- Intelligent Wellhead Systems, Inc. v. Downing Wellhead Equipment, LLCInstitution deniedPTAB · Sep 12, 2024 · IPR2024-00583 · APJ Benjamin D M Wood · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution on all grounds because Petitioner did not show a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on any challenged claim.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“II. ANALYSIS A. Legal Standards Used in the Merits Analysis “In an IPR, the petitioner has the burden from the onset to show with particularity why the patent it challenges is unpatentable.” Harmonic Inc. v. Avid Tech., Inc., 815 F.3d 1356, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (citing 35 U.S.C. § 312(a)(3) (requiring inter partes review petitions to identify “with particularity . . . the evidence that supports the grounds for the challenge to each claim”)); Dynamic Drinkware, LLC v. Nat’l Graphics, Inc., 800 F.3d 1375, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (discussing the burden of proof in inter partes review).” slip op. at 7
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“B. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art Petitioner contends that, for the ’779 patent, one of ordinary skill in the art “would have had an engineering degree and two or more years’ wellrelated operations experience, or equivalent education/experience.” Pet. 8. Patent Owner does not offer an alternative definition, but its Declarant, Mr. Hughett, submits that one of ordinary skill in the art would have had “a degree in petroleum or mining engineering, mechanical engineering, or a comparable discipline, and at least two years of experience in oil and gas extraction, or an equivalent combination of education and experience.” Ex. 2006 ¶ 17. On the record, we do not discern a meaningful difference between Petitioner’s and Mr. Hughett’s proposed definitions, and therefore adopt Petitioner’s definition for purposes of this Decision. We also presume that the cited prior-art references reflect the level of ordinary skill at the time of the invention. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (explaining the level of ordinary skill in the art may be evidenced by the cited references themselves).” slip op. at 8
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for petitioner
“The Specification does not suggest a particular definition of threshold, and neither party suggests that it is a term of art in the relevant field. Therefore, we consult a general dictionary for guidance. See Comaper Corp. v. Antec, Inc., 596 F.3d 1343, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (If “the specification does not assign or suggest a particular definition [of a claim term], in determining the ordinary and customary meaning of the claim term as viewed by a person of ordinary skill in the art, it is appropriate to consult a general dictionary definition of the word for guidance.”). Because Merriam-Webster’s online dictionary, Merriam-Webster.com, provides several definitions for threshold, we refer to the intrinsic record “to identify which of the different possible dictionary meanings is most consistent with the use of the words by the inventor.” Brookhill-Wilk 1, LLC v. Intuitive Surgical, Inc., 334 F.3d 1294, 1300 (Fed. Cir. 2003). Based on the context in which threshold is used in claims 1 and 8, we consider the most relevant definition to be “a level, point, or value above which something is true or will take place and below which it is not or will not.” Merriam- Webster.com/dictionary/threshold (accessed July 30, 2024). The claim context also indicates that threshold encompasses the opposite situation, i.e., the threshold may be a value below which something is true or will take place and above with it is not true or will not take place. Thus, a flow-rate value and time value are “thresholds” when there is an action that will or will not take place (or something is or is not true) depending on whether those values are met. The Specification identifies one particular action that occurs when these thresholds are met: performance of a CP swap from hydraulically fracturing the n1 well (i.e., a first well) to hydraulically fracturing the n1+1 well (i.e., a second well). Ex. 1001, 13:28–52, Figs. 1B, 12. To perform a CP swap, according to the Specification, zipper valves for the n1+1 well are opened while fluid is being pumped to the n1 well, allowing hydraulic fracturing fluid to flow to both wells, after which zipper valves for the n1 well are closed. Id. at 14:14–38, Figs. 15, 16A, 16B, 16C. This procedure is precisely what claims 1 and 8 recite. In addition to requiring “determining that the flow rate is below a flow-rate threshold . . . for a threshold amount of time,” claims 1 and 8 recite, e.g., “(c) during pumping of the fluid into the first well via the first valve, opening a second valve associated with a second well,” and “(e) during pumping of the fluid into the second well via the second valve, closing the first valve associated with the first well.” Ex. 1001, claims 1, 8. Thus, in the context of these claims, a flow-rate threshold and threshold amount of time would be flow-rate and time values that determine whether or not a second valve associated with a second well is opened during pumping of fluid into the first well via the first valve.” slip op. at 9
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“We are not persuaded that Ciezobka teaches or suggests limitation [1.3]. First, we agree with Patent Owner that this limitation necessarily requires comparing the measured flow rate to a threshold. Petitioner also appears to agree that such a comparison is necessary to perform limitation [1.3]. See Pet. 15 (“Ciezobka discloses determining the flowrate of the fluid and comparing the determined flowrate to certain thresholds . . . , and therefore discloses determining that the flow rate of the fluid being pumped into the first well is below a flowrate threshold.”) (emphasis added). Ciezobka does not, however, teach such a comparison. Assuming that the initial flow rate can be considered a “threshold,” Ciezobka’s teaching of the existence of an initial flow rate followed by the existence of a lower pulse flow rate does not constitute a teaching of a comparison of the two flow rates. Second, Petitioner has not established that the “initial flow rate” is a “threshold.” As discussed above, we construe “flow rate threshold” in the context of claim 1 to mean a flow rate value that an actual flow rate must drop below for a threshold amount of time in order for a second valve associated with a second well to be opened. See Section II.C. Ciezobka does not teach that a measured flow rate must drop below the initial flow rate or any other specific flowrate before one of valves 218 or 219 is opened. Instead, the valve is opened after a specific period of time and without comparing the actual flow rate to the initial flow rate. See Ex. 1037, 12:8– 12 (teaching that a pressure pulse is created by closing valve 219 “for a short period of time” ranging from 1 minute to 1 second, preferably 10 seconds). Indeed, opening valve 218/219 causes flow rate drop to one of the wells; it does not occur as a result of the flow-rate drop.” slip op. at 15
Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,401,779 - I4f Licensing NV v. Vilox ABInstitution deniedPTAB · Aug 21, 2024 · IPR2024-00602 · APJ Neil T Powell · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution because Petitioner did not show a reasonable likelihood that claims 1–15 were anticipated by Miller or obvious over Miller alone or Miller and Roy.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“An inter partes review may not be instituted “unless . . . the information presented in the petition . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). For the reasons explained below, we do not institute an inter partes review.” slip op. at 2
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“Considering all of the arguments and evidence, we agree with Patent Owner that Petitioner insufficiently supports its position that Miller discloses a locking recess with a curved horizontal locking surface. Petitioner does not cite any text in Miller that discloses a locking recess with a curved horizontal locking surface. E.g., Pet. 7–8, 14–23. Instead, Petitioner relies on Miller’s Figure 3 as allegedly showing a curved horizontal locking surface. E.g., id. at 15–18, 21–23. We do not find that Miller’s Figure 3 shows a locking recess with a curved horizontal locking surface in the location identified by Petitioner, i.e., the location of the curved red arrow that Petitioner added to Miller’s Figure 3. E.g., Pet. 15, 22. Even assuming that this portion of Miller’s drawing shows a very subtle rise (which we do not find), it does not show clearly a curve, as opposed to, for example, a slightly inclined flat surface. Moreover, we agree with Patent Owner that, at the point of Petitioner’s curved red arrow, Figure 3’s overlapping representation of the tongue’s lower surface and the groove’s upper surface prevents distinguishing one from the other. Prelim. Resp. 45 (“In Figure 3, the lines merge so that no conclusion can reasonably be made by a [person of ordinary skill in the art] as to whether a locking recess is present in the groove or not.”). Accordingly, Figure 3 does not allow discerning a curve in the groove’s upper surface at the point identified by Petitioner.” slip op. at 17
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“Additionally, Petitioner does not provide a persuasive reason that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had to configure Miller’s panel with a curved horizontal locking surface, in addition to an inclined horizontal locking surface, as required by independent claim 1. Pet. 34–39; Prelim. Resp. 54. In support of its argument that it was well-known to use curved locking surfaces, Petitioner provides a vague string cite of evidence that dubiously includes Miller (which has not been shown to disclose a curved horizontal locking surface). Pet. 37 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 25–26, 56; Ex. 1006, Figs. 2–4, 9, and 10 and associated description; Ex. 1004; Ex. 1006; Ex. 1005; Ex. 1009; Ex. 1010; Ex. 1011; Ex. 1012; Ex. 1013; Ex. 1014). Moreover, to the extent Petitioner is correct that it was well-known and easy to configure a panel with a curved locking surface, that may show that a person of ordinary skill in the art could have added a curved horizontal locking surface to Miller’s panel. But that does not show sufficiently that such a modification would have been obvious, as it does not demonstrate why a person of ordinary skill in the art would have modified Miller’s cladding panel to add a curved horizontal locking surface. See Belden v. Berk-Tek LLC, 805 F.3d 1064, 1073 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (stating that “obviousness concerns whether a skilled artisan not only could have made but would have been motivated to make the combinations or modifications of prior art to arrive at the claimed invention”) (citing InTouch Techs., Inc. v. VGo Commc’ns, Inc., 751 F.3d 1327, 1351–1352 (Fed. Cir. 2014)). Additionally, to the extent that Petitioner is correct that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have recognized a strength benefit of having two locking recesses, that does not explain why a person of ordinary skill in the art would have added a curved locking surface, as opposed to, for example, another substantially planar locking surface like the one at Miller’s contact point 42. Pet. 36–39; Ex. 1004, 5:19–34. And Petitioner does not identify, much less substantiate, any other reason that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had for combining a curved locking surface with an inclined horizontal locking surface in Miller’s cladding panel. Pet. 36–39. Because Petitioner has not persuasively addressed claim 1’s requirement that its dual locking recesses include one with a curved horizontal locking surface, Petitioner has not demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on its assertion that independent claim 1 would have been obvious over Miller. E.g., Pet. 7–8, 34–39. Additionally, this deficiency is not remedied in Petitioner’s challenges to dependent claims 2–15 based on Miller. E.g., Pet. 34, 40–50. Accordingly, Petitioner does not establish a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on its position that dependent claims 2–15 would have been obvious over Miller.” slip op. at 23
§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,421,425 - PTAB · Aug 5, 2024 · PGR2024-00014 · APJ Barry L Grossman · PGR · Institution
Instituted PGR on claims 33–36 on all asserted grounds; the Board found it more likely than not that at least one claim would be unpatentable over Clary and Tsuji.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“review. 35 U.S.C. § 324(a) (2018); 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a) (2023) (“The Board institutes the trial on behalf of the Director.”). Section 324(a) provides that a post-grant review may not be instituted “unless . . . the information presented in the petition . . . , if such information is not rebutted, would demonstrate that it is more likely than not that at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition is unpatentable.” Upon considering the evidence and arguments in the Petition (including its supporting testimonial evidence) and the evidence and arguments in the Preliminary Response (including its supporting testimonial evidence), we determine that the information presented shows that it is more likely than not that Petitioner would prevail with respect to at least one of the challenged claims. Accordingly, we institute post-grant review on all challenged claims on all asserted grounds. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.208(a) (“When instituting post-grant review, the Board will authorize the review to proceed on all of the challenged claims and on all grounds of unpatentability asserted for each claim.”); see also SAS Inst. Inc. v. Iancu, 138 S. Ct. 1348, 1359–60 (2018).” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedOther
“Petitioner asserts that a person of ordinary skill in the art “would have had at least a bachelor’s degree in mechanical engineering, electrical engineering, or similar technical degree and at least 2 years of experience in the field of mechanical design or relevant product design experience.” Pet. 27 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 56–58). Petitioner also asserts that “[f]or individuals with different educational backgrounds, a person could still be of ordinary skill in the art provided that person’s additional experience compensates for any differences in that person’s education as stated above.” Id. At this stage of the proceeding, Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s level of ordinary skill in the art, but “reserves the right to propose or challenge the level of ordinary skill and claim constructions should the Board institute trial.” Prelim. Resp. 21. Based on the record before us, we adopt, for purposes of this Decision, Petitioner’s proposed, and unopposed, level of ordinary skill. We also determine that this level of skill is consistent with the disclosed invention and the cited references.” slip op. at 16
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“Having considered the parties’ positions and evidence of record, we determine that no express construction of any claim term is necessary to determine whether to institute post-grant review. Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“[W]e need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))). To the extent further discussion of the meaning of any claim term is necessary to our decision, we provide that discussion below in our analysis of the asserted grounds of unpatentability. Any claim discussion in this Decision does not preclude the parties from arguing their proposed constructions of the claims during trial. Indeed, the parties are hereby given notice that final claim construction, in general, is an issue to be addressed at trial. Claim construction will be determined at the close of all the evidence and after any hearing. The parties are expected to assert all their claim construction arguments and evidence in the Petition,” slip op. at 17
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundInstituted
“As to why a person of ordinary skill would have modified Clary based on Tsuji, Petitioner asserts “rotatably coupling the actuator assembly directly to a linkage arm instead of a bracket or other intervening part would have been a mere design choice from a finite number of options.” Pet. 98 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 142). Petitioner also asserts that “in a four-bar linkage system like Clary, there are only a few options for coupling the actuator.” Id. If one end of the actuator assembly is coupled to the support bracket, then the other end of the actuator assembly can be coupled to a linkage arm or the display bracket. Pet. 98 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 142). would have been motivated to directly rotatably couple the actuator assembly to an arm of the arm assembly because this could reduce the number of parts and provide direct force from the actuator to the arm assembly which causes the display bracket to move. This configuration would simplify the design by reducing part count resulting in reduced inventory, assembly and inspection costs. Such a modification could also allow for a shorter actuator. Pet. 99 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 142).” slip op. at 23
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites KSR · Graham · NautilusPatents in suitUS 11,781,703 - Oracle Corporation v. Parking World Wide LLCAll claims unpatentablePTAB · Jul 11, 2024 · IPR2023-00385 · APJ Benjamin D M Wood · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–7 are unpatentable as obvious under §103 over Ivey, Matsumoto, and Tillotson, with Slemmer added for claims 4 and 7; Ward, Haynes, and Tillotson provide an alternative ground.
RulingsFinal written decision- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedDecided for petitioner
“improved “efficiency” would have been a sufficient reason for one of ordinary skill in the art to combine Ivey, Matsumoto, and Tillotson, Patent Owner does not expressly dispute Dr. Paradiso’s testimony that the combination of Ivey and Matsumoto “would more efficiently streamline parking enforcement.” Pet. 48. Based on Dr. Paradiso’s undisputed testimony, we find that one of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to combine Ivey and Matsumoto in the proposed manner “to more efficiently streamline parking enforcement.” Id. Patent Owner also does not expressly dispute Dr. Paradiso’s testimony that incorporating Tillotson’s reservation and subscription systems into Ivey/Matsumoto would have simplified the payment process and saved motorists’ time. Based on Dr. Paradiso’s testimony, we find that one of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to combine Ivey and Matsumoto with Tillotson in the proposed manner to “make the parking management system more efficient and easier to use,” to simplify the process by which parking spaces are paid for, and to save motorists’ time. Id. Finally, Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s contention that one of ordinary skill in the art would have had a reasonable expectation of success in combining the teachings of Ivey, Matsumoto, and Tillotson, or Dr. Paradiso’s testimony in support of that contention. Therefore, based on Dr. Paradiso’s undisputed testimony, we find that one of ordinary skill in the art would have had a reasonable expectation of success in combining these teachings.” slip op. at 27
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Patent Owner concurs with Petitioner’s definition. See PO Resp. 6 (“Patent Owner concurs with the Board in adopting Petitioner’s definition of a POSITA” for the Decision on Institution). As we did in our Decision on Institution, we adopt Petitioner’s unopposed definition of a person of ordinary skill. See Dec. 9. 8 Patent Owner has not presented any evidence of secondary considerations. 9 We find (and Patent Owner does not dispute) that Dr. Paradiso is qualified to offer expert testimony from the perspective of a skilled artisan. See, e.g., Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 7, 13.” slip op. at 9
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“As the parties do not expressly dispute the construction of any particular term, we determine that no express construction of any term is necessary. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (approving Board decision not to construe claim language where the construction is not material to the dispute). Several of Patent Owner’s arguments, however, imply that the claims are limited in particular ways. For example, Patent Owner suggests” slip op. at 10
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITAPlain and ordinary meaningDecided for petitioner
“We disagree that the claims are limited to parking spaces along a street. First, neither independent claim includes any such limitation; instead, the claims are directed to methods “for representing the parking status of a plurality of parking spaces,” without indicating where the plurality of parking spaces are located. Ex. 1001, claims 1, 5. Second, the Specification teaches that the parking spaces that may be represented can be in a lot or garage, not only on a street. See, e.g., id., Abstr. (“A parking status system overlays upon images of a street, a lot, or a garage with representations of parking vehicles the status of any parking space shown in the image.”); id. at 5:4–7 (“The present invention overlays the parking status of vehicles upon a visual image of a street or lot as it matches the GPS coordinates of the parking control officer, the vehicle, and the street scene.”). Patent Owner also suggests that the claims are limited to images obtained from a camera that is part of the user’s portable electronic device. Patent Owner asserts, for example, that Haynes obtains video images from “a camera upon a pole” that is “in a fixed position at a fixed elevation,” whereas “the ’421 patent receives imagery from a mobile device camera held by an officer at his height,” which is “movable.” PO Resp. 24. Again, we disagree that the claims are so limited. The independent claims recite a method for “representing the parking status of a plurality of parking spaces to a screen of a user’s portable electronic device upon a real time camera view.” Ex. 1001, claims 1, 5. “Represent[ing] . . . to a screen” means that the real time camera view of the parking spaces is displayed on the portable electronic device, but does not require the real time camera view to be obtained from the portable electronic device.” slip op. at 11
Patent outcomesUS 10,438,421 unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,438,421 - PTAB · Jun 10, 2024 · IPR2024-00300 · APJ Frederick C Laney · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–38 on all asserted grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood of prevailing based on the Carr grounds.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“Under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), an inter partes review may be instituted only if it is determined that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner will prevail with respect to at least one of the claims challenged in the petition. Considering the parties’ arguments and evidence, for reasons explained below, we conclude that Petitioner shows a reasonable likelihood that it will prevail with respect to at least one of the ’770 patent’s challenged claims. We institute an inter partes review on all challenged claims. See SAS Inst. Inc. v. Iancu, 138 S. Ct. 1348, 1355 (2018).” slip op. at 2
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Prior-art status of a reference › Patents / published applications (effective date, provisional support)Reference not prior artNot shown unpatentable
“Here, however, the February 18, 2022 filing date of Krupa (Ex. 1003, code (22)) is indisputably after the priority date for the claims recited in the ’770 patent, which Petitioner concedes is at least May 17, 2021 (Pet. 4, 14, filing date of the Krupa Provisional to qualify Krupa as prior art. See Pet. 4; 35 U.S.C. § 102(d)(2). Under subsection 102(d)(2), to qualify as prior art, a reference patent or published patent application is considered effectively filed as of the filing date of its provisional application only to the extent that the provisional “describes the subject matter” relied on in the reference patent document. 35 U.S.C. § 102(d)(2). We cannot presume that the Krupa Provisional describes the subject matter in Krupa that the Petition relies on, however. See Dynamic Drinkware, 800 F.3d at 1380 (“[B]ecause the PTO does not examine priority claims unless necessary, the Board has no basis to presume that a reference patent is necessarily entitled to the filing date of its provisional application.”). The burden to make this showing falls squarely on Petitioner. But Petitioner does not explain how the Krupa Provisional supports the relevant subject matter relied on in Krupa. In fact, Petitioner did not introduce the Krupa Provisional into the record, so it would not be possible to do so.9” slip op. at 11
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundInstituted
“But Patent Owner’s arguments do little to undermine the rational underpinning of Petitioner’s reasoning for combining Carr and Beuterbaugh because they improperly focus on what Carr and Beuterbaugh disclose individually, rather what they disclose in combination; and they appear to improperly rely on the bodily incorporation of Beuterbaugh’s pulsing method into Carr. Petitioner contends the motivation for combining Beuterbaugh and Carr in the manner claimed comes from the fact that valve sequencing generally (rather than Beuterbaugh’s specific pulsing method for “overlap of fluid flows to each well [to] be controlled to optimize the downhole pressure waves and minimize the surface impacts.” Pet. 63, 66 (citing Ex. 1005 ¶ 24; Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 496–512). Patent Owner does not dispute, at this preliminary stage, that Beuterbaugh suggests valve sequencing was a known technique that can enhance well operations; nor does Patent Owner dispute that Carr discloses a control system that can control the sequence of opening and closing valves in response to determining that the fluid communicated via the manifold has satisfied one or more conditions. Thus, after considering what Carr and Beuterbaugh teach as a whole, we are persuaded at this stage that Petitioner’s reasoning for combining those reference in the manner claimed has a rational underpinning, which is supported sufficiently by the cited evidence of record.” slip op. at 27
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“claims in a civil action before the courts under 35 U.S.C. § 282(b), the terms in the challenged claims carry their ordinary and customary meaning, as understood by an ordinarily skilled artisan in the field of art at the time of the invention, in view of the patent’s specification and prosecution history. 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b). Here, both parties contend that the challenged claims in this proceeding do not need to be construed further. Pet. 12; Prelim. Resp. 25. This is so, according to the parties, because a resolution in this proceeding does not hinge on a dispute about how the parties are interpretating any particular claim term or phrase. Id. Furthermore, neither Id. And we need only construe terms that are in controversy and only to the extent needed to resolve the controversy. Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019); U.S. Surgical Corp. v. Ethicon, Inc., 103 F.3d 1554, 1568 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (holding claim construction is for “resolution of disputed meanings”). Therefore, at this stage of the proceeding, the ordinary and customary meaning of each of the challenged claim terms and phrases, viewed in the proper context of the intrinsic record, applies without any further construction.” slip op. at 6
Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,560,770 - Intelligent Wellhead Systems, Inc. v. Downing Wellhead Equipment, LLCInstitution deniedPTAB · Jun 5, 2024 · IPR2024-00256 · APJ Benjamin D M Wood · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution because Petitioner did not show a reasonable likelihood of prevailing: Krupa was not established as prior art, and the other grounds failed to show key claim limitations.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“We have authority under 35 U.S.C. § 314, which provides that an inter partes review may not be instituted “unless . . . there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). Upon considering the Petition, we determine that Petitioner has not satisfied this threshold requirement, and therefore we do not institute inter partes review of claims 1–3, 6, 8–10, 13, 15–18, 25–28, 31, and 36 of the ’779 patent.” slip op. at 2
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Prior-art status of a reference › Patents / published applications (effective date, provisional support)Reference not prior artDecided for patent owner
“Here, however, Krupa’s actual filing date is after the ’779 patent’s filing date. Compare Ex. 1003, code (22) (Krupa filed Feb. 18, 2022) with Ex. 1001, code (22) (’779 patent filed Jul. 29, 2021). Petitioner therefore must seek the benefit of the earlier February 25, 2021 filing date of the Krupa Provisional. 35 U.S.C. § 102(d)(2). Pet. 6. Under subsection 102(d)(2), to qualify as prior art, a reference patent or published patent application is considered effectively filed as of the filing date of its provisional application only to the extent that the provisional “describes the subject matter” relied on in the reference patent document. We cannot presume that the Krupa Provisional describes the subject matter in Krupa that the Petition relies on, however. See Dynamic Drinkware, 800 F.3d at 1380 (“[B]ecause the PTO does not examine priority claims unless necessary, the Board has no basis to presume that a reference patent is necessarily entitled to the filing date of its provisional application.”). The burden to make this showing thus falls squarely on Petitioner. But Petitioner does not explain how the Krupa Provisional supports the relevant subject matter relied on in Krupa. In fact, Petitioner did not introduce the Krupa Provisional into the record, so it would not be possible to do so.7 Accordingly, Petitioner has not adequately shown that Krupa is prior art, and therefore Petitioner does not have a reasonable likelihood of prevailing with respect to any of the claims challenged in Grounds 1, 2, and 4, which grounds rely on Krupa in whole or substantial part.” slip op. at 11
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentable
“We are not persuaded that Kajaria teaches limitation [1.5] or limitation [8.7]. First, Kajaria does not expressly teach these limitations, and, indeed, Petitioner does not appear to contend as much. Instead, Petitioner contends that one of ordinary skill in the art would have understood paragraph 35 of Kajaria as “includ[ing]” this step. But paragraph 35 teaches that “it may be desirable to provide pressurized fluid to a particular well at a particular time or place in the frac cycle, while simultaneously stopping the flow of fluid into another well that is in a different place in the frac cycle.” Ex. 1004 ¶ 35 (emphasis added). Providing pressurized fluid to one well which simultaneously stopping flow to another well suggests that fluid flow is not being provided to both wells at the same time. Second, “direct[ing] flow between wells continuously” is not the same as pumping flow to wells continuously, as Petitioner’s argument suggests. Paragraph 35 of Kajaria states that it is possible to direct flow between wells continuously “simply by opening or closing the valves 66 associated with individual wells,” and is silent regarding whether the frac pumps are on. This suggests that “direct[ing] flow between wells continuously” only refers to the valve lineup—i.e., at least one valve 66 is open “continuously’’—and does not mean providing fluid flow continuously. Interpreting the “continuously” statement in paragraph 35 in this manner is consistent with our interpretation of the “simultaneously stopping” sentence in the same paragraph, discussed above.” slip op. at 17
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“At this stage of the proceeding, we do not perceive the need to expressly construe any claim terms, as the threshold question of institution can be decided without doing so. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (approving Board decision not to construe claim language where construction is not material to the dispute). See Pet. 14; see also Prelim. Resp. 40.” slip op. at 9
Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,401,779 - Hyundai Motor Company v. Mel Navip LLCInstitutedPTAB · May 22, 2024 · IPR2024-00172 · APJ Benjamin D M Wood · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted inter partes review of claims 1–3 and 5 on all asserted grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on at least one challenged claim.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“We have authority under 35 U.S.C. § 314, which provides that an inter partes review may not be instituted “unless . . . there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). Upon considering the Petition, Preliminary Response, and the present record, we determine that Petitioner has satisfied this threshold requirement, and therefore we institute inter partes review of claims 1–3 and 5 of the ’465 patent.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“B. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art Petitioner contends that a person of ordinary skill in the art “would have had an undergraduate degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering, computer science, or an equivalent degree, as well as at least three years of experience in the design and implementation of navigation systems.” Pet. 5 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 6). Patent Owner, on the other hand, contends that a person of ordinary skill in the art: would have (a) a Bachelor’s of Science degree in a technical field and at least four years of experience in the field of geospatial information sciences; (b) a Master's of Science degree in a technical field and at least two years of experience in the field of geospatial information sciences; or (c) a PhD in a technical field relating to the geospatial information sciences. Prelim. Resp. 5–6. Patent Owner also asserts that “[a]dditional graduate education could substitute for professional experience, or significant experience in the field could substitute for formal education” and that the ordinary artisan “is presumed to have knowledge of all relevant prior art, and therefore would have been familiar with each of the references cited in this declaration and the full range of teachings they contain.” Id. at 6 (citing Ex. 2001 ¶¶ 29–31). At this stage of the proceeding, we adopt Petitioner’s definition for purposes of this Decision. We note, however, that our decision would be the same if we applied Patent Owner’s definition. We also look to the cited prior art references as evidence of the level of ordinary skill at the time of the invention. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (explaining the level of ordinary skill in the art may be evidenced by the cited references themselves).” slip op. at 9
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedPatent owner expert discountedDecided for petitioner
“Neither Patent Owner nor its declarant, Dr. Qui, points to any portion of McDonough that supports the notion that McDonough’s system, and particularly its smooth-scrolling feature and use of first and second buffers, is “incompatible” with displaying an entire guide route. It is also unclear what Patent Owner means by McDonough not “need[ing] or want[ing]” to display the entire guide route. To the extent Patent Owner is arguing that McDonough’s smooth scrolling would render superfluous the ability to zoom out to see an entire guide route, Patent Owner has not explained why this would be the case. Patent Owner’s only supporting evidence is the testimony of its declarant, Dr. Qui, which merely repeats verbatim the assertion which it is supposed to support, without any additional evidence or reasoning. Ex. 2001 ¶ 76. We give such testimony little weight where, as here, we find the language in the filing that the declaration intends to support unpersuasive on its own. See Xerox Corp. v. Bytemark, Inc., IPR2022- 00624, Paper 9 at 15 (PTAB Aug. 24, 2022) (precedential) (according little weight to declarant testimony that is “conclusory and unsupported,” and “that merely repeats, verbatim, the conclusory assertion for which it is offered to support”). Conversely, Petitioner has provided evidence that the ability to zoom out to see an entire proposed route was a known functionality in navigation systems at the time of the invention, and that one of ordinary skill in the art would have understood that doing so was advantageous for drivers. Pet. 57 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 196). Patent Owner does not dispute this evidence at this preliminary stage of the proceeding, or explain why the ability to smooth-scroll would render such functionality undesirable.” slip op. at 21
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundInstituted
“teaching that roads that are part of a guide route are given the highest display priority so that they would be displayed regardless of the map scale. Id. at 55–56 (citing Ex. 1009 ¶¶ 28–31, 54–56, 58–59, 72, 77, Figs. 2A–C, 3A–C, 7, 8; Ex. 1003 ¶ 193). Petitioner contends that one of ordinary skill in the art would have modified McDonough’s map display system in accordance with this teaching to avoid discontinuities in the displayed guide route, which discontinuities “would undesirably confuse the driver who is expecting to see a continuous route.” Id. at 56–57 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 195). According to Petitioner, Tanizaki’s teachings beneficially increase driver safety in the use of the navigation system by avoiding distraction where the driver, due to route discontinuities, is uncertain regarding his or her current whereabouts, where he or she is relative to the guide route, and/or where he or she is relative to the destination. Id. at 57. Petitioner also asserts that before the invention, “it was common for navigation system users to ‘zoom out’ before starting a journey to see the entire guide route,” which “allowed the driver to visualize the entire route and plan potential stops along the way,” or to instruct the system to calculate a new route if the original proposed route was not acceptable. Pet. 57 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 196). Petitioner submits that “a POSITA would have recognized that, by preventing discontinuities in the displayed guide route even when the driver zooms out to see the entire guide route, the proposed modification would have made it easier for drivers to plan their trip and decide whether to request a new route.” Id.” slip op. at 20
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSRPatents in suitUS 8,244,465 - Hyundai Motor Company v. Mel Navip LLCInstitutedPTAB · May 16, 2024 · IPR2024-00174 · APJ Richard H Marschall · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR of claims 1, 2, and 4–8 on both asserted obviousness grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood of success based on Fujiwara.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“3. Conclusion Based on the foregoing, we determine that Petitioner establishes adequately that Fujiwara discloses the disputed limitations. We have also reviewed Petitioner’s arguments and evidence as to the remaining limitations of claim 1. Based on our review of the current record, Petitioner establishes sufficiently that Fujiwara discloses or renders obvious all of the limitations of claim 1 for the reasons provided by Petitioner. See Pet. 8–32. Accordingly, Petitioner establishes a reasonable likelihood that independent claim 1 would have been obvious based on Fujiwara. We have also reviewed Petitioner’s arguments and evidence as to dependent claims 2 and 4–8. See Pet. 32–43. Patent Owner does not separately address the dependent claims. Prelim. Resp. 9. Because we institute inter partes review as to independent claim 1, we also institute inter partes review as to dependent claims 2 and 4–8. See SAS Inst., Inc. v. Iancu, 138 S. Ct. 1348, 1359–60 (2018).” slip op. at 19
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“would have (a) a Bachelor's of Science degree in a technical field and at least four years of experience in the field of design and/or manufacture of navigation systems; (b) a Master's of Science degree in a technical field and at least two years of experience in the field of design and/or manufacture of navigation systems; or (c) a PhD in a technical field relating to the design and/or manufacture of navigation systems. Additional graduate education could substitute for professional experience, or significant experience in the field could substitute for formal education. Prelim. Resp. 3 (citing Ex. 2001 ¶ 29). Patent Owner does not identify any deficiencies in Petitioner’s proposal, and we view the parties’ proposals as overlapping to a large extent. See Pet. 4; Prelim Resp. 3. For purposes of this Decision, we adopt and apply Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill in the art, which we view as consistent with the level of skill reflected in the ’230 patent and the asserted prior art. None of our determinations in this Decision would have been different if we applied Patent Owner’s proposal. If the parties continue to propose differing levels of ordinary skill in the art during trial, they should explain the differences and the relevance to the patentability issues in this case.” slip op. at 7
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededPlain and ordinary meaningOther
“generally given their ordinary and customary meaning as would have been understood by a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention and in the context of the entire patent disclosure. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312–14 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc) (“We have frequently stated that the words of a claim ‘are generally given their ordinary and customary meaning.’” (citations omitted)). “The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). Petitioner contends that no claim construction is required for us to reach a decision on institution (Pet. 4), and Patent Owner does not address claim construction in its Preliminary Response. We determine that no express claim construction is necessary for the purposes of this Decision and therefore apply the plain and ordinary meanings of the claim limitations before us. If either party believes that the patentability of any challenged claim turns on a claim construction issue, they should set forth any proposed constructions in a separate section of their briefing during trial rather than implicitly relying on a construction in arguments addressing the prior art.” slip op. at 8
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Instituted
“Based on the current record, we find Petitioner’s arguments persuasive and Patent Owner’s arguments unavailing. While we agree with Patent Owner that Fujiwara’s information offering server may offer service information for multiple facilities, we disagree that this necessarily takes it outside of the scope of the claim limitation at issue, based on the current record. For example, in the situation where Fujiwara’s information offering server offers service information for a single facility, Fujiwara’s information offering server would pertain to a particular registration destination facility. We understand Petitioner’s argument as based on Fujiwara’s ability to provide information as to specific hotels, such as vacancies at a specific hotel, not hotels generally. See Pet. 9–14; Ex. 1005, Figs. 14–18, 20–23 (showing vacancy information for specific hotels). Fujiwara’s reference to vacancy information would seem to make little sense if not tied to a particular facility. Patent Owner does not address this aspect of Petitioner’s arguments, which renders Fujiwara’s ability to provide service information for more than one facility inapposite. Cf. Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Mustek Systems, Inc., 340 F.3d 1314, 1326 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (“[A] prior art product that sometimes, but not always, embodies a claimed method nonetheless teaches that aspect of the invention.”). As to Patent Owner’s argument that an ordinary artisan would not understand Fujiwara as rendering obvious this limitation because “the system of Fujiwara differs from that of the ’230 patent fundamentally,” we find the argument lacking in explanation and support. See Prelim. Resp. 7 (quoting Ex. 2001 ¶ 43). The cited declarant testimony does not aid Patent Owner here, as it merely repeats the arguments from the Preliminary Response without further explanation or citation to supporting evidence. Based on the current record, Petitioner establishes adequately that Fujiwara discloses “a service information reception processing unit for receiving service information at an external registration destination facility with which member registration is made, the service information being distributed from the external registration destination facility.”” slip op. at 13
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 8,812,230 - Hyundai Motor Company v. Mel Navip LLCInstitution deniedPTAB · May 16, 2024 · IPR2024-00173 · APJ Richard H Marschall · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution because the prior-art combinations did not make the required determination for claims 1–4, 7–12, 14, 16–17, and 19.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“review. See 35 U.S.C. § 314; 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a) (2022). Under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), we may not authorize an inter partes review unless the information in the petition and the preliminary response “shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” For the reasons that follow, we determine that Petitioner has not demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of prevailing with respect to any of the challenges in the Petition. Accordingly, we do not institute an inter partes review.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Patent Owner does not identify any deficiencies in Petitioner’s proposal, and we view the parties’ proposals as overlapping to a large extent. See Pet. 4–5; Prelim. Resp. 6. For purposes of this Decision, we adopt and apply Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill in the art, which we view as consistent with the level of skill reflected in the ’971 patent and the asserted prior art. None of our determinations in this Decision would have been different if we applied Patent Owner’s proposal.” slip op. at 8
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Plain and ordinary meaningDecided for petitioner
“that would be used to construe the claim in a civil action under 35 U.S.C. [§] 282(b).” 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b). Under this standard, claim terms are generally given their ordinary and customary meaning as would have been understood by a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention and in the context of the entire patent disclosure. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312–14 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc) (“We have frequently stated that the words of a claim ‘are generally given their ordinary and customary meaning.’” (citations omitted)). “The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). Here, both parties contend that no claim construction is required for us to reach a decision on institution. Pet. 5; Prelim. Resp. 6–7. We agree, and apply the plain and ordinary meanings of the claim limitations before us.” slip op. at 8
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“which requires that the route guidance unit output a message “when” the unit “determines” that two conditions are satisfied: (1) the vehicle has deviated from the route to a predetermined distance or more, and (2) the vehicle is traveling along a route after said first next waypoint. See Ex. 1001, claim 1. We agree with Patent Owner that Petitioner has not demonstrated that the combination of Khavakh or Lefebvre renders obvious the second aspect of the limitation—i.e., outputting a message when the “route guidance unit determines that the vehicle . . . is traveling along a route after said first next waypoint,” as required by claims 1 and 19. Prelim. Resp. 12. Petitioner’s assertions on this point have some support in Khavakh. For example, we agree with Petitioner in part that “Khavakh’s prompt would also be output” in the situation in Petitioner’s illustrated example, where a driver has missed a turn and deviates from a desired route after a first next waypoint. Pet. 34–35 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 164–166). These assertions, however, fail to track the claim language, which does not merely require a system that outputs a message when a driver misses a required turn or otherwise deviates from a chosen path. Instead, the limitation requires, in pertinent part, outputting the message “when” a specific determination has been made by the system—that the vehicle “is traveling along a route after said first next waypoint.” Ex. 1001, claim 1. Petitioner fails to point to any disclosure in Khavakh (or Lefebvre) that makes this determination and outputs a message when it occurs. See Pet. 30–41. Based on our review of the current record, it appears that Khavakh outputs a message indicating a driver has deviated from a desired route regardless of whether the driver is traveling along a route before or after the first next waypoint. Because Khavakh’s system appears to output messages to the driver without making a separate determination as to the relationship of the driver to the first next waypoint (whether it is “after” that waypoint as the claim requires), Petitioner has not persuaded us that it is reasonably likely to prevail on this issue.” slip op. at 14
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 8,649,971 - PTAB · Mar 26, 2024 · IPR2024-00008 · APJ Benjamin D M Wood · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR of claims 1–5, 7–14, and 16 on all asserted grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on at least one challenged claim.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“We have authority under 35 U.S.C. § 314, which provides that an inter partes review may not be instituted “unless . . . there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). Upon considering the Petition and the Preliminary Response, we determine that Petitioner has satisfied this threshold requirement, and therefore we institute inter partes review of claims 1–5, 7–14, and 16 of the ’121 patent.” slip op. at 2
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Denied
“On balance, we determine that Fintiv factors 1–5 do not favor discretionary denial of institution. As a result, we need not decide whether Petitioner presents a compelling unpatentability challenge. See CommScope Techs. LLC v. Dali Wireless, Inc., IPR2022-01242, Paper 23 at 4–5 (PTAB Feb. 27, 2023) (decision on Director review) (precedential) (“[I]n circumstances where the Board determines that the other Fintiv factors 1–5 do not favor discretionary denial, the Board shall decline to discretionarily deny under Fintiv without reaching the compelling merits analysis.”). 7. Conclusion Based on our review of the Fintiv factors, we decline to exercise our discretion under § 314(a) to deny institution.” slip op. at 19
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsDenied
“Section 325(d) requires us to “take into account whether, and reject the petition . . . because, the same or substantially the same prior art or arguments previously were presented to the Office.” 35 U.S.C. § 325(d); see Becton, Dickinson & Co. v. B. Braun Melsungen AG, IPR2017-01586, slip op. at 17–18 (Paper 8) (PTAB Dec. 15, 2017) (precedential as to § III.C.5, first paragraph) (setting forth six factors the Board may weigh in evaluating whether to exercise discretion under § 325(d)). The Board applies the following two-part framework in evaluating a request for discretionary denial under this section: (1) whether the same or substantially the same art or arguments were previously presented to the Office; and (2) if either condition of the first part of the framework is satisfied, whether the petitioner has demonstrated that the Office erred in a manner material to the patentability of the challenged claims. Advanced Bionics, LLC v. MED-EL” slip op. at 20
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“B. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art Petitioner contends that, for the ’121 patent: [A] POSA as of November 12, 2010, would have had at least a bachelor’s degree in mechanical or agricultural engineering and 2–4 years experience in the design or manufacture of agriculture equipment. A POSA would have been familiar with the design and operation of known seed distribution meters and with the use of bearings and other plate-like technologies to receive and distribute axial loads by providing bearing surfaces for the transfer of forces. Pet. 21 (citations omitted). Patent Owner “defers its position on this issue until such time as the Board decides to institute a trial.” Prelim. Resp. 28–29. At this stage of the proceeding, we adopt Petitioner’s unopposed definition for purposes of this Decision. We also presume that the cited prior art references reflect the level of ordinary skill at the time of the invention. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (explaining the level of ordinary skill in the art may be evidenced by the cited references themselves).” slip op. at 7
Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · KSRPatents in suitUS 8,770,121
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.