• Tesla, Inc. v. The United States Of America As Represented By The Secretary Of The Navy (Intellectual Ventures II LLC)Institution denied
  PTAB · Jul 24, 2025 · IPR2025-00341 · APJ Aaron W Moore · IPR · Institution

  The Board denied institution because Tesla had not shown a reasonable likelihood that claims 10, 11, 14, 16, and 18 were unpatentable over the asserted obviousness grounds.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied

    “Institution of an inter partes review is authorized when “the information presented in the petition . . . and any response . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a); see 37 C.F.R. § 42.108. Having considered the Petition, the Preliminary Response, the Reply, and the Sur-reply, as well as the evidence of record, we conclude that Petitioner has not shown a reasonable likelihood that it will prevail in establishing the unpatentability of claims 10, 11, 14, 16, and 18 of the ’743 patent. We accordingly do not institute inter partes review. A.” slip op. at 2

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Petitioner asserts that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have “been someone knowledgeable and familiar with the areas of networking and distributed computing that are pertinent to the ’743 patent,” would “have a bachelor’s degree in computer science, computer engineering, electrical engineering, or equivalent training, and approximately 2-3 years of professional experience relating to distributed computing,” and that a “[l]ack of professional experience can be remedied by additional education, and vice versa.” Pet. 17 (citing Ex.1003, ¶¶ 32-34). Patent Owner does not address this issue in the Preliminary Response. As Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s characterization of the level of skill in the art, we adopt it for purposes of this analysis. B.” slip op. at 7

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner

    “of “event,” in which Petitioner argued that the term should be broad enough to include “processing radar sensor data, performing radar tracking initialization and refinement, and distributing radar tracking information to other modules,” and Patent Owner argued that the specification uses the term as “as an umbrella term to cover various types of ‘internal event and performance data’ such as ‘application statuses, states, performance, and internally detected errors.’” Reply 1; Sur-reply 2. We agree with Patent Owner that that claimed “events” must concern “application statuses, states, performance, and internally detected errors.” See Ex. 1001, 7:44–45. The patent explains that function group 2 collects that type of information from applications using an API and then “correlate[es], combin[es], and reformat[s] [the] application data into higherlevel metrics (composite events) for use by displays or other Resource Management components.” Id. at 7:52–54. The middleware described and claimed in the ’743 is concerned with how applications are performing, not what they doing.” slip op. at 13

  • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “This claim limitation, however, also requires “event correlation capabilities.” For that, Petitioner asserts that “Welch’s metrics calculation component (part of the ‘second function group’) provides ‘event correlation capabilities’ because the QoS management software “implementation includes the following capabilities: . . . (2) track correlation and filtering algorithms.” Pet. 44–45 (citing Ex. 1003, 4). This, we find, mischaracterizes Welch’s disclosure, because Welch’s metrics calculation component does not perform the identified “correlation.” The language quoted by Petitioner comes from the experimental results section of Welch, which describes how the implementation of the NSWC HiPer-D testbed, the system that was used test Welch’s QoS middleware, included “track correlation and filtering algorithms.” Ex. 1005, 4. Welch is not explaining that the middleware correlates the QoS system level events that Petitioner has identified as the claimed “events,” but, instead, that the NSWC HiPer-D system that was used to test the middleware included the ability to correlate radar data in a shipboard anti-air-warfare system.6 The correlating mentioned in Welch occurs at the application level, not in the middleware.” slip op. at 12

  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 7,181,743
• Hulu, LLC v. Piranha Media Distribution, LLCInstitution denied
  PTAB · May 1, 2025 · IPR2025-00082 · APJ Karl D Easthom · IPR · Institution

  The Board denied institution because the district court had already held all challenged claims invalid under § 101.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • Other 314aInstitution denied discretionary otherInstitution denied

    “recent Director Review decision (i.e. in the above-noted related cases, IPR2024-01252 and IPR2024-01253) reached the opposite conclusion to that of AviaGames in holding that a district court’s § 101 invalidity judgment precludes instituting challenges to the invalid claims even though an appeal of that judgment is pending. Specifically, in Hulu, LLC v. Piranha Media Distribution, LLC, IPR2024-01252, -01253, Paper 27 (PTAB April 17, 2025) (Director Review decision) (“Hulu”), the Acting Director held that “[b]ecause the patent claims already stand invalid [due to the District Court’s § 101 invalidity judgment], it is unnecessary to institute another proceeding to review them for patentability under other grounds.” Hulu at 2, 3 (reasoning that “[i]n the event the Federal Circuit reverses the district court’s decision, Petitioner may raise such invalidity arguments in the district court on remand”) (remanding the panel’s institution decisions and denying institution). Accordingly, under clear guidance from Hulu, because the District Court held all the ’403 patent claims invalid under § 101, we deny institution. See Hulu at 3 (holding that “where a district court already has found the challenged claims invalid, the efficiency and integrity of the patent system is best served by denying institution” (citing Fintiv at 16)).” slip op. at 8

  Discretionary denial
  Patents in suitUS 10,986,403
• Hulu, LLC v. Piranha Media Distribution, LLCInstitution denied
  PTAB · May 1, 2025 · IPR2025-00081 · APJ Karl D Easthom · IPR · Institution

  The Board denied institution on all challenged claims because the district court had already held those claims invalid under § 101.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Institution denied fintivInstitution denied

    “IPR2024-01252 and IPR2024-01253) reached the opposite conclusion to that of AviaGames in holding that a district court’s § 101 invalidity judgment precludes instituting challenges to the invalid claims even though an appeal of that judgment is pending. Specifically, in Hulu, LLC v. Piranha Media Distribution, LLC, IPR2024-01252, -01253, Paper 27 (PTAB April 17, 2025) (Director Review decision) (“Hulu”), the Acting Director held that “[b]ecause the patent claims already stand invalid [due to a district court’s § 101 invalidity judgment], it is unnecessary to institute another proceeding to review them for patentability under other grounds.” Hulu at 2, 3 (reasoning that “[i]n the event the Federal Circuit reverses the district court’s decision, Petitioner may raise such invalidity arguments in the district court on remand”) (remanding the panel’s institution decisions and denying institution). Accordingly, under clear guidance from Hulu, because the District Court held all the ’403 patent claims invalid under § 101, we deny institution. See Hulu at 3 (holding that “where a district court already has found the challenged claims invalid, the efficiency and integrity of the patent system is best served by denying institution” (citing Fintiv at 16)).” slip op. at 8

  Discretionary denial
  Patents in suitUS 10,986,403
• Cisco Systems, Inc. / Fortinet, Inc. v. Infoexpress Inc.Institution denied
  PTAB · Oct 11, 2024 · IPR2024-00678 · APJ John A Hudalla · IPR · Institution

  Institution was denied for claims 1, 2, 5, and 6 because Petitioner did not show a reasonable likelihood that either Krantz alone or Krantz and Herrmann rendered them obvious.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied

    “review. See 35 U.S.C. § 314 (2018); 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a) (2023). Under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), we may not authorize an inter partes review unless the information in the petition and the preliminary response “shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” For the reasons that follow, we do not institute an inter partes review.” slip op. at 2

  • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “We are persuaded by Patent Owner’s arguments. As noted by Patent Owner (Prelim. Resp. 27), claim 1 separately recites (1) “an authentication module” that seeks access based on “authentication information” and (2) a “gatekeeper” that “formulate[s] an audit request” and evaluates whether to approve access based on a response to the audit request. The fact that authentication can be a part of a security policy audit (see Pet. 38 (citing Ex. 1301, 11:67–12:6)) does not change the fact that claim 1 recites separate sets of limitations for authentication and auditing that Petitioner must account for in its unpatentability contentions.” slip op. at 13

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedOther

    “remedied by additional education, and vice versa.” Id. Patent Owner argues that a person of ordinary skill in the art “would have had a bachelor’s degree in computer science, computer engineering, or electrical engineering and at least three years of experience in networking operating systems and cybersecurity.” Prelim. Resp. 1. Alternatively, Patent Owner argues that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had “a master’s degree in one of the foregoing and at least two years of experience in the aforementioned fields.” Id. at 2. Patent Owner does not cite any evidence supporting its assessment of the level of ordinary skill. Neither party explains why the outcome of this case would be affected by the adoption of any of the proffered definitions of a person of ordinary skill in the art. For purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s definition of the level of ordinary skill in the art. On the present record, we are satisfied that this definition of the level of skill is consistent with the teachings of the ’645 patent and the asserted prior art.” slip op. at 9

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “Petitioner argues that “a [person of ordinary skill in the art] would find the challenged claims unpatentable under any interpretation consistent with their plain and ordinary meaning in the context of the [’645 patent],” so we “need not expressly construe the claim terms.” Pet. 8. Patent Owner also argues that we should apply the plain and ordinary meaning of all claim terms. Prelim. Resp. 6. Nonetheless, Patent Owner argues that Petitioner deviates from the plain and ordinary meaning of certain limitations. Id. at 6– 7. Thus, Patent Owner puts forth its understanding of the plain and ordinary meaning for the following recitations: “configure an access point in response to approval of the device by the gatekeeper” and “device information received from the device in response to the audit request.” Id. at 7–13. Based on the present record, we need not expressly construe any claim terms in order to render the instant Decision. See, e.g., Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 10

  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 8,117,645
• Cisco Systems, Inc. / Fortinet, Inc. v. Infoexpress Inc.Institution denied
  PTAB · Sep 24, 2024 · IPR2024-00540 · APJ Christopher M Kaiser · IPR · Institution

  The Board denied institution because Petitioner did not show a reasonable likelihood that claims 1, 2, 4–10, 13, 16, 18, and 19 were obvious over Krantz alone or Krantz and Herrmann.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied

    “determine whether to institute an inter partes review under 35 U.S.C. § 314 and 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a). Inter partes review may not be instituted unless “the information presented in the petition filed under [35 U.S.C.] section 311 and any response filed under [35 U.S.C.] section 313 shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) (2018). “When instituting inter partes review, the Board will authorize the review to proceed on all of the challenged claims and on all grounds of unpatentability asserted for each claim.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.108(a) (2023). For the reasons set forth below, upon considering the briefing and the evidence of record, we determine that the information presented in the Petition does not establish a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner will prevail with respect to any of the challenged claims. Accordingly, we do not institute inter partes review.” slip op. at 2

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Petitioner contends that one of ordinary skill in the art “would have had a bachelor’s degree in computer science, computer engineering, or an equivalent, and two years of relevant experience in networking and network security, and related fields.” Pet. 4. Petitioner also asserts that “[l]ack of professional experience can be remedied by additional education, and vice versa.” Id. Patent Owner argues that a person of ordinary skill in the art “would have had a bachelor’s degree in computer science, computer engineering, or electrical engineering and at least three years of experience in networking operating systems and cybersecurity.” Prelim. Resp. 1–2. Alternatively, Patent Owner argues that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had “a master’s degree in one of the foregoing and at least two years of experience in the aforementioned fields.” Id. at 2. Neither party explains why the outcome of this case would be affected by the adoption of any of the proffered definitions of a person of ordinary skill in the art. For purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s assessment of the level of ordinary skill in the art, as it appears consistent with the ’350 patent and the asserted prior art. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001).” slip op. at 8

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached

    “Petitioner argues that “a [person of ordinary skill in the art] would find the challenged claims unpatentable under any interpretation consistent with their plain and ordinary meaning in the context of the [’350 patent],” so we “need not expressly construe the claim terms.” Pet. 7. Patent Owner argues to the contrary that we should construe the phrase “reconfiguring the communication port” as “to change the access point itself [rather than something else] in a way that the checked device is able to access the less-restricted portion of the protected network.” Prelim. Resp. 7–9. Patent Owner also argues that we should construe the phrases “audit data pertaining to a device” and “auditing the device in accordance with a security policy” as “requir[ing] that the ‘audit data’ and ‘auditing’ . . . be expressly about the device” rather that “the user.” Id. at 9–12. As discussed below, we are able to determine whether to institute review without resolving the construction of any claim terms. Accordingly, we need not and do not construe any terms expressly. See Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 9

  • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “We agree with Patent Owner. The ’350 patent distinguishes between user authentication using a username and password and application of a security policy. Ex. 1101, 1:35–39 (“A first level of access control is achieved by requiring authentication of a user. This may be accomplished by requiring the user to enter a username and a password.”), 1:45–48 (“Reliance on mere user authentication includes several disadvantages. For example, there are no provisions to assure that an access device used by the authenticated user meets network security policies.”). Although the ’350 patent describes both user authentication and application of a security policy as being carried out by a gatekeeper, this is accomplished in separate process steps. Id. at 10:38–41 (“GateKeeper 225 authenticates a user, obtains audit data, and applies a security policy in an Authenticate User Step 440, an Obtain Audit Data Step 450 and an Apply Security Policy Step 460, respectively.”). Thus, we are not persuaded that, as Petitioner argues, user authentication in the ’350 patent constitutes the application of a security policy.” slip op. at 12

  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 8,347,350
• Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC v. Yechezkal Evan SperoInstitution denied
  PTAB · Jan 19, 2024 · IPR2023-01126 · APJ Jason W Melvin · IPR · Institution

  The Board denied institution of review of claims 1–33 because it instituted review in IPR2023-01034, consistent with Petitioner’s position; joinder was dismissed as moot.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • Other 314aInstitution denied discretionary otherInstitution denied

    “II. ANALYSIS Petitioner asserts that we should institute here only if we deny institution in IPR2023-01034. Pet. 105. Petitioner’s Motion for Joinder is expressly conditioned on whether we institute review in IPR2023-01034. Mot. 1. Because we instituted review in IPR2023-01034, we accept Petitioner’s position and exercise our discretion to deny institution here, regardless of the Petition’s merits. Because we deny institution, Petitioner’s Motion for Joinder is moot.” slip op. at 5

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Joinder §315(c) / SAS all-or-nothingJoinder, deniedDenied

    “IPR2023-01034. Pet. 105. Petitioner’s Motion for Joinder is expressly conditioned on whether we institute review in IPR2023-01034. Mot. 1. Because we instituted review in IPR2023-01034, we accept Petitioner’s position and exercise our discretion to deny institution here, regardless of the Petition’s merits. Because we deny institution, Petitioner’s Motion for Joinder is moot.” slip op. at 5

  Discretionary denial
  Patents in suitUS 11,208,029
• Ao Kaspersky Lab v. Open Text Inc.Institution denied
  PTAB · Dec 7, 2023 · IPR2023-00895 · APJ Aaron W Moore · IPR · Institution

  The Board denied institution because Petitioner did not show Fratric was a § 102 printed publication, so it did not establish a reasonable likelihood that any challenged claim was unpatentable.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Prior-art status of a reference › Printed publication / public accessibilityPrinted publication not establishedDecided for patent owner

    “In an IPR, the petitioner bears the burden of establishing by a preponderance of the evidence that a particular document is a printed publication.” Nobel Biocare Servs. AG v. Instradent USA, Inc., 903 F.3d 1365, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (as amended Sept. 20, 2018). “[T]he key inquiry is whether or not a reference has been made ‘publicly accessible.’” In re Klopfenstein, 380 F.3d 1345, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2004); see Acceleration Bay, LLC v. Activision Blizzard Inc., 908 F.3d 765, 772 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (explaining that public accessibility is “the touch-stone” in determining whether a reference qualifies as a printed publication). slip op. at 8

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied

    “For these reasons, we conclude that Petitioner has not met its burden of establishing, by a preponderance of the evidence, that Fratric is a Section 102 printed publication. It follows that Petitioner has not established a reasonable likelihood of proving at least one claim of the ’591 patent unpatentable. III. CONCLUSION Having determined that Petitioner has not established a reasonable likelihood of proving that at least one claim of the ’591 patent is unpatentable over the cited prior art, we do not institute an inter partes review.5” slip op. at 10

  § 102 anticipation
  Patents in suitUS 10,284,591
• Infinera Corporation v. Alexander Soto And Walter SotoInstitution denied
  PTAB · Dec 4, 2023 · IPR2023-00834 · APJ Thu A Dang · IPR · Institution

  The Board denied institution because Petitioner did not show a reasonable likelihood that claims 1–3, 5, 10–14, and 16–21 were obvious over the cited combinations.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied

    “We accordingly determine that Petitioner does not sufficiently show that Vrazel meets the requirements of the recited step of “converting the first electrical binary data signal in the pluggable optical transceiver module to a first electrical m-ary modulation signal.” We therefore conclude that Petitioner does not demonstrate a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on its challenge of independent claim 1 as unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) over Pang and Vrazel. Each of claims 2, 3, 5, 10, 13, 14, and 16–21 depends directly or indirectly from independent claim 1, and Petitioner challenges these claims as unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) over Pang and Vrazel. Ex. 1001, 15:23–28, 32–35, 16:9–11, 16:18–25, 16:30–43; Pet. 46–56. The deficiency in Petitioner’s analysis of independent claim 1 also applies to each of these dependent claims. We accordingly conclude that Petitioner does not demonstrate a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on its challenge of dependent claims 2, 3, 5, 10, 13, 14, and 16–21. 3. Asserted Obviousness of Claims 11 and 12 over Pang, Vrazel and Yee (Ground 2). Claims 11 and 12 depend directly from claim 1. Petitioner does not rely on Yee to remedy the deficiencies discussed above concerning the “converting” to “m-ary modulation” signal step, but rather relies on its arguments associated with claim 1. See Pet. 59–60. We already addressed those arguments, and we find those arguments unavailing for the reasons stated above. We accordingly conclude that Petitioner does not demonstrate a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on its challenge of dependent claims 11 and 12.” slip op. at 21

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Not reached

    “III CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, we deny institution of an inter partes review.2 IV, ORDER In consideration of the foregoing, it is hereby: ORDERED that the Petition is denied, and no trial is instituted. 2 Because we deny the Petition on the merits, we do not reach Patent Owner’s request that we exercise our discretion to deny the Petition under Apple Inc. v. Fintiv, Inc., IPR2020-00019, Paper 11 at 13–14 (PTAB Mar. 20, 2020) (precedential) or under 35 U.S.C. § 325(d). See Prelim. Resp. 33– 54.” slip op. at 23

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsNot reached

    “III CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, we deny institution of an inter partes review.2 IV, ORDER In consideration of the foregoing, it is hereby: ORDERED that the Petition is denied, and no trial is instituted. 2 Because we deny the Petition on the merits, we do not reach Patent Owner’s request that we exercise our discretion to deny the Petition under Apple Inc. v. Fintiv, Inc., IPR2020-00019, Paper 11 at 13–14 (PTAB Mar. 20, 2020) (precedential) or under 35 U.S.C. § 325(d). See Prelim. Resp. 33– 54.” slip op. at 23

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “C. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art Petitioner asserts that a POSITA would have “at least a Bachelor’s degree in Computer Science, Computer Engineering, Electrical Engineering, or a similar degree and at least two years of professional experience with optical communications, networking, and signal processing,” wherein “[m]ore experience can supplement less education and vice versa.” Pet. 6 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 38). Patent Owner does not contest Petitioner’s proposal or offer an alternative. On this record, we are persuaded that Petitioner’s proposal is consistent with the technology described in the Specification and the cited prior art. For purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s proposed level of skill.” slip op. at 9

  § 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 9,887,795
• Infinera Corporation v. Alexander Soto And Walter SotoInstitution denied
  PTAB · Dec 4, 2023 · IPR2023-00838 · APJ Patrick M Boucher · IPR · Institution

  The Board denied institution because Petitioner did not show that Vrazel’s encoder or encoder and pre-distorter provided the claimed m-ary modulator for claims 1–3, 5, 6, 8, 10–17, 22, and 23.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied

    “We accordingly determine that Petitioner does not sufficiently show that Vrazel meets the requirements of the recited “m-ary modulator” in any of the challenged independent claims. We therefore conclude that Petitioner does not demonstrate a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on its challenge of independent claims 1, 22, or 23 as unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) over Pang and Vrazel.” slip op. at 20

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot reached

    “Because it is dispositive, we focus our analysis on each independent claim’s recitation of “an m-ary modulator for increasing the number of bits per symbol in the first electrical data signal to produce a first m-ary modulation signal.” Ex. 1001, 15:6–8 (claim 1), 17:13–15 (claim 22), 18:9– 11 (claim 23). In addressing this limitation, Petitioner relies solely on Vrazel, which Petitioner contends “discloses this limitation in at least two ways.” Pet. 28 (addressing claim 1), 64 (addressing claim 22 by referring to analysis for claim 1), 66 (addressing claim 23 by referring to analysis for claim 1).” slip op. at 16

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “used to construe the claim in a civil action under 35 U.S.C. 282(b), including construing the claim in accordance with the ordinary and customary meaning of such claim as understood by one of ordinary skill in the art and the prosecution history pertaining to the patent.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b) (2019); see Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312–13 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). “Petitioner proposes that each claim term in the Challenged Claims be given its plain and ordinary meaning in this proceeding, and that no specific construction of any claim term is required.” Pet. 6. Patent Owner similarly does not propose any explicit construction of any claim term in its Preliminary Response. On the record before us, we do not find it necessary to construe any term for this Decision. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“[W]e need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 9

  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 10,771,181
• Infinera Corporation v. Alexander Soto And Walter SotoInstitution denied
  PTAB · Dec 4, 2023 · IPR2023-00835 · APJ Patrick M Boucher · IPR · Institution

  The Board denied institution because the Petition did not show a reasonable likelihood that claims 1–3, 5–7, 9, and 11–20 were unpatentable over Pang and Vrazel.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied

    “We accordingly determine that Petitioner does not sufficiently show that the Vrazel meets the requirements of the recited “m-ary modulator.” We therefore conclude that Petitioner does not demonstrate a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on its challenge of independent claim 1 as unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) over Pang and Vrazel. F. Dependent Claims Each of claims 2, 3, 5–7, 9, and 11–20 depends directly or indirectly from independent claim 1, and Petitioner challenges those claims as unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) over Pang and Vrazel. Ex. 1001, 15:29–16:33; Pet. 53–67. The deficiency in Petitioner’s analysis of independent claim 1 also applies to each of the dependent claims. We accordingly conclude that Petitioner does not demonstrate a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on its challenge of dependent claims 2, 3, 5–7, 9, and 11–20.” slip op. at 19

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedOther

    “Petitioner proposes that a person of ordinary skill in the art “would have had at least a Bachelor’s degree in Computer Science, Computer Engineering, Electrical Engineering or a similar degree and at least two years of professional experience with optical communications, networking, and signal processing.” Pet. 7. Petitioner adds that “[m]ore experience can supplement less education and vice versa,” and supports its proposal with testimony by Dr. Min. Id.; Ex. 1003 ¶ 41. Patent Owner does not specifically address the level of ordinary skill in its Preliminary Response. Because we find Petitioner’s proposal reasonable, consistent with the level of skill reflected by the prior art, and supported by Dr. Min’s testimony, we adopt it for purposes of this Decision. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (the prior art may reflect an appropriate level of skill in the art).” slip op. at 8

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “used to construe the claim in a civil action under 35 U.S.C. 282(b), including construing the claim in accordance with the ordinary and customary meaning of such claim as understood by one of ordinary skill in the art and the prosecution history pertaining to the patent.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b) (2019); see Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312–13 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). “Petitioner proposes that each claim term in the Challenged Claims be given its plain and ordinary meaning in this proceeding, and that no specific construction of any claim term is required.” Pet. 6–7. Patent Owner similarly does not propose any explicit construction of any claim term in its Preliminary Response. On the record before us, we do not find it necessary to construe any term for this Decision. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“[W]e need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 9

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot reached

    “We accordingly determine that Petitioner does not sufficiently show that the Vrazel meets the requirements of the recited “m-ary modulator.” We therefore conclude that Petitioner does not demonstrate a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on its challenge of independent claim 1 as unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) over Pang and Vrazel. F. Dependent Claims Each of claims 2, 3, 5–7, 9, and 11–20 depends directly or indirectly from independent claim 1, and Petitioner challenges those claims as unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) over Pang and Vrazel. Ex. 1001, 15:29–16:33; Pet. 53–67. The deficiency in Petitioner’s analysis of independent claim 1 also applies to each of the dependent claims. We accordingly conclude that Petitioner does not demonstrate a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on its challenge of dependent claims 2, 3, 5–7, 9, and 11–20.” slip op. at 19

  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 10,263,723

Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.