- PTAB · Jun 14, 2024 · IPR2024-00461 · APJ Ken B Barrett · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 28 and 29 on all petitioned grounds and granted Nokia’s motion to join IPR2023-00978 as an understudy petitioner.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsDenied
“inter partes review, “the Director may take into account whether, and reject the petition or request because, the same or substantially the same prior art or arguments previously were presented to the Office.” 35 U.S.C. § 325(d). Patent Owner argues that we should discretionarily deny the Petition because “[t]he Board and the Federal Circuit have already conducted inter partes review of Claims 28 and 29 of the ’931 Patent based on the Vornefeld reference and confirmed the patentability of the claims,” and, “while Nokia now cites additional prior art references, those new references add nothing of significance to Vornefeld and the other prior art references previously considered by the Board and the Federal Circuit.” Prelim. Resp. 45.” slip op. at 11
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › General Plastic (serial petitions)Denied
“could find that Nokia is or was an indemnitor to Sprint, Patent Owner is left with the allegation that Nokia and Sprint have a pertinent relationship with each other because current Petitioner Nokia was a supplier of prior petitioner Sprint at the time of the Sprint IPR and Sprint Litigation. See Prelim. Resp. 54–55. Patent Owner does not direct our attention to any evidence indicating the substance of that relationship. See id. Without more, we cannot discern whether there was a standard customer-manufacturer relationship or whether there was, as Patent Owner alleges, a “significant relationship.” Prelim. Resp. 55. We determine, on the record in this case, that the mere existence of a supplier-customer relationship does not tend to show that Nokia is a real party in interest or privy of Sprint as argued by Patent Owner. See, e.g., WesternGeco LLC, 889 F.3d at 1321 (“a contractual and fairly standard customer-manufacturer relationship regarding the accused product” does not necessarily establish privity); Wi-Fi One, LLC, 887 F.3d at 1340–41 (affirming the Board’s determination that there was an inadequate showing of privity or of a real party in interest relationship even though the “evidence showed that Broadcom’s interests as to the issue of infringement were generally aligned with those of its customers”).” slip op. at 17
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“information presented in the petition . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) (2018). For the reasons that follow, we institute an inter partes review as to both of the challenged claims of the ’931 patent on all the grounds of unpatentability set forth in the Petition. We also grant Petitioner’s Motion for Joinder.” slip op. at 2
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Joinder §315(c) / SAS all-or-nothingJoinder, grantedGranted
“entitled to the requested relief. 37 C.F.R. § 42.20(c). In deciding whether to join a case, we consider: (1) the reasons why joinder is appropriate, (2) whether the petition raises any new grounds of unpatentability, (3) any impact that joinder would have on the cost and trial schedule for the existing review, and (4) whether joinder will add to the complexity of briefing or discovery. Kyocera Corp. v. Softview LLC, IPR2013-00004, Paper 15, 4 (PTAB Apr. 24, 2013); Trial Practice Guide9 at 76. Petitioner contends that “joinder with the Verizon IPR is appropriate because Nokia’s Petition includes identical arguments and the same grounds raised in the existing Verizon IPR proceeding (i.e., challenges the same claims of the same patent, relies on the same expert declaration, and is based on the same grounds and combinations of prior art submitted in the Verizon Petition).” Mot. 5. According to Petitioner, “good cause exists for joining Nokia to the Verizon IPR proceeding so that the Board can efficiently ‘secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive resolution’ of Nokia’s and Verizon’s petitions in a single proceeding.” Id. (quoting 37 C.F.R. § 42.1(b)). Petitioner also represents that it will act as an “understudy,” and that it “agrees to adhere to all applicable deadlines set forth in the Verizon IPR Scheduling Order,” and contends that, accordingly, the trial schedule should not be adversely impacted by the joinder. Id. at 2, 6. Petitioner further asserts that, because no new issues are being introduced by the requested joinder, “Patent Owner will . . . not be required to provide any additional analysis or arguments beyond what it will already provide in” slip op. at 24
Discretionary denialPatents in suitUS 7,230,931 - PTAB · Jun 14, 2024 · IPR2024-00392 · APJ Ken B Barrett · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 28 and 29 of the ’931 patent on all petition grounds and granted Ericsson’s motion to join IPR2023-00978 as an understudy petitioner.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › §315(e) estoppelEstoppel does not applyDecided for petitioner
“[The inquiry into whether a party is in privity with another] is grounded in due process concerns for both the petitioner . . . and the opposing party . . . . In other words, the inquiry has a dual-focus on preventing the petitioner from now lodging a successive attack for which it already had a first bite, thus, protecting the defending party from an unwarranted second attack, while also ensuring that the petitioner is not unfairly limited in its ability to lodge its challenges if it has not had a full and fair opportunity to do so already. Uniloc 2017 LLC v. Facebook Inc., 989 F.3d 1018, 1028 (Fed. Cir. 2021) (citations omitted). Accordingly, “the reach of privity cannot extend beyond the limits of due process.” WesternGeco LLC v. ION Geophysical Corp., 889 F.3d 1308, 1319 (Fed. Cir. 2018). “[A] person who was not a party to a suit generally has not had a ‘full and fair opportunity to litigate’ the claims and issues settled in that suit.” Id. (quoting Taylor, 553 U.S. at 894). “Because nonparty preclusion risks binding those who have not had a full and fair opportunity to litigate, the Supreme Court has cautioned that there is a general rule against nonparty preclusion, subject to certain exceptions.” Id. (citing, inter alia, Taylor, 553 U.S. at 892–93). The Supreme Court in Taylor identified considerations where nonparty preclusion would be justified, including:” slip op. at 12
- PTAB / AIA Trials › §315(b) time barNot time barredDecided for petitioner
“Section 315(b) provides: An inter partes review may not be instituted if the petition requesting the proceeding is filed more than 1 year after the date on which the petitioner, real party in interest, or privy of the petitioner is served with a complaint alleging infringement of the patent. The time limitation set forth in the preceding sentence shall not apply to a request for joinder under subsection (c). The referenced subsection (c) of section 315 is the provision under which Petitioner has filed its Motion for Joinder. Mot. 1. Patent Owner reiterates its argument that prior petitioner Sprint is Petitioner’s privy, and argues that, therefore, Petitioner is time-barred under § 315(b) because Sprint was served with a complaint more than a year prior to the filing of the Petition in the present case. See Prelim. Resp. 26–27. Patent Owner relies again, as the basis for the privity argument, on the determinations made in the Regents IPR and argues that “Ericsson must similarly be time-barred.” Id. We do not agree with Patent Owner. The statute provides that “[t]he time limitation set forth in [§ 315(b)] shall not apply to a request for joinder under [§ 315(c)].” 35 U.S.C. § 315(b). Because Petitioner’s Motion is a request for joinder under § 315(c), the statutory one-year time-bar does not apply.” slip op. at 18
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsInstitution denied 325dDenied
“inter partes review, “the Director may take into account whether, and reject the petition or request because, the same or substantially the same prior art or arguments previously were presented to the Office.” 35 U.S.C. § 325(d). Patent Owner argues that we should discretionarily deny the Petition because “[t]he Board and the Federal Circuit have already conducted inter partes review of Claims 28 and 29 of the ’931 Patent based on the Vornefeld reference and confirmed the patentability of the claims,” and, “while Ericsson now cites additional prior art references, those new references add nothing of significance to Vornefeld and the other prior art references previously considered by the Board and the Federal Circuit.” Prelim. Resp. 49. 12 Patent Owner, in the Introduction section of the Preliminary Response, argues that “strong grounds exist here for the Board to exercise its discretion to deny the petition under 35 U.S.C. § 325(d) and Fintiv.” Prelim. Resp. 2–3. Although the Preliminary Response contains sections arguing for discretionary denial under § 325(d) and General Plastic, it does not contain a section discussing Fintiv. See, e.g., id. at ii–iii (Table of Contents, heading G). We understand the Fintiv reference to be an inadvertent holdover from Patent Owner’s very similar preliminary response filed in the Verizon IPR. We, in the Verizon IPR, instituted an inter partes review of the ’931 patent on both challenged claims and all asserted grounds of unpatentability. IPR2023-00978, Paper 20 at 54–55. In the Verizon IPR, we addressed Patent Owner’s arguments that we should exercise discretion to deny institution under § 325(d), and we declined to deny institution on that basis. Id. at 22–27. Petitioner here represents that “[t]he instant Petition is substantially identical to the Verizon Petition; it involves the same claims of the same patent, the same grounds of unpatentability, and the same supporting evidence.” Mot. 1. Patent Owner’s § 325(d) arguments in the case currently before us appear to be substantively identical to those made in the preliminary response in the Verizon IPR, with the substitution of “Ericsson” for “Verizon.” Compare Prelim. Resp. 49–55 with IPR2023- 00978, Paper 15 at 46–53. For the same reasons set forth in our Institution Decision in the Verizon IPR, we decline to discretionarily deny institution under § 325(d) in the current case brought by Petitioner Ericsson. IPR2023- 00978, Paper 20 at 22–27.” slip op. at 20
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › General Plastic (serial petitions)Institution denied general plasticDenied
“On the record before us, no real party in interest, privity, or otherwise legally significant relationship has been shown to exist between current Petitioner Ericsson and prior petitioner Sprint that might warrant denying a follow-on petition by a different petitioner. As such, General Plastic factor 1 weighs against denying institution. “[W]here, as here, the first and second petitioners are neither the same party, nor possess a significant relationship under Valve, General Plastic factor one necessarily outweighs the other General Plastic factors.” Videndum Prod. Sols., Inc. v. Rotolight Ltd., IPR2023-01218, Paper 12 at 5– 6 (Vidal Apr. 19, 2024); see id. (“Under USPTO policy and precedent, General Plastic has not been extended to any cases in which the first and second petitioners do not have a significant relationship.”); see also Alcatel- Lucent USA Inc. v. Oyster Optics, LLC, IPR2017-02146, Paper 12 at 12 (PTAB Feb. 28, 2018) (non-precedential) (“Once resolution of factor 1 indicates that Petitioner had not previously filed a petition against the same patent, factors 2–5 bear little relevance unless there is evidence in the record of extenuating circumstances such as a showing that there was a previous petitioner who challenged the same patent and that the previous petitioner and the current petitioner planned the staggered petitions.”).” slip op. at 24
Discretionary denialPatents in suitUS 7,230,931 - Snap Inc. v. Playvuu, Inc.Adverse judgmentPTAB · Feb 29, 2024 · IPR2023-00848 · APJ Barbara A Parvis · IPR · Adverse judgment
The Board granted Patent Owner’s request for adverse judgment and entered judgment against Patent Owner on claims 1–11 after abandonment.
RulingsAdverse judgment- Adverse judgmentAdverse judgmentGranted
“Judgment (Paper 14, “Request for Adverse Judgment”), which states “[p]ursuant to 37 C.F.R. § 42.73(b)(4) Patent Owner makes this request for the Board to enter adverse judgment against Patent Owner with respect to claims 1-11” of the ’911 patent. Id. at 1. Patent Owner further states “Patent Owner makes this request because Patent Owner is not filing a Patent Owner Response and is abandoning this proceeding.” Id. Upon review of Patent Owner’s unopposed Request for Adverse Judgment, we grant the request for adverse judgment pursuant to 37 C.F.R. § 42.73(b)(4).” slip op. at 2
NonePatents in suitUS 10,931,911 - Vizio, Inc. v. Maxell, Ltd.InstitutedPTAB · Jul 6, 2023 · IPR2023-00316 · APJ Terrence W Mcmillin · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted review of claims 2–9 on all petitioned grounds and granted Vizio’s motion to join IPR2022-01348.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“the information presented in the petition filed under section 311 and any response filed under section 313 shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). Petitioner challenges claims 2–9 of the ’394 patent based on the same grounds advanced in IPR2022- 01348 as follows: slip op. at 2
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Joinder §315(c) / SAS all-or-nothingJoinder, grantedGranted
“Section 315(c) “authorizes joinder of a person as a party, not ‘joinder’ of two proceedings” and “does not authorize the joined party to bring new issues from its new proceeding into the existing proceeding.” Facebook, Inc. v. Windy City Innovations, LLC, 973 F.3d 1321, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2020). The Board “routinely grants motions for joinder where the party seeking joinder introduces identical arguments and the same grounds raised in the existing proceeding.” Samsung Elecs. Co., Ltd. v. Raytheon Co., IPR2016- 00962, Paper No. 12 at 9 (PTAB Aug. 24, 2016) (internal quotations and citations omitted). Petitioner makes an unopposed showing that joinder is appropriate.” slip op. at 4
NonePatents in suitUS 8,170,394 - PTAB · Mar 16, 2023 · IPR2022-01391 · APJ Mitchell G Weatherly · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 30–33, 35, 37–40, 43, 45–48, 51, 53, 54, 61, 62, 64, 65, 67, 69, 70, 72, and 75 on all petitioned grounds, and joined Samsung to IPR2022-01232.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“Institution of an inter partes review is authorized by statute when “the information presented in the petition filed under section 311 and any response filed under section 313 shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). For the reasons expressed below, we (1) institute inter partes review on the same grounds instituted in the Meta IPR, and (2) grant the Motion, subject to the conditions set forth below. B. Related Proceedings” slip op. at 3
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Denied
“We decline to exercise our discretion under Fintiv to deny institution of inter partes review. On June 21, 2022, the Director of the USPTO issued an Interim Procedure for Discretionary Denials in AIA Postgrant Proceedings with Parallel District Court Litigation, available at: https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/interim_proc_ discretionary_denials_aia_parallel_district_court_litigation_memo_ 20220621_.pdf (the “Interim Procedure”). The Interim Procedure provides that “the PTAB will not discretionarily deny institution of an IPR or PGR in view of parallel district court litigation where a petitioner stipulates not to pursue in a parallel district court proceeding the same grounds as in the petition or any grounds that could have reasonably been raised in the petition.” Interim Procedure 7. Here, Petitioner stipulates that it “will not pursue the grounds raised, or that reasonably could have been raised, in this IPR in the parallel litigation if IPR is instituted.” Pet. 9; Reply 1. We therefore adhere to the Interim Procedure in this Decision and decline to exercise our discretion to deny institution of inter partes review upon this basis.” slip op. at 7
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Joinder §315(c) / SAS all-or-nothingJoinder, grantedGranted
“Based on our review of the before us, we find that Petitioner demonstrates that allowing it to join the Meta IPR as a party will not materially lengthen the schedule, increase cost, or add to the complexity of briefing or discovery in the Meta IPR. Accordingly, we grant Petitioner’s Motion and add it as a party to the Meta IPR.” slip op. at 8
Discretionary denialPatents in suitUS 8,630,234 - PTAB · Mar 16, 2023 · IPR2022-01393 · APJ Terrence W Mcmillin · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on all challenged claims and grounds, and granted Samsung’s motion to join the Meta IPR as a petitioner.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“Institution of an inter partes review is authorized by statute when “the information presented in the petition filed under section 311 and any response filed under section 313 shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). For the reasons expressed below, we (1) institute inter partes review on the same grounds instituted in the Meta IPR, and (2) grant the Motion, subject to the conditions set forth below. B.” slip op. at 3
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Joinder §315(c) / SAS all-or-nothingJoinder, grantedGranted
“Here, Petitioner’s Motion requests no more than the statute allows. Petitioner represents that the current “Petition and the . . . Petition [in the Meta IPR] challenge the same claims, on the same grounds, and rely on the same prior art and evidence, including an identical declaration from the same expert.” Mot. 1. Furthermore, Petitioner agrees that, if joined as a party to the Meta IPR, “Petitioner will act as ‘understudy’ and will not assume an active role unless Meta ceases to participate” in the Meta IPR, “Meta will maintain the lead role in the proceeding so long as it is a party to the proceeding,” and “Petitioner will not seek additional depositions or deposition time.” Mot. 2.” slip op. at 5
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Decided for petitioner
“We decline to exercise our discretion under Fintiv to deny institution of inter partes review. On June 21, 2022, the Director of the USPTO issued an Interim Procedure for Discretionary Denials in AIA Postgrant Proceedings with Parallel District Court Litigation, available at: https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/interim_proc_ discretionary_denials_aia_parallel_district_court_litigation_memo_ 20220621_.pdf (the “Interim Procedure”). The Interim Procedure provides that “the PTAB will not discretionarily deny institution of an IPR or PGR in view of parallel district court litigation where a petitioner stipulates not to pursue in a parallel district court proceeding the same grounds as in the petition or any grounds that could have reasonably been raised in the petition.” Interim Procedure 7. Here, Petitioner stipulates that it will not pursue the grounds raised, or that reasonably could have been raised, in this IPR in the parallel litigation if IPR is instituted. Pet. 9; Reply 1. We therefore adhere to the Interim Procedure in this Decision and decline to exercise our discretion to deny institution of inter partes review upon this basis.” slip op. at 7
- Other 314aDecided for petitioner
“Patent Owner argues by implication that the Petition must set forth “compelling evidence of unpatentability” to avoid analysis of the Fintiv factors for deciding whether to exercise discretion to deny a petition. Opp. 13. Patent Owner’s argument is flawed for two reasons. First, as we discuss immediately above, even applying the Fintiv framework for deciding whether to discretionarily deny the Petition, we decline to exercise such discretion. Second, the Interim Procedure does not impose a requirement that a petition must always present compelling evidence of unpatentability to warrant institution. Rather, the Interim Procedure merely indicates that whenever a petitioner adduces compelling evidence of unpatentability, panels will not discretionarily deny the petition under Fintiv. Interim Procedure 2. D. Whether a Potential Denial of the Petition in the Meta IPR Justifies” slip op. at 8
Discretionary denialPatents in suitUS 10,880,721 - PTAB · Mar 16, 2023 · IPR2022-01392 · APJ Terrence W Mcmillin · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1, 2, 6, 9, 14, 15, 16, 20, 25, 34, 38, 39, 43, 45, 46, 49, 50, 135, 136, and 140 on all petitioned grounds, and granted joinder.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“Institution of an inter partes review is authorized by statute when “the information presented in the petition filed under section 311 and any response filed under section 313 shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). For the reasons expressed below, we (1) institute inter partes review on the same grounds instituted in the Meta IPR, and (2) grant the Motion, subject to the conditions set forth below. B.” slip op. at 3
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Joinder §315(c) / SAS all-or-nothingJoinder, grantedGranted
“If the Director institutes an inter partes review, the Director, in his or her discretion, may join as a party to that inter partes review any person who properly files a petition under section 311 that the Director, after receiving a preliminary response under section 313 or the expiration of the time for filing such a response, determines warrants the institution of an inter partes review under section 314. Section 315(c) “authorizes joinder of a person as a party, not ‘joinder’ of two proceedings” and “does not authorize the joined party to bring new issues from its new proceeding into the existing proceeding.” Facebook, Inc. v. Windy City Innovations, LLC, 973 F.3d 1321, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2020). Here, Petitioner’s Motion requests no more than the statute allows. Petitioner represents that the current “Petition and the . . . Petition [in the Meta IPR] challenge the same claims, on the same grounds, and rely on the same prior art and evidence, including an identical declaration from the same expert.” Mot. 1. Furthermore, Petitioner agrees that, if joined as a party to the Meta IPR, “Petitioner will act as ‘understudy’ and will not assume an active role unless Meta ceases to participate” in the Meta IPR, “Meta will maintain the lead role in the proceeding so long as it is a party to the proceeding,” and “Petitioner will not seek additional depositions or deposition time.” Mot. 2.” slip op. at 5
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Decided for petitioner
“We decline to exercise our discretion under Fintiv to deny institution of inter partes review. On June 21, 2022, the Director of the USPTO issued an Interim Procedure for Discretionary Denials in AIA Postgrant Proceedings with Parallel District Court Litigation, available at: https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/interim_proc_ discretionary_denials_aia_parallel_district_court_litigation_memo_ 20220621_.pdf (the “Interim Procedure”). The Interim Procedure provides that “the PTAB will not discretionarily deny institution of an IPR or PGR in view of parallel district court litigation where a petitioner stipulates not to pursue in a parallel district court proceeding the same grounds as in the petition or any grounds that could have reasonably been raised in the petition.” Interim Procedure 7. Here, Petitioner stipulates that it will not pursue the grounds raised, or that reasonably could have been raised, in this IPR in the parallel litigation if IPR is instituted. Pet. 9; Reply 1. We therefore adhere to the Interim Procedure in this Decision and decline to exercise our discretion to deny institution of inter partes review upon this basis.” slip op. at 7
- Other 314aDecided for petitioner
“Patent Owner argues by implication that the Petition must set forth “compelling evidence of unpatentability” to avoid analysis of the Fintiv factors for deciding whether to exercise discretion to deny a petition. Opp. 13. Patent Owner’s argument is flawed for two reasons. First, as we discuss immediately above, even applying the Fintiv framework for deciding whether to discretionarily deny the Petition, we decline to exercise such discretion. Second, the Interim Procedure does not impose a requirement that a petition must always present compelling evidence of unpatentability to warrant institution. Rather, the Interim Procedure merely indicates that whenever a petitioner adduces compelling evidence of unpatentability, panels will not discretionarily deny the petition under Fintiv. Interim Procedure 2. D. Whether a Potential Denial of the Petition in the Meta IPR Justifies” slip op. at 8
Discretionary denialPatents in suitUS 10,880,721 - PTAB · Mar 16, 2023 · IPR2022-01390 · APJ Mitchell G Weatherly · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted inter partes review of claims 1–3, 6, 10, 11, 19–22, 24, 25, 28, and 29 on all petitioned grounds and granted Samsung’s motion to join the Meta IPR.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“Institution of an inter partes review is authorized by statute when “the information presented in the petition filed under section 311 and any 1 The Leahy-Smith America Invents Act (“AIA”) included revisions to 35 U.S.C. §§ 102 and 103 that became effective March 16, 2013. Because the application for the ’234 patent was filed on July 28, 2009, we apply the pre-AIA versions of §§ 102, 103. 2 U.S. Patent No. 7,668,159 B2 (Ex. 1005, “Buckley”). 3 U.S. Patent No. 8,731,163 B1 (Ex. 1009, “Bates”). response filed under section 313 shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). For the reasons expressed below, we (1) institute inter partes review on the same grounds instituted in the Meta IPR, and (2) grant the Motion, subject to the conditions set forth below. B. Related Proceedings” slip op. at 2
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Decided for petitioner
“Patent Owner argues that we should deny the Petition under Apple Inc. v. Fintiv, Inc., IPR2020-00019, Paper 11 at 2–3 (PTAB Mar. 20, 2020) (precedential). Opp. 7–12. Patent Owner points to the Litigation. See supra Part I.B. We decline to exercise our discretion under Fintiv to deny institution of inter partes review. On June 21, 2022, the Director of the USPTO issued an Interim Procedure for Discretionary Denials in AIA Postgrant Proceedings with Parallel District Court Litigation, available at: https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/interim_proc_ discretionary_denials_aia_parallel_district_court_litigation_memo_ 20220621_.pdf (the “Interim Procedure”). The Interim Procedure provides that “the PTAB will not discretionarily deny institution of an IPR or PGR in view of parallel district court litigation where a petitioner stipulates not to pursue in a parallel district court proceeding the same grounds as in the petition or any grounds that could have reasonably been raised in the petition.” Interim Procedure 7. Here, Petitioner stipulates that it “will not pursue the grounds raised, or that reasonably could have been raised, in this IPR in the parallel litigation if IPR is instituted.” Pet. 9; Reply 1. We therefore adhere to the Interim Procedure in this Decision and decline to exercise our discretion to deny institution of inter partes review upon this basis.” slip op. at 7
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Joinder §315(c) / SAS all-or-nothingJoinder, grantedGranted
“Section 315(c) “authorizes joinder of a person as a party, not ‘joinder’ of two proceedings” and “does not authorize the joined party to bring new issues from its new proceeding into the existing proceeding.” Facebook, Inc. v. Windy City Innovations, LLC, 973 F.3d 1321, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2020). Here, Petitioner’s Motion requests no more than the statute allows. Petitioner represents that the current “Petition and the . . . Petition [in the Meta IPR] challenge the same claims, on the same grounds, and rely on the same prior art and evidence, including an identical declaration from the same expert.” Mot. 1. Furthermore, Petitioner agrees that, if joined as a party to the Meta IPR, “Petitioner will act as ‘understudy’ and will not assume an active role unless Meta ceases to participate” in the Meta IPR, “Meta will maintain the lead role in the proceeding so long as it is a party to the proceeding,” and “Petitioner will not seek additional depositions or deposition time.” Mot. 2.” slip op. at 5
- Other 314aDecided for petitioner
“Patent Owner argues by implication that the Petition must set forth “compelling evidence of unpatentability” to avoid analysis of the Fintiv factors for deciding whether to exercise discretion to deny a petition. Opp. 13. Patent Owner’s argument is flawed for two reasons. First, as we discuss immediately above, even applying the Fintiv framework for deciding whether to discretionarily deny the Petition, we decline to exercise such discretion. Second, the Interim Procedure does not impose a requirement that a petition must always present compelling evidence of unpatentability to warrant institution. Rather, the Interim Procedure merely indicates that whenever a petitioner adduces compelling evidence of unpatentability, panels will not discretionarily deny the petition under Fintiv. Interim Procedure 2. D. Whether a Potential Denial of the Petition in the Meta IPR Justifies Denying the Petition in this Proceeding” slip op. at 8
Discretionary denialPatents in suitUS 8,630,234 - PNC Bank, N.A. v. United Services Automobile AssociationInstitution deniedPTAB · May 11, 2022 · IPR2022-00050 · APJ Terrence W Mcmillin · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution on claims 1–30 because Petitioner did not show a reasonable likelihood that the asserted references qualified as prior art.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“In an [inter partes review], the petitioner has the burden from the onset to show with particularity why the patent it challenges is unpatentable.” Harmonic Inc. v. Avid Technology, Inc., 815 F.3d 1356,1363 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (citing 35 U.S.C. § 312(a)(3) (requiring inter partes review petitions to identify “with particularity . . . the evidence that supports the grounds for the challenge to each claim”)). Petitioner cannot satisfy its burden of proving obviousness by employing “mere conclusory statements.” In re Magnum Oil Tools Int’l, Ltd., 829 F.3d 1364, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2016). slip op. at 15
- Disclosure Requirements (§112) › Written description (Ariad)Written description adequateEntitled to earlier dateDecided for patent owner
“But, even accepting these premises, we disagree with the conclusion Petitioner asks us to draw from them. In particular, Petitioner appears to contend that we should find that the ’974 application does not provide written description support for the claims of the ’638 patent merely because the scope of the claims includes a configuration that is not expressly described in that document. See Pet. 15–16, 22. But this reflects a misunderstanding of the law—a claim can be broader than the embodiments disclosed. See, e.g., Rexnord, 274 F.3d at 1344 (“An applicant is not required to describe in the specification every conceivable and possible future embodiment of his invention.”); see also Ethicon Endo-Surgery, Inc. v. U.S. Surgical Corp., 93 F.3d 1572, 1582 n.7 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (noting that a claim may be “literally infringed by undisclosed embodiments” and yet sufficiently supported); Application of Smythe, 480 F.2d 1376, 1384 (C.C.P.A. 1973) (“We cannot agree with the broad proposition . . . that in every case where the description of the invention in the specification is narrower than that in the claim there has been a failure to fulfill the description requirement in section 112.”).” slip op. at 22
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not reached
“D. Obviousness Grounds Petitioner contends that the subject matter of claims 1–30 of the ’638 patent would have been obvious over various combinations of Oakes-I, Oakes-II, Medina, and Roach (collectively, “the asserted references”). Pet. 5, 32–100. Petitioner argues that the asserted references are prior art because the claims of the ’638 patent are not entitled to a priority date earlier than July 28, 2017. Id. at 4–5, 11–29. Patent Owner contends that Petitioner fails to establish a reasonable likelihood of success because Petitioner fails to sufficiently show that the asserted references qualify as prior art. Prelim. Resp. 18–59. Having reviewed the parties’ arguments and evidence, we determine that Petitioner has not demonstrated a reasonable likelihood that it will prevail in showing that the asserted references are prior art,8 and as a result, Petitioner fails to sufficiently show that any claim would have been unpatentable based on the asserted references.” slip op. at 16
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Other PTAB motions (exclude, strike, seal, additional discovery, rehearing)Granted
“In the first Joint Motion to Seal, the parties request entry of a Protective Order that is substantially the same as the Board’s Default Protective Order (see Consolidated Trial Practice Guide16 at 107–122 (App. B, Protective Order Guidelines and Default Protective Order)). Paper 9, 2.17 The parties also request sealing of Exhibit 2006 and sealing of portions of the Preliminary Response relating to that exhibit. Id. at 2–3. The portions of the Preliminary Response (Paper 11) requested to be sealed can be identified from the redacted version of the Preliminary Response filed as Paper 12. Based on the representations in the Joint Motion to Seal (Paper 9), the parties have shown good cause for entering the Protective Order and for sealing Exhibit 2006 and the identified portions of the Preliminary Response.” slip op. at 37
§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosurecites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,402,638 - PNC Bank, N.A. v. United Services Automobile AssociationInstitution deniedPTAB · Apr 27, 2022 · IPR2022-00049 · APJ Terrence W Mcmillin · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution for claims 20 and 22 because Petitioner did not show a reasonable likelihood that the asserted combinations rendered them obvious.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“IV. CONCLUSION The Petitioner has not persuasively established that a skilled artisan would have been motivated to combine the cited references so as to render any of the challenged claims unpatentable. Accordingly, we determine that Petitioner has not demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of showing at least one of the claims challenged in the Petition would have been obvious. V. ORDER In consideration of the foregoing, it is hereby: ORDERED that, pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), no inter partes review as to any claim of the ’638 patent is instituted; and” slip op. at 26
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentable
“Pet. 25–27 (emphasis added) (alterations in original). Although this passage is somewhat lengthy, the only reasons provided for combining the relevant teachings of Garcia and Byrne are “to avoid wasting communications resources and adding delays,” “avoid wasting resources and adding delays,” and “reducing wasteful network transmission and delays.” See id. However, the only argument as to the existence of the alleged motivating waste and delay is: “Garcia sends images by ‘a mobile telephone communications network, for example a GSM/GPRS network. . . A POSITA would have known that such networks are bandwidth and resourceconstrained, and that communications over such networks take[ ] time.” Id. at 25 (quoting Ex. 1103, 11:21–12:1). In the Petition, there is no explanation or reasoning to support concluding, based on Garcia’s statement that images are sent using a mobile telephone communications network, that a skilled artisan would recognize waste and delay even if such networks are bandwidth and resource-constrained and that communications over such networks take time. See id. And, there is no explanation or reasoning for concluding that a skilled artisan would recognize that to “check for errors before the submitting” in the manner taught by Byrne would help alleviate waste and delay in Garcia’s system. The only articulated rationale to combine in the Petition is a simple, unelaborated assertion that a skilled artisan would have known that “networks are bandwidth and resource-constrained” and “communications over such networks take time.” This assertion is too general10 and conclusory to accorded much weight and is inadequate to support the finding of rationale to combine. There is no elaboration in the Petition as to what is meant by this sentence. The Petition fails to explain what pertinent knowledge a skilled artisan would have had and how exactly this would have motivated the combination of the relevant teachings of Garcia and Byrne.” slip op. at 20
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“Under the standard set forth in Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312– 19 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc), claim terms are given their ordinary and customary meaning, as would have been understood by a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention, in light of the language of the claims, the specification, and the prosecution history of record. See Thorner v. Sony Comput. Ent. Am. LLC, 669 F.3d 1362, 1365–66 (Fed. Cir. 2012). There is a “heavy presumption,” however, that a claim term carries its ordinary and customary meaning. CCS Fitness, Inc. v. Brunswick Corp., 288 F.3d 1359, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (citation omitted). We determine we need not explicitly construe any claim terms for purposes of this Decision. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“we need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 14
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Real party in interest / privityNot reached
“Preliminary Response and Exhibit 2006); Paper 13 (relating to the Reply); and Paper 17 (relating to the Sur-reply). In each of these motions, the parties seek to protect as confidential certain information that relates to the issue of whether Petitioner has properly identified all the real parties in interest in its Petition. See 35 U.S.C. § 312(a)(2). As we deny the Petition on the merits and do not grant the request to institute an inter partes review, the issue of identification of the real parties in interest to this proceeding is moot. Therefore, we do not reach the arguments and evidence of the parties relating to whether Petitioner identified all the real parties in interest in the Petition, and we make no reference in this Decision to the documents and information that the parties seek to protect as confidential.” slip op. at 24
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,402,638
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.