- Daiichi Sankyo Company, Limited v. Alethia Biotherapeutics, Inc.All claims unpatentablePTAB · Jun 14, 2016 · IPR2015-00291 · APJ Sheridan K Snedden · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–6, 8–11, and 15–23 are unpatentable under § 102(a) over Hiruma because the claims lack priority to the Parent Application and Hiruma was not antedated.
RulingsFinal written decision- Disclosure Requirements (§112) › Enablement (Wands, Amgen full scope)Not enabledNot entitled to earlier dateDecided for petitioner
“of antibodies having the desired function would have required undue experimentation. In view of the forgoing, we find that practicing the methods of the challenged claims at the time of the filing of the Parent Application would have required excessive experimentation, even if routine. ALZA Corp. v. Andrx Pharm., LLC, 603 F.3d 935, 941 (Fed. Cir. 2010).” slip op. at 14
- Disclosure Requirements (§112) › Written description (Ariad)Written description inadequateNot entitled to earlier dateDecided for petitioner
“We are not persuaded by this reasoning. The challenged claims contain functional claim language concerning the biological properties of the recited antibody. The Federal Circuit, however, has on several occasions distinguished between claims not involving functional claim language and” slip op. at 16
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Priority / effective filing date / continuation supportPriority date, deniedReference is prior artDecided for petitioner
“3. Conclusion In view of the forgoing, we conclude that the claims of the ’181 patent are not entitled to the priority date of February 13, 2007. Hiruma is thus prior art to the ’181 patent and anticipates the challenged claims under 35 U.S.C. § 102(a). D. Antedating Hiruma” slip op. at 19
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableUnpatentable
“presented in the Petition demonstrates, by a preponderance of the evidence, that claims 1−6, 8−11, and 15−23 are unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 102(a) over Hiruma. This is a final written decision of the Board under 35 U.S.C. § 318(a). Parties to the proceeding seeking judicial review of the decision must comply with the notice and service requirements of 37 C.F.R. § 90.2. IV. ORDER In consideration of the foregoing, it is hereby: ORDERED that claims 1–6, 8–11, and 15–23 of the ’181 patent are unpatentable;” slip op. at 25
Patent outcomesUS 8,168,181 unpatentable§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosurecites PhillipsPatents in suitUS 8,168,181 - Nestlé USA, Inc. v. Steuben Foods, Inc.All claims unpatentablePTAB · Jun 2, 2016 · IPR2015-00195 · APJ Christopher G Paulraj · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–10, 14, 16–21, 25, 27, 29, and 32–36 are unpatentable as obvious over either of two combinations of prior art.
RulingsFinal written decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › §315(b) time barNot time barredDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner’s new arguments and evidence do not persuasively demonstrate that the machines purchased as lines 1–6/7 were built to Petitioner’s specification, nor has Patent Owner demonstrated persuasively that the purchase agreements otherwise created privity between GEA and Petitioner. Even if the agreements for lines 1–6/7 were similar to the Line 8 Agreement as Patent Owner contends, we examined the relationship created by the Line 8 Agreement in detail, and determined that Petitioner and GEA were not privies. See Inst. Dec. 6–17. Given this, Patent Owner has added nothing new of significance since our Institution Decision.” slip op. at 10
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownOther
“with the specification does not limit the claimed “sterilant concentration levels” to only airborne concentrations. We recognize that the specification, in one instance, refers to zones with “different concentration levels of gas laden sterilant (e.g., hydrogen peroxide in air).” Ex. 1001, 9:51–53. The specification, however, refers elsewhere to the “residual concentration” of H2O2, measured in terms of ppm. Id. at 12:46–47 (“The hot sterile air knives 208 also remove the hydrogen peroxide from the lids 200 so that the residual concentration of hydrogen peroxide is less than 0.5 PPM.”) (emphasis added); see also id. at 11:15–17 (“After bottle 12 has dried, the residual hydrogen peroxide remaining on the bottle 12 surface is less than 0.5 PPM.”) (emphasis added). Patent Owner acknowledges that “[o]ther discussions of ppm within the specification are in the context of residual sterilant on the bottle,” which is measured in accordance with the FDA Regulations (21 C.F.R § 178.1005(d) (Ex. 1013)) as the concentration in distilled water, but nonetheless asserts that “[t]his is consistent with the definition of ‘sterilant concentration’ in the context of the claim [as] parts of sterilant per million parts of carrier gas.” PO Resp. 6. However, insofar as it is undisputed that “residual” sterilant concentrations on the bottle surface are disclosed in the specification and encompassed by the claim scope, Patent Owner does not explain why the skilled artisan would have understood such a concentration would be measured as parts of sterilant per million parts of carrier gas (i.e., airborne) as opposed to parts of sterilant per million parts of distilled water in accordance with the FDA Regulations. See Ex. 1013, 326 (“No use of hydrogen peroxide solution in the sterilization of food packaging material shall be considered to be in compliance if more than 0.5 part per million of hydrogen peroxide can be determined in distilled water packaged under production conditions.”). In short, neither the claims nor the specification limit how or where within “the plurality of zones” the sterilant concentration levels should be assessed in order to determine whether the 5 to 1 ratio is satisfied. As such, we find no basis to limit the claimed sterilant concentration levels to only airborne concentrations.” slip op. at 13
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“14 Petitioner asserts that a person of ordinary skill in the art (“POSITA”) would possess “an undergraduate scientific or engineering degree in a relevant field (such as microbiology or mechanical, packaging, process, or food engineering), at least five years of experience in an aseptic packaging and/or processing field (or a graduate degree conferring similar expertise), and an understanding of the relevant principles of microbiology and food science and technology.” Pet. 12; Ex. 1004, ¶ 12. Patent Owner has not contested that definition in its Patent Owner Response, but its expert Dr. Sharon asserts that Petitioner’s definition is only partially correct insofar as it does not recognize that the POSITA could have a mechanical engineering Patent Owner’s arguments are directed primarily to the sterilant concentration ratio requirement recited in each of the challenged independent claims 1, 4, 17, and 33. Specifically, the challenged claims all require that the sterilant concentration levels in the plurality of zones within the sterilization tunnel “are maintained at a ratio of at least about 5 to 1.” Accordingly, we focus on that limitation, and treat the claims together for purpose of our analysis. 1. Scholle in view of Chambers, the FDA Regulations, Biewendt, Kelbrick, Elliott, Akai, and Kodera Petitioner asserts that, using partitions and pressure differentials, the apparatus of Scholle (Ex. 1004) is configured to prevent the H2O2 sterilant from migrating from the sterilizing compartment to the drying and filling compartments, and, thus, the sterilant concentration in the sterilization compartment of Scholle is necessarily different from the concentration in the drying and filling compartments. Pet. 20 (citing Ex. 1004 ¶ 55; Ex. 1005, 6:36–41). Petitioner also points to Scholle’s teaching of using a 30% solution of H2O2 in water (i.e., 300,000 ppm) as a sterilant (id. at 21 (citing Ex. 1004 ¶ 56; Ex. 1005, 5:18–22)), and asserts that the skilled artisan “would understand that to ensure consistent sterilization and residual peroxide levels, the concentration of applied sterilant must necessarily be ‘maintained.’” Id. degree. Ex. 2056, ¶ 12. We note, however, that Petitioner has included mechanical engineering as a “relevant field” within its definition. Accordingly, we apply Petitioner’s proposed level of skill in the art in our analysis.” slip op. at 19
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)UnpatentableUnpatentable
“A preponderance of the evidence supports the conclusion that the skilled artisan would have found it obvious to optimize the sterilant concentration levels within the different “zones” (i.e., compartments) of Scholle’s apparatus in such a manner. Several features of Scholle’s apparatus facilitate such an optimization. First, a 30-percent solution of H2O2 in water is atomized and continuously sprayed into the spraying compartment during operation. Ex. 1005, 5:18–26, 45–49. Second, the spraying zone is separated from other compartments by a partition with a narrow opening designed “to reduce the amount of [H2O2] mist passing through the opening.” Id. at 6:12-15. Third, in the drying compartment, the H2O2 is “evaporated” and vented out of the sterile tunnel. Id. at 6:33-36, 44- 55. And finally, the sterile air maintains a positive pressure in the filling and drying compartments, thus reducing any tendency of the H2O2 mist in the spray compartment to migrate through the narrow opening into those other compartments. Id. at 5:36–43, 6:36-41. Although the parties dispute the particular concentration of H2O2 that exists in the sterilization tunnel after it is sprayed, there is no dispute that the spraying compartment in Scholle’s apparatus will have a higher sterilant concentration than the filling compartment. Indeed, even if airborne concentration levels were to be considered, Patent Owner’s counsel acknowledged during oral argument that “there is going to be more sterilant in the air in the spray zone than in the fill zone.” Tr. 122:12–14; see also Ex. 1035, 122:21–123:3 (Patent Owner’s expert Dr. Sharon conceding that the airborne concentration is lower in the fill zone than in the spray zone). Furthermore, we find that the concentration of the 30% solution of H2O2 will remain close to 300,000 ppm in the liquid phase at some point after it is sprayed into the spraying compartment. Scholle discloses that the spray heads atomize the H2O2 solution into a “fine mist or fog,” which coats the exterior of the containers to kill microorganisms. Ex. 1005, 5:22–23, 8:8–13. Although Dr. Sharon asserts that the skilled artisan “would be motivated to use as little sterilant in the sterilization zone as necessary to get the job done” (Ex. 2056, ¶24), he nonetheless acknowledged that, after condensation, the concentration of liquid H2O2 that coats the containers is “somewhere in the neighborhood” of 30%, or 300,000 ppm. Ex. 1035, Tr. 105:17–106:15. Here, we also credit Dr. Heldman’s testimony who stated that although the process of atomizing H2O2 may “result in varying concentrations,” the skilled artisan nonetheless “would understand that to ensure consistent sterilization and residual peroxide levels, the concentration of applied sterilant must necessarily be ‘maintained.’” Ex. 1004 ¶¶ 51, 56.” slip op. at 22
Patent outcomesUS 6,475,435 unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnessPatents in suitUS 6,475,435 - Mylan Pharmaceuticals Inc. v. Astrazeneca ABRehearing grantedPTAB · May 2, 2016 · IPR2015-01340 · APJ Rama G Elluru · IPR · Rehearing
The Board granted Mylan’s rehearing request and instituted IPR of claims 1, 2, 4, 6-22, 25-30, 32-37, and 39-42.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, grantedGranted
“II. ANALYSIS When rehearing a decision on institution, the Board reviews the decision for an abuse of discretion. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(c). The applicable standard for a request for rehearing is set forth in 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d), which provides in relevant part: A party dissatisfied with a decision may file a single request for rehearing without prior authorization from the Board. The burden of showing a decision should be modified lies with the party challenging the decision. The request must specifically identify all matters the party believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked, and the place where each matter was previously addressed in a motion, an opposition, or a reply. We grant Petitioner’s request for rehearing and institute an inter partes review of claims 1, 2, 4, 6–22, 25–30, 32–37, and 39–42 of the ’186 patent for the reasons provided in the concurrently issued Decision on Institution. Paper 16.” slip op. at 2
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“References Basis Claims challenged Ashworth I, Villhauer, Raag and, 1, 2, 4, 6–11, 25–28, § 103(a) Hanessian 32–35, 39, and 40 Ashworth I, Villhauer, Raag, 12–16, 29, 30, 36, 37, Hanessian, Bachovchin, and § 103(a) 41, and 42 GLUCOPHAGE Label Ashworth I, Villhauer, Raag, Hanessian, Bachovchin and, § 103(a) 12, 17, 18, and 22 XENICAL Label Ashworth I, Villhauer, Raag, Hanessian, Bachovchin, and § 103(a) 12, 19, 20, and 21” slip op. at 2
None - Böhler-Edelstahl GmbH & Co. KG. v. Rovalma, S.A.All claims unpatentablePTAB · Apr 20, 2016 · IPR2015-00150 · APJ Robert A Pollock · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–4 are unpatentable as obvious over EP ’813 combined individually with CH ’893, JP ’241, JP ’650, or JP ’706.
RulingsFinal written decision- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed board ownDecided for patent owner
“Prelim. Resp. 6–7. Rovalma asserts that the thermal conductivity of a steel having carbidic constituents can be set by acting on the internal structure of the steel regardless of the specific steel composition. Id. at 6, 10, 13. “In other words, the thermal conductivity of a steel having a specific composition can be set to different values by following the process steps claimed in the ’056 Patent.” Id. at 13. Consistent with their plain language, we construe the “setting” step of the challenged claims as requiring the setting of the thermal conductivity at room temperature to more than, e.g., 42 W/mK. Rovalma further argues that the step of “metallurgically creating an internal structure of the steel in a defined manner” should be construed to mean “heat treating the steel . . . under specific conditions selected to achieve the desired internal structure[,]” “and hence thermal conductivity.” PO. Resp. 38, 39. Rovalma argues that “the ‘defined manner’ will differ based on the steel composition used, the desired thermal conductivity, and the specific hot-work application for the tool steel.” Id. at 39–40.” slip op. at 14
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)UnpatentableUnpatentable
“advantages including “higher toughness, thermal conductivity and weldability” as compared to high chromium ferritic steels. Ex. 1003, 2:16– 20, 4:7–16. Tables 2 and 3 of the reference disclose the chemical composition of low chromium steels having a carbon component. Id. 10–11. Example 8 comprises, by weight, 1.07% chromium, 0% molybdenum, 2.61% tungsten, and 0.21% vanadium. Id. at 10. Example 32 comprises, by weight, 0.98% chromium, 1.05% molybdenum, 1.01% tungsten, and 0.23% vanadium. Id. at 11. Accordingly, we find that EP ’813 Examples 8 and 32 each include “carbidic constituents” (i.e., carbon in conjunction with carbide formers such as chromium, tungsten, and vanadium) and, “by weight, 2– 10% Mo+W+V” as set forth in the challenged claims. See PO. Resp. 58 (admitting that “the prior art disclosed ‘providing a hot-work steel, including carbidic constituents and, by weight, 2-10% Mo+W+V’—step 1 of the challenged claims”). As with EP ’813, CH ’893 discloses low-chromium steel compositions having valuable characteristics including “relatively high hot tensile strength, toughness and resistance against temperature variations.” Ex. 1002, p. 1 ¶3, p. 3, ¶ 6. The second embodiment disclosed on page 4 of the reference comprises 0.27% carbon, 3.32% tungsten, and no chromium, molybdenum or vanadium. CH ’893 thus discloses the benefit of high thermal conductivity (“resistance against temperature variations”) and at least one embodiment comprising “carbidic constituents and, by weight, 2– 10% Mo+W+V” as set forth in the challenged claims. 18 JP ’241 discloses low chromium steels having, e.g., improved high temperature abrasion. Ex. 1004, 2–3. Claim 2 of the reference encompasses a steel composition comprising, by weight, “C: 0.10–0.40%, Si: 0.10– 1.00%, Mn: 0.20–2.00%, Cr: less than 0.95%, Mo: 0.50–3.50%, W: 0.50– 3.50% and Nb: 0.10–1.00%, and further containing more than one or two variations selected from Ni: 0.50-3.50%, Co: 0.50–3.50% and V: 0.10– 1.00%.” Id. at 2, claim 2. JP ’241 thus discloses steel compositions comprising “carbidic constituents and, by weight, 2–10% Mo+W+V” as set forth in the challenged claims. JP ’706 discloses a low chromium steel plug compositions B and C for seamless pipe manufacturing comprising 0.30% carbon, 0.5% chromium, 1.50% molybdenum, 2.00% and 3.00% tungsten, respectively, and no vanadium. Ex. 1006, Table 1. Accordingly, JP ’706 discloses steel compositions comprising “carbidic constituents and, by weight, 2–10% Mo+W+V” as set forth in the challenged claims.” slip op. at 18
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundDecided for petitioner
“As noted above, one of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention would have recognized that thermal processing conditions affect internal structure and, thus, thermal properties of steel. Bayati and Elliot, for example, teach that heat transport “depends on lattice defects, microstructure, impurities, and the processing of the metal or alloy,” and that matrix structure “play[s] a significant role” in determining thermal conductivity. Ex. 2009, 265; Tr. 67:3–13. As Rovalma further explains at page 7 of its Patent Owner Response, Heat is transported through metals by phonons and free electrons. Ex. 2009 at 265. In pure metals, heat transfer is primarily influenced by the metal’s free electrons. Id. Lattice defects and impurities in a metal or alloy scatter the electrons within the metallic matrix, thus reducing the rate that heat can transfer through the metal. Id. In non-metals such as carbides, thermal conductivity is primarily influenced by vibration within the lattice of atoms or molecules (these vibrations are referred to by the quantum mechanical term “phonon”). Id.; Paper 14 at 3. Concurrent with this understanding of heat transfer through metallic matrices and metal carbide inclusions, one of ordinary skill in the art would also have understood that “optimization of the microstructure has been known for a long time.” Tr. 66:9–16; see PO Resp. 5 (citing Ex. 2006); id. at n.1). Thus, “[u]sing equilibrium phase diagrams and knowing the effects of processing operations, those skilled in the art [could] predict which carbides will be present in a given steel and their microstructural distributions following various heat treatments.” PO Resp. 4 (citing Exs. 2005, 2006). Similarly, “readily available thermo-chemical databanks and software programs such as Thermo-Calc, allow[ed] those skilled in the art to” slip op. at 21
Patent outcomesUS 8,557,056 unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnessPatents in suitUS 8,557,056 - Tiffany And Company v. Lazare Kaplan International, Inc.All claims unpatentablePTAB · Apr 13, 2016 · IPR2015-00024 · APJ Jeffrey W Abraham · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1 and 7 are unpatentable as obvious over Fine Diamonds with the ILR Article and over Gresser with the ILR Article.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level board ownDecided for patent owner
“motion, lasers, and optics.” Ex. 1003 (“Trumper Declaration”) ¶ 17. Patent Owner and its declarant, Dr. Bokor, adopted the level of ordinary skill in the art advanced by Dr. Trumper. PO Resp. 43–44 and n.4; Ex. 2005 (“Bokor Declaration”) ¶ 22. For purposes of this decision, we credit the testimony provided by the declarants for both parties and hold that one of skill in the art would possess at least a bachelor’s degree in mechanical, electrical, manufacturing, or optical engineering, plus a few years of experience in the design and control of machines involving precision motion, lasers, and optics. This level of ordinary skill is reflected not only by the information presented by the parties, but also by the prior art of record. Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (the prior art itself can reflect the appropriate level of ordinary skill in the art).” slip op. at 7
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached
“For the reasons explained below, we determine that Petitioner has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that claims 1 and 7 are unpatentable under either of the proposed constructions of the “controlling” limitations. Accordingly, we determine that it is unnecessary to resolve the parties’ dispute over the term “controlling.” See Wellman, Inc. v. Eastman Chem. Co., 642 F.3d 1355, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (“[C]laim terms need only be construed ‘to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’”) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). We provide below an analysis of the challenged claims under both constructions.” slip op. at 10
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedPatent owner expert discountedMixed
“patterning and ablations of diamonds with a UV laser source. Ex. 1009, 2. The ILR Article depicts a computer in Figure 2, and refers to the “[i]ntegration of a computer into the direct-write system.” Id. at 3. The ILR Article further discloses that “[v]ideo images generated by the viewing system can be digitized and processed to derive information used for” various “operations that make the laser tool easier and faster to use.” Id. We credit the testimony of Dr. Trumper that “the ILR Article makes clear that the computer digitizes and processes the optical images of a gemstone, and the automated feedback derived from the images is used for controlling the directing of the focused laser energy,” as it is consistent with the ILR Article’s disclosure of integrating a computer into the diamond ablation system. Ex. 1003 ¶ 56. Thus, despite the fact that the ILR Article does not expressly state that the computer is used to digitize and process the video images, it would have been obvious to a person of ordinary skill in the art that integrating the computer into the direct write system would include using the computer (shown in Fig. 2) to digitize the video images generated by the viewing system and process them to conduct the various operations that make the laser tool easier to use. KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 US 398, 421 (2007) (“A person of ordinary skill is also a person of ordinary creativity, not an automaton.”). Furthermore, as noted above, the ILR Article teaches that “[c]omputer control of work surfaces allows direct production of CAD-generated shapes” on diamond surfaces. Ex. 1009, 2. Petitioner contends, and Patent Owner does not contest, that the CAD/CAM programs correspond to the required “marking instructions.” Pet. 25–26 (citing Ex. 1009, 2); Ex. 1003 ¶ 56 (Dr. Trumper stating “marking instructions (e.g., motion programming of the CAD/CAM program)”). Additionally, the ILR Article discloses that the “CAD/CAM interface . . . allows electronic control of processing speed, exposure parameters, and other features” of the laser tool that “simplifies set-up [and] accelerates process development.” Ex. 1009, 3. As Petitioner points out, the next sentence in the very same paragraph discusses digitizing and processing the video images. Reply 13. In view of this, we determine that a person of ordinary skill in the art, reviewing the ILR Article, would have understood the ILR Article to disclose or suggest using the computer to control and operate the laser tool to generate shapes based on a combination of two inputs, the CAD/CAM programs (i.e., “marking instructions”) and images fed back to the computer and digitized therein (i.e., electronic image information), which “simplif[y] set-up [and] accelerate[] process development” and “make the laser tool easier to use.”2 Ex. 1009, 3; Reply 13; Ex. 1003 ¶ 55.” slip op. at 19
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)UnpatentableUnpatentable
“contrary to Patent Owner’s arguments, we determine that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have understood that the ILR Article discloses or suggests that images are fed back to a processor and combined with marking instructions for, at the very least, setting up the laser inscription machine. Thus, although Patent Owner also argues that its proposed construction of the controlling limitations “distinguishes over systems that use gemstone images for setup—independent of ‘marking instructions’” (PO Resp. 29 (emphasis added)), the ILR Article discloses or suggests using images for set up in combination with marking instructions. Moreover, as Patent Owner points out, the Federal Circuit stated that the “controlling” limitations include “control based on . . . feedback derived from optical images of a gemstone, before or during the laser burn process.” Ex. 1006, 14 (emphasis added); PO Resp. 31–32. We note that Patent Owner argues that its proposed construction is consistent with the 2010 Federal Circuit opinion. PO Resp. 29–32. For all of the reasons discussed above, we determine that the ILR Article discloses or suggests the “controlling” limitations of claims 1 and 7. Petitioner has identified sufficiently where the additional limitations of claims 1 and 7 are present in Fine Diamonds and the ILR Article, and Patent Owner does not argue otherwise. We, therefore, conclude that Petitioner has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that Fine Diamonds and the ILR article disclose or suggest all elements of claims 1 and 7.” slip op. at 22
Patent outcomesUS 6,476,351 unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites PhillipsPatents in suitUS 6,476,351 - PTAB · Apr 8, 2016 · IPR2015-00720 · APJ Jacqueline Wright Bonilla · IPR · Rehearing
The Board denied rehearing and maintained denial of institution for claims 1–8 because Petitioner did not show the posters qualified as prior art printed publications.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied
“Under 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(c), “[w]hen rehearing a decision on petition, a panel will review the decision for an abuse of discretion.” An abuse of discretion occurs when a “decision was based on an erroneous conclusion of law or clearly erroneous factual findings, or . . . a clear error of judgment.” PPG Indus. Inc. v. Celanese Polymer Specialties Co. Inc., 840 F.2d 1565,” slip op. at 2
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Prior-art status of a reference › Printed publication / public accessibilityPrinted publication not establishedNot shown unpatentable
“In our Decision, we stated that we were “not persuaded that Petitioner has made a threshold showing that the posters were sufficiently publicly accessible to qualify as a ‘printed publication’ under § 102(b).” Dec. 5 (emphasis added). We also stated that Petitioner had “not demonstrated adequately” that either poster constituted prior art to the ’685 patent. Id. (emphasis added). In other words, when considering the Petition and information before us, Petitioner did not demonstrate sufficiently that either poster constituted prior art, and consequently, Petitioner did not establish that there was a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail with respect to at least one of the claims challenged in the Petition, as required under § 314(a). Petitioner’s assertions regarding the “proper standard” do not persuade us that we made a legal error in denying the Petition on that basis.” slip op. at 3
- Strike new argumentNew argument disregardedDecided for patent owner
“Once again, Petitioner essentially reargues, and attempts to bolster with new arguments now, the same contentions that we already considered and expressly addressed in our Decision. Dec. 3–5. As noted above, mere disagreement with the Board’s analysis or determination is not a proper basis for rehearing. Moreover, we will not consider new arguments made for the first time in a Request for Rehearing, especially when an opportunity to present arguments and information regarding the posters clearly existed at the time Petitioner filed its Petition. See, e.g., Berk-Tek LLC v. Belden Tech. Inc., Case IPR2013-00057, slip op. at 3 (PTAB May 15, 2013) (Paper 21) (“A request for rehearing is not an opportunity to submit new analysis, after the Decision has noted the deficiencies in the petitioner’s original analysis.”).” slip op. at 5
§ 102 anticipationPatents in suitUS 8,663,685 - PTAB · Apr 8, 2016 · IPR2015-00817 · APJ Jacqueline Wright Bonilla · IPR · Rehearing
The Board denied rehearing and left in place the denial of institution because Petitioner did not show the posters were publicly accessible printed publications qualifying as prior art.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied
“Under 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(c), “[w]hen rehearing a decision on petition, a panel will review the decision for an abuse of discretion.” An abuse of discretion occurs when a “decision was based on an erroneous conclusion of law or clearly erroneous factual findings, or . . . a clear error of judgment.”” slip op. at 2
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“In our Decision, we stated that we were “not persuaded that Petitioner has made a threshold showing that the posters were sufficiently publicly accessible to qualify as a ‘printed publication’ under § 102(b).” Dec. 5 (emphasis added). We also stated that Petitioner had “not demonstrated adequately” that either poster constituted prior art to the ’826 patent. Id. at 5–6 (emphasis added). In other words, when considering the Petition and information before us, Petitioner did not demonstrate sufficiently that either poster constituted prior art, and consequently, Petitioner did not establish that there was a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail with respect to at least one of the claims challenged in the Petition, as required under § 314(a). Petitioner’s assertions regarding the “proper standard” do not persuade us that we made a legal error in denying the Petition on that basis.” slip op. at 3
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Prior-art status of a reference › Printed publication / public accessibilityPrinted publication not establishedNot shown unpatentable
“exactly when, where, and to whom the Hayes and Goodman posters were presented at scientific meetings. Dec. 3–6.” slip op. at 5
- Strike new argumentNew argument disregardedOther
“with new arguments now, the same contentions that we already considered and expressly addressed in our Decision. Dec. 3–6. As noted above, mere disagreement with the Board’s analysis or determination is not a proper basis for rehearing. Moreover, we will not consider new arguments made for the first time in a Request for Rehearing, especially when an opportunity to present arguments and information regarding the posters clearly existed at the time Petitioner filed its Petition. See, e.g., Berk-Tek LLC v. Belden Tech. Inc., Case IPR2013-00057, slip op. at 3 (PTAB May 15, 2013) (Paper 21) (“A request for rehearing is not an opportunity to submit new analysis, after the Decision has noted the deficiencies in the petitioner’s original analysis.”).” slip op. at 5
§ 102 anticipationPatents in suitUS 8,007,826 - EMC Corporation v. Acqis LLCNo claims unpatentablePTAB · Mar 8, 2016 · IPR2014-01462 · APJ Robert J Weinschenk · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 54 and 56–61 were not shown unpatentable because the evidence did not establish that the cited references rendered the claimed PCI transaction communication obvious.
RulingsFinal written decision- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner
“construction in the Decision on Institution. The evidence indicates that the term “Peripheral Component Interconnect (PCI) bus transaction” refers to a particular industry standard, not just any communication with an interconnected peripheral component. Industry literature and dictionaries use the proper noun “Peripheral Component Interconnect” and the abbreviation “PCI” to refer to a particular industry specification for a local bus. See, e.g., Ex. 2001, 1; Ex. 2002, 6–7; Ex. 2003, 7–8. The challenged claims recite “Peripheral Component Interconnect” as a proper noun and abbreviate it as “PCI,” indicating that the challenged claims use those terms consistent with the understood industry meaning. Ex. 1001, col. 43, ll. 48–49, col. 44, l. 6; see Azure Networks, LLC v. CSR PLC, 771 F.3d 1336, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2014). The written description similarly uses the abbreviation “PCI” to refer to a particular industry standard, and uses the common noun “peripheral bus” to refer to a generic peripheral bus. Compare Ex. 1001, col. 5, ll. 31–33 (“The present invention . . . interface[s] two PCI or PCI-like buses”), with id. at col. 10, ll. 53–55 (“Additionally, the peripheral controller is coupled to a clock control logic, a configuration signal, and a peripheral bus.”) (emphasis added).” slip op. at 6
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“obvious over Horst and LVDS Owner’s Manual; claims 56 and 59 would have been obvious over Horst, LVDS Owner’s Manual, and Pocrass; and claim 58 would have been obvious over Horst, LVDS Owner’s Manual, and Deters. Pet. 58–59. A claim is unpatentable as obvious under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) if the differences between the claimed subject matter and the prior art are such that the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the subject matter pertains. KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 406 (2007). The question of obviousness is resolved on the basis of underlying factual determinations, including: (1) the scope and content of the prior art; (2) any differences between the claimed subject matter and the prior art; (3) the level of ordinary skill in the art; and (4) any objective indicia of non-obviousness. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17–18 (1966). We have considered the parties’ arguments and supporting evidence, and we determine that Petitioner has not shown by a preponderance of the evidence that claims 54 and 56–61 would have been obvious over the cited references.” slip op. at 7
- ExcludeMotion to exclude, deniedMixed
“Owner argues that paragraphs 10–24 and 31–37 of Exhibit 1031 should be excluded as irrelevant and prejudicial because Petitioner relies on those paragraphs to support improper arguments in the Reply. PO Mot. 8. Petitioner argues in the Reply that the TNet transaction in Horst includes PCI address bits, and that claim 54 only requires communicating two bits of a PCI bus transaction. PO Mot. 1. Patent Owner contends that both arguments exceed the scope of a proper reply, as set forth in 37 C.F.R. § 42.23(b), and that the portions of Exhibit 1031 that Petitioner relies upon to support those arguments should be excluded as irrelevant and prejudicial. PO Mot. 2–4, 6, 7. Patent Owner’s argument is not persuasive. Patent Owner argues in the Response that the TNet transaction in Horst does not include PCI address bits. PO Resp. 27–29. As such, Petitioner’s argument in the Reply that the TNet transaction includes PCI address bits is responsive to an argument raised in the Response. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.23(b) (generally permitting a reply to respond to arguments raised in a response). Patent Owner also argues in the Response that claim 54 requires communicating a 32-bit PCI address. PO Resp. 8–11. As such, Petitioner’s argument in the Reply that claim 54 only requires communicating two bits of a PCI bus transaction is responsive to an argument raised in the Response. Because we are not persuaded that the identified arguments in the Reply are improper, the premise of Patent Owner’s Motion to Exclude Exhibit 1031 fails. Therefore, Patent Owner’s Motion to Exclude paragraphs 10–24 and 31–37 of Exhibit 1031 is denied.” slip op. at 16
Patent outcomesUS 8,041,873 not shown unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites GrahamPatents in suitUS 8,041,873 - EMC Corporation v. Acqis LLCNo claims unpatentablePTAB · Mar 8, 2016 · IPR2014-01469 · APJ Robert J Weinschenk · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 24 and 31–33 were not shown unpatentable because Petitioner failed to prove obviousness over either asserted reference combination, including failure to establish Bogaerts as prior art.
RulingsFinal written decision- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner
“Interconnect (PCI) bus transaction” to mean “a data signal communication with an interconnected peripheral component.” Pet. 13. Patent Owner agrees with the construction in the Decision on Institution that the claim term “Peripheral Component Interconnect (PCI) bus transaction” means “Peripheral Component Interconnect (PCI) industry standard bus transaction.” PO Resp. 21–22. We see no reason now to deviate from the construction in the Decision on Institution. The evidence indicates that the term “Peripheral Component Interconnect (PCI) bus transaction” refers to a particular industry standard, not just any communication with an interconnected peripheral component. Industry literature and dictionaries use the proper noun “Peripheral Component Interconnect” and the abbreviation “PCI” to refer to a particular industry specification for a local bus. See, e.g., Ex. 2001, 1; Ex. 2002, 6–7; Ex. 2003, 7–8. The challenged claims recite “Peripheral Component Interconnect” as a proper noun and abbreviate it as “PCI,” indicating that the challenged claims use those terms consistent with the understood industry meaning. Ex. 1001, col. 27, ll. 24–25, col. 28, ll. 35–36; see Azure Networks, LLC v. CSR PLC, 771 F.3d 1336, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2014). The written description similarly uses the abbreviation “PCI” to refer to a particular industry standard, and uses the common noun “peripheral bus” to refer to a generic peripheral bus. Compare Ex. 1001, col. 19, ll. 31–33 (“the present invention may interface two PCI or PCI-like buses”), with id. at col. 7, ll. 4–6 (“Additionally, the host controller is coupled to a clock control logic, a configuration signal, and a peripheral bus.”) (emphasis added). Petitioner and Petitioner’s declarant, Mr. Bruce Young, acknowledge that the term “Peripheral Component Interconnect (PCI)” refers to an industry standard. Ex. 1003 ¶ 58; Ex. 2006, 1, 3; Ex. 2031, 16:8–12. The evidence Petitioner identifies in support of its proposed construction is the claim construction order issued in ACQIS LLC v. Appro International, Inc., No. 6:09-cv-00148 (E.D. Tex. Feb. 3, 2011). Pet. 12–13 (citing Ex. 1013). In that case, though, the parties did not appear to dispute that the term “Peripheral Component Interconnect (PCI)” refers to an industry standard. See Ex. 1013, 7 (“The parties’ primary dispute is whether the term is limited to the conventional, parallel PCI Local Bus, and, therefore excludes PCI Express bus architecture and bus transaction protocol.”). Moreover, the district court subsequently reconsidered its construction and clarified that the term “PCI bus transaction” refers to a PCI industry standard bus transaction. Ex. 1030, 8–10. Therefore, we construe the claim term “Peripheral Component Interconnect (PCI) bus transaction” to mean “Peripheral Component Interconnect (PCI) industry standard bus transaction,” and we construe the claim term “PCI bus transaction” to mean “PCI industry standard bus transaction.”” slip op. at 6
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“Horst outputs address and data bits of a PCI bus transaction in serial form over the TNet links. Pet. 31–34. Petitioner’s argument is not persuasive. The TNet processor interface in Horst translates a CPU transaction into a TNet transaction. Ex. 1009, 5 (“The interface to the destination CPU or I/O device provides mapping and validation hardware translating this virtual TNet address to the appropriate physical memory address.”), Figs. 5, 7; Ex. 2021 ¶ 94 (“The TNet Processor Interface generates TNet transactions from CPU front-side bus transactions.”). The TNet processor interface then encodes the TNet transaction using an 8B/9B encoder so that it can be output over the 9-bit serial TNet links. Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 48, 146; Ex. 1009, 3, Figs. 3, 4 (showing “8B/9B encoder”), Table 1; Ex. 2021 ¶ 105. Petitioner does not identify persuasive evidence indicating that either the CPU transaction or the TNet transaction is a PCI industry standard bus transaction. Pet. 31–34 (citing Ex. 1009, 3–8, Figs. 2, 3, 5, 7–9, Table 1; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 159[24C(i)], 159[24C(iv)], 159[24C(v)], 159[31B(i)], 159[31B(iii)]); Ex. 2021 ¶ 129. Thus, the evidence identified in the Petition does not indicate that the information output by the TNet processor interface over the TNet links includes address and data bits of a PCI industry standard bus transaction in serial form. Petitioner points out that, after a TNet transaction is communicated over the TNet links, a TNet bus interface in the console may use information in the TNet transaction to create a PCI industry standard bus transaction if a particular I/O device is connected to a PCI bus. Pet. 31–32 (citing Ex. 1009, 7, Fig. 8). But claims 24 and 31 require more than just communicating information over serial channels that subsequently might be used in the console to create a PCI industry standard bus transaction. Claims 24 and 31, when read in light of the specification, require that the information actually communicated over the serial channels includes address and data bits of a PCI industry standard bus transaction in serial form. Ex. 1001, col. 20, ll. 60–65, col. 21, ll. 15–21, col. 27, ll. 34–38, col. 28, ll. 34–39; Ex. 2022, 15:12–16:2, 22:11–16. As discussed above, the evidence identified in the Petition does not indicate that the information output by the TNet processor interface over the TNet links includes address and data bits of a PCI industry standard bus transaction in serial form.” slip op. at 11
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Prior-art status of a reference › Printed publication / public accessibilityPrinted publication not establishedDecided for patent owner
“The evidence identified by Patent Owner indicates that the date “2 October 1996” on Bogaerts is when it was submitted to the CERN/LHCC committee. Ex. 2021 ¶¶ 170, 171, 173; Ex. 2026, 12. Although it is possible that Bogaerts was available in the CERN Library at or around the same time, Petitioner has not shown that by a preponderance of the evidence. For example, Petitioner does not cite persuasive evidence indicating that the “Submitted by 2 Oct 1996” entry in the CERN Document Server record means that Bogaerts was available in the CERN Library on that date. Tr. 23:1–12, 25:5–25; Pet. Reply 21–25. In addition, Petitioner acknowledges that the CERN Document Server record itself was not created until December 18, 2014. Tr. 25:5–25; Ex. 2011, 439. Therefore, Petitioner has not shown sufficiently that Bogaerts is a prior art printed publication based on its availability in the CERN Library.” slip op. at 17
- ExcludeMotion to exclude, deniedDenied
“should be excluded for lack of authentication under Fed. R. Evid. 901. PO Mot. 2–6. Federal Rule of Evidence 901 requires that the proponent produce evidence sufficient to support a finding that an item is what the proponent claims it is. Here, Patent Owner does not dispute that Exhibit 1011 is what Petitioner claims it is, namely a reference entitled “RD24 Status Report: Application of the Scalable Coherent Interface to Data Acquisition at LHC.” Id. What Patent Owner disputes is whether Petitioner has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that Bogaerts is prior art with respect to the ’814 patent. Id. Patent Owner attempts to characterize this dispute as a question of authentication, arguing that Petitioner has not produced “evidence that [Exhibit 1011] is a true and correct copy of a publication that was publicly available as of the date asserted by Petitioner.” Id. at 3. But this is a question of sufficiency of proof, not admissibility. Therefore, Patent Owner’s Motion to Exclude Exhibit 1011 is denied.” slip op. at 20
Patent outcomesUS RE42,814 not shown unpatentableClaim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham - PTAB · Feb 26, 2016 · IPR2015-01047 · APJ Stephen C Siu · IPR · Rehearing
The Board denied Patent Owner’s rehearing request, leaving institution of IPR2016-00167 and its joinder with IPR2015-01047 in place.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied
“because “the ’167 IPR is entirely devoid of any supporting expert testimony” but expert testimony was supposedly submitted in IPR2015-01047. Req. Reh’g 3–4. As previously explained, however, the record reflects that Petitioner has demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of prevailing and Patent Owner fails to demonstrate sufficiently that the absence of expert testimony alone indicates the failure to demonstrate a reasonable likelihood of prevailing in proving unpatentability of a challenged claim. See, e.g., Decision 4.” slip op. at 2
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Joinder §315(c) / SAS all-or-nothingOther
“(“Req. Reh’g” or “Request”), seeks reversal of the Board’s Decision granting institution in IPR2016-00167 and joining IPR2016-00167 with IPR2015-01047. See Req. Reh’g 1. The Board denies the requested relief.” slip op. at 2
NonePatents in suitUS 7,490,151
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.