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  • PTAB · Jun 6, 2025 · IPR2025-00257 · APJ Lilan Ren · IPR · Institution

    The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–15 and all asserted grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that claim 1 is unpatentable over Cable and Naware and over Comb and Tummala.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Denied

      “discussed below, we decline to exercise our discretion to deny the Petition.” slip op. at 8

    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

      “review. See 35 U.S.C. § 314 (2024); 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a) (2024). Institution of an inter partes review requires that “the information presented in the petition . . . and any response . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). For the reasons set forth below, we determine that there is a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner will prevail with respect to at least one challenged claim, and we institute an inter partes review.” slip op. at 2

    • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundInstituted

      “persuaded that Petitioner has sufficiently shown for purposes of institution that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to combine the teachings of Cable and Naware in the manner argued by Petitioner. For example, both references directly relate to 3D printing, and we are persuaded that Cable teaches “a heated build platform and calls on the POSITA to implement this teaching via suitable solutions known in the art.” Pet. 13 (noting that Cable teaches a build platform that can be heated “by any suitable heating elements” (citing 1006 ¶ 45)). The current record also indicates that Naware taught known options in this regard, e.g., where it describes a build plate to be used in a 3D printing process that includes contact plates and temperature control modules. See, e.g., Ex. 1007, code (57). Petitioner additionally argues that there is a reasonable expectation of success in combining Cable with Naware because “3D printers with temperature-controlled heated build plates were well-known technologies at the time of the ’660 patent in 2014, and these technologies had been successfully demonstrated in the real-world by then.” Pet 15 (citing various portions of Ex. 1003). Patent Owner does not contest Petitioner’s arguments with respect to a reasonable expectation of success in combining Cable with Naware. See generally Prelim. Resp. Based on our review and consideration of the current record, we are persuaded that Petitioner has sufficiently shown for the teachings of Cable and Naware in the manner argued by Petitioner.” slip op. at 23

    • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

      “Patent Owner “does not contest Petitioner’s description of a person of ordinary skill in the art (a ‘POSITA’) having a bachelor’s degree in Mechanical Engineering, Chemical Engineering, Materials Science, or a comparable field and at least two years of experience related to 3D printing, with additional experience potentially being a substitute for a formal degree or training (and vice versa).” Prelim. Resp. 37. Patent Owner does not address the specific knowledge that Petitioner contends that ordinarily skilled artisan would possess. Id. For purposes of this decision, we adopt Petitioner’s unopposed definition of the level of ordinary skill in the art as it appears consistent with the disclosures of the ’660 patent and the prior art of record. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001).” slip op. at 18

    Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 9,592,660
  • PTAB · Aug 19, 2022 · IPR2022-00712 · APJ Michael A Valek · IPR · Institution

    Institution was denied for claims 1–9 and 11–13 because the petition did not show a reasonable likelihood of establishing unpatentability on any asserted obviousness ground.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied

      “Regarding the alleged motivation to combine Tanaka’s purification “guidance,” Petitioner has not articulated persuasive reasoning with rational underpinning to explain why a POSA would have sought to further purify Deeter’s rHSA. Deeter already teaches that its rHSA is purified using ion-exchange chromatography and reports that such rHSA is equivalent to or better than pHSA in stimulating cell growth. Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 116–120 (Examples 7–9). In view of these disclosures, Petitioner has not sufficiently explained why a POSA would be have been motivated to apply a different purification process or to add additional purification steps to Deeter’s existing process.” slip op. at 13

    • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

      “We find that Petitioner’s description of the level of ordinary skill in the art is supported by the record. Thus, for purposes of this decision, we apply Petitioner’s description of a POSA.” slip op. at 7

    • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

      “C. Claim Construction Neither party suggests that the issues presented in the Petition turn on claim construction. See Pet. 16 (noting the parties’ competing constructions in a related proceeding, but urging that the prior art discloses the limitations “[r]egardless of which interpretations are applied”); Prelim. Resp. 19 (“validity of the ’951 patent does not hinge on claim construction”). We agree that no formal claim construction is necessary for this decision. Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms that . . . are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’”) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)).” slip op. at 7

    • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentable

      “Regarding the alleged motivation to combine Tanaka’s purification “guidance,” Petitioner has not articulated persuasive reasoning with rational underpinning to explain why a POSA would have sought to further purify Deeter’s rHSA. Deeter already teaches that its rHSA is purified using ion-exchange chromatography and reports that such rHSA is equivalent to or better than pHSA in stimulating cell growth. Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 116–120 (Examples 7–9). In view of these disclosures, Petitioner has not sufficiently explained why a POSA would be have been motivated to apply a different purification process or to add additional purification steps to Deeter’s existing process.” slip op. at 13

    Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 10,618,951
  • PTAB · Nov 18, 2020 · PGR2019-00048 · APJ David Cotta · PGR · Final written decision

    Claims 1–13 were not shown unpatentable because the prior art did not establish a reasonable expectation that doses above 300 mg/day of mifepristone could be safely co-administered with a strong CYP3A inhibitor.

    RulingsFinal written decision
    • Skill levelSkill level patent owner adoptedDecided for patent owner

      “The definition of a POSA that best incorporates both experience with drug-drug interaction and experience treating patients is Petitioner’s proposed multidisciplinary team. Patent Owner does not object to defining the POSA as part of a multidisciplinary team, so long as that team includes a person with experience treating Cushing’s syndrome, which, as discussed above, is appropriate. Tr. 38. Accordingly, we define the POSA as: a multidisciplinary team that includes researchers and clinicians in the field and is able to draw upon not only the individual skills of each team member, but also the specialized skills of others to solve a given problem. The 6 Claim 5 and its dependents are directed to “[a] method of treating symptoms associated with elevated cortisol levels.” Cushing’s syndrome is “caused by excess levels of cortisol.” Ex. 1001, 1:31–33. Accordingly, claim 5 relates to Cushing’s syndrome even if it does not specifically recite that the patient has Cushing’s syndrome. All of the other claims expressly recite Cushing’s syndrome. researchers and clinicians would have an M.D., a Pharm. D., and/or a Ph.D. in pharmacology or a related discipline. The clinician would have at least four years of experience treating patients with Cushing’s syndrome using mifepristone and/or CYP3A inhibitors. The researcher would have at least four years of experience studying drug-drug interactions involving CYP3A inhibitors.” slip op. at 8

    • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Preamble limiting or notPreamble limitingDecided for patent owner

      “Further, if we were to consider Petitioner’s new argument, we would find that the claims do require safety, as entirely consistent with what both parties unmistakably understood, as evidenced by their patentability arguments throughout the proceeding (until Petitioner’s new argument in its Reply). In this regard, we note that the preambles in the independent claims at issue, i.e., in claims 1, 5, and 10, are necessarily limiting and we consider the scope of the challenged claims as a whole, including preambles, in our patentability analysis. The preamble in claim 1, for example, recites a “method of treating Cushing’s syndrome in a patient who is taking an original once-daily dose of 1200 mg or 900 mg per day of mifepristone.” Ex. 1001, 68:2–16. Claims 5 and 10 contain similar language relating to a patient taking an “original once-daily dose” of 1200 mg or 900 mg per day of mifepristone, although claim 5 is directed to a “method of treating symptoms associated with elevated cortisol levels,” and claim 10 is directed” slip op. at 19

    • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for patent owner

      “In addition, when considering the recited methods of treatment (or controlling hyperglycemia) in a patient in the context of the specification, we interpret the recited methods to require administration of drugs in a manner that is safe for a patient. The summary section in the specification of the ’214 patent, for example, states that: concomitant administration of a CYP3A inhibitor such as ketoconazole and a GRM such as mifepristone is believed to be safe for the subject, and to provide the therapeutic benefits of both drugs to the subject, and may allow the reduction in the amount of a GRM, or of a CYP3A inhibitor, administered to the subject; such reduction may reduce the risk of toxic effects of the CYP3A inhibitor concomitantly administered with the GRM. Ex. 1001, 3:50–58 (emphasis added); see id. at 4:4–21. That disclosure, along with many other statements in the specification, clarify that safety and efficiency are important aspects of the recited methods, especially in relation to toxic effects that might preclude treatment in patients. See also id. at 13:1–3 (stating “Applicant discloses herein methods for the safe concomitant administration of both a glucocorticoid receptor modulator (GRM) and steroidogenesis inhibitor to a subject.”), 13:10–23 (same).” slip op. at 20

    • Strike new argumentNew argument disregardedDecided for patent owner

      “Our regulations require the Petition to identify “[h]ow the challenged claim is to be construed” and “[h]ow the construed claim is unpatentable.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.104(b)(3),(4). A reply is not an opportunity to start anew, to fill in gaps or to remedy omissions in a petition. See SAS Inst., Inc. v. Iancu, 138 S. Ct. 1348, 1357 (2018) (explaining that “petitioner’s contentions [in a petition] ... define the scope of the litigation all the way from institution through to conclusion.”); see also Patent Trial and Appeal Board Consolidated Trial Practice Guide 73 (Nov. 2019), https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/tpgnov.pdf. We therefore decline to consider Petitioner’s belatedly presented new argument in its Reply that the claims do not require safety. See Acceleration Bay, LLC v. Activision Blizzard Inc., 908 F.3d 765, 775 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (concluding that the Board did not abuse its discretion in refusing to consider portions of a reply declaration “rais[ing] a new obviousness argument for [a claim] limitation that could have been made in the petition” but was not); Intelligent Bio-Sys., 821 F.3d at 1369–70 (concluding that the Board did not abuse its discretion in refusing to consider reply brief arguments advocating a “new theory” of unpatentability under 37 C.F.R. § 42.23(b)). Even if we were to consider Petitioner’s new argument regarding claim construction, we would not find it persuasive because Petitioner’s obviousness rationale incorporates an expectation of safety. Irrespective of whether the claims require safety, Petitioner cannot carry its burden to establish that the claimed methods would have been obviousness without establishing that – as posited in the Petition – the POSA would have expected co-administration to be safe.” slip op. at 18

    Patent outcomesUS 10,195,214 not shown unpatentable
    Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips
    Patents in suitUS 10,195,214
  • PTAB · Feb 24, 2020 · IPR2018-01520 · APJ Timothy G Majors · IPR · Final written decision

    Claims 1–8 are unpatentable as obvious; the contingent motion to amend is granted for substitute claims 9–16.

    RulingsFinal written decision
    • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner

      “1. “anti-fingerprint coating” The phrase “anti-fingerprint coating” appears twice in claim 1: first in” slip op. at 16

    • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successUnpatentableMotivation foundUnpatentable

      “fingerprint must “vaporize” from the coated surface.30 As discussed above (Section III(C)), the claimed “anti-fingerprint” functionality encompasses a coating that is capable of actively reducing transfer of a fingerprint or decomposing a fingerprint transferred to a surface of the coated substrate. Accordingly, notwithstanding Buchanan’s shortcomings in evidencing inherent vaporization of enzymatically decomposed fingerprint components, we are unpersuaded this is fatal to Petitioner’s challenge. Rather, for” slip op. at 43

    • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert discountedPatent owner expert creditedDecided for patent owner

      “conclusory” lack merit. Dr. Cairns has relevant expertise in this area, whereas Petitioner’s declarant, Dr. Rozzell, does not. Ex. 2035 (Rozzell dep.), 128:15–20 (“[Y]ou are not a person of ordinary skill in the art as it pertains to the use of haze values to assess visibility, are you? A. No.”); Ex. 2033 (Cairns Decl.) ¶¶ 2–9 (describing, inter alia, Dr. Cairns’s many years of experience working with and researching specialized coatings for display and touch-sensor applications and optical properties for such devices). Accordingly, Dr. Cairns’s testimony about there being a recognized and sufficiently definite correlation between haze and contaminant (including fingerprint) visibility on display devices is entitled to greater weight than Dr. Rozzell’s opinions on the topic. See, e.g., Ex. 2036 ¶¶ 62–67 (analyzing portions of the patent and prior art to support the opinion that haze is correlated to visibility); Ex. 2035 (Rozzell dep.) 125:1– 16 (“[W]hatever familiarity you have acquired with respect to the utilization of haze as a measurement of visibility has been acquired in the context of this IPR; correct? A That’s correct.”). Dr. Cairns’s opinions are also not conclusory as argued, but are supported with evidence from the patent and the prior art as noted. Ex. 2036 ¶¶ 62–67. slip op. at 83

    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Motions to amend / substitute claimsMotion to amend, grantedGranted

      “have wanted to combine Amin’s and Wang’s coatings, Petitioner simply does not provide an adequate, evidence-backed analysis of how such person would have predictably done so. As Patent Owner points out, the evidence on this record raises doubts that the two coatings could have been successfully combined. MTA Reply 6–8. Specifically, evidence of record supports Patent Owner’s argument that a skilled artisan would not have reasonably expected “that the digestive enzymes of Wang could be successfully immobilized on the fluorine-coated surface of Amin.” Id.; Ex. 2036, ¶¶ 6–10; Ex. 2035, 15:5˗19:2. Notably, the testimony of Petitioner’s own declarant supports the conclusion that the combination Petitioner proposes would not have been reasonably predictable—if even possible at all. When Dr. Rozzell was asked if there were other materials (like enzymes) that could be adhered to the surface of Amin’s coatings, he did not know. Ex. 2035: 15:16–17:13 (“[Y]ou don’t know what any of those materials [that might adhere] are, sitting here today? A Not without doing some research on my end.”) (“So turning back to our discussion of immobilizing an enzyme on this [Amin’s coating], you don’t know of a way, today, that you could immobilize an enzyme on top of a fluorine-coated layer. A Well, I’ve personally not done exactly that type of experiment, but I can imagine that there would be approaches that would allow you to do that. Q But you don’t know any of them today? A I can’t tell you one as I’m sitting here today. Q Okay. And you’ve not recalled seeing this in a publication? A No.”).” slip op. at 87

    Patent outcomesUS 8,932,717 unpatentable
    Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Graham · Nautilus
    Patents in suitUS 8,932,717
  • PTAB · Mar 9, 2018 · IPR2017-02002 · APJ Grace Karaffa Obermann · IPR · Institution

    The Board denied institution because the Petition did not show a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on any challenged claim.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied

      “We have authority to determine whether to institute an inter partes review. 35 U.S.C. § 314; 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a). An inter partes review may be instituted only upon a showing that “there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). Taking account of the information presented, we determine that the Petition fails to make out that threshold showing for review. Accordingly, we deny the Petition and decline to institute a trial.” slip op. at 2

    • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

      “A. The Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art Petitioner argues that a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention would have had a B.S. or M.S. in biochemistry, polymer chemistry, medicinal chemistry, pharmaceutical chemistry, or a related field with “several years” of practical experience. Alternatively, according to Petitioner, the ordinary artisan would have had less practical experience but a Ph.D. in one of those fields, or an M.D. in dermatology, plastic surgery, or a specialty related to the clinical use of dermal fillers. Pet. 10 (citing Ex. 1041 ¶¶ 12–13). Patent Owner does not contest that argument in the Preliminary Response. For purposes of this decision, we accept Petitioner’s definition, which, on this record, is consistent with the level of skill reflected in the asserted prior art references. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (the prior art itself may reveal the level of ordinary skill in the art).” slip op. at 8

    • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Preamble limiting or notPreamble limitingDecided for petitioner

      “Second, a term in a patent preamble is limiting when it “breathes life and meaning into the patent claims.” In re Wertheim, 541 F.2d 257, 269 (CCPA 1976). “Whether to treat a preamble as a limitation is a determination ‘resolved only on review of the entire” patent disclosure “to gain an understanding of what the inventors actually invented and intended to encompass by the claim.’” Catalina Mktg. Int’l. v. Coolsavings.com, Inc., 289 F.3d 801, 808 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (quoting Corning Glass Works v. Sumitomo Electric U.S.A., Inc., 868 F.2d 1251, 1257 (Fed. Cir. 1989)). Our review of the ’475 patent persuades us that the inventors “actually invented and intended to encompass by” claim 1 a stable composition as defined in the specification. Catalina Mktg. Int’l., 289 F.2d at 808. The inventors disclosed and claimed a “stable” composition containing both HA and lidocaine that overcame the “relative inferior stability properties” of prior art compositions. Ex. 1001, 2:6–32. In that regard, the specification repeatedly refers to the ability of the claimed compositions to remain stable after high-temperature sterilization procedures (such as autoclaving) or shelf-storage storage for prolonged lengths of time. See, e.g., id. at 2:42–49 (contrasting the “enhanced stability” of the claimed compositions “relative to conventional HA-based compositions including” “lidocaine” “when subjected to sterilization techniques such as autoclaving” or “when stored for long periods of time at ambient temperature”);” slip op. at 10

    • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Lexicography (patentee as own lexicographer)Term construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner

      “One final point pertaining to the “stable” limitation requires discussion. The specification makes clear that stability, in the context of the ’475 patent, relates to the “shelf life” of the composition “when stored for a lengthy period of time” prior to injection into a patient, for example, “for a period of time of at least 6 months to a year or more.” Id. at 6:51–53, 13:51; see id. at 2:26–27 (objective of invention is to provide “HA-based injectable compositions which incorporate lidocaine” that are not “prone to” degradation “when placed in storage for any significant amount of time”), 4:42–43, 5:33–38 (composition has “enhanced stability” “when stored at ambient temperature for an extended period of time”), 8:4–5 (the composition of the invention will “remain stable when stored for long periods of time at room temperature”). Accordingly, we determine that the preamble term “stable” (Ex. 1001, 16:40) “breathes life and meaning into” claim 1 and, therefore, is limiting. In re Wertheim, 541 F.2d at 269. We adopt for purposes of this decision the following definition of “stable,” which is advanced by Petitioner: soft tissue filler that is free of viable microorganisms as determined by a sterility test recognized by a regulatory authority, the filler can be sterilized by any method known in the art, and is resistant to degradation such that the composition maintains one or more of the following aspects: transparent appearance, pH, extrusion force and/or rheological characteristics, hyaluronic acid (HA) concentration, sterility, osmolarity, and lidocaine concentration, after being effectively sterilized by autoclaving and subsequently stored at a temperature of at least about 25° C for at least about two months. Pet. 11. That construction is not opposed by Patent Owner at this stage of the proceeding (Prelim. Resp. 3–4) and is substantially consistent with an express definition set forth in the specification. Ex. 1001, 5:17–20.” slip op. at 12

    Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousness
    Patents in suitUS 8,450,475
  • PTAB · Feb 8, 2018 · IPR2016-01412 · APJ Christopher G Paulraj · IPR · Final written decision

    Claims 1–13 and 16–19 are unpatentable as obvious over Palermo, Joshi, and Handbook, and over Oshlack, Joshi, Handbook, and Doyon.

    RulingsFinal written decision
    • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

      “’976 patent would have “a degree in one or more fields of medicine, chemical engineering, chemistry, pharmaceutical science, polymer chemistry, pharmaceutics, pharmaceutical technology, pharmacokinetics, and/or pharmacology, and/or a number of years of industry training or experience in one or more of those fields.” Pet. 15 (citing Ex.1007 ¶¶ 31– 34). Patent Owner agrees with Petitioner’s proposed level of skill in the art. PO Resp. 24 (citing Ex. 2001 ¶¶ 74–75). We, therefore, apply that skill level in our analysis, with the understanding that the level of skill is also reflected in the prior art of record. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001).” slip op. at 8

    • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner

      “We find Petitioner’s proposed construction to be more persuasive based on the ’376 patent specification. In particular, the specification defines “unsuitable for injection” “to mean that one would have substantial difficulty injecting the dosage form (e.g., due to pain upon administration or difficulty pushing the dosage form through a syringe) due to the viscosity imparted on the dosage form, thereby reducing the potential for abuse of the opioid analgesic from the dosage form.” Ex. 1001, 3:15–20. Additionally, in an example concerning the formation of a gel at different concentrations, the specification characterizes certain solutions as “THICK (10 cP to 60 cP): Although a syringe can be filled with this solution, it was hard to do.” Id. at 32:8–24, Table 3. Thus, the specification teaches that a viscosity of at least 10 cP is difficult to pull into a syringe or administer parenterally (via injection). Patent Owner does not address these teachings of the specification. We, therefore, determine that the broadest reasonable interpretation of “unsuitable for parenteral administration” and “unsuitable to pull into an insulin syringe” encompasses a gelling agent that imparts a viscosity of at least 10 cP.” slip op. at 10

    • PTAB / AIA Trials › §315(e) estoppelEstoppel appliesDecided for petitioner

      “articulated a four-factor test in determining whether collateral estoppel attaches: “(1) the identity of the issues in a prior proceeding; (2) the issues were actually litigated; (3) the determination of the issues was necessary to the resulting judgment; and (4) the party defending against preclusion had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issues.” Levi Strauss & Co. v. Abercrombie & Fitch Trading Co., 719 F.3d 1367, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2013). Collateral estoppel can attach in proceedings before the Office for identical issues that were addressed with respect to a different patent during prior district court litigation. See In re Arunachalam, No. 2016-1607, 2017 WL 4387224, at *2–4 (Fed. Cir. Oct. 3, 2017) (“In light of Dr. Arunachalam’s previous opportunity to litigate the validity of the asserted claims of the ’500 Patent, which contain the [same] terms . . . , we see no reason to allow her to appeal the patentability of the challenged claims of the ’556 Patent, which also contain the same critical terms.”). All four factors for collateral estoppel are met here. With regard to the first factor, the issue of Joshi’s status as prior art is identical for both proceedings. The ’376 patent is part of the same chain of continuity as the ’888 patent, and both patents share the same specification and claim priority to the same non-provisional application filed August 6, 2002 and provisional application filed August 6, 2001. As such, to the extent Joshi qualifies as prior art to the ’888 patent, it would also qualify as prior art to the ’376 patent.” slip op. at 16

    • Disclosure Requirements (§112) › Written description (Ariad)Not entitled to earlier dateWritten description inadequateNot shown unpatentable

      “Although the statements above encompass “mixtures” of HPMC and PEO among a myriad of other possibilities for the gelling agent, we find no basis to conclude that the inventors of the ’376 patent were in possession of the specifically claimed formulation from such a broad disclosure.11 The 10 The April 25th draft application is heavily redacted and we thus cannot discern what other materials were specifically contemplated as “thickening agents” by that time. See Ex. 2091, 5. However, given the nature and amount of the redactions and Patent Owner’s assertion that the draft application ultimately led to the filing of the ’534 provisional with the broad disclosure set forth above, we find it reasonable to conclude that additional materials were included in the draft application. Moreover, the draft application was forwarded as part of an email from Patent Owner’s attorney, which “[e]nclosed the latest draft of the tamper resistant application.” Ex. 2091. As such, there is no evidence to suggest that the list of thickening agents included as part of the draft application originated from the inventors as opposed to patent counsel. 11 We recognize that the same broad disclosure with a “laundry list” of possible gelling agents is found in the specification of the ’376 patent. See Federal Circuit has held that such “laundry list” disclosures are insufficient to satisfy the written description requirement when there is no further guidance (“blazemarks”) provided about which species or combination of species included as part of the list may be selected to arrive at the claimed invention. See Fujikawa v. Wattanasin, 93 F.3d 1559, 1571 (Fed. Cir. 1996). Not having specifically named or mentioned the combination in any manner, “one is left to select[] from the myriads of possibilities encompassed by the broad disclosure, with no guide indicating or directing that this particular selection should be made rather than any of the many others which could also be made.” In re Ruschig, 379 F.2d 990, 995 (CCPA 1967); see also Los Angeles Biomedical Research Inst. at Harbor-UCLA Med. Ctr. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 849 F.3d 1049, 1057 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“To satisfy the written description requirement, the disclosure in each application must ‘reasonably convey[ ]’ to those skilled in the art that as of the claimed priority date the inventor was in possession of the later claimed subject matter.”) (citing Vas-Cath Inc. v. Mahurkar, 935 F.2d 1555, 1563 (Fed. Cir. 1991)). Other evidence of record further supports our conclusion that the inventors of the ’376 patent had not conceived of or reduced to practice the claimed formulation prior to Joshi’s August 30, 2001 filing date. In his Declaration, inventor Benjamin Oshlack attests that Patent Owner’s laboratory scientists focused on “testing the syringeability of various concentration solutions of pectin, sodium alginate, and sodium acrylate, as well as combinations of pectin and sodium alginate” between January 4 and Ex. 1001, 6:46–62. We, however, do not address the issue of written description support for any of the subsequently filed applications. 17, 2001. Ex. 2081 ¶ 22. Additionally, Mr. Oshlack attests that the scientists had evaluated “xanthan gum, carrageenan, and locust bean gum (and combinations thereof) as gelling agents, between April 5 and 12, 2001.” Id. ¶ 23. None of the laboratory notebook excerpts proffered by Patent Owner mention a combination of HPMC and PEO as gelling agents to be used in an oxycodone formulation. Exs. 2087–2090. Consistent with the testing actually done, the working examples set forth in the ’534 provisional (as well as in the ’376 patent) focus on xantham gum, pectin, microcrystalline cellulose, and hydroxyethlcellulose as the gelling agents. See Ex. 1026, 44– 49 (Examples 1–5). We find, therefore, that the inventors did not particularly consider either PEO or HPMC, let alone both PEO and HPMC in combination, when evaluating possible gelling agents for an abuse-deterrent formulation of oxycodone. Accordingly, because we find that the ’376 patent is not entitled to a filing date earlier than August 6, 2002, we further determine that Joshi qualifies as § 102(e) prior art as of that date. Having determined that Joshi qualifies as prior art, we turn to the merits of Petitioner’s patentability challenges.” slip op. at 21

    Patent outcomesUS 9,034,376 unpatentable
    Claim construction§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosure
    Patents in suitUS 9,034,376
  • PTAB · Jan 17, 2018 · IPR2016-01413 · APJ Christopher G Paulraj · IPR · Final written decision

    Claims 1–13 and 16–19 are unpatentable as obvious over Royce, McGinity, Hoffmeister, Joshi, and PDR.

    RulingsFinal written decision
    • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

      “DISCUSSION A. Level of Skill in the Art Petitioner contends that a person of ordinary skill in the art for the ’976 patent would have “a degree in one or more fields of medicine, chemical engineering, chemistry, pharmaceutical science, polymer 1 Royce, U.S. Patent 5,273,758, issued Dec. 28, 1993 (Ex. 1022) (“Royce”). 2 McGinity et al, WO 97/49384, published Dec. 31, 1997 (Ex. 1024) (“McGinity”). 3 Hoffmeister et al., U.S. Patent 4,070,494, issued Jan. 24, 1978 (Ex. 1010) (“Hoffmeister”). 4 Joshi et al., Pub. No. US 2002/0187192 A1, published Dec. 12, 2002 (Ex. 1014) (“Joshi”). 5 OxyContin entry in Physicians’ Desk Reference, 2569–74 (53d ed., 1999) (Ex. 1016)(“PDR”). chemistry, pharmaceutics, pharmaceutical technology, pharmacokinetics, and/or pharmacology, and/or a number of years of industry training or experience in one or more of those fields.” Pet. 16 (citing Ex. 1007 ¶¶ 31– 34). Patent Owner agrees with Petitioner’s proposed level of skill in the art. PO Resp. 27. We, therefore, apply that skill level in our analysis, with the understanding that the level of skill of art in this proceeding is also reflected in the prior art of record. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001).” slip op. at 7

    • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed petitioner constructionOther

      “We find Petitioner’s proposed construction to be more persuasive based on the ’376 patent specification. In particular, the specification defines “unsuitable for injection” “to mean that one would have substantial difficulty injecting the dosage form (e.g., due to pain upon administration or difficulty pushing the dosage form through a syringe) due to the viscosity imparted on the dosage form, thereby reducing the potential for abuse of the opioid analgesic from the dosage form.” Id. at 3:15–20. Additionally, in an example concerning the formation of a gel at different concentrations, the specification characterizes certain solutions as “THICK (10 cP to 60 cP): Although a syringe can be filled with this solution, it was hard to do.” Id. at 32:8–24, Table 3. Thus, the specification teaches that a viscosity of at least 10cp is difficult to pull into a syringe or administer parenterally (via injection). Patent Owner does not address these teachings of the specification. We, therefore, determine that the broadest reasonable interpretation of “unsuitable for parenteral administration” and “unsuitable to pull into an insulin syringe” encompasses a gelling agent that imparts a viscosity of at least 10 cp.” slip op. at 9

    • PTAB / AIA Trials › §315(e) estoppelEstoppel appliesDecided for petitioner

      “Under the doctrine of issue preclusion, also called collateral estoppel, a judgment on the merits in a first suit precludes relitigation in a second [proceeding] of issues actually litigated and determined in the first suit.” In re Freeman, 30 F.3d 1459, 1465 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (citing Lawlor v. National Screen Serv. Corp., 349 U.S. 322, 326 (1955)). The Federal Circuit has articulated a four-factor test in determining whether collateral estoppel attaches: “(1) the identity of the issues in a prior proceeding; (2) the issues were actually litigated; (3) the determination of the issues was necessary to the resulting judgment; and (4) the party defending against preclusion had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issues.” Levi Strauss & Co. v. Abercrombie & Fitch Trading Co., 719 F.3d 1367, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2013). Collateral estoppel can attach in proceedings before the Office for identical issues that were addressed with respect to a different patent during prior slip op. at 16

    • Disclosure Requirements (§112) › Written description (Ariad)Written description inadequateDecided for petitioner

      “Although the statements above encompass “mixtures” of HPMC and PEO among a myriad of other possibilities for the gelling agent, we find no basis to conclude that the inventors of the ’376 patent were in possession of the specifically claimed formulation from such a broad disclosure.10 The Federal Circuit has held that such “laundry list” disclosures are insufficient to satisfy the written description requirement when there is no further guidance (“blazemarks”) provided about which species or combination of species included as part of the list may be selected to arrive at the claimed 9 The April 25th draft application is heavily redacted and we thus cannot discern what other materials were specifically contemplated as “thickening” agents by that time. See Ex. 2091, 5. Given the nature and amount of the redactions and Patent Owner’s assertion that the draft application ultimately led to the filing of the ’534 provisional with the broad disclosure set forth above, we find it reasonable to conclude that additional materials were included in the draft application. Moreover, the draft application was forwarded as part of an email from Patent Owner’s attorney, which “[e]nclosed the latest draft of the tamper resistant application.” Ex. 2091. As such, there is no evidence to suggest that the list of thickening agents included as part of the draft application originated from the inventors as opposed to patent counsel. 10 We recognize that the same broad disclosure with a “laundry list” of possible gelling agents is found in the specification of the ’376 patent. See Ex. 1001, 6:46–62. We, however, do not address the issue of written description support for any of the subsequently filed applications. invention. See Fujikawa v. Wattanasin, 93 F.3d 1559, 1571 (Fed. Cir. 1996). Not having specifically named or mentioned the combination in any manner, “one is left to select[] from the myriads of possibilities encompassed by the broad disclosure, with no guide indicating or directing that this particular selection should be made rather than any of the many others which could also be made.” In re Ruschig, 379 F.2d 990, 995 (CCPA 1967); see also Los Angeles Biomedical Research Inst. at Harbor-UCLA Med. Ctr. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 849 F.3d 1049, 1057 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“To satisfy the written description requirement, the disclosure in each application must ‘reasonably convey[ ]’ to those skilled in the art that as of the claimed priority date the inventor was in possession of the later claimed subject matter.”) (citing Vas-Cath Inc. v. Mahurkar, 935 F.2d 1555, 1563 (Fed. Cir. 1991)). Other evidence of record further supports our conclusion that the inventors of the ’376 patent had not conceived of or reduced to practice the claimed formulation prior to Joshi’s August 30, 2001, filing date. In his declaration, inventor Benjamin Oshlack attests that Patent Owner’s laboratory scientists focused on “testing the syringeability of various concentration solutions of pectin, sodium alginate, and sodium acrylate, as well as combinations of pectin and sodium alginate” between January 4 and 17, 2001. Ex. 2081 ¶ 22. Additionally, Mr. Oshlack attests that the scientists had evaluated “xanthan gum, carrageenan, and locust bean gum (and combinations thereof) as gelling agents, between April 5 and 12, 2001.” Id. ¶ 23. None of the laboratory notebook excerpts proffered by Patent Owner mention a combination of HPMC and PEO as gelling agents to be used in an oxycodone formulation. Exs. 2087–2090. Consistent with the testing actually done, the working examples set forth in the ’534 provisional (as well as in the ’376 patent) focus on xantham gum, pectin, microcrystalline cellulose, and hydroxyethlcellulose as the gelling agents. See Ex. 1026, 44– 49 (Examples 1–5). We find, therefore, that the inventors did not particularly consider either PEO or HPMC, let alone both PEO and HPMC in combination, when evaluating possible gelling agents for an abuse-deterrent formulation of oxycodone. Accordingly, because we find that the ’376 patent is not entitled to a” slip op. at 22

    Patent outcomesUS 9,034,376 unpatentable
    Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosurecites KSR
    Patents in suitUS 9,034,376
  • PTAB · Jan 17, 2018 · IPR2016-01317 · APJ Kristina M Kalan · IPR · Final written decision

    Claims 1–20 are unpatentable as obvious over Gerber and O’Donnell; claims 1–4 and 6–11 are also unpatentable as obvious over Gerber and Barrie.

    RulingsFinal written decision
    • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownOther

      “would be understood by one of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention. See In re Translogic Tech., Inc., 504 F.3d 1249, 1257 (Fed. Cir. 2007). Any special definitions for claim terms must be set forth with reasonable clarity, deliberateness, and precision. See In re Paulsen, 30 F.3d 1475, 1480 (Fed. Cir. 1994). Only those terms which are in controversy need to be construed, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co. Ltd., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“we need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy’”) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)).” slip op. at 6

    • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

      “We adopt Petitioner’s contention that a person of ordinary skill in the art would be a physician specializing in urology or oncology, or holding a Ph.D. in pharmacology, biochemistry or a related discipline. Additional experience could substitute for the advanced degree. To the extent necessary, one of skill in the art may collaborate with one or more other persons of skill in the art for one or more aspects with which the other person may have expertise, experience and/or knowledge that was obtained through his or her education, industrial or academic experiences. For example, one of skill may consult with an enzymologist and/or molecular biologist and thus may rely on the opinions of such specialists in evaluating the claims. Pet. 7 (citations omitted). Patent Owner does not appear to dispute Petitioner’s definition in its Patent Owner Response. See generally PO Resp. The level of ordinary skill in the art in this case is further demonstrated by” slip op. at 9

    • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedDecided for petitioner

      “Regarding the interpretation of O’Donnell’s Synacthen test, we do not agree with Patent Owner that the results “lack any significance.” See PO Resp. 20. We are persuaded that one of ordinary skill in the art would understand the results of this test to be an indicator that something was amiss with the O’Donnell Study C patients’ cortisol levels following administration of abiraterone acetate. Results of the Synacthen test led O’Donnell to conclude that further studies were needed to determine whether glucocorticoid replacement would be necessary. Ex. 1003, 2323. We understand Patent Owner’s position that the “Synacthen test results in O’Donnell do not give a complete picture of a patient’s glucocorticoid production.” PO Resp. 21. We, however, do not perceive that a complete picture of a patient’s glucocorticoid production is required for one of ordinary skill in the art to be motivated to explore whether glucocorticoid replacement therapy was necessary. Petitioner’s experts opine that O’Donnell’s results for the Study C patients were “unquestionably abnormal” and implied that abiraterone acetate could result in chronic cortisol deficiency “for which glucocorticoid replacement therapy could be required.” Reply 6– 7 (citing Ex. 1093, 22, 68; Ex. 1023, 1245). We credit this testimony as supporting Petitioner’s argument that one of ordinary skill in the art, upon reviewing O’Donnell’s Synacthen test results and statement regarding impact on adrenal reserve, would not conclude that they lack any significance; rather, they would conclude that they are significant enough to merit further investigation of administration of abiraterone acetate with glucocorticoids.” slip op. at 19

    • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundDecided for petitioner

      “aware of the differences and the similarities in the mechanisms and, nevertheless, would have compared and analogized between the two. See, e.g., Tr. 14:20–15:5; Ex. 1003, 2318, Figure 1; Ex. 1188, 168:22–169:23. Both O’Donnell and Barrie refer to ketoconazole in their discussions of abiraterone acetate, indicating that teachings regarding ketoconazole administration were a starting point for exploration of abiraterone acetate administration. Ex. 1003, 2318; Ex. 1005, Table 1. For example, O’Donnell, after evaluating ketoconazole as an agent, turns to an evaluation of abiraterone acetate as a more selective CYP17 inhibitor, i.e., as an improvement on ketoconazole. Ex. 1003, 2318. After presenting the results from its studies, O’Donnell discusses that, in the clinical use of ketoconazole, “it is common practice to administer supplementary hydrocortisone” and that, therefore, “further studies with abiraterone acetate will be required to ascertain if concomitant therapy with glucocorticoid is required on a continuous basis, at times of physiological stress, if patients become symptomatic or indeed at all.” Id. at 2323. This statement represents the proposition that one of ordinary skill in the art would use the example of ketoconazole’s clinical use to take the next investigative steps with abiraterone acetate. We have not been presented with evidence that dissuades us from taking this statement at face value. Patent Owner’s expert testified that ketoconazole, as “an inhibitor of steroid biosynthesis that had been used at that point,” was a basis for comparison: “When you write scientific papers, you always like to make comparisons with what is known and explain why your results are different or the same or what the caveats are. And I think that’s setting up . . . to understand what comes next, why they did this experiment.” Ex. 1188, 169:15–23. Thus, we are persuaded that one of ordinary skill in the art would understand that both ketoconazole and abiraterone are CYP17 inhibitors, albeit with different mechanisms. With this knowledge, and given the teachings of the prior art on administration of ketoconazole and administration of abiraterone acetate, we find that one of ordinary skill in the art would look to the administration of ketoconazole for guidance on how to administer abiraterone acetate.” slip op. at 17

    Patent outcomesUS 8,822,438 unpatentable
    Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 8,822,438
  • PTAB · Jan 17, 2018 · IPR2016-01582 · APJ Kristina M Kalan · IPR · Final written decision

    Claims 1–20 are unpatentable as obvious over Gerber, O’Donnell, and Sartor because the combination would have provided a reasonable expectation of success.

    RulingsFinal written decision
    • Prior constructionPrior construction adoptedDecided for patent owner

      “treatment,” and “therapeutically effective amount of prednisone.” Pet. 20– 21. Petitioner notes that these claim terms have already been construed in IPR2016-00286,1 Paper 14, and states that it analyzes the claims under those constructions for the purpose of this proceeding. Id. In our Decision on Institution, we applied our claim constructions of “treat,” “treating,” “treatment,” and “therapeutically effective amount of prednisone,” as set forth in IPR2016-00286, to the present case. Dec. 5–7; IPR2016-00286, Paper 14, 5–7. Thus, we construed those terms as follows: 1 IPR2016-00286 is an earlier-filed case involving the ’438 patent, the same grounds, and the same Patent Owner. Claim term(s) Construction “treat,” “treating,” and include the eradication, removal, “treatment” modification, management or control of a tumor or primary, regional, or metastatic cancer cells or tissue and the minimization or delay of the spread of cancer Ex. 1001, 3:46–50 “therapeutically effective an amount of prednisone effective for amount of prednisone” treating prostate cancer Patent Owner states: “Neither party has disputed the Board’s slip op. at 6

    • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

      “We adopt Petitioner’s contention that a person of ordinary skill in the art would be a treating clinician specializing in oncology, typically holding an M.D. degree, with at least five years of experience specializing in medical oncology. Alternatively, a POSA would have an M.D., with at least five years of experience specializing in urology and at least two years of clinical experience. A POSA would have also typically worked as part of a multi-disciplinary team and drawn upon not only his or her own skills, but also taken advantage of certain specialized skills of others in the team, to solve a given problem. Pet. 3–4 (citations omitted). Patent Owner does not appear to dispute Petitioner’s definition in its Patent Owner Response. See generally PO Resp. The level of ordinary skill in the art in this case is further demonstrated by the prior art asserted in the Petition. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001). D. Overview of the Prior Art” slip op. at 9

    • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundDecided for petitioner

      “Based on the information presented during trial, we understand that ketoconazole and abiraterone acetate do not have identical mechanisms. See, e.g., Ex. 1005, 2318, Figure 1. As noted by both Petitioner and Patent Owner, however, abiraterone acetate and ketoconazole are both CYP17 inhibitors. Pet. 11–13; PO Resp. 13–15. Although Patent Owner urges us to focus on the differences in the mechanisms of operation of ketoconazole and abiraterone acetate (PO Resp. 13–15), we look not only at the differences, but also at the similarities. The evidence demonstrates that one of ordinary skill would have been aware of the differences and the similarities in the mechanisms, and nevertheless would have compared and analogized between the two. Ex. 1005, 2318, Figure 1; Ex. 1002 ¶ 67. O’Donnell refers to ketoconazole in its discussion of abiraterone acetate, indicating that teachings regarding ketoconazole administration were a starting point for exploration of abiraterone acetate administration. Ex. 1005, 2318. O’Donnell, after evaluating ketoconazole as an agent, turns to an evaluation of abiraterone acetate as a more selective CYP17 inhibitor, i.e., as an improvement on ketoconazole. Ex. 1005, 2318. After presenting the results from its studies, O’Donnell discusses that, in the clinical use of ketoconazole, “it is common practice to administer supplementary hydrocortisone” and that, therefore, “further studies with abiraterone acetate will be required to ascertain if concomitant therapy with glucocorticoid is required on a continuous basis, at times of physiological stress, if patients become symptomatic or indeed at all.” Id. at 2323. This statement represents the proposition that one of ordinary skill in the art would use the example of ketoconazole’s clinical use to take the next investigative steps with abiraterone acetate. We have not been presented with evidence that dissuades us from taking this statement at face value. Thus, we are persuaded that one of ordinary skill in the art would understand that both ketoconazole and abiraterone are CYP17 inhibitors, albeit with different mechanisms. With this knowledge, and given the teachings of the prior art on administration of ketoconazole and administration of abiraterone acetate, we find that one of ordinary skill in the art would look to the administration of ketoconazole for guidance on how to administer abiraterone acetate.” slip op. at 16

    • Obviousness (§103) › Objective indicia / secondary considerations › Unexpected resultsObjective indicia no nexusDecided for petitioner

      “Regarding Patent Owner’s comparison of abiraterone acetate monotherapy with abiraterone acetate/dexamethasone therapy, we agree with Petitioner that “to the extent that [Patent Owner] tries to draw any conclusion between studies that involve a combination with dexamethasone, we respectfully submit that there’s no nexus there” in that “[d]examethasone is not what’s claimed and there’s no nexus to the claims.” Tr. 19:17–20, 20:2– 3. Although dexamethasone and prednisone are both glucocorticoids, Patent Owner does not point us to satisfactory evidence as to why the ordinary artisan would consider dexamethasone and prednisone to be interchangeable for the purpose of comparing results. Cf. Ex. 2038 ¶ 240 (stating that a person of ordinary skill would “understand the dexamethasone extension study results to be due to a class effect of glucocorticoids” without further citation). Because the claims cover prednisone, and not any other glucocorticoid, the results of the combination of dexamethasone with abiraterone acetate are of limited use, as we are not informed of the similarities or differences of the mechanism of action of those glucocorticoids or how the mechanism leads to the asserted unexpected results. Moreover, to the extent the table purportedly compares the abiraterone acetate monotherapy to abiraterone acetate administered with prednisone, the table compares the abiraterone acetate monotherapy administered in clinical trial COU-AA-001 with the abiraterone acetate administered with prednisone in clinical trial COU-AA-002, without explaining or accounting for the differences between the two trials. Tr. 20:10–19. We determine that there is insufficient evidence that the alleged unpredictable and unexpected results of abiraterone acetate and prednisone are objective indicia of nonobviousness of the challenged claims. Patent Owner does not sufficiently tie the allegedly unpredictable and unexpected result to the administration of abiraterone acetate and prednisone as claimed. Thus, we determine this consideration does not weigh in favor of the patentability of the challenged claims.” slip op. at 36

    Patent outcomesUS 8,822,438 unpatentable
    Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 8,822,438
  • PTAB · Jan 17, 2018 · IPR2017-00853 · APJ Kristina M Kalan · IPR · Final written decision

    Claims 1–20 are unpatentable as obvious over Gerber and O’Donnell; claims 1–4 and 6–11 are also unpatentable as obvious over Gerber and Barrie.

    RulingsFinal written decision
    • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

      “We adopt Petitioner’s contention that a person of ordinary skill in the art would be a physician specializing in urology, endocrinology, or oncology, or a person holding a Ph.D. in pharmacology, biochemistry or a related discipline, such as pharmaceutical science. Additional experience could substitute for the advanced degree. To the extent necessary, one of skill in the art may collaborate with one or more other persons of skill in the art for one or more aspects with which the other person may have expertise, experience and/or knowledge that was obtained through his or her education, industrial or academic experiences. For example, one of skill may consult with an endocrinologist, oncologist, or medical biochemist and thus may rely on the opinions of such specialists in evaluating the claims. Pet. 7 (citations omitted). Patent Owner does not appear to dispute Petitioner’s definition in its Patent Owner Response. See generally PO Resp. The level of ordinary skill in the art in this case is further demonstrated by the prior art asserted in the Petition. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001).” slip op. at 10

    • ExcludeMotion to exclude, deniedMixed

      “responded (Paper 76) and to which Patent Owner filed a Reply (Paper 80). The party moving to exclude evidence bears the burden of proof to establish that it is entitled to the relief requested, e.g., that the material sought to be excluded is inadmissible under the Federal Rules of Evidence. See 37 C.F.R. §§ 42.20(c), 42.62(a). Patent Owner seeks to exclude Exhibits 1002 ¶ 30; 1017; 1017 [B-1]; 1028; 1040; 1041; 1046–51; 1053–55; 1057; 1064–66; 1088; 1089; 1091 ¶¶ 17–29, 31; 1092–95; 1097, ¶¶ 11–16, 95; 1100, 1102, 1103; 1104 ¶¶ 5–9, 11–13, 88–90, 92–95, and 119–22; 1117; 1125; and 1139. Paper 69, 10. Patent Owner seeks to exclude these exhibits as (a) expert declarations and exhibits that Patent Owner alleges are outside of the scope of the prior art permitted by 35 U.S.C. § 311(b); (b) sections of Petitioner’s declarations that are not cited in the briefs, and therefore irrelevant and prejudicial; and (c) exhibits that lack authenticity or violate the hearsay rule. Id. at 1.” slip op. at 44

    • Prior constructionPrior construction not adoptedDecided for petitioner

      “treatment” and “treating” by the district court in a companion litigation. Ex. 2004. The district court, after a lengthy analysis, construed the disputed terms as follows: “Treatment/treating means the eradication, removal, modification, management or control of a tumor or primary, regional, or metastatic cancer cells or tissue and the minimization or delay of the spread of cancer.” Id. at 30. The district court read out of the definition the term “includes.” Id. Although we are not bound by the district court’s reasoning and claim constructions in related proceedings, we do not disregard the determinations of a court interpreting the same claim term in a related patent in a concurrent proceeding. Power Integrations, Inc. v. Lee, 797 F.3d 1318, 1326–27 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (“The fact that the board is not generally bound by a previous judicial interpretation of a disputed claim term does not mean, however, that it has no obligation to acknowledge that interpretation or to assess whether it is consistent with the broadest reasonable construction of the term.”). Thus, although we acknowledge and have considered the district court’s interpretation, we retain our broadest reasonable construction of the terms “treat,” “treatment,” and “treating.” We see no reason to modify our claim construction positions in light of the record developed at trial, and we maintain our claim constructions from the Decision on Institution for the purposes of this Decision. No other claim terms have been presented to us for construction following institution of trial, and we determine that no other claim terms require express construction. B. Principles of Law slip op. at 8

    • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundDecided for petitioner

      “Based on the information presented during trial, we understand that ketoconazole and abiraterone acetate do not have identical mechanisms. See, e.g., Ex. 2038 ¶¶ 25–39, Figs. 4, 5). As noted by both Petitioner and Patent Owner, however, abiraterone acetate and ketoconazole are both steroid synthesis inhibitors, particularly, CYP17 inhibitors. Pet. 26; PO Resp. 13– 15; Reply 2, 5, 9. Both parties appear to agree that, based on their respective mechanisms of action, administration of ketoconazole would inhibit production of cortisol, and administration of abiraterone acetate inhibits one of the pathways of cortisol production. Pet. 5, 26; Tr. 12:18–19; PO Resp. 14, Figs. 1, 2; Ex. 1003, 2318; Ex. 1023, 3, Fig. 1. Patent Owner takes the position that abiraterone acetate “allows some cortisol to be made.” Tr. 31:27–29. Although Patent Owner urges us to focus on the differences in the mechanisms of ketoconazole and abiraterone acetate, we look not only at the differences, but also at the similarities. The evidence demonstrates that one of ordinary skill would have been aware of the differences and the similarities in the mechanisms and, nevertheless, would have compared and analogized between the two. See, e.g., Ex. 1003, 2318, Figure 1; Reply 6 (citing Ex. 1104 ¶¶ 14–31; Ex. 1097 ¶¶ 44–49). Both O’Donnell and Barrie refer to ketoconazole in their discussions of abiraterone acetate, indicating that teachings regarding ketoconazole administration were a starting point for exploration of abiraterone acetate administration. Ex. 1003, 2318; Ex. 1005, Table 1. O’Donnell, after evaluating ketoconazole as an agent, turns to an evaluation of abiraterone acetate as a more selective CYP17 inhibitor, i.e., as an improvement on ketoconazole. Ex. 1003, 2318. After presenting the results from its studies, O’Donnell discusses that, in the clinical use of ketoconazole, “it is common practice to administer supplementary hydrocortisone” and that, therefore, “further studies with abiraterone acetate will be required to ascertain if concomitant therapy with glucocorticoid is required on a continuous basis, at times of physiological stress, if patients become symptomatic or indeed at all.” Id. at 2323. This statement represents the proposition that one of ordinary skill in the art would use the example of ketoconazole’s clinical use to take the next investigative steps with abiraterone acetate. We have not been presented with evidence that dissuades us from taking this statement at face value. Thus, we are persuaded that one of ordinary skill in the art would understand that both ketoconazole and abiraterone are CYP17 inhibitors, albeit with different mechanisms. With this knowledge, and given the teachings of the prior art on administration of ketoconazole and administration of abiraterone acetate, we find that one of ordinary skill in the art would look to the administration of ketoconazole for guidance on how to administer abiraterone acetate.” slip op. at 18

    Patent outcomesUS 8,822,438 unpatentable
    Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 8,822,438
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