- PTAB · Dec 11, 2025 · IPR2025-01021 · APJ Timothy G Majors · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–12, 14–31, and 33–38 on all asserted grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood of success on at least claim 1.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“its challenge to the claims under Grounds 1A–4A. We have also considered Patent Owner’s counterarguments, which we find unavailing at this stage for reasons explained below. See infra Section III.E.3. Upon considering the parties’ argument and evidence, we find that Petitioner has established that it is reasonably likely to succeed in showing that at least claim 1 would have been obvious under Grounds 1A–4A. Based on the preliminary record, Petitioner persuades us that a POSA would have had reasons for adding a stopcock (or similar flow-control valve) to Laub’s system between the catheter and the cited clot canister and pressure source, as suggested by Garrison. See, e.g., Ex. 1006 ¶¶ 130–134; Ex. 1012, Fig. 1A; Ex. 1006, Fig. 34. Petitioner persuades us that Laub’s system, modified as proposed, would allow a user to close the valve while a pressure source (e.g., a pump) creates a negative pressure and vacuum between the valve and the pressure source, which vacuum may then be applied to a distal portion of the catheter upon opening the valve to facilitate a rapid aspiration of a portion of a PE into the clot canister. Pet. 38–42; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 48, 103–114.” slip op. at 30
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“(“POSA”) “would have had an undergraduate degree in mechanical engineering or a related engineering discipline and 2-4 years of catheter design experience and, where necessary, would have consulted with a physician regarding the methods of treatment.” Pet. 13 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 35). Patent Owner counters that Petitioner’s proposed definition is “insufficient” but does not, in the Preliminary Response, explain why it is “insufficient” or propose a definition of its own. Prelim. Resp. 20 (citing333 Ex. 2005 ¶ 52).14 Instead, in advancing Patent Owner’s counterarguments, “Patent Owner applies Petitioner’s definition.” Id. For this Decision, we apply Petitioner’s POSA definition, which appears to be reasonable and consistent with the prior art.” slip op. at 12
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached
“specification and considering the patent’s prosecution history. 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b). We need only construe terms where the parties dispute a term’s meaning and only to the extent needed to resolve the controversy. Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019). Petitioner contends that the term “filament” in, for example, dependent claim 11 means at least “one or more threads, lines, cords, ropes, ribbons, flat wires, sheets, or tapes.” Pet. 15. Patent Owner notes its disagreement with Petitioner’s interpretation of the term “filament” in related proceedings (e.g., IPR2025-00289). Prelim. Resp. 20 n.3. But Patent Owner contends that the claim construction issue in related proceedings “is not germane” to Patent Owner’s arguments in the present case and, thus, the Board need not construe that term (or any other term of the ’333 patent’s challenged claims) at this time. We need not, at this stage, further construe the ’333 patent’s claims to address the issues that are presently in dispute.” slip op. at 13
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundDecided for petitioner
“pumps, like described in Laub, Aklog, and Garrison would, in the proposed modified systems, generate a vacuum pressure as claimed will be best assessed on a full record at trial. As an initial matter, claim 1 does not recite a “maximum level of aspiration in a rapid fashion.” At most, Patent Owner’s argument (if accepted) may weaken some of Petitioner’s reasoning for modifying the prior art. In any event, we are at this stage unpersuaded that a pump would not, when a fluid control valve is closed, generate a vacuum pressure and operate in the manner claimed. See, e.g., Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 103–105 (testifying that a stopcock and aspiration pump would generate a vacuum and provide for rapid aspiration). Garrison does not disclose that only syringes have such capability, and Garrison teaches, in the same paragraph where the cited alternative aspiration sources may be used in its systems (“active source[s] of aspiration may be an aspiration pump, a regular or locking syringe, a hand-held aspirator, hospital suction, or the like”). Ex. 1006 ¶ 134. Garrison’s disclosure is, thus, not limited to use of syringes or even peristaltic pumps (as allegedly depicted in Figure 34). We also note (as pointed out by Petitioner) that the ’333 patent indicates that both pumps and syringes generate and store negative/vacuum pressure in an aspiration system.18 Ex. 1001, 7:28–41, dependent claim 15 (aspiration source comprises “an electric pump”); Prelim. Reply 5. That a POSA would have understood that both syringes and pumps, like disclosed in Garrison, can generate a vacuum pressure to permit rapid aspiration of clots also finds further evidentiary support in Dr. Turk’s testimony that surgeons have used pumps and syringes for that purpose since the early 2010s. Ex. 1022 ¶ 23. Moreover, although Laub teaches that running a pump continuously at high flow rates can assist with dislodging clots, Petitioner persuades us on the present record that a POSA would see benefit in modifying Laub’s system to also allow for an initial or intermittent rapid burst of vacuum pressure to help remove a clot. Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 106, 109.” slip op. at 33
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,969,333 - PTAB · Dec 10, 2025 · PGR2025-00054 · APJ Ryan H Flax · PGR · Institution
The Board instituted PGR on claims 1–16 on all four grounds, finding at least one claim more likely than not unpatentable based on obviousness, indefiniteness, or lack of written description.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“institute trial in a post-grant review. We institute a post-grant review only if the information presented in the petition filed under 35 U.S.C. § 321, if unrebutted, shows that it is more likely than not that at least one claim challenged in the petition is unpatentable. 35 U.S.C. § 324. On the existing record, we conclude that Petitioner demonstrates it is more likely than not that Petitioner would prevail in showing that at least one challenged claim of the ’781 patent is unpatentable under a presented ground. See generally Pet. Therefore, we grant institution of post-grant review. Our reasoning is discussed below.” slip op. at 2
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Real party in interest / privityDecided for petitioner
“STANDING Petitioner states that it certifies that: (1) the ’781 patent is available for post grant review because its earliest claimed effective filing date is October 9, 2018, and the patent issued less than nine months ago, on December 3, 2024; and (2) Petitioner is not barred or estopped from requesting a post grant review on the grounds in this petition. Pet. 5. This is sufficient. See 35 U.S.C. § 100(note)(A)–(B), § 321; 37 C.F.R. § 42.204(a). Patent Owner does not contest standing. See generally Prelim. Resp. B. REAL PARTIES-IN-INTEREST Petitioner states that “[t]he real parties-in-interest are Petitioner Straumann USA, LLC and its affiliates Institut Straumann AG and JJGC Indústria e Comércio de Materiais Dentários S.A.” Pet. 3. Patent Owner raises no objection and itself identifies “Smart Denture Conversions, LLC is the real party-in-interest.” Paper 4, 2; see generally Prelim. Resp. C.” slip op. at 3
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“At this point, we find little meaningful difference between the two proposed definitions. In fact, neither does Patent Owner’s witness, Mr. Leinsing, who states that his “opinions would not change under either definition.” Ex. 2011 ¶ 42. And, as set forth above, Patent Owner asserts that, for the sake of its present arguments, it matters not which of the two proposed definitions we use for this proceeding. Prelim. Resp. 21. Thus, at this stage, we accept and use Petitioner’s proposed definition of the ordinarily skilled artisan, which, unlike Patent Owner’s, does not implicate reliance on the knowledge of people other than the individual ordinarily skilled artisan. Petitioner’s definition appears to comport with the level of skill in the art reflected in the prior art of record and the ’781 patent. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (“[T]he prior art itself [may] reflect[] an appropriate level” of ordinary skill in the art) (quoting Litton Indus. Prods., Inc. v. Solid State Sys. Corp., 755 F.2d 158, 163 (Fed. Cir. 1985)). This issue may be further developed at trial by the parties, if desired. C.” slip op. at 19
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“same claim construction standard that is used to construe patent claims in a civil action in federal district court thus, by default, we give claim terms their ordinary and customary meaning, which is “the meaning that the term would have to a person of ordinary skill in the art in question at the time of the invention.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.200(b); Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312–13 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). Petitioner indicates that None of the claim terms of claims 1–16 need to be construed to determine the patentability issues presented in this petition. The petition applies the ordinary meaning of the claim language as it would be understood by a POSA after reading the ’781 patent. Ex. 1002, ¶130. Petitioner will propose a construction if Patent Owner argues or the Board determines that one is required for any term. Pet. 31 (citing Ex. 1002). And, Patent Owner presents no express position on claim construction at this point. See generally Prelim. Resp. At this stage of the proceeding, we do not expressly construe any claim terms; however, this position is preliminary and we may change it based on the fully developed record at trial.8 D.” slip op. at 19
Claim construction§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosurecites GrahamPatents in suitUS 12,156,781 - Valve Corporation v. Ironburg Inventions Ltd.All claims unpatentablePTAB · Dec 2, 2025 · IPR2017-00858 · APJ Mitchell G Weatherly · IPR · Remand
On remand, the Board held claims 18, 19, 21, 26, and 29 unpatentable as obvious over Burns and LaCelle; collateral estoppel also rendered those claims unpatentable.
RulingsRemand decision- Skill levelSkill level board ownDecided for petitioner
“understanding of a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention. Graham, 383 U.S. at 17. Valve contends that the ordinarily skilled artisan would have: a bachelor’s degree in an industrial design or engineering field, and approximately two years of relevant experience, for example. Alternatively, the same or an equivalent level of skill in the art could be obtained by end users or hobbyists who have substantial experience modifying or creating customized game controllers that include features to better suit their needs, even without any college education. Pet. 10 (citing Ex. 1009 ¶ 11). Ironburg, without expressly defining the level of ordinary skill, contends that a college degree of the type identified by Valve is not required. See Supp. PO Resp. 4–6. Ironburg notes that the level of ordinary skill is “relatively low” and the technology involved “is simple and straightforward.” Id. at 4 (citing Ex. 2016 ¶ 21). Ironburg’s contentions regarding the level of ordinary skill are consistent with Valve’s position, id. at 6, which we apply in our analysis. D. Whether Claims 18, 19, 21, 26, and 29 Are “Patentably Distinct” from” slip op. at 12
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed board ownOther
“Ex. 1001, 10:65–11:3. In IPR2016-00948, in which we addressed similar claim limitations in a related patent, U.S. Patent 8,641,525 (Ex. 1038, the “’525 patent”),12 we found that “thickness” as used in claims such as claims 18 and 19 refers to “the dimension of the elongate member perpendicular to 12 Claims 10 and 11 of the ’525 patent contain the limitations directed to the thickness of the elongate member that substantially parallel the limitations introduced in claims 18 and 19 respectively. Compare Ex. 1038, 5:13–16, with Ex. 1001, 10:65–11:3. the surface of the elongate member (i.e., also the direction of displacement when the user activates the control function).” Ex. 1058, 10–11; Ex. 1055, 13; Ex. 1056. We interpret “thickness” the same way in this proceeding.13” slip op. at 16
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)UnpatentableUnpatentable
“2. Whether the Combined Teachings of Burns and LaCelle Describe All Elements of Claims 18, 19, 21, 26, and 29 Valve argues that it is “undisputed that all elements of base claim 1 are taught by the combination of Burns in view of LaCelle.” Valve Remand Br. 21 (citing Pet. 33–38; Ex. 1009 ¶¶ 23–25, 27–29). Ironburg disagrees, responding that “neither Burns nor LaCelle discloses the first control with an elongate member having a second surface arranged to be non-parallel with the back, outer surface of case.” Ironburg Remand Br. 20. Ironburg’s argument appears to rest on the issue of whether LaCelle describes its underside items as a control. We have already found that LaCelle’s underside items are controls as explained above. However, even if LaCelle did not disclose that its underside items were controls, Valve relies upon Burns as describing this aspect of claim 1. Valve Supp. Reply 9–10. Either way, Valve persuades us that the Burns and LaCelle, when combined as Valve suggests, teach every element of claim 1. In Parts II.D.1–4 above, we have also analyzed the parties’ arguments and supporting evidence on the issues of whether Burns describes the limitations introduced in each of claims 18, 19, 21, 26, and 29. For the reasons expressed above, Valve persuades us that Burns and LaCelle, when combined as Valve suggests, teach every element of dependent claims 18, 19, 21, 26, and 29. We have already concluded that Valve has proven that an ordinarily skilled artisan would have been motivated to combine teachings of Burns and LaCelle to arrive at the invention of claim 1, and those motivations also suffice for dependent claims 18, 19, 21, 26, and 29, all of which introduce limitations that we find to be described by Burns. Accordingly, we find that Valve has proven by a preponderance of evidence that the combined teachings of Burns and LaCelle render claims 18, 19, 21, 26, and 29 unpatentable as obvious.” slip op. at 25
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundDecided for petitioner
“On the first issue, we find that LaCelle’s underside items would have been understood by an ordinarily skilled artisan as a “control.” LaCelle describes the article illustrated in all its figures as a “game controller.” Ex. 1005, code (57). Dr. Rempel testifies that even if an ordinarily skilled artisan “were not 100% certain that the identified features on the back of the . . . LaCelle . . . controller[] are functional controls, their location and appearance certainly suggests functional back controls to one of ordinary skill in the art (even if another interpretation were also possible).” Ex. 1019 ¶ 12. The Federal Circuit has instructed us that we erred by failing to consider Dr. Rempel’s testimony supporting Valve’s Supplement Reply. Valve II, at 16. Dr. Rempel’s testimony is consistent with the manner in which LaCelle graphically depicts the items on the underside of its game controller, and we credit that testimony as being persuasive. Additionally, as we explain below, we do not find that Valve must prove that LaCelle describes its underside items as a control to support its position that an ordinarily skilled artisan would have been motivated to apply the curved shape of LaCelle’s underside items to the surface of Burns’s elongate members. On the second issue, we find that LaCelle undisputedly describes its items on the underside of the controller as being curved. On the third issue, the probative value of Valve’s Supplemental Reply argument and supporting evidence, the Federal Circuit held that we ignored important testimony establishing that an ordinarily skilled artisan “‘would have combined LaCelle and Burns’ and ‘would recognize that the predictable result of the combination — a back paddle having an end that is curved like that of LaCelle — could have better coupling with the user’s finger.’” Id., at 17–18 (quoting Ex. 1019 ¶ 39 with added emphasis). The Federal Circuit also refocused our obviousness inquiry on “whether a person of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to combine Burns and LaCelle, not whether the combination would with absolute certainty result in the desired outcome.” Id. at 18. Dr. Rempel’s testimony cited by the Federal Circuit establishes that an ordinarily skilled artisan would have been motivated to apply the curved shape of LaCelle’s underside items to Burns’s elongate members. Our original Remand Decision failed to consider that testimony, and the Federal Circuit has identified that failure as error. Valve II, at 17. The argument proffered by Ironburg to rebut Dr. Rempel’s testimony is not supported by evidence. See Ironburg Remand Br. 23–24 (citing our Remand Decision but failing to cite evidence in support of Ironburg’s proffered argument).” slip op. at 24
Patent outcomesUS 9,289,688 unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · GrahamPatents in suitUS 9,289,688 - PTAB · Nov 21, 2025 · IPR2025-00956 · APJ Ryan H Flax · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–12 under all asserted grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that at least one claim is unpatentable.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“institute trial in an inter partes review. We institute an inter partes review only if the information presented in the petition filed under 35 U.S.C. § 311, and any preliminary response filed under § 313, shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail with respect to at least one of the claims challenged in the petition. 35 U.S.C. § 314. After reviewing the parties’ submissions in view of the existing record, we conclude that Petitioner demonstrates a reasonable likelihood it would prevail in showing that at least one challenged claim of the ’992 patent is unpatentable under the presented grounds. See Pet. Therefore, we grant institution of inter partes review. Our reasoning is discussed below. A.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“These two proposed definitions of the ordinarily skilled artisan share many consistencies, for example, the types of degrees and experience such a person would have had, but differ in the number of years of experience. Petitioner proposes the ordinarily skilled artisan would have had at least five years of experience and Patent Owner proposes at least three years (which would necessarily include five years, too). Patent Owner also proposes that the ordinarily skilled artisan would have consulted a dentist, oral surgeon, prosthodontist, or periodontist with experience in dental implants and prosthetics. At this point, we find little meaningful difference between the two proposed definitions. In fact, neither does Patent Owner’s witness, Mr. Leinsing, who states that his “opinions would not change under either definition.” Ex. 2011 ¶ 40. Thus, at this stage, we accept and use Petitioner’s proposed definition of the ordinarily skilled artisan, which, unlike Patent Owner’s, does not implicate reliance on the knowledge of people other than the individual ordinarily skilled artisan. Petitioner’s definition appears to comport with the level of skill in the art reflected in the prior art of record and the ’992 patent. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (“the prior art itself [may] reflect[] an appropriate level” of the ordinary level of skill in the art) (quoting Litton Indus. Prods., Inc. v. Solid State Sys. Corp., 755 F.2d 158, 163 (Fed. Cir. 1985)). This parties may further developed this issue at trial, if desired. C.” slip op. at 13
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“The Board interprets claim terms in an inter partes review using the same claim construction standard that is used to construe patent claims in a civil action in federal district court. 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b). In construing claims, district courts and the Board here, by default, give claim terms their ordinary and customary meaning, which is “the meaning that the term would have to a person of ordinary skill in the art in question at the time of the invention.” Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312–13 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc).” slip op. at 14
- Disclosure Requirements (§112) › Written description (Ariad)Written description inadequateNot entitled to earlier dateDecided for petitioner
“Here, the first claim limitation at issue is broad, i.e., different thread pattern/profile between a definite and a temporary screw, and the Specification’s and priority applications’ disclosure is narrow and specific, asymmetric buttress style threads in a temporary screw and symmetrical threads in a definite screw (are different). Any apparent predictability in or maturity of the relevant field here must be contrasted with the fact that the Specification, considering the ’992 patent itself or any of the identified priority applications, never once even discusses the (claimed) concept of specifically differing the thread style between a temporary and a definitive screw. Any differences in thread style are not called out by the disclosure, but are described and can be discerned only in relation to the respective threads’ functionality, i.e., Fig. 75’s temporary screw 190 has buttress-style threading so it can be pulled out rather than unscrewed from the abutment; Fig. 9’s definitive screw 75 has male threads that fill the female threads of the abutment 8 for a secure permanent engagement. Ex. 1001, 15:23–30, 21:25–44, 23:3–36; Ex. 1012, 97–98, Figs. 9, 75. And, although it is possible for a single disclosed species to provide written description support for a claimed genus, “a sufficient description of a genus . . . requires the disclosure of either a representative number of species falling within the scope of the genus or structural features common to the members of the genus so that one of skill in the art can ‘visualize or recognize’ the members of the genus.” Ariad, 598 F.3d at 1350; see also Synthes USA, LLC v. Spinal Kinetics, Inc., 734 F.3d 1332, 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2013). That does not appear to be the case here—the present record does not support that the described asymmetrical buttress, serrated style of different temporary screw threading (relative to that of the definitive screw and regardless of the direction of the threads for rotation) is sufficiently representative of the genus’s “different” thread patterns/profiles. See, e.g., Ex. 1006 (a buttress style thread does not function the same as a buttress reverse or 75º joint profile or rounded, or trapezoidal thread).” slip op. at 30
Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosurecites Phillips · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,937,992 - Giesecke+devrient GmbH / Giesecke+devrient Currecy Technology GmbH et al. v. Lumenco, LLCSome claims unpatentablePTAB · Nov 21, 2025 · IPR2024-00839 · APJ Meredith C Petravick · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1, 2, 5, 6, and 12–20 are unpatentable as obvious; claims 3, 4, and 7–11 were not shown unpatentable because the asserted combinations did not establish random mirror selection.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“We adopt Petitioner’s proposed definition of a POSITA because Petitioner’s definition is consistent with the types of problems encountered in the art, the prior art solutions to those problems, and the sophistication of the technology. For example, the ʼ863 patent provides, as relevant background, a discussion of anti-counterfeiting devices made up of arrays of lenses used to display unique images, placed on currency and labels for retail products. Ex. 1001, 1:31–43. The ʼ863 patent also discusses using lenses to create holograms. Id. at 2:7–20. Similarly, the prior art in this field, such as Fuhse847, relates to the use of lenses and mirrors to create hologram images for security purposes. Ex. 1022, 1–8. These descriptions demonstrate, consistent with Petitioner’s proposed definition, that a POSITA would need an educational background to understand optics, lenses, and mirrors along with professional experience with optical security features to understand the creation holograms and images using lenses and mirrors for the purpose of preventing counterfeiting of currency and other valuable products. Patent Owner’s proposed definition differs from Petitioner’s in that it includes “or a similar field” when describing the education level of a POSITA and it includes “with diffusive light” when describing the experience level of a POSITA. As to the first difference, the addition of “similar field” introduces vagueness and unnecessary uncertainty into the definition. Patent Owner does not explain what aspects of computer science would make it a field similar to the others listed, or what additional engineering coursework would suffice to make a person a POSITA. See Ex. 2001 ¶ 25. Nor does Patent Owner explain, generally, what makes a field “similar” to the ones listed or how to make that determination. As to the second difference, the addition of “with diffusive light”” slip op. at 10
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedDecided for petitioner
“Patent Owner did not move to exclude Dr. Hesselink’s testimony. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.62; Pet. Reply 25 (arguing that Patent Owner waived its ability to challenge Dr. Hesselink’s qualification.). At the hearing, Patent Owner explained that its argument that Dr. Hesselink is not a POSITA “goes to [the] weight” of Dr. Hesselink’s testimony. Tr. 37:8. In any event, Patent Owner’s argument is based on its proposed definition of a POSITA, which we do not adopt. We, therefore, are not persuaded that Dr. Hesselink testimony should be given little or no weight.” slip op. at 12
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“Petitioner contends that “no claim terms require express construction.” Pet. 11. Patent Owner agrees “that the terms do not require construction for purposes of evaluating the Petition.” PO Resp. 13. We do not need to construe any terms explicitly to reach our decision on institution. See Realtime Data LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)); Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (approving Board decision not to construe claim language where construction is not material to the dispute).” slip op. at 13
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundUnpatentable
“teaches the preamble and all of the limitations of claim 1. Pet. 12–34. Petitioner contends that it would have been obvious to a POSITA to automate the computations for designing micro mirror arrays in Fuhse847 with Rich’s teaching of a processor running software. Id. at 14–17. Patent Owner does not specifically dispute Petitioner’s contentions regarding the preamble, limitations 1b–1e, and the motivation to combine Fuhse847 and Rich. See generally PO Resp. We have reviewed Petitioner’s contentions and supporting evidence and are persuaded that the combination of Fuhse847 and Rich teaches the preamble and undisputed limitations 1b–1e, and that one of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to combine Fuhse847 and Rich in the manner set forth in the Petition.” slip op. at 17
Patent outcomesUS 11,448,863 mixedClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,448,863 - PTAB · Nov 20, 2025 · IPR2025-00951 · APJ Eric C Jeschke · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–19 and all asserted grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that claim 1 would have been obvious over DuroMax and De Vries.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“review. See 35 U.S.C. § 314; 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a) (2024) (“The Board institutes the trial on behalf of the Director.”). Inter partes review may not be instituted “unless . . . the information presented in the petition . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314. Upon consideration of the evidence and arguments in the record, for the reasons below, we determine that the information presented shows a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail with respect to at least one of the challenged claims. We thus institute inter partes review on all challenged claims on all asserted grounds. See SAS Inst. Inc. v. Iancu, 584 U.S. 357, 362–63, 369–70 (2018); 37 C.F.R. § 42.108(a) (“When instituting inter partes review, the Board will authorize the review to proceed on all of the challenged claims and on all grounds of unpatentability asserted for each claim.”).” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“For purposes of this Decision, we adopt the definition of the level of ordinary skill in the art proposed by Petitioner. As to the inclusion of physics in Petitioner’s definition, Patent Owner acknowledges that an undergraduate mechanical engineering degree holder would have the requisite knowledge here but does not adequately explain why an undergraduate physics degree holder would not. In addition, Patent Owner requires “a four-year degree in mechanical engineering or a closely related field,” but fails to identify what fields are “closely related.” See Prelim. Resp. 10 (emphasis added). Based on the Winkel Declaration, we are persuaded at this stage that a hypothetical undergraduate physics degree holder would have had adequate knowledge for one of ordinary skill in the art of the invention here. See Winkel Decl. ¶ 106. As to the requisite years of experience proposed in the definitions— three for Petitioner versus “at least one” for Patent Owner—we note that Patent Owner’s definition is broader than, but includes, Petitioner’s definition. Moreover, for both the inclusion of physics and the years of experience issues, Patent Owner acknowledges that the arguments in the Preliminary Response “are not impacted based on which definition is applied.” Prelim. Resp. 10. Further, Patent Owner does not argue at this stage that Petitioner’s proposal for the level of ordinary skill leads to an improper understanding of how a skilled artisan would have understood either the challenged patent or the prior art.” slip op. at 11
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached
“At this stage of the proceeding and on the current record, we need not and do not explicitly construe the phrase “selector switch.” See Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). Although we do not expressly adopt Petitioner’s proposed construction at this stage of the proceeding, we note that it at least generally aligns with the tentative claim construction issued by the United States District Court in the California Litigation: “Mechanical device whose positioning precludes simultaneous access to two fuels.” Ex. 300310 at 2; see also 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b) (“Any prior claim construction determination concerning a term of the claim in a civil action, or a proceeding before the International Trade Commission, that is timely made of record in the inter partes review proceeding will be considered.”); Memorandum from Acting Director Coke Morgan Stewart to Members of the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (Sept. 15, 2025), available at https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/ Memo_re_prior_findings_of_fact_and_conclusions_of_law_9_16_25.pdf (“Prior Determinations Memo”) (discussing PTAB consideration of prior findings of fact and conclusions of law). We also note that Patent Owner” slip op. at 14
- Obviousness (§103) › Analogous artAnalogous artDecided for petitioner
“Like the Federal Circuit in In re Ellis, although the patent classification of the reference is “some evidence of ‘non-analogy, . . . we consider the similarities and differences in structure and function of the inventions . . . to carry far greater weight.” In re Ellis, 476 F.2d at 1372 (affirming the Board and rejecting the applicant’s nonanalogous art argument). Here, the challenged patent discusses in the Background of the Invention the need for a way to “prevent both valves from being ‘on’ at the” slip op. at 21
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,598,101 - Giesecke+devrient GmbH / Giesecke+devrient Currecy Technology GmbH et al. v. Lumenco, LLCAll claims unpatentablePTAB · Nov 19, 2025 · IPR2024-00838 · APJ Meredith C Petravick · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–12 are unpatentable: claims 1 and 6 over Fuhse262, and the dependent claims over the additional asserted combinations.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“We adopt Petitioner’s proposed definition of a POSITA because Petitioner’s definition is consistent with the types of problems encountered in the art, the prior art solutions to those problems, and the sophistication of the technology. For example, the ʼ191 patent provides, as relevant background, a discussion of anti-counterfeiting devices made up of arrays of lenses used to display unique images, placed on currency and labels for retail products. Ex. 1001, 1:27–42. The ʼ191 patent also discusses using lenses to create holograms. Id. at 2:6–21. Similarly, the prior art in this field, such as Fuhse262, relates to the use of lenses and mirrors to create hologram images for security purposes. Ex. 1006 ¶¶ 1–7. These descriptions demonstrate, consistent with Petitioner’s proposed definition, that a POSITA would need an educational background to understand optics, lenses, and mirrors along with professional experience with optical security features to understand the creation of holograms and images using lenses and mirrors for the purpose of preventing counterfeiting of currency and other valuable products.” slip op. at 10
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedPatent owner expert discountedDecided for petitioner
“spot. Ex. 1006 ¶¶ 95–96, Fig. 10. Dr. Hesselink credibly testifies that while Fuhse262 depicts rays that form a light spot, the rays depicted are “chief rays” that depict only the center rays of light for each optical element. Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 178–179. Ambient light, however, reflects from the entire surface of the mirrors and forms reflected beams of light, not just the center rays aimed at the center point. Id. ¶ 178. According to Dr. Hesselink, the “chief ray” is representative of the larger bundle of rays that form the beams of light reflected off of the mirrors. See Id. ¶ 44. The volume of the voxel is set by the intersection of these beams and the center of the voxel is the point at which the center rays of each beam intersect. Id. ¶ 179. Although Dr. Lindstrand testifies “a POSITA would not have understood Fuhse262 to disclose creating a voxel” (Ex. 2004 ¶ 43), Dr. Lindstrand does not dispute Dr. Hesselink’s testimony that light would reflect off of the entire surface of Fuhse262’s mirrors and form reflected beams of light. See Ex. 2004 ¶¶ 42–58; Ex. 1055, 112:15–21 (“You also agree the ambient light would not just strike the center of the surface, it would strike the entire surface, correct? . . . THE WITNESS: I would say that that is a fair and accurate description.”) Dr. Hesselink’s testimony explaining that light beams would reflect off the entire surface of Fuhse262’s micromirrors and would create a voxel when they intersect with each other, provides sufficient support demonstrating how a POSITA would have understood Fuhse262’s disclosure of light rays being reflected off of mirrors and converging at a light spot shown in Figure 10. See Unification Techs. LLC v. Micron Tech. Inc., 2024 WL 3738401 at *7 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 9, 2024) (affirming the use of expert testimony to demonstrate how a skilled artisan would have understood a prior art reference’s disclosure as teaching a claim limitation).” slip op. at 18
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner contends that “no claim terms require express construction.” Pet. 15. “Patent Owner agrees that the terms do not require construction for purposes of evaluating the Petition.” PO Resp. 13. We do not need to construe any terms explicitly to reach our decision on institution. See Realtime Data LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)); Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (approving Board decision not to construe claim language where construction is not material to the dispute).” slip op. at 12
- BurdenUnpatentable
“off the entire surface of Fuhse262’s micromirrors and would create a voxel when they intersect with each other, provides sufficient support demonstrating how a POSITA would have understood Fuhse262’s disclosure of light rays being reflected off of mirrors and converging at a light spot shown in Figure 10. See Unification Techs. LLC v. Micron Tech. Inc., 2024 WL 3738401 at *7 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 9, 2024) (affirming the use of expert testimony to demonstrate how a skilled artisan would have understood a prior art reference’s disclosure as teaching a claim limitation). Patent Owner argues that light beams that intersect in an irregular or unintentional manner would not necessarily form a voxel, but does not explicitly show that Fuhse262’s light beams do, in fact, intersect in an irregular manner. PO Resp. 19. Petitioner has shown, as supported by Fuhse262’s disclosure, that Fuhse262’s mirrors are each oriented intentionally to point to a spot that allows them to create a light spot at the intended coordinates. See Pet. 27 (“In particular, Fuhse262 explains that ‘[t]he position of the mirror surfaces, i.e. the normal vector n, is to be determined in such a way that the light incident from a specified direction k ⃗ is reflected onto the focal point (x0, y0, z0) for all micromirrors 102 assigned to light spot 110.’”) (quoting Ex. 1006 ¶¶ 96–97). This disclosure, combined with Dr. Hesselink’s testimony that the intersection of light beams from the mirrors would create not just a spot but a voxel due to light reflecting off the entire surface of Fuhse262’s mirrors demonstrates that Fuhse262 teaches limitation 1b.5.” slip op. at 19
Patent outcomesUS 10,901,191 unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,901,191 - MPL Brands NV, Inc. v. Buzzballz, LLCAll claims unpatentablePTAB · Nov 17, 2025 · PGR2024-00035 · APJ Cynthia M Hardman · PGR · Final written decision
Claims 1–20 are unpatentable as obvious over the cited prior art, based on the Board’s findings across the four asserted grounds.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelOther
“II. ANALYSIS A. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art Petitioner contends that a person of ordinary skill in the art” slip op. at 12
- Expert testimonyPatent owner expert discountedDecided for patent owner
“person or designer of ordinary skill in the art. See Reply 7; Ex. 2001 ¶ 5. Patent Owner asserts that Mr. Kirkpatrick’s testimony is nevertheless relevant because it “informs the opinion of expert witnesses who do qualify as POSITAs” (i.e., Dr. Rojas). PO Resp. 4–5. But the level of ordinary skill in the art as defined here does not mention patents or patent drawings, and Patent Owner has not explained why or in what capacity a person of ordinary skill in the art would have consulted with a patent illustrator.15 For these reasons, we accord no weight to Mr. Kirkpatrick’s opinions on how a person of ordinary skill in the art would have viewed the figures. See” slip op. at 26
- BurdenFwd all claims unpatentableUnpatentable
“Petitioner has the burden of proving unpatentability of the challenged claims by a preponderance of the evidence. 35 U.S.C. § 326(e). Having reviewed the parties’ arguments and cited evidence, for the reasons we discuss below, we find that Petitioner has demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that claims 1–20 are unpatentable as obvious over the cited prior art.” slip op. at 2
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundUnpatentable
“For the above reasons, and after considering Patent Owner’s” slip op. at 47
Patent outcomesUS 11,932,441 unpatentable§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,932,441 - Giesecke+devrient GmbH / Giesecke+devrient Currency Technology GmbH et al. v. Lumenco, LLCAll claims unpatentablePTAB · Nov 17, 2025 · IPR2024-00836 · APJ Nabeel U Khan · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1, 6–14, 28, and 32–39 are unpatentable as obvious over the asserted combinations of Fuhse262, Fuhse925, Jordan, and Fuhse172.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“ways: the first is the inclusion of “or a similar field” when describing the education level of a POSITA, and second is the inclusion of “with diffusive light” when describing the experience level of a POSITA. We decline to include either of these additional requirements in the definition of the level of ordinary skill. As to the first difference, Patent Owner does not explain what aspects of computer science would make it a field similar to the others listed, nor what additional engineering coursework would suffice. See Ex. 2004 ¶ 25. Nor does Patent Owner explain, generally, what makes a field “similar” to the ones listed or how to make that determination. We determine that Patent uncertainty into the definition and, therefore, do not adopt it. As to the second difference, Patent Owner proposes that the level of skill include two years’ experience with “diffusive light micro-optic security features.” The ʼ294 patent, however, does not mention “diffusive light.” Instead, the challenge claims and the written description of the ʼ294 patent use the term “ambient light.” See, e.g., Ex. 1001, Abstract, 20:50, 59. Ambient light, such as sunlight, includes both parallel and diffuse light. See Ex. 1055, 97:21–98:8; Ex. 1006 ¶ 54 (describing the use of sunlight or ceiling light). The ʼ294 patent mentions ambient light in an ordinary manner without discussing any distinctions between parallel light and diffuse light or giving any significance to the nature of diffuse light and its effects on the invention. We, therefore, adopt Petitioner’s definition of level of ordinary skill except that we find that the phrase “at least” in Petitioner’s proposed definition creates a vague, open-ended upper bound for the level of ordinary skill, and we therefore do not adopt that aspect of the proposal.” slip op. at 11
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedPatent owner expert discountedDecided for petitioner
“references expressly teach but what they would have suggested to one of ordinary skill in the art at the time the invention was made”) (quoting In re Lamberti, 545 F.2d 747, 750 (CCPA 1976)) (emphasis added); Syntex (U.S.A.) LLC v. Apotex, Inc., 407 F.3d 1371, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (“What a reference teaches a person of ordinary skill is not . . . limited to what a reference specifically ‘talks about’ or what is specifically ‘mentioned’ or ‘written’ in the reference.”). Here, Petitioner has established that Fuhse262 discloses mirrors that reflect light rays converging at a light spot. Ex. 1006 ¶¶ 95–96, Fig. 10. Dr. Hesselink credibly testifies that while Fuhse262 depicts rays that form a light spot, the rays depicted are “chief rays” that depict only the center rays of light for each optical element. Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 169–170. Ambient light, however, reflects from the entire surface of the mirrors and forms reflected beams of light, not just the center rays aimed at the center point. Id. ¶ 170. According to Dr. Hesselink, the “chief ray” is representative of the larger bundle of rays that form the beams of light reflected off of the mirrors. See Id. ¶ 44. The volume of the voxel is set by the intersection of these beams and the center of the voxel is the point at which the center rays of each beam intersect. Id. ¶ 171. Although Dr. Lindstrand testifies a POSITA would not have understood Fuhse262 to disclose creating a voxel (Ex. 2004 ¶ 43), Dr. Lindstrand does not dispute Dr. Hesselink’s testimony that light would reflect off of the entire surface of Fuhse262’s mirrors and form reflected beams of light. See Ex. 2004 ¶¶ 42– 58; Ex. 1055, 112:15–21 (“You also agree the ambient light would not just strike the center of the surface, it would strike the entire surface, correct? . . . THE WITNESS: I would say that that is a fair and accurate description.”) would reflect off the entire surface of Fuhse262’s micromirrors and would create a voxel when they intersect with each other, provides sufficient support demonstrating how a person of ordinary skill in the art would have understood Fuhse262’s disclosure of light rays being reflected off of mirrors and converging at a light spot shown in Figure 10. See Unification Techs. LLC v. Micron Tech. Inc., 2024 WL 3738401 at *7 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 9, 2024) (affirming the use of expert testimony to demonstrate how a skilled artisan would have understood a prior art reference’s disclosure as teaching a claim limitation).” slip op. at 28
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededDecided for patent owner
“Petitioner argues that “no claim terms require express construction to resolve the challenges here.” Pet. 13. Patent Owner “agree[s] that the terms Resp. 13–14. Having reviewed the record and the arguments before us, we determine that no claim terms require express construction to resolve the dispute between the parties.” slip op. at 13
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundDecided for petitioner
“As to Petitioner’s more general allegations regarding motivation to combine the embodiments of Fuhse262 and reasonable expectation of success, we agree with Petitioner for the reasons provided in the Petition and summarized above. Specifically, we agree with Petitioner that Fuhse262 concave mirrors and lenses with embodiments that use micromirrors. See Ex. 1006 ¶ 83 (“In order to still obtain a higher resolution in the produced light-spot image with an unchanged high floating height, the large mirrors or lenses used in the previous exemplary embodiments are each replaced by a plurality of smaller micromirrors or microprisms, which together have essentially the same optical effect as the original optical element.”). We also agree that the embodiments of Fuhse262 build on each other and often refer back to each other. For example, Fuhse262 expressly refers back to “previous exemplary embodiments” when explaining that micromirrors may replace other optical elements in the various embodiments. Ex. 1006 ¶ 83. Fuhse262’s Figures 8(a) through 8(d) build on each successive example, adding and modifying the configuration of mirrors disclosed in the previous figure. See Id. ¶¶ 88, 94 (explaining that Figure 8(b) is based on Figure 8(a) but shows mirrors arranged in checkerboard-like manner and Figures 8(c) and 8(d) further modify the configuration with every “fourth field” and “ninth field” respectively being assigned to specific light spots.) Fuhse262 also explains that Figure 9 is a sectional view of Figure 8 and that Figure 10 illustrates the “calculation of the flat mirror surfaces of the micromirrors” of Figures 8 and 9. Id. ¶¶ 91, 95. For the aforementioned reasons, we determine that Petitioner has demonstrated, by a preponderance of the evidence, that a person of ordinary skill would have been motivated to combine the teachings of the relied upon embodiments of Fuhse262.” slip op. at 18
Patent outcomesUS 10,189,294 unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,189,294 - PTAB · Nov 13, 2025 · IPR2025-00805 · APJ Eric C Jeschke · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–24 and all asserted grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail on at least one challenged claim.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“review. See 35 U.S.C. § 314; 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a) (2024) (“The Board institutes the trial on behalf of the Director.”). Inter partes review may not be instituted “unless . . . the information presented in the petition . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314. Upon consideration of the evidence and arguments in the record, for the reasons below, we determine that the information presented shows a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail with respect to at least one of the challenged claims. We thus institute inter partes review on all challenged claims on all asserted grounds. See SAS Inst. Inc. v. Iancu, 584 U.S. 357, 362–63, 369–70 (2018); 37 C.F.R. § 42.108(a) (“When instituting inter partes review, the Board will authorize the review to proceed on all of the challenged claims and on all grounds of unpatentability asserted for each claim.”).” slip op. at 2
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsNot reached
“C. Patent Owner’s Arguments Under 35 U.S.C. § 325(d) In the Preliminary Response, Patent Owner contends that Petitioner’s unpatentability arguments presented in this proceeding were previously considered by the USPTO. See Prelim. Resp. 31–33. In her decision referring this matter to the Board, then-Acting Director Stewart rejected that argument. See Paper 20 at 2–3 (discussing why “Petitioner provides persuasive reasoning, supported by evidence, that discretionary denial under 35 U.S.C. § 325(d) is not appropriate”); see also Prelim. Resp. 31–33 (referring to and citing Patent Owner’s Discretionary Denial Brief (Paper 8)). We need not and do not address this issue further.” slip op. at 15
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“For purposes of this Decision, we adopt the definition of the level of ordinary skill in the art proposed by Petitioner. As to the inclusion of physics in Petitioner’s definition, Dr. Singhose (a professor of mechanical engineering) testifies as to why undergraduate mechanical engineering degree holders would have the requisite knowledge here, but does not testify that undergraduate physics degree holders would not. See Singhose Decl. ¶¶ 2, 27, 28. In addition, Patent Owner and Dr. Singhose require “a four-year degree in mechanical engineering or a closely related field,” but fail to identify what fields are “closely related.” See Prelim. Resp. 11; Singhose Decl. ¶ 27. Based on the Morse Declaration, we are persuaded at this stage that a hypothetical undergraduate physics degree holder would have adequate knowledge for one of ordinary skill in the art of the invention here. See Morse Decl. ¶ 31. As to the requisite years of experience proposed in the definitions— three for Petitioner versus “at least one” for Patent Owner—we note that Patent Owner’s definition is broader than, but includes, Petitioner’s definition. Moreover, for both the inclusion of physics and the years of experience issues, Patent Owner acknowledges that the arguments in the Preliminary Response “are not impacted based on which definition is applied.” Prelim. Resp. 12 (citing Singhose Decl. ¶¶ 30–34). Further, Patent Owner does not argue at this stage that Petitioner’s proposal for the level of ordinary skill leads to an improper understanding of how a skilled artisan would understand either the challenged patent or the prior art.” slip op. at 11
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“B. Claim Construction In inter partes reviews, the Board interprets claim language using the same claim construction standard that would be used in a civil action under 35 U.S.C. § 282(b), as described in Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). See 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b). Under that standard, we generally give claim terms their ordinary and customary meaning, as would be understood by a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention, in light of the language of the claims, the specification, and the prosecution history. See Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1313–14. Although extrinsic evidence, when available, may also be useful when construing claim terms under this standard, extrinsic evidence should be considered in the context of the intrinsic evidence. See id. at 1317–19. Petitioner does not propose express constructions for any claim terms. Pet. 12. Patent Owner also does not propose any express constructions. See Prelim. Resp. 12. On the current record, we need not construe explicitly any claim terms. See Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). As discussed below, however, the parties dispute the meaning of “gaseous fuel.” We address this issue below in the analysis of the challenge to claims 1–3, 5–9, and 18 based on Nakafushi and Olmr.” slip op. at 12
Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites PhillipsPatents in suitUS 10,393,034
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.