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  • PTAB · Jan 31, 2017 · IPR2015-01650 · APJ Stacy B Margolies · IPR · Final written decision

    Claims 1–3, 8, 9, 11, 12, and 15–19 are unpatentable as anticipated by King; claim 10 is unpatentable as obvious over King and Gilbert.

    RulingsFinal written decision
    • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

      “Patent Owner does not challenge Dr. Goldberg’s testimony regarding the level of skill in the art. See generally PO Resp. However, Mr. Blackburn, Patent Owner’s declarant, opines that a person of ordinary skill in the art would probably have had a graduate degree in computer engineering, electrical engineering, applied physics, or a related field, and at least three years’ experience in the design and development of GPS or cellular location services, systems, and/or devices or (2) a Bachelor’s degree in computer engineering, electrical engineering, applied physics, or a related field, and at least five years’ experience in the design, analysis, and/or development of GPS, cellular and PSTN location services, systems, and/or devices. Ex. 2004 ¶ 11 (emphases added). As illustrated by the emphasized words above, Mr. Blackburn’s proposed level of ordinary skill differs slightly from Dr. Goldberg’s. Patent Owner, however, does not cite the above testimony in its Patent Owner Response. Nor does Patent Owner or Mr. Blackburn explain the reason for including cellular and PSTN location services, or for adding analysis as an alternative in the description of experience in the field. See generally PO Resp. We determine that the level of ordinary skill proposed by Petitioners’ declarant is consistent with the challenged patent and the asserted prior art, and we therefore adopt Dr. Goldberg’s definition of the level of ordinary skill in the art for the purposes of the analysis below. However, our analysis would not differ if we were to adopt Mr. Blackburn’s definition.” slip op. at 13

    • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner

      “Petitioners’ proposed construction of “quality of service,” on the other hand, is consistent with the ’815 patent specification. The specification, for example, describes evaluating criteria such as “accuracy,” “time-to-first-fix” and “sensitivity.” Ex. 1001, 6:9–24. The specification also gives the following examples of quality of service: “Most accurate,” “Fastest,” and “Least Expensive.” Id. at 5:33–36. Moreover, Petitioners’ declarant, Dr. Goldberg, persuasively testifies that the attributes of accuracy, time-to-first-fix (TTFF), sensitivity, speed, and cost are all indications of a grade or level of performance that is to be associated with the computed position estimate. Ex. 1051 ¶ 155. Petitioners’ proposed construction also is supported by the applicant’s statements during prosecution of the ’815 patent and a description of quality of service in a prior art reference as referring to, for example, accuracy, periodicity, and response time. See Pet. 19–20 (citing Ex. 1002, 50; Ex. 1005, 5; Ex. 1051 ¶¶ 155–157). Patent Owner does not challenge Petitioners’ proposed construction of the shorter phrase “quality of service.” See PO Resp. 10–20. We determine that the common term “desired”—for which there is no special definition or disavowal in the specification—need not be expressly construed. See Pet. Reply 3–4. For the foregoing reasons, the broadest reasonable interpretation of “determining a desired quality of service,” as recited in claim 1, and “determine a desired quality of service,” as recited in claim 17, is not limited to “ascertaining a quality of service associated with a computed position estimate as a function of any user- or position application-selectable input related to quality of service,” as proposed by Patent Owner. We also determine that, contrary to Patent Owner’s unsupported argument, the desired QoS may be received from the cellular network. Moreover, for the reasons explained above, we determine that the broadest reasonable interpretation of “quality of service” is “an indication of grade or level of performance associated with a computed position estimate.”” slip op. at 19

    • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableUnpatentable

      “mobile terminal “determining” a “desired” quality of service because, in King, the mobile station receives a QoS parameter from the network are based on Patent Owner’s proposed construction, which we do not adopt. See supra Section II.C. As explained in the claim construction section above, Patent Owner’s proposal to limit “determining a desired quality of service” to “ascertaining a quality of service associated with a computed position estimate as a function of any user- or position application-selectable input related to quality of service” unreasonably limits the claim to one embodiment in the specification. See supra Section II.C. Moreover, as explained above, Patent Owner’s claim construction argument that the desired QoS is not sent from the cellular network to the mobile terminal is unreasonably narrow in light of express disclosures in the ’815 patent specification that determining a desired quality of service includes receiving a specified quality of service from a source external to the mobile terminal. See id. Thus, Patent Owner’s arguments distinguishing King because King’s mobile terminal receives a QoS from the cellular network, and that King’s mobile terminal does not determine the desired QoS, rest on a proposed claim construction which we do not adopt. Patent Owner’s remaining arguments distinguishing King are based on requirements not recited in the claim—that the quality of service be chosen by a user or a positioning application, and that the quality of service be an input which can prioritize criteria according the user or positioning application’s preference. The disputed limitation merely recites “determining a desired quality of service” without specifying the source of desired quality of service or requiring multiple options for prioritizing criteria (such as the options of most accurate, fastest, or least expensive). Although one embodiment in the ’815 patent specification is providing a user with the ability to select from a number of options, claim 1 is not specific to that embodiment. Indeed, as explained above, claim 1 at least encompasses the subject matter of dependent claims 8, 9, and 10, and only claim 10 is directed to prompting a user to input the desired quality of service. And, claim 10 is not limited to a “selectable input” and does not require input which can prioritize criteria according the user or positioning application’s preference. In sum, Patent Owner’s arguments that King does not disclose “determining a desired quality of service” are based on an unreasonably narrow reading of this claim limitation. Accordingly, for the above reasons, we determine that Petitioners have shown that King discloses “determining a desired quality of service,” as recited in claim 1.” slip op. at 31

    • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedDecided for petitioner

      “We also credit and find persuasive, as supported by King, Dr. Goldberg’s testimony (i) that the features on which Petitioners rely are all applicable to assisted GPS; (ii) that the use of DGPS data does not exclude the use of other aiding data such as ephemeris data; and (iii) that an ordinarily skilled artisan would have recognized that King’s embedded algorithm could be used with the steps illustrated in Figures 5, 9A, and 9B of King. Ex. 1056 ¶¶ 32–34. Indeed, the final point is corroborated by the claims of King, which illustrate that the embedded algorithm is one way of computing the predicted accuracy per step 608 of Figure 9A. Specifically, claim 1 of King recites a method for determining a location of the mobile radio handset that includes receiving a point-to-point ephemeris message that includes ephemeris data, receiving a point-to-point differential correction message that includes differential correction data, and determining a prediction of an accuracy of the computed location. Ex. 1026, 28:17–46. According to King, Figures 9A and 9B “are a flowchart of the operation of the handset . . . for request/receive and point-to-point delivery of ephemeris and differential correction data in accordance with the preferred embodiment of the present invention.” Id. at 4:20–24. Claim 3 of King depends from claim 1 and recites that the step of determining a prediction of the accuracy comprises determining a prediction based on covariance information derived by a Weighted Least Square fixing method. Id. at 28:53–58. King discloses a Weighted Least Square fixing method only in connection with the embedded algorithm. See id. at 22:53–24:35.” slip op. at 39

    Patent outcomesUS 6,535,815 unpatentable
    Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 6,535,815
  • PTAB · Jan 25, 2017 · IPR2015-01583 · APJ Patrick R Scanlon · IPR · Final written decision

    Claims 1, 13, and 17–20 are unpatentable as obvious over Korpela and Beaton.

    RulingsFinal written decision
    • Skill levelSkill level board ownDecided for petitioner

      “Given that the parties’ proposed levels of ordinary skill are substantially similar, we adopt a hybrid of the two proposals for the purposes of this Final Written Decision. Specifically, a person having ordinary skill in the art, for the purposes of the analysis below, is a person having a bachelor’s degree in computer engineering, computer science, or electrical engineering, and five years of experience with communications systems and networking, cellular communication protocols, and/or real-time embedded systems, or equivalent education and experience. Our analysis, however, would not differ if we adopted the level of ordinary skill set forth by either party.” slip op. at 8

    • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed board ownOther

      “To clarify this issue, we note that claim 1 recites “[a] portable wireless communications device, comprising: . . . a read only memory (ROM) having . . . a control program.” Ex. 1001, 7:2–11 (emphases added). Claim 1 also recites “a control processor controlling the operation of said transmitter and said receiver in response to said control messages according to said control program,” and “said man-machine interface operates under the control of said control processor according to said control program.” Id. at 7:16–18, 7:20–22 (emphases added). Each of these recitations of “said control program” refers to the previously recited control program. Thus, Petitioner is correct that claim 1 is not necessarily limited to a single control program because, by virtue of the open-ended language, the portable wireless communications device could include control programs in addition to the control program recited in the claim. Nevertheless, we interpret claim 1 as requiring the transmitter and the receiver and the man-machine interface as being controlled according to the same control program. Other than this clarification, we determine that no other terms in the challenged claims require express construction for purpose of this Final Written Decision.” slip op. at 10

    • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundUnpatentableUnpatentable

      “We find, as Petitioner contends, relying on citations to Beaton and Mr.Ulrich’s testimony, that Beaton discloses a control program written in Java stored in a ROM along with a Java interpreter. Ex. 1023, 4:51–5:11; Ex. 1026 ¶¶ 207–208; see, e.g. Pet. 50 (citing Ex. 1023, 4:51–5:11; Ex. 1026 ¶ 209). Also, we find Korpela discloses a ROM containing a control program and the possibility of storing a control program in an interpreted language and an interpreter for the control program instead of a compiler and a protocol code file. Ex. 1024, 10, 17; Ex. 1026 ¶¶ 201–218; see Pet. 44, 47–48 (arguing same). Our finding is based on citations to Korpela and on Mr. Ulrich’s testimony, which we credit because it cites to Korpela and thus discloses underlying facts on which his opinion is based. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.65(a) (“Expert testimony that does not disclose the underlying facts or data on which the opinion is based is entitled to little or no weight.”). For the reasons that follow, we determine the combination of Korpela and Beaton set forth by Petitioner would have conveyed to one of ordinary skill in the art the limitation of a ROM having a Java control program and a Java interpreter program, as recited in claim 1. We do not agree with Patent Owner’s argument to the contrary. Despite any alleged deficiencies, Petitioner provides persuasive evidence that, at the time of the invention, Java also provided several known advantages—such as platform independence, high performance, security, and simplicity. Reply 16 (citing Ex. 1026, 33, 37 (citing Ex. 1022, 9); Ex. 1008, 11). Our reviewing court has recognized that a given course of action often has simultaneous advantages and disadvantages, and this does not necessarily obviate any or all reasons to combine the references. See Winner Int’l Royalty Corp. v. Wang, 202 F.3d 1340, 1349 n.8 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (“The fact that the motivating benefit comes at the expense of another benefit, however, should not nullify its use as a basis to modify the disclosure of one reference with the teachings of another. Instead, the benefits, both lost and gained, should be weighed against one another.”). In this case, the evidence of record does not support a finding that the disadvantages alleged by Patent Owner outweigh the several advantages of using Java. That the ’310 patent fails to explain how the disadvantages Patent Owner asserts would have dissuaded a skilled artisan from using Java were overcome by the claimed invention also supports our finding.” slip op. at 17

    • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of success › Teaching awayTeaching away not foundDecided for petitioner

      “reports. For example, regarding Exhibit 1022, Petitioner correctly points out that “the very next sentence of the report states that ‘[h]owever, by combining certain Java programming conventions with special implementation techniques, it is possible to support varying degrees of realtime reliability,’ including ‘100% guaranteed compliance with hard-real-time constraints.’” Reply 20 (quoting Ex. 1022, 1). Exhibit 1022 also states that “[t]he benefits of a Real-Time Java standard include lower development and maintenance costs, quicker time to market, increased portability, enhanced network connectivity, improved reliability, and increased functionality of real-time systems.” Exhibit 1022, 2 (emphasis added). In view of these additional statements, we determine that Exhibit 1022 does not teach away from using Java in a real-time application. Regarding Exhibit 1013, the same person who states “you can’t write hard real-time parts in Java,” also states, regarding an effort to define real-time extensions to Java, “[y]ou still won’t get microsecond latencies in Java, but you will get safe real-time applications.” Ex. 1013, 6. As such, neither one of these two Exhibits, which represent only a small sample of the commentators in the Java community in any event, completely discredit the use of Java in real-time applications. We, thus, are not persuaded that the statements noted by Patent Owner would have dissuaded one of ordinary skill in the art from making the proposed combination. See DePuy Spine, Inc. v. Medtronic Sofamor Danek, Inc., 567 F.3d 1314, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2009).” slip op. at 18

    Patent outcomesUS 6,418,310 unpatentable
    Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR
    Patents in suitUS 6,418,310
  • PTAB · Jan 25, 2017 · IPR2015-01628 · APJ Stacy B Margolies · IPR · Final written decision

    Petitioners did not show claim 11 unpatentable under either § 103 ground because they did not establish a persuasive motivation to combine Usui and Gong.

    RulingsFinal written decision
    • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

      “Patent Owner does not challenge Dr. Malek’s testimony regarding the level of skill in the art. See generally PO Resp. However, Dr. Muftic, Patent Owner’s declarant, opines that a person of ordinary skill in the art “would probably have had a Bachelor’s degree in computer science, with at least two years’ experience in the field of software security.” Ex. 2010 ¶ 22. Dr. Muftic’s proposed level of ordinary skill differs slightly from Dr. Malek’s. Patent Owner, however, does not cite the above testimony in its Patent Owner Response. Nor does Patent Owner or Dr. Muftic quarrel with the definition proposed by Petitioner and Dr. Malek. See generally PO Resp. We determine that the level of ordinary skill proposed by Petitioners’ declarant is consistent with the challenged patent and the asserted prior art, and we therefore adopt Dr. Malek’s definition of the level of ordinary skill in the art for the purposes of the analysis below. However, our analysis would not differ if we were to adopt Dr. Muftic’s definition.” slip op. at 14

    • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

      “Petitioners propose constructions for a number of terms, and asserts that “interface component,” “interception module,” “decision entity,” “security access manager,” and “access controller” are means-plus-function limitations. Pet. 16–20; Pet. Br. 5–15. Patent Owner disagrees that the foregoing terms are means-plus-function limitations and asserts that only “software services component” be explicitly construed. PO Br. 6–16; PO Resp. 8–9. As explained below, the dispositive issue in this case is whether Petitioners provide a persuasive articulated reason with rational underpinning to support their contention that a person of ordinary skill would have been motivated to combine Usui and Gong. In reaching this issue, we determine that no claim terms require express construction.” slip op. at 15

    • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

      “Indeed, Patent Owner cites uncontroverted evidence that in designing the J2ME platform for mobile phones, Sun Microsystems did not use the full security of the Java 2 Standard Edition and its fine-grained protection domains like that described in Gong. See Ex. 2010 ¶¶ 210, 211, 223, 224. For example, the specification for the CLDC of J2ME, which defines a “standard, minimum-footprint Java platform for small, resource-constrained, connected devices,” states that “the J2SE security model is too memory-consuming to be included in a CLDC device that allows only a few hundred kilobytes of total memory budget.” Ex. 2014, 14, 25; see also PO Resp. 21– 26. In addition, a 2000 JavaOne presentation from a Sun Microsystems employee explains that the “J2SE platform security model is much larger than the entire CLDC implementation” and that the “full J2SE™ platform security model” cannot be supported in CLDC target devices. Ex. 2015, 48. In view of this context, Petitioners lack of explanation regarding purported design incentives that would have prompted a skilled artisan to make the proposed combination is significant. See, e.g., Ex. 1010, 5 (disclosing that the Usui team designed the user interface (UI) “so that the Java part was as small as possible” to “achieve good performance of the UI capability in the mobile phone” and noting that “[r]eleasing resources that are no longer used by Java applications is very important for resource-limited systems such as mobile phones”); Ex. 1001, 1:55–61 (disclosing that “drastically increased functionality” in cellular telecommunications systems “has placed substantial demands on the developers of mobile terminals” and this demand “is exacerbated by the fact that a mobile terminal is a ‘resource scarce’ environment that is limited in size, memory, and power”).” slip op. at 30

    Patent outcomesUS 7,149,510 not shown unpatentable
    Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 7,149,510
  • PTAB · Jan 25, 2017 · IPR2015-01622 · APJ Stacy B Margolies · IPR · Final written decision

    Claims 1–5 and 7–10 were not shown unpatentable because Petitioners did not establish a persuasive motivation to combine Usui and Oaks, including for claim 4’s ground adding Spencer.

    RulingsFinal written decision
    • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

      “Patent Owner does not challenge Dr. Malek’s testimony regarding the level of skill in the art. See generally PO Resp. However, Dr. Muftic, Patent Owner’s declarant, opines that a person of ordinary skill in the art “would probably have had a Bachelor’s degree in computer science, with at least two years’ experience in the field of software security.” Ex. 2009 ¶ 22. Dr. Muftic’s proposed level of ordinary skill differs slightly from Dr. Malek’s. Patent Owner, however, does not cite the above testimony in its Patent Owner Response. Nor does Patent Owner or Dr. Muftic quarrel with the definition proposed by Petitioner and Dr. Malek. See generally PO Resp. We determine that the level of ordinary skill proposed by Petitioners’ declarant is consistent with the challenged patent and the asserted prior art, and we therefore adopt Dr. Malek’s definition of the level of ordinary skill in the art for the purposes of the analysis below. However, our analysis would not differ if we were to adopt Dr. Muftic’s definition.” slip op. at 14

    • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

      “Petitioners propose constructions for a number of terms, and asserts that “interface component,” “interception module,” “decision entity,” “security access manager,” and “access controller” are means-plus-function limitations. Pet. 16–22; Pet. Br. 5–15. Patent Owner disagrees that the foregoing terms are means-plus-function limitations and asserts that only “software services component” and “identification of requesting application domain software” be explicitly construed. PO Br. 6–17; PO Resp. 7–11. As explained below, the dispositive issue in this case is whether Petitioners provide a persuasive articulated reason with rational underpinning to support their contention that a person of ordinary skill would have been motivated to combine Usui and Oaks. In reaching this issue, we determine that no claim terms require express construction.” slip op. at 15

    • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot shown unpatentableMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentable

      “explanation for why, simply because the two references are in the same field of endeavor, a skilled artisan would have had reason to make the proposed combination. See Ex. 1301 ¶ 173. Nor do Petitioners or Dr. Malek elucidate what design incentives would have prompted a skilled artisan to use the finegrained security control of Oaks with the mobile phone platform of Usui, given the design constraints of less memory and resources of a mobile phone. See, e.g., Ex. 1010, 5; Ex. 2014, 14, 25; Ex. 2015, 8. Indeed, Patent Owner cites uncontroverted evidence that in designing the J2ME platform for mobile phones, Sun Microsystems did not use the full security of the Java 2 Standard Edition like that described in Oaks. See Ex. 2009 ¶¶ 90 (security manager does not exist in J2ME), 185. For example, the specification for the CLDC of J2ME, which defines a “standard, minimum-footprint Java platform for small, resource-constrained, connected devices,” states that “the J2SE security model is too memory-consuming to be included in a CLDC device that allows only a few hundred kilobytes of total memory budget.” Ex. 2014, 14, 25; see also PO Resp. 17. In addition, a 2000 JavaOne presentation from a Sun Microsystems employee explains that the “J2SE platform security model is much larger than the entire CLDC implementation” and that the “full J2SE™ platform security model” cannot be supported in CLDC target devices. Ex. 2015, 48. In view of this context, Petitioners lack of explanation regarding purported design incentives that would have prompted a skilled artisan to make the proposed combination is significant. See, e.g., Ex. 1010, 5 (disclosing that the Usui team designed the user interface (UI) “so that the Java part was as small as possible” to “achieve good performance of the UI capability in the mobile phone” and noting that “[r]eleasing resources that are no longer used by Java applications is very important for resource-limited systems such as mobile phones”); Ex. 1001, 1:55–61 (disclosing that “drastically increased functionality” in cellular telecommunications systems “has placed substantial demands on the developers of mobile terminals” and this demand “is exacerbated by the fact that a mobile terminal is a ‘resource scarce’ environment that is limited in size, memory, and power”).” slip op. at 27

    Patent outcomesUS 7,149,510 not shown unpatentable
    Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 7,149,510
  • PTAB · Jan 25, 2017 · IPR2015-01605 · APJ Stacy B Margolies · IPR · Final written decision

    Claims 1–5 and 7–10 were not shown unpatentable because Petitioners failed to establish a persuasive motivation to combine Usui and Gong, including for claim 4’s ground with Spencer.

    RulingsFinal written decision
    • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

      “Patent Owner does not challenge Dr. Malek’s testimony regarding the level of skill in the art. See generally PO Resp. However, Dr. Muftic, Patent Owner’s declarant, opines that a person of ordinary skill in the art “would probably have had a Bachelor’s degree in computer science, with at least two years’ experience in the field of software security.” Ex. 2003 ¶ 22. Dr. Muftic’s proposed level of ordinary skill differs slightly from Dr. Malek’s. Patent Owner, however, does not cite the above testimony in its Patent Owner Response. Nor does Patent Owner or Dr. Muftic quarrel with the definition proposed by Petitioner and Dr. Malek. See generally PO Resp. We determine that the level of ordinary skill proposed by Petitioners’ declarant is consistent with the challenged patent and the asserted prior art, and we therefore adopt Dr. Malek’s definition of the level of ordinary skill in the art for the purposes of the analysis below. However, our analysis would not differ if we were to adopt Dr. Muftic’s definition.” slip op. at 14

    • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

      “Petitioners propose constructions for a number of terms, and asserts that “interface component,” “interception module,” “decision entity,” “security access manager,” and “access controller” are means-plus-function limitations. Pet. 16–22; Pet. Br. 5–15. Patent Owner disagrees that the foregoing terms are means-plus-function limitations and asserts that only “software services component” and “identification of requesting application domain software” be explicitly construed. PO Br. 6–17; PO Resp. 7–11. As explained below, the dispositive issue in this case is whether Petitioners provide a persuasive articulated reason with rational underpinning to support their contention that a person of ordinary skill would have been motivated to combine Usui and Gong. In reaching this issue, we determine that no claim terms require express construction.” slip op. at 15

    • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

      “general field of endeavor and, as recognized by the Supreme Court, known work in one field of endeavor may prompt variations of it for use in either the same field or a different one based on design incentives or other market forces if the variations are predictable to one of ordinary skill in the art.” Pet. 29–30 (citing Ex. 1201 ¶ 175) (emphasis omitted). Petitioners’ declarant, Dr. Malek, repeats this statement from the Petition but fails to provide any additional explanation for why, simply because the two references are in the same field of endeavor, a skilled artisan would have had reason to make the proposed combination. See Ex. 1201 ¶ 175. Nor do Petitioners or Dr. Malek elucidate what design incentives would have prompted a skilled artisan to use the fine-grained security control of Gong with the mobile phone platform of Usui, given the design constraints of less memory and resources of a mobile phone. See, e.g., Ex. 1010, 5; Ex. 2014, 14, 25; Ex. 2015, 8. Indeed, Patent Owner cites uncontroverted evidence that in designing the J2ME platform for mobile phones, Sun Microsystems did not use the full security of the Java 2 Standard Edition and its fine-grained protection domains like that described in Gong. See Ex. 2003 ¶¶ 187, 188, 200, 201. For example, the specification for the CLDC of J2ME, which defines a “standard, minimum-footprint Java platform for small, resource-constrained, connected devices,” states that “the J2SE security model is too memory-consuming to be included in a CLDC device that allows only a few hundred kilobytes of total memory budget.” Ex. 2014, 14, 25; see also PO Resp. 17– 18. In addition, a 2000 JavaOne presentation from a Sun Microsystems employee explains that the “J2SE platform security model is much larger than the entire CLDC implementation” and that the “full J2SE™ platform security model” cannot be supported in CLDC target devices. Ex. 2015, 48. In view of this context, Petitioners lack of explanation regarding purported design incentives that would have prompted a skilled artisan to make the proposed combination is significant. See, e.g., Ex. 1010, 5 (disclosing that the Usui team designed the user interface (UI) “so that the Java part was as small as possible” to “achieve good performance of the UI capability in the mobile phone” and noting that “[r]eleasing resources that are no longer used by Java applications is very important for resource-limited systems such as mobile phones”); Ex. 1001, 1:55–61 (disclosing that “drastically increased functionality” in cellular telecommunications systems “has placed substantial demands on the developers of mobile terminals” and this demand” slip op. at 29

    Patent outcomesUS 7,149,510 not shown unpatentable
    Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 7,149,510
  • PTAB · Jan 25, 2017 · IPR2015-01602 · APJ Patrick R Scanlon · IPR · Final written decision

    Claims 1–12 and 15 are unpatentable under § 103 over Iwata and Stephan (claims 1, 2, and 15), and Iwata, Stephan, and Capps (claims 3–12).

    RulingsFinal written decision
    • Skill levelSkill level patent owner adoptedDecided for patent owner

      “We agree with Petitioner’s second point. Mr. Ward actually opines that a person of ordinary skill in the art “would probably have had a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering or computer engineering, at least 2–3 years of hands-on experience working with hand held contact-sensitive user interface devices, and direct knowledge of the types of user interfaces used in mobile phones and handheld devices in 1997.” Ex. 2004 ¶ 22. In reaching this conclusion, Mr. Ward indicates he “considered the ‘931 patent, the types of problems encountered in the art of handheld radio telephone devices and handheld devices, the prior art solutions to those problems, and the educational level of workers active in the field.” Id. In contrast, Dr. Wolfe does not explain the basis for his opinion. 1201 ¶ 58. We determine that the level of ordinary skill proposed by Mr. Ward is consistent with the challenged patent and the asserted prior art, and we therefore adopt this definition of the level of ordinary skill in the art for the purposes of the analysis below. Our analysis would not differ, however, if we adopted Dr. Wolfe’s definition.” slip op. at 9

    • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededDenied

      “given its broadest reasonable construction in light of the specification of the patent in which it appears.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b); see also Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2144–46 (2016) (upholding the use of the broadest reasonable interpretation standard). There is a presumption that a claim term carries its ordinary and customary meaning. CCS Fitness, Inc. v. Brunswick Corp., 288 F.3d 1359, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2002); In re Translogic Tech., Inc., 504 F.3d 1249, 1257 (Fed. Cir. 2007). Furthermore, only those terms that are in controversy need to be construed, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy. Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999). Prior to our Institution Decision, Petitioner proposed constructions for “contact-sensitive transducer . . . which produces an output signal” and “graphical object(s).” Pet. 10–13. Patent Owner did not propose any express constructions or challenge Petitioner’s proposed construction. See generally Prelim. Resp. 2–15. In the Institution Decision, we determined that no claim term required express construction. Inst. Dec. 6. In its Response, Patent Owner indicates that it “generally agrees that the constructions proposed by [Petitioner] are in keeping with how a [person of ordinary skill in the art] would have understood those terms.” PO Resp. 29. Accordingly, we determine, for purpose of this Final Written Decision, that no term in the challenged claims requires express construction. See, e.g., Wellman, Inc. v. Eastman Chem. Co., 642 F.3d 1355, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (“[C]laim terms need only be construed ‘to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 10

    • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundUnpatentable

      “As discussed above, Petitioner asserts four reasons supporting why one of ordinary skill in the art would have been led to make the proposed modification. See supra Section III.D.3.a.v. After considering all evidence and arguments, we determine that Petitioner has provided a persuasive articulated reason with rational underpinning to support its contention that a person of ordinary skill would have had a reason or motivation to combine Iwata and Stephan in the manner provided. We also determine that Petitioner has provided analysis explaining how the combination would have conveyed to one of ordinary skill in the art the claim limitations. See supra Section III.D.3.a. c) Conclusion In view of the above, we determine that Petitioner has demonstrated, by a preponderance of the evidence, that claim 1 is unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as directed to subject matter that would have been obvious to a person of ordinary skill in the art in light of Iwata and Stephan.” slip op. at 30

    • Expert testimonyPatent owner expert discountedOther

      “The only support provided for asserting that 10 millimeters is “a standard assumption for finger size in the art of touch screen devices” is the testimony of Mr. Ward. Id. at 32 (citing Ex. 2004 ¶ 79). Mr. Ward’s testimony, however, merely repeats this statement from the Patent Owner Response without providing any supporting evidence or reasoning. Ex. 2004 ¶ 79. Accordingly, we give this testimony little weight. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.65(a) (“Expert testimony that does not disclose the underlying facts or data on which the opinion is based is entitled to little to no weight.”). Rather, we agree with Petitioner that the evidence of record does not support the conclusion that, when combining Iwata and Stephan in the manner proposed, a skilled artisan “would have modified Iwata to necessarily have a scroll region width of 3.3 millimeters.” See Reply 28–29 (emphasis added).” slip op. at 20

    Patent outcomesUS RE43,931 unpatentable
    Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR
  • PTAB · Jan 18, 2017 · IPR2015-01558 · APJ Elizabeth M Roesel · IPR · Final written decision

    Claims 1–17 are unpatentable: claims 1–7 and 10–17 as obvious over Link, and claims 8–9 as obvious over Link and Nguyen.

    RulingsFinal written decision
    • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

      “We accept Petitioner’s assertions regarding the level of ordinary skill in the art, as set forth in the paragraph bridging pages 3 and 4 of the Petition. Our finding is supported by Dr. Huck’s testimony (Ex. 1002 ¶ 12), as well as the prior art references cited by Petitioner, which reflect the level of skill in the art asserted by Petitioner. See, e.g., Ex. 1004 ¶¶ 160, 316 (discussing use of aqueous droplets in microfluidic devices as “nanoreactors” for chemical and biochemical reactions and assays); Ex. 1006, 2 (discussing principles of fluid dynamics relevant to droplet formation in microfluidic devices); Ex. 1009,1 2032 (review article addressing fluid dynamics of microfluidic droplets, including for “lab on a chip” applications in which chemical or biochemical reactions are performed in droplets). See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (the prior art, itself, can reflect the level of skill in the art).” slip op. at 7

    • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction needed

      “their broadest reasonable interpretation in light of the specification of the patent in which they appear. 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b); Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2144–46 (2016). Under that standard, we generally give claim terms their ordinary and customary meaning, as understood by a person of ordinary skill in the art in the context of the entire disclosure. In re Translogic Tech., Inc., 504 F.3d 1249, 1257 (Fed. Cir. 2007). We construe claim terms only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy. Wellman, Inc. v. Eastman Chem. Co., 642 F.3d 1355, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). Construction of claims 1–3 is discussed below in connection with patentability of those claims over Link. Except for the terms of claims 1–3 discussed below, we determine that it is not necessary to provide an explicit construction of any other claim term for purposes of this decision.” slip op. at 6

    • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for petitioner

      “Under a broadest reasonable construction, the phrase, “a reservoir,” in claim 2 means one or more reservoirs. See Baldwin Graphic Sys., Inc. v. Siebert, Inc., 512 F.3d 1338, 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (“[A]n indefinite article ‘a’ or ‘an’ in patent parlance carries the meaning of ‘one or more’ in open-ended claims containing the transitional phrase ‘comprising.’”). Applying this construction in context, claim 2 requires that each carrier fluid channel be in fluid communication with one or more reservoirs, all of which apply a same constant pressure to the carrier fluid. Based on that construction, we do not accept Patent Owner’s position that claim 2 requires a common syringe for all of the oil channels in the system. PO Resp. 40.” slip op. at 34

    • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)UnpatentableUnpatentable

      “droplet formation disclosed in Link relates to the step of “applying a same constant pressure to the carrier fluid in each of the immiscible carrier fluid channels.” Ex. 1001, 16:17–28. More specifically, we find that, although Link teaches controlling pressures applied to the carrier fluid and aqueous fluid channels to regulate droplet size and periodicity (Ex. 1004 ¶ 166), Link does not expressly disclose applying a “same constant pressure” to the carrier fluid in each of the immiscible carrier fluid channels, as recited in the penultimate step of claim 1. For the reasons discussed below, we find that the preponderance of the evidence supports that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have found it obvious to implement Link’s disclosures by applying a same constant pressure to the carrier fluid in each of the immiscible carrier fluid channels. This step of claim 1 includes two aspects: (1) applying a same pressure, and (2) applying a constant pressure. We discuss each aspect below.” slip op. at 16

    Patent outcomesUS 8,658,430 unpatentable
    Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 8,658,430
  • PTAB · Jan 4, 2017 · IPR2015-01411 · APJ Kalyan K Deshpande · IPR · Final written decision

    Claims 1, 9–13, 15, 19, and 20 are unpatentable as obvious over Zhang and Altmejd and over Orenstien and Filippo.

    RulingsFinal written decision
    • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed board ownDecided for petitioner

      “We interpreted “power conversion unit,” under the broadest reasonable interpretation, to mean “a system or device that changes power from one form or level to another” in our Decision to Institute. Dec. 5‒6. Patent Owner has not presented any further arguments that would require us to disturb that construction. Accordingly, on this record, we interpret “power conversion unit” to mean “a system or device that changes power from one form or level to another.” See id. 2. “power management unit” Claim 1 recites a “power management unit.” In our Decision to Institute, we interpreted “power management unit” to mean “hardware or software that manages or assists in managing of power.” Id. at 6‒8. Patent Owner does not present any arguments that would require us to disturb that construction. Accordingly, on this record, we interpret “power management unit” to mean “hardware or software that manages or assists in managing of power.” See id..” slip op. at 5

    • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successUnpatentableMotivation foundUnpatentable

      “blocks and processor cores, including the vast differences in sizes and structure, communication patterns, timing issues, and redesign of circuitry are not persuasive because they assume a bodily incorporation of Altmejd’s functional units in to Zhang’s processor core system, whereas Petitioner’s rationale to combine is limited to power-management of processor cores of Zhang with the power-management policy taught by Altmejd. “The test for obviousness is not whether the features of a secondary reference may be bodily incorporated into the structure of the primary reference. . . . Rather, the test is what the combined teachings of those references would have suggested to those of ordinary skill in the art.” In re Keller, 642 F.2d 413, 425 (CCPA 1981). Here, the issue is what the combination of Zhang and Altmejd would have suggested to a person with ordinary skill in the art. Altmejd discloses the adjustment of power to functional units based on usage amounts, and a person with ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to combine the specifics of Altmejd’s power management policies in to Zhang. Pet. 16‒17 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶ 47). Specifically, a person with ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to combine Altmejd’s power management policy to Zhang in order to provide a more granular and efficient power management policy, and, as explained by Mr. Gafford, Altmejd’s power management policy would lead to more cost savings. Id. at 17‒18 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶ 48). Petitioner identifies that this motivation is explicitly disclosed in the Zhang and Altmejd, where Zhang discloses the individual turning off of processor cores “may result in a reduction of the overall power consumed by the processor” (Ex. 1006 ¶ 30), and Altmejd discloses that “it is advantageous from a power savings perspective to reduce the voltage when possible because the power saved is proportional to the square of the voltage reduction, whereas the power savings is linear with respect to frequency reductions” (Ex. 1007, 7:9–13). Pet. 18‒19 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶ 49). Petitioner’s analysis demonstrates that the claimed combination is merely a combination of known elements, for their known use to achieve a predictable result. Accordingly, we are not persuaded by Patent Owner’s argument that a person with ordinary skill in the art would not have been led to combine the teachings of Zhang and Altmejd because of the difference between functional units and processor cores only. Rather, Petitioner has demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that a person with ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to combine the power management policy described by Altmejd in to Zhang’s multi-core processor management system.” slip op. at 14

    • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of success › Teaching awayTeaching away not foundDecided for petitioner

      “We disagree with Patent Owner. “A reference may be said to teach away when a person of ordinary skill, upon reading the reference, would be discouraged from following the path set out in the reference, or would be led in a direction divergent from the path that was taken by the applicant.” Ricoh Co., Ltd. v. Quanta Computer, Inc., 550 F.3d 1325, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (citations and quotation marks omitted). We are unpersuaded by Patent Owner’s citations to Orenstien as criticizing an on/off scheme as teaching away from such a scheme. Orenstien’s disclosure of such a scheme’s impact on performance and latency is, at best, a general preference to minimize the use of an on/off scheme. A reference does not teach away if it merely expresses a general preference for an alternative invention from amongst options available to the ordinarily skilled artisan, but does not discredit or discourage investigation into the invention claimed. In re Fulton, 391 F.3d 1195, 1201 (Fed. Cir. 2004). Orenstien’s characterization is more fully understood as a preference, rather than discouragement or discrediting, because, as argued by Petitioner, Orenstien discloses an embodiment that turns a processor core off. Pet. Reply 15 (citing Ex. 1008, 6:6‒46, Fig. 4; Pet. 43; Ex. 1002 ¶ 103).” slip op. at 25

    • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)UnpatentableUnpatentable

      “We disagree with Patent Owner. Claim 1 recites “a first power conversion unit configured to independently supply a first supply voltage to the first core” and “a second power conversion unit configured to independently supply a second supply voltage to the second core.” Claim 1 further recites “the first supply voltage being controlled based on the information relating to the usage amount of the first core and being controlled independent of the information relating to the usage amount of the second core” and “the second supply voltage being controlled based on the information relating to the usage amount of the second core and being controlled independent of the information relating to the usage amount of the first core.” As such, although we agree with Patent Owner that claim 1 explicitly requires that the voltages supplied to the first and second core are based on usage information of that core, and independent of the usage information of the other core, we agree with Petitioner that claim 1 does not recite the “based only on” language as alleged by Patent Owner. Regardless, we determine that the combination of Zhang and Altmejd discloses the claimed limitations under either construction. See id. As discussed above, Zhang discloses supplying voltages to each core” slip op. at 16

    Patent outcomesUS 7,664,971 unpatentable
    Claim construction§ 103 obviousness
    Patents in suitUS 7,664,971
  • PTAB · Dec 27, 2016 · IPR2015-01409 · APJ Garth D Baer · IPR · Final written decision

    Claims 4, 8, and 9 are unpatentable under § 103; claim 30 was not shown unpatentable because the prior art did not teach shutdown based on total processor use below a threshold.

    RulingsFinal written decision
    • BurdenOther

      “III. ANALYSIS A. PRINCIPLES OF LAW Petitioner bears the burden of proving unpatentability of the challenged claims, and that burden never shifts to Patent Owner. Dynamic Drinkware, LLC v. Nat’l Graphics, Inc., 800 F.3d 1375, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2015). To prevail, Petitioner must establish the facts supporting its challenge by a preponderance of the evidence. 35 U.S.C. § 316(e); 37 C.F.R. § 42.1(d).” slip op. at 7

    • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Prior-art status of a reference › Printed publication / public accessibilityPrinted publication establishedDecided for petitioner

      “Public accessibility” is the touchstone in determining whether a reference is a “printed publication.” In re Hall, 781 F.2d 897, 898–99 (Fed. Cir. 1986). A reference is publicly accessible upon a satisfactory showing that such document has been made available to the extent that persons interested and ordinarily skilled in the subject matter or art exercising reasonable diligence, can locate it. Kyocera Wireless Corp. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 545 F.3d 1340, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (quoting SRI Int’l, Inc. v. Internet Sec. Sys., Inc., 511 F.3d 1186, 1194 (Fed. Cir. 2008)). slip op. at 13

    • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner

      “construction in light of the specification of the patent in which [they] appear[].” 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b). We presume a claim term carries its “ordinary and customary meaning,” which is “the meaning that the term would have to a person of ordinary skill in the art in question” at the time of the invention. In re Translogic Tech., Inc., 504 F.3d 1249, 1257 (Fed. Cir. 2007). We construe only those claim terms necessary to resolve the controversy. See Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999).” slip op. at 8

    • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedDecided for patent owner

      “We decline to disregard all of Mr. Gafford’s testimony. In light of Mr. Gafford’s education and experience (a Bachelor of Science Degree in Electrical Engineering and over 43 years working for corporations in the design, manufacturing, and support for computer systems and microprocessors, see Ex. 1011 ¶¶ 14–20), we see no reason why Mr. Gafford’s frequent participation in other cases—even to ultimately mixed results—makes his testimony here unhelpful in understanding the evidence in this case. See Fed. R. Evid. 702(a). In assessing the merits of this case, we have considered the proffered testimony from Mr. Gafford, as well as Patent Owner’s Declarant Dr. Friedman, and accorded weight based on the testimony’s substantive persuasiveness.” slip op. at 29

    Patent outcomesUS 7,636,863 mixed
    Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 7,636,863
  • PTAB · Dec 15, 2016 · IPR2015-01222 · APJ Kevin F Turner · IPR · Final written decision

    Claims 1–11 and 13–15 are unpatentable as obvious over Strubbe and Rae; claims 12 and 16–20 were not shown unpatentable because the petition did not tie the connection-fee limitation to those references.

    RulingsFinal written decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Real party in interest / privityRpi dispute resolved for petitionerDecided for petitioner

      “We found Patent Owner’s arguments and evidence to be insufficient to show a real party-in-interest issue. Discovery Order 8–10. First, we found the mere existence of the relationship between Petitioner and a parent company (American Securities) to be insufficient to demonstrate a real party-in-interest issue. Discovery Order 8. In addition, we determined the evidence did not show that American Securities and Petitioner have “corporate boundaries that were inextricably intertwined.” Discovery Order 8. Second, we found the existence of common directors or employees between American Securities and Petitioner to be insufficient to show a real party-in-interest issue, unless the directors controlled or participated in the filing of the proceedings. Discovery Order 9. We found insufficient evidence that common officers between American Securities and Petitioner 9 were involved in the filing of the present proceedings or had the ability to direct the filing of the present proceedings. Discovery Order 9. Nor did we find persuasive evidence that American Securities provided any prior art to Petitioner in the instant proceedings. Discovery Order 9. Third, we found ambiguous and unreliable statements made by a non- lawyer CEO during settlement negotiations covering “ongoing intellectual property disputes” (see Discovery Motion 1) failed to demonstrate that American Securities funded and controlled the instant proceeding. Discovery Order 9; see Exs. 2006, 2011.” slip op. at 9

    • ExcludeMotion to exclude, deniedDenied

      “Similarly to the posture of Petitioner’s First Motion to Exclude, the current situation does not require us to assess the merits of Petitioner’s Second Motion to Exclude. See Discovery Order, 13 (indicating that Patent Owner’s evidence was insufficient, “even without excluding Patent Owner’s supporting evidence”). According to Petitioner, the two declarations filed by Patent Owner in support of its Motion for Additional Discovery allegedly recount statements made by Petitioner’s CEO during settlement discussions between Patent Owner and GTL. Mot. Exc. 2nd, 1–2.” slip op. at 12

    • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner

      “We agree with Petitioner. One portion of the Specification cited by Patent Owner details: “[t]he list of items displayed for the inmate may be selected based upon data stored in the inmate's profile on JAMS database 115.” Ex. 1001, 3:61–63 (emphasis added). The conditional nature of the selection need not be incorporated into claim 8. In addition, the instant claim language would also read on a display of all items, with indications of 18 availability with each item for the inmate, such that all items would be displayed instead of Patent Owner’s truncated listing. As such, we conclude that Patent Owner’s proposed construction of the language of claim 8 is overly narrow and is not adopted in the analysis that follows.” slip op. at 18

    • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

      “Petitioner’s declarant, Dr. Leonard J. Forys, testifies that one of ordinary skill in the art “would have a bachelor’s degree in Electrical Engineering, Computer Science, or an equivalent field as well as at least 2–3 years of academic or industry experience in a call center technology particularly computer telephony integration and in telephone networks in general.” Ex. 1003 ¶ 30; see Pet. 10 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 29–30). Patent Owner’s declarant, Mr. Ivan Zatkovich, proposes that Petitioner’s definition be adopted. Ex. 2012 ¶ 31. As such, we adopt Dr. Forys’ definition of the level of ordinary skill in the art for the purposes of the analysis below.” slip op. at 21

    Patent outcomesUS 8,750,486 mixed
    Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 8,750,486

Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.