- Dr. Falk Pharma GmbH v. Ellodi Pharmaceuticals, L.P.Adverse judgmentPTAB · Jan 26, 2026 · IPR2025-00055 · APJ Zhenyu Yang · IPR · Adverse judgment
The Board granted Patent Owner’s motion, entered adverse judgment against Patent Owner on claims 1–42 after statutory disclaimer, and terminated the proceeding.
RulingsAdverse judgment- Adverse judgmentAdverse judgmentGranted
“A party may request judgment against itself at any time during a proceeding. 37 C.F.R. § 42.73(b). Under the Rules, actions construed as a request for entry of adverse judgment include “[c]ancellation or disclaimer of a claim such that the party has no remaining claim in the trial.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.73(b)(2). Here, Patent Owner has disclaimed, under 37 C.F.R. § 1.321, claims 1–42 of the ’407 patent, which constitute all challenged claims involved in this trial. See Ex. 2031. We thus construe the statutory disclaimer as a request for entry of adverse judgment. Having reviewed the statutory disclaimer, we determine that adverse judgment against Patent Owner with respect to claims 1–42 of the ’407 patent is appropriate.” slip op. at 2
NonePatents in suitUS 9,486,407 - Dr. Falk Pharma GmbH v. Ellodi Pharmaceuticals, L.P.Adverse judgmentPTAB · Jan 23, 2026 · IPR2025-00054 · APJ John G New · IPR · Adverse judgment
The Board granted Patent Owner’s unopposed motion and entered adverse judgment against Patent Owner as to claims 1–16 after statutory disclaimer.
RulingsAdverse judgment- Adverse judgmentAdverse judgmentGranted
“A party may request judgment against itself at any time during a proceeding. Actions construed to be a request for adverse judgment include … [d]isclaimer of the involved application or patent.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.73(b)(1). We find that good cause exists to grant Patent Owner’s unopposed request for adverse judgment and to terminate this proceeding. Consequently, we grant Patent Owner’s Motion to Terminate and Request for Adverse Judgment. slip op. at 2
NonePatents in suitUS 11,246,828 - Dr. Falk Pharma GmbH v. Ellodi Pharmaceuticals, L.P.Adverse judgmentPTAB · Jan 23, 2026 · IPR2025-00052 · APJ John G New · IPR · Adverse judgment
The Board granted Patent Owner’s unopposed motion and entered adverse judgment against Patent Owner as to claims 1–17 following statutory disclaimer of all claims.
RulingsAdverse judgment- Adverse judgmentAdverse judgmentGranted
“A party may request judgment against itself at any time during a proceeding. Actions construed to be a request for adverse judgment include … [d]isclaimer of the involved application or patent.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.73(b)(1). We find that good cause exists to grant Patent Owner’s unopposed request for adverse judgment and to terminate this proceeding. Consequently, we grant Patent Owner’s Motion to Terminate and Request for Adverse Judgment. slip op. at 2
NonePatents in suitUS 10,632,069 - Dr. Falk Pharma GmbH v. Ellodi Pharmaceuticals, L.P.Adverse judgmentPTAB · Jan 23, 2026 · IPR2025-00056 · APJ Ryan H Flax · IPR · Adverse judgment
The Board entered adverse judgment against Patent Owner on claims 1–30 after it statutorily disclaimed all claims, and terminated the IPR.
RulingsAdverse judgment- Adverse judgmentAdverse judgmentGranted
“A party may request judgment against itself at any time during a proceeding. Actions construed to be a request for adverse judgment include . . . [d]isclaimer of the involved application or patent.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.73(b)(1). We find good cause exists to grant Patent Owner’s unopposed request for adverse judgement and to terminate this proceeding. Thus, we grant Patent Owner’s Motion to Terminate and Request for Adverse Judgment. slip op. at 2
NonePatents in suitUS 11,260,061 - Mylan Pharmaceuticals Inc. / Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc. et al. v. Bayer Pharma AktiengesellschaftAdverse judgmentPTAB · Jan 12, 2026 · IPR2022-01513 · APJ Ryan H Flax · IPR · Adverse judgment
The Board granted Petitioners’ withdrawal and entered adverse judgment against them on remanded claims 5–8; claims 1–4 remained affirmed as unpatentable.
RulingsAdverse judgment- Adverse judgmentAdverse judgmentGranted
“A party may request judgment against itself at any time during a proceeding. Actions construed to be a request for adverse judgment include: . . . [a]bandonment of the contest.” 37 C.F.R. §42.73(b)(4). We find good cause exists to grant Petitioners’ request to withdraw from the proceedings, which is a request for adverse judgement (with respect to challenged claims 5–8). slip op. at 3
NonePatents in suitUS 10,828,310 - Mylan Pharmaceuticals Inc. / Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc. et al. v. Bayer Pharma AktiengesellschaftAdverse judgmentPTAB · Jan 12, 2026 · IPR2022-01515 · APJ Ryan H Flax · IPR · Adverse judgment
The Board granted Petitioners’ withdrawal request and entered adverse judgment against them as to claims 5–8; claims 1–4 remained affirmed as unpatentable.
RulingsAdverse judgment- Adverse judgmentAdverse judgmentGranted
“A party may request judgment against itself at any time during a proceeding. Actions construed to be a request for adverse judgment include: . . . [a]bandonment of the contest.” 37 C.F.R. §42.73(b)(4). We find good cause exists to grant Petitioners’ request to withdraw from the proceedings, which is a request for adverse judgement (with respect to challenged claims 5–8). slip op. at 3
NonePatents in suitUS 10,828,310 - Mylan Pharmaceuticals Inc. / Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc. et al. v. Bayer Pharma AktiengesellschaftAdverse judgmentPTAB · Jan 12, 2026 · IPR2022-00517 · APJ Ryan H Flax · IPR · Adverse judgment
The Board granted Petitioners’ withdrawal request and entered adverse judgment against them as to claims 5–8 after remand.
RulingsAdverse judgment- Adverse judgmentAdverse judgmentGranted
“A party may request judgment against itself at any time during a proceeding. Actions construed to be a request for adverse judgment include: . . . [a]bandonment of the contest.” 37 C.F.R. §42.73(b)(4). We find good cause exists to grant Petitioners’ request to withdraw from the proceedings, which is a request for adverse judgement (with respect to challenged claims 5–8). slip op. at 3
NonePatents in suitUS 10,828,310 - Innoscience (Zhuhai) Technology Company, Ltd / Innoscience America, Inc. v. Efficient Power Conversion CorporationAll claims unpatentablePTAB · Mar 18, 2025 · IPR2023-01381 · APJ Jon B Tornquist · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–3 and 7–9 are unpatentable as obvious over Uemoto and Smith; the motion to amend is granted, and proposed substitute claims 13 and 14 are not shown unpatentable.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“In order to determine whether an invention would have been obvious at the time the application was filed, we consider the level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art. Graham, 383 U.S. at 17. In assessing the level of ordinary skill in the art, various factors may be considered, including the “type of problems encountered in the art; prior art solutions to those problems; rapidity with which innovations are made; sophistication of the technology; and educational level of active workers in the field.” In re GPAC, Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (quotation omitted). Petitioner contends a person of ordinary skill in the art “would have possessed at least a four-year degree in electrical engineering, chemical engineering, physics, or material science, or a closely related field, and at least two years of experience in semiconductor device design or fabrication, including the processing of semiconductor materials, analysis of device operation, or the development of new device topologies.” Pet. 5–6. Petitioner contends “[a]dditional education could substitute for professional experience and vice versa.” Id. at 6. Patent Owner contends that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had “at least a four-year degree in electrical engineering, physics, material science, or a closely related field, and three years of professional work experience in the epitaxial growth, design, and fabrication of semiconductor electronic devices, including those of GaN.” PO Resp. 7 (citing Ex. 2009 ¶ 82). Upon review of the evidence of record and the parties’ arguments, we adopt Petitioner’s definition of the person of ordinary skill in the art as it is consistent with the prior art of record. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (holding that the prior art itself can reflect the appropriate level of ordinary skill in the art). We note, however, that the conclusions reached in this Decision would be the same under either proposed definition of the ordinarily skilled artisan. See Ex. 2009 ¶ 83 (Dr. Schubert testifying that his opinions would be the same under either proposed definition); Ex. 1033 ¶ 9 (Dr. Shealy testifying that the differences in proposed definitions of the ordinarily skilled artisan “would not change the outcome of the invalidity analysis in any material manner”); PO Resp. 7; Pet. Reply 1.” slip op. at 9
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for patent owner
“compensated GaN layer above the barrier layer, and a gate contact above the compensated GaN layer.” Ex. 1001, 5:12–18. Petitioner contends the term “compensated” indicates that the step of compensating the GaN layer has already occurred, such that the term “compensated GaN layer” should be construed as a “‘[d]oped GaN layer formed with a step to passivate its impurities’ which is a ‘product-by-process’ limitation.”5 Pet. 12–14. And, because compensation with hydrogen was the “critical step” distinguishing the claims from the prior art, and because hydrogenation in as-grown III-nitride materials had been well known for over a decade by 2009, Petitioner contends “compensated” “cannot be interpreted as mere hydrogen presence in as-grown material, a well-known property of doped GaN.” Id. at 15. Patent Owner contends “compensated GaN material” should be construed as “a semiconductor GaN gate material in which one type of impurity (for example, donor) cancels the electrical effects of the other type of impurity (for example, acceptor).” PO Resp. 11 (citing Ex. 2009 ¶ 92) (emphasis added). Patent Owner contends this construction is consistent with the IEEE dictionary, which defines “compensated semiconductor” as 5 Given that product-by-process steps in a device claim are not entitled to patentable weight, Petitioner contends “the prior art only need show a material with passivated impurities to show unpatentability, not the step to achieve it.” Pet. 15–16. “[a] semiconductor in which one type of impurity or imperfection (for example, donor) partially cancels the electric effects of the other type of impurity or imperfection (for example, acceptor).” PO Resp. 14 (quoting Ex. 2004). Patent Owner contends its construction is also consistent with the written description of the ’294 patent, which explains that a compensated GaN material is part of the gate and includes a p-type impurity that imparts an electrical effect (i.e., conductivity), as well as a second impurity, e.g., hydrogen, that partially cancels the electrical effect of the p-type impurity, rendering the layer semi-insulating. Id. at 14–15 (citing Ex. 1001, 3:10–13, 3:43–45). On this record, we construe “compensated GaN layer” as “a GaN layer in which one type of impurity (for example, donor) partially cancels the electric effects of the other type of impurity (for example, acceptor).” This is consistent with the disclosures of the ’294 patent, the IEEE dictionary definition, and the construction ultimately adopted by the ITC. Ex. 2004, 3; Ex. 1049, 16–17 (ITC construing “compensated GaN layer” to mean “a GaN layer in which one type of impurity partially cancels the electrical effects of another type of impurity”); Ex. 1001, 3:43–45 (explaining that the compensated GaN layer of the ’294 patent is formed through the “passivation of a p-type impurity using hydrogen”). For the reasons set forth below, however, we decline to construe “compensated GaN layer” as a product-by-process claim term (as asserted by Petitioner), or to limit the compensated GaN layer to a gate material (as asserted by Patent Owner).” slip op. at 11
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Specification disavowal / 'present invention' languageDisclaimer not foundDecided for petitioner
“There are two exceptions to the general rule that we apply the ordinary and customary meaning of a claim term: (1) when a patentee sets out a definition and acts as his own lexicographer, or (2) when the patentee disavows the full scope of a claim term either in the specification or during prosecution. See Thorner, 669 F.3d at 1365. The standards for lexicography and disclaimer, however, are “exacting.” Id. at 1366. There is no argument that the patentees acted as their own lexicographer to redefine the term “compensated GaN layer.” With respect to disavowal, a “patentee may demonstrate intent to deviate from the ordinary and accustomed meaning of a claim term by including in the specification expressions of manifest exclusion or restriction, representing a clear disavowal of claim scope.” Thorner, 669 F.3d at 1366 (quoting Teleflex, Inc. v. Ficosa N. Am. Corp., 299 F.3d 1313, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2002)). As noted by Patent Owner, the title of the ’294 patent is, in part, “Compensated Gate MISFET” and much of the discussion of the ’294 patent is of a compensated GaN layer that is directly below the gate contact and above a barrier layer and operates in conjunction with the gate contact to control the on/off state of the transistor. PO Resp. 12–14. We are presented with insufficient argument or evidence to conclude, however, that these disclosures rise to the level of a disclaimer. For example, although the title of the ’294 patent is directed to a “Compensated Gate MISFET,” claim 1 is more broadly directed to “[a] column III Nitride transistor.” Ex. 1001, 5:12, code (54). Nor are we directed to an expression or statement of manifest exclusion in the ’294 patent that would serve to disclaim any “compensated GaN layer” that is not directly below the gate and/or that does not function in concert with the gate electrode to control the on/off state of the transistor. See Thorner, 669 F.3d at 1366. With respect to the stated goals of the invention, as noted by Patent Owner, one of the primary purposes of the compensated GaN layer of the ’294 patent is to reduce gate leakage and gate capacitance. Ex. 1001, 2:13– 19, 3:18–21 (“[U]sing a compensated semiconductor layer 38 leads to low gate leakage during device operation.”). We cannot use the goals of the invention, however, to rewrite the claims or insert terms that are not present. See Thorner, 669 F.3d at 1366. Moreover, the prior art of record indicates that a compensated GaN layer that is below the gate contact and above a barrier layer, but not part of the active gate structure, may also “decrease the leakage current between the gate and the drain.” Ex. 1006 ¶¶ 44 (“Even when a positive bias of 5 V or higher is applied to the gate electrode, no significant gate-leakage current is observed.”), 61. As such, evidence of record suggests that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have understood that one of the primary goals disclosed in the ’294 patent is achieved regardless of whether the compensated GaN layer is part of the gate, or simply in close vicinity to the gate. In view of the foregoing, we are not persuaded that the written description of the ’294 patent indicates that the “compensated GaN layer” must be part of the gate structure.” slip op. at 17
- Obviousness (§103) › Objective indicia / secondary considerations › NexusObjective indicia no nexusDecided for petitioner
“To be probative, Patent Owner must prove there is a nexus between the presented evidence and the merits of the claimed invention. See Demaco Corp. v. F. Von Langsdorff Licensing Ltd., 851 F.2d 1387, 1392 (Fed. Cir. 1988). A rebuttable presumption of nexus applies when the “patentee shows that the asserted evidence is tied to a specific product and that the product ‘is the invention disclosed and claimed.’” Fox Factory, Inc. v. SRAM, LLC, 944 F.3d 1366, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (quoting Demaco, 851 F.2d at 1392). “That is, presuming nexus is appropriate ‘when the patentee shows that the asserted objective evidence is tied to a specific product and that product embodies the claimed features, and is coextensive with them.’” Id. (quoting Polaris Indus., Inc. v. Arctic Cat, Inc., 882 F.3d 1056, 1072 (Fed. Cir. 2018)). If the praise is not limited to the features of the claimed invention, the patent owner may still prove nexus “by showing that the evidence of secondary considerations is the ‘direct result of the unique characteristics of the claimed invention.’” Id. at 1373–74 (quoting In re Huang, 100 F.3d 135, 140 (Fed. Cir. 1996)). Patent Owner contends that the compensated gate of the ’294 patent “was a breakthrough invention and resulted in the first commercially viable enhancement-mode GaN transistor.” PO Resp. 60 (citing Ex. 2009 ¶¶ 192– 193, 197; Ex. 2021). Patent Owner further contends that this achievement required the counter-intuitive use of a compensated gate material in the gate structure, and represented “a technological leap that laid the foundation for viable enhancement-mode GaN transistors.” Id. at 61–62. For this achievement, Patent Owner contends the inventor, Dr. Alex Lidow, received the 2015 SEMI Award. Id. at 60 (citing Ex. 2021). Upon review of Patent Owner’s evidence and the parties’ arguments, we find that Patent Owner’s objective indicia evidence is entitled to little, if any, weight. The evidence of praise relied upon by Patent Owner is not clearly linked to the claimed invention or any particular product having each of the claimed features of the ’294 patent. Ex. 2021. For example, the 2015 SEMI award was provided to Dr. Lidow “for commercialization of GaN power devices.” Id. An article explaining the award indicates that “high cost” previously “limited [the] commercial success” of GaN technologies, but Dr. Lidow was able to overcome these issues, “from resolving packaging limitations to establishing a low-cost supply chain,” “through persistence.” Id. This praise is not demonstrably linked to the claimed invention or any particular device, and does not mention the use of a compensated gate, or any other relevant feature recited in the claims. In view of the foregoing, we determine that Patent Owner’s objective evidence of non-obviousness is entitled to little, if any, weight.” slip op. at 20
Patent outcomesUS 8,350,294 unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosurecites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 8,350,294 - PTAB · Oct 11, 2024 · IPR2024-00772 · APJ Monica S Ullagaddi · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on all challenged claims and petition grounds, found the merits threshold met, and granted Texas Instruments’ motion to join IPR2024-00001.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“3. Analysis At this stage of the proceeding, we determine that Patent Owner’s statements made during prosecution of the ’195 patent appear to contradict its arguments in the present proceeding. See generally Prelim. Resp. Based on the present record, Patent Owner’s statements during prosecution support Petitioner’s argument tthat a graded dopant concentration is enough to teach aiding carrier movement in a particular direction. Patent Owner does not dispute that Kawagoe has a graded dopant concentration in the active region at this stage of the proceeding. Id. Patent Owner also does not dispute that Kawagoe’s transistor has carriers in the active region or that the graded dopant concentration of Kawagoe is lowered from the surface to the bottom substrate (Ex. 1007, Fig. 17). Id. At this stage of the proceeding, the evidence of record supports Petitioner’s position sufficiently to meet the reasonable likelihood threshold for institution. We decline to make further determinations, on this preliminary record, regarding the dispute surrounding this limitation, because the trial in the 00001IPR is the better proceeding in which to do so. Specifically, as compared to the preliminary phase of this case, the instituted trial in the 10 The examined claims of the ’195 patent generally recited “a unidirectional drift field drawing all minority carriers from said surface layer to said substrate.” Ex. 1016, 286. Patent Owner amended the claims of the ’195 patent to recite “maintain[ing] a single static unidirectional electric drift field to aid the movement of minority carriers from said surface layer to said substrate.” Id. 00001IPR affords the parties a better opportunity to fully and fairly brief, argue, and develop evidence in support of their positions. We observe, on this record, the dispute is inadequate to undermine the sufficiency of Petitioner’s evidence to support institution of review.” slip op. at 14
- PTAB / AIA Trials › §315(b) time barNot time barredDecided for petitioner
“instituted if the petition requesting the proceeding is filed more than 1 year after the date on which the petitioner, real party in interest, or privy of the 1 The Leahy-Smith America Invents Act (“AIA”), Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011), amended 35 U.S.C. § 103, effective March 16, 2013. Because applications from which the ’481 patent claims priority were filed before this date, the pre-AIA version of § 103 applies. 2 U.S. Patent No. 6,043,114, issued Mar. 28, 2000 (Ex. 1007, “Kawagoe”). 3 U.S. Patent No. 6,163,877, issued Dec. 19, 2000 (Ex. 1014, “Gupta”). 4 U.S. Patent Publication No. 2003/0183856 A1, published Oct. 2, 2003 (Ex. 1006, “Wieczorek”). 5 Petitioner cites four volumes for Wolf: Stanley Wolf & Richard Tauber, Silicon Processing For The VLSI Era, Volume 1 – Process Technology, 2nd ed., (Lattice Press 2000) (Ex. 1008A); Stanley Wolf & Richard Tauber, Silicon Processing For The VLSI Era, Volume 2 – Process Integration, (Lattice Press 2000) (Ex. 1008B); Stanley Wolf & Richard Tauber, Silicon Processing For The VLSI Era, Volume 3 – The Submicron MOSFET, (Lattice Press 2000) (Ex. 1008C); and Stanley Wolf & Richard Tauber, Silicon Processing For The VLSI Era, Volume 4 – Deep-Submicron Process Technology, (Lattice Press 2000) (Ex. 1008D). petitioner is served with a complaint alleging infringement of the patent.” Patent Owner argues that the Petition is untimely under 35 U.S.C. § 315(b) because Petitioner is in privity with time-barred entities. Prelim. Resp. 14– 35. However, 35 U.S.C. § 315(b) also provides that the one-year time bar “shall not apply to a request for joinder under subsection (c).” 37 C.F.R. § 42.122(b). Because the Petition is accompanied by a timely request for joinder (Paper 2) to the instituted 00001IPR proceeding, which we grant as further discussed below, Patent Owner’s argument that the Petition is timebarred under 35 U.S.C. § 315(b) is moot, irrespective of whether Petitioner is in privity with time-barred entities.” slip op. at 4
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Joinder §315(c) / SAS all-or-nothingJoinder, grantedGranted
“Based on the facts and circumstances discussed above, having reviewed the briefings of both parties, we determine Petitioner has established good cause for joining the 00001IPR. Specifically, we find that joining Petitioner to the 00001IPR is unlikely to require any delay or modification to the scheduling order already in place for the 00001IPR. We also determine that Patent Owner will not be prejudiced unduly by the joinder of this proceeding. Thus, we determine that granting the Motion for Joinder under these circumstances would help “secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive resolution” of these proceedings. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.1(b). For the above reasons, we grant Petitioner’s Motion for Joinder and join Petitioner as a party to the 00001IPR.” slip op. at 19
NonePatents in suitUS 10,734,481 - PTAB · Oct 11, 2024 · IPR2024-00774 · APJ Jon B Tornquist · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on all challenged claims and petition grounds, and granted Texas Instruments’ motion to join the Cirrus IPR.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“IPR. Compare id., with IPR2024-00019, Paper 46 at 1–4, 6–22 (Patent Owner’s response in the Cirrus IPR) (public version). We decline to resolve the material issue of fact surrounding this limitation on this preliminary record, because the trial in the Cirrus IPR is the better proceeding in which to do so. Specifically, as compared to the preliminary phase of this case, the instituted trial in the Cirrus IPR affords the parties a better opportunity to fully and fairly brief, argue, and develop evidence in support of their positions, and, in particular, to address Cirrus Logic’s alleged admission that the existence of a gradient alone is insufficient to disclose the “aid carrier movement” limitations of independent claims 1 and 21. We observe only that, on this record, the disputed issue of material fact is not sufficient to undermine the sufficiency of Petitioner’s evidence supporting institution of review.” slip op. at 16
- PTAB / AIA Trials › §315(b) time barNot time barredDecided for petitioner
“instituted if the petition requesting the proceeding is filed more than 1 year after the date on which the petitioner, real party in interest, or privy of the petitioner is served with a complaint alleging infringement of the patent.” Patent Owner argues that the Petition is untimely under 35 U.S.C. § 315(b) because Petitioner is in privity with time-barred entities. Prelim. Resp. 15– 35. The one-year time bar under § 315(b), however, “shall not apply to a request for joinder under subsection (c).” 35 U.S.C. § 315(b); see 37 C.F.R. § 42.122(b). And, because the Petition is accompanied by a timely request for joinder (Paper 1) to the instituted proceeding (IPR2024-00019), which we grant as further discussed below, Patent Owner’s argument that the Petition is time-barred under 35 U.S.C. § 315(b) is moot, irrespective of whether Petitioner is in privity with time-barred entities.” slip op. at 8
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Joinder §315(c) / SAS all-or-nothingJoinder, grantedGranted
“Based on the facts and circumstances discussed above, we determine Petitioner has established good cause for joining the Cirrus IPR. Specifically, we find that joining Petitioner to the Cirrus IPR is unlikely to require any delay or modification to the scheduling order already in place for that proceeding. We also determine that Patent Owner will not be prejudiced unduly by the joinder of this proceeding. Thus, we determine that granting the Motion for Joinder would help “secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive resolution” of these proceedings. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.1(b). Accordingly, we grant Petitioner’s Motion for Joinder and join Petitioner as a party to the Cirrus IPR.” slip op. at 19
NonePatents in suitUS 11,316,014
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.