- Clearh2o, Inc. v. Ceva Animal Health Inc.Institution deniedPTAB · Mar 18, 2020 · IPR2020-00039 · APJ Michael L Woods · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution of IPR on claims 1–15 under § 325(d), finding the asserted art and arguments substantially similar or cumulative to those considered during examination.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsInstitution denied 325dInstitution denied
“§ 314(a) (stating “[t]he Director may not authorize an inter partes review to be instituted unless the Director determines that the information presented in the petition . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition” (emphasis added)); see also Harmonic Inc. v. Avid Tech., Inc., 815 F.3d 1356, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“the PTO is permitted, but never compelled, to institute an IPR proceeding”). The exercise of our discretion to institute an inter partes review is informed by 35 U.S.C. § 325(d), which requires us to “take into account whether, and reject the petition . . . because, the same or substantially the same prior art or arguments previously were presented to the Office.” In evaluating whether to exercise our discretion under § 325(d), we weigh the following non-exclusive factors: (a) the similarities and material differences between the asserted art and the prior art involved during examination; (b) the cumulative nature of the asserted art and the prior art evaluated during examination; (c) the extent to which the asserted art was evaluated during examination, including whether the prior art was the basis for rejection; (d) the extent of the overlap between the arguments made during examination and the manner in which Petitioner relies on the prior art or Patent Owner distinguishes the prior art; (e) whether Petitioner has pointed out sufficiently how the Examiner erred in its evaluation of the asserted prior art; and (f) the extent to which additional evidence and facts presented in the Petition warrant reconsideration of prior art or arguments. Becton, Dickinson & Co. v. B. Braun Melsungen AG, IPR2017-01586, slip op. at 17–18 (Paper 8) (PTAB Dec. 15, 2017) (precedential-in-part, indentations added for clarity). Upon reviewing the factors enumerated in Becton, Dickinson, we find that, on balance, the factors weigh in favor of exercising our discretion to deny institution under 35 U.S.C. § 325(d).” slip op. at 24
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied
“We have authority under 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a) and 35 U.S.C. § 314, which provides that an inter partes review may not be instituted unless the information presented in the Petition “shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” Having considered the arguments and the evidence presented, for the reasons described below, we do not institute an inter partes review of any challenged claim.” slip op. at 2
Discretionary denialPatents in suitUS 8,794,185 - Grit Energy Solutions, LLC v. Oren Technologies, LLCRehearing deniedPTAB · Jan 10, 2020 · IPR2017-01917 · APJ Michael L Woods · IPR · Rehearing
The Board denied rehearing and confirmed that claim 13 was not shown unpatentable under §103 because the asserted safety factor was speculative and unsupported.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied
“the burden of showing a decision should be modified, and the request for rehearing must specifically identify all matters the party believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked and the place where each matter was previously addressed in its papers. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d). Therefore, Petitioner bears the burden of establishing that we misapprehended or overlooked the matters that it requests that we review.” slip op. at 3
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert discountedPatent owner expert creditedDecided for patent owner
“based on speculation and entitled to little weight. See Velander v. Garner, 348 F.3d 1359, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (according little weight to broad conclusory statements in expert testimony); Gorelik v. Holder, 339 F. App’x 70, 73 (2d Cir. 2009) (noting that “little weight” should be given to an expert’s testimony where the expert’s reasoning is “speculative”); Jenkins v. Astrue, 250 F. App’x 645, 647 (5th Cir. 2007) (holding that “hypothetical testimony” by a vocational expert, which is unsupported by the evidence, may be properly disregarded). Smith is a patent document, not an engineering specification, and does not mention any safety factor, let alone one that is at least 1.15. We credit Mr. Smith’s testimony that confirms this fact. See, e.g., Ex. 2049 ¶ 139 (“Smith is silent about whether his containers are designed with any safety factor, let alone something as specific as Dr. Wooley’s assumed 1.15”) (citing Ex. 2048, 145:25–146:3). Simply because Dr. Wooley testifies that Smith has a safety factor does not make it true. See Trial Practice Guide Update, 5 (August 2018) (“[E]xpert testimony . . . is not a substitute for disclosure in a prior art reference itself.”). We are mindful not to read into Smith that which is not disclosed; such hindsight bias has no role in an obviousness analysis.” slip op. at 7
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“that Smith’s “sidewalls have a rigidity suitable for retaining no less than about 30,000 pounds of proppant when positioned therein,” as recited in claim 13. Ex. 1002, 10:14–17. “In an [inter partes review], the petitioner has the burden from the onset to show with particularity why the patent it challenges is unpatentable.” Harmonic Inc. v. Avid Tech., Inc., 815 F.3d 1356, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2016). Petitioner did not meet its burden. In support of its “safety factor” argument, Petitioner relies on Dr. Wooley’s testimony that Smith has a safety factor of at least 1.15. See Pet. 70 (citing in relevant part Ex. 1001 ¶ 181); see also supra Part II.b. Dr. Wooley’s testimony regarding Smith’s safety factor, however, is based on speculation and entitled to little weight. See Velander v. Garner, 348 F.3d 1359, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (according little weight to broad conclusory statements in expert testimony); Gorelik v. Holder, 339 F. App’x 70, 73 (2d Cir. 2009) (noting that “little weight” should be given to an expert’s testimony where the expert’s reasoning is “speculative”); Jenkins v. Astrue, 250 F. App’x 645, 647 (5th Cir. 2007) (holding that “hypothetical testimony” by a vocational expert, which is unsupported by the evidence, may be properly disregarded). Smith is a patent document, not an engineering specification, and does not mention any safety factor, let alone one that is at least 1.15. We credit Mr. Smith’s testimony that confirms this fact. See, e.g., Ex. 2049 ¶ 139 (“Smith is silent about whether his containers are designed with any safety factor, let alone something as specific as Dr. Wooley’s assumed 1.15”) (citing Ex. 2048, 145:25–146:3). Simply because Dr. Wooley testifies that Smith has a safety factor does not make it true. See Trial Practice Guide Update, 5 (August 2018) (“[E]xpert testimony . . . is not a substitute for disclosure in a prior art reference itself.”). We are mindful not to read into Smith that which is not disclosed; such hindsight bias has no role in an obviousness analysis.” slip op. at 7
§ 103 obviousnessPatents in suitUS 9,296,518 - Arrows Up, LLC v. Oren Technologies, LLCSome claims unpatentablePTAB · Jan 10, 2020 · IPR2018-01230 · APJ Paul J Korniczky · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–3 and 6–11 are unpatentable as obvious; claims 4 and 5 were not shown unpatentable because the petitioner did not establish a reason to use a second conveyor to unload proppant to a road …
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“We adopt Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill in the art because it is consistent with the problems and solutions in the prior art of The Leahy-Smith America Invents Act (“AIA”), Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284, 287–88 (2011), amended 35 U.S.C. § 103 effective March 16, 2013. Because the ’772 patent has an effective filing date before March 16, 2013, the pre-AIA version of § 103 applies. record. See Daiichi Sankyo Co. v. Apotex, Inc., 501 F.3d 1254, 1256 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (“Factors that may be considered in determining level of ordinary skill in the art include: (1) the educational level of the inventor; (2) type of problems encountered in the art; (3) prior art solutions to those problems; (4) rapidity with which innovations are made; (5) sophistication of the technology; and (6) educational level of active workers in the field.”).” slip op. at 7
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for patent owner
“In our decision to institute, we determined that “a broad, but reasonable construction of the claimed ‘second different end surface’ limitation requires that the two end surfaces are structurally different.” Paper 7, 10. Petitioner does not dispute our construction. See generally Reply. Patent Owner agrees with our construction. PO Resp. 11 (“The evidence shows the Board’s construction is correct and should be maintained.”). Upon reviewing the claim language in light of the Specification, we maintain our interpretation that a reasonable construction of the claimed “second different end surface” limitation requires that the first and second end surfaces be structurally different, for the reasons given in our decision to institute. See Paper 7, 8–10.” slip op. at 9
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededDecided for patent owner
“2. Other Claim Terms We determine that no other claim limitation requires express construction for purposes of this Decision. See Wellman, Inc. v. Eastman Chem. Co., 642 F.3d 1355, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (“[C]laim terms need only be construed ‘to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (internal citation omitted)).” slip op. at 10
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedDecided for petitioner
“Based on these figures and their associated descriptions, and after having weighed the competing testimony of Petitioner’s expert (Mr. Robert Schaaf (e.g., Ex. 1002)) and Patent Owner’s expert (Mr. Fred P. Smith (e.g., Ex. 2008)), we credit Mr. Schaaf’s testimony that a person of ordinary skill in the art “would understand Sheesley’s auger could provide proppant received from a rail car on the rail spur (the ‘source’ on the supply chain of proppant) into Sheesley’s empty proppant containers, and that such containers would necessarily be in ‘close proximity’ to the rail spur.” Ex. 1002 ¶ 68.” slip op. at 16
Patent outcomesUS 9,248,772 mixedClaim construction§ 103 obviousnessPatents in suitUS 9,248,772 - Arrows Up, LLC v. Oren Technologies, LLCSome claims unpatentablePTAB · Jan 10, 2020 · IPR2018-01231 · APJ Michael L Woods · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1, 2, and 4–6 are unpatentable as obvious over Sheesley, with or without Mintz; claim 3 was not shown unpatentable because Sheesley lacks a required conveying-to-a-source limitation.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“We adopt Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill in the art “because it is consistent with the problems and solutions in the prior art of record.” See Daiichi Sankyo Co. v. Apotex, Inc., 501 F.3d 1254, 1256 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (“Factors that may be considered in determining level of ordinary 1 The Leahy-Smith America Invents Act (“AIA”), Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284, 287–88 (2011), amended 35 U.S.C. § 103 effective March 16, 2013. Because the ’066 patent has an effective filing date before March 16, 2013, the pre-AIA version of § 103 applies. skill in the art include: (1) the educational level of the inventor; (2) type of problems encountered in the art; (3) prior art solutions to those problems; (4) rapidity with which innovations are made; (5) sophistication of the technology; and (6) educational level of active workers in the field.”).” slip op. at 7
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for petitioner
“In our decision to institute, we determined that “a broad, but reasonable construction of the claimed ‘second different end surface’ limitation requires that this surface is structurally different from the ‘first end surface.’” Paper 7, 9. Petitioner does not dispute our construction. See generally Pet. Reply. Patent Owner agreed with our construction. PO Resp. 10 (“The evidence shows the Board’s construction is correct and should be maintained.”). Upon reviewing the claim language in light of the Specification, we maintain our interpretation that a reasonable construction of the claimed “second different end surface” limitation requires that this surface be structurally different from the “first end surface,” for the reasons given in our decision to institute. See Paper 7, 8–9.” slip op. at 9
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededDecided for petitioner
“2. Other Claim Terms We determine that no other claim limitation requires express construction for purposes of this Decision. See Wellman, Inc. v. Eastman Chem. Co., 642 F.3d 1355, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (“[C]laim terms need only be construed ‘to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (internal citation omitted)).” slip op. at 9
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedPatent owner expert discountedDecided for petitioner
“A reference must be considered for everything that it teaches, not simply the described invention or a preferred embodiment.” In re Applied Materials, Inc., 692 F.3d 1289, 1298 (Fed. Cir. 2012). When read in its entirety, Sheesley teaches the claimed limitation. To illustrate this point, we begin by reproducing Sheesley’s Figure 5, below: Figure 5 depicts empty containers being filled with proppant after being placed on a rail car for transport. Although Figure 5 depicts the empty containers placed on a rail car, rather than on a road vehicle, as required by the claim, Sheesley’s disclosure is not limited to rail cars, as Patent Owner contends. Specifically, Sheesley discloses that rail is merely one of many modes of transportation, including trucks. Ex. 1005 ¶ 78 (“Modified cargo containers 270 can be loaded on a ship 272, barge 274, rail 276, or a flatbed truck trailer 278”). For the reasons discussed above, and after having weighed the competing testimony of Petitioner’s expert (Mr. Robert Schaaf (Ex. 1002)) and Patent Owner’s expert (Mr. Fred P. Smith (Ex. 2009)), we credit Mr. Schaaf’s testimony that Sheesley discloses this limitation. Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 71–78; see id. ¶ 78 (“[I]t is my opinion that Sheesley discloses ‘positioning a plurality of empty proppant containers, each removably positioned on a trailer of a respective proppant transporting road vehicle.’”). Accordingly, Petitioner has shown that Sheesley discloses “positioning a plurality of empty proppant containers . . . on a trailer of . . . proppant transporting road vehicle.” slip op. at 14
Patent outcomesUS 9,617,066 mixedClaim construction§ 103 obviousnessPatents in suitUS 9,617,066 - Blasters, Inc v. Waterblasting, LLCSome claims unpatentablePTAB · Jul 16, 2019 · IPR2018-00504 · APJ John R Kenny · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–4 and 10 are unpatentable as obvious over Clemons and NLB; claims 5 and 6 were not shown unpatentable over the asserted combinations.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level patent owner adoptedDecided for patent owner
“Both Mr. Boos’s and Dr. King’s assessments appear consistent with the level of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention as reflected in the prior art in the instant proceeding. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001). Further, neither expert has testified, and neither party has argued, that the difference in the experts’ assessments would affect the analysis of any asserted ground. Under the circumstances, we adopt Dr. King’s assessment due to its greater specificity. We, however, determine the differences between the experts’ assessments would not affect our analysis; we would reach the same conclusions using either assessment.” slip op. at 8
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner’s proposed construction for “articulating link.” In this proceeding, we construe a claim term to have its broadest reasonable construction. Petitioner’s proposed construction, which is broader than Patent Owner’s proposal, is reasonable in light of the Specification. The only non-testimonial evidence in the record for the ordinary meanings of the terms “articulating” and “link” are the dictionary definitions provided by Petitioner (Ex. 1012, 1015), and those dictionary definitions support Petitioner’s proposed construction. The 1999 edition of the Chambers Dictionary of Science and Technology provides an engineering definition for “articulation,” which is “[t]he connection of two parts in such a way (usually by a pin joint) as to permit relative movement.” Ex. 1015. The 2004 edition of the Merriam-Webster Dictionary defines “link” as “a connecting structure.” Ex. 1012. Mr. Boos testifies, and we agree, that these definitions are evidence that an ordinarily skilled artisan would have understood the ordinary meaning of “articulating link” to be “a connecting structure that connects two parts in such a way as to permit relative movement.” Ex. 1009 ¶ 9. Further, Petitioner’s proposed construction is consistent with the disclosure of an articulating link in the Specification, which describes articulating link 31 as connecting blast head 23 and tractor 20, and permitting relative movement between those parts. Ex. 1001, 4:11–14 (“horizontal movement” and “vertical movement”). In addition, we determine that Patent Owner’s proposed construction is not a reasonable construction in light of the Specification. Neither Patent Owner nor Dr. King directs us to any portion of the Specification that expressly defines the term “articulating link.” Instead, the cited portions of the Specification describe what one exemplary articulating link, link 31, does. For example, a cited portion of the Specification describes that articulating link 31 is capable of horizontal and vertical movement and has a rotatable connection with arms 37, 38, 44, and 45. Ex. 1001, 4:11–43 (cited by Ex. 2012 ¶ 40). Nowhere does the Specification, however, indicate that all articulating links must have such a capacity and such a connection. See id. Instead, the Specification merely discloses that this particular exemplary articulating link has these features. Id. In the absence of an explicit or implicit definition, we cannot read limitations from the Specification into the claims. Comark Commc’ns, Inc. v. Harris Corp., 156 F.3d 1182, 1186 (Fed.” slip op. at 15
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached
“We do not need to provide a different construction because Patent Owner does not dispute that NLB discloses a cleaning system. Therefore, any dispute between the parties that could exist regarding the meaning of the term “cleaning system” is not material to any patentability issue we need to decide. 3. Disputes that Concern Only Petitioner’s Alternative Arguments The parties propose differing constructions for the terms “hard surface,” “high pressure,” “blast head,” “coatings,” and “high power vacuum pump.” Compare Pet. 13–17, with PO Resp. 7–9. The differences in the parties’ constructions for these terms are material only to Petitioner’s alternative arguments that the asserted references without NLB would disclose the recited “hard surface,” “high pressure,” “blast head,” “coatings,” and “high power vacuum pump.” Because we do not need to address those alternative arguments in this Decision, we do not need to construe these terms, as we explain in more detail below. First, Petitioner proposes construing “hard surface,” recited in claims 1 and 4, as “any surface having rigidity sufficient to support the weight of a vehicle carrying the blast head.” Pet. 13. Patent Owner proposes construing the term as “the surface of a material that is hard enough to withstand high-pressure water blasting without disintegrating, for instance paving material in common use for road, parking lot, and airport runway surfaces such as asphalt or concrete.” PO Resp. 8–9. The differences between these proposed claim constructions are material only to Petitioner’s alternative arguments that the asserted references without NLB would disclose a hard surface. Under both parties’ constructions, NLB’s roads, concrete, and asphalt are “hard surfaces,” which neither party has disputed. Ex. 1006, 2. Therefore, we do not need to construe “hard surface.”” slip op. at 19
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert discountedMixed
“After evaluating the parties’ arguments and evidence, we agree with Patent Owner that Mr. Boos is an interested witness because of his positions with and his equity stake in Petitioner, and in evaluating his testimony, we consider his status as an interested witness in determining the probative weight of his opinions. For example, when Mr. Boos’s testimony is not sufficiently corroborated by objective evidence, we attribute little or no weight to his testimony due to that interest. When Mr. Boos’s testimony is sufficiently corroborated by objective evidence, however, we do not so discount his testimony. We do not agree with Petitioner’s suggestion that Patent Owner had to prove that Mr. Boos’s interest influenced his testimony for us to take into account that interest. Patent Owner established Mr. Boos’s interest. Therefore, we consider that interest when evaluating Mr. Boos’s testimony. Ethicon, 135 F.3d at 1465. We are not persuaded by Patent Owner’s other arguments for discounting Mr. Boos’s testimony. First, we do not read the testimony of Mr. Boos cited by Patent Owner as demonstrating that Petitioner’s attorneys, rather than Mr. Boos, were responsible for the technical opinions provided in his declarations. Ex. 1023, 16:10–18:3. Mr. Boos describes the preparation of his declaration as a collaboration with Petitioner’s attorneys. Id. Mr. Boos clarified that Petitioner’s attorneys helped with the legal parts of the declarations, but that Mr. Boos wrote the technical conclusions in his declaration. Id. at 240:24–241:23. Second, Mr. Boos articulated a motivation for combining references. See, e.g., Ex. 1009 ¶¶ 142–147.” slip op. at 23
Patent outcomesUS 7,255,116 mixedClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 7,255,116 - Becton, Dickinson And Company v. B. Braun Melsungen AGNo claims unpatentablePTAB · Dec 12, 2018 · IPR2017-01588 · APJ Michael L Woods · IPR · Final written decision
The Board found claims 12, 13, 20–23, and 29 not shown unpatentable under any of four § 103 combinations; the contingent motion to amend was dismissed as moot.
RulingsFinal written decision- Claim Construction › Functional claiming / §112(f) means-plus-function › Whether §112(f) applies (Williamson, nonce words)§112(f) does not applyDecided for patent owner
“Because the term “means” is not used, there is a presumption that the limitation is not subject to § 112 ¶ 6, and Petitioner has not overcome this presumption. See Williamson, LLC, 792 F.3d at 1349 (explaining that the presumption is overcome “if the challenger demonstrates that the claim term fails to ‘recite sufficiently definite structure’ or else recites ‘function without reciting sufficient structure for performing that function’”) (internal citation omitted). The claims do not simply recite a “needle protective device,” without more, but explicitly require that the “needle protective device [be] positioned proximally of the valve and at least in part around the needle and distal of a proximal end of the second hub in a ready position and configured to prevent unintended needle sticks in a protective position.” Ex. 1001, 13:58– 61 (emphasis added to structural limitations of claim 12); see also id. at 14:51–55 (reciting similar structure in independent claim 23). Petitioner fails to address these structural limitations in its proposed claim construction, instead focusing only on the three words “needle protective device.” See Pet. 11–15. Moreover, Petitioner’s proposed construction would seemingly render superfluous several of these other claimed structural features. As argued by Patent Owner, we determine that the needle protective device limitation recites sufficient structure. Mr. Meyst explains how a person of ordinary skill in the art “would recognize that the claimed ‘needle protective device’ refers to the class of structures included in safety IV catheters that prevent unintended needle-sticks by covering (i.e., protecting or guarding) the needle tip.” Ex. 2001 ¶ 56 (citing Ex. 2014, which is cited in the ’735 patent). We find Mr. Meyst’s testimony persuasive.” slip op. at 13
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner
“of the claimed limitation. Here, the claims require the “arm” to extend distally of the third hub. Ex. 1001, 13:34–14:59. “[I]n determining the ordinary and customary meaning of the claim term as viewed by a person of ordinary skill in the art, it is appropriate to consult a general dictionary definition of the word for guidance.” See Comaper Corp. v. Antec, Inc., 596 F.3d 1343, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (citation omitted). In consulting general dictionary definitions, including that submitted by Petitioner (Ex. 1008), we find “arm” to be defined as: “any armlike part or attachment, as the tone arm of a phonograph” (www.dictionary.com (last visited Nov. 13, 2017) (emphasis added)); “[a] part attached to or projecting from something” (Ex. 1008); “a long thin piece that is connected to the main part of a machine, structure, etc., and that looks or moves like a human arm” (www.learnersdictionary.com (last visited Nov. 13, 2017) (emphases added)). We also consult the prosecution history of record. In an amendment dated February 7, 2013, the applicant asserted that “[t]he scope of independent claims [1 and 23] can be found in FIGs. 13 and 14 of the instant application and corresponding written description.” Ex. 1010, 10. We now review the Specification, namely, Figures 13 and 14 and their accompanying description. We find that these figures depict an “arm” extending distally of a “third hub,” and to illustrate this structure, we reproduce Figure 13 of the ’247 patent, below: The ’247 patent describes: The third housing 204 incorporates a pair of arms 210 each comprising a hook 212. The two hooks 212 are configured to engage the two bumps 36 to retain the third housing 204 to the catheter hub 14 in a ready to use position. The two arms 210 are preferably flexible to provide a gripping force against the two bumps 36, which is higher than the frictional force to withdraw the needle through the tip protector 202, hemostatic valve 46, and catheter 12. Alternatively the two arms 210 can be biased radially outward to increase the gripping force. Further, the two arms can be biased inwardly against the needle shaft to decrease the gripping force after the needle is withdrawn proximal of the arms 210. Ex. 1001, 11:33–45 (emphasis added).” slip op. at 18
- Skill levelSkill level board ownDecided for petitioner
“Neither Patent Owner nor Petitioner disputes our initial determination of a person having ordinary skill in the art (“POSITA”), and we see no reason to revisit it here. See, generally, PO Resp.; see also, generally, Pet. Reply. Accordingly, and as explained in our Decision to Institute, we determine that a POSITA would be either a medical practitioner (e.g., a nurse or doctor) having at least some experience with vascular catheter devices, or a person with a technical degree (e.g., associate’s degree in engineering or physics) and having at least some experience with vascular catheter devices. Paper 8, 17–18.” slip op. at 22
- Expert testimonyPatent owner expert creditedPetitioner expert discountedDecided for patent owner
“Having considered Callaway in its entirety, and after weighing the competing testimony of Mr. Griffis and Mr. Meyst, we agree with Patent Owner and credit its expert that Callaway’s “third hub” 21 would do “nothing more than hold the spring clip in place until the needle is withdrawn,” and that the “only embodiment in which the inner catheter hub (21) potentially adds any needle protection is in the Critikon version” (PO Resp. 35), which does not integrate Woehr-630’s safety clip (Ex. 1004 ¶ 62), and which Petitioner does not rely on (see Pet. 26–27). Accordingly, because Petitioner fails to demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that Callaway teaches Woehr-630’s spring clip retained in hub 21 after the needle is withdrawn, Petitioner has not shown that claims 12, 13, 20–23, and 29 are unpatentable over Woehr, Callaway, and Sutton.” slip op. at 50
Patent outcomesUS 8,460,247 not shown unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 8,460,247 - Fasteners For Retail, Inc. v. RTC Industries, Inc.Rehearing deniedPTAB · Nov 15, 2018 · IPR2018-00744 · APJ Michael L Woods · IPR · Rehearing
The Board denied Fasteners for Retail’s rehearing request, leaving institution denied because it failed to identify Olympus as a real party in interest.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied
“Petitioner’s argument is without merit because it mischaracterizes our Order. Contrary to Petitioner’s assertion (Request 5), our Order does not “instruct” or “direct” Petitioner to file a reply brief if it believes Olympus is not an unnamed RPI. Rather, our Order explicitly provides that if “Petitioner does not believe that Olympus is an unnamed real party in interest, in lieu of updating its mandatory notices, Petitioner may file a reply brief.” Order 3 (emphasis added). In other words, the Order does not state “Petitioner must file a reply brief,” as Petitioner’s argument would have us believe. The Order further provides:” slip op. at 4
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Real party in interest / privityDecided for patent owner
“We entered a decision denying institution (Paper 25, “DDI”), in which we explained that Petitioner failed to persuade us that Olympus was not an RPI. DDI 14.” slip op. at 2
Discretionary denialPatents in suitUS 9,635,957 - Fasteners For Retail, Inc. v. RTC Industries, Inc.Rehearing deniedPTAB · Nov 15, 2018 · IPR2018-00743 · APJ Michael L Woods · IPR · Rehearing
The Board denied Fasteners for Retail’s rehearing request and left institution denied because it failed to identify Olympus as a real party in interest.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied
“Petitioner’s argument is without merit because it mischaracterizes our Order. Contrary to Petitioner’s assertion (Request 5), our Order does not “instruct” or “direct” Petitioner to file a reply brief if it believes Olympus is not an unnamed RPI. Rather, our Order explicitly provides that if “Petitioner does not believe that Olympus is an unnamed real party in interest, in lieu of updating its mandatory notices, Petitioner may file a reply brief.” Order 3 (emphasis added). In other words, the Order does not state “Petitioner must file a reply brief,” as Petitioner’s argument would have us believe. The Order further provides: ORDERED that within 7 days of the entry of this Order, Petitioner may amend its mandatory notices to name other parties, including Olympus as a real party in interest in each [proceeding] . . . FURTHER ORDERED that in lieu of updating its mandatory notices, Petitioner may file a 7-page reply brief to address Patent Owner’s RPI arguments in each [proceeding].” slip op. at 4
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Real party in interest / privityInstitution denied rpiDecided for patent owner
“We entered a decision denying institution (Paper 25, “DDI”), in which we explained that Petitioner failed to persuade us that Olympus was not an RPI. DDI 14.” slip op. at 2
Discretionary denialPatents in suitUS 9,504,321 - Fasteners For Retail, Inc. v. RTC Industries, Inc.Rehearing deniedPTAB · Nov 15, 2018 · IPR2018-00742 · APJ Michael L Woods · IPR · Rehearing
The Board denied the rehearing request in all four proceedings, upholding denial of institution because Petitioner failed to identify Olympus as a real party in interest.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied
“b. Standard for Reconsideration The party filing a request for rehearing has the burden of showing a decision should be modified, and the request for rehearing must specifically identify all matters the party believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked and the place where each matter was previously addressed in its papers. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d). Therefore, Petitioner bears the burden of establishing that we misapprehended or overlooked the matters that it requests that we review. When rehearing a decision whether to institute a trial, the Board reviews the decision for an abuse of discretion. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(c).” slip op. at 3
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Real party in interest / privityRpi dispute resolved for patent ownerDecided for patent owner
“I. INTRODUCTION a. Background Fasteners for Retail, Inc. (“Petitioner”), filed four petitions (IPR2018- 00741, IPR2018-00742, IPR2018-00743, and IPR2018-00744) requesting inter partes review of claims in U.S. Patent Nos. 9,173,505, 9,149,132, 9,504,321, and 9,635,957. Paper 1.2 RTC Industries, Inc. (“Patent Owner”), filed a Preliminary Response (Paper 8, “Prelim. Resp.”) arguing that Petitioner failed to identify Olympus Partners LP (“Olympus”) as a real party-in-interest (“RPI”). Prelim. Resp. 28–39. After receiving the Preliminary Response, we issued an order (Paper 13, “Order”) permitting Petitioner to either: (1) amend its mandatory notices within 7 days to name Olympus as an RPI; or (2) file a reply brief within 7 days to address Patent Owner’s RPI argument. Order 4. Although it amended its mandatory notices to add certain additional RPIs (Paper 14), Petitioner chose to file a reply brief (Paper 15, “Reply”) rather than name Olympus as an RPI. We entered a decision denying institution (Paper 25, “DDI”), in which we explained that Petitioner failed to persuade us that Olympus was not an RPI. DDI 14.” slip op. at 2
Discretionary denialPatents in suitUS 9,149,132 - Fasteners For Retail, Inc. v. RTC Industries, Inc.Rehearing deniedPTAB · Nov 15, 2018 · IPR2018-00741 · APJ Michael L Woods · IPR · Rehearing
The Board denied Fasteners for Retail’s rehearing request, leaving institution denied because Petitioner failed to identify Olympus as a real party in interest.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied
“b. Standard for Reconsideration The party filing a request for rehearing has the burden of showing a decision should be modified, and the request for rehearing must specifically identify all matters the party believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked and the place where each matter was previously addressed in its papers. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d). Therefore, Petitioner bears the burden of establishing that we misapprehended or overlooked the matters that it requests that we review. When rehearing a decision whether to institute a trial, the Board reviews the decision for an abuse of discretion. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(c).” slip op. at 3
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Real party in interest / privityRpi dispute resolved for patent ownerDecided for patent owner
“Moreover, the 7-day period for amending its mandatory notices to name Olympus as an RPI expired on July 27, 2018, (Order 4), and we entered our decision denying institution based on Petitioner’s failure to name Olympus as an RPI on September 12, 2018, (DDI 14). To permit Petitioner to now amend its mandatory notices to cure its failure to name Olympus as an RPI would be unfair to Patent Owner and would encourage gamesmanship by allowing petitioners to refrain from naming all RPIs until if and after such unnamed RPI is the cause for denying institution. Indeed, we are not aware of any Board decision that has permitted such amendment to mandatory notices after a decision denying institution. Accordingly, Petitioner’s Request is denied.” slip op. at 5
Discretionary denialPatents in suitUS 9,173,505
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.