- Netapp, Inc. v. Realtime Data LLCInstitution deniedPTAB · Nov 14, 2017 · IPR2017-01354 · APJ Kamran Jivani · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution of NetApp’s petition challenging claims 1, 2, 9, 10, 15, 17, 20, and 24, exercising discretion under § 314(a) based on the General Plastic factors.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › General Plastic (serial petitions)Institution denied general plasticDenied
“IPR2016-01357 Paper 19, 16 (citations omitted). We recognize that these General Plastic factors typically have been used to analyze situations in which the same party files multiple petitions challenging the same patent. However, our discretion under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) and 37 C.F.R. § 42.108(a) is not limited to situations where the same party files multiple petitions, and we find that the General Plastic factors provide a useful framework for analyzing the facts and circumstances present in this case, in which a different petitioner filed a petition challenging a patent that had been challenged already by previous petitions. Applying the General Plastic factors to the present Petition, we conclude that the circumstances present here warrant discretionary denial of institution.” slip op. at 10
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied discretionary otherInstitution denied
“provides that the “Director[3] may not authorize an inter partes review to be instituted unless . . . the information presented in the petition . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” “Congress did not mandate that an inter partes review must be instituted under certain” slip op. at 8
Discretionary denialPatents in suitUS 9,054,728 - Dell Inc. / Riverbed Technology, Inc. et al. v. Realtime Data LLCNo claims unpatentablePTAB · Oct 31, 2017 · IPR2017-00364 · APJ Jason J Chung · IPR · Final written decision
Petitioner failed to prove claims 1, 2, 4–6, 9, 11, 21, 22, 24, and 25 unpatentable because it did not establish a reasonable expectation of success combining the cited references.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Patent Owner confirms that Petitioner’s statements regarding the level of ordinary skill in the art are partially consistent with Patent Owner’s view, but, nonetheless, Patent Owner contends that an ordinarily skilled artisan would be the “ultimate generalist.” Ex. 2017 ¶¶ 16–17 (citing Ex. 2015, 84:13–20). We do not observe a meaningful differences between the parties’ assessments of a person of ordinary skill in the art. We further note that either assessment appears consistent with the level of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention as reflected in the prior art in the instant proceeding. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001). Moreover, Dr. Creusere appears to satisfy either assessment. Our analysis in this Decision is supported by either assessment, but, for purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s assessment.” slip op. at 7
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“The parties do not argue a claim construction for any terms. See generally PO Resp.; Reply. In the Decision to Institute, we did not construe any terms. Dec. 4–5. We determine that no terms require express construction for purposes of this Decision. See Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (only those claim terms or phrases that are in controversy need to be construed, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy).” slip op. at 8
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert discountedPatent owner expert creditedDecided for patent owner
“the art would have a reasonable expectation of success (Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 131– 132), on this record, we cannot reconcile paragraphs 131–132 of his declaration when faced with the plethora of his own testimony on cross-examination to the contrary, such as his acknowledgement of “unlimited” permutations that were “impossible” to address. E.g., Ex. 2015, 81:21– 83:24, 84:13–24, 143:20–144:3. Stated differently, in his initial position, Dr. Creusere testifies a person having ordinary skill in the art would have a reasonable expectation of success (Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 131–132), while his later testimony vacillates to a stance that makes it difficult to demonstrate a reasonable expectation of success–– i.e., the existence of “unlimited” permutations that were “impossible” to address. Ex. 2015, 81:21–83:24, 84:13–24, 143:20–144:3. We find this testimony contradictory. In summary, neither the Petition, Dr. Creusere’s declaration, nor his deposition testimony provide any indication as to how a person having ordinary skill in the art would select among the countless permutations or further narrow the set of choices. Petitioner’s modeling, simulation, and testing theory fails to satisfy sufficiently its “reasonable expectation of success” theory evidentiary burden pursuant to the Federal Circuit’s decision in In re Kubin, 561 F.3d 1351, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (it is “improper” to argue an obviousness theory on the basis that “it would have been ‘obvious to try’ . . . to vary all parameters or try each of numerous possible choices until one possibly arrived at a successful result.”). Leo Pharm. Prod., Ltd. v. Rea, 726 F.3d 1346, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (“obviousness law in general recognizes an important distinction between combining known options into ‘a finite number of identified, predictable solutions,’ and ‘merely throwing metaphorical darts at a board’ in hopes of arriving at a successful result.”). Furthermore, the Federal Circuit explained in Kubin, the Board should not use hindsight based on allegations that require that the person having ordinary skill in the art to randomly pick from a board filled with combinational prior art possibilities. Kubin, 561 F.3d at 1359. To paraphrase, Petitioner is attempting to bypass its evidentiary burden of having to proffer particular evidence of a specific combination, which would teach the “faster than” limitation recited in claims 1, 21, and 25 by instead repeating that “modeling, simulation, and testing” leads to a reasonable expectation of success (Pet. 28); whereas, in this proceeding, the number of permutations and variables are “unlimited” and “impossible” to address, as acknowledged by Dr. Creusere (Ex. 2015, 81:21–83:24, 84:13– 24, 143:20–144:3). That is, Petitioner’s attempt at crafting a theory of obviousness using non-specific teachings from Franaszek and Osterlund that allegedly demonstrate a reasonable expectation of success; this attempt, however, falls significantly short of the Federal Circuit’s requirements. Another obstacle to our reliance on Dr. Creusere’s vacillating opinions is Patent Owner’s declarant, Dr. Kenneth A. Zeger, Ph.D. Dr. Zeger opines in his declaration that Franaszek illustrates complex choices a person having ordinary skill in the art would face in considering whether and how to modify Franaszek in light of Osterlund on this record. Ex. 2017 ¶¶ 152–169. In particular, Dr. Zeger opines that Franaszek’s approach requires numerous steps that each create delays before compression occurs, which are illustrated in Dr. Zeger’s figure below. Id.” slip op. at 18
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot shown unpatentableMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentable
“Put another way, we do not find that Petitioner demonstrates a “reasonable expectation of success” when Dr. Creusere acknowledges that a person having ordinary skill in the art did not specify whether to discard or keep Franaszek’s sampling approach, or would use only Franaszek’s teachings of compression algorithms, or incorporate other such algorithms, or what data type or data types an intended system teaches would be created to compress, or what specific goals and objectives the person having ordinary skill in the art would have had reason to achieve. Compare id. at 75:18–76:19, 126:20–127:1, 76:24–78:6, 94:4–12, 96:4–98:14 with Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 121–134; Ex. 2017 ¶¶ 165–167. Instead, Petitioner simply asserts, in a conclusory manner, that “[b]ecause the relevant art is predictable and compression algorithms and transmission times may be modeled, simulated, and easily tested, a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had a reasonable expectation of success in combining these various teachings found in the prior art to arrive at the claimed invention” (emphasis added). Pet. 28 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 131–132). Notably, Dr. Creusere acknowledges that the number of possible permutations faced by a person having ordinary skill in the art would have been “unlimited” and that it was “impossible” for him to address “all the permutations of those possibilities.” Id. at 81:21–83:24, 84:13–24, 143:20– 144:3. Although Dr. Creusere opines that a person having ordinary skill in the art would have a reasonable expectation of success (Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 131– 132), on this record, we cannot reconcile paragraphs 131–132 of his declaration when faced with the plethora of his own testimony on cross-examination to the contrary, such as his acknowledgement of “unlimited” permutations that were “impossible” to address. E.g., Ex. 2015, 81:21– 83:24, 84:13–24, 143:20–144:3. Stated differently, in his initial position, Dr. Creusere testifies a person having ordinary skill in the art would have a reasonable expectation of success (Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 131–132), while his later testimony vacillates to a stance that makes it difficult to demonstrate a reasonable expectation of success–– i.e., the existence of “unlimited” permutations that were “impossible” to address. Ex. 2015, 81:21–83:24, 84:13–24, 143:20–144:3. We find this testimony contradictory. In summary, neither the Petition, Dr. Creusere’s declaration, nor his deposition testimony provide any indication as to how a person having ordinary skill in the art would select among the countless permutations or further narrow the set of choices. Petitioner’s modeling, simulation, and testing theory fails to satisfy sufficiently its “reasonable expectation of success” theory evidentiary burden pursuant to the Federal Circuit’s decision in In re Kubin, 561 F.3d 1351, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (it is “improper” to argue an obviousness theory on the basis that “it would have been ‘obvious to try’ . . . to vary all parameters or try each of numerous possible choices until one possibly arrived at a successful result.”). Leo Pharm. Prod., Ltd. v. Rea, 726 F.3d 1346, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (“obviousness law in general recognizes an important distinction between combining known options into ‘a finite” slip op. at 17
Patent outcomesUS 9,116,908 not shown unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 9,116,908 - Riverbed Technology, Inc. / Dell Inc. et al. v. Realtime Data LLCAll claims unpatentablePTAB · Oct 30, 2017 · IPR2016-00978 · APJ Kevin C Trock · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–4, 6, 10–16, 18–20, and 22 are unpatentable as obvious over Wang, Matsubara, and Franaszek under § 103(a).
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Petitioners’ Declarant, Dr. Creusere, opines that a person of ordinary skill in the art relevant to the ’513 patent, and in the time period around 2001, would have been a person with “at least a bachelor’s degree in computer science, computer engineering, electrical and computer engineering, electrical engineering, or electronics and at least two years of experience working with data compression or a graduate degree focusing in the field of data compression.” Ex. 1013 ¶ 25. Patent Owner does not offer any alternative explanation regarding who would qualify as a person of ordinary skill in the art relevant to the ’513 patent. Based on our review of the ’513 patent, the types of problems and solutions described in the ’513 patent and cited prior art, and the testimony of Petitioners’ Declarant, we adopt and apply Dr. Creusere’s definition of a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the claimed invention for purposes of this Decision. We also note that, in this case, the applied prior art reflects the appropriate level of skill at the time of the claimed invention. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001).” slip op. at 8
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundDecided for petitioner
“We are not persuaded by Patent Owner’s arguments. The test for obviousness is what the combined teachings of the references would have suggested to those of ordinary skill in the art. In re Keller, 642 F.2d 413, 425 (CCPA 1981). “Under the correct [obviousness] analysis, any need or problem known in the field of endeavor at the time of invention and addressed by the patent can provide a reason for combining the elements in the manner claimed.” KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 420 (2007). “[A]n analysis of obviousness . . . may include recourse to logic, judgment, and common sense available to the person of ordinary skill that do not necessarily require explication in any reference or expert opinion.” Perfect Web Technologies, Inc. v. InfoUSA, Inc., 587 F.3d 1324, 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2009). Here, Wang teaches that if a file format is not identified or recognized, then the file is compressed with a default lossless compression algorithm. Pet. 19 (citing Ex. 1009, 4). Dr. Zeger, Patent Owner’s Declarant, agreed that a file format potentially could refer to a data type. Pet. Reply 13 (citing Ex. 1014, 87–88). With respect to Patent Owner’s argument that Wang never fails to recognize any data types, Franaszek recognizes the issue and teaches the use of a default compression algorithm if a data type is not recognized. Pet. 22 (citing Ex. 1011, 5:49–54). This is consistent with the holding in KSR, that any need or problem known in the field of endeavor at the time of invention and addressed by the patent can provide a reason for combining the elements in the manner claimed by” slip op. at 23
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of success › HindsightDecided for petitioner
“We think Patent Owner’s argument and its reliance on In re Schweickert is misplaced here. First, as discussed supra, Petitioner combines Matsubara with Wang to address an automatic recognition issue and combines Franaszek with Wang to address a known issue when there is a lack of recognition. These are distinct issues with different reasons for their combination. In particular, Petitioner’s rationale for combining Matsubara and Wang is based on incorporating Matsubara’s construction of histograms using a file’s byte pattern, and then analyzing the pattern to determine the data type as the method for Wang to “automatically” determine the data type of a file. Pet. 22–24. Petitioner relies on Franaszek’s techniques for using a default compression algorithm to compress data types that may not be recognized or identified by Wang. Id. at 24–26. Second, in In re Schweickert, the Board affirmed the Examiner’s conclusion of obviousness, relying on a combination of two prior art references, with the bare assertion that “modifying [the references] would have been a predictable use of prior art elements according to their established functions—an obvious improvement.” In re Schweickert at 993. The Court found that there was no sufficient justification in the opinion by the Board why the combination would provide the asserted “obvious improvement.” Id. at 994. Moreover, the Court noted that it was apparent that substitution would “defeat[] the purpose” of the prior art the Board contended would be obvious to modify. Id. The Court found that even if the technology of the second prior art reference were “readily applicable” to the first prior art reference, there still needed to be an explanation as to “why a skilled artisan would still have a reason to combine [the references] to achieve the claimed invention,” which the Board did not do. Id. at 995. Here, unlike in Schweickert, Petitioner provided evidentiary support for modifying Wang’s method for automatically compressing files using an identification technique (Matsubara) since Wang teaches automatically recognizing the data type in the file, (Ex. 1013 ¶ 77) and using Franaszek’s default lossless compression algorithm when a file’s data type is not recognized because Wang teaches to use a default lossless compression algorithm when a file format is not identified or recognized (id. ¶ 86). Thus, Petitioner has articulated sufficient reasoning why a POSITA would have combined the teachings of Wang and Matsubara, as well as reasons why a POSITA would have also combined the teachings of Wang and Franaszek addressing a distinct issue, and how those combinations achieve the claimed invention. Accordingly, we are persuaded by Petitioner’s evidence and arguments that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had reason to combine (1) Wang’s teaching to use a default lossless compression algorithm, such as LZW, when the file format is not recognized with Franaszek’s teaching of using a default compression method when the data type is not recognized; and (2) Wang’s method for automatically compressing computer files with Franaszek’s techniques for using a default compression algorithm to compress data types that are not recognized or identified. See Pet. 24–26, 30–42. Petitioner’s rationale for combining Wang and Matsubara is based on using Matsubara’s data analysis technique in Wang’s step of automatic data recognition, whereas Petitioner’s rationale for combining Wang and Franaszek is directed to both references suggesting default compression methods for unrecognized data. See Pet. 22–24, 30–42. Thus, each of the aspects that would be used from Matsubara and Franaszek with Wang are different. Therefore, we are persuaded by Petitioner’s evidence and arguments that one of ordinary skill in the art would have been led to combine the teachings of Wang, Matsubara, and Franaszek in the manner articulated by Petitioner.” slip op. at 28
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)UnpatentableUnpatentable
“We agree with Patent Owner’s position that the file extension names and control information in Wang appear to be “descriptors” of a data block. Nevertheless, we are persuaded by Petitioner that the combination of Wang, Matsubara, and Franaszek teaches the recited analysis steps. Specifically, we are persuaded that Wang recognizes the format of a file by the extension name of the file and determines whether the file is a simple file or a compound file, then teaches automatically recognizing the type of data contained in the file and automatically compressing the data using a compression algorithm suitable for the type of data identified. Pet. 32 (citing Ex. 1009, 4; Ex. 1013 ¶ 115). In addition, we are persuaded Matsubara teaches determining a file’s data type based on an analysis of its byte patterns (i.e., something other than a descriptor) (Ex. 1011, 3:61–67), while Franaszek teaches analysis of a sample taken from uncompressed data appended to a data block and compressing a data block with a default compression algorithm when the data type is not identified (Ex. 1011, 4:30– 35, 5:18–21, 5:53–54, Fig. 2). Furthermore, based on the testimony of Dr. Creusere (Ex. 1013 ¶ 116), histograms of byte patterns of a file in Matsubara function as an analysis of a data block and not merely as a descriptor of the data block. Accordingly, we find the combination of Wang, Matsubara, and Franaszek teaches the recited analysis steps as limited by the “wherein” clauses of independent claims 1 and 15.” slip op. at 31
Patent outcomesUS 8,643,513 unpatentable§ 103 obviousnesscites KSRPatents in suitUS 8,643,513 - PTAB · Sep 20, 2017 · IPR2015-01611 · APJ Stacey G White · IPR · Rehearing
Denied Volkswagen’s rehearing request; the Board maintained that Kniffin did not show the “responsive to” limitation for claims 26, 31, 38, 42, 43, 48, 60, 63, 64, 73, 74, 85, 138, 139, and 143.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied
“rehearing. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d). The party requesting rehearing has the burden of showing the decision should be modified, and “[t]he request must specifically identify all matters the party believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked, and the place where each matter was previously addressed in a motion, an opposition, or a reply.” Id.” slip op. at 2
NonePatents in suitUS 6,549,130 - Qualcomm Incorporated / Qualcomm Atheros, Inc. v. Parkervision, Inc.No claims unpatentablePTAB · Mar 7, 2017 · IPR2015-01833 · APJ Bart A Gerstenblith · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 4, 22, 23, 100, 113–116, 118, 119, 309–312, 314, 315, and 319 were not proven unpatentable because the asserted combinations did not establish the claimed bias signal.
RulingsFinal written decision- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Lexicography (patentee as own lexicographer)Term construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner
“ordinary meaning of “bias signal” is “a signal having a steady predetermined level.” Resp. 24; Reply 6. The parties also agree that at least some information signals may be considered “bias signals.” The crux of the parties’ disagreement is which type of information signal. The ’940 patent defines “information signal” as “[t]he signal that contains the information that is to be transmitted. As used herein, it refers to the original baseband signal at the source.” Ex. 1001, 8:48–50 (emphasis added). Thus, the ’940 patent clearly defines “information signal” as “the original baseband signal at the source.” The ’940 patent defines “baseband signal” as: Any generic information signal desired for transmission and/or reception. As used herein, it refers to both the information signal that is generated at a source prior to any transmission (also referred to as the modulating baseband signal), and to the signal that is to be used by the recipient after transmission (also referred to as the demodulated baseband signal). Ex. 1001, 7:41–47. The ’940 patent clearly gives a broad meaning to “baseband signal” such that it encompasses any signal desired for transmission and/or reception, but the definition of “information signal,” as quoted above, does not refer to any baseband signal. Rather, it refers to “the original baseband signal at the source.” Ex. 1001, 8:48–54. By including the terms “original” and “at the source,” the meaning of information signal, as defined by the ’940 patent, is more limited than the definition of a baseband signal. Thus, Petitioner’s contention that the meaning of “information signal,” and, hence, “bias signal” should be expanded to include any “baseband signal” (Reply 4) improperly takes “information signal” out of context. Petitioner’s contention eliminates the terms “original” and “at the source” from the ’940 patent’s definition of “information signal,” without providing any reason why those terms should not be considered. Accordingly, we agree with Patent Owner and construe “bias signal” to mean “(1) a signal having a steady, predetermined level or (2) the original baseband signal at the source.”” slip op. at 11
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededDecided for patent owner
“C. “to gate,” “desired harmonics,” and “pulse shaping module” Patent Owner asserts that we need not construe any of these terms because they “are not material to this IPR and should not be addressed or decided by the Board.” Resp. 31. Petitioner does not discuss the constructions of these terms in its Reply. See generally Reply. Based on the arguments before us, construing these terms does not appear to resolve a controversy between the parties. Accordingly, we agree with Patent Owner that we need not construe expressly any of these terms for purposes of this Decision” slip op. at 13
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“3. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art Petitioner contends that one of ordinary skill in the art as of October 1998 would possess, at a minimum, either (a) a master of science degree in electrical engineering and two or more years of experience in radio frequency circuit design, or (b) a bachelor of science degree in electrical engineering with three or more years of experience with the design and development of RF circuits. Pet. 9 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 24–32). Petitioner’s argument is supported by Dr. Larson’s testimony. Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 24–32. Patent Owner does not contest Petitioner’s designation of the level of ordinary skill in the art as of the date of the invention. Accordingly, for the purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill in the art.” slip op. at 17
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“Petitioner’s argument in its Reply is based on its incorrect claim construction of “bias signal” as encompassing any information signal. See, e.g., Reply 6–7 (asserting that the “bias signal” is met by Dobrovolny’s disclosure because it teaches “an information carrying High Level RF Source for reception”) (citing Ex. 1023, 1:14–17; Ex. 1002 ¶ 160). As explained above, “bias signal” is understood to mean “(1) a signal having a steady, predetermined level or (2) the original baseband signal at the source.” See supra Section II.A. Petitioner does not argue, and has not established, that Dobrovolny’s RF Source signal is either at a steady, predetermined level or is the original baseband signal at the source. Thus, Petitioner has not shown that Dobrovolny discloses the “bias signal” limitations recited in claims 4 and 22, and the claims that depend from each.6 Accordingly, Petitioner has not shown, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the combination of Dobrovolny and Maas would have rendered the subject matter of claims 4, 22, 113–116, 119, 309–312, 315, and 319 obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention.” slip op. at 19
Patent outcomesUS 6,091,940 not shown unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnessPatents in suitUS 6,091,940 - Qualcomm Incorporated / Qualcomm Atheros, Inc. v. Parkervision, Inc.No claims unpatentablePTAB · Mar 7, 2017 · IPR2015-01834 · APJ Bart A Gerstenblith · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 21, 25, 26, 281, 283–286, 288, 289, 293, 363–366, 368, 369, and 373 were not proven unpatentable because the asserted obviousness combinations did not establish the claimed bias or reference signal.
RulingsFinal written decision- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Lexicography (patentee as own lexicographer)Term construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner
“information signals may be considered “bias signals” and “reference signals.” The crux of the parties’ disagreement is which type of information signal. The ’940 patent defines “information signal” as “[t]he signal that contains the information that is to be transmitted. As used herein, it refers to the original baseband signal at the source.” Ex. 1001, 8:48–50 (emphasis added). Thus, the ’940 patent clearly defines “information signal” as “the original baseband signal at the source.” The ’940 patent defines “baseband signal” as: Any generic information signal desired for transmission and/or reception. As used herein, it refers to both the information signal that is generated at a source prior to any transmission (also referred to as the modulating baseband signal), and to the signal that is to be used by the recipient after transmission (also referred to as the demodulated baseband signal). Ex. 1001, 7:41–47. The ’940 patent clearly gives a broad meaning to “baseband signal” such that it encompasses any signal desired for transmission and/or reception, but the definition of “information signal,” as quoted above, does not refer to any baseband signal. Rather, it refers to “the original baseband signal at the source.” Ex. 1001, 8:48–54. By including the terms “original” and “at the source,” the meaning of information signal, as defined by the ’940 patent, is more limited than the definition of a baseband signal. Thus, Petitioner’s contention that the meaning of “information signal,” and, hence, “bias signal” should be expanded to include any “baseband signal” (Reply 4) improperly takes “information signal” out of context. Petitioner’s contention eliminates the terms “original” and “at the source” from the ’940 patent’s definition of “information signal,” without providing any reason why those terms should not be considered. Accordingly, we agree with Patent Owner and construe “bias signal” to mean “(1) a signal having a steady, predetermined level or (2) the original baseband signal at the source”; and we construe “reference signal” to mean “the original baseband signal at the source.”6” slip op. at 12
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededDecided for patent owner
“decided by the Board.” Resp. 31. Petitioner does not discuss the constructions of these terms in its Reply. See generally Reply. Based on the arguments before us, construing these terms does not appear to resolve a controversy between the parties. Accordingly, we agree with Patent Owner that we need not construe expressly any of these terms for purposes of this Decision.” slip op. at 14
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“4. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art Petitioner contends that one of ordinary skill in the art as of October 1998 would possess, at a minimum, either (a) a master of science degree in electrical engineering and two or more years of experience in radio frequency circuit design, or (b) a bachelor of science degree in electrical engineering with three or more years of experience with the design and development of RF circuits. Pet. 10 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 24–29). Petitioner’s argument is supported by Dr. Larson’s testimony. Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 24–29. Patent Owner does not contest Petitioner’s designation of the level of ordinary skill in the art as of the date of the invention. Accordingly, for the purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill in the art.” slip op. at 18
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“Petitioner’s argument in its Reply is based on its incorrect claim construction of “bias signal” as encompassing any information signal. See, e.g., Reply 7 (asserting that the “bias signal” is met by Dobrovolny’s disclosure because it teaches “an information carrying High Level RF Source for reception”) (citing Ex. 1023, 1:14–17; Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 154, 210). As explained above, “bias signal” is understood to mean “(1) a signal having a steady, predetermined level or (2) the original baseband signal at the source.” See supra Section II.A. Petitioner does not argue, and has not established, that Dobrovolny’s RF Source signal is either at a steady, predetermined level or is the original baseband signal at the source. Thus, Petitioner has not shown that Dobrovolny discloses the “bias signal” recited in claim 21 and the claims that depend therefrom, or the “reference signal” recited in claim 25 and the claims that depend therefrom.8 8 Petitioner does not rely upon Maas or Nardozza as disclosing a “bias signal” or “reference signal.” See Pet. 37–38 (relying only on Dobrovolny), 52–53 (same). Accordingly, Petitioner has not shown, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the combination of Dobrovolny, Maas, and Nardozza would have rendered the subject matter of claims 21, 25, 26, 281, 283–286, 289, 293, 363–366, 369, and 373 obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention.” slip op. at 20
Patent outcomesUS 6,091,940 not shown unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnessPatents in suitUS 6,091,940 - Qualcomm Incorporated / Qualcomm Atheros, Inc. v. Parkervision, Inc.No claims unpatentablePTAB · Mar 7, 2017 · IPR2015-01832 · APJ Bart A Gerstenblith · IPR · Final written decision
The Board found claims 1, 18, 81–84, 86, 88–91, 93, 94, 251–254, 256, 258–261, 263, and 264 not proven unpatentable under either asserted obviousness ground.
RulingsFinal written decision- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Lexicography (patentee as own lexicographer)Term construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner
“ordinary meaning of “bias signal” is “a signal having a steady predetermined level.” Resp. 28; Reply 6–7. The parties also agree that at least some information signals may be considered “bias signals.” The crux of the parties’ disagreement is which type of information signal. The ’940 patent defines “information signal” as “[t]he signal that contains the information that is to be transmitted. As used herein, it refers to the original baseband signal at the source.” Ex. 1001, 8:48–50 (emphasis added). Thus, the ’940 patent clearly defines “information signal” as “the original baseband signal at the source.” The ’940 patent defines “baseband signal” as: Any generic information signal desired for transmission and/or reception. As used herein, it refers to both the information signal that is generated at a source prior to any transmission (also referred to as the modulating baseband signal), and to the signal that is to be used by the recipient after transmission (also referred to as the demodulated baseband signal). Ex. 1001, 7:41–47. The ’940 patent clearly gives a broad meaning to “baseband signal” such that it encompasses any signal desired for transmission and/or reception, but the definition of “information signal,” as quoted above, does not refer to any baseband signal. Rather, it refers to “the original baseband signal at the source.” Ex. 1001, 8:48–54. By including the terms “original” and “at the source,” the meaning of information signal, as defined by the ’940 patent, is more limited than the definition of a baseband signal. Thus, Petitioner’s contention that the meaning of “information signal,” and, hence, “bias signal” should be expanded to include any “baseband signal” (Reply 4) improperly takes “information signal” out of context. Petitioner’s contention eliminates the terms “original” and “at the source” from the ’940 patent’s definition of “information signal,” without providing any reason why those terms should not be considered. Accordingly, we agree with Patent Owner and construe “bias signal” to mean “(1) a signal having a steady, predetermined level or (2) the original baseband signal at the source.”” slip op. at 11
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached
“Further, Patent Owner explains that “[t]he parties agree on the portion of the ‘to gate’ construction that is material to this IPR, i.e., that ‘to gate,’ the switch module must change between connecting and disconnecting the bias signal from the switch module’s output.” Id. at 37 (citing Pet. 13–14). Patent Owner’s proposed construction is consistent with the construction proposed by Petitioner. See Dec. 11 (discussing Petitioner’s construction of “to gate [a signal]” as “to change . . . between (i) connecting a signal at an input to an output such that the input and output have an equal voltage, and (ii) disconnecting the signal from the output” (quoting Pet. 14)). In light of the consistency between the proposed constructions, and in light of the lack of an actual controversy between the parties with respect to the impact of the minor differences in the proposed meanings of this term, we need not construe expressly the term further.4 Petitioner’s Reply does not challenge Patent Owner’s arguments regarding these claim terms. Accordingly, we adopt the construction of “switch module,” as reproduced above, for the reasons explained in our Decision to Institute. See Dec. 8–11. Additionally, we decline to construe expressly the terms “summer” and “to gate,” for the reasons discussed above.” slip op. at 13
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“3. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art Petitioner contends that one of ordinary skill in the art as of October 1998 would possess, at a minimum, either (a) a master of science degree in electrical engineering and two or more years of experience in radio frequency circuit design, or (b) a bachelor of science degree in electrical engineering with three or more years of experience with the design and development of RF circuits. Pet. 11 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 24–29). Petitioner’s argument is supported by Dr. Larson’s testimony. Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 24–29. Patent Owner does not contest Petitioner’s designation of the level of ordinary skill in the art as of the date of the invention. Accordingly, for the purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill in the art.” slip op. at 18
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“High Level Radio Frequency (“RF”) Source 10. The RF signal contains the information that television watchers see and hear.” Pet. 29 (citing Ex. 1023, 1:14–17). Petitioner asserts that Dobrovolny’s “RF Source signals are information signals that constitute ‘bias signals’ as that term is defined by the ‘940 patent.” Id. (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 154, 210). Petitioner’s position is based on its claim construction of “bias signals” as “encompassing information signals.” Id. Notably, in the Petition,5 Petitioner does not assert that the recited “bias signal[s]” would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art in light of Dobrovolny’s RF Source signals; rather, Petitioner’s position is that “bias signal[s]” are disclosed expressly. See id. (“RF Source signals . . . constitute ‘bias signals’”) (emphasis added).6 Patent Owner’s primary argument is as follows: [E]ven accepting [Petitioner’s] assertion that the ’940 patent expanded the ordinary meaning of ‘bias signal’ to include ‘information signal’ as defined in the patent . . . . [Petitioner] does not even allege, much less prove, that the purported ‘bias signal’—Dobrovolny’s high frequency Radio Frequency (RF) television signal—meets either of these definitions. Resp. 38–39. Patent Owner reiterates that Petitioner’s “only attempt to prove that the Dobrovolny RF television signal satisfies the claimed first and second bias signals is its assertion that Dobrovolny’s ‘RF signal contains the information that television watchers see and hear.’” Id. at 39 (quoting 5 As discussed infra, see Section III.C., Petitioner’s additional argument that bias signals would have been obvious in light of Dobrovolny’s RF Source signals constitutes a new argument, set forth only in Petitioner’s Reply, and we do not consider it here for the reasons explained below. 6 With respect to independent claim 18, Petitioner relies upon its arguments directed to the similar claim limitations of claim 1. See Pet. 44–45 (referring to Petitioner’s arguments directed to claim 1). Pet. 29). Patent Owner contends, however, that “an ‘information signal’ is not just any signal containing information . . . as [Petitioner’s] argument implicitly presumes. Rather, as defined in the ’940 patent, an information signal is restricted to ‘the original baseband signal at the source.’” Id. (quoting Ex. 1001, 8:48–54). Petitioner’s argument in its Reply is based on its incorrect claim construction of “bias signal” as encompassing any information signal. See, e.g., Reply 7 (asserting that the “bias signal” is met by Dobrovolny’s disclosure because it teaches “an information carrying High Level RF Source for reception”) (citing Ex. 1023, 1:14–17; Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 154, 210). As explained above, “bias signal” is understood to mean “(1) a signal having a steady, predetermined level or (2) the original baseband signal at the source.” See supra Section II.A. Petitioner does not argue, and has not established, that Dobrovolny’s RF Source signal is either at a steady, predetermined level or is the original baseband signal at the source. Thus, Petitioner has not shown that Dobrovolny discloses the “bias signal” limitations recited in claims 1 and 18, and the claims that depend from each.7 Accordingly, Petitioner has not shown, by a preponderance of the” slip op. at 19
Patent outcomesUS 6,091,940 not shown unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnessPatents in suitUS 6,091,940 - Qualcomm Incorporated / Qualcomm Atheros, Inc. v. Parkervision, Inc.Some claims unpatentablePTAB · Mar 7, 2017 · IPR2015-01828 · APJ Christopher L Crumbley · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 21, 281, 283–286, 288, 289, and 293 are unpatentable as obvious over Nozawa and Philips 4052; claims 25, 26, 363–366, 368, 369, and 373 were not proven unpatentable.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Qualcomm contends, citing Dr. Larson’s testimony, that one of ordinary skill in the art as of October 1998 would possess, at a minimum, either (a) a master of science degree in electrical engineering and two or more years of experience in radio frequency circuit design, or (b) a bachelor of science degree in electrical engineering with three or more years of experience with the design and development of RF circuits. Pet. 10–11 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 31–39). ParkerVision does not contest Qualcomm’s designation of the level of ordinary skill in the art as of the date of the invention. Accordingly, we adopt Qualcomm’s proposed level of ordinary skill in the art.” slip op. at 11
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededDecided for patent owner
“During the trial, ParkerVision asserted that we should maintain our construction of “harmonic” (PO Resp. 19–23), and Qualcomm did not address the adopted construction. With respect to the remaining terms, ParkerVision argues that none of these terms are material to the remaining dispute between the parties, which is focused on the “harmonic” limitation. Id. at 24–25. On this, we agree. As the remaining terms are not material to the parties’ dispute, we decline to construe them further. See Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999).” slip op. at 7
- Expert testimonyOther
“Regarding the Maas equation, ParkerVision directs us to a portion of Dr. Larson’s deposition, in which Dr. Larson used the Maas equation to calculate the harmonics produced by a mixer, given certain assumed inputs supplied by ParkerVision’s counsel (an input signal of 100 kHz and an LO input of 1 MHz). Id. at 29–31 (citing Ex. 2001, 177–87). ParkerVision notes that Dr. Larson’s calculations produced -0.9, 3.1, and -4.9 MHz as the first three harmonics, which are not integer multiples. PO Resp. 31. Thus, ParkerVision argues, the circuit of Nozawa does not necessarily produce a plurality of harmonics, defined by the ’940 patent as being integer multiples of the fundamental frequency. Id. Qualcomm argues that the Maas equation “shows that Nozawa will necessarily produce the required ‘integer multiple’ harmonics for many input frequencies.” Pet. Reply 4 (emphasis added). According to Qualcomm, it is not required to show that Nozawa will produce integer multiple harmonics for all operating conditions; rather, it is only relevant that Nozawa could be operated to produce the harmonics. Id. Regarding Dr. Larson’s calculations during his deposition, Qualcomm contends that even using the assumed inputs provided by ParkerVision, the Maas equation shows that the 35th and 37th harmonics are 35.1 and -36.9 MHz, respectively, which are integer multiples of the fundamental frequency of 0.9 MHz. Id. at 7. Qualcomm also notes that selecting slightly different input frequencies for the Maas equation will produce much lower integer multiple harmonics, such as at the 7th and 9th harmonics. Id. at 8. The parties’ disagreements over the various inputs and permutations of the Maas equation aside, one point appears to be beyond dispute: under some conditions, but not all conditions, the Maas equation shows that Nozawa’s structure will produce a periodic signal that contains integer multiples of the fundamental frequency. In other words, the structure of Nozawa is capable of producing a signal that satisfies the limitations of the claim. Qualcomm argues that this is sufficient to show unpatentability. Pet. Reply 13 (citing Gen. Electric Co. v. Jewel Incandescent Lamp Co., 326 U.S. 242, 248–49 (1945)). On this point, we agree. Claim 21 and its dependents are apparatus claims; as such, they “cover what a device is, not what a device does.” Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Bausch & Lomb Inc., 909 F.2d 1464, 1469 (Fed. Cir. 1990). In other words, the “periodic signal” limitations, which are directed to the transitory electrical signals produced by the apparatus, cannot give rise to patentability so long as the underlying apparatus has been shown to be capable of generating those signals. Here, it is undisputed that Nozawa’s circuit is capable of generating a periodic signal having a plurality of harmonics, wherein those harmonics are integer multiples of the fundamental frequency. Furthermore, we agree with Qualcomm that Nozawa’s low-pass filter is capable of isolating one or more of those harmonics, as desired.” slip op. at 16
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundDecided for petitioner
“Qualcomm contends that “Nozawa and Philips 4052 both provide architectures and methods for upconversion that can be used for a transmitter.” Pet. 21. Indeed, as Qualcomm observes, the 74HC4052 chip described in Philips 4052 is used in Nozawa. Id. at 28–29. We agree with Qualcomm that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had reason to look to the disclosure of Philips 4052 to learn more about the operation of the 74HC4052 chip disclosed in Nozawa. ParkerVision does not challenge that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have combined Nozawa with Philips 4052.” slip op. at 12
Patent outcomesUS 6,091,940 mixedClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites GrahamPatents in suitUS 6,091,940 - Qualcomm Incorporated / Qualcomm Atheros, Inc. v. Parkervision, Inc.All claims unpatentablePTAB · Mar 7, 2017 · IPR2015-01831 · APJ Christopher L Crumbley · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 4, 22, 23, 100, 113–116, 118, 119, 309–312, 314, 315, and 319 are unpatentable as obvious over Nozawa and Philips 4052, with Maas added for claims 119 and 315.
RulingsFinal written decision- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed board ownNo construction neededDecided for patent owner
“During the trial, ParkerVision asserted that we should maintain our construction of “harmonic” (PO Resp. 18–22), and Qualcomm did not address the adopted construction. With respect to the remaining terms, ParkerVision argues that none of these terms are material to the remaining dispute between the parties, which is focused on the “harmonic” limitation. Id. at 23–24. On this, we agree. As the remaining terms are not material to the parties’ dispute, we decline to construe them further. See Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999).” slip op. at 7
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Qualcomm contends, citing Dr. Larson’s testimony, that one of ordinary skill in the art as of October 1998 would possess, at a minimum, either (a) a master of science degree in electrical engineering and two or more years of experience in radio frequency circuit design, or (b) a bachelor of science degree in electrical engineering with three or more years of experience with the design and development of RF circuits. Pet. 10 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 31–39). ParkerVision does not contest Qualcomm’s designation of the level of ordinary skill in the art as of the date of the invention. Accordingly, we adopt Qualcomm’s proposed level of ordinary skill in the art.” slip op. at 12
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundDecided for petitioner
“Qualcomm contends that “Nozawa and Philips 4052 both provide architectures and methods for upconversion that can be used for a transmitter.” Pet. 21. Indeed, as Qualcomm observes, the 74HC4052 chip described in Philips 4052 is used in Nozawa. Id. at 23–24. We agree with Qualcomm that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had reason to look to the disclosure of Philips 4052 to learn more about the operation of the 74HC4052 chip disclosed in Nozawa. ParkerVision does not challenge that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have combined Nozawa with Philips 4052.” slip op. at 12
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)UnpatentableUnpatentable
“The parties’ disagreements over the various inputs and permutations of the Maas equation aside, one point appears to be beyond dispute: under some conditions, but not all conditions, the Maas equation shows that Nozawa’s structure will produce a periodic signal that contains integer multiples of the fundamental frequency. In other words, the structure of Nozawa is capable of producing a signal that satisfies the limitations of the claim. Qualcomm argues that this is sufficient to show unpatentability. Pet. Reply 13 (citing Gen. Electric Co. v. Jewel Incandescent Lamp Co., 326 U.S. 242, 248–49 (1945)). On this point, we agree. The challenged claims at issue here are apparatus claims; as such, they “cover what a device is, not what a device does.” Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Bausch & Lomb Inc., 909 F.2d 1464, 1469 (Fed. Cir. 1990). In other words, the “periodic signal” limitations, which are directed to the transitory electrical signals produced by the apparatus, cannot give rise to patentability so long as the underlying apparatus has been shown to be capable of generating those signals. Here, it is undisputed that Nozawa’s circuit is capable of generating a periodic signal having a plurality of harmonics, wherein those harmonics are integer multiples of the fundamental frequency. Furthermore, we agree with Qualcomm that Nozawa’s low-pass filter is capable of isolating one or more of those harmonics, as desired. Accordingly, we find that Qualcomm has shown,5 by a preponderance of the evidence, that the combination of Nozawa and Philips 4052 teaches each and every limitation of claims 4, 22, 23, 100, 113–116, 118, 309–312, 314, and 319. Additionally, for the reasons discussed above, we find that Qualcomm has shown that one of ordinary skill in the art would have been prompted to combine the teachings of the references in the manner proposed.” slip op. at 16
Patent outcomesUS 6,091,940 unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites GrahamPatents in suitUS 6,091,940 - Qualcomm Incorporated / Qualcomm Atheros, Inc. v. Parkervision, Inc.All claims unpatentablePTAB · Mar 7, 2017 · IPR2015-01829 · APJ Christopher L Crumbley · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1, 2, 18, 81–84, 86, 88–91, 93, 94, 251–254, 256, 258–261, 263, and 264 are unpatentable as obvious over Krauss and Ariie, with Sullivan added for claims 86, 93, 256, and 263.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“as of October 1998 would possess, at a minimum, either (a) a master of science degree in electrical engineering and two or more years of experience in radio frequency circuit design, or (b) a bachelor of science degree in electrical engineering with three or more years of experience with the design and development of RF circuits. Pet. 12 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 24–29). ParkerVision does not contest Qualcomm’s designation of the level of ordinary skill in the art as of the date of the invention. Accordingly, we adopt Qualcomm’s proposed level of ordinary skill in the art.” slip op. at 11
- Expert testimonyPatent owner expert discountedDecided for petitioner
“experts. We agree with Qualcomm that, in the combination of references as proposed, the rectangular wave of Krauss would drive the Ariie FET as a switch. That switch, in turn, would cause the FET to gate the input signals of Krauss, satisfying the disputed limitations of the claims. We note that Dr. Birkett does not testify to the contrary, stating only that Ariie does not teach the FET as alternating between connecting and disconnecting the data signal. Ex. 2008 ¶ 37. While this is correct, Dr. Birkett’s testimony is directed to the disclosure of Ariie individually, rather than looking to the proposed combination. In re Keller, 642 F.2d 413, 426 (CCPA 1981) (“[O]ne cannot show non-obviousness by attacking references individually where, as here, the rejections are based on combinations of references.” (citing In re Young, 409 F.2d 754 (CCPA 1968))). Dr. Birkett does not address—and ParkerVision does not dispute—that when operated with the rectangular waves of Krauss, Ariie’s FET acts as a switch.” slip op. at 14
- Strike new argumentNew argument consideredDecided for petitioner
“5 ParkerVision contends that Qualcomm’s argument—regarding operating Ariie’s mixer with a rectangular wave—is a new argument that goes beyond the scope of a proper reply. See Paper 24, 1 (identifying pages 9–12 and 16– 18). We have evaluated ParkerVision’s position and disagree that Qualcomm raised the argument for the first time in its Reply. In particular, we note that the Petition specifically highlighted the “First Oscillating Signal D” of Figure 16-3(c)—the rectangular wave—and states that gate G of Ariie’s FET Q1 would receive that signal. Pet. 26, 28. Krauss, is shown as an input into one of the mixers of Figure 16-3(a). Ex. 1003, 64. Qualcomm contends that when wave D is high, it would cause the FET to close; whereas, when D is low, the FET would open. Pet. Reply 11. The same reasoning holds for rectangular wave E, which drives the second mixer of Krauss. Qualcomm argues that it is irrelevant whether the FET of Ariie could be run in another manner, which does not operate as a switch, because the rectangular control signal of Krauss has only two states, off and on. Id. at 12.” slip op. at 13
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed patent owner constructionNo construction neededOther
“In its Reply, Qualcomm does not contest any of ParkerVision’s claim construction assertions, or take issue with its characterization that the parties agree on the salient aspects. Given the parties’ positions, and upon review of the entire record, we maintain our prior constructions of “switch module” and “harmonic,” and adopt ParkerVision’s proffered construction of “to gate” as “to change between connecting and disconnecting.” As the construction of “summer” is not material to the parties’ dispute, we decline to provide an express construction here. See Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999).” slip op. at 8
Patent outcomesUS 6,091,940 unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites GrahamPatents in suitUS 6,091,940
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.