- Micron Technology, Inc. v. Yangtze Memory Technologies Company, Ltd.Some claims unpatentablePTAB · Oct 23, 2025 · IPR2024-00790 · APJ Jo-Anne M Kokoski · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–3 are unpatentable as obvious over Kim; claims 4 and 5 were not shown unpatentable over the asserted grounds.
RulingsFinal written decision- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner
“SuperGuide, 358 F.3d at 875 (“We review the patent’s written description and drawings to confirm that the patentee’s own use of the disputed term is consistent with the meaning given to it by the court.”). The ’031 patent teaches that dielectric pairs of different tiers are etched to form staircases extending along the x-y plane. Ex. 1001, 13:27–28. As described above (§ I.D, supra), dielectric filling structure 311 is formed by depositing a dielectric filling material to fill the space remaining after portions of dielectric stack 203 are removed to form staircase structure 303. Id. at 13:36–41; see also id. at 22:63–65 (“Memory structure 1200 can be formed by forming dielectric filling structure 1201 to fill the space formed by the removal of portions of dielectric stack 1003.”) The ’031 patent then teaches that excess dielectric filling material overlying the topmost surface of staircase structure 303 is removed using a suitable planarization method. Id. at 13:41–44; see also 22:67–23:5 (performing a planarization process to remove excess dielectric filling structure 1201 over the top surface of memory structure 1200). According to the ’031 patent, the portion of the deposited dielectric filling material that remains “over staircase structure 303 and isolation layer 109” forms “dielectric filling structure 311 that surrounds staircase structure 303.” Id. at 13:44–48 (emphasis added); see also id. at 1:56–58 (stating in “some embodiments, the memory device also includes a filling structure surrounding the multiple-stack staircase structure”). structure is etched along the x-, y-, and z-axes, and the dielectric filling structure fills the spaces in the x-, y-, and z-directions created when the staircase structure is etched. Because the excess portion of the dielectric filling structure overlying the top of the staircase structure is removed, what remains is dielectric filling structure in the spaces around the staircase structure in the x-, y-, and z-planes. In this way, the ’031 patent teaches that the dielectric filling structure surrounds, i.e., is all around or encircles, the staircase structure.” slip op. at 11
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“(“POSITA”) would have had “a bachelor of science degree in electrical engineering or a similar discipline” with “2–3 years of professional experience working with (e.g., researching, designing, or teaching) monolithic 3D structures and NAND memory devices,” or “an equivalent level of skill, knowledge, and experience (e.g., an advanced degree may replace some of the professional experience).” Pet. 22–23. Petitioner further contends that a “POSITA would have been aware of and generally knowledgeable about 3D NAND’s structure, its component parts, how it operates, and how it is controlled.” Id. at 23 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 41–44). Patent Owner states that it does not object to the definition of a POSITA proffered by Petitioner. PO Resp. 13–14 (citing Pet. 22). In the Institution Decision, we adopted the assessment offered by Petitioner. Dec. 7. Because Petitioner’s definition of the level of skill in the art is consistent with the ’031 patent and the asserted prior art, we maintain it for purposes of this Final Written Decision. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir 2001).” slip op. at 7
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundMixed
“Dr. Banerjee adequately explains why a POSITA would have been motivated to make dummy structures DS with a conductive core as Petitioner proposes. In an obviousness analysis, some kind of reason must be shown as to why a POSITA would have thought of combining or modifying the prior art to achieve the patented invention. See Innogenetics, N.V. v. Abbott Labs., 512 F.3d 1363, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2008). Here, Petitioner offers only the general proposition that pillar support structures comprising electrically conductive material were known in the art, but this does not provide a reason why a POSITA would have been motivated to modify Kim’s dummy structures. Pet. 55–56; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 156–157. Petitioner’s arguments and Dr. Banerjee’s testimony with respect to the modification of Kim leaves an analytical gap that does not apprise us of why a POSITA would have modified Kim’s dummy structures to include a conductive core as the pillar-support material recited in claim 4. Instead, Petitioner attempts to imbue a POSITA with the knowledge of the claimed invention, when no prior art reference, references of record, or other evidence conveys or suggests that knowledge. Petitioner’s argument that a POSITA would have modified Kim in this way appears to be premised on Petitioner’s knowledge of the ’031 patent disclosure. This is improper hindsight reasoning. Petitioner needed to explain sufficiently what invention to consider modifying Kim’s dummy structures to include a conductive core. Petitioner fails to provide such an explanation. See W.L. Gore & Assoc., Inc. v. Garlock, Inc., 721 F.2d 1540, 1553 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (In an obviousness analysis, we must “cast the mind back to the time the invention was made” and “occupy the mind of one skilled in the art who is presented only with the references, and who is normally guided by the thenaccepted wisdom in the art.”).” slip op. at 23
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of success › HindsightNot shown unpatentableDecided for patent owner
“Dr. Banerjee adequately explains why a POSITA would have been motivated to make dummy structures DS with a conductive core as Petitioner proposes. In an obviousness analysis, some kind of reason must be shown as to why a POSITA would have thought of combining or modifying the prior art to achieve the patented invention. See Innogenetics, N.V. v. Abbott Labs., 512 F.3d 1363, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2008). Here, Petitioner offers only the general proposition that pillar support structures comprising electrically conductive material were known in the art, but this does not provide a reason why a POSITA would have been motivated to modify Kim’s dummy structures. Pet. 55–56; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 156–157. Petitioner’s arguments and Dr. Banerjee’s testimony with respect to the modification of Kim leaves an analytical gap that does not apprise us of why a POSITA would have modified Kim’s dummy structures to include a conductive core as the pillar-support material recited in claim 4. Instead, Petitioner attempts to imbue a POSITA with the knowledge of the claimed invention, when no prior art reference, references of record, or other evidence conveys or suggests that knowledge. Petitioner’s argument that a POSITA would have modified Kim in this way appears to be premised on Petitioner’s knowledge of the ’031 patent disclosure. This is improper hindsight reasoning. Petitioner needed to explain sufficiently what invention to consider modifying Kim’s dummy structures to include a conductive core. Petitioner fails to provide such an explanation. See W.L. Gore & Assoc., Inc. v. Garlock, Inc., 721 F.2d 1540, 1553 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (In an obviousness analysis, we must “cast the mind back to the time the invention was made” and “occupy the mind of one skilled in the art who is presented only with the references, and who is normally guided by the thenaccepted wisdom in the art.”).” slip op. at 23
Patent outcomesUS 10,868,031 mixedClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites PhillipsPatents in suitUS 10,868,031 - Micron Technology, Inc. v. Yangtze Memory Techonologies Company, Ltd.All claims unpatentablePTAB · Oct 23, 2025 · IPR2024-00789 · APJ Jo-Anne M Kokoski · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–6 and 11–13 are unpatentable as obvious over Tessariol; Petitioner did not show claims 1–6, 11, and 13 obvious over Park.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“(“POSITA”) would have had “a bachelor of science degree in electrical engineering or a similar discipline” with “2–3 years of professional experience working with (e.g., researching, designing, or teaching) monolithic 3D structures and NAND memory devices,” or “an equivalent level of skill, knowledge, and experience (e.g., an advanced degree may replace some of the professional experience).” Pet. 33. Petitioner further contends that a “POSITA would have been aware of and generally knowledgeable about 3D NAND’s structure, how it is manufactured, and its component parts.” Id. (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 40–43). Patent Owner states that it does not object to the definition of a POSITA proffered by Petitioner. PO Resp. 13 (citing Pet. 33). In the Institution Decision, we adopted the assessment offered by Petitioner. Dec. 5–6. Because Petitioner’s definition of the level of skill in the art is consistent with the ’872 patent and the asserted prior art, we maintain it for purposes of this Final Written Decision. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir 2001).” slip op. at 6
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner
“Read as a whole, the Specification supports the conclusion that a “dummy source structure” does not function as a source for the memory cells. Dummy source structures are variously described as being (1) electrically separated from the conductive layers of the memory stack, (2) used to laterally separate 3D memory device 100 into multiple memory regions, (3) used as a mechanical support structure, and (4) used as an interconnect to peripheral devices. None of these functions are directed to sourcing the memory cells. Moreover, the Specification describes a “source structure” as being connected with a channel structure of a memory string via a common source, such as a doped region in the substrate. That a dummy source structure does not function as a source to the memory cells is consistent with this description of source structure.” slip op. at 11
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)UnpatentableUnpatentable
“After considering the complete record, we are persuaded that Petitioner sufficiently establishes that Tessariol teaches “at least two of the plurality of dummy source structures are of nominally equal lateral distances to the staircase contact” and “the plurality of dummy source structures are of nominally equal lateral distances to the staircase contact” as recited in claims 3 and 4. As an initial matter, we note that the ’872 patent defines “nominal/nominally” as follows: As used herein, the term “nominal/nominally” refers to a desired, or target, value of a characteristic or parameter for a component or a process operation, set during the design phase of a product or a process, together with a range of values above and/or below the desired value. The range of values can be due to slight variations in manufacturing, processes or tolerances. Ex. 1001, 4:9–15. Referring to Figure 1A, the ’872 patent also teaches that “[t]he four dummy source structures indicated by 146 may be spaced with nominally equal lateral distances to staircase contact 122. In other words, the four dummy source structures indicated by 146 may be evenly or Accordingly, we understand “nominally equal lateral distances” as used in claims 3 and 4 to include evenly or uniformly distributed structures. See Ex. 1003 ¶ 162 (Dr. Banerjee testifying that “[n]ominally lateral distances to, in the context of the ’872 Patent, includes being ‘evenly or uniformly distributed.’”). Tessariol’s Figure 15 illustrates that dummy structures 60 are evenly distributed around operating conductive vias 80. Ex. 1006, Fig. 15. The figure is consistent with Tessariol’s teaching that dummy-structure openings 56 (which become dummy structures 60) are “collectively arrayed in straight-line rows and columns” and “any alternate configuration may be used including, for example, staggering . . . alternating openings 54/56 in rows and/or columns.” Id. ¶ 37. We also credit Dr. Banerjee’s testimony that “it is best practice to use repeating patterns in semiconductive designs” and “a POSITA viewing the Tessariol figures would immediately interpret the figures to include this repeating pattern, in which these objects are of equal distance from the contact.” Ex. 1035 ¶ 85. We disagree with Patent Owner that Tessariol’s Figure 15 is insufficient to show that the dummy source structures are of nominally equal lateral distances to the staircase contact. The Federal Circuit has held that “the speculative modeling premised on unstated assumptions in prior art patent drawings cannot be the basis for challenging the validity of claims reciting specific dimensions not disclosed directly in such prior art.” Nystrom v. TREX Co., 424 F.3d 1136, 1148 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (emphasis added). Here, claims 3 and 4 recite relative positioning (“nominally equal lateral distances”), not specific dimensions or proportions. Accordingly, we find Petitioner’s reliance on Tessariol’s Figure 15 to establish the placement particularly given Dr. Banerjee’s credible testimony regarding best practices in semiconductor design and that a POSITA viewing the Tessariol figures would have understood the objects are of equal distance from the contact. See Ex. 1035 ¶ 85. Based on our consideration of the entire record, and for the reasons set forth above, we determine that Petitioner shows, by a preponderance of the evidence, that claims 3 and 4 would have been obvious over the teachings of Tessariol.” slip op. at 27
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert discountedDecided for patent owner
“Petitioner’s and Dr. Banerjee’s arguments are not persuasive. The arguments are circular as they assert that a POSITA would have understood that dummy source structure must have a complete path (i.e., not have a partial path, or dead-end) like a source structure because the source structure must have a complete path. See, e.g., Ex. 1035 ¶ 50. Similarly, the argument that the ’872 patent’s use of “connect” can only refer to an electrical connection between dummy source structure 246 and the channel structures is based on a figure depicting a source line as having an electrical connection and Dr. Banerjee’s unsupported assertion that the source line is a dummy source line (in some embodiments). Pet. Reply 9; Ex. 1035 ¶ 50. Again, Dr. Banerjee’s evidence is circular as it asserts the dummy source structure must have a complete path because the figure depicts a source line having a complete path, and therefore dummy source lines (in some embodiments) must have a complete path. Id. To the extent Dr. Banerjee asserts that it was “well known” that dummy source structures function as sources or source structures, any such assertion is not credible in light of his testimony that he had never heard of dummy source structures. See Ex. 1035 ¶¶ 17 (stating he “never heard of ‘dummy source structure’ before reading the ’872 patent”), 50 (stating “how these dummy source and source structures function as sources . . . was well known”). Thus, Petitioner’s assertion that the ’872 patent teaches a dummy source structure may connect to channel structures in the inner region is insufficient to show that the dummy source structure acts as a source to the memory cells.” slip op. at 14
Patent outcomesUS 10,861,872 unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites PhillipsPatents in suitUS 10,861,872 - Micron Technology, Inc. v. Yangtze Memory Technologies Company, Ltd.Some claims unpatentablePTAB · Oct 22, 2025 · IPR2024-00794 · APJ Michael T Cygan · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1 and 6 are unpatentable over Park; claims 2–5 and 7–11 were not shown unpatentable on the asserted grounds.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“B. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art Petitioner asserts that a person of ordinary skill in the art (“POSITA”) at the critical time “would have had a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering or a similar discipline, along with 2-3 years of professional experience working with (e.g., researching, designing, or teaching) NAND flash memory devices, or an equivalent level of skill, knowledge, and experience (e.g., an advanced degree may replace some of the professional experience).” Pet. 19 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 36–37). Petitioner further asserts that a POSITA “would have been aware of and generally knowledgeable about 3D NAND’s structure, its component parts, how it operates, and how it is controlled.” Id. Patent Owner does not object to this assessment, arguing that its claims are valid regardless of the precise definition. PO 3 Neither party presents evidence or arguments regarding objective evidence of non-obviousness. skill, as it appears to be consistent with the specification of the ’623 patent and the prior art of record.” slip op. at 5
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert discountedMixed
“the Petition, Petitioner’s approach to Shibata’s drive circuit and Park’s dummy channel/open region teachings results in a deficiency in its showing of reasonable expectation of success for its expressed combination of extending Park’s insulative trenches to replace some of its common source lines. Petitioner relies solely on the fact that the references are capable of performing the relied-upon functions or could possess the relied-upon structure. See, e.g., Pet. Reply 19–20 (stating, “If Shibata accommodates this type of trench . . . there is no reason Park cannot as well,” and “Park itself already presents a variety of ways to minimize any etching problem that may be encountered when using wet etching”). But Park does not describe its dummy channel or open region teachings as generally applicable to all of its embodiments. And Petitioner needs to show a reason why the application of Shibata would be reasonably expected to have been successfully applied in Park, not merely state that there is “no reason” to expect that it would not be successful. See DSS Tech. Mgmt., Inc. v. Apple Inc., 885 F.3d 1367, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (finding that even where two structures have “the same physical structure,” applying the teachings of one structure to the other requires “additional, reasoned analysis.”). The knowledge of one skilled in the art cannot bridge this gap, because these are inventive features of Park and Shibata. Furthermore, Petitioner also has not sufficiently explained, for any of its proposed augmentations, how metal gate deposition would occur sufficiently in the most remote regions of the long, parallel insulating layers in Petitioner’s Park-Shibata combination of such regions to avoid the risk of incomplete gate electrode layers in the final memory device that Patent Owner argues would result in a significant trade-off in memory device accuracy, and device scalability. PO Resp. 68 (citing Ex. 2010 ¶ 145). For example, Dr. Lee addresses only etching issues, not deposition issues. Ex. 1025, ¶¶ 32–47.” slip op. at 46
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner
“We agree with Petitioner. As pointed out by Patent Owner, the “trenches formed in the BSG” language of claim 1 reflects specific description of the gate-first method of manufacturing, but not the gate-last method of manufacturing. Ex. 1001, 7:17–19 (“referring to Fig. 1A, one or more first dielectric trenches . . . are formed in the one or more BSGs”). However, as Petitioner points out, the claims are to a memory “device,” not to a method of manufacturing or a device produced by specific manufacturing steps. Pet. Reply 1. During prosecution of the application that matured into the ’623 patent, the Examiner determined that the device of claim 1 was distinct from a separately claimed method of manufacturing and The Examiner’s requirement stated that the memory device of claim 1 is not limited by the disclosed process of manufacture because “the process claims require . . . deposition steps of polysilicon whereas the product claims do not require any polysilicon.” Id. Applicant agreed “without traverse” with the Examiner’s determination and selected to pursue only the “device” claims. Id. at 596 (“Applicant elects, without traverse, Invention I, Claims 1–11, drawn to a device”).4 The distinctiveness is also supported by the discussion in the ’623 patent of “formed in the BSG” that describes its device separately from its method of formation. The ’623 patent describes that “[i]n the disclosed memory device, one or more first dielectric trenches are formed in the BSG and extend in a length direction of the substrate to separate the BSG into a plurality of sub-BSGs.” Ex. 1001, 2:25–28. This description precedes, and is separate from, its description of an aspect of a process for manufacturing a memory device in which the BSG layer is formed and then “dielectric trenches are formed” that may “pass through the BSG layer” so that the “BSG layer is separated by the one or more first dielectric trenches into a plurality of sub-BSG layers.” Id. at 3:30–45. The description of the device having trenches formed in the BSG, which is not limited to a particular manufacturing process, further supports Petitioner’s contention that the “formed in the BSG” language is not limited to a particular manufacturing embodiment.” slip op. at 7
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Specification disavowal / 'present invention' languageTerm construed board ownDecided for patent owner
“We do not agree that such arguments support Patent Owner’s conclusion. Patent Owner acknowledges that two portions of a BSG that are connected at a small opening are not separated because both portions remain electrically connected to each other. Id. at 17 (stating, “common source regions 52a is merely in the middle of a single sub-BSG 2 (‘SUB-BLK2’) and does not divide it into further sub-BSGs because there is an H-cut 72 that connects the two sides of the common source region such that both regions are part of the same sub-BSG”) (citing Ex. 1001, 9:15–19, 9:41–44) (emphasis omitted); Ex. 1026, 34:4–15, 41:23–42:16 (Dr. Kuhn attesting that common source regions may isolate adjacent BSGs). Patent Owner considers other portions of the BSG to be separated into sub-BSGs because there is no such connection between the sub-BSG portions. Id. at 17–18 (annotating Ex. 1001, Fig. 1B). Under such reasoning, the addition of a trench closing a gap between two neighboring BSG portions, thereby breaking the electrical connection therebetween, would “separate” the two BSG portions into further sub-BSGs. In its obviousness assertions, Petitioner argues for such an interpretation of the claim. See Pet. Reply 10 (“Park’s layers 111 electrically separate its BSG”). Based on the above, we determine that the phrase “dielectric trenches formed in the BSG and extending in a length direction of the substrate to perform electrical separation between sub-BSGs, but does not require that the trenches act alone, extending from one end of the device to the other across the entire BSG. Similarly, the trenches need not have any particular length, and need only to have some length that performs that separation.” slip op. at 13
Patent outcomesUS 10,950,623 mixedClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,950,623 - Advancell Pty Ltd.InstitutedPTAB · Oct 14, 2025 · PGR2025-00029 · APJ Kimberly Mcgraw · PGR · Institution
The Board instituted PGR on claims 1–6 and 8–20 on all asserted grounds, finding it more likely than not that at least one challenged claim is unpatentable.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“After reviewing the parties’ briefs and supporting evidence, we determine that Petitioner has sufficiently shown that Hassfjell-Hoff discloses each element of claim 1. As such, Petitioner’s argument and evidence as set forth above and further discussed below, sufficiently shows that it is more likely than not that claim 1 is anticipated by Hassfjell-Hoff, notwithstanding Patent Owner’s arguments, also addressed below.” slip op. at 16
- Adverse judgmentAdverse judgmentOther
“Here, Patentee Sciencons AS filed a statutory disclaimer of claim 7 of the ’603 patent. Ex. 2001. Based on our review of Exhibit 2001 and U.S. Patent and Trademark Office public records, we find that the disclaimer of claim 7 complies with the above-listed requirements of 37 C.F.R. § 1.321(a). Accordingly, we treat claim 7 as having never been part of the ’603 patent. See Vectra Fitness, Inc. v. TNWK Corp., 162 F.3d 1379, 1383 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (“This court has interpreted the term ‘considered as part of the original patent’ in [35 U.S.C.] § 253 to mean that the patent is treated as though the disclaimed claims never existed.”). Because post-grant review cannot be instituted based on disclaimed claims, claim 7 is outside the scope of this proceeding. 37 C.F.R. § 42.207(e) (“No post-grant review will be instituted based on disclaimed claims.”); General Elec. Co. v. United Techs. Corp., IPR2017-00491, Paper 9 (PTAB July 6, 2017) (precedential) (denying institution in view of a statutory disclaimer of all the challenged claims). Thus, we confine our analysis in this Decision to claims 1–6 and 8– 20, the remaining challenged claims that have not been disclaimed.” slip op. at 7
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Real party in interest / privityGranted
“Sciencons AS also states that ARTBIO, Inc. is responsible for defending the ’603 patent in this proceeding and requests that ARTBIO, Inc. be included in the caption for this proceeding.2 Paper 4, 1; Paper 7, 1. ARTBIO, Inc. has signed powers of attorney appointing the same practitioners that were appointed by Sciencons AS to transact all business associated with the instant post-grant review proceeding of the ’603 patent. See Papers 3, 4, 7, 8. To date, no objection has been raised to Patent Owner’s request. Given Sciencons AS’s representation that ARTBIO, Inc. is currently the exclusive licensee of the ’603 patent and is responsible for defending the ’603 patent, we grant Sciencons AS’s unopposed request that ARTBIO, Inc. be included in the caption. For convenience we refer to Sciencons AS and the purported exclusive licensee ARTBIO, Inc. collectively as “Patent Owner.” As stated supra, to the extent any party disputes ARTBIO, Inc.’s right to participate in this proceeding or to be included in the caption, the party shall request authorization to brief the issue within 10 business days of this Decision.” slip op. at 3
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner contends that a person of ordinary skill in the art “would have had a bachelor’s degree in chemistry, chemical engineering, physics, nuclear chemistry, radiochemistry, or materials science, or a comparable field of study, plus approximately two to three years of professional experience with radioisotope generators, or other relevant industry experience” and that “[a]dditional graduate education could substitute for professional experience, and significant experience in the field could substitute for formal education.” Pet. 2–3 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶ 33; Ex. 1017 ¶ 27). At this stage of the proceeding, Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s proposed definition nor provide a proposed definition of its own. See generally Prelim. Resp. For the purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s undisputed proposed definition.” slip op. at 10
§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosurecites PhillipsPatents in suitUS 12,125,603 - Ascend Elements, Inc. v. Duesenfeld GmbHInstitution deniedPTAB · Oct 10, 2025 · PGR2025-00037 · APJ Kevin W Cherry · PGR · Institution
The Board denied institution of PGR on claims 1–14 because Petitioner did not show that any challenged claim was more likely than not unpatentable.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“information presented in the petition filed under [35 U.S.C. §] 321 . . . demonstrates that it is more likely than not that at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition is unpatentable.” 35 U.S.C. § 324(a). For the reasons set forth below, we determine that Petitioner has failed to demonstrate that it is more likely than not that at least one of claims 1–14 of the ’463 patent is unpatentable. Accordingly, we deny institution of a postgrant review of claims 1–14 based on the grounds set forth in the Petition.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner contends that one of ordinary skill in the art “would have had at least a Bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, material science, chemical engineering, or an equivalent field, as well as at least 2 to 3 years of academic or industry experience in the recycling or processing of lithiumion batteries. Additional formal education focusing on processing of lithium batteries may substitute for practical experience and additional practical experience can substitute for less education.” Pet. 10–11. Patent Owner does not contest this definition of a person of skill in the art. See Prelim. Resp. 11. For purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s assessment of the level of ordinary skill in the art, as, on the present record, it appears consistent with the ’463 patent and the asserted prior art. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001).” slip op. at 8
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert discountedPatent owner expert creditedDecided for patent owner
“distinct from “comminute[ion],” Petitioner offers only the testimony of its expert, Mr. Juzkow, who equates Tomioka’s “cutting” with “comminute[ion].” See Ex. 1003 ¶ 121. However, Mr. Juzkow provides insufficient reasoning to support his conclusion, particularly given the intrinsic and extrinsic evidence discussed above. In contrast, Patent Owner’s expert, Mr. Dantam, provides extensive reasoning, supported by citations to other evidence, to support his conclusion that Tomioka’s “dismantling” is not the claimed “comminution.” Thus, we give more weight to Mr. Dantam’s testimony than Mr. Juzkow’s testimony. Weighing this evidence all together, we find that Petitioner has failed to show that it is more likely than not that Tomioka’s teaches the claimed comminution under Petitioner’s first theory.” slip op. at 15
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundTeaching away not foundNot shown unpatentable
“obvious. Pet. 34–35. However, we agree with Patent Owner that Petitioner has also failed to show that it is more likely than not that Tomioka renders this limitation obvious. See Prelim. Resp. 28–31. To begin with, Petitioner’s contentions lack sufficient reasoning explaining why a person of ordinary skill would have modified Tomioka in the manner proposed. “[R]ejections on obviousness grounds cannot be sustained by mere conclusory statements; instead, there must be some articulated reasoning with some rational underpinning to support the legal conclusion of obviousness.” In re Kahn, 441 F.3d 977, 988 (Fed. Cir. 2006). Petitioner merely asserts that a person of ordinary skill in the art could use the roller system in place of the dismantling disclosed for the embodiments in Figures 19 and 20. On this record, we find this bare contention insufficient. actual disclosure of Tomioka. The rollers in Tomioka are used to separate the “battery body” from the “resin package enclosing the battery body,” and Tomioka specifically discloses that this technique is designed to “avoid damaging the battery body.” Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 25, 26, 29; Ex. 2011 ¶¶ 72–73. Thus, there is a significant difference between what Tomioka teaches and what Petitioner proposes to use the roller system to do. In addition, as Patent Owner points out, Tomioka specifically discloses there are risks associated with mechanically crushing battery packs, such as “risk of sparking due to residual voltage if the battery units are damaged in the process.” Ex. 1005 ¶ 5. Although we do not agree with Patent Owner that this amounts to a “teaching away,” see In re Gurley, 27 F.3d 551, 553 (Fed. Cir. 1994), we do believe that this teaching suggests a trade off that should be weighed in determining whether to make the modification, see Medichem S.A. v. Rolabo S.L., 437 F.3d 1157, 1165 (Fed. Cir. 2006). However, Petitioner has failed to account adequately, if at all, for this trade off. Thus, we find that Petitioner has failed to show that it is more likely than not that Tomioka accounts for the claimed “comminuting.”” slip op. at 15
§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosurecites Phillips · Graham · NautilusPatents in suitUS 12,119,463 - Micron Technology, Inc. v. Yangtze Memory Technologies Company, Ltd.All claims unpatentablePTAB · Oct 7, 2025 · IPR2024-00795 · APJ Michael T Cygan · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–9 and 11–19 are unpatentable as obvious over Lee or Zhao and Lee; the Board did not find claims unpatentable over Zhao or Yang alone.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“B. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art Petitioner asserts that a person of ordinary skill in the art (“POSITA”) at the critical time would have had a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering or a similar discipline, along with 2-3 years of professional experience working with (e.g., researching, designing, or teaching) NAND memory devices (including issues relating to the operation, e.g., programming, of said devices), or an equivalent level of skill, knowledge, and experience (e.g., an advanced degree may replace some of the professional experience). Pet. 18 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 35–38). Petitioner further asserts that a POSITA “would have been aware of and generally knowledgeable about NAND memory’s structure, its component parts, how it operates, and how it is controlled. Id. (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 38). Patent Owner does not object to this assertion. PO Resp. 12. We adopt Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill, as it appears to be consistent with the specification of the ’822 patent and the prior art of record.” slip op. at 6
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached
“1. Word line pre-pulse signal Patent Owner argues that such a signal “must increase in value and then decrease in value (or vice versa).” PO Resp. 13; PO Sur-Reply 1. Petitioner agrees with this construction. Pet. Reply. 3. Patent Owner further argues that the pre-pulse signal “prepares the word line before the programming step.” PO Resp. 13. We agree that Petitioner applies its teachings with the same understanding of “pre-pulse signal” as Patent Owner. See, e.g., Pet. 38–39 (asserting that Lee teaches, or that that Lee would make obvious, pre-bias signals applied as pulses). Because both parties agree that a pre-pulse signal “must increase in value and then decrease in value (or vice versa),” and apply this construction in their assertions and arguments, no dispute as to the meaning of this phrase exists in a manner that would affect the outcome of this decision. Therefore, we do not need to determine a particular construction. Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“[W]e need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci & Eng'g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 7
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner
“with the plain language of the claims, each claim states “disposed.” Patent Owner provides dictionary definitions for “disposed,” which is described as a verb. See, e.g., Ex. 2016, 3. When described as a verb in these definitions, “disposed” is the action of the actor; i.e., “the chief disposed his attendants in a circle” (Ex. 2019, 3); “She disposed of her estate among her heirs” (Ex. 2018, 3); “disposed of the matter efficiently” (Ex. 2017, 3); “troops disposed for withdrawal” (Ex. 2016, 3). Petitioner offers no contrary definition from either the Specification or any extrinsic source for that term. We agree with Patent Owner’s construction of “disposed” as “put in place” or “arranged in a particular position.” Nevertheless, the construction of “disposed” does not resolve the controversy over the language of claims 2, 3, 12, and 13. The claims recite “are disposed.” For example, claim 2 recites, “wherein the [first through third groups] of the plurality of word lines are disposed in an order of distance from the selected word line.” Under Patent Owner’s construction, this reads as, “wherein the [first through third groups] of the plurality of word lines are arranged in a particular position in an order of distance from the selected word line.” But claim 2 does not recite that the word lines are arranged “based on” the selected word line, or that the arrangement occurs only after a word line is selected, as argued by Patent Owner. We agree with Petitioner that the express language of claim 2 does not recite any limitation as to how or when the groups of word lines are disposed. Both parties point to the same language in the ’822 patent Specification in support of their position: “the word lines disposed between the selected word line and the top select gate TSG can be divided into multiple groups of the word lines.” PO Sur-Reply 2 (citing Pet. Reply 11 requires the recited arrangement to exist, at some point. But we determine that none of claims 2, 3, 12, or 13 require a step of arrangement, or an action to change the arrangement of grouped word lines.” slip op. at 9
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundUnpatentableUnpatentable
“not based on the location of the source or bit lines. Instead, Petitioner relies upon the distance from the selected word line and the drain-side of the string. See Pet. 66 (“the channel length between the drain-side of the string and word line selected for programming would be quite long, resulting in a relatively high channel resistance” (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 360)). Petitioner asserts that Lee’s application of higher pre-charge voltages to the drain-side word lines “offset the channel resistance effect.” Id. (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 361). Lee and Zhao both admittedly have “typical memory strings, which are a ‘vertical column’ of memory cells arranged in series between a source side select transistor and a drain side transistor.” PO Resp. 53 (emphasis omitted). Petitioner asserts that applying pre-charging to mitigate program disturb (sought by both Lee and Zhao) relies on the creation of a potential difference to facilitate electron redistribution. Pet. Reply 17–18 (citing Ex. 1004, 1:52–56; Ex. 1005, 17:4–12; Ex. 1021 ¶¶ 72–78). Petitioner asserts that the application of voltage can be performed from either end of the channel so long as it targets the portion of the channel desired to be pre- charged. Id. at 18 (citing Ex. 1021 ¶¶ 77–78; Ex. 1010, 17:16–23). Although Patent Owner points to Yang as showing different “biasing schemes” based upon whether the bit line, source line, or both are used for pre-charging, each of the cited Figures 8–10 of Yang indicates that Vbypass (Yang’s uncontested pre-pulse signal) is applied to at least some word lines between the selected word line and the drain-side SGD0. Ex. 1010, Figs. 8C, 9C, 10C; see PO Resp. 25–28 (“a ‘bypass voltage’ (‘Vbypass’) is applied to ‘not yet programmed’ memory cells during the ‘pre-charge phase’” (citing Fig. 8C) (emphasis omitted)). We do not discern in Patent Owner’s arguments, or in the evidence provided during trial, sufficient reasons why applying voltage from either source or bit line disturbs Petitioner’s asserted advantage of offsetting the resistance of the channel between a selected word line and the drain side of the string. Patent Owner further argues that Lee discusses a “wholly disparate approach” for mitigating program disturb than Zhao and that a POSITA would not have been motivated to apply Lee’s teaching to Zhao. PO Resp. 56–58. Patent Owner contends that because Zhao does not conduct current when applying its bypass voltage to equalize charges, but Lee does conduct current when doing so, Lee need only compensate for insufficient charge boosting due to the increased resistance component between source and drain and does not need to compensate for “resistance” effects creating voltage differences along the length of the memory string channel. Id. at 56. Dr. Przybylski’s supporting testimony is based upon such differences in the resistance components. See, e.g., Ex. 2011 ¶ 128. However, we have credited Dr. Liu’s testimony that a chain of transistors in both systems creates a resistance effect regardless of current flow in the steady state. Supra § II.F.1.b.2. We further agree with Petitioner that applying pre- on the creation of a potential difference to facilitate electron redistribution. Pet. Reply 17–18 (citing Ex. 1004, 1:52–56; Ex. 1005, 17:4–12; Ex. 1021 ¶¶ 72–78). We further credit Dr. Liu’s testimony that Zhao’s use of the same pre-charge voltages to not-yet-programmed word lines presents an issue of inadequate pre-charging that Lee addresses. Ex. 1021 ¶¶ 55–56; Pet. Reply 22–23. Consequently, we are persuaded by Petitioner that the chain resistance effects in Zhao and Lee permit the application of Lee’s method of pre-charging to mitigate program disturb to be applicable and desirable in Zhao’s method of applying pre-charging to mitigate program disturb. Consequently, we determine that Petitioner has shown persuasive motivation for its combination.” slip op. at 45
Patent outcomesUS 11,501,822 unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,501,822 - PTAB · Sep 19, 2025 · PGR2025-00025 · APJ Kimberly Mcgraw · PGR · Institution
The Board instituted PGR on claims 1–19 and all asserted grounds, finding it more likely than not that claim 1 is anticipated by the Gatorade Label.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“if “the information presented in the petition . . . demonstrate[s] that it is more likely than not that at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition is unpatentable.” Post-grant review is available for patents that issue from applications that at one point contained at least one claim with an effective filing date on or after March 16, 2013. See Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011) (“AIA”), §§ 3(n)(1), 6(f)(2)(A). After considering the briefing and the evidence of record, for the reasons set forth below, we determine that Petitioner has shown that the ’422 Patent is eligible for post-grant review and has shown it is more likely than not that at least one challenged claim of the ’422 Patent is unpatentable under § 324(a). Accordingly, we institute a post-grant review of the challenged claims of the ’422 Patent.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“B. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art Petitioner contends that a person of ordinary skill in the art “would possess at least (1) a Bachelor’s degree in chemistry or a related field, with (2) five years of experience in material identification and characterization using multiple analytical methods and field sampling, or equivalent research or professional experience.” Pet. 12 (citing Ex. 1014 ¶ 24). Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s definition for one of ordinary skill in the art nor provide a proposed definition of its own. See generally Prelim. Resp. For the purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s undisputed proposal regarding the level of one of ordinary skill in the art.” slip op. at 7
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Prosecution history disclaimer / disavowalDisclaimer foundDecided for patent owner
“336. The applicant explained that not all combinations of shrink films and light blocking materials are recyclable. Id. at 335. The applicant explained that films can be compatible with PET recycling in two ways, (1) the film can float in water and be separated from PET that sinks in water or (2) the PET films crystallize and “can be recovered with the PET stream.” Id. at 336 (citing “A Resource Document by the Association of Plastic Recyclers (APR)”) (found at Ex. 1002, 323–332) (emphasis omitted). The applicant explained that “removing the label before or during the recycling process is not evidence of the recyclability of the label” and that “[r]emoving the label during the recycling process is not equivalent to actually recycling the label.” Id. at 335. As such, a POSITA reading the prosecution history would understand that a label is not recyclable with a PET container, as recited by the independent claims, by removing the label from the PET recycle stream before or during the recycling process.” slip op. at 10
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed board ownOther
“To determine how a person skill in the art would determine if a shrink label is “recyclable” as recited in the independent claims, we look to how the Specification of the ’422 Patent describes or defines recyclable shrink labels. For example, the ’422 Patent states that PET shrink films are generally considered recyclable if no inks are retained on the film after a caustic wash cycle typically used in PET reclaiming processes. Ex. 1001, 6:61–65. The ’422 Patent further states that labels are fully recyclable if the polymers used are clear, preferably clear PET, and the labels include inks that can be washed off in a “typical PET recycling wash (caustic wash).” Id. at 11:44– 49; see also id. at 11:49–54 (describing embodiments in which the labels are free or substantially free of inks that cannot be washed off in a caustic wash or where the labels are free or substantially free of color plastics that cannot be recycled). The ’422 Patent further discusses “industry standards” for determining whether various embodiments of shrink labels are recyclable. See, e.g., id. at 11:29–53. For example, the Specification states that the “Association for Plastic Recyclers (APR) Critical Guidance Protocol for Clear PET Articles with Labels and Closures (PET-CG-02)” (Ex. 1005) can certify that a film is fully recyclable with a container or bottle. Id. at 11:34– 38. Additionally, the Specification states that labels “are recyclable according to the Evaluation of the Near Infrared (NIR) Sorting Potential of a Whole Plastic Article (SORT-B-01)” (Ex. 1010) and/or the “Evaluation of Sorting Potential for Plastic Articles Utilizing Metal, Metalized, or Metallic Printed Components (SORT-B-03)” (Ex. 1011). Ex. 1001, 11:39–44. The ’422 Patent further states that embodiments of the labels “are fully recyclable. For example, the labels may include inks that can be washed off in a typical PET recycling wash (caustic wash) and the polymers” are preferably clear PET. Id. at 11:44–48. The ’422 Patent thus provides various descriptions or standards to determine the recyclability of shrink labels. For the purposes of addressing the anticipation and obviousness grounds, we determine that any of these standards can be used to determine if a shrink label is “recyclable.” We note that our construction is preliminary and is based on the present record. We invite the parties to further the address the construction of “wherein the recyclable shrink label is recyclable with a PET container” during trial.” slip op. at 12
Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosurecites Phillips · NautilusPatents in suitUS 11,961,422 - Commscope Technologies LLC v. Belden Canada UlcAdverse judgmentPTAB · Sep 8, 2025 · IPR2024-01382 · APJ Kimberly Mcgraw · IPR · Adverse judgment
The Board granted Patent Owner’s withdrawal of its motion to amend and entered adverse judgment against all challenged claims after their statutory disclaimer, terminating the IPR.
RulingsAdverse judgment- PTAB / AIA Trials › Motions to amend / substitute claimsMotion to amend, grantedGranted
“In view of the facts presented, including that no decision as to the patentability of the proposed substitute claims has yet been made and Petitioner does not oppose the withdrawal, we grant Patent Owner’s Motion to Withdraw its Motion to Amend.” slip op. at 2
- Adverse judgmentAdverse judgmentGranted
“Under our rules, a party may request adverse judgment against itself at any time during a proceeding, including by disclaiming all claims involved in a trial. 37 C.F.R. §42.73(b). Because Patent Owner’s request to withdraw its Motion to Amend has been granted and Patent Owner has disclaimed all Challenged Claims such that no claims remain in the trial, we grant Patent Owner’s Motion to Terminate by Adverse Judgment.” slip op. at 3
NonePatents in suitUS 11,740,423 - Commscope Technologies LLC v. Belden Canada UlcAdverse judgmentPTAB · Sep 8, 2025 · IPR2024-01228 · APJ Kimberly Mcgraw · IPR · Adverse judgment
The Board granted Patent Owner’s withdrawal of its motion to amend and entered adverse judgment on the disclaimed challenged claims, terminating the IPR.
RulingsAdverse judgment- PTAB / AIA Trials › Motions to amend / substitute claimsMotion to amend, grantedGranted
“In view of the facts presented, including that no decision as to the patentability of the proposed substitute claims has yet been made and Petitioner does not oppose the withdrawal, we grant Patent Owner’s Motion to Withdraw its Motion to Amend.” slip op. at 2
- Adverse judgmentAdverse judgmentGranted
“Under our rules, a party may request adverse judgment against itself at any time during a proceeding, including by disclaiming all claims involved in a trial. 37 C.F.R. §42.73(b). Because Patent Owner’s request to withdraw its Motion to Amend has been granted and Patent Owner has disclaimed all Challenged Claims such that no claims remain in the trial, we grant Patent Owner’s Motion to Terminate by Adverse Judgment.” slip op. at 3
NonePatents in suitUS 11,656,422 - Commscope Technologies LLC v. Belden Canada UlcAdverse judgmentPTAB · Sep 8, 2025 · IPR2024-01227 · APJ Christopher M Kaiser · IPR · Adverse judgment
The Board granted Patent Owner’s withdrawal of its motion to amend and entered adverse judgment after it disclaimed challenged claims 1–5 and 8–13, terminating the IPR.
RulingsAdverse judgment- Adverse judgmentAdverse judgmentGranted
“Under our rules, a party may request adverse judgment against itself at any time during a proceeding, including by disclaiming all claims involved in a trial. 37 C.F.R. §42.73(b). Because Patent Owner’s request to withdraw its Motion to Amend has been granted and Patent Owner has disclaimed all Challenged Claims such that no claims remain in the trial, we grant Patent Owner’s Motion to Terminate by Adverse Judgment.” slip op. at 3
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Motions to amend / substitute claimsMotion to amend, grantedGranted
“In view of the facts presented, including that no decision as to the patentability of the proposed substitute claims has yet been made and Petitioner does not oppose the withdrawal, we grant Patent Owner’s Motion to Withdraw its Motion to Amend.” slip op. at 2
NonePatents in suitUS 11,435,542
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.