• Stingray Group Inc. / Stingray Music USA, Inc. v. Edwin A. Hernandez-MondragonSome claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jun 10, 2026 · IPR2025-00350 · APJ Jason M Repko · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 7–12 were held unpatentable over Wannamaker alone or with Avellan; claims 1–6 and 13 were not shown unpatentable because Avellan did not teach the claimed screen-capture sequence and assembly.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level board ownDecided for petitioner

    “Patent Owner submits a similar definition and does not take issue with the Petition’s characterization of the level of ordinary skill in the art. PO Resp. 17. We determine that no express finding is necessary and that the level of ordinary skill in the art is reflected by the prior art of record. Any perceived difference in how each party characterizes a POSITA’s education, knowledge, and work experience does not change our analysis or conclusions.” slip op. at 5

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “Neither party has offered any claim construction arguments, relying on ordinary and customary meaning. Pet. 19–20; PO Resp. 18. We determine that construction of claim terms is not necessary to resolve the disputes raised by the parties in this proceeding.” slip op. at 5

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert discountedDecided for patent owner

    “Yet paragraph 122 of Mr. Lipoff’s declaration merely repeats the Petition’s argument almost verbatim. Compare Ex. 1007 ¶ 122, with Pet. 28. Mr. Lipoff does not add any citation to Avellan or any other source that supports his testimony. See Ex. 1007 ¶ 122. Nor does Mr. Lipoff offer any additional technical reasoning than what is stated in the Petition. Testimony may be entitled to little weight if it merely restates the petition’s unsupported, conclusory assertions without adding supporting evidence or technical reasoning. Xerox Corp. v. Bytemark, Inc., IPR2022-00624, Paper 9 at 15 (PTAB Aug. 24, 2022) (precedential). That is the case here.” slip op. at 8

  • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “We are persuaded by Patent Owner’s argument that claim 1 is not obvious over Avellan because it does not assemble a media stream of multimedia items using the recited screen captures. See PO Resp. 21–23. We agree with Patent Owner that the plain language of the claim requires more than transmitting individual media items. PO Sur-reply 20. To the extent that Avellan captures images, those images do not meet the claimed requirements for a “temporal sequence of screen captures” in the independent claims, which must (1) be of the web page rendered by a browser, (2) “define all the content of the web page at a given time,” (3) “illustrate a dynamic change of at least a portion of the content over time” when two of them are compared, and (4) used to assemble “the at least one media stream.” Rather, the record better supports Patent Owner’s argument that Avellan transmits the multimedia items separate from any media stream assembled from screen captures. PO Resp. 21–23; PO Sur-reply 20.” slip op. at 7

  Patent outcomesUS 10,524,002 mixed
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR
  Patents in suitUS 10,524,002
• Shenzhen Tuozhu Technology Co., Ltd. v. Stratasys, Inc.No claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jun 9, 2026 · IPR2025-00321 · APJ Christopher M Kaiser · IPR · Final written decision

  The Board held claims 1, 2, 5–7, 9, 16, and 17 not unpatentable because the asserted combinations did not establish the required purge-tower teachings or prior-art status.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Petitioner contends that one of ordinary skill in the art “would have had (1) at least a bachelor’s degree in Mechanical Engineering, Computer Engineering, Chemical Engineering, Materials Science, or a related field, and (2) at least two years of research or industry experience in 3D printing or materials used for 3D printing.” Pet. 5 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 14–16). Petitioner also argues that “[a]dditional experience could substitute for a formal degree or formal training (and vice versa).” Id. Patent Owner proposes a slightly different level of skill, arguing that a person of ordinary skill in the art “would have had a bachelor’s degree in Mechanical Engineering, Computer Engineering, Chemical Engineering, Materials Science, or a comparable field and at least two years of experience related to 3D printing, with additional experience potentially being a substitute for a formal degree or training (and vice versa).” Prelim. Resp. 24. Neither party explains why the outcome of this case would be affected by the adoption of any of the proffered definitions of a person of ordinary skill in the art. We adopt Petitioner’s assessment of the level of ordinary skill in the art, as it appears consistent with the ’324 patent and the asserted prior art. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001).” slip op. at 8

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownOther

    “According to the ’713 patent, “[p]urge tower 24 itself may be . . . recycled or otherwise discarded as desired.” Ex. 1001, 8:27–28. This description provides some support for Patent Owner’s view, because a purge tower too intimately integrated with the part would be difficult or impossible to recycle or discard. This is further supported by the ’713 patent’s statement that “purge tower 24 may be printed at any suitable location on build substrate 44 (i.e., at any location in the x-y build plane not occupied by 3D part 20 or support structure 22).” Id. at 8:30–34. It also is supported by Dr. Hickner’s testimony that the ’713 patent “clearly shows . . . the 24 purge tower separated from the part” and that “the purge tower is a separate physical object.” Ex. 2016, 28:8–10, 64:1–9. On the other hand, there is evidence supporting Petitioner’s view that, as long as the purge tower is generally separate from the part and the support structure, it may still make contact with those portions of the print. As noted above, “purge tower 24 may be printed at any suitable location on build substrate 44 (i.e., at any location in the x-y build plane not occupied by 3D part 20 or support structure 22).” Ex. 1001, 8:30–34. This language does not exclude locations adjacent to or in contact with the part or the support structure. Thus, determine that a “purge tower,” as that term is used in the context of the ’713 patent, may not be an integrated portion of a printed part or support structure but need not be free of all contact with the printed part or support structure.” slip op. at 9

  • BurdenNot shown unpatentable

    “There is evidence of record to support both Petitioner’s view and Patent Owner’s view. On the record developed at trial, however, we cannot say that the preponderance of the evidence favors Petitioner, who bears the burden of proof. See 35 U.S.C. § 316(e). Accordingly, Petitioner has not shown by a preponderance of the evidence that KISSlicer teaches printing a layer of a purge tower each time the printer switches one extruder to the operating mode. Because proving the obviousness of claims 1 and 16 requires such a showing, Petitioner has not shown by a preponderance of the evidence that claims 1 and 16 would have been obvious over the combination of Priedeman and KISSlicer. 5. Analysis of Remaining Claims Claims 2, 6, 7, 9, and 17 all depend, directly or indirectly, from claim 1 or claim 16. Accordingly, they all include the limitations of either claim 1 or claim 16. Because, as discussed above, Petitioner has not shown that the combination of Priedeman and KISSlicer teaches or suggests all the limitations of claims 1 and 16, Petitioner also has not proven by a preponderance of the evidence that claims 2, 6, 7, 9, and 17 would have been obvious over that combination of references.” slip op. at 21

  • Obviousness (§103) › Analogous artAnalogous artOther

    “On the record developed at trial, we agree with Petitioner. According to several industry forum posts, people interested in three-dimensional printing located the website where KISSlicer was posted between February 2012 and April 2012. Ex. 1028, 1 (post discussing and directing others to KISSlicer on April 11, 2012); Ex. 1031, 1 (two posts discussing KISSlicer on March 16, 2012, and March 21, 2012); Ex. 1032, 1 (two posts discussing KISSlicer on February 11, 2012, and February 14, 2012). Thus, not only was it possible for people of ordinary skill in the art to locate KISSlicer; people of ordinary skill in the art actually did locate it. Accordingly, Petitioner has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that KISSlicer was publicly accessible.” slip op. at 19

  Patent outcomesUS 9,421,713 not shown unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 9,421,713
• X Corp. v. Sterling Computers CorporationAll claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jun 9, 2026 · IPR2025-00299 · APJ Bach V Hoang · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–22 are unpatentable as obvious over the stated Dumais-based and Kircher/Krug grounds; Patent Owner’s and Petitioner’s motions to exclude are dismissed as moot.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Our Institution Decision adopted Petitioner’s definition of a person of ordinary skill in the art. Inst. Dec. 8–9. In its response, Patent Owner adopts Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill. See PO Resp. 14–15 (“Patent Owner and its expert adopt the Board’s definition for purposes of this Response”). Having considered the record, we continue to adopt Petitioner’s proposed level of skill, as articulated above. We are satisfied that Petitioner’s proposal comports with the level of skill necessary to understand and implement the teachings of the ’217 Patent. Accord Inst. Dec. 8–9.” slip op. at 9

  • Claim Construction › Functional claiming / §112(f) means-plus-function › Whether §112(f) applies (Williamson, nonce words)No construction neededNot reached

    “1. “computer program modules” The parties dispute whether four “computer program modules comprising” (1) “a monitoring module,” (2) “a first relevance measurement module,” (3) “a second relevance measurement module,” and (4) “a relevance analysis module” (collectively, “module limitations”) invoke 35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶ 6 and should be treated as means-plus-function limitations. See Pet. 8–18; PO Resp. 15–18; Pet. Reply 3–5; PO Sur-reply 4–7. However, the parties do not argue that the construction of these terms affects the analysis of Petitioner’s challenges. See PO Resp.; Pet. Reply; PO Sur-reply. Moreover, our analysis does not rely on any particular construction of these terms and, so, we need not resolve this dispute.” slip op. at 10

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached

    “2. “one or more measures derived from the group consistent of” Petitioner asserts limitations 1[g] and 1[g][i]–1[g][iv] recite an open Markush group listing alternatively useable members. Pet. 20–21 (citing Gillette Co. v. Energizer Holdings, Inc., 405 F.3d 1367, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2005); Abbot Lab’ys v. Baxter Pharm. Prod., Inc., 334 F.3d 1274, 1281 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (explaining that the listing of specified alternatives within a claim is referred to as a Markush group or Markush grouping)); See Ex. 1001, 47:47–58. Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s construction. See PO Resp; PO Sur-reply. As these terms are not in controversy, we need not opine on this construction.” slip op. at 10

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITANo construction neededNot reached

    “Petitioner’s and Patent Owner’s respective constructions overlap in their requirement that “cognate” users share similar past user actions and assessments or are defined by similar direct input by the user. See Pet. 18; PO Resp. 20–21; PO Sur-reply 10. Petitioner argues that Patent Owner’s construction “exclude[s] ‘groups’ from the claims” and further limits the scope of to users who share actions (Pet. Reply 8–9), but Patent Owner states that its proposed construction does not so limit the claims (PO Sur-reply 10). As such, there is no disagreement that “cognate” users share similar past user actions and assessments or are defined by similar direct input by the user. As there is no controversy, we need not, and do not, construe the meaning of “cognate.” However, Patent Owner’s requirement that “at least one other of the plurality of users” is specifically cognate to “the user” who was sent the content is plainly recited in the claim language itself. The claim recites a “relevance score of a piece of electronic content sent from a sender to a user” in the preamble and similarly again in limitation 1[g]. See Ex. 1001, 47:25–28 (emphasis added), 45:62–64. The limitation in question directly references the claimed “user” when reciting the cognate relationship: “identify at least one other of the plurality of users . . . that is cognate to the user.” Ex. 1001, 47:43–45 (emphasis added). As such, the claim language plainly supports Patent Owner’s requirement and Petitioner does not contest that requirement. See Pet. Reply 8. least one other of the plurality of users . . . that is cognate to the user” as requiring that the identified other user is cognate specifically to the user whose relevance score is being determined.” slip op. at 12

  Patent outcomesUS 7,716,217 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR
  Patents in suitUS 7,716,217
• Micron Technology, Inc. v. Yangtze Memory Technologies Company, Ltd.No claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jun 9, 2026 · IPR2025-00118 · APJ Jo-Anne M Kokoski · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–14 were not shown unpatentable because the Petition did not establish the claimed adjacent pad groups, common ESD bus, or pad-to-pad bonding wires.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedOther

    “would have had a bachelor of science degree in electrical engineering or similar discipline, and 2–3 years of professional experience working with (e.g., researching, analyzing, designing, or teaching) ICs, or equivalent level of skill, knowledge, and experience (e.g., an advanced degree may replace some of the professional experience and vice versa). This POSITA would have been aware of and generally knowledgeable about IC design, layout, manufacturing, packaging, and ESD protection. Pet. 18 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 29–33). Patent Owner states that it “does not dispute Petitioner’s proposed level of a” POSITA “for purposes of this IPR.” PO Resp. 10. In the Institution Decision, we adopted the assessment offered by Petitioner. Dec. 7. Because Petitioner’s definition of the level of skill in the art is consistent with the ’164 patent and the asserted prior art, we maintain it for purposes of this Final Written Decision. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001).” slip op. at 7

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “customary meaning of such claim as understood by one of ordinary skill in the art and the prosecution history pertaining to the patent.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b). Under this standard, claim terms are generally given their plain and ordinary meaning as would have been understood by a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention and in the context of the entire patent disclosure. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). Only those terms in controversy need to be construed, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy. Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019). Based on our review of the complete trial record and the arguments raised by the parties, we determine that it is not necessary to expressly construe any claim terms to resolve the parties’ dispute. Realtime Data, 912 F.3d at 1375.” slip op. at 7

  • Expert testimonyPatent owner expert creditedDecided for patent owner

    “includes segmented ground rails 350, 355. . . . The package substrate 310 includes a package common ground rail 360, and the segmented SoC ground rails 350, 355 are independently connected to the package common ground rail 360 via separate connections 370, 375 respectively.”). As set forth above, Dr. Foty describes the three ground lines in Saint Figure 7-7 as “segmented rails” when discussing the combination of Saint and Haralabidis, thus equating the three ground lines in Saint Figure 7-7 with Haralabidis’ segmented ground rail. Ex. 1003 ¶ 368. Neither Petitioner nor Dr. Foty, however, adequately addresses how or why a POSITA would have understood that the three separate grounds lines in Saint Figure 7-7 were “segmented rails” like the segments of the single ground line described in Haralabidis. In contrast, Dr. Khatri credibly testifies: Haralabidis teaches the use of a “common ground rail” to connect “segmented ground rails.” Haralabidis, 3:9–22, 3:34– 40, 3:65–4:12. A POSITA would understand “segmented ground rails” to refer to a single ground signal that has been “segmented.” That is fundamentally different from the design of Saint’s Figure 7-7 that Dr. Foty relies on, which uses three different ground signals, GND1, GND2, and GND3—not a single ground signal that has been “segmented.” Because of that, a POSITA would not have been motivated to change the Figure 7-7 design completely to connect three separate signals (GND1, GND2, and GND3) together as Dr. Foty proposes. Ex. 1003 ¶ 368. Indeed, for these reasons, a POSITA would have understood Haralabidis’ teachings of a “common ground rail” are inapplicable to Saint’s Figure 7-7. Ex. 2010 ¶ 129. Petitioner’s arguments and Dr. Foty’s testimony with respect to the modification of Saint Figure 7-7 leave an analytical gap that does not apprise us of why a POSITA would have modified Saint Figure 7-7 to include a common ESD bus as described in Haralabidis.” slip op. at 37

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “For these reasons, we find that Yoshinaga’s statement that “[r]eference potential pads are not shown to simplify the drawing” indicates that reference potential pads are not depicted in Yoshinaga Figure 6, and determine that Yoshinaga Figure 6 does not disclose “a plurality of pad groups, adjacent and connected to the plurality of ESD buses” as recited in claim 6. Petitioner also argues that a POSITA would have understood that power supply pads 3, 4, and 58 in Yoshinaga “could just as readily be used as reference pads” and it would have been obvious “to use the pads immediately next to the saved areas as reference pads (e.g., pads 5 and 6) as pad assignments were left to the designer’s discretion.” Pet. 31 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 137–139). Petitioner asserts that “selecting which pads to use for ground, power signals, etc. is a design choice that depends on factors like chip size, the number of I/O signals, and the number of pads available.” Pet. 31 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 137–139). Petitioner states that such discretion would be to preserve Yoshinaga’s saved area for other circuitry as taught by Saint. Pet. 31–32 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 137–139; Pet. 19–23 (§ IX.A)). Neither Petitioner nor Dr. Foty adequately explain, however, why a POSITA would have made this specific design choice, namely, replacing power supply pads 3, 4, and 58 with reference pads. Pet. 31; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 137–139; see also Polaris Indus., Inc. v. Arctic Cat, Inc., 882 F.3d 1056, 1069 n.4 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (“Merely stating that a particular placement of an element is a design choice does not make it obvious.” (quoting Cutsforth, Inc. v. MotivePower, Inc., 636 Fed. Appx. 575, 578 (Fed. Cir. 2016))). Petitioner offers the general proposition that pad assignments are left to the designer’s discretion, but this does not provide a reason why a POSITA would have been motivated to modify Yoshinaga Figure 6 as proposed. Pet. 31; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 137–139. We have determined that Yoshinaga does not show (rather than does not label) reference pads. Because all of Yoshinaga’s illustrated pads are power supply pads, Petitioner’s proposed reassignment of pads would not be a simple matter of rearrangement of an existing mixture of power supply and reference pads, but require that reference pads be imported from elsewhere, and power supply pads be moved to some unspecified location. Petitioner’s arguments and Dr. Foty’s testimony with respect to the modification of Yoshinaga Figure 6 leave an analytical gap that does not apprise us of why a POSITA would have modified Yoshinaga Figure 6 to include reference pads in the place of power supply pads 3, 4, and 58. We agree with Patent Owner that none of Petitioner’s rationales” slip op. at 20

  Patent outcomesUS 10,879,164 not shown unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips
  Patents in suitUS 10,879,164
• Abbott Laboratories v. Miracor Medical SAAll claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jun 8, 2026 · IPR2025-00112 · APJ James A Tartal · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–3, 10, 11, 14, and 17 are unpatentable as obvious over Schima and Akamatsu; the other asserted grounds were not established.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “may be considered, including the “type of problems encountered in the art; prior art solutions to those problems; rapidity with which innovations are made; sophistication of the technology; and educational level of active workers in the field.” In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995). Petitioner contends a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention “would have at least a bachelor’s degree in engineering; knowledge and experience in human circulatory system anatomy and physiology; and at least five years’ experience designing and developing implantable medical devices.” Pet. 6 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 18).” slip op. at 10

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner

    “sufficient basis for limiting the plain meaning of “magneto coupling.” That the ’357 patent describes embodiments using bar magnets does not serve to require the use of permanent magnets for the recited “magneto coupling.” See Sisvel Int’l S.A. v. Sierra Wireless, Inc., 81 F.4th 1231, 1236 (Fed. Cir. 2023) (quoting Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1323 (“[A]lthough the specification often describes very specific embodiments of the invention, we have repeatedly warned against confining the claims to those embodiments.”)). Moreover, the claim language here is not so limited. 11 Patent Owner notes that Petitioner’s grounds of unpatentability based on Wampler and Bourque depend on the disclosure only of electromagnetic drives in each reference, implying that “Petitioner does not believe its own proposed narrower construction.” PO Resp. 6; see also Pet. 8 (Petitioner alleging that in the Parallel Proceeding Patent Owner “conflates ‘magneto coupling’ . . . with a stator drive using a stationary electromagnet, instead of a rotating magnet, to rotate the rotor magnet,” and asserting that as the basis for Petitioner’s reliance on Wampler and Bourque as teaching a “magneto coupling” in this proceeding (citing Ex. 1019, 9–11; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 84–87)). distinguished “magneto coupling” drives from drives using stators. Pet. 7–8 (citing Ex. 1011, 1 (explaining that the rotating field is generated by rotating magnets in a magnetic coupling pump and by electric stator windings in a stator pump)). Petitioner does not explain how this cited reference evidences that one of ordinary skill in the art would have understood “magneto coupling” requires rotating permanent magnets. At most, this reference teaches an example device that provides “magneto coupling.” See Ex. 1011, 1. In sum, we agree with Patent Owner that “magneto coupling,” consistent with our Institution Decision, encompasses generating a rotating field either by rotating magnets or by an electromagnet / stator. See Inst. Dec. 22” slip op. at 22

  • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “ignores the readily apparent fact that the lower arrow is placed in a location that misrepresents the minimum distance between the magnetically driven rotor and the second magnetic device to suggest that Wampler teaches “the second magnetic device positioned axially closer to the first magnetic device than to the magnetically driven rotor,” as required by claim 1. Petitioner purports to justify this misrepresentation by asserting that “the vast majority of the impeller 74 is spaced significantly farther apart from the stators 90 and 94 than the magnetic pieces 88 are positioned from the stators 90 and 94.” Id. at 33–34. Claim 1 does not recite any feature based on the “vast majority” of a component and it is readily apparent from Petitioner’s own annotated version of Figure 11a that the distance from both the “motor magnets [88]” and “impeller 74” to the “circular electromagnetic stator[s] [90 and 94]” is the same. We agree with Patent Owner that Petitioner has provided a “misleading Figure with two red arrows denoting measurement distances to illustrate its incorrect view that the second magnetic device is farther from the magnetically driven rotor than from the first magnetic device.” PO Resp. 13–15 (providing an annotated version of Wampler’s Figure 11a with an orange arrow showing that in Wampler the distances from the second magnetic device to both the rotor and the first magnetic device are the same). Accordingly, Petitioner fails to show that Wampler teaches “the second magnetic device positioned axially closer to the first magnetic device than to the magnetically driven rotor.”” slip op. at 29

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “To orient the pump in the least obtrusive position (i.e., in the human configuration, as in Figure 3), it was decided that the rotational axis of the pump’s rotor should be perpendicular to the body’s long axis. That resulted in a sharp bend in the flow before it enters the impeller. To minimize the losses in this transition, the flow is slightly accelerated through this elbow. that this type of elbow [i.e., the elbow used with Bourque’s centrifugal pump] was unnecessary,” applying Wampler to Bourque would have improved “blood flow.” Pet. 73 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 418–419; Ex. 1007, 402; Ex. 1008 ¶¶ 75–76). As explained above, Wampler does not teach that “this type of elbow” was unnecessary. Bourque uses a centrifugal pump with an additional elbow specifically so that the centrifugal pump may be oriented “in the least obtrusive position.” Ex. 1007, 402. Moreover, there is no persuasive evidence to support Petitioner’s assertion that eliminating the elbow from Bourque would improve “blood flow.” Mr. Crosby’s declaration provides no additional explanation or support to show how “blood flow” would have been improved. See Ex. 1003 ¶ 419. Nor does Mr. Crosby address the fact that Bourque expressly states that “flow is slightly accelerated” through the elbow to “minimize losses in this transition.” Ex. 1007, 402. Eliminating the elbow from Bourque, as Petitioner and Mr. Crosby propose, would mean the pump could no longer be placed in “the least obtrusive position” according to Bourque and there is no persuasive evidence that such a modification would improve blood flow.” slip op. at 45

  Patent outcomesUS 11,351,357 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 11,351,357
• Resmed Corp. v. Cleveland Medical Devices, Inc.No claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jun 5, 2026 · IPR2025-00160 · APJ Sheridan K Snedden · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–5, 7, 8, 10–13, 15–18, and 20–31 were not shown unpatentable because the proposed Toge-Kumar combination did not establish the claimed remote internet site hosted on a server.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Real party in interest / privityRpi dispute resolved for petitionerDecided for petitioner

    “Patent Owner filed a Response. Paper 23 (“PO Resp.”). Petitioner filed a Reply. Paper 27 (“Reply”). Patent Owner filed a Sur-reply. Paper 35 (“Sur-reply”). Additionally, during trial, Patent Owner filed an authorized Motion to Terminate, alleging that Petitioner failed to name a real party in interest (namely, Petitioner’s corporate parent, Resmed Inc.). Paper 37. Petitioner filed an opposition. Paper 38. Patent Owner filed a reply. Paper 39. We denied the Motion to Terminate. Paper 44.” slip op. at 2

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “We determine that no express construction of any claim term is necessary to resolve the dispute between the parties. Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“[W]e need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))). To the extent further discussion of the meaning of any claim term is necessary to our decision, we provide that discussion below in our analysis of the asserted grounds of unpatentability. C. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art” slip op. at 11

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “We adopt Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill in the art because it appears to be consistent with the cited prior art and is undisputed on this record. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (indicating that the prior art itself may reflect an appropriate skill level). D. Summary of the Asserted Prior Art” slip op. at 12

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “summarized above, we determine that a person of ordinary skill in the art would not have implemented Toge’s physician-side computer as a web server using a “localhost” architecture as proposed by Petitioner because such a configuration cannot communicate with external devices over the public internet, a deficiency that directly contradicts Petitioner’s stated motivations for the combination of permitting broad data access. Petitioner’s expert, Dr. Chatterjee, expressly acknowledged in his Reply Declaration that when a client and server reside on the same machine, the communications between them do not traverse the internet. Ex. 1069 ¶ 8. Specifically, Dr. Chatterjee cited the Microsoft Computer Dictionary’s definition of “localhost” as “[t]he name that is used to represent the same computer on which a TCP/IP message originates,” noting that “[a]n IP packet sent to localhost has the IP address 127.0.0.1 and does not actually go out to the Internet.” Id. (citing Ex. 1070, 316). Accordingly, Petitioner’s proposed configuration of placing both the client and web server on Toge’s physician-side computer would create a closed loop of communication that does not reach the broader network. Id. As noted by Patent Owner, “[i]f ‘the physician-side computer and the web server are on one machine,’ the local web server would not communicate with other devices via the Internet.” Sur-Reply, 3–4 (comparing Ex. 1069 ¶ 19 with id. at ¶ 8). Thus, the consequence of Petitioner’s proposed Toge-Kumar configuration is that other devices in the system, such as the PAP device that generates the treatment data and any remote client devices that might need to access that data, would be unable to send data to or retrieve data from the localhost web server. Patent Owner persuasively argues, supported by evidence of record, that under Petitioner’s proposed configuration, “the PAP device could not send data thereto nor could other clients receive data therefrom, as only the local client browser can exchange data.” Id. (citing Ex. 1069 ¶ 8); see Ex. 2003, 4 (one-tier architecture “is not suitable for a web application” because “it can only access data available in a single computer or server” and therefore “is not suitable for a web application.”); Ex. 2022, 3 (Unlike more advanced multi-tier systems, a one-tier architecture “cannot transmit information from one client machine to another.”); Ex. 2020, 4 (While “the client process and server process can be on the same computer,” this architecture “is rarely used today” precisely because it cannot “take advantage of the distributed computing environment.”).” slip op. at 29

  Patent outcomesUS 11,786,680 not shown unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 11,786,680
• Resmed Corp. v. Cleveland Medical Devices, Inc.No claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jun 4, 2026 · IPR2025-00158 · APJ Sheridan K Snedden · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–20 were not shown unpatentable because Orbach did not disclose a single computer or processor performing all claimed remote analysis, output, and display functions.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • BurdenNot shown unpatentable

    “After considering all of the arguments and evidence presented on the full trial record, we determine that Petitioner has not demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that claims 1–6, 8–17, 19, and 20 are unpatentable as obvious over the combination of Ciulla and Orbach. We find that the deficiencies in Petitioner’s arguments regarding claim limitations [1.d], [1.f], and [1.g] are dispositive and we address the parties’ arguments concerning those limitations below.” slip op. at 24

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedOther

    “Pet. 8. Patent Owner agrees to apply Petitioner’s proposed definition of POSITA. PO Resp. 4. We adopt Petitioner’s proposed definition of a POSITA because the proposed level of ordinary skill in the art appears to be consistent with the cited prior art and is undisputed on this record. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (indicating that the prior art itself may reflect an appropriate skill level).” slip op. at 11

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “the Board need not construe any terms. Pet. 9. Patent Owner agrees. PO Resp. 4. We determine that no express construction of any claim term is necessary to resolve the dispute between the parties. Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“[W]e need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))). Nevertheless, in our analysis of the asserted grounds of unpatentability below, we discuss the scope of certain claim terms, e.g., “the computer” and “the processor.” C. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art” slip op. at 11

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentable

    “Accordingly, to show obviousness, Petitioner must show in Orbach that either (a) remote server 140’s output to viewing station 150 constitutes “display” within the meaning of the claim, or (b) viewing station 150 receives data “over cell towers” notwithstanding the intervening server. We determine that Petitioner has failed to do so on this record. Our analysis follows.” slip op. at 33

  Patent outcomesUS 11,690,512 not shown unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 11,690,512
• Trove Brands, LLC v. Camelbak Products, LLCSome claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jun 2, 2026 · IPR2025-00140 · APJ Carl M Defranco · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–6 are unpatentable as obvious; claims 7–18 were not shown unpatentable because Ribarits does not disclose a mouthpiece disposed on the pivotal mount.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Trove contends that a person of ordinary skill in the art “would have had an undergraduate degree in mechanical engineering or equivalent coursework, and a year or more of experience in designing, prototyping, and/or manufacturing fluid containers or similar products” and that “[m]ore work experience may substitute for a lower level of education, and vice versa.” Pet. 15 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶ 25). While CamelBak offers “a similar, though slightly different level,” it nonetheless “discerns no material difference between the definitions provided by the parties for purposes of the Board’s decision in this proceeding.” PO Resp. 27. That being the case, we adopt Trove’s proposed definition of the level of skill in the art, as it is 2 JP 2002-211613A, published July 31, 2002 (Ex. 1004, “Nakajima”). 3 WO 2004/063042 A2, published July 29, 2004 (Ex. 1006, “Ribarits”). 4 US 4,485,963, issued Dec. 4, 1984 (Ex. 1007, “Panicci”). 5 US 6,523,711 B1, issued Feb. 25, 2003 (Ex. 1008, “Hughes”). reasonable and consistent with what is reflected in the asserted prior art and the specification of the ’250 patent. B. Claim Construction” slip op. at 7

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner

    “We will not bite. CamelBak’s original assertion—that the plain and ordinary meaning of the constituent parts of “mouth” and “piece” is “a piece (or part) that goes in the mouth”—underscores the fallacy of CamelBak’s additional physical contact requirement. PO Resp. 28 (emphasis added). Indeed, in support of that earlier assertion, CamelBak pointed to the very dictionary definition that we relied on at institution in construing “mouthpiece” as a part that either “goes in the mouth or to which the mouth is applied.” See id. at 31 (citing Ex. 2005 (emphasis added)). Even the original testimony of CamelBak’s own expert confirms that one skilled in the art “would understand that the term ‘mouthpiece’ is commonly known in the art as a part designed for a user’s mouth,” without any requirement for physical contact with the mouth. Ex. 2016 ¶ 58 (citing Ex. 2005) (emphasis added)). And nothing in the Specification limits that common understanding. Although, indisputably, the Specification contemplates an embodiment where the user physically contacts the mouthpiece with their teeth (i.e., a bite-actuated mouthpiece), it also contemplates an embodiment where the user simply inserts the bottle in their mouth and commences fluid flow by squeezing it. See Ex. 1001, 10:9–13. That disclosure supports a meaning of “mouthpiece” that simply requires placement in the opening of the user’s mouth without necessarily incurring physical contact with some portion of the mouth, such as the teeth, tongue, or lips. Indeed, had CamelBak wished to premise the meaning of “mouthpiece” on some sort of physical contact with the mouth, it knew how to do so. For instance, the independent claims of CamelBak’s earlier ’255 patent, which is the subject of the related 1137 IPR, are limited in just such a manner, as they recite “wherein the resilient mouthpiece is adapted to resiliently compress responsive to compressive forces applied to the resilient mouthpiece by a user’s teeth.” Ex. 2023, at 20–25 (emphasis added). Thus, we reject CamelBak’s attempt to narrow our construction of “mouthpiece” to something other than “a part (as of an instrument) that goes in the mouth or to which the mouth is applied.” Neither the intrinsic nor extrinsic evidence supports the narrower construction proposed by CamelBak.” slip op. at 11

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert discountedDecided for patent owner

    “In reply, Trove argues that CamelBak’s “novel” construction that the mouthpiece moves with rotational motion about that same axis of rotation defined by the two joint as the pivotal mount and in the same direction as the pivotal mount “are inconsistent with the claim language’s plain and ordinary meaning and find no support in the intrinsic and extrinsic record.” See Pet. Reply 16. But, because we find that, when properly construed, the claimed “pivotal movement with the pivotal mount” about “two joints that define a pivotal axis” requires that the mouthpiece rotate about the same axis and in the same direction as the pivotal mount, we reject Trove’s argument as unavailing. And, although we agree with Trove that Nakajima’s mouthpiece engages in counter-clockwise rotation about a “Second Pivot Axis” when Nakajima’s lid 4 is opened (id. at 20–22), that rotation is about a different axis—one defined by Nakajima’s protrusions 24 rather than the claimed “pivotal axis” defined by Nakajima’s hinge shafts 19—and in a different manner—an upward and counterclockwise path rather than the claimed “pivotal movement with the pivotal mount” defined by Nakajima’s lid 4. Finally, in an alternative theory, Trove and its expert use “image- manipulation tools” in an attempt to show that Nakajima’s mouthpiece engages in some initial “clockwise-rotation” with Nakajima’s lid as it is opened. See Pet. Reply 18–24. We reject that theory as entirely conjectural and unsupported by the evidence.” slip op. at 39

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “We disagree. As discussed above, the proper construction of “for pivotal movement with the pivotal mount” requires that the mouthpiece mirror the rotational movement of the pivotal mount, i.e., rotate about the same axis as the pivotal mount and in the same direction as the pivotal mount. See supra § II.B.3. But Nakajima’s mouthpiece does neither, and, thus, does not exhibit the claimed “pivotal movement with the pivotal mount” about “two joints that define a pivotal axis for . . . the pivotal mount axis,” as properly construed.” slip op. at 36

  Patent outcomesUS 11,851,250 mixed
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousness
  Patents in suitUS 11,851,250
• AT&T Services, Inc. / Cellco Partnership D/B/A Verizon Wireless et al. v. Pegasus Wireless Innovation LLCAll claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jun 2, 2026 · IPR2025-00083 · APJ Kristen L Droesch · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–9 are unpatentable as obvious over Takeda and Yan; the Board found the alternative Marinier, Yan, and R1-1711853 ground insufficient.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “had “a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering, or a related discipline, knowledge of the relevant 3GPP standards” and “at least 2 years of experience working in a field involving wireless communications.” Pet. 10 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 38–40). According to Petitioner, a “person with a different degree but with additional relevant experience could still qualify if the additional experience compensates for the different educational background.” Id. Petitioner also asserts a “person with less than 2 years of experience working in a field involving wireless communications could still qualify if the person has additional education that compensate[s] for their lesser experience.” Id. Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s proposed level of skill. See generally PO Resp. We find that “at least” in Petitioner’s formulation of the level of skill in the art is vague and open-ended. Otherwise, we adopt Petitioner’s formulation of the level of ordinary skill in the art, because it appears consistent with the ’463 Patent Specification and the prior art of record.” slip op. at 8

  • Claim Construction › Functional claiming / §112(f) means-plus-function › Whether §112(f) applies (Williamson, nonce words)Not reached

    “Petitioner asserts that elements 1[b] and 1[c] constitute a mean-plus- function limitation under 35 U.S.C. § 112(f) and Patent Owner disputes Petitioner’s assertion. See Pet. 5–7; PO Resp. 11–13. As demonstrated below, there is no dispute as to whether the prior art teaches limitations 1[b] and 1[c] under Petitioner’s claim construction. Therefore, we need not address whether 35 U.S.C. § 112 (f) applies. “The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)).” slip op. at 9

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundDecided for petitioner

    “We do not agree with Patent Owner’s arguments disputing Petitioner’s backward compatibility rationale for combining the teachings of Yan and Takeda. Patent Owner’s arguments are misplaced because they are premised incorrectly on Takeda’s teachings being limited to 5G NR (i.e., standalone 5G NR), and the proposed combination requiring “mixing standards and behaviors.” To the contrary, Petitioner explicitly asserts that “Takeda states that its teachings are applicable to both 4G and 5G”––i.e., non-standalone 5G. Pet. 14 (citing Ex. 1007 ¶ 239). Likewise, instead of mixing 5G and 4G standards and behaviors as argued by Patent Owner, Petitioner merely proposes retaining Yan’s 4G method of allocating UL channel resources sets with Takeda’s teaching of 5G NR BWPs. See Pet. 14–15. We credit Dr. Roy’s testimony that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to modify Takeda’s teachings with Yan’s teachings to provide Takeda with backwards network capability because it is supported by the cited evidence of record. See Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 105, 106 (citing Ex. 1007 ¶ 239; Ex. 1031, 1, 3; Ex. 1033, 5:23–31; Ex. 1034, 10; Ex. 1035, 1, 5; Ex. 1037, 31). Moreover, as pointed out by Petitioner, Dr. Shimony’s deposition testimony regarding the usefulness of backward compatibility and the importance of a non-standalone UE having the ability to communicate over both 4G and 5G standards supports Dr. Roy’s testimony, yet undermines Patent Owner’s arguments. See Ex. 1050, 178:16–182:16; Pet. Reply 14–15. Based on the entire record developed during trial, we are persuaded by a preponderance of the evidence that Petitioner provides sufficient articulated reasoning with rational underpinning to support the conclusion that it would have been obvious to a person of ordinary skill in the art to modify Takeda’s teachings with Yan’s teachings to provide Takeda with backwards network compatibility.10 See Pet. 13–15; KSR, 550 U.S. at 418.” slip op. at 15

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedPatent owner expert discountedDecided for petitioner

    “We credit Dr. Roy’s testimony that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to modify Takeda’s teachings with Yan’s teachings to provide Takeda with backwards network capability because it is supported by the cited evidence of record. See Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 105, 106 (citing Ex. 1007 ¶ 239; Ex. 1031, 1, 3; Ex. 1033, 5:23–31; Ex. 1034, 10; Ex. 1035, 1, 5; Ex. 1037, 31). Moreover, as pointed out by Petitioner, Dr. Shimony’s deposition testimony regarding the usefulness of backward compatibility and the importance of a non-standalone UE having the ability to communicate over both 4G and 5G standards supports Dr. Roy’s testimony, yet undermines Patent Owner’s arguments. See Ex. 1050, 178:16–182:16; Pet. Reply 14–15. Based on the entire record developed during trial, we are persuaded by a preponderance of the evidence that Petitioner provides sufficient articulated reasoning with rational underpinning to support the conclusion that it would have been obvious to a person of ordinary skill in the art to modify Takeda’s teachings with Yan’s teachings to provide Takeda with backwards network compatibility.10 See Pet. 13–15; KSR, 550 U.S. at 418.” slip op. at 15

  Patent outcomesUS 10,638,463 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 10,638,463
• Micron Technology, Inc. v. Yangtze Memory Technologies Company, Ltd.All claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jun 1, 2026 · IPR2025-00117 · APJ Michael T Cygan · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–19 are unpatentable: claims 1–9, 11–16, 18, and 19 as obvious over Kim; claims 10 and 17 as obvious over Kim and Fang, Park, and Park and Fang.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “at the critical time “would have had a bachelor of science degree in electrical engineering or a similar discipline, along with 2-3 years of professional experience working with (e.g., researching, designing, or teaching) monolithic 3D structures and NAND flash memory devices, or an equivalent level of skill, knowledge, and experience (e.g., an advanced degree may replace some of the professional experience).” Pet. 27 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 42). Petitioner further asserts that a POSITA “would have been aware of and generally knowledgeable about 3D NAND’s structure, its component parts, how it operates, and how it is controlled.” Id. Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s definition. PO Resp. 7. We adopt Petitioner’s proposed 4 Neither party presents evidence or arguments regarding objective evidence of non-obviousness. Pet. 103; PO Resp. the ’711 patent and the prior art of record.” slip op. at 5

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Lexicography (patentee as own lexicographer)Term construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner

    “Based on the record before us, we agree with Petitioner that “on a surface” should be interpreted in line with the definition of “on” set forth in the ’711 patent. Ex. 1001, 4:1–6. We particularly note that the ’711 patent states that “‘on’ . . . should be interpreted in the broadest manner” and that “on” is not limited to “directly on.” Id. Instead, the ’711 patent states that “‘on’ also includes the meaning of ‘on’ something with an intermediate feature or layer therebetween.” Id. Patent Owner agrees that this definition controls the “standalone ‘on’” term such that A may be on B even if there is an intervening layer between them. Tr. 55:8–11 (“The standalone ‘on,’ we agree in the context of the patent, you can have intervening layers. I think the patent is clear about that.”). Claim 14 recites that the etch-stop layer is “on” something; i.e., “on a side surface and a top surface of each step.” Ex. 1001, 16:20–22. Patent Owner agrees that a surface is a “something.” Tr. 56:5–8 (“surface obviously is a something”). Substituting the “a “‘on’ something with an intermediate feature or layer therebetween” results in claim 14 reading as, “on a surface with an intermediate feature or layer therebetween.” Unlike “directly on,” which specifies the relation between two things, “a surface” may merely indicate the thing that something is “on,” particularly when “on” is “interpreted in the broadest manner” as expressly required by the ’711 patent.” slip op. at 7

  • Expert testimonyPatent owner expert discountedDecided for petitioner

    “Although Dr. Campbell testified in his deposition in response to Petitioner’s counsel that “on the surface” requires direct contact with the surface, his interpretation was based on “embodiments of” the patent rather than a general understanding of a person skilled in the art confronted with that term. Ex. 1027, 122:6–25, 124:6–23 (“I’m not sure if there are other sources for that, but it was on the ’711, so I’ve taken it there.”). Dr. Campbell, upon questioning from Patent Owner’s counsel, later stated that “an expert in semiconductor fabrication” would understand “on the surface” to mean “contact between one layer and another . . . with nothing in between.” Id. at 146:25–147:6. However, Dr. Campbell did not explain why such an interpretation is particular to the semiconductor fabrication art, or provide other explanation or support for this statement, which is in tension with the definition of “on” in the ’711 patent. Accordingly, we significantly discount the weight accorded to that statement. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1318 (stating, “conclusory, unsupported assertions by experts as to the definition of a claim term are not useful to a court. Similarly, a court should discount any expert testimony ‘that is clearly at odds with the claim construction mandated by the claims themselves, the written description, and patent.’”). On balance, Dr. Campbell’s testimony is best understood as a description of certain Figures of the ’711 patent rather than a representation of an ordinarily skilled person’s understanding of the term “on the surface.” See Ex. 2009 ¶ 47 (describing Figs. 1, 3, and 4 as depicting layers in contact with the underlying layer or substrate). For example, Dr. Campbell describes Figure 9A as having a barrier layer “on and directly contacting the top and side surfaces of each step.” Id. ¶ 28 (emphasis added) (citing inter alia Ex. 1001, 7:6–67). Dr. Campbell does not explain why, beyond the fact that many Figures show layers as adjacent and in contact, a person of ordinary skill in the relevant art would understand those Figures to limit the claim language rather than illustrating particular embodiments that fall within a broader scope of claims 14 and 15. See Hill-Rom Servs., Inc. v. Stryker Corp., 755 F.3d 1367, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (“While we read claims in view of the specification, of which they are a part, we do not read limitations from the embodiments in the specifications into the claims.”).” slip op. at 9

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundUnpatentable

    “We agree with Petitioner that Kim’s first and second section are described as compatible, not mutually exclusive, embodiments. Kim’s second section builds further layers upon the structure of its first section, and states: In these embodiments, the same elements as in the embodiments previously described with reference to FIGS. 5A through 14A and FIGS. 5B through 14B will be denoted by the same reference numbers therein, and for concise description, overlapping description of elements previously described with reference to FIGS. 5A through 14A and FIGS. 5B through 14B may be omitted. Ex. 1005 ¶ 184 (emphasis added). Patent Owner argues that only the embodiments in Figures 17A–22B describe an etch-stop layer and a barrier layer (as claimed), and that the language cited for a gate-stack-on-top configuration (e.g., Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 90, 91, and 240) is “conspicuously absent from the description of Figures 17A–22B.” PO Resp. 20 (citing Ex. 2009 ¶ 36). However, Figures 17A–22B do not further address the underlying staircase structure that was detailed in the descriptions of the Figures 4 through 15 embodiments. While Figures 17A–22B show a gate-stack-on-bottom configuration, this merely continues the gate-stack-on-bottom illustrations that were used in all of the previous Figures, even for those in which it is undisputed that a gate-stack-on-top configuration is a described alternative. The Figures exemplify rather than limit the description of the gate-stack-on-bottom view in Figures 4–15 and do not exclude the gate-stack on bottom description of the embodiments exemplified by those figures.” slip op. at 17

  Patent outcomesUS 10,672,711 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 10,672,711

Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.