- Shenzhen Tuozhu Technology Co., Ltd. v. Stratasys, Inc.All claims unpatentablePTAB · Oct 5, 2026 · IPR2025-00438 · APJ Lilan Ren · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–5, 7–13, and 16–20 are unpatentable; the Board found the challenged claims unpatentable on the grounds set out in its conclusions and summary table.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner’s definition of the level of ordinary skill in the art, and Petitioner’s definition appears consistent with the disclosures of the ’466 patent and the prior art of record. Accordingly, we adopt Petitioner’s definition. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001). C. Claim Construction” slip op. at 12
- BurdenUnpatentable
“Decision under 35 U.S.C. § 318(a) as to the patentability of the challenged claims of the ’466 patent. For the reasons discussed below, we determine Petitioner has established by a preponderance of the evidence that claims 1– 5, 7–13, and 16–20 of the ’466 patent are unpatentable.” slip op. at 2
Patent outcomesUS 10,569,466 unpatentableNonecites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,569,466 - Shenzhen Tuozhu Technology Co., Ltd. v. Stratasys, Inc.Some claims unpatentablePTAB · Sep 28, 2026 · IPR2025-00531 · APJ Hyun J Jung · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–11 and 13–15 are unpatentable over the stated obviousness grounds; claim 12 was not shown unpatentable.
RulingsFinal written decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“Petitioner filed a Petition (Paper 2, “Pet.”) requesting institution of an inter partes review of claims 1–15 of the ’698 patent. Discretionary denial of institution was determined to be not appropriate in this proceeding, and the proceeding was referred to the Board. Paper 10. Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 314, we instituted an inter partes review of claims 1–15 of the ’698 patent on all presented challenges. Paper 11 (“Inst. Dec.”), 15.” slip op. at 2
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)UnpatentableNot shown unpatentableMixed
“Decision is issued pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 318(a) and 37 C.F.R. § 42.73 (2025). For the reasons that follow, we determine that Shenzhen Tuozhu Technology Co., Ltd. (“Petitioner”) has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that claims 1–11 and 13–15, but not claim 12, of U.S. Patent No. 9,168,698 B2 (Ex. 1001, “the ’698 patent”) are unpatentable.” slip op. at 2
Patent outcomesUS 9,168,698 mixed§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 9,168,698 - Ajinomoto Co., Inc. v. Abtis Co., Ltd.No claims unpatentablePTAB · Aug 3, 2026 · IPR2025-00283 · APJ Lilan Ren · IPR · Final written decision
The Board cancelled claim 11 and granted substitute claims 14–16, finding Petitioner had not shown those claims unpatentable on any asserted ground.
RulingsFinal written decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Motions to amend / substitute claimsMotion to amend, grantedGranted
“must determine whether the motion to amend meets the statutory and regulatory requirements set forth in 35 U.S.C. § 316(d) and 37 C.F.R. § 42.121. Lectrosonics, Paper 15 at 4. In that regard, Patent Owner bears the burden of persuasion to show that: (1) the amendment proposes a reasonable number of substitute claims; (2) the amendment responds to a ground of unpatentability involved in the trial; (3) the amendment does not seek to enlarge the scope of the claims of the patent or introduce new subject matter;” slip op. at 9
- ExcludeMotion to exclude, deniedDenied
“In this case, Patent Owner’s expert “Dr. Zhou signed the second declaration, stood behind its contents, and was available for cross-examination.” Paper 35, 4. Petitioner does not dispute this statement. Paper 39, 1. Petitioner does not identify any specific undue prejudice caused by Exhibit 2008. For example, Petitioner argues that “the failure to impress upon a witness that a statement is under oath goes to the heart of its reliability as evidence” and that “as the Board has recognized, hearsay is inherently unreliable” without specifying what statement in Exhibit 2008 lacks reliability. Paper 39, 4. Because Petitioner does not provide specific evidence of undue prejudice, we find Petitioner has suffered no such undue prejudice in this case. See Liquidia, 2021 WL 4860773 at *25. We therefore deny Petitioner’s Motion to Exclude on the basis of lack of authenticity. With regard to the assertion that Exhibit 2008 is hearsay, Petitioner objects to the exhibit because the testimony is based “on other informal and unpublished documents that are hearsay under FRE 802.” Paper 29, 1. Petitioner does not specify what such “informal and unpublished documents” are. See id. Federal Rule of Evidence 703 expressly states, “[a]n expert may base an opinion on fact or data in the case that the expert has been made aware of or personally observed.” The facts or data “need not be deny Petitioner’s Motion to Exclude on the basis of hearsay.” slip op. at 50
- Disclosure Requirements (§112) › Written description (Ariad)Written description adequateNot shown unpatentable
“Petitioner’s argument is unpersuasive. Paragraph 59 of the ’503 application describes formula 8-1 but does not support Petitioner’s argument that other unknown formulas may be included in the recited modified heavy chains. Ex. 2003 ¶ 59. Petitioner’s hypothesis that the recited heavy chains may (or may not) encompass unknown formulas is also inapposite to the written description inquiry before us — that is, whether the inventor was in possession of the subject matter recited in claims 14–16 based on the disclosure including formulas 8-1, 8-2, and 8-3. See PowerOasis, 522 F.3d at 1306.” slip op. at 14
- Disclosure Requirements (§112) › Enablement (Wands, Amgen full scope)EnabledNot shown unpatentable
“These arguments in the Sur-Reply are unpersuasive to show a lack of enablement first and foremost because the arguments do not specifically provide evidence showing that any purported experimentation is undue. See Sur-Reply 2–8 (asserting, but without providing evidence under any specific Wands factors, that the examples and guidance in the specification do not extend to the broad scope of all antibodies); see Wands, 858 F.2d at 737. We again emphasize that the analysis of undue experimentation does not necessarily require every Wands factor to be explicitly addressed but the analysis must be based on “weighing many factual considerations” depending on the nature of the invention and underlying art. Cephalon, Inc. v. Watson Pharms., Inc., 707 F.3d 1330, 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2013). The assertion that the claim scope is broad alone does not suffice to show a lack of enablement based on the record before us. Moreover, as we note supra, Petitioner’s claim scope argument is based on the false premise that the scope of claims 14–16 is as broad as the claim term “antibody” without taking into account all other claim elements. For example, Petitioner does not disagree with Patent Owner’s statement that “[t]he ’675 Patent’s specification discloses the structural modification site, the chemistry used to modify that residue, and working examples demonstrating the modification” (Reply 2), but asserts only that “[t]he disclosure of SSFI that only binds to IgG1 Fc domains (SEQ ID NO:1) is . . . . inconsistent with the expansive scope of the claims.” Sur-Reply 5. Petitioner’s argument that the claims encompass proteins that lack a lysine reside at a 248 position improperly excludes from the claim language the “lysine residue at 248 position . . . [as] determined by the EU numbering system” that claims 14–16 require. As Dr. Zhou testifies, “each proposed lysine residue at position 248 (EU numbering) is covalently modified with a specific attachment with a terminal bio-orthogonal click-chemistry functional group. The specification describes targeted transfer of a chemical functional group to lysine 248” and when claims 14–16 are considered in their entirety, which includes all claim elements, “[a] POSA would understand the claim itself to limit the modified antibodies to those with lysine at position 248.” Ex. 2004 ¶ 48; Ex. 2008 ¶ 47. We also note that Patent Owner states “a POSA would understand that the phrase ‘one or more modified heavy chain’ encompasses antibodies within typical DAR distributions (i.e., fractional numbers) rather than requiring a distinct process for producing antibodies bearing modified heavy chains in exact integers.” Reply 2–3. Moreover, Patent Owner states that PepTalk Presentation demonstrates that “a POSA would understand antibody conjugation products to exist as mixtures rather than discrete whole number species” because PepTalk Presentation “presents DAR values as non-integer measurements, i.e. DARs of 1.8 and 1.9 reflecting such distributions.” Id. at 3 (citing Ex. 1007, 28). According to Patent Owner, “preparations having an average DAR of approximately 1.8 (commonly referred to in practice as ‘DAR2’) may reflect typical reaction distributions in which some antibodies contain two modified heavy chains while others contain fewer.” Id. at 3 (citing Ex. 2008 ¶ 46). Petitioner does not rebut these statements. See Sur-Reply 2–8. Based on the foregoing, the evidence before us does not show any” slip op. at 27
Patent outcomesUS 11,896,675 not shown unpatentable§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosurecites Phillips · KSR · Graham · NautilusPatents in suitUS 11,896,675 - Shenzhen Tuozhu Technology Co., Ltd. v. Stratasys, Inc.No claims unpatentablePTAB · Jun 9, 2026 · IPR2025-00321 · APJ Christopher M Kaiser · IPR · Final written decision
The Board held claims 1, 2, 5–7, 9, 16, and 17 not unpatentable because the asserted combinations did not establish the required purge-tower teachings or prior-art status.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner contends that one of ordinary skill in the art “would have had (1) at least a bachelor’s degree in Mechanical Engineering, Computer Engineering, Chemical Engineering, Materials Science, or a related field, and (2) at least two years of research or industry experience in 3D printing or materials used for 3D printing.” Pet. 5 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 14–16). Petitioner also argues that “[a]dditional experience could substitute for a formal degree or formal training (and vice versa).” Id. Patent Owner proposes a slightly different level of skill, arguing that a person of ordinary skill in the art “would have had a bachelor’s degree in Mechanical Engineering, Computer Engineering, Chemical Engineering, Materials Science, or a comparable field and at least two years of experience related to 3D printing, with additional experience potentially being a substitute for a formal degree or training (and vice versa).” Prelim. Resp. 24. Neither party explains why the outcome of this case would be affected by the adoption of any of the proffered definitions of a person of ordinary skill in the art. We adopt Petitioner’s assessment of the level of ordinary skill in the art, as it appears consistent with the ’324 patent and the asserted prior art. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001).” slip op. at 8
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownOther
“According to the ’713 patent, “[p]urge tower 24 itself may be . . . recycled or otherwise discarded as desired.” Ex. 1001, 8:27–28. This description provides some support for Patent Owner’s view, because a purge tower too intimately integrated with the part would be difficult or impossible to recycle or discard. This is further supported by the ’713 patent’s statement that “purge tower 24 may be printed at any suitable location on build substrate 44 (i.e., at any location in the x-y build plane not occupied by 3D part 20 or support structure 22).” Id. at 8:30–34. It also is supported by Dr. Hickner’s testimony that the ’713 patent “clearly shows . . . the 24 purge tower separated from the part” and that “the purge tower is a separate physical object.” Ex. 2016, 28:8–10, 64:1–9. On the other hand, there is evidence supporting Petitioner’s view that, as long as the purge tower is generally separate from the part and the support structure, it may still make contact with those portions of the print. As noted above, “purge tower 24 may be printed at any suitable location on build substrate 44 (i.e., at any location in the x-y build plane not occupied by 3D part 20 or support structure 22).” Ex. 1001, 8:30–34. This language does not exclude locations adjacent to or in contact with the part or the support structure. Thus, determine that a “purge tower,” as that term is used in the context of the ’713 patent, may not be an integrated portion of a printed part or support structure but need not be free of all contact with the printed part or support structure.” slip op. at 9
- BurdenNot shown unpatentable
“There is evidence of record to support both Petitioner’s view and Patent Owner’s view. On the record developed at trial, however, we cannot say that the preponderance of the evidence favors Petitioner, who bears the burden of proof. See 35 U.S.C. § 316(e). Accordingly, Petitioner has not shown by a preponderance of the evidence that KISSlicer teaches printing a layer of a purge tower each time the printer switches one extruder to the operating mode. Because proving the obviousness of claims 1 and 16 requires such a showing, Petitioner has not shown by a preponderance of the evidence that claims 1 and 16 would have been obvious over the combination of Priedeman and KISSlicer. 5. Analysis of Remaining Claims Claims 2, 6, 7, 9, and 17 all depend, directly or indirectly, from claim 1 or claim 16. Accordingly, they all include the limitations of either claim 1 or claim 16. Because, as discussed above, Petitioner has not shown that the combination of Priedeman and KISSlicer teaches or suggests all the limitations of claims 1 and 16, Petitioner also has not proven by a preponderance of the evidence that claims 2, 6, 7, 9, and 17 would have been obvious over that combination of references.” slip op. at 21
- Obviousness (§103) › Analogous artAnalogous artOther
“On the record developed at trial, we agree with Petitioner. According to several industry forum posts, people interested in three-dimensional printing located the website where KISSlicer was posted between February 2012 and April 2012. Ex. 1028, 1 (post discussing and directing others to KISSlicer on April 11, 2012); Ex. 1031, 1 (two posts discussing KISSlicer on March 16, 2012, and March 21, 2012); Ex. 1032, 1 (two posts discussing KISSlicer on February 11, 2012, and February 14, 2012). Thus, not only was it possible for people of ordinary skill in the art to locate KISSlicer; people of ordinary skill in the art actually did locate it. Accordingly, Petitioner has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that KISSlicer was publicly accessible.” slip op. at 19
Patent outcomesUS 9,421,713 not shown unpatentableClaim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 9,421,713 - Shenzhen Tuozhu Technology Co., Ltd. v. Stratasys, Inc.All claims unpatentablePTAB · Jun 9, 2026 · IPR2025-00311 · APJ Christopher M Kaiser · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1, 3–11, and 17–22 are unpatentable as obvious over grounds using Mazumder and Mori; grounds relying on Henke fail because Henke is not analogous art.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“had a bachelor’s degree in Mechanical Engineering, Computer Engineering, Electrical Engineering, Materials Science, or a comparable field and at least two years of experience related to 3D printers including remote control of rapid fabrication systems.” Pet. 6 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 40–42). Petitioner also argues that “[a]dditional years of experience could substitute for an advanced-level degree (and vice versa).” Id. Patent Owner proposes a slightly different level of skill, arguing that a person of ordinary skill in the art “would have had a bachelor’s degree in Mechanical Engineering, Computer Engineering, Electrical Engineering, Materials Science, or a comparable field and at least two years of experience related to 3D printing, with additional experience potentially being a substitute for a formal degree or training (and vice versa).” PO Resp. 11–12. Neither party explains why the outcome of this case would be affected by the adoption of either of the proffered definitions of a person of ordinary skill in the art. We adopt Petitioner’s assessment of the level of ordinary skill in the art, as it appears consistent with the ’324 patent and the asserted prior art. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001).” slip op. at 9
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner
“There is also evidence that supports Petitioner’s proposed construction, under which a user interface may display both the image and the projection if it displays them at different times. This evidence includes statements in the specification that describe displaying an image “instead” of “a rendering of a three-dimensional model” and that describe displaying a “video image and/or model projection” rather than merely a video image and a model projection. Ex. 1001, 22:43–53, 24:52–55, Figs. 5, 7. It also includes arguments in the prosecution history distinguishing Taminger on the basis of failure of disclose any display of both an image and a projection at all, rather than on the basis of failure to disclose simultaneous display of both visualizations. Ex. 1002, 160, 161. Based on our review of all the probative evidence, we find that the preponderance of the evidence supports Petitioner’s view, so we construe the challenged claims as not requiring simultaneous display of the image and the projection.” slip op. at 15
- Obviousness (§103) › Analogous artAnalogous artDecided for petitioner
“With the problem solved by the ’324 patent defined as monitoring automated three-dimensional fabrication processes, we find that Mori is at least reasonably pertinent to the problem. Mori discloses “[a] machining status monitoring apparatus.” Ex. 1005, code (57), ¶ 43. That apparatus uses “actual CCD cameras . . . to image the workpiece.” Id. ¶ 49. It also has a “virtual image generating section” with “virtual CCD cameras” having “view points” that “match the view points of the actual CCD cameras.” Id. ¶¶ 59, 61, 62. This disclosure relates quite closely to monitoring an automated three-dimensional fabrication process and thus is at least reasonably pertinent to solving that problem. d) Conclusion For the reasons discussed above, Mori is both in the same field as the ’324 patent and at least reasonably pertinent to the problem solved by the ’324 patent. Accordingly, it is analogous art to the ’324 patent.” slip op. at 21
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundDecided for petitioner
“Regarding combining the teachings of Mazumder with those of Mori, the evidence of record shows that the print head of Mazumder’s three-dimensional printer could obscure portions of the actual camera’s view of the object being printed and that displaying Mori’s virtual image of the object in addition to Mazumder’s actual image of the object “would have allowed the user to of the remote computer to monitor the progress of the object even when the actual view of the object is partially or totally obscured.” Ex. 1003 ¶ 86. c) Conclusion Regarding Claim 1 For the reasons discussed above, the preponderance of the evidence shows that claim 1 would have been obvious over the combination of Mazumder and Mori.” slip op. at 26
Patent outcomesUS 8,562,324 unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 8,562,324 - BMW Of North America, LLC v. Foras Technologies Ltd.No claims unpatentablePTAB · Mar 5, 2026 · IPR2024-01347 · APJ Russell E Cass · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–27 were not shown unpatentable because the asserted combinations did not teach switching the boot-processor role to a spare processor.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“B. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art The level of skill in the art is “a prism or lens” through which we view the prior art and the claimed invention. Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001). “This reference point prevents . . . factfinders from using their own insight or, worse yet, hindsight, to gauge obviousness.” Id.” slip op. at 17
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownOther
“processor” to the spare processor, we determine that the claim is describing this transfer of identification of “boot processor,” which is required when transferring a boot processor’s functions to a spare because of the “problems [that] arise in attempting to idle (or eject) the boot processor.” Id. at 6:25– 27. This is confirmed by the language of limitation [1d], stating that the switching of the role of boot processor involves “changing a system identifier of the spare processor to that of the boot processor.” Thus, the firmware and operating system exchange this information identifying the boot processor, which is described in the specification as a device tree. See, e.g., id. at 13:21–35. The ’302 patent makes clear that accurate identification of which processor is the boot processor remains critical during runtime. See, e.g., id. at 6:25–27. Thus, Patent Owner is correct in requiring the system to have a way to identify the boot processor and to transfer this identification during runtime. However, as made clear in the embodiments described in the ’302 patent discussed above, this identification is for runtime purposes to accommodate runtime problems, not for booting purposes. Although Patent Owner may be correct that a function of the boot processor is to boot the system (PO Sur-reply 5), the problem identified in the ’302 patent is a problem relating to the runtime reassignment of the boot processor identity, to address a runtime need to identify the boot processor. See, e.g., Ex. 1001, 11:6–9. Accordingly, based on our analysis of the claims and specification, we determine that “switching the role of boot processor to a spare processor without shutting down the system’s operating system” means causing the system to identify the spare processor as the boot processor (e.g., in a device tree), which then causes the spare processor to appear as the boot processor to the system during runtime. Ex. 1001, 6:25–41, 11:4–18 (describing why boot processors are treated differently even after the boot process has completed); compare id. at 9:65–11:3 (process for recovering from loss of lockstep of a non-boot processor without using a spare), with id. at 11:4–43 (process for recovering from loss of lockstep of a boot processor using a spare because boot processors, during runtime, need special treatment); see also 14:66–15:21 (emphasizing that spares are only needed for recovering boot processors). We construe switching a “role of boot processor” to mean transferring an identification in the system of which processor is the boot processor. This construction comports with the embodiments described in the specification. We do not adopt an additional requirement that this procedure also requires designating which processor will boot the system in the next reboot, which is not disclosed in the specification.” slip op. at 24
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“may swap processors that are failing, and perform the necessary bookkeeping to keep the operating system informed as to how to address the processors available, nothing in the Petition persuasively explains whether this generic processor swapping switches the boot processor role. As we explained in our claim construction section, the term “boot processor” is not merely a label of convenience to describe the processor that happened to have earlier booted the system. The role of boot processor is specifically switched to the spare; it is a piece of information tracked by the system. As we explain below, Petitioner does not adequately address the transfer of this information to make the system aware of which processor has the boot processor role. Petitioner asserts that “the BSP flag” of the IA-32 system is used to “determine whether a processor is the boot processor.” Pet. 17–18. Petitioner here is relying on a register used in IA-32 processors to identify whether or not they are the boot processor. This register is used during booting so that only the boot processor boots the system. See, e.g., Ex. 1008, 238–40, 710. This register does not appear to serve any further role, and Petitioner offers no persuasive evidence or argument that the processor register flag is exposed or copied to the operating system or APIC table. Petitioner’s proposed combination does not involve updating this register, nor does Petitioner explain how, even if the register were updated, it would meet the “switching” a “role of boot processor” in limitation [1d].” slip op. at 32
- ExcludeOther
“The USPTO has established Rules for objecting to and challenging evidence. 37 C.F.R. § 42.64. This process sets various timeframes and permits briefing and curative actions, all of which are designed to crystallize 5 We follow the parties’ convention of citing to the later-added “Page X of Y” pagination rather than the native pagination. the issues and ensure a full and fair opportunity for the parties to be heard. See id. In this instance, Patent Owner’s evidentiary arguments regarding Exhibits 1008 and 1028 are untimely. Accordingly, we will not exclude Exhibits 1008 or 1028 on the basis of their authenticity, admissibility, or for any reason that should have been raised under the proper procedures. See, e.g., PO Resp. 7–8; PO Sur-reply 7–8; see also Pet. Reply 11 (asserting that “Patent Owner has not filed any objection to or a motion to exclude these references”). We consider Petitioner’s citations to these documents in our prior art analysis below. Notwithstanding, as is clear from our patentability analysis below, Exhibits 1008 and 1028 do not serve to demonstrate the unpatentability of any claim.” slip op. at 26
Patent outcomesUS 7,624,302 not shown unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 7,624,302 - BMW Of North America, LLC v. Foras Technologies Ltd.No claims unpatentablePTAB · Mar 5, 2026 · IPR2024-01346 · APJ Russell E Cass · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–30 were not shown unpatentable because the prior-art combinations did not establish transfer of the role of boot processor during system runtime.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for patent owner
“Patent Owner asserts that: A person of ordinary skill in the art in the field of the ’781 patent would have been a person with at least a bachelor’s degree in Electrical Engineering, Computer Engineering, or equivalent, and at least two years of prior work experience with computer architecture, including experience relating to fault tolerant computer architecture, as of the earliest priority date of the ’781 patent—October 25, 2004. If a person did not have a bachelor’s degree, additional relevant and practical experience with fault tolerant computer systems could provide an acceptable substitute. Likewise, further education beyond a bachelor’s degree could compensate for a deficiency in practical experience. See EX2004, Declaration of Nigel A. Jones (“Jones”), ¶ 26. PO Resp. 3. Patent Owner further notes that its position is “similar, but not identical to, Petitioner’s [position]” but that “the analysis [of the claims] is identical for both proposed determinations.” Id. We agree that our analysis would not differ based on choosing one proposed level of skill over the other, but as the losing party, we select Petitioner’s proposed level of skill.” slip op. at 20
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for patent owner
“Accordingly, based on our analysis of the claims and specification, we determine that “logic . . . for transferring, during system runtime, the role of boot processor” means logic that causes the system to identify the spare processor as the boot processor (e.g., in a device tree) which then causes the spare processor to appear as the boot processor to the system during runtime. Ex. 1001, 5:39–55, 10:43–67 (describing why boot processors are treated differently even after the boot process has completed); compare id. at 9:37– 10:42 (process for recovering from loss of lockstep of a non-boot processor without using a spare), with id. at 10:43–11:42 (process for recovering from loss of lockstep of a boot processor using a spare because boot processors, during runtime, need special treatment); see also 15:21–42 (emphasizing that spares are only needed for recovering boot processors). We construe transferring a “role of boot processor” to mean transferring an identification in the system of which processor is the boot processor. This construction comports with the embodiments described in the specification. We do not adopt an additional requirement that this procedure also requires designating which processor will boot the system in the next reboot, which is not disclosed in the specification.” slip op. at 26
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert discountedDecided for patent owner
“Based on the clear support in the specification for the above interpretation, we see no need to resort to extrinsic evidence. Seabed Geosolutions (US) Inc. v. Magseis FF LLC, 8 F.4th 1285, 1287 (Fed. Cir. 2021) (“If the meaning of a claim term is clear from the intrinsic evidence, there is no reason to resort to extrinsic evidence.”) (citing Profectus Tech. LLC v. Huawei Techs. Co., 823 F.3d 1375, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“Extrinsic evidence may not be used ‘to contradict claim meaning that is unambiguous in light of the intrinsic evidence.’” (quoting Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1324)). In general, the cited portions of testimony from the declarants from both parties in the briefs do little more than point to the portions of the ’781 patent described above or argue about what a boot processor does during booting. See, e.g., Pet. Reply 2–8. The specification makes clear that it is focused on the role of boot processor during runtime because of problems encountered during runtime; it is not focused on the boot processor during booting. Ex. 1001, 5:39–55, 10:43–67. Thus, the testimony about what a boot processor does during booting, or that the primary function of the boot processor is to boot, is not particularly pertinent, and does not undo the unambiguous discussion in the ’781 patent.” slip op. at 27
- BurdenDecided for patent owner
“whether they are the boot processor or not (Ex. 1008, 238, 710), Petitioner does not explain how such information is exposed to the BIOS or operating system, nor how it is changed during runtime, after its purpose has been fulfilled. In sum, even if Petitioner’s proposed combination swaps the spare processor for the processor that booted the system, Petitioner’s proposed combination does not appear to transfer the role of boot processor to the spare processor. At best, Petitioner’s proposed combination transfers the tasks of one processor to another. See Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 15 (Fox describing its disclosure as “updat[ing] the ‘active’ processor list” and “[re-]allocat[ing] the threads that were running on the failing processor”), 46 (transferring “processes (instructions, threads, etc.) initially allocated to the failing processor” to the spare processor)). Of the art of record, we are only aware of the ’781 patent transferring a designation of which processor is the boot processor during the swap to a spare processor. See, e.g., Ex. 1001, 10:43– 55, 11:10–12, 16:19–21, 17:51–55; claims 1, 9, 16, 25. In conclusion, we find that Petitioner has not shown, by a preponderance of the evidence, how the prior art teaches “transferring” a “role of boot processor” as required by limitation 1[c].” slip op. at 40
Patent outcomesUS 7,627,781 not shown unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 7,627,781 - Cisco Systems, Inc. v. Lionra Technologies LimitedAll claims unpatentablePTAB · Mar 4, 2026 · IPR2024-01281 · APJ Steven M Amundson · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–3, 5–10, 12–15, and 17–21 are unpatentable as obvious over Cornett, Paatela, and Nelson; claim 8 is also unpatentable with Russell.
RulingsFinal written decision- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundUnpatentable
“been motivated to combine the teachings of Cornett, Paatela, Nelson, and Russell in the way Petitioner proposes and would have had a reasonable expectation of success. See supra §§ III.E.2(a)–(b). Hence, Petitioner has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that claim 8 is unpatentable under § 103(a) because the claim would have been obvious over Cornett, Paatela, Nelson, and Russell.” slip op. at 122
- Skill levelOther
“B. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art Factors pertinent to determining the level of ordinary skill in the art” slip op. at 13
Patent outcomesUS 7,738,471 unpatentable§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 7,738,471 - PTAB · Dec 8, 2025 · IPR2025-01064 · APJ George R Hoskins · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR of claims 1–18 on all four §103 grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that Volkswagen would prevail on at least claim 1 over Weese.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“A. Legal Standards — Petitioner’s Burden “In an [inter partes review], the petitioner has the burden from the onset to show with particularity why the patent it challenges is unpatentable.” Harmonic Inc. v. Avid Tech., Inc., 815 F.3d 1356, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (citing 35 U.S.C. § 312(a)(3) (requiring inter partes review petitions to identify “with particularity . . . the evidence that supports the 1 Amendments to 35 U.S.C. § 103 enacted by the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011) (“AIA”) took effect in March 2013. The ’353 patent issued from an application filed in September 2004. See Ex. 1001, code (22). Thus, we apply the pre-AIA version of § 103. grounds for the challenge to each claim”)). This burden of persuasion never shifts to the patent owner. See Dynamic Drinkware, LLC v. Nat’l Graphics, Inc., 800 F.3d 1375, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2015). B. Legal Standards — Obviousness A patent claim is unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) if the differences between the claimed subject matter and the prior art are such that the subject matter, as a whole, would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains. KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 406 (2007). The question of obviousness is resolved on the basis of underlying factual determinations including: (1) the scope and content of the prior art; (2) any differences between the claimed subject matter and the prior art; (3) the level of ordinary skill in the art; and (4) objective evidence of nonobviousness, if made available in the record, which has not happened here. See Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17–18 (1966).” slip op. at 6
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“C. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art Petitioner contends a person having ordinary skill in the art pertaining to the ’353 patent “would have possessed at least a four-year degree in physics, biophysics, medical physics, or a related field, and two years of experience in developing and/or applying computed tomography methods,” wherein “[a]dditional education and professional experience are interchangeable.” Pet. 1; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 54–55. “Patent Owner utilizes Petitioner’s proposed level of skill in the art.” Prelim. Resp. 2. For purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s formulation of ordinary skill in the art, as it appears to be consistent with the ’353 patent and the asserted prior art. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001).” slip op. at 7
- Expert testimonyOther
“unpatentable as having been obvious over Weese, including supporting testimony from Dr. Peterson. See Pet. 17–22, 26–83; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 138–149, 159–257. Patent Owner opposes. See Prelim. Resp. 1–2, 6–7. We conclude Petitioner has demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on its assertions, as follows.” slip op. at 13
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Instituted
“(iii) Analysis Based on the present record, we determine Petitioner’s contentions regarding the third step of claim 1 are supported sufficiently by the cited disclosures in Weese and Dr. Peterson’s testimony to justify institution of review. In particular, Weese describes obtaining a plurality of second images of the patient’s internal organs (i.e., PET image I0 in Fig. 1, and PET image I10 in Fig. 3) using a second imaging technique (i.e., PET). See Ex. 1005, Figs. 1, 3, and 6, ¶¶ 47–49, 58–59, 72. In particular, PET image I0 in Figure 1 may be a reconstructed “volume image[]” composed of a plurality of “quasi two-dimensional” “slice images” that, when combined, represent a three-dimensional region inside the patient. Id. ¶¶ 48, 58, 61; see also Pet. 56–57. PET image I10 in Figure 3 may be a similarly reconstructed volume image composed of a plurality of slice images.4 See 4 We do not rely here on Petitioner’s alternative theory that Weese discloses a “plurality” of second images because PET images I0 and I10 are “superposed” images encompassing “several states of motion.” Pet. 58. Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 61, 83–84. Patent Owner’s sole opposition to Petitioner’s assertions in this regard are limited to whether Weese “obtain[s]” PET images I0 and I10 as recited in claim 1, which we address below. Also, it appears that PET images I0 and I10 are obtained while also obtaining second movement measurements of the patient’s internal organs using a second sensor system (i.e., motion acquisition unit 12 and motion sensor 15 / S1) which is independent from the PET imaging technique. See Ex. 1005, Figs. 1 and 6, ¶ 65 (“[T]he respiratory motion is determined during the acquisition of the PET projections P1 by means of a respiratory motion sensor provided on the patient and therefrom the frequency function f(r) or, more generally, a state of motion function F1 is derived for the construction of the motion model M2.”). Furthermore, Weese describes how frequency function f(r) is utilized to facilitate image comparison between CT and PET images at common motion states. See id. ¶¶ 31, 49–51, 70–71, 75–77, 79–80, 83; see also Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 214–216 (Dr. Peterson’s supporting testimony). Patent Owner’s sole opposition to Petitioner’s assertions in this regard are limited to whether Weese “obtain[s]” PET images I0 and I10 as recited in claim 1, which we address below. Patent Owner’s two opposing arguments are unavailing, based on the present preliminary record. First, Petitioner relies on reconstructed PET images I0 and I10 as satisfying the “plurality of second images” recited in claim 1, not PET projections P1 from which PET images I0 and I10 are derived. See, e.g., Pet. 56, 58 (“I0 and I10 disclose and render obvious a ‘plurality of second images’ in two ways” — “I0 and I10 may be ‘volume images’ formed using ‘known’ techniques,” and “I0 and I10 are ‘superposed’ PET images encompassing ‘several states of motion,’ which” slip op. at 18
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 8,265,353 - PTAB · Dec 3, 2025 · IPR2025-01026 · APJ Steven M Amundson · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted review of claims 1–20 on all petition challenges because the Baliarda-543 challenges met the reasonable-likelihood threshold.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“to institute an inter partes review. We may institute an inter partes review only if “the information presented in the petition filed under section 311 and any response filed under section 313 shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) (2024). The “reasonable likelihood” standard is “a higher standard than mere notice pleading” but “lower than the ‘preponderance’ standard to prevail in a final written decision.” Hulu, LLC v. Sound View Innovations, LLC, IPR2018- 01039, Paper 29 at 13 (PTAB Dec. 20, 2019) (precedential). Based on the current record and for the reasons explained below, Petitioner has shown that there is a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail with respect to at least one of the challenged claims. Thus, we 1 Petitioner filed a confidential version of the Petition as Paper 3 and a public version of the Petition as Paper 4. We cite to the public version of the Petition. institute an inter partes review of claims 1–20 in the ’677 patent on all challenges included in the Petition.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedOther
“Petitioner asserts that a person of ordinary skill as of the ’677 patent’s effective filing date would have had “at least a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer science, or a similar degree and at least four years of experience in applied electromagnetics with an emphasis on antennas.” Pet. 11 (quoting Ex. 1018 ¶ 32). Petitioner also asserts that “[a]lternatively, the person of ordinary skill in the art would have a master’s degree in electrical engineering (or similar discipline) and at least two years of similar experience.” Id. (quoting Ex. 1018 ¶ 32). Dr. van der Weide’s testimony supports Petitioner’s assertions. See Ex. 1007 ¶ 40. For purposes of the Preliminary Response only, Patent Owner employs Petitioner’s description of an ordinarily skilled artisan. Prelim. Resp. 17. Based on the current record and for purposes of this decision, we accept Petitioner’s description of an ordinarily skilled artisan because it comports with the technology and claims of the ’677 patent as well as the asserted references. See, e.g., Ex. 1001, 1:26–6:47, 42:47–44:61, code (57); infra §§ III.E.1–III.E.2.” slip op. at 23
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“4. DISCUSSION “[O]nly those terms need be construed that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.” Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999); see Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017). Based on the current record, we determine that no claim term, phrase, or limitation requires an explicit construction to decide whether Petitioner satisfies the “reasonable likelihood” standard for instituting trial.” slip op. at 26
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“Although “Dou does not require its ‘diversity antenna architecture’ to provide spatial diversity,” Dou nevertheless requires a wireless device with some type of diversity antenna architecture. See, e.g., Ex. 1013 ¶¶ 14, 17–18, 22–24, 30, 32–34, codes (54), (57), claims 1 and 16. As an example, Dou’s independent claim 1 covering a “wireless device” requires a “first diversity antenna” and a “second diversity antenna.” Id. at claim 1. As another example, Dou’s independent claim 16 covering a “wireless device” also requires a “first diversity antenna” and a “second diversity antenna.” Id. at claim 16. As yet another example, Dou’s Abstract describes a “wireless device” including a “first diversity antenna” and a “second diversity antenna.” Id. at code (57). Petitioner does not explain how the proposed combination provides anything other than spatial diversity. See Pet. 33–35; Prelim. Reply 1–3; Ex. 1007 ¶¶ 118–124. Based on the current record, we agree with Patent Owner that with Ciais-Quadband’s antenna used for Dou’s two antennas 206 and 208, the two identical quadband antennas would have:” slip op. at 46
Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosurecites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,031,677
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.