- PTAB · Sep 10, 2025 · IPR2025-00141 · APJ Ken B Barrett · IPR · Remand
The Board instituted IPR of claims 1–21 on all asserted grounds after finding a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on the Nishida-based challenges.
RulingsRemand decision- Director reviewDirector review, grantedGranted
“partes review of U.S. Patent No. 8,266,749 B2 (“the ’749 patent,” Ex. 1001). Paper 1 (“Pet.”). The Petition challenges the patentability of claims 1–21 of the ’749 patent. Nike, Inc. (“Patent Owner”)2 filed a Preliminary Response to the Petition. Paper 6 (“Prelim. Resp.”). With our authorization, Petitioner filed a Reply to Patent Owner’s Preliminary Response (Paper 10) and Patent Owner filed a Sur-reply (Paper 13). We discretionarily denied institution under 35 U.S.C. § 325(d). Paper 20. Petitioner filed a request for Director Review of the Decision denying institution. Paper 21. Director Review was granted, the Decision denying institution of inter partes review was vacated, and the case was remanded to the Board. Id. at 4. Specifically, the case was “remanded to the Board with instructions to consider Petitioner’s Nishida grounds and to determine whether the Petition should be instituted.” Id. at 3–4.” slip op. at 2
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“presented in the Petition and the Preliminary Response “shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). Having considered the arguments and evidence presented by Petitioner and Patent Owner, we determine that Petitioner has demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on at least one of the challenged claims of the ’749” slip op. at 2
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedPatent owner expert discountedDecided for petitioner
“In support of Petitioner’s position, Dr. Adanur testifies that “Nishida discloses that the unfinished surface area 1.1 is part of the web 1 itself,” that Nishida discloses that the computer-controlled process can (using Nishida’s phrase) “put in” up to seven different textile fibers or yarns into the web of material in one operation, and that, “[t]hus, Nishida discloses simultaneously knitting its layouts 2 and tongue 40 (each a ‘textile element’) with the unfinished surface area 1.1 (a ‘surrounding textile structure’).” Ex. 1002 ¶ 216 (citing Ex. 1022, 2:12–20, 4:47–55, 5:45–49). For purposes of institution, we credit that testimony over the testimony of Dr. Pastore, because, on the current record, we regard Dr. Adanur’s testimony as more consistent with the evidence. This and the other related issues may be explored more fully during the trial.” slip op. at 23
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner contends that: A person of ordinary skill in the art (“POSITA”) in the field of the ’749 patent in March 2004 would have been someone with at least a few years of experience in knit materials and knitting methods and machines that can be used in making footwear, or a bachelor’s degree in textile-related sciences, engineering, or industrial product design, or equivalent academic or work experience, including in the footwear industry. EX1002, ¶68. Such a person of ordinary skill would have at least a general understanding of general construction processes and materials used in the manufacturing process of fabric-based articles. For individuals with a lower educational level, a person could still be of ordinary skill in the art provided that person’s working experience compensates for any such lower educational level, or vice versa. See id. Pet. 23–24. Patent Owner states that, “[f]or purposes of this Preliminary Response, Nike applies Skechers’ definition for a person of ordinary skill in the art.” Prelim. Resp. 14. Petitioner’s definition is consistent with the level of ordinary skill reflected in the prior art references of record. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (recognizing that the prior art itself may reflect an appropriate level of skill in the art). For purposes of this decision, we apply Petitioner’s definition of the person of ordinary skill in the art.” slip op. at 10
Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 8,266,749 - Innoscience (Zhuhai) Technology Company, Ltd / Innoscience America, Inc. v. Efficient Power Conversion CorporationAll claims unpatentablePTAB · Mar 18, 2025 · IPR2023-01381 · APJ Jon B Tornquist · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–3 and 7–9 are unpatentable as obvious over Uemoto and Smith; the motion to amend is granted, and proposed substitute claims 13 and 14 are not shown unpatentable.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“In order to determine whether an invention would have been obvious at the time the application was filed, we consider the level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art. Graham, 383 U.S. at 17. In assessing the level of ordinary skill in the art, various factors may be considered, including the “type of problems encountered in the art; prior art solutions to those problems; rapidity with which innovations are made; sophistication of the technology; and educational level of active workers in the field.” In re GPAC, Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (quotation omitted). Petitioner contends a person of ordinary skill in the art “would have possessed at least a four-year degree in electrical engineering, chemical engineering, physics, or material science, or a closely related field, and at least two years of experience in semiconductor device design or fabrication, including the processing of semiconductor materials, analysis of device operation, or the development of new device topologies.” Pet. 5–6. Petitioner contends “[a]dditional education could substitute for professional experience and vice versa.” Id. at 6. Patent Owner contends that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had “at least a four-year degree in electrical engineering, physics, material science, or a closely related field, and three years of professional work experience in the epitaxial growth, design, and fabrication of semiconductor electronic devices, including those of GaN.” PO Resp. 7 (citing Ex. 2009 ¶ 82). Upon review of the evidence of record and the parties’ arguments, we adopt Petitioner’s definition of the person of ordinary skill in the art as it is consistent with the prior art of record. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (holding that the prior art itself can reflect the appropriate level of ordinary skill in the art). We note, however, that the conclusions reached in this Decision would be the same under either proposed definition of the ordinarily skilled artisan. See Ex. 2009 ¶ 83 (Dr. Schubert testifying that his opinions would be the same under either proposed definition); Ex. 1033 ¶ 9 (Dr. Shealy testifying that the differences in proposed definitions of the ordinarily skilled artisan “would not change the outcome of the invalidity analysis in any material manner”); PO Resp. 7; Pet. Reply 1.” slip op. at 9
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for patent owner
“compensated GaN layer above the barrier layer, and a gate contact above the compensated GaN layer.” Ex. 1001, 5:12–18. Petitioner contends the term “compensated” indicates that the step of compensating the GaN layer has already occurred, such that the term “compensated GaN layer” should be construed as a “‘[d]oped GaN layer formed with a step to passivate its impurities’ which is a ‘product-by-process’ limitation.”5 Pet. 12–14. And, because compensation with hydrogen was the “critical step” distinguishing the claims from the prior art, and because hydrogenation in as-grown III-nitride materials had been well known for over a decade by 2009, Petitioner contends “compensated” “cannot be interpreted as mere hydrogen presence in as-grown material, a well-known property of doped GaN.” Id. at 15. Patent Owner contends “compensated GaN material” should be construed as “a semiconductor GaN gate material in which one type of impurity (for example, donor) cancels the electrical effects of the other type of impurity (for example, acceptor).” PO Resp. 11 (citing Ex. 2009 ¶ 92) (emphasis added). Patent Owner contends this construction is consistent with the IEEE dictionary, which defines “compensated semiconductor” as 5 Given that product-by-process steps in a device claim are not entitled to patentable weight, Petitioner contends “the prior art only need show a material with passivated impurities to show unpatentability, not the step to achieve it.” Pet. 15–16. “[a] semiconductor in which one type of impurity or imperfection (for example, donor) partially cancels the electric effects of the other type of impurity or imperfection (for example, acceptor).” PO Resp. 14 (quoting Ex. 2004). Patent Owner contends its construction is also consistent with the written description of the ’294 patent, which explains that a compensated GaN material is part of the gate and includes a p-type impurity that imparts an electrical effect (i.e., conductivity), as well as a second impurity, e.g., hydrogen, that partially cancels the electrical effect of the p-type impurity, rendering the layer semi-insulating. Id. at 14–15 (citing Ex. 1001, 3:10–13, 3:43–45). On this record, we construe “compensated GaN layer” as “a GaN layer in which one type of impurity (for example, donor) partially cancels the electric effects of the other type of impurity (for example, acceptor).” This is consistent with the disclosures of the ’294 patent, the IEEE dictionary definition, and the construction ultimately adopted by the ITC. Ex. 2004, 3; Ex. 1049, 16–17 (ITC construing “compensated GaN layer” to mean “a GaN layer in which one type of impurity partially cancels the electrical effects of another type of impurity”); Ex. 1001, 3:43–45 (explaining that the compensated GaN layer of the ’294 patent is formed through the “passivation of a p-type impurity using hydrogen”). For the reasons set forth below, however, we decline to construe “compensated GaN layer” as a product-by-process claim term (as asserted by Petitioner), or to limit the compensated GaN layer to a gate material (as asserted by Patent Owner).” slip op. at 11
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Specification disavowal / 'present invention' languageDisclaimer not foundDecided for petitioner
“There are two exceptions to the general rule that we apply the ordinary and customary meaning of a claim term: (1) when a patentee sets out a definition and acts as his own lexicographer, or (2) when the patentee disavows the full scope of a claim term either in the specification or during prosecution. See Thorner, 669 F.3d at 1365. The standards for lexicography and disclaimer, however, are “exacting.” Id. at 1366. There is no argument that the patentees acted as their own lexicographer to redefine the term “compensated GaN layer.” With respect to disavowal, a “patentee may demonstrate intent to deviate from the ordinary and accustomed meaning of a claim term by including in the specification expressions of manifest exclusion or restriction, representing a clear disavowal of claim scope.” Thorner, 669 F.3d at 1366 (quoting Teleflex, Inc. v. Ficosa N. Am. Corp., 299 F.3d 1313, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2002)). As noted by Patent Owner, the title of the ’294 patent is, in part, “Compensated Gate MISFET” and much of the discussion of the ’294 patent is of a compensated GaN layer that is directly below the gate contact and above a barrier layer and operates in conjunction with the gate contact to control the on/off state of the transistor. PO Resp. 12–14. We are presented with insufficient argument or evidence to conclude, however, that these disclosures rise to the level of a disclaimer. For example, although the title of the ’294 patent is directed to a “Compensated Gate MISFET,” claim 1 is more broadly directed to “[a] column III Nitride transistor.” Ex. 1001, 5:12, code (54). Nor are we directed to an expression or statement of manifest exclusion in the ’294 patent that would serve to disclaim any “compensated GaN layer” that is not directly below the gate and/or that does not function in concert with the gate electrode to control the on/off state of the transistor. See Thorner, 669 F.3d at 1366. With respect to the stated goals of the invention, as noted by Patent Owner, one of the primary purposes of the compensated GaN layer of the ’294 patent is to reduce gate leakage and gate capacitance. Ex. 1001, 2:13– 19, 3:18–21 (“[U]sing a compensated semiconductor layer 38 leads to low gate leakage during device operation.”). We cannot use the goals of the invention, however, to rewrite the claims or insert terms that are not present. See Thorner, 669 F.3d at 1366. Moreover, the prior art of record indicates that a compensated GaN layer that is below the gate contact and above a barrier layer, but not part of the active gate structure, may also “decrease the leakage current between the gate and the drain.” Ex. 1006 ¶¶ 44 (“Even when a positive bias of 5 V or higher is applied to the gate electrode, no significant gate-leakage current is observed.”), 61. As such, evidence of record suggests that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have understood that one of the primary goals disclosed in the ’294 patent is achieved regardless of whether the compensated GaN layer is part of the gate, or simply in close vicinity to the gate. In view of the foregoing, we are not persuaded that the written description of the ’294 patent indicates that the “compensated GaN layer” must be part of the gate structure.” slip op. at 17
- Obviousness (§103) › Objective indicia / secondary considerations › NexusObjective indicia no nexusDecided for petitioner
“To be probative, Patent Owner must prove there is a nexus between the presented evidence and the merits of the claimed invention. See Demaco Corp. v. F. Von Langsdorff Licensing Ltd., 851 F.2d 1387, 1392 (Fed. Cir. 1988). A rebuttable presumption of nexus applies when the “patentee shows that the asserted evidence is tied to a specific product and that the product ‘is the invention disclosed and claimed.’” Fox Factory, Inc. v. SRAM, LLC, 944 F.3d 1366, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (quoting Demaco, 851 F.2d at 1392). “That is, presuming nexus is appropriate ‘when the patentee shows that the asserted objective evidence is tied to a specific product and that product embodies the claimed features, and is coextensive with them.’” Id. (quoting Polaris Indus., Inc. v. Arctic Cat, Inc., 882 F.3d 1056, 1072 (Fed. Cir. 2018)). If the praise is not limited to the features of the claimed invention, the patent owner may still prove nexus “by showing that the evidence of secondary considerations is the ‘direct result of the unique characteristics of the claimed invention.’” Id. at 1373–74 (quoting In re Huang, 100 F.3d 135, 140 (Fed. Cir. 1996)). Patent Owner contends that the compensated gate of the ’294 patent “was a breakthrough invention and resulted in the first commercially viable enhancement-mode GaN transistor.” PO Resp. 60 (citing Ex. 2009 ¶¶ 192– 193, 197; Ex. 2021). Patent Owner further contends that this achievement required the counter-intuitive use of a compensated gate material in the gate structure, and represented “a technological leap that laid the foundation for viable enhancement-mode GaN transistors.” Id. at 61–62. For this achievement, Patent Owner contends the inventor, Dr. Alex Lidow, received the 2015 SEMI Award. Id. at 60 (citing Ex. 2021). Upon review of Patent Owner’s evidence and the parties’ arguments, we find that Patent Owner’s objective indicia evidence is entitled to little, if any, weight. The evidence of praise relied upon by Patent Owner is not clearly linked to the claimed invention or any particular product having each of the claimed features of the ’294 patent. Ex. 2021. For example, the 2015 SEMI award was provided to Dr. Lidow “for commercialization of GaN power devices.” Id. An article explaining the award indicates that “high cost” previously “limited [the] commercial success” of GaN technologies, but Dr. Lidow was able to overcome these issues, “from resolving packaging limitations to establishing a low-cost supply chain,” “through persistence.” Id. This praise is not demonstrably linked to the claimed invention or any particular device, and does not mention the use of a compensated gate, or any other relevant feature recited in the claims. In view of the foregoing, we determine that Patent Owner’s objective evidence of non-obviousness is entitled to little, if any, weight.” slip op. at 20
Patent outcomesUS 8,350,294 unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosurecites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 8,350,294 - Apple Inc. v. RJ Technology, LLCInstitutedPTAB · Aug 20, 2024 · IPR2024-00597 · APJ Jon B Tornquist · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted review of claims 1–18 on all asserted grounds and granted Apple’s motion to join IPR2023-01183.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“An inter partes review may not be instituted “unless . . . the information presented in the petition . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) (2018). Having considered the arguments and evidence presented by Petitioner, we determine that Petitioner has demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on at least one of the challenged claims of the ’641 patent. Accordingly, we institute an inter partes review as to all the challenged claims of the ’641 patent on all the grounds of unpatentability set forth in the Petition. And, for the reasons set forth below, we grant Petitioner’s Motion for Joinder.” slip op. at 2
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Joinder §315(c) / SAS all-or-nothingJoinder, grantedGranted
“In considering a motion for joinder, and whether such joinder is appropriate, the Board may consider “whether a new ground of unpatentability is raised in the second petition, how the cost and schedule of the first proceeding will be impacted if joinder is granted, and whether granting joinder will add to the complexity of briefing and/or discovery.” Patent Trial and Appeal Board Consolidated Trial Practice Guide November 20197 at 76 (citing Kyocera Corp. v. SoftView LLC, IPR2013-00004, Paper 15 at 4 (PTAB Apr. 24, 2013)).” slip op. at 9
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner contends that a person of ordinary skill in the art “would have had a Master’s degree in material science, chemical engineering, chemistry, or similar field with four years experience designing testing, and building secondary lithium batteries.” Pet. 11 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶ 51). Petitioner further contends that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have been aware of “(1) positive electrode materials, (2) negative electrode materials, (3) separators, (4) electrolytes, (5) charge-discharge parameters, and (6) protection circuits, as well as ‘battery failure modes’ such as plating and the formation of dendrites.” Id. at 11–12 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 50–51). Upon review of the prior art of record and the Petitioner’s arguments, we adopt Petitioner’s uncontested definition of the person of ordinary skill in the art for purposes of this Decision as it appears consistent with the ’641 patent and the prior art of record.” slip op. at 7
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“Petitioner provides constructions for the terms “A method for improving . . . characterized in that,” “ratio of positive electrode material to negative electrode material as calculated by a theoretic capacity with a charge cut-off voltage set at 4.2 V” (claim 5), “as calculated by a specific capacity with a charge voltage limited to 4.2 V” (claim 1), and “at least 7500 of capacity” (claim 11). Pet. 8–11. For purposes of this decision, we determine that no claim terms require express construction. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (“[O]nly those terms need be construed that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.”)).” slip op. at 8
Claim constructioncites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 7,749,641 - Peag LLC (D/B/A Jlab Audio) / Audio Partnership LLC et al. v. Varta Microbattery GmbHAll claims unpatentablePTAB · Jan 5, 2022 · IPR2020-01214 · APJ Avelyn M Ross · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–8 are unpatentable as obvious over Kobayashi and skilled-artisan knowledge; the contingent motion to amend is granted for substitute claims 9–16.
RulingsFinal written decision- ExcludeNew argument disregardedNew argument consideredGranted in part
“regarding (1) the motivation to combine Kaun with Kobayashi based on dendrite formation (id. at 2–4), (2) additional motivations to modify Kaun with Kobayashi (id. at 4–6), (3) a reasonable expectation of success relating to Kaun’s central fastener (id. at 6–7), and (4) a reasonable expectation of success regarding Kobayashi’s modified electrode assembly (id. at 7–9). Because we do not reach Petitioner’s challenge based on the combination of Kaun and Kobayashi, as discussed below, we similarly need not reach Patent Owner’s Motion to Exclude Mr. Gardner’s opinions as they relate to the Kaun/Kobayashi combination. Accordingly, we dismiss Patent Owner’s Motion to Exclude these purportedly new opinions as moot. We address Patent Owner’s remaining concerns, relating to Mr. Gardner’s allegedly new testimony regarding Kobayashi, below.” slip op. at 8
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“In the Decision on Institution, we determined that a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention of the ’913 patent would have had at least a bachelor’s degree in mechanical engineering, or a similar field, such as materials engineering, chemical engineering, or physics with at least five years of experience in the field of battery design and manufacturing. A person with a master’s degree in one of the above fields could have less practical experience of approximately three years. A person with a PhD could have less practical experience, about two years. A person with less education but more relevant practical experience may also meet this standard. DI 20–21 (adopting Petitioner’s proposed definition). For purposes of this Final Written Decision, we maintain our determination from the Decision on Institution because neither party asserts that our decision depends on that determination and because the level of skill is consistent with the record. See PO Resp. 8 (stating that “[t]he claims are patentable regardless of which definition is used.”); see generally Pet. Reply; MTA Opp. 1–2 (“Regardless of which definition is used, however, Patent Owner’s Substitute Claims are still not patentable.”).” slip op. at 12
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction needed
“In their briefing, the parties dispute the meaning of three claim terms or phrases—(1) “insulating means”, (2) “connected to one another by at least one flat separator,” and (3) “button cell.” See Pet. 17–21; PO Resp. 9–12. We discern no material difference between the parties’ respective constructions. Additionally, Patent Owner, during the hearing, expressed a general view that claim construction was unlikely to affect the parties’ positions.6 In particular, Patent Owner states that “[o]ur position is that really nothing turns on claim construction. You don’t have to engage in claim construction in this case.” Tr. 56:18–20, 56:21–24 (explaining that 6 The parties disagree as to what the newly added phrase “the cup casing include[ing] a first part proximal to the flat bottom area and a second part disposed in the overlapping area, the first part of the casing being disposed radially inward with respect to the second part” means. See generally MTA Opp.; MTA Reply; MTA Sur-reply. Neither party proposes an express construction for this phrase. Id. We address the interpretation of this phrase below and only to the extent necessary to resolve the dispute raised by the parties’ substantive arguments. limitations were submitted for construction “to gain some benefit in the co-pending litigations.”). Only terms that are in controversy need to be construed, and then only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy. Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (applying Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999) in the context of an inter partes review). Because the outcome of our decision does not depend on either parties’ claim construction position, we determine that none of the identified claim terms require construction to resolve the issues in dispute in this proceeding.” slip op. at 13
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundDecided for petitioner
“On this issue, we agree with Petitioner. Mr. Gardner explains that the skilled artisan “would further recognize that the output conductor can be comprised of various materials . . . . which could be metal or various materials . . . . [and] the shape of the output conductor is not particularly limited.” Ex. 1003 ¶ 322. Mr. Gardner further testifies that a person of ordinary skill in the art “would recognize, not only that metal foil conductors could be inserted into these grooves without difficulty, but also that the depth of the grooves can be altered in order to better accommodate metal foil output conductors.” Ex. 1041 ¶¶ 53, 70. We recognize Patent Owner’s argument that numerous factors must be considered and that conventional battery design does not necessarily translate to button cell designs (PO Resp 25–26), but as Mr. Gardner testifies, “this may be true in some cases, [but] the lessons and advantages of using techniques from conventional battery design and applying it to button cell would be obvious to a [person of ordinary skill in the art].” Ex. 1041 ¶ 103. He continues to explain that “[n]aturally, such transposition of techniques would require some modification and adjustments. . . . [and that] each of these adjustments, . . . would be well within the skill of a [person of ordinary skill in the art].” Id. ¶ 104 (describing, for example, “reducing the thickness of the conductor plates of Kobayashi”). We credit Mr. Gardner’s testimony. Moreover, Patent Owner does not allege that any proposed modification would be beyond the skill of a person of ordinary skill in the art or explain how any of the “constraints unique to . . . button cell design” (PO Resp. 25) are relevant to the proposed substitution of a metal foil for a metal terminal electrode plate. See generally id.; Sur-reply. Finally, Patent Owner argues that “[r]eliance upon the general knowledge of a [person of ordinary skill in the art] to provide a missing element in a combination of references is an exception rather than the rule” and “is particularly true where the proposed modification goes to the essence of the claims.” PO Resp. 26. Patent Owner states that “Petitioners have provided no more than ‘conclusory statements and unspecified expert testimony’ to supply a metal foil that is admittedly missing from Kobayashi, and is not shown in any other button cell art.” Id. at 27. We disagree. As the Federal Circuit has explained ‘common sense and common knowledge have their proper place in the obviousness inquiry,’ (a) invoking ‘common sense . . . to supply a limitation that was admittedly missing from the prior art’ should generally only be done when the [missing] limitation in question [is] unusually simple and the technology particularly straightforward;’ and (b) references to common sense ‘cannot be used as a wholesale substitute for reasoned analysis and evidentiary support’ Koninklijke Philips N.V. v. Google LLC, 948 F.3d 1330, 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2020)(quoting Arendi S.A.R.L v. Apple Inc., 832 F.3d 1355, 1361–1362 (Fed. Cir. 2013)). Here, Petitioner proposes to substitute a metal foil for a metal terminal electrode plate to provide contact with the inner surface of the button cell housing. Ex. 1006 ¶ 34. As detailed above, Petitioner and Mr. Gardner direct our attention to the prior art of record which suggests use of foil within small battery cells to provide electrical contact was well-known and explains why the skilled artisan would have reduced the thickness of the terminal electrode plate to maximize the available space for active electrode components. Accordingly, unlike the expert in Arendi, Petitioner here provides more than “conclusory statements and unspecific expert testimony.” Arendi, 832 F.3d at 1366.” slip op. at 22
Patent outcomesUS 9,799,913 unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 9,799,913 - Peag LLC (D/B/A Jlab Audio) / Audio Partnership LLC et al. v. Varta Microbattery GmbHAll claims unpatentablePTAB · Jan 5, 2022 · IPR2020-01212 · APJ Avelyn M Ross · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–12 are unpatentable as obvious over Kobayashi and Kaun; the contingent motion to amend is granted for substitute claims 14–25.
RulingsFinal written decision- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedDecided for petitioner
“that “Kaun discloses that the cell is sealed ‘by a ‘U’ shaped insulator/gasket 32 . . . to seal the cell without pressure-loading,’” and therefore, venting via a pressure release seal is not required. Pet. 64 (citing Ex. 1005 ¶ 120). In an alternate embodiment, Kaun provides a means to relieve gas pressure “via the peripheral gasket which can reseal after an event.” Ex. 1005 ¶ 91. As Petitioner explains, “Kaun discloses that it is sealed, but upon the application of certain conditions, the internal pressure of gases within the cell can cause gases to vent. During such events, Kaun discloses ‘[t]he specified limit for internal pressure is handled by release via the peripheral gasket which can reseal after an event.’” Pet. Reply 13 (citing Ex. 1041 ¶¶ 37–39; Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 91, 101). Thus, while Kaun discloses venting to prevent pressure build up, Kaun “is otherwise sealed at all times during functioning.” Id. (citing Ex. 1041 ¶¶ 38–39; Ex. 1005 ¶ 101). Neither the ’835 patent nor Patent Owner’s own proposed construction of “closed without being beaded over” requires closure at all times. Furthermore, Mr. Gardner testifies that “[i]f a battery which, upon application of significant internal pressure, would be considered not ‘closed’ at other times, th[e]n almost no battery could be considered closed. [Because] [a]ny battery, when subjected to certain pressures, would leak or burst.” Ex. 1041 ¶ 39. We credit Mr. Gardner’s undisputed testimony in this regard. Mr. Gardner reasons that a person of ordinary skill in the art would understand that Kaun is closed.” Id. Dr. Peckerar similarly testifies that Kaun shows a housing that is closed without being beaded over. Ex. 1034, 131:4–11; 237:19–238:22 (describing Kaun as “closed during normal operation”). Accordingly, the record evidence supports Petitioner’s assertion that the combination of Kobayashi and Kaun suggests a button cell that is closed without being beaded over.” slip op. at 28
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“We discern no material difference between the parties’ respective constructions. Additionally, Patent Owner, during the hearing, expressed a general view that claim construction was unlikely to affect the parties’ positions.8 In particular, Patent Owner states that “[o]ur position is that really nothing turns on claim construction. You don’t have to engage in 8 The parties disagree as to what the newly added phrase “the cup casing include[ing] a first part proximal to the flat bottom area and a second part disposed in the overlapping area, the first part of the casing being disposed radially inward with respect to the second part” means. See generally MTA Opp.; MTA Reply; MTA Sur-reply. Neither party proposes an express construction for this phrase. Id. We address the interpretation of this phrase below and only to the extent necessary to resolve the dispute raised by the parties’ substantive arguments. claim construction in this case.” Tr. 56:18–20, 56:20–24 (explaining that limitations were submitted for construction “to gain some benefit in the co-pending litigations.”). Only terms that are in controversy need to be construed, and then only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy. Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (applying Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999) in the context of an inter partes review). Because the outcome of our decision does not depend on either parties’ claim construction position, we determine that none of the identified claim terms require construction to resolve the issues in dispute in this proceeding.” slip op. at 16
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundUnpatentable
- Obviousness (§103) › Objective indicia / secondary considerations › NexusObjective indicia no nexusDecided for petitioner
“Thus, Patent Owner identifies three claimed features—i.e., the jelly- roll configuration, the insulating layer, and a housing closed without being beaded over—as responsible for the improved performance of the VARTA CoinPower® button cell batteries. Id. However, Patent Owner’s declarants testify further and explain that it is the combination of the three identified features, in addition to a flat foil conductor resting flat between the electrode top and housing and welding the foil conductor from outside the housing, that are responsible for improved performance. In particular, Mr. Miehlich, employed in VARTA’s marketing and sales department, testifies that the new cell design, which “provided unprecedented increases in performance, including in energy density, charge capacity, and cycling stability,” consisted of a “jelly roll electrode coil packed tightly into an uncrimped, button-like housing. The electrode coil was protected against short-circuiting by [an] insulating means, and was connected to the cell terminals by a flexible flat foil conductors resting flat between the electrode top and housing, and welded to the housing components from the outside. These features are all found in the claims of the VARTA patents here under review. Ex. 2045 ¶¶ 15–16. And, Dr. Lindner, one of the named inventors of the ’835 patent, testifies that the complex issues we faced were how to safely pack the required amount of electrode material into the very small “button”-sized housing and protect it against short circuits; how to connect the “jelly roll” electrode to the terminals in such a confined space without itself consuming much volume, and how to seal the top and bottom of the cell housing, all while accommodating the expansion and contraction of the electrode winding and the resulting mechanical forces. Ex. 2046 ¶ 33. According to Dr. Linder, the jelly-roll configuration with an insulator, flexible foil output conductors, sealing the cell without crimping, and welding the foil conductors from outside the housing each contributed to the improved battery performance. Id. ¶¶ 34–43. Thus, it is the combination of five elements—not the three claimed in the ’835 patent—that are purportedly responsible for the “vastly increased performance characteristics” of the CoinPower® products. Id. ¶ 43; see also id. ¶ 45 (noting that “various aspects of our invention are covered by 10 issued patents, including the four United States patents here under review” (emphasis added)); Tr. 84:24–85:10 (explaining that welding, for example, is “also part of the success”). Like the patent owner in Fox Factory, “[i]n light of the patentee’s own assertions about the significance of the unclaimed features, no reasonable fact finder could conclude that these features are insignificant.” Fox Factory, 944 F.3d 1375. As a result, the patent claims are not coextensive with the CoinPower® products because those products include “‘critical’ unclaimed feature[s] that [are] claimed by a different patent and materially impacts the product’s functionality.” Id.” slip op. at 40
Patent outcomesUS 9,153,835 unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 9,153,835 - Cxloyalty, Inc. v. Maritz Holdings Inc.All claims unpatentablePTAB · Dec 19, 2019 · CBM2018-00037 · APJ Justin T Arbes · CBM · Final written decision
Claims 1–15 are unpatentable under § 101; the motion to amend is granted for proposed substitute claims 16–23, which were not shown unpatentable.
RulingsFinal written decision- Patent Eligibility (§101) › Alice/Mayo step one — 'directed to'Step1 directed to exceptionUnpatentable
“does not remove the claim from the realm of abstract ideas. See Pet. 52–53; Reply 12; SAP Am., Inc. v. InvestPic, LLC, 898 F.3d 1161, 1168 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (holding that it “does not matter to [the conclusion that the claim is directed to an abstract idea] whether the information here is information about real investments,” as “even if a process of collecting and analyzing information is ‘limited to particular content’ or a particular ‘source,’ that limitation does not make the collection and analysis other than abstract” (citation omitted)). Further, the last two clauses of claim 1 that recite how the transaction is viewed from the perspectives of the participant and vendor system, respectively, merely express the “non-physical result” of the information transfers and confirm the abstract nature of the claimed subject matter. See Pet. 57. In fact, as to the vendor system clause, the Specification indicates that the vendor system transfers information no differently than it would for any other transaction. See Ex. 1001, col. 7, ll. 15–18 (disclosing that vendor system 208 responds to purchase request 216 “in the same way that it would respond to any other purchase request from a consumer that presents a credit card”).” slip op. at 35
- Patent Eligibility (§101) › Alice/Mayo step two — inventive conceptStep2 no inventive conceptUnpatentable
“Our conclusion also is supported by the ’087 patent’s description of” slip op. at 41
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Motions to amend / substitute claimsMotion to amend, grantedGranted
“transaction, . . . display[ing] an order message indicating the completion of the purchase transaction to the respective participant.” Mot., App’x A, 4. An example in which a judicial exception is not integrated into a practical application is when “an additional element adds insignificant extra-solution activity to the judicial exception.” Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 55; Flook, 437 U.S. at 590 (holding that a step of adjusting an alarm limit variable was “post-solution activity”). Displaying an order message after the facilitated transaction has been completed amounts to insignificant post-solution activity, and does not support a conclusion that the abstract idea of claim 16 is integrated into a practical application.” slip op. at 75
- 101 substituteMixed
“transaction, . . . display[ing] an order message indicating the completion of the purchase transaction to the respective participant.” Mot., App’x A, 4. An example in which a judicial exception is not integrated into a practical application is when “an additional element adds insignificant extra-solution activity to the judicial exception.” Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 55; Flook, 437 U.S. at 590 (holding that a step of adjusting an alarm limit variable was “post-solution activity”). Displaying an order message after the facilitated transaction has been completed amounts to insignificant post-solution activity, and does not support a conclusion that the abstract idea of claim 16 is integrated into a practical application.” slip op. at 75
Patent outcomesUS 7,134,087 unpatentable§ 101 eligibilitycites Alice · Mayo · Bilski · Berkheimer · EnfishPatents in suitUS 7,134,087 - Saudi Arabian Oil Company v. SK Innovation Co., Ltd.All claims unpatentablePTAB · May 9, 2019 · IPR2018-00159 · APJ Monté T Squire · IPR · Final written decision
Claim 2 was held unpatentable as anticipated by Novomer 1; the contingent motion to amend was granted, substituting claim 5.
RulingsFinal written decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“Applying the standard set forth in 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), which requires demonstration of a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail with respect to at least one challenged claim, we granted Petitioner’s request and instituted an inter partes review for challenged claim 2. Paper 9 (“Institution Dec.”).” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Patent Owner agrees with Petitioner’s assessment regarding the level of ordinary skill in the art. Mot. Amend 7. We determine the level of ordinary skill proposed by Petitioner is consistent with the ’979 patent and the asserted prior art, and we adopt that level in construing and deciding the patentability of claim 2.” slip op. at 9
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“In the Institution Decision, we determined that the phrase “A poly(alkylene carbonate) represented by Formula 10” did not require construction at that stage. Institution Dec. 9; see also id. at 7 (citing Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (holding that only terms which are in controversy need be construed and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy)). Neither party has argued post-institution that this phrase of claim 2 needs be construed. See PO Resp. 2; Pet. Reply 1–3. We conclude that no further construction of this phrase is necessary.” slip op. at 10
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner
“In the Institution Decision, we agreed with Petitioner that the variable construction of the phrase “each independently” is the broadest reasonable interpretation in light of the specification, and construed the phrase to mean that “each variable R81, R82, R83, and R84 is independent from one instance to another throughout the polymer.” Institution Dec. 13–14. Based on that construction, we also determined in the Institution Decision that claim 2 encompasses the following genera: (1) “Genus A,” which includes a poly(ethylene glycol) chain transfer agent flanked by poly(ethylene carbonate) chains (Pet. 24); (2) “Genus B,” which includes a poly(propylene glycol) chain transfer agent flanked by poly(propylene carbonate) chains (id. at 25–26); (3) “Genus C,” which includes a poly(propylene glycol) chain transfer agent flanked by poly(ethylene carbonate) chains (id. at 26); and (4) “Genus D,” which includes a poly(ethylene glycol) chain transfer agent flanked by poly(propylene carbonate) chains (id. at 27). Institution Dec. 12–13. Neither party opposes adopting the variable construction of the phrase “each independently” and the determination that, under the variable construction, claim 2 encompasses Genus A, Genus B, Genus C, and Genus D. PO Resp. 2; Pet. Reply 1–3. We maintain the variable construction of the phrase “each independently” on the complete record.” slip op. at 11
Patent outcomesUS 9,023,979 unpatentableClaim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 9,023,979 - Enovate Medical, LLC v. Intermetro Industries CorporationAll claims unpatentablePTAB · May 11, 2016 · IPR2015-00300 · APJ Jennifer S Bisk · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 27, 28, 88, 101, and 108 are unpatentable as obvious over Dell, Sweere, and Allan, with Planar additionally applied to claim 108.
RulingsFinal written decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Real party in interest / privityRpi dispute resolved for petitionerDecided for petitioner
“77 Fed. Reg. 48,756, 48,759 (Aug. 14, 2012) (internal citations omitted). Generally, “the ‘real party-in-interest’ [on the petitioner side] is the party that desires review of the patent. Thus, the ‘real party-in-interest’ may be the petitioner itself, and/or it may be the party or parties at whose behest the petition has been filed.” Id.” slip op. at 8
- ExcludeMotion to exclude, grantedGranted
“IV. MOTIONS TO EXCLUDE Petitioner filed a Motion to Exclude Exhibits 2003–2006. Paper 33. Each of Exhibits 2003–2005 is a license agreement, and Exhibit 2006 is a Declaration by Robert A. Sobie. All of this evidence was submitted by Patent Owner as objective evidence of secondary considerations. Because we do not rely on any of that evidence in a manner adverse to Petitioner, we dismiss the Motion as moot. Patent Owner filed a Motion to Exclude Exhibit 1007, which is a declaration by T.E. Schlesinger, Ph.D., which Petitioner filed with its Reply. Paper 35. Because we do not rely on Exhibit 1007 in any manner, we dismiss the Motion as moot.” slip op. at 28
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Other PTAB motions (exclude, strike, seal, additional discovery, rehearing)Other
“entity. It was filed without our authorization because it was filed with Patent Owner’s Opposition to Petitioner’s Motion to Exclude despite that Exhibit 202316 is not responsive to the Motion to Exclude. Paper 42 (“Opp. to Pet. Mot. to Excl.”). In fact, Patent Owner’s Opposition requests that we enter into the record “new Exhibit 2023, which was finalized subsequent to Patent Owner’s Response.” Opp. to Pet. Mot. to Excl. 1. A request for relief should not be made in an opposition brief. It should be made in a motion. 37 C.F.R. § 42.20(a) (“Relief, other than a petition requesting the institution of a trial, must be requested in the form of a motion.”). Further, a motion (and, thus, a request for relief) may be filed only if authorization has been obtained. 37 C.F.R. § 42.20(b) (“A motion will not be entered without Board authorization. Authorization may be provided in an order of general applicability or during the proceeding.”). Consequently, Exhibit 2023 shall be expunged because it was filed without our authorization. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.7.” slip op. at 29
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction needed
“No limitation requires an express construction for purposes of the patentability challenge at issue here. See Pet. 6–7 (offering only one proposed construction, which was not material to the patentability challenge);8 PO Resp. 11 (“Patent Owner agrees that the claim terms involved in the [instituted Grounds] do not require construction for purposes of resolving this [inter partes review (IPR)].”).” slip op. at 7
Patent outcomesUS 6,721,178 unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 6,721,178
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.