- Cambridge Industries USA, Inc. v. Applied Optoelectronics, Inc.Rehearing deniedPTAB · Dec 19, 2025 · IPR2025-00434 · APJ Mitchell G Weatherly · IPR · Rehearing
The Board denied Petitioner’s rehearing request, leaving institution denied because Shen and Soldano did not establish a reasonable likelihood of anticipating claims 1–7.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied
“When rehearing a decision on petition, the Board will review the decision for an abuse of discretion. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(c). An abuse of discretion may be determined if a decision is based on an erroneous interpretation of law, if a factual finding is not supported by substantial evidence, or if the decision represents an unreasonable judgment in weighing relevant factors. See Arnold P’ship v. Dudas, 362 F.3d 1338, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2004). The party challenging the decision has the burden of showing the decision should be modified, and the request for rehearing “must specifically identify all matters the party believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked, and the place where each matter was previously addressed” in its papers. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d).” slip op. at 2
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“II. ANALYSIS In our Decision, we concluded that Petitioner had failed to carry its burden of demonstrating a reasonable likelihood of prevailing that either Shen or Soldano anticipated claims 1–7. Dec. 18, 26. Petitioner argues that we should institute review for three reasons. First, Petitioner argues that we abused our discretion by (a) “refusing” to interpret the scope of the claimed” slip op. at 2
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached
“Owner’s interpretation of “carrier” as meaning “one or more components for supporting ROSA components such as an AWG.” Dec. 9 (quoting Pet. 11). For our analysis of Petitioner’s challenges, we referred to this interpretation of “carrier” as Petitioner’s second alternative construction. Id. We also noted that Petitioner appeared to dispute Patent Owner’s interpretation when it argued that “carrier” should mean “a ceramic or silicon substrate.” Id. (quoting Pet. 10). We referred to this interpretation of “carrier” as the first alternative construction. Id. Rather than resolve this apparent dispute about the meaning of “carrier,” we found that both of Petitioner’s anticipation challenges failed under both interpretations of “carrier.” Id. at 10–26. Because we found that Petitioner had failed to carry its burden regardless of which interpretation of “carrier” applied, we found it unnecessary to resolve the dispute over that interpretation. Id. at 9–10. For the reasons expressed in Parts II.B–C below, we maintain our conclusion that Petitioner has failed to demonstrate a reasonable likelihood of proving that either Shen or Soldano anticipates any claim under either interpretation of “carrier.” Accordingly, Petitioner fails to demonstrate an abuse of discretion in our alleged “refusal” to interpret “carrier.”” slip op. at 3
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“Reh’g Req. 14. We cannot weigh Petitioner’s arguments based on its assertions about “caselaw” because Petitioner cited no cases to support its arguments. See id. Nevertheless, we infer that Petitioner intends its statements of “caselaw” to refer to the requirements to make out a case for anticipation. If so, Petitioner demonstrably miscasts what appear to be the legal principles for proving anticipation. As stated in our Decision: “A claim is anticipated only if each and every element as set forth in the claim is found, either expressly or inherently described, in a single prior art reference.” Verdegaal Bros., Inc. v. Union Oil Co. of California, 814 F.2d 628, 631 (Fed. Cir. 1987).” Dec. 7. Making a showing that a prior art reference anticipates a patent claim thus necessarily requires proof that a single reference “expressly or inherently” describes every element of that claim and with all elements being arranged in the reference as they are in the” slip op. at 7
Claim construction§ 102 anticipationPatents in suitUS 10,379,301 - Google LLC v. Metarail, Inc.Rehearing deniedPTAB · Aug 25, 2025 · IPR2024-01270 · APJ Frances L Ippolito · IPR · Rehearing
The Board denied Google’s rehearing request, leaving in place the denial of institution because the Petition did not show a reasonable likelihood that Belanger-Halevy teaches limitation [1C] of claims 1–26.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied
“II. ANALYSIS A request for rehearing “must specifically identify all matters the party believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked, and the place where each matter was previously addressed in a motion, an opposition, a reply or sur-reply.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d). The party challenging a decision bears the burden of showing the decision should be modified. Id. We address Petitioner’s rehearing arguments below.” slip op. at 2
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“[m]issing, however, from Halevy’s disclosure is any teaching or suggestion that a ‘plurality of computer-readable field identifiers’ are mapped ‘to one another’ as required by claim 1.” Dec. 22. We discussed and quoted extensively from Petitioner’s expert declaration of Dr. Fox and Patent Owner’s expert declaration of Dr. Malek. Id. at 22–26 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 104; Ex. 2001 ¶¶ 69, 71). In reviewing the parties’ submissions, we found that: Halevy’s disclosures are consistent with Patent Owner’s arguments and Dr. Malek’s testimony that Halevy does not teach mapping fields to one another or mapping of fields to one another through SO-properties. For example, as described, in Figure 6 and Halevy as a whole, Halevy does not teach or suggest mapping or linking different keywords to one another, rather the keywords are mapped to SO-properties. slip op. at 5
- Expert testimonyPatent owner expert creditedPetitioner expert discountedDecided for patent owner
“Dr. Fox states that “Halevy’s disclosure of a form database in which corresponding fields from different forms on different websites map to the same SO-properties would have been recognized by a POSA as what the ’378 patent refers to as a universal variable map.” Ex. 1003 ¶ 108 (citing Ex. 1001, 17:42–46). Based on this conclusory opinion, Dr. Fox reasons that Halevy’s form database is a “universal variable map” that must also link computer-readable field identifiers (including parameter names) from multiple different websites to each other in the form database, because the field identifiers are mapped to the same SO-properties associated with an SO-class. Id. We observe first that Dr. Fox’s conclusion is not supported by the cited portions of the ’378 patent. In column 17, lines 42–46, the ’378 patent explains that fields or variables may be part of forms and variations of these data fields or variables “may include a source form, a destination form, a single source to many destination form, many sources to one destination form, cascading forms (e.g., a first form links to a second form which links to a third form, etc.) and so on.” Ex. 1001, 17:42–46. While this portion of the ’378 patent indicates that forms may include variations on fields or variables, it does not describe any linking or mapping of variables to one another. Ex. 2001 ¶ 76 (“[T]hat portion of the specification does not have anything to do with the definition of a “universal variable map.” Rather, it merely discusses different types of variables and fields that might appear in different types of forms.”). Dec. 28–29. We again referred to the disclosure of the ’378 patent to address evidence in the Petition relied upon by Dr. Fox to support Petitioner’s position. Id. We credited Dr. Malek’s testimony over Dr. Fox’s testimony because Dr. Malek underlined the distinctions between the asserted Belanger-Halevy prior art combination and limitation [1C]. Dec. 28–31. In short, any confusion applying the prior art Belanger-Halevy references to the claim limitation is rooted in the Petition. The Board denied the Petition because the Petition did not demonstrate a reasonable likelihood of showing that Belanger-Halevy discloses or teaches limitation [1C] of the ’378 patent.” slip op. at 5
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededDecided for patent owner
“Finally, with regard to the Reply and Sur-Reply submitted by the parties (Req. 9), we note that our Decision on Institution reviewed the parties’ discussion of claim construction, but ultimately determined that “[b]ased on our review of the preliminary record, we do not need to construe any terms expressly to reach our decision.” Dec. 11. Thus, we disagree with Petitioner that we misconstrued the mapping limitation where we did not find it necessary to construe any claim term for the purposes of our institution decision because we determined the Petition deficient for failing to meet our threshold requirements as discussed above and in detail in the Decision on Institution. See Req. 1–11.” slip op. at 7
Claim constructionPatents in suitUS 9,633,378 - PTAB · Apr 22, 2025 · IPR2024-00910 · APJ Jo-Anne M Kokoski · IPR · Rehearing
The Board denied Micron’s rehearing request, leaving institution denied because the Petition did not show a reasonable likelihood that claims 7–10 were obvious over Park.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied
“II. STANDARD OF REVIEW When rehearing a decision on institution, we do not review the merits of the decision de novo, but instead review the decision for an abuse of discretion. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(c). An abuse of discretion may be determined “if a decision is based on an erroneous interpretation of law, if a factual finding is not supported by substantial evidence, or if the decision represents an unreasonable judgment in weighing relevant factors.” Arnold Partnership v. Dudas, 362 F.3d 1338, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (citing In re Gartside, 203 F.3d 1305, 1315–16 (Fed. Cir. 2000)). The party requesting rehearing has the burden to show that the decision should be modified. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d). Additionally, the request for rehearing “must specifically identify all matters the party believes the Board misapprehended” slip op. at 2
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for patent owner
“dummy source structure might not even be an inoperable structure,” and therefore “the ’872 Patent does not use ‘dummy’ to exclude the dummy source structure from being an operable, functioning element.” Ex. 1003 ¶ 85 (citing Ex. 1001, 5:41–43, 16:63–66). In support of his testimony, Dr. Banerjee points to the Specification’s teaching that “[i]n some embodiments, one or more dummy source structures are in contact with the substrate and may provide interconnect between the 3D memory device and peripheral devices” (Ex. 1001, 5:41–43), and “[w]hen conductive materials are used to fill dummy source hole 212 (e.g., contact 224), the dummy source structure 246 may function as an interconnect to connect 3D memory device 100 with other peripheral devices” (id. at 16:63–66), which we considered and relied upon in construing “dummy source structure” in the Decision. Dec. 11–13. None of the functions identified by Dr. Banerjee, however, relate to whether the dummy source structure would function as a source to the memory cells. Specification consistently describes that function as an interconnect with other peripheral devices, and does not teach or suggest that the dummy source structure may function to provide source to the memory cells. See Ex. 1001, 5:40–43 (“In some embodiments, one or more dummy source structures are in contact with the substrate and may provide interconnect between the 3D memory device and peripheral devices.”), 11:46–48 (“In some embodiments, dummy source structures 178 may function as interconnects to connect 3D memory device 100 with other peripheral devices.”), 16:63–66 (“When conductive materials are used to fill dummy source hole 212 (e.g., contact 244), the dummy source structure 246 may function as an interconnect to connect 3D memory device 100 with other peripheral devices.”). Our construction of “dummy source structure” is consistent with the Specification, and does not foreclose the dummy source structure from being operational, for example, as an interconnect to peripheral devices. Nor is it inconsistent with the Specification’s teaching that “[i]n some embodiments, dummy source structure 246 may not connect to channel structures in the inner region.” See Req. 11 (citing Ex. 1001, 16:38–44). In the case where the dummy source structure connects with the channel structures, the other end may connect with peripheral devices, or may be a dead end. Thus, even if the dummy source structure is operable as an interconnect to connect the 3D memory device with other peripheral devices, it does not follow that a dummy source structure would function as an interconnect to a supply that provides source to the memory cells. For these reasons, we are not persuaded that we abused our discretion in our construction of the term “dummy source structure.”” slip op. at 5
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“(Paper 14, “Request” or “Req.”) of our Decision (Paper 13, “Decision” or “Dec.”) denying institution of an inter partes review of claims 7–10 (“the challenged claims”) of U.S. Patent No. 10,861,872 B2 (Ex. 1001, “the ’872 patent”). The Request challenges our determination that the information presented in the Petition did not establish a reasonable likelihood of showing that claims 7–10 would have been obvious over the teachings of Park.1 Dec. 19–23.” slip op. at 2
Claim constructionPatents in suitUS 10,861,872 - Giesecke+devrient GmbH / Giesecke+devrient Currency Technology GmbH et al. v. Lumenco, LLCRehearing deniedPTAB · Mar 13, 2025 · IPR2024-00837 · APJ Benjamin D M Wood · IPR · Rehearing
The Board denied Petitioner’s rehearing request, leaving in place the denial of institution because Petitioner did not show a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on claims 1, 3–7, and 9–13.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied
“rehearing without prior authorization from the Board.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d). The request must “specifically identify all matters the party believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked, and the place where each matter was previously addressed in a motion, an opposition, a reply, or a surreply.” Id. “When rehearing a decision on petition, a panel will review the decision for an abuse of discretion.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(c).” slip op. at 2
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner
“Petitioner misreads limitation [1d], and in particular fails to accord proper meaning to the word “each” in this limitation. “A claim must be read in accordance with the precepts of English grammar.” In re Hyatt, 708 F.2d 712, 714 (Fed. Cir. 1983). Importantly, “[e]ach is treated as singular . . . when it comes before a singular noun (e.g., each house): Each group is responsible for its own quality control—A. Francis, 1986;” and “when it is followed by of and a plural noun (e.g. each of the houses): each of the three parties has a right to a confidential briefing (not have).” Fowler’s Dictionary of Modern English Usage 242 (J. Butterfield ed., 4th ed. 2015). Thus, each refers to each singular (i.e., individual) set of micro mirrors, even though it is followed by “of the sets.” The plain language of limitation [1d] confirms that “each of the sets” is singular by using the singular verb tense “has” rather than the plural tense “have.” Ex. 1001, 28:31. Accordingly, as we held in the Decision (Dec. 17), limitation [1d] requires that each individual set of micro mirrors has a differing cone angle offset. The rest of the limitation’s subject language—“providing the pixels for each of the differing ones of the images”—does not change this result. “[P]roviding the pixels” identifies the relevant “each of the sets of the micro mirrors,” and “for each of the differing ones of the images” identifies the relevant “pixels.” In combination, “providing the pixels for each of the differing ones of the images” clarifies that “each of the sets of the micro mirrors” has, as an antecedent basis, the set (singular) of micro mirrors recited in limitation [1c]. This limitation reads: “the array of micro mirrors includes, for each of the pixels of each of the images, a set of the micro mirrors each having a reflective surface oriented to reflect the ambient light toward a point on the plane corresponding to one of the pixels.” Ex. 1001, 28:24–28 (emphasis added). Thus, each individual set of micro mirrors must have a different cone angle offset from that of the other sets of micro mirrors, whether or not they provide pixels for the same or different images. Petitioner’s interpretation of this language as not requiring differing cone angle offset for sets of micro mirrors forming pixels within the same image (Reh’g Req. 7) is therefore incorrect.” slip op. at 5
Claim constructioncites PhillipsPatents in suitUS 10,317,691 - PTAB · Feb 6, 2025 · IPR2024-00324 · APJ Michelle N Wormmeester · IPR · Rehearing
The Board denied Comcast’s rehearing request and left in place denial of institution after finding no abuse of discretion in its construction and compelling-merits analysis.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied
“abuse of discretion. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(c). An abuse of discretion occurs when a “decision [i]s based on an erroneous conclusion of law or clearly erroneous factual findings, or . . . a clear error of judgment.” PPG Indus., Inc. v. Celanese Polymer Specialties Co., 840 F.2d 1565, 1567 (Fed. Cir. 1988). “The burden of showing that a decision should be modified lies with the party challenging the decision.” Patent Trial and Appeal Board Consolidated Trial Practice Guide 90 (Nov. 2019) (hereinafter, “CTPG”).5 In its request for rehearing, the dissatisfied party must (1) “specifically identify all matters the party believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked” and (2) identify the place “where each matter was previously addressed.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d); CTPG 90.” slip op. at 3
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Institution denied fintivDenied
“discretion to deny institution due to the advanced state of parallel litigation, taking into consideration the six factors identified in Apple Inc. v. Fintiv, Inc., IPR2020-00019, Paper 11 (PTAB Mar. 20, 2020) (precedential), as well as applying guidance set forth in a Memorandum regarding the “Interim Procedure for Discretionary Denials in AIA Post-Grant Proceedings with Parallel District Court Litigation” issued by the Director of the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (hereinafter, “Guidance Memo”).6 Inst. Dec. 6–43. We determined that the first five Fintiv factors favor discretionary denial,7 and that the Petition presents compelling evidence of unpatentability as to independent claims 1, 12, and 17 under the sixth Fintiv factor. Id. at 15–16, 23–43. Because “the PTAB will not deny institution based on Fintiv if there is compelling evidence of unpatentability,” we declined to exercise our discretion to deny and instituted trial. Guidance Memo 5; Inst. Dec. 15–16. In our Rehearing Decision, however, we agreed with Patent Owner that we erred in determining the claim terms “first format” and “second format” are not limited to different formats, and determined that the proper construction of these claim terms indeed requires the two formats to be different formats. Reh’g Dec. 5–9, 19. Applying the proper construction, we further determined that none of Petitioner’s asserted challenges presents compelling merits of unpatentability as to any claim of the ’751 patent, 6 Available at https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/interim_ proc_discretionary_denials_aia_parallel_district_court_litigation_memo_20 220621_.pdf. 7 Our analysis of the first five Fintiv factors in our First Institution Decision remains undisturbed on rehearing. contrary to our initial determination in the Institution Decision. Id. at 19–20. Having determined that the first five Fintiv factors favor discretionary denial, and that the Petition does not meet the compelling merits standard of the Guidance Memo under the sixth Fintiv factor, we modified our decision and denied institution on rehearing. Id. at 20.” slip op. at 4
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Prosecution history disclaimer / disavowalDisclaimer foundDecided for patent owner
“Contrary to Petitioner’s position, Patent Owner met its burden of showing that our Institution Decision should be modified. In our Institution Decision, we relied on claim differentiation when we determined that claim 1 is not limited to different first and second formats. Inst. Dec. 31. We did not consider the prosecution history, which was part of the record. See Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (“[W]e have held that a court ‘should also consider the patent’s prosecution history, if it is in evidence.’”). As we noted in our Rehearing Decision, however, the Federal Circuit has explained that “[t]he prosecution history modifies the scope of a claim term if ‘the patentee distinguished that term from prior art on the basis of a particular embodiment, expressly disclaimed subject matter, or described a particular embodiment as important to the invention.” Reh’g Dec. 8 (quoting Sentry Protection Prods., Inc. v. Eagle Mfg. Co., 400 F.3d 910, 915 (Fed. Cir. 2005)). The Federal Circuit also has explained that “[a]lthough claim differentiation is a useful analytic tool, it cannot . . . relieve any claim of limitations imposed by the prosecution history.” Id. at 13 (quoting Fenner Invs., Ltd. v. Cellco P’Ship, 778 F.3d 1320, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2015)). In other words, we erred in not considering the prosecution history, which led to our erroneous conclusion that claim 1 is not limited to different first and second formats. See Ex. 1104, 170 (prosecution history). Our Institution Decision was based on this erroneous conclusion of law, as Patent Owner argued, and we modified it accordingly.” slip op. at 9
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentable
“claim 1. As discussed above with respect to limitation 1D, Petitioner asserted that its proposed combination of Danciu and Mahajan would have provided a system where “Danciu’s remote control would translate commands associated with a first type of media playing application to a generic format, transmit them to the controlled device, which would translate them to a command associated with a second type of media playing application for execution.” Reh’g Dec. 12–13 (quoting Pet. 31). In other words, both Danciu’s remote control and controlled device translate commands. With respect to claim 5, Petitioner asserted that Mahajan’s abstraction module could operate at Danciu’s server. Pet. 43. Even if Mahajan’s abstraction module (which translates commands) could operate at Danciu’s server, Petitioner does not adequately explain why an ordinarily skilled artisan would have had reason to modify Danciu’s system to locate Mahajan’s abstraction module at the server, especially where both Danciu’s remote control and controlled device already translate commands. See In re Kahn, 441 F.3d 977, 988 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (“[T]here must be some articulated reasoning with some rational underpinning to support the legal conclusion of obviousness.”). Petitioner does not point to anything in its analysis of claim 5 that demonstrates we misapprehended or overlooked a matter.” slip op. at 15
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites PhillipsPatents in suitUS 11,048,751 - Tomofun, LLC v. Doggyphone LLCRehearing deniedPTAB · Dec 10, 2021 · IPR2021-00260 · APJ Patrick R Scanlon · IPR · Rehearing
The Board denied rehearing and maintained its denial of institution because Petitioner did not show the Board overlooked or misapprehended its arguments or abused its discretion.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied
“A party dissatisfied with a decision may file a single request for rehearing, without prior authorization from the Board. The burden of showing a decision should be modified lies with the party challenging the decision. The request must specifically identify all matters the party believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked, and the place where each matter was previously addressed in a motion, an opposition, or a reply. We review our Decision under an abuse of discretion standard. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(c). An abuse of discretion may arise if a decision is based on an erroneous interpretation of law, if a factual finding is not supported by substantial evidence, or if the decision represents an unreasonable judgment in weighing relevant factors. Star Fruits S.N.C. v. United States, 393 F.3d 1277, 1281 (Fed. Cir. 2005); Arnold P’ship v. Dudas, 362 F.3d 1338, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2004); In re Gartside, 203 F.3d 1305, 1315–16 (Fed. Cir. 2000). “Substantial evidence is ‘such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.’” OSI Pharm., LLC v. Apotex” slip op. at 2
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“Claim(s) Ground 35 U.S.C. § Reference(s)/Basis Challenged 1 7 102(b) Alasaarela1 2 8 103(a) Alasaarela 3 7–9 102(b) Beccaria2 4 7–9 103(a) Carelli,3 Beccaria 5 7–9 103(a) Bloksberg,4 Beccaria Pet. 4. Petitioner asserts that Alasaarela discloses the audio signal limitation for Grounds 1 and 2. Id. at 23–24, 31. Petitioner asserts that Beccaria discloses the audio signal limitation for Ground 3, and Carelli discloses the audio signal limitation for Ground 4. Id. at 36–37, 48. For Ground 5, Petitioner asserts that Bloksberg discloses the audio signal limitation. Id. at 60.” slip op. at 3
- BurdenDecided for patent owner
“As such, the Petition does not indicate with sufficient particularity that Petitioner relies on the Examiner’s finding as a basis for asserting that Bloksberg discloses the audio signal limitation and, thus, does not satisfy Petitioner’s burden on this point. See Harmonic Inc. v. Avid Tech., Inc., 815 F.3d 1356, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“In an IPR, the petitioner has the burden from the onset to show with particularity why the patent it challenges is unpatentable.” (citing 35 U.S.C. § 312(a)(3)); see also Intelligent Bio- Systems, Inc. v. Illumina Cambridge Ltd., 821 F.3d 1359, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“It is of the utmost importance that petitioners in the IPR proceedings the ‘evidence that supports the grounds for the challenge to each claim.’” (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 312(a)(3))). Because the Petition did not indicate clearly that it was relying on the Examiner’s finding, we could not have misapprehended or overlooked such a position. In addition, Patent Owner was not afforded a fair opportunity to dispute any reliance on the Examiner’s finding or the reasoning underlying the finding.” slip op. at 5
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“We disagree with Petitioner’s characterization of Ground 3 as being based on obviousness. Rather, the Petition clearly asserts for Ground 3 that “Claims 7-9 are anticipated under 35 U.S.C. § 102 by Beccaria[].” Pet. 4; see also id. at 32 (“Ground 3 – Claims 7–9 Are Unpatentable As Anticipated By Beccaria[]”). Petitioner’s Ground 3 analysis of claim 7 relies on Beccaria disclosing each limitation, including the audio signal limitation. Id. at 32–40. Petitioner’s Rehearing Request does not direct us to any portion of the Petition for Ground 3 that asserts any claim limitation would have been obvious over Beccaria, alone or in combination with another reference. Accordingly, we are not persuaded that we misapprehended Petitioner’s argument with respect to Beccaria.” slip op. at 9
§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnessPatents in suitUS 9,723,813 - PTAB · Dec 8, 2021 · IPR2021-00608 · APJ Thu A Dang · IPR · Rehearing
The Board denied Samsung’s rehearing request, leaving institution denied under § 325(d) because the same or substantially the same arguments were previously presented and examiner error was not shown.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied
“II. STANDARD OF REVIEW A party requesting rehearing bears the burden of showing that the decision should be modified. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d). The party must identify specifically all matters we misapprehended or overlooked, and the place where each matter was previously addressed in its petition. Id. When reconsidering a decision on institution, we review the decision for an abuse of discretion. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(c). An abuse of discretion may be determined if a decision is based on an erroneous interpretation of law, if a factual finding is not supported by substantial evidence, or if the decision represents an unreasonable judgment in weighing relevant factors. Star” slip op. at 2
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsInstitution denied 325dInstitution denied
“Advanced Bionics, we exercised our discretion under 35 U.S.C. § 325(d) and determined not to institute inter partes review. Dec. 7−26 (citing Advanced Bionics, LLC v. MED-EL Elektromedizinische Geräte Gmbh, IPR2019- 01469, Paper 6 at 8 (PTAB Feb. 13, 2020) (precedential)). As to Part 1 of the Advanced Bionics framework, we determined that the same or substantially the same arguments were presented previously to the Office. Id. at 10−13. Under Part 2 of the Advanced Bionics framework, we determined that Petitioner failed to show that the Examiner erred by not realizing that Chu ’330 and Chu ’886 qualify as 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) prior art and are material to the patentability of the claims in the ’654 patent. Id. at 14−26.” slip op. at 3
- Strike new argumentNew argument disregardedDecided for patent owner
“Petitioner’s arguments are new arguments raised for the first time in its Rehearing Request. Petitioner acknowledges that “NRG and Hollmer were not cited in the Petition.” Req. Reh’g 10. Nevertheless, Petitioner alleges that it “could not have anticipated the Patent Owner’s mischaracterization of the Droplets decision, nor the Board’s reliance on this mischaracterization,” and that Petitioner was not authorized to file a reply to the Patent Owner Preliminary Response. Id.; see also id. at 2−3, fn.1. Petitioner’s new arguments in connection with Hollmer and NRG are improper. As we discussed above, Patent Owner did not mischaracterize and we did not misapprehend Droplets. It was not necessary to authorize Petitioner to file a reply, as we were capable of determining whether Patent Owner mischaracterizes Droplets. As discussed above, Petitioner fails to recognize that the language relied upon by Patent Owner in Droplets is consistent with 37 C.F.R. § 1.57 and MPEP § 608.01(p). Although Petitioner relies on MPEP § 608.01(p) in its Petition, Petitioner now in its Rehearing Request for the first time suggests that we should ignore MPEP § 608.01(p) and the case law cited in MPEP § 608.01(p). Pet. 11–12; Req. Reh’g 6−7. A request for rehearing is not an opportunity to submit new arguments, after the decision has noted the deficiencies in the petitioner’s original analysis. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d). It is Petitioner’s burden to identify specifically all matters we misapprehended or overlooked in our Decision to Institute. We could not have misapprehended or overlooked the new arguments that were not presented in the record until after the Decision.” slip op. at 15
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Priority / effective filing date / continuation supportPriority date awardedDecided for patent owner
“Contrary to Petitioner’s contentions, section 1.57 of Title 37 of the Code of Federal Regulations is not a “statute,” but a regulation that became effective on September 21, 2004. See 69 Fed. Reg. 56,482. The ’882 application, which incorporated Chu ’886 by reference, was filed on September 8, 1998, and issued as Chu ’330 on February 5, 2002. Ex. 1005, codes (21), (22), (45), (60), 6:1–7. The ’654 patent, which incorporated the ’882 application by reference, is a reissue of Application No. 09/312,199 (“the ’199 application”) filed on May 14, 1999, now U.S. Patent No. 6,634,777 (“the ’777 patent”), issued on November 4, 2003. Ex. 1001, codes (63), (64); 5:63–67. Both the ’882 application (issued as Chu ’330) and the ’199 application (reissued as the ’654 patent) were filed and issued as patents prior to the effective date, September 21, 2004, of 37 C.F.R. § 1.57. Petitioner does not explain why the applicant should have complied with 37 C.F.R. § 1.57, which did not exist at the time of filing of those applications or issuance of those patents that incorporated by reference Chu ’886 and the ’882 application. Pet. 7–8, 10−17; Req. Reh’g 1−12. We decline to apply 37 C.F.R. § 1.57 retroactively to the incorporation by reference statements submitted in the ’882 application and the ’199 application.” slip op. at 6
§ 102 anticipationDiscretionary denial - PTAB · Dec 6, 2021 · IPR2021-00605 · APJ Thu A Dang · IPR · Rehearing
The Board denied Samsung’s rehearing request, leaving institution denied under § 325(d) because the same or substantially the same arguments were previously presented and material Examiner error was not shown.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied
“II. STANDARD OF REVIEW A party requesting rehearing bears the burden of showing that the decision should be modified. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d). The party must identify specifically all matters we misapprehended or overlooked, and the place where each matter was previously addressed in its petition. Id. When reconsidering a decision on institution, we review the decision for an abuse of discretion. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(c). An abuse of discretion may be determined if a decision is based on an erroneous interpretation of law, if a factual finding is not supported by substantial evidence, or if the decision represents an unreasonable judgment in weighing relevant factors. Star” slip op. at 2
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsInstitution denied 325dInstitution denied
“Under Part 2 of the Advanced Bionics framework, Petitioner has the burden to show that “[t]he Examiner erred by not realizing that Chu ’330, Chu ’185, and Chu ’886 qualify as 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) prior art and are material to the patentability of the ’768 Patent claims,” as Petitioner alleges in its § 325(d) analysis. Pet. 7, 9−18. Upon consideration of Petitioner’s Request for Rehearing, we are not persuaded by Petitioner’s arguments of Examiner error.” slip op. at 4
- Strike new argumentNew argument disregardedDecided for patent owner
“Petitioner’s arguments are new arguments raised for the first time in its Rehearing Request. Petitioner acknowledges that “Hollmer and NRG were not cited in the Petition.” Req. Reh’g 10. Nevertheless, Petitioner alleges that it “could not have anticipated the Patent Owner’s mischaracterization of the Droplets decision, nor the Board’s reliance on this mischaracterization,” and that Petitioner was not authorized to file a reply to the Patent Owner Preliminary Response. Id.; see also id. at 2−3, fn.1. Petitioner’s new arguments in connection with Hollmer and NRG are improper. As we discussed above, Patent Owner did not mischaracterize and we did not misapprehend Droplets. It was not necessary to authorize Petitioner to file a reply, as we were capable of determining whether Patent Owner mischaracterizes Droplets. As discussed above, Petitioner fails to recognize that the language relied upon by Patent Owner in Droplets is consistent with 37 C.F.R. § 1.57 and MPEP § 608.01(p). Although Petitioner relies on MPEP § 608.01(p) in its Petition, Petitioner now in its Rehearing Request for the first time suggests that we should ignore MPEP § 608.01(p) and the case law cited in MPEP § 608.01(p). Pet. 11; Req. Reh’g 6−7. A request for rehearing is not an opportunity to submit new arguments, after the decision has noted the deficiencies in the petitioner’s original analysis. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d). It is Petitioner’s burden to identify specifically all matters we misapprehended or overlooked in our Decision to Institute. We could not have misapprehended or overlooked the new arguments that were not presented in the record until after the Decision.” slip op. at 15
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Priority / effective filing date / continuation supportPriority date awardedDecided for patent owner
“codes (21), (22), (45), (60), 6:1–7. The initial parent application in the ’768 patent’s priority chain, U.S. Application No. 09/569,758 (“the ’758 application”), which incorporated the ’882 application by reference, was filed on May 12, 2000, and issued as U.S. Patent No. 6,718,415 B1 (“the ’415 patent”) on April 6, 2004. See Ex. 1001, code (63); Ex. 1008, code (45), 4:50–53. Both the ’882 application (issued as Chu ’330) and the ’758 application (issued as the ’415 patent) were filed and issued as patents prior to the effective date, September 21, 2004, of 37 C.F.R. § 1.57. Petitioner does not explain why the applicant should have complied with 37 C.F.R. § 1.57, which did not exist at the time of filing of those applications or issuance of those patents that incorporated by reference Chu ’886 and the ’882. Pet. 7, 9−18; Req. Reh’g 1−13. We decline to apply 37 C.F.R. § 1.57 retroactively to the incorporation by reference statements submitted in the ’882 application and the ’758 application.” slip op. at 7
§ 102 anticipationDiscretionary denialPatents in suitUS 9,529,768 - Foster-Miller Inc. v. Flir Detection Inc.Rehearing deniedPTAB · Oct 20, 2021 · IPR2020-00301 · APJ Meredith C Petravick · IPR · Rehearing
The Board denied Foster-Miller’s rehearing requests in both proceedings, leaving institution denied because the petition did not adequately show the challenged claim’s limitations in SuperDroid or Wang.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied
“II. STANDARD A party requesting rehearing bears the burden of showing that a decision should be modified. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d). The party must identify all matters it believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked, and the place where each matter was addressed previously in a motion, an opposition, or a reply. Id. When rehearing a decision, we review the decision for an abuse of discretion. See generally 37 C.F.R. § 42.71 (b)–(d). An abuse of discretion occurs when a “decision was based on an erroneous conclusion of law or clearly erroneous factual findings, or ... a clear error of judgment.” PPG Indus. Inc. v. Celanese Polymer Specialties Co., 840 F.2d 1565, 1567 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (citations omitted). A request for rehearing is not an opportunity merely to disagree with the panel’s assessment of the arguments or weighing of the evidence. “It is not an abuse of discretion to have made an analysis or conclusion with which a party disagrees,” and “mere disagreement with the Board’s analysis or conclusion is not a proper basis for rehearing.” EMC Corp. v. PersonalWeb Techs., LLC, IPR2013-00085, Paper 29 at 4 (PTAB June 5, 2013).” slip op. at 3
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot reached
“Petitioner does not persuade us that we overlooked Superdroid’s disclosures. After careful consideration of the evidence presented in the Petition and the Requests for Rehearing, as stated in our Institution Decision, “it is not clear from SuperDroid’s figures h and i or the brief explanation of Steps 2 and 3 that the front end of the robot contacts and ascends the front face of the obstacle, with the support surface generating sufficient traction to climb the riser.” Inst. Dec. 14 (citing Ex. 2001 ¶¶ 26–27 (testimony of testimony of Dr. Robert H. Sturges, declarant for Patent Owner)). Petitioner provides additional argument and analysis of SuperDroid’s figures in support of its Request for Rehearing, but arguments that go beyond the analysis presented as to this limitation in the Petition could not have been misapprehended. See, e.g., Req. Reh’g 3 (providing annotated version of SuperDroid’s figure g), 6 (providing enlarged and annotated version of SuperDroid’s figure h). Petitioner’s argument is mere disagreement with our findings in the Institution Decisions regarding the disclosure of Superdroid.” slip op. at 4
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITADecided for patent owner
“plain meaning of Element [1d] for the first time in its Request for Rehearing. Petitioner did not provide any explicit construction of Element [1d] in the Petition. See Pet. 10 (“no claim terms require[] construction, and all claims should be given their plain and ordinary meaning”). We could not have misapprehended an argument that was not adequately made in the Petition. In any event, Petitioner does not persuade us that the plain language of Element [1d] does not require pivoting the trailing arm while the vehicle ascends the stair. Petitioner’s argument relies upon Figs. 5G–5I of the ’752 patent to argue that Element [1d] does not require pivoting the trailing arm while the vehicle ascends the stair. Req. Reh’g 13. Petitioner’s argument, however, does not account for Figs. 5J–5O of the ’752 patent, which depict pivoting the trailing arm to push the robot vehicle upward while driving the vehicle tracks to surmount the stair nose. See Ex. 1001, 10:61–11:4, claims 2–4. Accordingly, the ’752 patent figures are consistent with reading Element [1d] to require pivoting the trailing arm while the vehicle ascends the stair. At a minimum, Petitioner’s reading of the claim required further explanation if not an explicit construction in the Petition, given that the limitation could be read consistent with the specification in a manner different that Petitioner presumed.” slip op. at 6
- BurdenDecided for patent owner
“And, as explicitly pointed out in the Institution Decision, the Petition’s explanation of how Wang meets Element [1d] is insufficient to establish that Wang’s arm pivots while ascending a stair. See Inst. Dec. 20– 21. “In an [inter partes review], the petitioner has the burden from the onset to show with particularity why the patent it challenges is unpatentable.” Harmonic Inc. v. Avid Tech., Inc., 815 F.3d 1356, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (citing 35 U.S.C. § 312(a)(3) (requiring inter partes review petitions to identify “with particularity . . . the evidence that supports the grounds for the challenge to each claim”)).” slip op. at 6
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessPatents in suitUS 8,074,752 - Peddinghaus Corporation v. Ficep CorporationRehearing deniedPTAB · Oct 8, 2021 · IPR2020-01707 · APJ Jameson Lee · IPR · Rehearing
The Board denied Peddinghaus’s rehearing request, finding no abuse of discretion in denying institution on claims 1–14 because Hashimoto did not disclose the claimed intersection parameters.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied
“Reh’g Req. 7–8. Although Petitioner avers that the “identifying” of intersection parameters, or connecting holes, is completed in Hashimoto by the member totaling module before any order list is prepared, the order list is pertinent evidence for that assertion and there is nothing inappropriate in discussing that evidence. We recognize no other evidence which was identified by the Petitioner in the Petition, and Petitioner points to no such other evidence that we overlooked. Indeed, Petitioner states: “The Petition references the order list depicted in Figure 19 as merely providing a summary of the information (the ‘total’) that was previously identified and extracted by the member totaling module.” Id. at 8 (emphasis added). As we stated in our Decision, Petitioner points to no description or disclosure in Hashimoto that its member totaling module recognizes the difference between a connecting hole, or intersection parameter, from a nonconnecting hole. Dec. 27. Hashimoto’s member totaling module “automatically totals, by cross section or length, the information including the shape, length, quantity, hole shape and the hole position (design drawing information) of all the light gauge sheet steel used for the steel house existing in the CAD system” and “[b]ased on this total, an order list (steel member order list) is prepared (FIG. 19).” Ex. 1005 ¶ 101. Nowhere in this exhaustive list of hole information, however, is mentioned any data that identifies the difference between a connecting hole, or intersection parameter, and a non-connecting hole. Further, Petitioner’s statement on page 8 of the Rehearing Request that “hole shape” and “hole position” constitute intersection parameters is not persuasive because, from this information, it is unknown how the hole is intended to be used. Moreover, the order list of Figure 19 – which “merely shows the number of holes and the die numbers and positions of where those holes are formed”1 – is the only indicated output of the member totaling module.” slip op. at 3
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITADecided for patent owner
“meaning of “fastening holes” changes from the first to second embodiment.3 For example, in the Background section of Hashimoto, “fastening holes” are defined generally as holes formed “in the light gauge shape steel for the fastening tools.” Ex. 1005 ¶ 4. The same Background paragraph provides examples of “fastening tools such as a tapping screw and a one-side rivet.” Id. (Emphasis added). Thus, this definition does not strictly limit fastening holes to connecting holes, since it does not foreclose the likely possibility of fastening tools including wires or wiring. Moreover, a “machine for forming the fastening holes” is also disclosed in the Background, the same “non-stationary fastening hole forming machine 5” discussed in Figures 20-21 of the second embodiment. Id. ¶ 5. Thus, when “fastening holes for passing the electrical wiring” (emphasis added) are disclosed in the discussion of Figures 20-21 in Hashimoto’s paragraph 154, there is no evidence suggesting that a different type of “fastening hole” other than what has been generally described in the Background is being mentioned. Id. ¶ 154. The same applies for the 3 The statement made in footnote 3 on pages 11–12 of the Rehearing Request that the only holes in Figure 18 are joints only establishes that the holes in Figure 18 may be connecting holes, not all “fastening holes” in Hashimoto. disclosure that “fastening hole information includ[es]…[where] the wiring holes [are] formed in the stud” in paragraph 156 and how character c in Figure 23 “designates a hole for electrical wiring or a fastening hole for mounting the stud on the structural face plate” (emphasis added) in paragraph 157. Id. ¶¶ 156–157. Thus, it is a much more reasonable reading that in all embodiments of Hashimoto, the definition of “fastening holes” includes both connecting holes and non-connecting holes – such as those for wiring.” slip op. at 6
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“As we stated in our Decision, Petitioner points to no description or disclosure in Hashimoto that its member totaling module recognizes the difference between a connecting hole, or intersection parameter, from a nonconnecting hole. Dec. 27. Hashimoto’s member totaling module “automatically totals, by cross section or length, the information including the shape, length, quantity, hole shape and the hole position (design drawing information) of all the light gauge sheet steel used for the steel house existing in the CAD system” and “[b]ased on this total, an order list (steel member order list) is prepared (FIG. 19).” Ex. 1005 ¶ 101. Nowhere in this exhaustive list of hole information, however, is mentioned any data that identifies the difference between a connecting hole, or intersection parameter, and a non-connecting hole. Further, Petitioner’s statement on page 8 of the Rehearing Request that “hole shape” and “hole position” constitute intersection parameters is not persuasive because, from this information, it is unknown how the hole is intended to be used. Moreover, the order list of Figure 19 – which “merely shows the number of holes and the die numbers and positions of where those holes are formed”1 – is the only indicated output of the member totaling module.” slip op. at 3
Claim construction§ 102 anticipationPatents in suitUS 7,974,719
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.