- Google LLC v. Dialect, LLCAll claims unpatentablePTAB · Oct 17, 2025 · IPR2024-00753 · APJ Jon M Jurgovan · IPR · Final written decision
Claim 12 is unpatentable as obvious over Kennewick and Ross because their combination teaches each limitation and a skilled artisan would have had reason to combine them with a reasonable expectation of success.
RulingsFinal written decision- BurdenUnpatentable
“A. Legal Principles “In an [inter partes review], the petitioner has the burden from the onset to show with particularity why the patent it challenges is unpatentable.” Harmonic Inc. v. Avid Tech., Inc., 815 F.3d 1356, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (citing 35 U.S.C. § 312(a)(3) (requiring inter partes review petitions to identify “with particularity . . . the evidence that supports the grounds for the challenge to each claim”)). This burden of persuasion never shifts to the patent owner. See Dynamic Drinkware, LLC v. Nat’l Graphics, Inc., 800 F.3d 1375, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2015). The burden of production, however, may shift between the petitioner and patent owner as arguments and evidence are presented during the proceeding. Id. A patent claim is unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103 if the differences between the claimed subject matter and the prior art are such that the subject matter, as a whole, would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art (“POSITA”) to which said subject matter pertains. KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 406 (2007). The question of obviousness is resolved on the basis of underlying factual determinations including: (1) the scope and content of the prior art; (2) any differences between the claimed subject matter and the prior art; (3) the level of ordinary skill in the art; and (4) objective evidence of nonobviousness.2 See Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17–18 (1966).” slip op. at 8
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“B. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art Petitioner contends a POSITA pertaining to the ’160 patent “would have possessed a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering or computer science, and two years of work experience in the field of speech and natural language-interfaces for interacting with and directing computer systems and software, including speech recognition and processing (and more experience could substitute for less formal education, and vice versa).” Pet. 10; Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 11–15. Patent Owner does not respond to Petitioner’s formulation of the level of ordinary skill in the art. See PO Resp. generally. We determine that Petitioner’s proposed skill level is consistent with the problems and solutions identified in the ’160 patent and the prior art references asserted by Petitioner. In addition, we find the skill level consistent with the education and experience that a POSITA would have had. See In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (citing Custom Accessories, Inc. v. Jeffrey-Allan Indus., Inc., 807 F.2d 955, 962 (Fed. Cir. 1986)) (citing factors to consider when determining level of ordinary skill in the art). Accordingly, we adopt Petitioner’s proposed skill level to apply in this proceeding.” slip op. at 9
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for petitioner
“After review of the evidence, we determine that the record does not support Patent Owner’s construction of “expected contexts” as “a subset of the contexts in a context stack.” PO Resp. 16–17. The sole mention of “expected contexts” in the ’160 patent’s description is the following: “The knowledge-enhanced speech recognition may access a set of expected contexts that are stored in a context stack to determine a most likely context.” Ex. 1001, 13:66–14:2. This statement does not provide any definition for “expected contexts.” Although the ’160 patent’s description mentions a “set,” this is not the same as a “subset” as Patent Owner proposes in its construction. Similarly, claims 1, 12, 13, and 15 of the ’160 patent recite “one or more expected contexts” but do not elaborate further on what an “expected context” is. Likewise, “expected contexts” were mentioned but not discussed or defined in the prosecution history of the ’160 patent. Ex. 1012, 281, 305, 382. Consequently, we decline to restrict the construction of “one or more expected contexts” as Patent Owner proposes. To the extent that Patent Owner so argues, we do not consider “expected contexts” to require the use of “context specific matchers.” In this regard, the ’160 patent states that “knowledge-enhanced speech recognition may use context specific matchers that are able to identify context such as time, location, numbers, dates, categories (e.g., music, movies, television, addresses, etc.) and other context.” Ex. 1001, 14:2–6 (emphasis added). Hence, the ’160 patent states that “contexts” may be identified using “context specific matchers” but this is not required. We further decline to interpret “one or more expected contexts” to exclude “possible contexts” as Patent Owner argues. Simply put, we find no support in the ’160 patent or elsewhere that “expected contexts” cannot be “possible contexts” or that the two terms are mutually exclusive of one another. Although the ’160 patent mentions scoring “possible contexts” (Ex. 1001, 21:7–9), we find no reason why these “possible contexts” cannot also be “expected contexts.” Although we agree with Petitioner that “expected contexts” are ones” slip op. at 13
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundDecided for petitioner
“motivations to combine with reasonable expectation of success. However, in its Sur-reply, Patent Owner argues that Petitioner’s combination “makes no sense” because Ross’s contexts are arranged in order by recency of access such that no scoring is required to find a selected context, whereas Kennewick scores every context in the context stack to select a context. PO Sur-reply 9–10. Patent Owner further argues that Ross’s context grammars are fixed whereas Kennewick’s are dynamic according to prior utterances, and that Ross’s search ends upon finding a match whereas Kennewick scores the entire context stack. Id. at 10. Patent Owner’s late arguments, to which Petitioner has not had an opportunity to respond, do not undermine Petitioner’s proposed motivations to combine with reasonable expectation of success. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.23(b). Patent Owner’s arguments hinge on its assertion that “expected contexts” are not scored and are dynamic, but the ’160 patent does not define “expected contexts” in this way. See § III.C, supra. Furthermore, we do not agree that Ross’s search necessarily ends upon finding a match or that Kennewick and Ross are otherwise incompatible. See Inst. Dec. 19–22. Thus, we find that Petitioner has demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that a POSITA would have been motivated to combine Kennewick and Ross with a reasonable expectation of success to arrive at the claimed invention. 4.” slip op. at 22
Patent outcomesUS 7,640,160 unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · GrahamPatents in suitUS 7,640,160 - Prime Time Toys LLC / Prime Time Toys Ltd. et al. v. Spin Master, Inc.No claims unpatentablePTAB · Oct 10, 2025 · IPR2023-01339 · APJ Brent M Dougal · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 4–9, 12, and 14 were not shown unpatentable because Petitioner failed to establish a reason to combine Peev and Spitballs.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level patent owner adoptedOther
“We agree that the three definitions are similar. The parties do not advocate for any particular definition. We also determine that no distinction between the definitions is material to this Decision. As such, we do not repeat all three definitions and accept Patent Owner’s definition as most closely fitting the legal requirements: a bachelor’s degree in mechanical engineering, industrial design, or equivalent, with at least one year of relevant experience designing projectile launching systems but would also be a member of a team, which would include a person with a bachelor’s in materials science, chemistry, or equivalent (e.g., chemical engineering), or has at least one year experience working with materials for use in consumer products equivalent work experience may substitute for educational experience, and vice versa” slip op. at 7
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“Neither Petitioner or Patent Owner advocate for the construction of any particular claim term. Pet. 20–21; see generally PO Resp. We determine that no terms require express construction. See Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 8
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot shown unpatentableMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentable
“conducting this kind of basic muzzle energy analysis—a conventional, even industry standard technique at the time—would not have concluded that the polymer balls that Spitballs teaches are a safer form of ammunition simply because they are softer than lightweight airsoft rounds,” because the record supports it. Ex. 2015 ¶ 59. slip op. at 12
- Obviousness (§103) › Objective indicia / secondary considerationsNot reached
“that softer ammunition was a possible solution and that Vat19 shows Spitballs exploding on contact with a person without harm. Reply 28–30 (citing Paper 12, 16–17; PO Resp. 63). However, we agree with Patent Owner, that Kim and Vat19 do not disclose all of the limitations of the claims. PO Resp. 61–62; PO Sur-reply 26; Ex. 1004, 302:7–22; Ex. 1022, 8, 9; Ex. 1024; Ex. 2007, 100 (ALJ concluding “there is no disclosure that [Kim’s] gel material is a SAP”); Ex. 2015 ¶¶ 236–239. Petitioner makes no assertions to the contrary. See Pet. 57–60; Reply 28–30. As discussed above, the full record does not support that one of ordinary skill in the art would have combined Peev and Spitballs for the reasons asserted by Petitioner. Petitioner’s insufficient evidence of simultaneous invention does not overcome that deficiency.” slip op. at 21
Patent outcomesUS 8,640,683 not shown unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites GrahamPatents in suitUS 8,640,683 - Prime Time Toys LLC / Prime Time Toys Ltd. et al. v. Spin Master, Inc.No claims unpatentablePTAB · Oct 10, 2025 · IPR2023-01348 · APJ Neil T Powell · IPR · Final written decision
The Board held claims 2, 3, 5–15, 17, and 19–21 not shown unpatentable over Spitballs and Peev because the evidence did not establish an obvious reason to use the SAP ammunition in Peev’s airsoft gun.
RulingsFinal written decision- Adverse judgmentAdverse judgmentOther
“After the Petition was filed, Patent Owner disclaimed independent claim 1 and dependent claim 4 of the ’282 patent. Prelim. Resp. 26; Ex. 2013. Accordingly, we need not reach Petitioner’s challenges to claims 1 and 4. E.g., 37 C.F.R. § 42.107(e). Thus, the remaining challenged claims are claims 2, 3, 5–15, 17, and 19–21.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level board ownOther
“that were proposed in the ITC proceeding as “similar” and noting the ITC ALJ’s determination that “all of the proposals are appropriate,” Petitioner does not argue for the application of any particular level of skill in the art in this proceeding. Pet. 20 (citing Ex. 1015, 8). We too find the definitions advanced in the ITC proceeding similar. Indeed, any differences between the definitions do not rise to a level that would affect our analysis of whether the Petition and associated evidence are sufficiently persuasive for purposes of institution. In our view, the foregoing level of ordinary skill in the art proposed by Patent Owner in the ITC proceeding best fits the legal requirements. Accordingly, we adopt and apply that level of ordinary skill in the art in our analysis of the merits.” slip op. at 10
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“The parties’ arguments and evidence do not raise any issues that necessitate an express claim construction in order to determine whether Petitioner has demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence the unpatentability of at least one of the challenged claims. Accordingly, we need not and do not expressly construe any claim language. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (holding that only claim terms in controversy need to be construed, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy (citing Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 11
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert discountedPatent owner expert creditedDecided for patent owner
“success in an airsoft gun such as Peev, including rubber, cork, foam, and soft plastics, such as SAPs.” Ex. 1016 ¶ 78; Pet. 37. For multiple reasons, this testimony fails to support Petitioner’s suggestion that using SAP ammunition in Peev’s airsoft gun was among a finite number of identified, predictable solutions. For example, because Mr. Delman does not support this testimony with objective supporting evidence, it is not entitled to persuasive weight in Petitioner’s favor. Ex. 1016 ¶ 78; 37 C.F.R. § 42.65(a) (“Expert testimony that does not disclose the underlying facts or data on which the opinion is based is entitled to little or no weight.”). Additionally, even if Mr. Delman substantiated his view that an ordinarily skilled artisan “could have considered” SAPs as airsoft ammunition, that would not persuade us that SAPs were identified, predictable solutions for airsoft ammunition.” slip op. at 17
Patent outcomesUS 8,371,282 not shown unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 8,371,282 - Prime Time Toys LLC / Prime Time Toys Ltd. et al. v. Spin Master, Inc.No claims unpatentablePTAB · Oct 10, 2025 · IPR2023-01461 · APJ Hyun J Jung · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1, 2, 13, and 15–20 were not shown unpatentable because Petitioner failed to establish a sufficient motivation to combine Peev and Spitballs, including with Moorhouse.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level patent owner adoptedDecided for patent owner
“The parties do not address the adopted level of ordinary skill in the art. See PO Resp.; Pet. Reply; PO Sur-reply. Based on the full record, we maintain and affirm that one of ordinary skill in the art would have had: a bachelor’s degree in mechanical engineering, industrial design, or equivalent, with at least one year of relevant experience designing projectile launching systems but would also be a member of a team, which would include a person with a chemical engineering), or has at least one year experience working with materials for use in consumer products and that “equivalent work experience may substitute for educational experience, and vice versa.” Pet. 21–22 (quoting Ex. 1015, 7–8); see also Ex. 1016 ¶ 55 (stating that “Patent Owner’s and Petitioner’s definitions of the [person of ordinary skill in the art] are similar, and my opinions in this Declaration would not change if I used Patent Owner’s definition of the [person of ordinary skill in the art] rather than Petitioner’s definition”). We find that the proposed level of ordinary skill in the art is consistent with the ’255 patent and the asserted prior art.” slip op. at 7
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“Neither Petitioner nor Patent Owner proposes any interpretation for any claim term. Pet. 23; see PO Resp. Petitioner notes that the ALJ in the ITC proceeding construed two terms used in the ’282 and ’683 patents, specifically “super absorbent polymer” and “a firing mechanism that directly applies a force to the ammunition.” Pet. 23 (citing Ex. 1015, 12, 14). Based on the full record, we determine that no term requires express construction to resolve the parties’ dispute. See Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to necessary to resolve the controversy.’”) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)).” slip op. at 8
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert discountedMixed
“we give little weight to the opinion of Dr. Courtney on whether Spitballs would have been considered liquid filled by one of ordinary skill in the art. Pet. Reply 15–16; PO Sur-reply 18; Ex. 1037 ¶ 55; Ex. 2121, 61:12–13; see also PO Sur-reply 14–15 (arguing that Dr. Courtney does not meet the adopted level of ordinary skill in the art). We agree with Patent Owner that Petitioner’s list of “rubber, cork, foam, and soft plastics, such as SAPs” “does not exclude all of the other types of materials Petitioner failed to address—e.g., the gelatin materials used to make paintballs.” PO Resp. 24 (citing Ex. 2117, 1). The “openended” list “has no meaningful evidentiary support” because the cited paragraphs from its declaration “make no reference at all to potential airsoft ammunition.” Pet. 38; PO Resp. 24; Ex. 1016 ¶ 77; Ex. 1017 ¶¶ 36–39, 46– 48. Petitioner’s declarant Dr. Reitman also “acknowledged that airsoft considerations are beyond the scope of her testimony.” Ex. 2030, 117:17– 118:20. We agree with Patent Owner that Petitioner’s list would include “countless distinct polymers.” PO Resp. 25; Ex. 2120, 27–28.” slip op. at 21
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentable
“In other words, Petitioner does not squarely address the testimonial evidence that the softness of Spitballs would not have been equated with safety, because of its higher weight and kinetic energy. Ex. 2015 ¶¶ 44–55. We agree with Patent Owner that Petitioner does not assert fragmentation and deformation would have overcome the greater kinetic energy of the heavier Spitballs, and that Petitioner’s declarant admitted such calculation was not done. PO Sur-reply 7 (citing Ex. 2121, 48:11–49:7); Ex. 2121, 48:11–49:7 (Petitioner’s declarant testifying that calculations of how much kinetic energy is absorbed when Spitballs bounce or explode were not done). Petitioner’s declarant also identified that back splatter can create an additional safety concern. Ex. 2121, 101:14–104:4. We agree with Patent Owner that Petitioner failed to discuss the deformation and fragmentation of Spitballs in its Petition and declarations. PO Sur-reply 6 (citing Pet. Reply 10–11; Ex. 1037 ¶ 43). We also agree that Petitioner did not explain how one of ordinary skill in the art could have reliably assessed the safety of Spitballs and airsoft rounds. Id.; see also Ex. 2121, 47:1–48:10 (Petitioner’s declarant testifying that experimentation would be the best way to quantify how much kinetic energy is absorbed through deformation and fragmentation of a given projectile). focused on the mass and diameter calculations provided by Petitioner’s declarant, and Petitioner has the burden to analyze a projectile other than the one disclosed in Spitballs, not Patent Owner. PO Sur-reply 10–11 (citing Pet. Reply 13; Ex. 1017 ¶ 67; Ex. 2015 ¶ 59). Petitioner failed to do such an analysis of a 6mm Spitball or SAP projectile. Regarding Petitioner’s reliance on deposition testimony from the ITC proceedings, as argued by Patent Owner, its declarant agreed that making ammunition softer would make injury less likely, if all other parameters were equal, not larger and heavier like a substitution with Spitballs. PO Resp. 16–17 (citing Pet. 37; Ex. 1004, 531:25–532:9; Ex. 2015 ¶¶ 60–61); Ex. 1017 ¶ 67 (Petitioner’s declarant opining that Spitballs can “grow up to 200 times their original size” to reach a mass of 1.844g); Ex. 1037 ¶ 39 (Petitioner’s declarant agreeing that “when all other variables are held constant, heavier is less safe, meaning injury potential is increased”); Ex. 2015 ¶¶ 54–59 (Patent Owner’s declarant opining that heavier and softer ammunition can pose more injury risk); Ex. 2016, 11 (indicating that airsoft ammunition typically comes in weights from 0.12g to 0.25g). We, thus, agree with Patent Owner that Petitioner fails to prove that” slip op. at 16
Patent outcomesUS 8,596,255 not shown unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · GrahamPatents in suitUS 8,596,255 - Tanklogix, LLC v. Sitepro, Inc.Institution deniedPTAB · Oct 10, 2025 · IPR2025-00653 · APJ Bart A Gerstenblith · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution on all claims because the Petition did not show a reasonable likelihood that any challenged claim was unpatentable over the asserted grounds.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“An inter partes review may be instituted only if “the information presented in the petition . . . and any [preliminary] response . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) (2024). For the reasons given below, on this record Petitioner has not established a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail in showing the unpatentability of any of the Challenged Claims. Accordingly, we do not institute an inter partes review.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level patent owner adoptedDecided for patent owner
“The parties’ proposed levels of ordinary skill in the art are similar, although Patent Owner proposes two years of experience along with a bachelor’s degree whereas Petitioner proposes “significant” experience. Patent Owner also proposes an alternative with more extensive experience in lieu of a bachelor’s degree. Although we find Petitioner’s proposed qualifications acceptable, we adopt Patent Owner’s proposed qualifications for the purposes of this Decision because they offer a wider range of qualifications that nonetheless comport with the level of ordinary skill necessary to understand and implement the teachings of the ’504 patent and the asserted prior art. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001); In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995); In re Oelrich, 579 F.2d 86, 91 (CCPA 1978). Our analysis and findings herein, however, do not turn on any differences in the parties’ proposed qualifications.” slip op. at 12
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“Additionally, only terms that are in controversy need to be construed, and these need be construed only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy. See Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’”) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). The parties assert that each claim term should be construed in accordance with its plain and ordinary meaning. Pet. 9; Prelim. Resp. 4 (citing Ex. 2009 ¶ 72); see Ex. 1002 ¶ 22 (opining the same). And, in the respective claim construction sections of their briefs, the parties do not propose any claim terms for express construction. We agree with the parties that no claim terms require express construction to resolve the controversy before us. See Realtime Data, 912 F.3d at 1375.” slip op. at 13
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert discountedDecided for patent owner
“Ex. 1002 ¶ 47. As reflected above, Dr. Wooley’s testimony as to element [1.2] does not even assert that Cardamone discloses a tank, let alone one or more sensors disposed at a tank as recited in element [1.2]. Thus, Dr. Wooley’s testimony does not support Petitioner’s argument on this issue.” slip op. at 18
Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,726,504 - Tanklogix, LLC v. Sitepro, Inc.Institution deniedPTAB · Oct 10, 2025 · IPR2025-00652 · APJ Bart A Gerstenblith · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution because Petitioner did not show a reasonable likelihood that claims 1–23 and 25–30 were unpatentable over the asserted grounds.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsDenied
“presented in the petition . . . and any [preliminary] response . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) (2024). For the reasons given below, on this record Petitioner has not established a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail in showing the unpatentability of any of the Challenged Claims. Accordingly, we do not institute an inter partes review.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level patent owner adoptedDecided for patent owner
“The parties’ proposed levels of ordinary skill in the art are similar, although Patent Owner proposes two years of experience along with a bachelor’s degree whereas Petitioner proposes “significant” experience. Patent Owner also proposes an alternative with more extensive experience in lieu of a bachelor’s degree. Although we find Petitioner’s proposed qualifications acceptable, we adopt Patent Owner’s proposed qualifications for the purposes of this Decision because they offer a wider range of qualifications that nonetheless comport with the level of ordinary skill necessary to understand and implement the teachings of the ’403 patent and the asserted prior art. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001); In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995); In re Oelrich, 579 F.2d 86, 91 (CCPA 1978). Our analysis and findings herein, however, do not turn on any differences in the parties’ proposed qualifications.” slip op. at 12
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“The parties assert that each claim term should be construed in accordance with its plain and ordinary meaning. Pet. 10; Prelim. Resp. 4 (citing Ex. 2009 ¶ 73); see Ex. 1002 ¶ 22 (opining the same). And, in the respective claim construction sections of their briefs, the parties do not propose any claim terms for express construction. We agree with the parties that no claim terms require express construction to resolve the controversy before us. See Realtime Data, 912 F.3d at 1375.” slip op. at 13
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“We agree with Patent Owner that the Petition fails to demonstrate that Kahn discloses element [1.2] because the evidence cited does not disclose a “first computer system being configured to provide remote control of the first pump or first valve” (i.e., a fluid-handling device). Kahn is directed to providing access to fluid sensing data and analyzing and providing visual information on that data, but Petitioner has not identified any disclosure of the capability to remotely control fluid-handling devices. See, e.g., Ex. 1005, code (54), 1:27–36, 2:50–3:2. More specifically, Kahn’s disclosures that Petitioner relies on for allegedly teaching remote control are deficient. We discuss each. First, Petitioner points to the following, “[f]or instance, as illustrated in FIG. 1C, a fluid control device such as a valve 15A is located on the input side of a sen[s]or unit 110.” Ex. 1005, 8:19–21, cited in Pet. 13. This portion of Kahn, however, does not disclose remote control. Second, Petitioner cites to the following: Finally, or in addition to, the communication unit 112B can include on-site alerts such as optical (indicator lights), audible alerts (e.g., alarm sounds), tactile (e.g., vibration of the unit) or can be interfaced to an appropriate control valve for simply shutting off the supply of fluid upon the detection of emergency events, for instance. Pet. 13 (citing Ex. 1005, 10:62–67). We agree with Patent Owner that this portion of Kahn teaches on-site alerts and local control of the fluid-handling device. See Prelim. Resp. 7. This portion of Kahn does not disclose remote control.” slip op. at 18
Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,294,403 - Tanklogix, LLC v. Sitepro, Inc.Institution deniedPTAB · Oct 10, 2025 · IPR2025-00651 · APJ Bart A Gerstenblith · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution because Petitioner did not show a reasonable likelihood that claims 1–3, 6, 7, and 9–20 were unpatentable over any asserted ground.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsDenied
“presented in the petition . . . and any [preliminary] response . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) (2024). For the reasons given below, on this record Petitioner has not established a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail in showing the unpatentability of any of the Challenged Claims. Accordingly, we do not institute an inter partes review.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level patent owner adoptedDecided for patent owner
“The parties’ proposed levels of ordinary skill in the art are similar, although Patent Owner proposes two years of experience along with a bachelor’s degree whereas Petitioner proposes “significant” experience. Patent Owner also proposes an alternative with more extensive experience in lieu of a bachelor’s degree. Although we find Petitioner’s proposed qualifications acceptable, we adopt Patent Owner’s proposed qualifications for the purposes of this Decision because they offer a wider range of qualifications that nonetheless comport with the level of ordinary skill necessary to understand and implement the teachings of the ’680 patent and the asserted prior art. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001); In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995); In re Oelrich, 579 F.2d 86, 91 (CCPA 1978). Our analysis and findings herein, however, do not turn on any differences in the parties’ proposed qualifications.” slip op. at 11
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner
“target value” is part of a command that is sent from a computing device to a server and then to a controller. The controller then receives a measurement of the fluid by a sensor and determines whether the measurement satisfies the “target value.” If the measurement does not satisfy the “target value,” further operations are undertaken. The recited operation sequence makes clear that the plain and ordinary meaning of “target value” is not as Dr. Wooley opines because the particular operating condition that a device is in at a particular time is represented by the measurement taken by the sensor, 11 Some claim language less relevant to construing “target value” was omitted for ease of reference. which the controller then uses to determine whether the measurement satisfies the “target value.” Additionally, claim 1 recites that the “target value” is sent as part of a command to the controller. The “target value” is not sent to the controller from the sensor, as might be expected if the plain and ordinary meaning of “target value” were as Dr. Wooley opines. Petitioner and Dr. Wooley’s construction would also result in “target value” meaning effectively the same thing as the measurement of the fluid by the sensor, a concept that is separately recited in claim 1 and to which the “target value” is compared. The Specification of the ’680 patent does not support Petitioner’s understanding of the plain and ordinary meaning of “target value.” Although the Specification does not recite “target value,” it recites “target state,” and describes “target state” sufficiently to understand the plain and ordinary meaning of “target” as used in “target value” and “target state.” In particular, the ’680 patent explains that “[i]n some embodiments, the process 104 includes receiving, via a network interface, from a remote user device, (e.g., via a command-center server) a command to change a state of a fluid-handling device to a target state.” Ex. 1001, 11:48–51. This portion reflects that the command is seeking to change a state of a fluid-handling device to a target state. In other words, the “target value” or “target state” is not generally “the particular operating condition that a device is in at a particular time”; rather, it is a value or state that the fluid-handling device is desired to be in, as Patent Owner and Dr. Durham explain. Additionally, just as claim 1 recites a directional component for the “target value” to be sent to the controller in a command, so too does the Specification describe a “target state” as being sent in a command from a remote user device. Thus, the Specification clearly supports the plain and ordinary meaning proposed by Patent Owner and Dr. Durham and not the plain and ordinary meaning proposed by Petitioner and Dr. Wooley. slip op. at 14
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“time-stamped process data, report exception therein to the remote host, and extract and transmit time-stamped process data to the remote host.” Ex. 1005, Abst. (emphases added). Almadi explains that its remote field systems must include a plurality of controller units “to issue commands to, and gather and process data from a plurality of field devices, including remote systems and instruments, . . . [and] a database server for the storage of process data retrieved from the remote subsystems and instruments.” Id. at 2:22–30 (emphases added). Based on these disclosures, we agree with Patent Owner that Petitioner has not established that Almadi discloses element [1.4]. Specifically, the teachings from Almadi identified by Petitioner refer to process data, which is data retrieved from the remote subsystems/field devices. Thus, we understand that Almadi’s teaching—of using an Ethernet switch to transmit “process data”—describes transmitting data from the remote subsystems/field devices. See Ex. 1005, 3:13–17, cited in Pet. 15. But claim 1 and particularly element [1.4], recites “sending, with the server, the target value to the network address [which identifies a controller of the fluid-handling device13] via the network,” which is different than sending process data from the field devices to the remote host or database server for storage.” slip op. at 19
Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,175,680 - Tanklogix, LLC v. SiteproInstitution deniedPTAB · Oct 10, 2025 · IPR2025-00650 · APJ Sheila F Mcshane · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution because Petitioner did not show a reasonable likelihood that claims 18–32 and 34 were unpatentable over Kahn or Kahn and Gutierrez.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“information presented in the petition . . . and any response . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) (2024). Upon consideration of the Petition, the Preliminary Response, and the evidence of record, we determine that Petitioner has not established a reasonable likelihood of prevailing with respect to the unpatentability of at least one claim of the ’871 patent. Accordingly, for the reasons that follow, we decline to institute an inter partes review of claims 18–32 and 34 of the ’871 patent.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level patent owner adoptedDecided for patent owner
“The respective proposed levels of qualifications for a person of ordinary skill in the art are similar, with Patent Owner proposing two years of experience compared to Petitioner proposing significant experience with remotely controlling fluid-handling devices, like SCADA systems. Patent Owner also proposes more extensive experience in lieu of educational experience. While we find Petitioner’s proposed qualifications to be acceptable, we adopt Patent Owner’s proposed qualifications for the purposes of this Decision because they offer a wider range of qualifications that nonetheless comport with the level of skill necessary to understand and implement the teachings of the ’871 patent and the asserted prior art. Our analysis and findings herein, however, do not turn on any differences in the qualifications adopted.” slip op. at 8
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“We determine that we need not expressly construe any claim terms to resolve the parties’ disputes on the current record. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“[W]e need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 10
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“actuators and the remote control of fluid handling devices, including the receipt with the user-interface module of “a user command to actuate an actuator via a presented control interface” (limitation [18.7]) and “account authorized to send commands to remotely control fluid handling devices” (limitation [18.11]). We agree with Patent Owner that the Petition fails to demonstrate that Kahn discloses or teaches these limitations because the evidence does not provide support that there is remote control of fluid handling devices or the use of a user command on a control interface to send a command to a fluid handling device, for instance. Kahn is directed to providing access to fluid sensing data and analyzing and providing visual information on that data, but we do not discern that it teaches or discloses the capability to remotely control fluid handling devices. See, e.g., Ex. 1005, code (54), 1:27–36, 2:50–3:2. More specifically, the Kahn disclosures that Petitioner repeatedly relies upon for allegedly teaching this control are deficient. See Ex. 1005, 10:62–67, 14:35– 15:2, 15:62–16:32; see also Pet. 12–14, 16–18. Kahn discloses that “the communication unit 112B can include on-site alerts such as optical (indicator lights), audible alerts (e.g., alarm sounds), tactile (e.g., vibration of the unit) or can be interfaced to an appropriate control valve for simply shutting off the supply of fluid upon the detection of emergency events, for instance.” Ex. 1005, 10:62–67. Communication unit 112B is part of the local “sensor unit,” wherein the detection conditions determined by the sensor are communicated to remote devices by communication unit 112B. See id. at 3:31–33, 5:62–6:2, 6:27–35, 7:33–37, 13:7–12, Figs. 1A–1C. Kahn discloses that the sensor units, which include communication units 112B, can be located near shut-off valves and can communicate with distant locations. See id. at 11:1–13. There are no disclosures, however, in the above passages that there is remote control of fluid handling devices, that there is a user command on a control interface that actuates an actuator, or that there is a command sent to the facility actuators via a network connection, as required in limitations [18.5]–[18.7] and [18.9]–[18.12], respectively. Rather, the disclosure indicates that the communication unit 112B includes on-site alerts and that the local (non-remote) communication unit 112B can be interfaced with the control valve.” slip op. at 18
Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,488,871 - Skullcandy, Inc. v. Earin ABInstitution deniedPTAB · Sep 15, 2025 · IPR2025-00690 · APJ Monica S Ullagaddi · IPR · Director review
The Board denied institution because the petition did not show a reasonable likelihood that claims 20 and 21 were unpatentable on any asserted obviousness ground.
RulingsDirector review decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“review. See 35 U.S.C. § 314 (2018); 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a) (2023). The standard for instituting an inter partes review is set forth in 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), which provides that an inter partes review may not be instituted “unless the Director determines . . . there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” Having considered the parties’ arguments and the evidence of record, we determine that, for the reasons discussed herein, Petitioner does not demonstrate a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail with respect to at least one of the challenged claims. We thus decline to institute an inter partes review on all challenged claims on all asserted grounds. See SAS Inst., Inc. v. Iancu, 138 S. Ct. 1348, 1354, 1359–60 (2018).” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“may be considered, including the “type of problems encountered in the art; prior art solutions to those problems; rapidity with which innovations are made; sophistication of the technology; and educational level of active workers in the field.” In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (citing Custom Accessories, Inc. v. Jeffrey–Allan Indus., Inc., 807 F.2d 955, 962 (Fed.Cir.1986)).” slip op. at 7
- BurdenNot shown unpatentable
“Analysis of the Parties’ Contentions We agree with Patent Owner that the Petition is conclusory––the Cooperstock Declaration merely reiterates the position set forth in the Petition and does not provide sufficient detail or explanation of why Olodort’s “low power state” would have been understood by a POSITA to mean that “existing connections to a second wireless earbud and to a wireless audio streaming host device will be disconnected,” as recited in claim 20. 37 C.F.R. § 42.65(a) (“Expert testimony that does not disclose the underlying facts or data on which the opinion is based is entitled to little or no weight.”); see Pet. 23–24; Ex. 1007 ¶¶ 84–87. We further agree that claim 38 is not directed to entering “a standby mode” as it recites “the low power state is a standby mode from which the second earpiece is awakened in response to detecting that the second earpiece has been attached to an ear.” Ex. 1002, claim 38 (emphasis added). As such, we agree with Patent Owner that Olodort’s “claim 38 contains no disclosure concerning what happens to ‘existing connections’ when exiting, let alone entering, the ‘standby mode.’” See Prelim. Resp. 9 (citing Ex. 1002, claims 32, 34, 38). We further agree with Patent Owner that the Cooperstock Declaration in paragraphs 86 and 87 sets forth an alternative obviousness theory “based on a modification to Olodort to add ‘circuitry for disconnecting the earbuds from one another and from any wireless audio streaming host device when in the low power state’” that is improperly incorporated by reference into the Petition. Prelim. Resp. 10–11 (emphasis added) (citing 35 U.S.C. § 312(a)(3) (A petition for inter partes review “may be considered only if . . . the petition identifies, in writing and with particularity . . . the evidence that supports the grounds for challenged to each claim.”); 37 C.F.R. § 42.104(b)(4) (“The petition must specify where each element of the claim is found in the prior art patents or printed publications relied upon.”); 37 C.F.R. § 42.6(a)(3) (“Arguments must not be incorporated by reference from one document into another.”)). As such, we need not and do not consider this alternative obviousness theory.” slip op. at 18
- Expert testimonyDecided for patent owner
“Analysis of the Parties’ Contentions We agree with Patent Owner that the Petition is conclusory––the Cooperstock Declaration merely reiterates the position set forth in the Petition and does not provide sufficient detail or explanation of why Olodort’s “low power state” would have been understood by a POSITA to mean that “existing connections to a second wireless earbud and to a wireless audio streaming host device will be disconnected,” as recited in claim 20. 37 C.F.R. § 42.65(a) (“Expert testimony that does not disclose the underlying facts or data on which the opinion is based is entitled to little or no weight.”); see Pet. 23–24; Ex. 1007 ¶¶ 84–87. We further agree that claim 38 is not directed to entering “a standby mode” as it recites “the low power state is a standby mode from which the second earpiece is awakened in response to detecting that the second earpiece has been attached to an ear.” Ex. 1002, claim 38 (emphasis added). As such, we agree with Patent Owner that Olodort’s “claim 38 contains no disclosure concerning what happens to ‘existing connections’ when exiting, let alone entering, the ‘standby mode.’” See Prelim. Resp. 9 (citing Ex. 1002, claims 32, 34, 38). We further agree with Patent Owner that the Cooperstock Declaration in paragraphs 86 and 87 sets forth an alternative obviousness theory “based on a modification to Olodort to add ‘circuitry for disconnecting the earbuds from one another and from any wireless audio streaming host device when in the low power state’” that is improperly incorporated by reference into the Petition. Prelim. Resp. 10–11 (emphasis added) (citing 35 U.S.C. § 312(a)(3) (A petition for inter partes review “may be considered only if . . . the petition identifies, in writing and with particularity . . . the evidence that supports the grounds for challenged to each claim.”); 37 C.F.R. § 42.104(b)(4) (“The petition must specify where each element of the claim is found in the prior art patents or printed publications relied upon.”); 37 C.F.R. § 42.6(a)(3) (“Arguments must not be incorporated by reference from one document into another.”)). As such, we need not and do not consider this alternative obviousness theory.” slip op. at 18
§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 9,402,120 - Meta Platforms, Inc. v. Sitnet LLCAll claims unpatentablePTAB · Sep 8, 2025 · IPR2024-00529 · APJ Neil T Powell · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–9 and 20 are unpatentable as obvious; claims 10–19 are cancelled by adverse judgment after Patent Owner’s request.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“had a bachelor’s degree in Computer or Electrical Engineering or equivalent discipline, and approximately two years’ experience in telecommunications or computer networking,” adding that “[a]dditional education could substitute for professional experience, and significant work experience could substitute for formal education.” Pet. 9 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 45–46).” slip op. at 7
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededDecided for patent owner
“proposed constructions, and determined that “event node” does not need construction. Ex. 2007, 5. In the Institution Decision, we agreed with the District Court that “event node” does not need construction, and we continue to do so here. See Inst. Dec. 8. Independent claim 1 recites “creating, by an event node server, an event node in a multi-dimensional personal information network, the event node corresponding to a situation,” “transmitting an invitation to establish a link with the event node server to the devices corresponding to each node in the projection formed in step (b),” “receiving a response from at least one of the devices from step (c) accepting the invitation to establish a link with the event node server,” and “establishing a link with each device accepting the invitation.” Ex. 1001, 33:21–35; see also PO Resp. 3 (emphasizing claim 1’s recitations that the “event node” is “in a multi-dimensional personal information network” and “correspond[s] to a situation.”). Claim 20 includes similar recitations related to the “event node.” Ex. 1001, 34:45–64. In view of this, we determine that the claim language itself provides sufficient meaning for the term “event node” and further construction is not necessary.9” slip op. at 10
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)UnpatentableUnpatentable
“event node.” Petitioner persuades us that Amidon’s architecture provides a social network (the recited “situational network”) and the social network conference within the social network is the event node. In particular, the evidence demonstrates that Amidon separately teaches a social network and a social network conference. For example, as Petitioner notes, Amidon suggests that a conference may include a subset of the users in its social network, such as “all users currently listening to the same song” or “a subset of a social network circuit related to a game when the subset includes three or more people.” Ex. 1005, 13:6514:3, 14:22–27; Pet. 20–22; see also Ex. 1005, 13:57–14:29. Therefore, Patent Owner’s argument that the social network conference is the social network (see Sur-reply 6–8), rather than the event node, does not persuasively address Petitioner’s contentions.10 Patent Owner’s argument that Amidon’s social network conference merely comprises a group of individuals communicating with each other so it cannot be an event node does not take into account that Amidon’s social network conference is also defined by a data structure, such as the data structure shown in Figure 3. See PO Resp. 7–10; Pet. 19–20; Reply 7–8. The parties do not dispute that Amidon’s social network conference is defined by a data structure. PO Resp. 11–13 (e.g., “Fig. 3 shows a database entry for a conference.”); Reply 7. We find persuasive Petitioner’s argument that “the conference itself (as defined by the stored data and accessible via window 200) is the claimed event node.” Reply 7. slip op. at 20
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundUnpatentable
“Weighing the Parties’ arguments and evidence, Petitioner persuades us that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had motivation to configure Wong’s social network with an ad-hoc communication network like Gogic’s, as well as a reasonable expectation of success. As Petitioner argues, Gogic’s disclosure that the ad-hoc communication network “may allow emergency services to be more efficiently or more appropriately deployed” would have motivated adding such an ad-hoc communication network to Wong’s system. Pet. 48; Ex. 1007, 4:20–24. Additionally, contrary to Patent Owner’s arguments, Petitioner’s evidence demonstrates technical compatibility of the references’ disclosures. As Petitioner notes, Gogic discloses using its approach with a wide range of technologies, including “portable or desktop computers.” Ex. 1007, 4:46– 49; Pet. 48. Wong likewise discloses implementing its social network with a wide range of technologies, such as “laptops, desktops, handheld, personal digital assistants, personal digital assistants, [or] mobile telephones.” Ex. 1006 ¶ 17; Pet. 49. These disclosures show that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had a reasonable expectation of success implementing Gogic’s method in Wong’s social network using, for example, desktop computers.11 Patent Owner recognizes that Gogic discloses implementing its system with desktop computers. PO Resp. 22. But Patent Owner contends that a person of ordinary skill in the art would not have known how to implement Gogic’s invention, such as its location determination, using desktop computers. Id. This argument does not recognize that, as a prior art patent, Gogic is presumed enabled, including its disclosure of using desktop computers to implement its system. Apple Inc. v. Corephotonics, Ltd., 861 F. App’x 443, 450 (Fed. Cir. 2021) (nonprecedential; inter partes review context); Amgen Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc., 314 F.3d 1313, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2003). Patent Owner’s arguments and evidence do not rebut this presumption. For example, Dr. Rubin’s testimony that “from the descriptions and figures provided in Gogic it would suggest that location is determined via technologies specific to wireless networks and telecommunications” does not persuade us that Gogic fails to enable 11 Accordingly, Patent Owner’s argument about the difficulties of modifying Gogic to use Wong’s social network are inapposite. PO Resp. 24. implementing its approach with desktop computers, such as those used in Wong. Ex. 2009 ¶ 87 (emphasis added). To the extent Gogic suggested wireless technologies as a way to determine location, that does not detract from Gogic’s disclosure of using other technologies, including desktop computers, to implement its invention.” slip op. at 35
Patent outcomesUS 8,332,454 unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites PhillipsPatents in suitUS 8,332,454
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.