhanced by a variety of methods known to those of ordinary skill in the art.”)). Topical application of adenosine will, therefore, result in adenosine being brought into contact with both the epidermis and the dermis. As also discussed in the Decision, the specification provides examples in which a concentration of adenosine matching the high end recited in the claims (10-4 M) is applied directly to dermal cells (fibroblasts), suggesting that the inventors considered it desirable for the dermal cells to receive the claimed concentration of adenosine. Id. In this context, the meaning of claim 1 is clear: adenosine is first topically applied to the epidermal layer of the skin and, only after it penetrates this outer skin layer, is a specific concentration (10-4 M to 10-7 M) of the adenosine “applied” to the dermal cells.” slip op. at 6
Claim constructioncites PhillipsPatents in suitUS 6,423,327 - Necksgen, Inc. v. Simpson Performance Products, Inc.Rehearing deniedPTAB · Jul 25, 2018 · IPR2018-00133 · APJ Bart A Gerstenblith · IPR · Rehearing
The Board denied rehearing, leaving in place its denial of institution because Petitioner did not show the asserted art taught claim 1[d] or establish motivation to combine with a reasonable expectation of success.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied
“II. STANDARD OF REVIEW When considering a request for rehearing, the Board reviews its decision for an abuse of discretion. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(c). An abuse of discretion may arise if the decision was based on an erroneous interpretation of law, if a factual finding is not supported by substantial evidence, or if an unreasonable judgment is made in weighing relevant factors. Star Fruits S.N.C. v. U.S., 393 F.3d 1277, 1281 (Fed. Cir. 2005); Arnold P’ship v. Dudas, 362 F.3d 1338, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2004). Additionally: “The burden of showing a decision should be modified lies with the party challenging the decision. The request must specifically identify all matters the party believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked, and the place where each matter was previously addressed in a motion, an opposition, or a reply. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d).” slip op. at 2
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Lexicography (patentee as own lexicographer)Term construed board ownDecided for patent owner
“the Preliminary Response. In our Decision, we determined that “[w]e do not need to construe expressly any claim terms for purposes of this Decision” because it did not appear, from the arguments presented, that any claim terms were in dispute. Dec. 6. When we considered the parties’ positions in reaching our Decision, we were aware that the term “tether” was defined in the ’529 patent, even though Petitioner did not state that expressly. In other words, we understood, and now explicitly determine, that the patentee acted as his own lexicographer by setting forth a specific definition for “tether” in the ’529 patent. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc) (if the specification “reveal[s] a special definition given to a claim term by the patentee that differs from the meaning it would otherwise possess[,] . . . the inventor’s lexicography governs”) (citing CCS Fitness, Inc. v. Brunswick Corp., 288 F.3d 1359, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2002)).” slip op. at 4
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot shown unpatentableMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentable
“Motivation to Combine & Reasonable Expectation of Success Petitioner contends that we abused our discretion by failing to consider the appropriate claim scope when evaluating motivation to combine and reasonable expectation of success. Req. Reh’g 10–14. First, as discussed above, we did not fail to consider the appropriate claim scope. Second, we have now set forth that claim scope expressly. In light of our discussion above, our analysis regarding motivation to combine and reasonable expectation of success is no different from that which we set forth in our Decision. Dec. 11–15. Petitioner’s reiteration of the same positions set forth in Petition does not persuade us that we abused our discretion in finding that Petitioner has not established a reasonable likelihood of demonstrating that one of ordinary skill in the art would have been promoted to modify and combine the teachings as proposed by Petitioner with a reasonable expectation of success. Accordingly, we are unpersuaded by Petitioner’s argument that we abused our discretion with respect to these issues.” slip op. at 8
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites PhillipsPatents in suitUS 9,351,529 - Icon Health & Fitness, Inc. v. Nautilus, Inc.Rehearing deniedPTAB · Oct 27, 2017 · IPR2017-00493 · APJ Bart A Gerstenblith · IPR · Rehearing
The Board denied rehearing, leaving in place its denial of institution because the Petition failed to identify corresponding structure and show the prior art disclosed the same or equivalent structures.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied
“II. STANDARD OF REVIEW Pursuant to 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(c), “[w]hen rehearing a decision on petition, a panel will review the decision for an abuse of discretion.” An abuse of discretion occurs when a “decision was based on an erroneous We did not undertake an analysis to determine whether the equivalent structure was shown in the prior art because Petitioner failed to do so in the first instance: “By not identifying a corresponding structure, material, or acts in the ’542 patent specification, Petitioner does not show where that structure, material, or acts or its equivalent is disclosed by Maresh-I.” Dec. 18 (citing 37 C.F.R. § 42.104(b)(4) (“The petition must specify where each element of the claim is found in the prior art . . . relied upon.”)). conclusion of law or clearly erroneous factual findings, or . . . a clear error of judgment.” PPG Indus., Inc. v. Celanese Polymer Specialties Co., 840 F.2d 1565, 1567 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (citations omitted). The request must identify, specifically, all matters the party believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked, and the place where each matter was addressed previously in a motion, opposition, or reply. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d).” slip op. at 3
- Claim Construction › Functional claiming / §112(f) means-plus-function › Whether §112(f) applies (Williamson, nonce words)§112(f) appliesDecided for patent owner
“In particular, we first construed “right means,” “left means,” “second end portion support,” “first support,” “second support,” “first member,” and “second member” as invoking § 112, ¶ 6, because none of the terms has a sufficiently definite meaning as a name for structure. Dec. 7–15. Second, with respect to independent claims 1, 46, 75, and 86, we found that Petitioner did not identify corresponding structure, material, or acts in the specification for performing each of the recited functions. See id. at 17–18 (discussing Maresh-I), 19–21 (discussing Stearns). With respect to independent claims 91, 94, 97, and 100, we found that even if we accepted Petitioner’s identification of the alleged corresponding structure, material, or acts, Petitioner’s analysis failed to show that the prior art structures were the same or equivalent. Id. at 18 (discussing Maresh-I), 20–21 (discussing Stearns). Rather, Petitioner’s analysis focused entirely on the functional language of these claim elements without identifying and addressing the corresponding structure. Id. at 18 (discussing Maresh-I), 20–21 (discussing Stearns).1” slip op. at 2
- BurdenNot shown unpatentable
“We disagree. Petitioner did not do either. First, Petitioner did not identify any portion of the specification describing corresponding structure in the Petition. Second, there is no mention of tracks or swing arms in the discussion of Maresh-I and Stearns at pages 14, 15, and 40 of the Petition, let alone any argument that the structures identified in either reference are equivalent. See Pet. 14, 15, 40. Accordingly, we did not misapprehend or overlook whether Petitioner complied with these requirements for means-plus-function claim terms; Petitioner did not. Petitioner’s Alleged Analysis and Evidence Regarding the Same or Equivalent Structures” slip op. at 7
Claim constructionPatents in suitUS 7,341,542 - Icon Health & Fitness, Inc. v. Nautilus, Inc.Rehearing deniedPTAB · Oct 27, 2017 · IPR2017-00494 · APJ Bart A Gerstenblith · IPR · Rehearing
The Board denied rehearing, leaving in place its denial of institution because the Petition did not explain how the prior-art structures were the same as or equivalent to the claimed structures.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied
“petition, a panel will review the decision for an abuse of discretion.” An abuse of discretion occurs when a “decision was based on an erroneous conclusion of law or clearly erroneous factual findings, or . . . a clear error of judgment.” PPG Indus., Inc. v. Celanese Polymer Specialties Co., 840 F.2d 1565, 1567 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (citations omitted). The request must identify, specifically, all matters the party believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked, and the place where each matter was addressed previously in a motion, opposition, or reply. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d).” slip op. at 3
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“focuses on the functional language of these claim limitations and fails to explain how the structures of Maresh-I and Stearns are the same as, or equivalent to, those identified in the ’219 patent. Dec. 15–16. For example, Petitioner’s discussion of Maresh-I equates the claimed “first means” and “second means” with Maresh-I’s “radially displaced pins of cranks 760,” but fails to make any argument explaining how these are the same or equivalent structures. See Pet. 13–14. Petitioner also points to paragraphs 37 and 90 of Mr. Ganaja’s declaration where he testifies that Maresh-I’s radially displaced pins are crank arms and that a connection between rollers 2023 and cranks 2020 is the crank arm in Stearns. Req. Reh’g 5–6 (discussing Ex. 1006 ¶ 37), 6 (discussing Ex. 1006 ¶ 90). There is no question that Mr. Ganaja’s testimony in these paragraphs addresses the issues that we found lacking in the Petition. The problem for Petitioner, however, is that the Petition itself did not include these arguments equating the structures as Mr. Ganaja did. Citing to these paragraphs of Mr. Ganaja’s declaration without providing any explanation of the significance thereof in the Petition itself is insufficient. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.6(3) (“Arguments must not be incorporated by reference from one document into another document.”). See also DeSilva v. DiLeonardi, 181 F.3d 865, 866–67 (7th Cir. 1999) (“A brief must make all arguments accessible to the judges, rather than ask them to play archaeologist with the record.”).” slip op. at 4
- BurdenDecided for patent owner
“focuses on the functional language of these claim limitations and fails to explain how the structures of Maresh-I and Stearns are the same as, or equivalent to, those identified in the ’219 patent. Dec. 15–16. For example, Petitioner’s discussion of Maresh-I equates the claimed “first means” and “second means” with Maresh-I’s “radially displaced pins of cranks 760,” but fails to make any argument explaining how these are the same or equivalent structures. See Pet. 13–14. Petitioner also points to paragraphs 37 and 90 of Mr. Ganaja’s declaration where he testifies that Maresh-I’s radially displaced pins are crank arms and that a connection between rollers 2023 and cranks 2020 is the crank arm in Stearns. Req. Reh’g 5–6 (discussing Ex. 1006 ¶ 37), 6 (discussing Ex. 1006 ¶ 90). There is no question that Mr. Ganaja’s testimony in these paragraphs addresses the issues that we found lacking in the Petition. The problem for Petitioner, however, is that the Petition itself did not include these arguments equating the structures as Mr. Ganaja did. Citing to these paragraphs of Mr. Ganaja’s declaration without providing any explanation of the significance thereof in the Petition itself is insufficient. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.6(3) (“Arguments must not be incorporated by reference from one document into another document.”). See also DeSilva v. DiLeonardi, 181 F.3d 865, 866–67 (7th Cir. 1999) (“A brief must make all arguments accessible to the judges, rather than ask them to play archaeologist with the record.”). Accordingly, we did not misapprehend or overlook discussion in the Petition regarding these structures.” slip op. at 4
- Claim Construction › Functional claiming / §112(f) means-plus-function › Whether §112(f) applies (Williamson, nonce words)§112(f) appliesDecided for petitioner
“In particular, we first construed “first means” and “second means” as invoking § 112, ¶ 6, as proposed by Petitioner and Patent Owner. Dec. 9. Second, we found that even if we accepted Petitioner’s identification of the alleged corresponding structure, material, or acts, Petitioner’s analysis failed to show that the prior art structures were the same or equivalent. Id. at 15– 16 (discussing Maresh-I and Stearns). Rather, Petitioner’s analysis focused entirely on the functional language of these claim elements without addressing the corresponding structure. Id.” slip op. at 2
Claim constructionPatents in suitUS 7,632,219 - Icon Health & Fitness, Inc. v. Nautilus, Inc.Rehearing deniedPTAB · Oct 27, 2017 · IPR2017-00490 · APJ Bart A Gerstenblith · IPR · Rehearing
The Board denied rehearing, finding no overlooked or misapprehended matter in its § 112, ¶ 6 construction and its determination that Petitioner’s prior-art analysis was deficient.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied
“II. STANDARD OF REVIEW Pursuant to 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(c), “[w]hen rehearing a decision on petition, a panel will review the decision for an abuse of discretion.” An abuse of discretion occurs when a “decision was based on an erroneous conclusion of law or clearly erroneous factual findings, or . . . a clear error of judgment.” PPG Indus., Inc. v. Celanese Polymer Specialties Co., 840 F.2d 1565, 1567 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (citations omitted). The request must identify, specifically, all matters the party believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked, and the place where each matter was addressed previously in a motion, opposition, or reply. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d).” slip op. at 3
- Claim Construction › Functional claiming / §112(f) means-plus-function › Whether §112(f) applies (Williamson, nonce words)§112(f) appliesDecided for patent owner
“In particular, we first construed “second portion support” as invoking § 112, ¶ 6, because it did not have a sufficiently definite meaning as a name for structure. Dec. 7–10. Second, we found that Petitioner did not identify corresponding structure, material, or acts in the specification for performing the recited function of guiding the second portions of the right and left foot engagement members to follow a forward-rearward reciprocating motion in response to the user moving the user’s feet with striding steps during the striding exercise as the right and left crank arms reciprocally lift and lower the first portions of the right and left foot engagement members. Id. at 11–12 (quoting Ex. 1001, 22:65–23:4). Third, we determined that Petitioner’s analysis was deficient because it did not identify where the same structure, material, or acts or their equivalents were found in the prior art.1 Id. at 12–13.” slip op. at 2
- BurdenNot shown unpatentable
“§ 112, ¶ 6, because it did not have a sufficiently definite meaning as a name for structure. Dec. 7–10. Second, we found that Petitioner did not identify corresponding structure, material, or acts in the specification for performing the recited function of guiding the second portions of the right and left foot engagement members to follow a forward-rearward reciprocating motion in response to the user moving the user’s feet with striding steps during the striding exercise as the right and left crank arms reciprocally lift and lower the first portions of the right and left foot engagement members. Id. at 11–12 (quoting Ex. 1001, 22:65–23:4). Third, we determined that Petitioner’s analysis was deficient because it did not identify where the same structure, material, or acts or their equivalents were found in the prior art.1 Id. at 12–13.” slip op. at 2
Claim constructionPatents in suitUS 6,689,019 - Arris International PLC / Pace Ltd. et al. v. Sony CorporationRehearing deniedPTAB · Jan 30, 2017 · IPR2016-00834 · APJ Charles J Boudreau · IPR · Rehearing
The Board denied Sony’s rehearing request, leaving institution in place because the “reproducing means” in claims 5 and 8 was not shown to be computer-implemented and need not include algorithmic structure.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied
“When rehearing a decision on petition, a panel will review the decision for an abuse of discretion.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(c). “The burden of showing a decision should be modified lies with the party challenging the decision[,]” which party “must specifically identify all matters the party 1 Section 4(c) of the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act (AIA), Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 4(c), 125 Stat. 284 (2011), re-designated 35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶ 6 as 35 U.S.C. § 112(f). Because the ’676 patent has a filing date before the September 16, 2012, effective date of the statute, we refer to the pre-AIA version of 35 U.S.C. § 112. believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked, and the place where each matter was previously addressed in a motion, an opposition, or a reply.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d). slip op. at 2
- Claim Construction › Functional claiming / §112(f) means-plus-function › Corresponding structure / algorithm (indefinite if none)Term construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner
“reproducing means for reproducing the audio data of the channel designated by the default value stored in the storing means,” as recited in claims 5 and 8 of the ’676 patent (the “reproducing means” limitations). Inst. Dec. 12–16. In particular, we agreed with the parties that the reproducing means limitations are written in means-plus-function format pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶ 6 and that the function of the reproducing means is “reproducing the audio data of the channel designated by the default value stored in the storing means.” Id. at 10, 12–13 (citing Pet. 16; Prelim. Resp. 4). We also agreed with Petitioner’s identification of “synthesizer 11” and “controller 13” as being the corresponding structure disclosed in the specification for the reproducing means limitations. Id. at 12–13, 16. We disagreed, however, with Patent Owner’s assertion that the structure of the reproducing means must further include an algorithm disclosed in the specification, as would be required for a computer-implemented means-plus-function limitation. Id. at 13–14 (citing Prelim. Resp. 1, 2, 8). We concluded, therefore, that the reproducing means limitations are, accordingly, properly construed under 35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶ 6 to cover “a controller and a synthesizer, or the equivalent.” ANALYSIS In the Institution Decision, we determined that the ’676 patent discloses a controller and a synthesizer, neither of which is disclosed in the ’676 patent as being computer-implemented, as structure corresponding to the “reproducing means” recited in claims 5 and 8. Inst. Dec. 14–15. As we explained, “synthesizer 11 and controller 13 both are shown and described in the ’676 patent as discrete hardware elements that interface with other hardware elements of the described information reproducing devices.” Id. at 14. We determined, accordingly, that the reproducing means recited in claims 5 and 8 is not a “computer-implemented” means-plus-function term subject to “the legal rule that computer-implemented means-plus-function terms must be construed to include the corresponding algorithmic structure disclosed in the specification.” Id.; cf. Reh’g Req. 2. Contrary to Patent Owner’s contentions (Reh’g Req. 1–2), we did not determine in the Institution Decision that “unless a claim recites the terms ‘computer’ or ‘microprocessor,’ it is not computer-implemented”; that “the claimed controller is not a computer based solely on a word matching exercise”; or that the Board “is free to disregard the law on how computer-implemented means-plus-function terms are to be construed.” Patent Owner’s arguments in its Request for Rehearing do not persuade us of any error in our Institution Decision. slip op. at 3
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“Because, on this record, we conclude that the reproducing means limitations of claims 5 and 8 are not properly construed to include “algorithmic structure,” we also disagree with Patent Owner’s further argument that “[b]ecause Petitioners failed to consider the algorithmic structure corresponding to the ‘reproducing means’ and thus failed to compare the ‘reproducing means’ as properly construed to the prior art for structural equivalency, the Board should have denied institution as to all claims with that term.” Id. at 10. We accordingly deny Patent Owner’s Request for Rehearing. Additionally, the Chief Administrative Patent Judge declines” slip op. at 8
Claim constructionPatents in suitUS 6,097,676
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.