- Google LLC v. Flypsi, Inc. (D/B/A Flyp)All claims unpatentablePTAB · Jul 31, 2024 · IPR2023-00360 · APJ James J Mayberry · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–6 are unpatentable: claims 1–5 as obvious over Backhaus and Logan, and claim 6 as obvious over Backhaus, Logan, and Saksena.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“A person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the alleged invention of the ’770 patent . . . would have had an undergraduate degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering, computer science or a related field along with two years of work experience in the field of communication . . . More education can supplement practical experience and vice versa. Pet. 4 (referencing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 17–18). Patent Owner does not dispute the level of ordinary skill in the art. PO Resp. 5. For the purposes of this Decision, we apply Petitioner’s undisputed definition of the level of ordinary skill in the art. We find that this definition is consistent with the prior art of record and the skill reflected in the Specification of the ’770 patent.” slip op. at 13
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededDecided for patent owner
“to refer to “[a] channel [that] does not have to be fully connected on both ends or actually transmitting a particular type of information to qualify as a channel.” PO Resp. 6. Petitioner asserts that Backhaus teaches transmitting an access telephone number via a data channel in two ways. Pet. 45–46. As will be evident from our analysis below, we conclude that it would have been obvious to employ an IP-based communication. There is no dispute that an IP-based communications channel satisfies the term channel as used in the claims. Therefore, we determine that the term “channel” does not require an express construction to resolve the parties’ disputes regarding the asserted grounds of unpatentability. See Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms. . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’”) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)).” slip op. at 14
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner
“not require the pre-call information to be transmitted after the call is received at the switch. The “general rule [is that], ‘[u]nless the steps of a method [claim] actually recite an order, the steps are not ordinarily construed to require one.’” Mformation Techs., Inc., 764 F.3d at 1398. As discussed in greater detail below, we do not find the asserted claims, read in light of the Specification,6 to require that the pre-call information having a bridge number be transmitted after a call to a secondary number is made. We begin with the words of the claim. See, e.g., Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1314 (“[T]he context in which a term is used in the . . . claim [at issue] can be highly instructive.”). The complete “transmitting” step recites: transmitting pre-call information to the handset over the at least one data channel the pre-call information including the bridge telephone number and the handset-associated telephone number, such that the handset is capable of displaying the handset-associated telephone number to a user and, based on user input, accepting the incoming call by connecting with the switch over the at least one voice channel using the bridge telephone number. Ex. 1001, 10:29–37. The plain language of the claims requires that the pre-call information is transmitted such that the handset is capable of displaying the handset-associated telephone number and accepting the incoming call. Nothing in this language precludes the pre-call information from being transmitted before the incoming call is received at the switch— the requirement is that the information makes the handset capable of displaying the handset-associated telephone number to a user and accepting” slip op. at 18
- Expert testimonyPatent owner expert discountedDecided for patent owner
“The Petition, at page 41, makes the argument. We also do not agree with Patent Owner and Dr. Akl that a person having ordinary skill in the art would not have been motivated to employ IP-based communications for the pre-call information. Dr. Akl testifies that [i]f the relationship number was split into a separate transmission[] and transmitted faster than the call itself, as the Petition appears to suggest, then the relationship number could arrive before the call. In this case, the handset would have a notification relating to a call that is not ready to accept, which would be a bad experience for the user because the user would be able to see the incoming call notification but would be unable to accept it. Ex. 2010 ¶ 81. But this testimony ignores the fact that the scenario discussed in Backhaus is the case where a third party caller calls for the first time, and a relationship number is created. See Ex. 1005 ¶ 53. If the pre-call information arrives before the call, then the SLS module on the phone can use the information to display the caller information once the call is connected. Such an approach may avoid the situation where “unknown caller” needs to be displayed, for example. See id. ¶ 55. Indeed, Backhaus suggests Petitioner’s proposed use. See id. ¶ 73 (“Such channels can be used in setting up the relationship databases, sharing information between the SLS module 105 and the SLS platform 115.”). Because Dr. Akl’s testimony is inconsistent with Backhaus’s express teachings, we give it little weight.” slip op. at 42
Patent outcomesUS 9,667,770 unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 9,667,770 - Google LLC v. Flypsi, IncAll claims unpatentablePTAB · Jul 29, 2024 · IPR2023-00361 · APJ Michael T Cygan · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–11 are unpatentable: claims 1–11 are shown obvious on the decided grounds; the additional Taylor grounds are not reached.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“time “would have had an undergraduate degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering, computer science or a related field along with two years of work experience in the field of telecommunication. . . . More education can supplement practical experience and vice versa.” Pet. 4–5 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 17–18). Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s assessment of the level of ordinary skill. PO Resp. 6. Determining the level of ordinary skill in the art involves various factors, including the “type of problems encountered in the art; prior art solutions to those problems; rapidity with which innovations are made; sophistication of the technology; and educational level of active workers in the field.” In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (citation omitted). The prior art of record also reflects the level of ordinary skill in the art. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001). Based on the complete trial record, we adopt the assessment offered by Petitioner and undisputed by Patent Owner, as it is consistent with the ’105 patent and the asserted prior art.” slip op. at 7
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededTerm construed board ownMixed
“the term, and invited further briefing. Dec. on Inst. 14–15. Patent Owner does not assert that this construction affects Petitioner’s “first way” obviousness assertions. PO Resp. 31. After consideration of the post- Institution briefing, we agree with Patent Owner that Petitioner’s “second way” obviousness assertions rely upon a lack of ordering in claims 1 and 2 such that the transmitting of pre-call information may occur prior to the receiving on an incoming call (Pet. Reply 3); therefore, the term “pre-call information” requires construction to resolve the controversy. The “general rule [is that], ‘[u]nless the steps of a method [claim] actually recite an order, the steps are not ordinarily construed to require one.’” Mformation Techs., Inc. v. Research In Motion Ltd., 764 F.3d 1392, 1398 (Fed. Cir. 2014). As discussed above, we do not find the asserted information having a bridge number be transmitted after a call to a secondary number is made. The plain language of the claim requires that the pre-call information include a bridge number “for connecting the handset to the incoming call at the switch”; i.e., information to be used with respect to the incoming call recited in limitation [1.d]. The transmission of the pre-call information may therefore be at any time such that its contents (the bridge number) may be used with respect to the recited incoming call. Consequently, we do not adopt Patent Owner’s proffered construction.” slip op. at 13
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundUnpatentable
“whether teachings other than Winbladh would be preferentially considered, improperly frame the obviousness question. Patent Owner and Dr. Akl emphasize that Winbladh uses a “‘host resource’ that manages multiple call legs,” arguing that is different from Backhaus’s “more limited” system that uses a “conventional call routing system.” PO Resp. 36–37 (citing Ex. 2010 ¶ 113). However, the obviousness question is “whether the relevant artisan would be motivated to make the combination to arrive at the claims’ actual limitations,” not whether such a combination would preserve all aspects of either Backhaus or Winbladh. See Axionics, Inc. v. Medtronic, Inc., 2023 WL 4410686 (Fed. Cir. July 10, 2023). Moreover, “it’s not necessary to show that a combination is ‘the best option, only that it be a suitable option.” Intel Corp. v. Qualcomm Inc., 21 F.4th 784, 800 (Fed. Cir. 2021) (quoting PAR Pharm., Inc. v. TWI Pharms, Inc., 773 F.3d 1186, 1197–98 (Fed. Cir. 2014)). Further, “[t]he test for obviousness is not whether the features of a secondary reference may be bodily incorporated into the structure of the primary reference [but rather] what the combined teachings of those references would have suggested to those of ordinary skill in the art.” Facebook, Inc. v. Windy City Innovations, LLC, 973 F.3d 1321, 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2020) (“KSR does not support [the] theory that a person of ordinary skill can only perform combinations of a puzzle element A with a perfectly fitting puzzle element B”). Here, Petitioner’s combination provides for a pre-call transmission of local telephone number #βr, and would logically provide advantage in those situations in which a long distance number was originally used for the connection; i.e., those situations for which Winbladh is purposed. We further note that a combination need not work in all situations for a person having ordinary skill in the art to find it advantageous. See Intel tradeoffs should be weighed when a benefit occurs during only some operating conditions).” slip op. at 39
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedDecided for petitioner
“4 Patent Owner argues that we should still address its proposed construction of the term “channel” because it “significantly impacts the credibility” of Petitioner’s declarant, Dr. Bill Lin. Tr. 68:3–24; PO Sur-reply 3 n.1. We disagree. The portions of the Lin Declaration that we rely on in this Decision are credible because those portions are consistent with and supported by the other evidence of record. See Sections II.D–II.E.” slip op. at 9
Patent outcomesUS 10,051,105 unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,051,105 - PTAB · Jul 26, 2024 · IPR2024-00342 · APJ Hyun J Jung · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution of review of claims 1–24 and 26–30 under § 314(a), finding that Petitioner had not shown that a second petition was necessary.
RulingsInstitution decision- Parallel petitionsInstitution denied discretionary otherInstitution denied
“In view of Patent Owner’s clear stipulation that it will not assert any additional claims of the ’733 patent against Samsung, and that it will not assert the ’733 patent against Google, Petitioner’s arguments regarding the large number of claims asserted in litigation fails to show that more than one petition is necessary. Paper 3, 3–4; Prelim. Reply 2–4; CTPG 59. Furthermore, all of the claims asserted in related litigation (claims 1– 14, 19, 21–24, 26, 29, and 30) are addressed in IPR2024-00341. Paper 3, 3; Ex. 1021, 2. Petitioner’s arguments that certain dependent claims are reached only in this proceeding, but not in IPR2024-00341, also fail to show that more than one petition is necessary. Paper 3, 4 (“Specifically, claim 25 is only challenged in the [IPR2024-00341] Petition, and claims 18, 20, and 28 are only challenged in the [present] Petition.”); Prelim. Reply 4–5. None of dependent claims 18, 20, or 28 is being asserted in related litigation, and Patent Owner stipulates not to add any additional claims to its infringement contentions if institution is denied here. Prelim. Sur-reply 3. Thus, Petitioner’s arguments that the present Petition reaches dependent claims 18, 20, and 28, which are not reached in IPR2024-00341, insufficiently shows that more than one petition is necessary. See CTPG 59. Petitioner also argues that the public availability of the primary reference (“TS-23.140”) used in IPR2024-00341 “is open to challenge by Patent Owner.” Paper 3, 1–2. “Patent Owner stipulates that if institution is denied in this proceeding, Patent Owner will not challenge the public availability of the TS-23.140 specification in the -00341 proceeding.” Prelim. Resp. 4. not challenge the public availability of TS-23.140, Petitioner fails to show that more than one petition is necessary. Paper 3, 1–2; CTPG 59, 61 (“If stating that issues are not material or in dispute, the patent owner should clearly proffer any necessary stipulations. For example, the patent owner may seek to avoid additional petitions by proffering a stipulation that certain claim limitations are not disputed or that certain references qualify as prior art.”). Petitioner further argues that the present Petition relies on a different type of primary reference and different art combinations than those in IPR2024-00341. Paper 3, 1–3. Petitioner, though, does not explain specifically why “challeng[ing] the claims from different perspectives” demonstrates that more than one petition is necessary. See id. Further, we agree with Patent Owner that there is substantial overlap in the art and art combinations, such as the substantially similar reliance on Ogawa in both proceedings. Prelim. Resp. 5–7; see also Paper 3, 5 (stating that “Petitioners have purposefully used the same secondary reference (Ogawa) in a similar manner in both petitions” with “similar motivations to combine these secondary references with the respective primary references” and that “Petitioners are presenting only two petitions, with each relying on different primary references, but the same secondary reference (Ogawa) that is applied in the presented combinations in a similar manner”). Given the substantial overlap in the art asserted, Petitioner’s arguments regarding different primary references and art combinations fail to show that more than one petition is necessary. See CTPG 59.” slip op. at 7
Discretionary denialPatents in suitUS 8,406,733 - PTAB · Jul 26, 2024 · IPR2024-00341 · APJ Hyun J Jung · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–17, 19, 21–27, 29, and 30 because Petitioner showed a reasonable likelihood that claim 1 would be obvious over TS-23.140 and Ogawa.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“b) Petitioner Shows a Reasonable Likelihood of Prevailing Based on the present record, Petitioner shows a reasonable likelihood of prevailing in its challenge to claim 1 as unpatentable over TS-23.140 and Ogawa.” slip op. at 20
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner argues that a person of ordinary skill in the art “would have had (1) at least a bachelor’s degree in computer science, electrical engineering, or a related field, and (2) 3–5 years of experience in services and application implementation in communication networks,” and that “[a]dditional graduate education could substitute for professional experience, and vice versa.” Pet. 2 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 1–15, 21, 22). Based on the preliminary record, we adopt Petitioner’s asserted level of ordinary skill to determine whether there is a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail with respect to at least one of the claims challenged in the Petition.” slip op. at 7
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“At this stage, we do not need to interpret expressly any claim term. Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms that . . . are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’”) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). We apply Petitioner’s understanding of the claim terms as above described.” slip op. at 9
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successInstituted
“Petitioner argues that TS-23.140 would have been implemented with a modem because “it was well-known to use a modem to enable communications over the networks described in TS-23.140,” “would have been a conventional and obvious way to implement what TS-23.140 describes,” and would have been “nothing more than utilizing familiar, known components to achieve a predictable result of facilitating TS- 23.140’s communications.” Pet. 9–10 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 61–63; Ex. 1004, 14, 17–19, 23–24; Ex. 1008 ¶¶ 27–28, 44, Figs. 1, 4); see also id. at 19 (summarizing the proposed combination). Petitioner also argues that there would have been a reasonable expectation of success in implementing a modem in TS-23.140. Id. at 10 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 63).” slip op. at 18
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 8,406,733 - Google LLC v. Flypsi, Inc.All claims unpatentablePTAB · Jul 26, 2024 · IPR2023-00358 · APJ Robert J Weinschenk · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–4 are unpatentable: claims 1, 2, and 4 as obvious over Backhaus and Taylor, and claim 3 as obvious over Backhaus, Saksena, and Taylor.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“B. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art Petitioner argues that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had “an undergraduate degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering, computer science or a related field along with two years of work experience in the field of telecommunication.” Pet. 4 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 17–18). Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s description. PO Resp. 5. We adopt Petitioner’s description for purposes of this Decision.” slip op. at 7
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“Patent Owner proposes construing the term “channel” in all challenged claims to refer to “[a] channel [that] does not have to be fully connected on both ends or actually transmitting a particular type of information to qualify as a channel.” PO Resp. 6. Petitioner asserts that Backhaus teaches transmitting an access telephone number via a data channel in two ways. Pet. 23–29. We rely only on the “second way” for purposes of this Decision. See Section II.D.3; Pet. 26–29. Patent Owner’s proposed construction of the term “channel” does not impact the parties’ dispute about the “second way” that Backhaus teaches transmitting an access telephone number via a data channel. PO Resp. 21–23; PO Sur-reply 11; Tr. 10:2–11, 68:3–24.1 Therefore, we determine that the term “channel” does not require an express construction to resolve the parties’ disputes regarding the asserted grounds of unpatentability.” slip op. at 7
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundUnpatentable
“art to combine the teachings of Backhaus and Taylor so that Backhaus’s SLS platform communicates with the PSTN using Taylor’s PSTN interface. Id. at 55–56; Ex. 1002 ¶ 101. Doing so would have been obvious because Backhaus teaches using its SLS platform with a PSTN, and Taylor provides an interface that allows an external system, such as Backhaus’s SLS platform, to communicate with a PSTN. Pet. 54–56; Ex. 1002 ¶ 101; Ex. 1005 ¶ 32; Ex. 1007 ¶¶ 4, 8. In addition, a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had a reasonable expectation of success in using Taylor’s PSTN interface with Backhaus’s SLS platform. Pet. 57; Ex. 1002 ¶ 102.” slip op. at 22
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedDecided for petitioner
“because it is “highly conclusory” and “internally contradictory,” and because Dr. Lin “could not explain his opinions at deposition.” PO Resp. 38–39; PO Sur-reply 15–17. In particular, Patent Owner contends that the Lin Declaration “does not contain any statement of the legal standards the expert understood or was applying, such as standards relating to defining the person of ordinary skill in the art, anticipation, or obviousness,” and Dr. Lin “could not recall whether Petitioner gave him instructions on any legal principle.” PO Resp. 39–40 (citing Ex. 2009, 9:1–11, 14:5–17:6, 23:6–11, 25:3–10, 26:9–22, 33:11–34:1, 34:3–11); PO Sur-reply 16. Patent Owner’s argument is unavailing. We do not rely on the Lin Declaration as evidence of any legal standard or for Dr. Lin’s legal conclusions. Rather, we rely on the Lin Declaration to support our factual determinations regarding the teachings of Backhaus, Saksena, and Taylor, as well as why and how a person of ordinary skill in the art would have combined those teachings. See Sections II.D.3, II.D.6, II.E.1, II.E.2. Thus, irrespective of whether the Lin Declaration discusses a particular legal standard, we do not disregard the entire Lin Declaration.” slip op. at 26
Patent outcomesUS 10,334,094 unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,334,094 - Google LLC v. Flypsi, Inc.All claims unpatentablePTAB · Jul 26, 2024 · IPR2023-00357 · APJ Robert J Weinschenk · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–4 are unpatentable: claims 1, 2, and 4 as obvious over Backhaus and Taylor, and claim 3 as obvious over Backhaus, Saksena, and Taylor.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“B. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art Petitioner argues that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had “an undergraduate degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering, computer science or a related field along with two years of work experience in the field of telecommunication.” Pet. 4–5 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 17–18). Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s description. PO Resp. 5. We adopt Petitioner’s description for purposes of this Decision.” slip op. at 7
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“Patent Owner proposes construing the term “channel” in all challenged claims to refer to “[a] channel [that] does not have to be fully connected on both ends or actually transmitting a particular type of information to qualify as a channel.” PO Resp. 6. Petitioner asserts that Backhaus teaches transmitting an access telephone number via a data channel in two ways. Pet. 22–26. We rely only on the “second way” for purposes of this Decision. See Section II.D.3; Pet. 25–26. Patent Owner’s proposed construction of the term “channel” does not impact the parties’ dispute about the “second way” that Backhaus teaches transmitting an access telephone number via a data channel. PO Resp. 21–23; PO Sur-reply 11; Tr. 10:2–11, 68:3–24.1 Therefore, we determine that the term “channel” does not require an express construction to resolve the parties’ disputes regarding the asserted grounds of unpatentability.” slip op. at 7
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundUnpatentable
“had reason to combine the cited teachings of Backhaus and Taylor. Pet. 50– 54 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 94–100). We agree with Petitioner’s rationale. Specifically, it would have been obvious to a person of ordinary skill in the art to combine the teachings of Backhaus and Taylor so that Backhaus’s SLS platform communicates with the PSTN using Taylor’s PSTN interface. Id. at 53; Ex. 1002 ¶ 97. Doing so would have been obvious because Backhaus teaches using its SLS platform with a PSTN, and Taylor provides an interface that allows an external system, such as Backhaus’s SLS platform, to communicate with a PSTN. Pet. 52–53; Ex. 1002 ¶ 97; Ex. 1005 ¶ 32; Ex. 1007 ¶¶ 4, 8. In addition, a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had a reasonable expectation of success in using Taylor’s PSTN interface with Backhaus’s SLS platform. Pet. 53–54; Ex. 1002 ¶ 98.” slip op. at 21
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedDecided for petitioner
“Sur-reply 15–17. In particular, Patent Owner contends that the Lin Declaration “does not contain any statement of the legal standards the expert understood or was applying, such as standards relating to defining the person of ordinary skill in the art, anticipation, or obviousness,” and Dr. Lin “could not recall whether Petitioner gave him instructions on any legal principle.” PO Resp. 39–40 (citing Ex. 2009, 9:1–11, 14:5–17:6, 23:6–11, 25:3–10, 26:9–22, 33:11–34:1, 34:3–11); PO Sur-reply 16. Patent Owner’s argument is unavailing. We do not rely on the Lin Declaration as evidence of any legal standard or for Dr. Lin’s legal conclusions. Rather, we rely on the Lin Declaration to support our factual determinations regarding the teachings of Backhaus, Saksena, and Taylor, as well as why and how a person of ordinary skill in the art would have combined those teachings. See Sections II.D.3, II.D.6, II.E.1, II.E.2. Thus, irrespective of whether the Lin Declaration discusses a particular legal standard, we do not disregard the entire Lin Declaration.” slip op. at 26
Patent outcomesUS 11,218,585 unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,218,585 - Google LLC v. Flypsi, Inc. (D/B/A Flyp)All claims unpatentablePTAB · Jul 26, 2024 · IPR2023-00359 · APJ James J Mayberry · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–4 are unpatentable: claims 1, 2, and 4 over Backhaus and Taylor, and claim 3 over Backhaus, Taylor, and Saksena.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“A person of ordinary skill in the art . . . at the time of the alleged invention of the ’554 patent would have had an undergraduate degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering, computer science or a related field along with two years of work experience in the field of telecommunication . . . More education can supplement practical experience and vice versa. Pet. 4–5 (referencing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 17–18). Patent Owner does not dispute the level of ordinary skill in the art. PO Resp. 5. For the purposes of this Decision, we apply Petitioner’s undisputed definition of the level of ordinary skill in the art. We find that this definition is consistent with the prior art of record and the skill reflected in the Specification of the ’554 patent.” slip op. at 13
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“challenged claims to resolve the underlying controversy.” Pet. 8. Patent Owner proposes construing the term “channel” in all challenged claims to refer to “[a] channel [that] does not have to be fully connected on both ends or actually transmitting a particular type of information to qualify as a channel.” PO Resp. 6. Petitioner asserts that Backhaus teaches transmitting an access telephone number via a data channel in two ways. Pet. 22–26. As will be evident from our analysis below, we rely only on the “second way” for purposes of this Decision. Patent Owner’s proposed construction of the term “channel” does not impact the parties’ dispute about the “second way” that Backhaus teaches transmitting an access telephone number via a data channel. PO Resp. 21–22; Pet. Reply 3 (“Flyp does not even allege that its construction is relevant to the ‘second way’ the Petition addresses limitation [1.b].”); PO Sur-reply 11; Tr. 10:2–11, 68:3–24.5 Therefore, we determine that the term “channel” does not require an express construction to resolve the parties’ disputes regarding the asserted grounds of unpatentability. See Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms that . . . are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’”) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). Also, we determine that we need not expressly construe any other claim terms to resolve the parties’ disputes. To the extent that the scope of any particular claim term requires discussion, however, we provide it in our assessment of the challenges, which we turn to next.” slip op. at 13
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedPatent owner expert discountedMixed
“suggest that we categorially disregard Dr. Lin’s declaration. As a general point, our precedential decision in Xerox does not provide a blank condemnation of declaration testimony that is identical or virtually identical to language in a paper. Xerox found that the “cited declaration testimony is conclusory and unsupported, adds little to the conclusory assertion for which it is offered to support, and is entitled to little weight.” Xerox at 15; see also 37 C.F.R. § 42.65(a) (“Expert testimony that does not disclose the underlying facts or data on which the opinion is based is entitled to little or no weight.”). Here, Dr. Lin cites to evidence to support certain testimony. See, e.g., Ex. 1003 ¶ 73 (citing to Ex. 1007 and Ex. 1011). Also, we do not rely on the Lin Declaration as evidence of any legal standard or for Dr. Lin’s legal conclusions. Rather, we rely on the Lin Declaration to support our factual determinations regarding the teachings of Backhaus, Saksena, and Taylor, as well as why and how a person of ordinary skill in the art would have combined those teachings. Finally, Patent Owner’s arguments go to the weight of Dr. Lin’s testimony. We assess the appropriate weight to give the testimony in our analyses below.” slip op. at 15
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundDecided for petitioner
“provided a motivation to combine the teachings of a PSTN interface in Backhaus’s system, even though Backhaus discloses interfacing with the PSTN. Backhaus is silent as to how its system interfaces with the PSTN. As such, we agree with Petition that a person having ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to connect SLS platform 115 with the PSTN and to also include a PSTN interface in order to facilitate such an connection when implementing Backhaus’s system and processes—such that SLS platform 115 could provide the disclosed second line services to many device users connected to the PSTN that is known to provide reliable communications. Pet. 50. Indeed, Patent Owner’s argument that Backhaus discloses interacting with the PSTN strengthens Petitioner’s position, demonstrating that a person having ordinary skill in the art, when considering Backhaus’s and Taylor’s teachings together, would have used a PSTN interface to ensure a connection with a PSTN. Cf. Pet. Reply 19 (“Rather, it shows that a [person having ordinary skill in the art] would have been motivated to ‘include a PSTN interface similar to that discussed in Taylor when implementing Backhaus’s telephony service system.’” (citing Pet., 49–51)).” slip op. at 32
Patent outcomesUS 11,012,554 unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,012,554 - PTAB · Jul 15, 2024 · IPR2023-00611 · APJ Georgianna W Braden · IPR · Adverse judgment
The Board granted Patent Owner’s request for adverse judgment after it disclaimed all challenged claims, terminating the proceeding and entering judgment against Patent Owner.
RulingsAdverse judgment- Adverse judgmentAdverse judgmentGranted
“Under 35 U.S.C. § 42.73(b), a party may request judgment against itself at any time during a proceeding. Also, under 37 C.F.R. § 42.73(b)(2), actions construed as a request for entry of adverse judgment include disclaimer of a claim such that the party has no remaining claim in the trial. Here, Patent Owner has not only disclaimed all of the challenged claims of the ’224 patent, such that no claim remains in this proceeding, but also expressly requests entry of adverse judgment. Therefore, under § 42.73(b), adverse judgment is appropriate. Accordingly, we grant Patent Owner’s requests and enter adverse judgment against Patent Owner pursuant to § 42.73(b), thus terminating this proceeding and cancelling the portion of the July 16, 2024 hearing that was allotted to this proceeding and the ’224 patent.” slip op. at 2
NonePatents in suitUS 10,197,224 - Sony Interactive Entertainment LLC v. Intellectual Pixels LimitedAll claims unpatentablePTAB · Jun 5, 2024 · IPR2021-00237 · APJ Iftikhar Ahmed · IPR · Remand
Claims 1–12 are unpatentable as obvious over Wiltshire and Saha, with Chen or PC Magazine additionally applied to the specified dependent claims.
RulingsRemand decision- RemandOther
“Petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal of the Final Written Decision with the Federal Circuit. See Paper 39. On October 13, 2023, the Federal Circuit issued a decision in the appeal vacating our Final Written Decision and remanding for further proceedings consistent with its decision. Sony, 2023 WL 6773879. The Federal Circuit found that our determination that Petitioner’s asserted reference Wiltshire does not disclose the “generating” limitation of claims 1 and 8 was not supported by substantial evidence. Id. at *2–4. The Court vacated our Final Written Decision and remanded for further proceedings consistent with the Court’s opinion. Id. at *5. After the Federal Circuit issued its mandate, we asked the parties to propose a procedure on remand. Ex. 3001, 2. The parties proposed an agreed-upon procedure to allow post-remand briefing with no additional evidence or expert declarations. Id. at 1. We issued an Order authorizing each party to file opening and responsive briefs. Paper 43. The parties then filed the following briefs: Petitioner’s Opening Brief Pursuant to Paper No. 43 (Paper 47, “Pet. Remand Br.”), Patent Owner’s Opening Brief on Remand (Paper 46, “PO Remand Br.”), Petitioner’s Response Brief Pursuant” slip op. at 3
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successUnpatentableMotivation foundUnpatentable
“6773879, at *4. The Federal Circuit concluded that was improper. As the Court explained, “the existence of those examples does not exclude other examples where new images are created,” and “[a]lthough both parties agree[d] the game Doom requires creating new images, [we incorrectly] determined that listing Doom in the specification was not a sufficient disclosure.” Id. Contrary to Patent Owner’s assertion, the logical conclusion from the Federal Circuit’s reasoning is that our finding that Wiltshire is silent as to the content of that compressed MPEG stream has now been rejected. We must “credit[] Wiltshire’s disclosure of applying its system to video games like Doom, which require ‘generating’ new images.” Id. Based on that reading of Wiltshire, Petitioner persuasively shows that the combination of Wiltshire and Saha teaches compressing those new images using MPEG and transmitting those as compressed frames. Dr. Fuchs testifies that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have understood from Wiltshire’s disclosure that “if the image is displayed or updated, it is then sent to the client in the form of a ‘video stream,” and that “[t]ransmitting the updated images as a video stream allows Wiltshire’s system to be used with the wide variety of games it contemplates, including arcade games (like Doom) that continually update images on the screen.” Ex. 1033 ¶ 46; see also id. ¶ 49 (“The video stream must be dynamically generated because Wiltshire system must be capable of playing real-time interactive games like Doom.”); Pet. Reply 13–16. We find Dr. Fuchs’s testimony persuasive and consistent with the Court’s guidance as to Wiltshire’s disclosure.” slip op. at 48
- ExcludeMotion to exclude, grantedMotion to exclude, deniedGranted in part
“objection to excluding Exhibit 1024 from the record. Id. Accordingly, Patent Owner’s motion to exclude as to Exhibit 1024 is granted.” slip op. at 89
Patent outcomesUS 10,681,109 unpatentable§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,681,109 - PTAB · Apr 1, 2024 · IPR2023-01360 · APJ Russell E Cass · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–23 on all petitioned grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that at least one challenged claim would be shown unpatentable.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“An inter partes review may not be instituted unless it is determined that “the information presented in the petition filed under section 311 and any response filed under section 313 shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314 (2018); see also 37 C.F.R § 42.4(a) (2021) (“The Board institutes the trial on behalf of the Director.”). The reasonable likelihood standard is “a higher standard than mere notice pleading,” but “lower than the ‘preponderance’ standard to prevail in a final written decision.” Hulu, LLC v. Sound View Innovations, LLC, IPR2018-01039, Paper 29 at 13 (PTAB Dec. 20, 2019) (precedential). For the reasons provided below and based on the record before us, we determine that Petitioner has demonstrated a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail in showing the unpatentability of at least one of the challenged claims. Accordingly, we institute an inter partes review on all grounds set forth in the Petition.” slip op. at 2
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“A claim “shall be construed using the same claim construction standard that would be used to construe the claim in a civil action under 35 U.S.C. § 282(b).” 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b). At this stage of the proceeding, neither party presents any claim terms for construction. Pet. 2– 3; Prelim. Resp. 3. Based on the present record, we determine that it is not necessary to provide an express interpretation of any claim terms at this time. See Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’”) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)).” slip op. at 5
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“ordinary skill in the art would have had “(1) at least a bachelor’s degree in computer science, electrical engineering, or a related field, and (2) three to five years of experience with networking, power consumption of networked computing devices, and/or wireless communication systems.” Pet. 5, n.1; Ex. 1003 ¶ 17. Dr. Butler further states that “[m]ore education, e.g., a doctorate in an academic area emphasizing electrical engineering, computer engineering, computer science, or a related technical field, would compensate for fewer years of work experience.” Id. Patent Owner states that “[f]or the purposes of this preliminary response,” it “does not challenge that definition.” Prelim. Resp. 3. For purposes of this Decision, we adopt the assessment of the level of ordinary skill in the art proposed by Petitioner and Dr. Butler and not disputed by Patent Owner as reasonable and consistent with the prior art. See Okajima v Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir 2001) (the prior art may reflect an appropriate level of skill in the art).” slip op. at 7
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedDecided for petitioner
“Based on the present record, we determine that Petitioner has made a sufficient showing as to this limitation for purposes of institution. In this regard, Petitioner has introduced sufficient evidence at this stage of the proceeding that one of ordinary skill would have been motivated to combine Rao and Araujo as Petitioner proposes. This evidence includes the testimony of Dr. Butler that one of ordinary skill “would have found it obvious to combine a Remote Access Client as taught by Rao with a PPM and request deflector as taught by Araujo to provide a client that better ‘use[s] the energy in a way that strikes a balance between providing functionality and maintaining longevity of the charge.’” Ex. 1003 ¶ 75. It also includes Dr. Butler’s testimony that, in implementing Rao’s filtering, prioritization, and queuing functionality, one of ordinary skill “would have perceived opportunities for improving the policy management capabilities already present in Rao to impart additional advantages, such as optimizing power use,” and would have known that “mobile devices use techniques for optimizing the use of constrained resources, including network bandwidth and battery power.” Id. ¶ 77. Dr. Butler further explains that one of ordinary skill “would have recognized the importance of power management at least because, in mobile devices, applications cannot execute without sufficient power.” Id. Additionally, Dr. Butler testifies that, for these reasons, one of ordinary skill “would have looked to policy-based power management such as taught in Araujo to serve as one of Rao’s ‘multitude of ways to define client-side application priorities,’” to create a device that “would both manage power according to the PPM techniques of Araujo and manage network use according to the techniques of both Rao and Araujo.” Id. ¶ 78. And, Dr. Butler explains, based on Rao and Araujo, one of ordinary skill “would have understood and found obvious that policy enforcement” in the Rao-Araujo combination “may be based on application state (foreground, background) and power state (battery/plugged-in). Id. ¶ 80. We determine that this testimony is reasonable and credible based on the record presently before us, and is unrebutted by countervailing evidence from Patent Owner. We also determine that Petitioner has introduced sufficient evidence that one of ordinary skill would have had a reasonable expectation of success in achieving the proposed Rao-Araujo combination. This evidence includes the testimony of Dr. Butler that one of ordinary skill “would have expected success integrating a PPM and deflector components as taught by Araujo into a remote access client as taught by Rao,” that “the request deflector (Araujo) and packet capture mechanism (Rao) serve similar functions,” and that “[c]ombining such functions would have required only routine programming skill well within the skill set of” a person of ordinary skill. Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 81, 83.” slip op. at 22
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSRPatents in suitUS 9,609,544
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.