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  • Google LLC v. Mindbasehq, LLCAll claims unpatentable
    PTAB · Mar 16, 2026 · IPR2021-01251 · APJ Kara L Szpondowski · IPR · Remand

    On remand, claims 14–19, 33–40, and 43–46 were held unpatentable as obvious over Conlon alone or Conlon, Miller, and Fong; the affirmed unpatentability of claims 1–13, 20–32, 41, and 42 remains.

    RulingsRemand decision
    • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner

      “automatically classifying and storing” (as recited in limitation [14.3]), is correct. Appeal Dec. 8. That is, “the ‘dictionary routine’ claims can be practiced by [the] use of an already-created dictionary, and do not also require the automatic creation of a dictionary.” Id. at 10; see also Reply 7 (the limitation is “directed to the use of a dictionary function to automatically look up words and their syntax”); Appeal Dec. 8 (“nothing about the term . . . would inform a person of ordinary skill in the art that automatic ‘creation’ of a database, in addition to the ‘use’ of an already-created database, is a requirement of the dictionary routine claims”); id. (“the plain and ordinary meaning of the claim language is broad enough to include ‘use’”); id. (agreeing with Petitioner that “the specification describes the ‘dictionary routine’ as the act of looking up words already in the database”); id. at 9 (stating that “[i]t is notable, as well, that the specification nowhere describes automatically creating a dictionary; all instances of creating dictionary entries rely, at least in part, on manual data entry by users”). As directed by the Federal Circuit, we will apply this construction in our analysis.8 Id. 8 Patent Owner argues that the Federal Circuit “cherry-picks” and misinterprets the patents’ specifications, and “ignores the clearly contrary specification language.” PO Remand Br. 4–5, 10; id. at 8 (arguing that that the specification clearly set forth the definition of the claim term, and “the Board must accept term definitions . . . above all external definitions”). We do not consider these arguments on the construction of this limitation, because the Federal Circuit has directed us to proceed under its construction of the limitation. We also agree with Petitioner that the Federal Circuit’s claim construction is “foreclosed from further consideration” under its slip op. at 17

    • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundUnpatentable

      “combination of Conlon, Miller, and Fong. The Federal Circuit stated, “[i]n this context, ‘normalization’ generally refers to de-duplicating and simplifying database entries (for instance, combining entries for ‘car’ and ‘automobile’).” Appeal Dec. 4 (cited at Pet. Response Br. 5). This is consistent with the disclosure in the ’433 patent. E.g., Ex. 1001, 16:55– 17:24 (discussing, for example, “recogniz[ing] that the differently named data elements in different structures are actually the same data element . . . is referred to as normalizing the names of the same data elements,” “recogniz[ing] that the same named data elements in different structures are actually different data elements . . . is referred to as normalizing the names of the different data elements,” and “normalizing multiple single data elements”). This is also consistent with how Fong describes “normalization.” Ex. 1029, 76 (The “Function” of “Normaliz[ing] the collection of entities” is to “[r]emove redundancies and detect errors”); see also Ex. 1057 ¶ 226. Patent Owner’s arguments that Fong’s normalization is “different” from the normalization described in the ’433 patent does not persuasively rebut Petitioner’s arguments. As Petitioner points out, Patent Owner does not provide a construction for “normalization,” despite claiming that the term is “defined” in the ’433 patent. Pet. Remand Resp. Br. 6; PO Remand Br. 13. Moreover, although Patent Owner purports to identify differences between the ’433 patent and Fong, the “normalization” applied is expressly recited in limitations [43.1.1], [43.1.2], and [43.2], and the subsequent actions taken on those normalized databases (i.e., comparing and recording) are recited in limitations [43.3]–[43.5]. That is, the “normalization” required by the claim is reflected in the claim language itself, and is broader than argued by Patent Owner. See In re Baxter Travenol Labs., 952 F.2d 388, 391 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (“It is not the function of this court to examine the claims in greater detail than argued by an appellant, looking for nonobvious distinctions over the prior art”). Patent Owner does not explain how these purported “differences” (e.g., that Fong may require the use of “database keys,” “identifiers,” “entities,” or determining ‘non-key attributes’ from key attributes) impacts the claim language, or Petitioner’s showing. See EWP Corp. v. Reliance Universal Inc., 755 F.2d 898, 907 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (A prior art reference “must be considered for everything it teaches by way of technology and is not limited to the particular invention it is describing and attempting to protect”). For the same reasons, as well as those set forth by Petitioner, we are also not persuaded by Patent Owner’s arguments that each DBMS requires a normalization process that is customized for it. Pet. Remand Resp. Br. 6–7. These arguments by Patent Owner also are not commensurate with the scope of the claim language, which does not recite a DBMS, and generally recites “normalizing” or “normalized” without regard to the DBMS. Id. Dr. Jansen provides an example of a database in unnormalized form that is converted into a normalized form, based on Fong’s four conditions, as applied to the claim language. See Reply 31–35; Ex. 1057 ¶¶ 226–261. Therefore, we are not persuaded by Patent Owner’s arguments that Petitioner has not explained how the example maps onto the limitations. PO Remand Resp. Br. 6–12. Patent Owner’s complaint that Dr. Jansen created the graphic in the example does not undermine Petitioner’s showing. E.g., Trial Practice Guide,14 I.G., (“Experts may testify about the teachings of the prior art and how they relate to the patentability of the challenged claims.”). We find Dr. Jansen’s testimony credible and persuasive in explaining why the combination of Conlon and Fong teaches the claim limitations.” slip op. at 31

    • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedDecided for petitioner

      “Dr. Jansen provides an example of a database in unnormalized form that is converted into a normalized form, based on Fong’s four conditions, as applied to the claim language. See Reply 31–35; Ex. 1057 ¶¶ 226–261. Therefore, we are not persuaded by Patent Owner’s arguments that Petitioner has not explained how the example maps onto the limitations. PO Remand Resp. Br. 6–12. Patent Owner’s complaint that Dr. Jansen created the graphic in the example does not undermine Petitioner’s showing. E.g., Trial Practice Guide,14 I.G., (“Experts may testify about the teachings of the prior art and how they relate to the patentability of the challenged claims.”). We find Dr. Jansen’s testimony credible and persuasive in explaining why the combination of Conlon and Fong teaches the claim limitations.” slip op. at 32

    • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)UnpatentableUnpatentable

      “4. Summary of Ground 1 Having considered the Graham factors,11 including the level of ordinary skill in the art, the scope and content of the prior art, and the differences between the prior art and the challenged claims, we are persuaded, based on the current record, that Petitioner has shown, by a preponderance of the evidence, that claims 14–19 and 33–40 would have been obvious over Conlon.” slip op. at 24

    Patent outcomesUS 6,510,433 unpatentable
    Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 6,510,433
  • PTAB · Jan 14, 2026 · IPR2025-00632 · APJ Mitchell G Weatherly · IPR · Remand

    On remand, the Board reinstituted review of all challenged claims on all grounds after finding Petitioner sufficiently explained its differing claim-construction positions.

    RulingsRemand decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

      “Id. The Director neither addressed the merits of Petitioner’s challenges nor found that our prior consideration of those merits was faulty. Accordingly, we understand that we need not reconsider our conclusion that Petitioner had demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of proving that claims 1, 2, 7–9, 11, 12, and 20–24 were unpatentable or that the merits of patentability set forth in the Petition warranted institution of inter partes review.” slip op. at 5

    • BurdenDecided for petitioner

      “The question before us, therefore, is whether the Petitioner’s proffered explanation that it has proposed a different claim interpretation before the Board because the District Court may decline to adopt the narrower claim interpretations it advocates there is sufficient. We find that Petitioner’s explanation is sufficient because it follows the Director’s exemplary logic. Whether a district court has already or might in the future decline to adopt constructions that a petitioner proposes in related district court litigation merely reflects the timing of when a dispute over claim interpretation will be resolved. The Director and Patent Owner both recognize that, to resolve the dispute over claim interpretation that exists here, a decision-maker must determine “a single claim construction that best captures the true meaning of the patent claim.” Remand 4; PO Remand Br. 3. Based on the record presented by the parties to date in this proceeding, no dispute exists that the disputed claim terms mean what Patent Owner says they mean in the Litigation. Accordingly, we find that, at this stage of the proceeding, it is undisputed that Patent Owner’s interpretations of the claim terms represent the “single claim construction that best captures the true meaning of the patent claim.”8 Under that claim interpretation, we” slip op. at 8

    None
    Patents in suitUS 11,835,421
  • PTAB · Dec 15, 2025 · IPR2025-01084 · APJ Nabeel U Khan · IPR · Institution

    Instituted IPR on claims 1–29 over Ross, Agarwal, and Biran because Petitioner showed a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on at least one challenged claim.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

      “An inter partes review may not be instituted “unless . . . the information presented in the petition . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). Having considered the arguments and evidence presented by Petitioner and Patent Owner, we determine that Petitioner has demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on at least one of the challenged claims of the ’896 patent. We institute inter partes review as to all the challenged claims of the ’896 patent on all the grounds of unpatentability set forth in the Petition.” slip op. at 2

    • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

      “Petitioner argues that a person of ordinary skill in the art (POSITA) “would have had a bachelor’s degree in an academic area emphasizing computer science (i.e., computer science, computer information systems, computer engineering, etc.) or cybersecurity and (2) at least two years of work experience with cybersecurity and cloud computing.” Pet. 5 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 53–54). Petitioner further argues that “[a]dditional education or experience might substitute for the above requirements.” Id. Patent Owner does not contest Petitioner’s proposed definition of a POSITA at this stage of the proceeding. See generally, Prelim. Resp. ordinary skill because it is consistent with the level of skill in the art at the time of the invention as reflected by the ’896 patent and the cited prior art.” slip op. at 7

    • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Preamble limiting or notPreamble not limitingDecided for petitioner

      “1[Pre] A method for generation of unified graph models for network entities, comprising: Petitioner contends that the preamble is not limiting, but to the extent by teaching the remaining limitations of the claim which are the steps in generating unified graph models for network entities, as the preamble recites. Pet. 9–10. Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s contentions. At this stage of the proceeding, we agree with Petitioner that the preamble is not limiting because it merely states the purpose or intended use of an invention and because none of the subsequent limitations rely upon the preamble for completeness or antecedent basis. See Catalina Marketing Int’l., Inc. v. Coolsavings.com, Inc., 289 F.3d 801, 808 (Fed. Cir. 2002); Bicon, Inc. v. Straumann Co., 441 F.3d 945, 952 (Fed. Cir. 2006); In re Hirao, 535 F.2d 67 (CCPA 1976).” slip op. at 14

    • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundDecided for petitioner

      “sufficiently established a motivation to combine Ross, Agarwal, and Biran in the manner proposed. For example, Petitioner contends for limitation 1[b] that a POSITA would have been motivated to implement Ross’s system to genericize network entities as taught by Agarwal and that Agarwal provides an express motivation to do so, explaining that “[t]he grouping of nodes can be helpful when attempting to understand system properties in a cloud environment, like availability, security and performance, where the system includes a large number of nodes.” Pet. 21 (citing Ex. 1005, 4:13–26, 13:21–27; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 103–108). Similarly, for limitation 1[d] Petitioner argues that “Biran provides express motivation to implement Ross to gather information on host-less components . . . to generate an accurate, service-aware view of the system infrastructure.” Id. at 32 (citing Ex. 1006, 1:59– 61; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 134–136). These disclosures demonstrate that Petitioner’s motivation to combine stems from the prior art references themselves rather than from hindsight. Moreover, Petitioner’s contentions are supported by credible testimony from Dr. Easttom. See Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 103–108, 122–123, Addressing a motivation to combine on a limitation-by-limitation basis, as Petitioner has done in its Petition, is not necessarily improper, and may in fact be more suitable in certain situations depending on the proposed combination. Patent Owner does not provide any authority supporting its contention that providing a motivation to combine in the manner asserted in the Petition is contrary to proper obviousness analysis under Graham.” slip op. at 25

    Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 11,929,896
  • PTAB · Dec 15, 2025 · IPR2025-01087 · APJ Lisa A Murray · IPR · Institution

    The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–17 because Orca showed a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on its § 103 obviousness ground over Shua and Lang.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

      “An inter partes review may be instituted only if “the information presented in the petition . . . and any [preliminary] response . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). For the reasons given below, on this record, Petitioner has established a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail in showing the unpatentability of at least one of the challenged claims. We determine that institution of an inter partes review of the challenged claims is appropriate. B. Real Parties in Interest” slip op. at 2

    • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

      “35 U.S.C. § 103 involves determining the level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art at the time the invention was made. Graham, 383 U.S. at 17. The level of skill in the art is “a prism or lens” through which we view the prior art and the claimed invention. Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001). The person of ordinary skill in the art is a hypothetical person who knows the relevant art. In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995). Factors to consider include the types of problems encountered in the art, the sophistication of the technology, and the educational level of active workers in the field. Id. One or more factors may predominate. Id. Petitioner asserts that one of ordinary skill in the field of the ’529 Patent would have had “a bachelor’s degree in computer engineering, computer science, electrical engineering, or a similar degree, with 2–3 years additional education or experience might substitute for these requirements.” Pet. 5; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 32–33. Patent Owner’s Preliminary Response does not address this issue. We find Petitioner’s formulation to be consistent with the evidence of record at this stage of the proceedings, including the asserted prior art and the ’529 Patent, and we preliminarily adopt and apply that definition for purposes of this Decision. C. Claim Construction” slip op. at 6

    • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed board ownOther

      “Owner contends that Petitioner’s argument “inverts the appropriate understanding: just because the challenged patent identifies an example security database that stores a representation of a computing environment as nodes and edges does not mean that anything that stores a representation of a computing environment as nodes and edges is necessarily a security database.” Prelim. Resp. at 7–8. We agree with the logic of Patent Owner’s argument, but disagree that Petitioner necessarily “relies on this inverted understanding for its prior art mapping.” Id. at 8. We understand Dr. Zadok’s explanation to mean only that the claim term “security database” encompasses graph databases that include a representation of the computing environment, meaning that some (but not necessarily all) security databases are graph databases. See Ex. 1003 ¶ 100. The language in the Petition to which Patent Owner objects can be read consistently with Dr. Zadok’s declaration. Petitioner does not, however, take a position on what the outer bounds of the claim term “security database” should be. Without attempting a full construction of the term “security database,” it is possible to determine from the current record, at least on a preliminary basis, some of the database types that would fall within its scope. The ’529 Patent explains that the claimed “security database” is part of an “inspection cybersecurity threats. Specifically, it provides as follows: In certain embodiments, the cloud computing environment 110 is monitored for cybersecurity objects, threats, risks, and the like, by an inspection environment 130. In an embodiment, the inspection environment 130 is configured to monitor the cloud computing environment 110 for cybersecurity objects, threats, risks, combinations thereof, and the like. Ex. 1001, 6:1–7; see id. Fig. 1. The ’529 Patent also provides: “In an embodiment, the inspection environment 130 further includes a security database 136. In some embodiments, the security database 136 is configured to store a representation of the cloud computing environment 110, for example based on a predetermined data schema.” Id. at 7:46–50. Thus, we can conclude that the term “security database,” as used in the ’529 Patent, encompasses at least a database within an inspection environment that monitors for cybersecurity threats and is configured to store a representation of a cloud computing environment that is monitored by the inspection environment. An example of such a security database is the Neo4j® graph database. Id. at 7:58–60. As discussed below, another example is the “context map” disclosed in Shua ’048. See Ex. 1005, 15, 25.” slip op. at 19

    • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundDecided for petitioner

      “We find nothing contradictory in Petitioner’s argument that “100% of an organization’s assets” would include its AI models. Pet. 11, 21. Shua ’048 appears to contemplate treating multiple layers of structures as assets to be mapped and monitored. Ex. 1005 ¶ 30 (Shua’s Orca system “automatically assesses the security state of discovered asset[s] throughout the technology stack, including all four cloud layers: I/S, OS, apps, and data.”). On the current record, a VM is an asset that contains other assets, including an AI model.10 We conclude that for the purposes of institution, Petitioner’s mapping, as elucidated by Dr. Zadok, adequately demonstrates that the combination of Shua and Lang discloses limitation 1[c] and the corresponding limitations in claims 9 and 10. We further conclude that Petitioner’s identification of a motivation to combine Shua with Lang is adequate for institution purposes.” slip op. at 23

    Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 12,003,529
  • PTAB · Dec 15, 2025 · IPR2025-01083 · APJ Nabeel U Khan · IPR · Institution

    The Board denied institution because Petitioner did not show a reasonable likelihood that Shivamoggi disclosed the required natural-language list of abnormal connections, including for the dependent-claim grounds.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied

      “information presented in the petition . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). Having considered the arguments and evidence presented by Petitioner and Patent Owner, we determine that Petitioner has not demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on at least one of the challenged claims of the ’554 patent. We do not institute inter partes review as to the challenged claims of the ’554 patent.” slip op. at 2

    • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

      “Petitioner argues that a person of ordinary skill in the art (POSITA) “would have had a bachelor’s degree in an academic area emphasizing computer science (i.e. computer science, computer information systems, computer engineering, etc.) or cybersecurity, with at least two years of experience in the field of cybersecurity.” Pet. 6 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 49). Petitioner further argues that “additional education or experience might substitute for these requirements.” Id. Patent Owner does not contest Petitioner’s proposed definition of a POSITA at this stage of the proceeding. See generally, Prelim. Resp. For purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill because it is consistent with the level of skill in the art at the time of the invention as reflected by the ’554 patent and the cited prior art.” slip op. at 7

    • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

      “Petitioner asserts that “no claim terms need to be construed to resolve any issues in controversy in the Petition.” Pet. 7 (citing Wellman, Inc. v. Eastman Chem. Co., 642 F.3d 1355, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2011)). Patent Owner asserts that “[n]o constructions are necessary to deny institution because denial is warranted for numerous reasons that do not depend on claim construction, as further detailed below.” Prelim. Resp. 2. We determine that, at this stage of the proceeding, no explicit constructions are required to resolve the dispute between the parties.” slip op. at 8

    • BurdenNot shown unpatentable

      “Having reviewed the record presently before us, we agree with Patent Owner. Limitation 1[d] requires generating “insights, wherein the generated insights include at least a list of abnormal connections between the identified network objects.” The ʼ554 patent states that “[n]etwork insights are natural-language representations of aspects of the network graph.” 1 Ex. 1001, 10:15–17. Petitioner acknowledges that the recited “insights” are “natural-language representations.” Pet. 26 (citing Ex. 1001, 10:16–18). Dr. Easttom also agrees that insights are natural-language representations. Ex. 1003 ¶ 100 (testifying that “Shivamoggi’s insights are provided to the user as textual descriptions (i.e. natural-language representations).”). As an 1 The parties do not address whether the “wherein” clause of limitation 1[d] runs afoul of the printed matter doctrine. “[T]he petition must set forth . . . . [h]ow the challenged claim is to be construed.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.104. Even though “insights” are described in the ʼ554 patent as “natural-language representations of aspects of the network graph” (Ex. 1001, 10:15–17), Petitioner does not construe “insights, wherein the generated insights include at least a list of abnormal connections between the identified network objects,” as “printed matter” that may be disregarded because it is “not functionally related to the substrate.” See Praxair Distribution, Inc. v. Mallinckrodt Hosp. Prods. IP Ltd., 890 F.3d 1024, 1032 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (“‘Where the printed matter is not functionally related to the substrate, the printed matter will not distinguish the invention from the prior art in terms of patentability.’. . . For example, in In re Ngai, 367 F.3d 1336, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2004) there was no functional relationship between claimed instructions and a diagnostic kit, as the instructions ‘in no way depend[ed] on the kit, and the kit [did] not depend on the’ instructions.” (quoting Ngai, 367 F.3d 1336, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2004)). Because the parties have not addressed it, we decline to consider if the printed matter doctrine applies here. “virtual machine one to load balancer five, where port eighty is routed to port 1337 on virtual machine one, then from load balancer five to firewall two, where port eighty of firewall two is open, then from firewall two to subnet sixteen, where subnet sixteen has a network address of 10.0.1.0/24, then from subnet sixteen virtual network ten, where virtual network ten has a network address of 10.0.0.0/16, then from virtual network ten to virtual network eleven, via peering connection twelve, where peering connection twelve includes a routing rule to virtual network twelve, specifying virtual network twelve's network address, where virtual network twelve's network address is 172.31.0.0/16.” Ex. 1001, 10:31–45 (quotation marks in original). This example illustrates that an insight is provided in natural-language, or textual, format, consistent with the description of an insight in the ʼ554 patent and the testimony of Dr. Easttom. The limitation, which recites “the generated insights include at least a list of abnormal connections,” therefore requires generating a naturallanguage representation of a list of abnormal connections.” slip op. at 18

    Claim constructioncites Phillips · KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 11,722,554
  • PTAB · Dec 15, 2025 · IPR2025-01086 · APJ Lisa A Murray · IPR · Institution

    The Board denied institution on all challenged claims because Orca did not show a reasonable likelihood of prevailing, based on its unexplained inconsistent positions on a claim term.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied

      “An inter partes review may be instituted only if “the information presented in the petition . . . and any [preliminary] response . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). For the reasons given below, on this record, Petitioner has not established a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail in showing the unpatentability of at least one of the challenged claims. Accordingly, we decline to institute an inter partes review of the challenged claims. B. Real Parties in Interest” slip op. at 2

    • Prior constructionPrior construction not adoptedDecided for patent owner

      “The Board has recently clarified that “[s]imply noting that the petitioner is adopting a patent owner’s claim construction proposals from district court . . . is not a sufficient reason for advancing different positions in the two forums.” Revvo Techs., Inc. v. Cerebrum Sensor Techs, Inc., IPR2025-00632, Paper 20, 5 (PTAB Nov. 3, 2025) (precedential). In Revvo, as in this case, the petitioner did not propose its own constructions for claim terms in the Petition, but instead accepted the patent owner’s proposed constructions from the related district court litigation. Id. at 2. Although the petitioner had proposed different constructions for the claim terms in district court, it did not explain why it was taking a different position before the Board. Id. The Board’s trial rules “do not necessarily prohibit petitioners from taking inconsistent claim construction positions before the Board and a explain why alternative positions are warranted.” Revvo, Paper 20, 3–4 (quoting Cambridge Mobile Telematics, Inc. v. Sfara, Inc., IPR2024-00952, Paper 12 at 8–9 (PTAB Dec. 13, 2024) (informative)). Petitioner has not sufficiently done so here. Moreover, the fact that Petitioner cannot raise its indefiniteness challenge in an inter partes review is not a sufficient reason to allow Petitioner to take inconsistent claim construction positions before the Board and the district court. Tesla, Inc. v. Intellectual Ventures II LLC, IPR2025- 00340, Paper 18, 3 (Nov. 5, 2025) (informative). As explained in the Board’s Tesla decision: Petitioner’s statement that it cannot raise indefiniteness challenges in an inter partes review is not a sufficient explanation. Indeed, the statement amounts to an assertion that a petitioner should be permitted to raise inconsistent invalidity challenges in the two forums. Petitioner’s explanation may have risen to a sufficient level, for example, if Petitioner had shown that, notwithstanding the alleged indefiniteness of the claim term, an ordinarily skilled artisan would understand that the asserted art satisfies the claim limitation (such as if the limitation prescribed a range and only the outer bounds of the range were unclear). Instead, Petitioner argued indefiniteness in the district court and then adopted Patent Owner’s plain and ordinary meaning construction from the district court litigation in its Petition. Allowing a petitioner to advance a claim construction before the Board when that petitioner has made inconsistent indefiniteness arguments in” slip op. at 7

    Claim constructioncites Phillips
    Patents in suitUS 12,001,549
  • PTAB · Dec 15, 2025 · IPR2025-01085 · APJ Karl D Easthom · IPR · Institution

    The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–21, finding a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on both § 103 grounds: Calvo and Nguyen, and Calvo, Nguyen, and Datsenko.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

      “presented in a petition and preliminary response shows that “there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). For the reasons explained below, we determine that Petitioner establishes a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail with respect to at least one challenged claim. Accordingly, we institute an inter partes review as to the challenged claims and the grounds raised in the Petition.” slip op. at 2

    • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

      “B. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art Petitioner contends that a person of ordinary skill in the art (POSITA) at the time of the ’693 Patent would have had a bachelor’s degree in computer engineering, computer science, electrical engineering, or a similar degree, with at least two years of experience in the field of cybersecurity; additional education or experience might substitute for these requirements. Pet. 7 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 63–64). Patent Owner does not provide a level of ordinary skill in the art. See generally Prelim. Resp. Based on a review of the record, we adopt Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill in the art because it is consistent with the evidence of record, including the asserted prior art and ’693 patent specification.” slip op. at 6

    • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for petitioner

      “support a construction that is similar to Petitioner’s construction of a “network path” as “a link between two machines.” See Pet. 17. That is, limitation 1(a) recites “selecting a reachable resource having a network path to access the reachable resource, wherein the reachable resource is a cloud object . . . having access to an external network which is external to the cloud computing environment,” and limitation 1(b) recites “actively inspecting the network path to determine if the network path of the reachable resource is accessible from the external network.” This plain language shows that a network path is simply a connection (link) between an external network object and a resource in a cloud (or cloud object). The specification provides an example of accessing “port 22”: “Active inspection allows to [sic] generate instructions directed at the reachable resource over a network path, which when received by the reachable resource cause the reachable resource to send a response.” Ex. 1001, 5:40–45. The specification also states that “a network path may include sequential representations of possible data/control flows between two or more objects in a graph.” Ex. 1001, 12:49–52; accord Ex. 1001, 12:60–62 (describing “a path show[ing] a connection between security objects and/or computing objects that communicate over a network”), 12:42–44 (“A network path is a connection of two or more security objects accessible from an external or internal network, and/or an external or internal object.”). In other words, the specification indicates that a transmitting testing object may be an object external to the cloud connected via a network path to another object (a cloud resource for testing). The “network path” may also include resources/objects (represented as graph vertices) on the path. See id. at 12:51–59 (“A path may be a vertexonly path, describing a sequence of vertex-to-vertex ‘hops,’ an edge-only path, describing only the edges included in the sequence without description of the associated vertices, or a combined edge-vertex path, describing both edges and vertexes included in the sequence.” (emphasis added)). Accordingly, for purposes of institution, we construe a “network path” as “a connection between an external object and a cloud resource, wherein the connection itself include objects and/or cloud resources.”” slip op. at 9

    • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

      “4. Remaining Terms No express construction of any other claim term is necessary to determine whether to institute inter partes review. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“[W]e need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))). D.” slip op. at 12

    Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 11,936,693
  • PTAB · Dec 10, 2025 · IPR2024-01186 · APJ Brian D Range · IPR · Final written decision

    Claims 1–20 were not shown unpatentable because Kwatra does not teach or suggest minimizing rotational velocity and acceleration as required by the claims.

    RulingsFinal written decision
    • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

      “Petitioner contends that a person of ordinary skill in the art (POSITA) would have the following characteristics: “a bachelor’s degree in engineering or computer science, or equivalent field, and two years of experience working on image or video processing or digital cameras.” Pet. 6 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 36–37). Petitioner states that, “[a]lternatively, a POSITA would have four years of experience working on image or video processing 6 Patent Owner asserts objective evidence of nonobviousness. Prelim. Resp. 19–27. or digital cameras.” Id. Petitioner further contends “[a]n advanced graduate degree in the disciplines cited above may make up for the work experience indicated above.” Id. Patent Owner does not dispute the level of ordinary skill in the art. Prelim Resp. 14–15. For purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s proposal as reasonable and consistent with the ’894 patent specification and the prior art. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (the prior art may reflect an appropriate level of skill in the art).” slip op. at 10

    • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededDecided for patent owner

      “Petitioner “does not believe any terms require a formal construction.” Pet. 6. Patent Owner agrees “no claim terms presently require construction to resolve any current dispute between the parties.” PO Resp. 15. We do not discern a need to construe explicitly any claim language at this juncture because doing so would have no effect on our analyses below of Petitioner’s asserted grounds and will not assist in resolving the present controversy between the parties. See Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’”) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)).” slip op. at 11

    • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

      “Kwatra teaches, at Equation 7, minimizing velocity and acceleration of a function representing camera path (P). FF ¶¶ 6, 8–9. Kwatra does not state that this camera path function considers rotation. Rather, the words “camera path” suggest x, y, z movement of the camera rather than rotation of the camera. Dr. Foroosh’s testimony that Kwatra’s minimization of a smoothed camera path does not result in minimizing rotational velocity and acceleration is credible because this testimony is consistent with Kwatra as a whole and consistent with the other evidence of record. Id. ¶ 10. Kwatra recognizes that image rotation angle (“θ”) may not remain smooth. Id. ¶ 12. But rather than attempting to minimize velocity and acceleration of rotation of the camera housing, Kwatra states that applying a smoothness constraint on rotation angle “may be non-linear.” Id. ¶ 13. Consistent with Kwatra, Dr. Foroosh credibly explains the difficulty of applying linear techniques to rotation. Id. Thus, Kwatra proposes instead constraining the sine and cosine of theta. Id. ¶ 14. The Kwatra provisional application is part of the Kwatra reference (id. ¶ 15), and it similarly opts for simpler schemes rather than estimating all parameters for all frames jointly. Id. ¶ 16. The provisional explains that the rotational component is relatively small such that non-linear computations minimizing velocity and rotation can be avoided. Id. ¶¶ 17–18. The testimony of Patent Owner’s witness, Dr. Foroosh, explaining the provisional is credible (Ex. 2018 ¶ 72) because it is consistent with Kwatra’s complete disclosure. Dr. Foroosh’s testimony is more credible than the testimony of Petitioner’s witness, Dr. Katsaggelos, because Dr. Katsaggelos did not review the Kwatra provisional application and, thus, did not review the entire disclosure of Kwatra. Id. ¶ 19; see also In re Etter, 756 F.2d 852, 859 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (en banc) (obviousness analysis considers whether “the claimed inventions are rendered obvious by the teachings of the prior art as a whole” (emphasis added)).” slip op. at 28

    • Expert testimonyPatent owner expert creditedPetitioner expert discountedDecided for patent owner

      “(id. ¶ 15), and it similarly opts for simpler schemes rather than estimating all parameters for all frames jointly. Id. ¶ 16. The provisional explains that the rotational component is relatively small such that non-linear computations minimizing velocity and rotation can be avoided. Id. ¶¶ 17–18. The testimony of Patent Owner’s witness, Dr. Foroosh, explaining the provisional is credible (Ex. 2018 ¶ 72) because it is consistent with Kwatra’s complete disclosure. Dr. Foroosh’s testimony is more credible than the testimony of Petitioner’s witness, Dr. Katsaggelos, because Dr. Katsaggelos did not review the Kwatra provisional application and, thus, did not review the entire disclosure of Kwatra. Id. ¶ 19; see also In re Etter, 756 F.2d 852, 859 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (en banc) (obviousness analysis considers whether “the claimed inventions are rendered obvious by the teachings of the prior art as a whole” (emphasis added)).” slip op. at 28

    Patent outcomesUS 10,574,894 not shown unpatentable
    Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 10,574,894
  • PTAB · Dec 9, 2025 · IPR2024-00896 · APJ Andreas Baltatzis · IPR · Final written decision

    Claims 25–28 are unpatentable as obvious over the asserted Li-based combinations; claim 29 was not shown unpatentable over Li, Siam, and Tiirola.

    RulingsFinal written decision
    • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

      “relevant to the challenged claims, as of the earliest claimed priority date, “would have had a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer science, computer engineering, or a related field, and two-to-three years of experience in the research, design, development, or testing of wireless data communication systems at the physical and media access control (MAC) layer.” Pet. 8 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 30–34). Patent Owner does not oppose Petitioner’s definition of a person of ordinary skill in the art. See PO Resp.; see also Ex. 2022 ¶ 22 (adopting “Petitioners’ and Dr. Valenti’s proposed definition of a person of ordinary skill in the art.”) On the complete record, we determine Petitioner’s proposed level of skill comports with the qualifications a person would have needed to understand and implement the teachings of the ’120 patent and the prior art of record. C. Claim Construction” slip op. at 10

    • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner

      “court in the parallel litigation issued a final claim construction. Pet. Reply 2; PO Sur-Reply 3–5. The district court construed “idle power consumption” as “a power consumed by the mobile station when the mobile station is powered on and waiting to send.” Ex. 1050, 12. The parties propose that we construe the claims to match the district court’s final construction. See Pet. Reply 2; PO Sur-Reply 3; Tr. 26. We agree and adopt the district court’s final claim construction of “idle power consumption” as “a power consumed by the mobile station when the mobile station is powered on and waiting to send,” for the reasons set forth below.” slip op. at 11

    • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededDecided for petitioner

      “2. Additional Claim Terms For purposes of institution, we determine that no other claim terms require express construction. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (citing Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (“[O]nly those terms need be construed that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.”)). D. Asserted Obviousness of Claims 25, 27, and 28 over Li and Siam” slip op. at 15

    • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundDecided for petitioner

      “On the full record, we find that a preponderance of the evidence supports Petitioner’s argument that one skilled in the art would have been motivated to combine Li and Siam to reduce total power consumption including idle power consumption (Li) and circuit power consumption (Siam). Both Li and Siam describe a need for reducing energy consumption in wireless devices. See Ex. 1005 ¶ 18; Ex. 1006, 875–76. Both references further describe switching from MIMO mode to another operating mode to reduce power consumption and optimize battery life. See Ex. 1005 ¶ 19; Ex. 1006, 875 (“[W]e dynamically adjust the ‘transmission mode’ . . . so as to minimize the total energy consumption.”). In sum, the references teach the same technique, i.e., mode switching, to achieve the same goal, i.e., reducing energy consumption, in similar devices, i.e., wireless devices. See KSR, 550 U.S. at 417 (“[I]f a technique has been used to improve one device, and a person of ordinary skill in the art would recognize that it would unless its actual application is beyond his or her skill.”). Accordingly, we are persuaded by Petitioner’s argument and evidence that one skilled in the art would have combined the Li and Siam with a reasonable expectation of success in doing so. See Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 91, 92.” slip op. at 20

    Patent outcomesUS 8,798,120 mixed
    Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 8,798,120
  • PTAB · Dec 2, 2025 · IPR2024-01052 · APJ Brian D Range · IPR · Final written decision

    Claims 1, 2, 7–12, and 17–20 are unpatentable as obvious; claims 3–6 and 13–16 were not shown unpatentable because the asserted Watanabe combinations were unsupported.

    RulingsFinal written decision
    • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

      “cameras.” Pet. 6 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 36–38). Petitioner further contends “[a]n advanced graduate degree in the disciplines cited above may make up for the work experience indicated above.” Id. Patent Owner does not dispute and applies Petitioner’s proposed level of skill. PO Resp. 6. We find that Petitioner’s proposal is reasonable and consistent with the ’832 patent specification and the prior art. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (the prior art may reflect an appropriate level of skill in the art). Thus, we apply Petitioner’s proposal in our analysis.” slip op. at 13

    • Prior constructionPrior construction adoptedDecided for petitioner

      “In our Institution Decision, we construed “determin[ing] a viewing window for the visual content as a function of progress through the progress length” as “requiring determining a viewing window for different times of the video.” Inst. Dec. 21. Neither party disputes this construction. PO Resp. 7; Pet. Reply 1–7. We maintain this same construction.” slip op. at 13

    • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundDecided for petitioner

      “Thomason are in the same field of endeavor. Thomason describes a camera and method for correctly orientating pictures from the camera. See, e.g., Ex. 1004 ¶¶ 1, 2 29–40, Figs. 3a–3b. In particular, Thomason is interested in rotating and cropping images to reduce the effect of poor orientation. Pet. 9 (citing Ex. 1004 ¶¶ 2, 34, 36). Pacurariu likewise describes aligning and resizing/cropping of a captured image to correct poor orientation. See, e.g., Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 1, 3, 45–56, Figs. 5A–5C. The preponderance of the evidence also supports that a person having ordinary skill in the art would have had reason to combine the Pacurariu’s teachings with Thomason to predictably improve Thomason. Thomason teaches correct rotation of video data and makes use of rotation sensor to correct rotated images. Pet. 19–21 (citing, e.g., Ex. 1004 ¶¶ 4, 27, 29, 35; Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 76–77). Pacurariu similarly uses sensors and measures tilt angle of the camera. Id at 21–22 (citing, e.g., Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 51–52, Fig. 6; Ex. 1002 ¶ 78). Pacurariu further teaches that its tilt data angle can be stored for each “video frame.” Id. at 22 (citing Ex. 1005 ¶ 52). Petitioner, with support from credible testimony of Dr. Katsaggelos, explains how the teachings of Thomason and Pacurariu could be successfully combined. Id. at 23 (citing, for example, Ex. 1002 ¶ 81). A person of ordinary skill in the art could have known that Thomason’s system could be improved by saving rotation data for each video frame and correcting images on a frame-by-frame basis. Id. at 23–24. The testimony of Dr. Katsaggelos is credible in this regard. Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 80–81. Petitioner and Dr. Katsaggelos explain the references’ teachings and, based on these teachings, assert that a person having skill in the art would have had reason to combine with reasonable expectation of success based on those teachings. Reason to combine may properly come from the references themselves. KSR Int’l Co., 550 U.S. at 418 (explaining reason to combine may come from “interrelated teachings of multiple patents”). Based on the evidence presented, Petitioner establishes by a preponderance of the evidence that a person having ordinary skill in the art would have had reason to combine the teachings of Thomason and Pacurariu with a reasonable expectation of success. Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 76–81, 89–92; Ex. 1004 ¶¶ 4, 8–9, 27, 29, 35; Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 26, 41, 46, 51–52, 55–57, Figs. 6, 7.” slip op. at 27

    • Obviousness (§103) › Objective indicia / secondary considerations › NexusObjective indicia no nexusDecided for patent owner

      “evaluating nexus between the claimed invention and objective evidence of nonobviousness, also referred to as secondary considerations. Lectrosonics, Inc. v. Zaxcom, Inc., IPR2018-01129, Paper 33 at 33 (PTAB Jan. 24, 2020) (precedential). We first consider whether Patent Owner has demonstrated “that its products are coextensive (or nearly coextensive) with the challenged claims,” resulting in a rebuttable presumption of nexus. Id. at 33. If not, that “does not end the inquiry into secondary considerations”; “the patent owner is still afforded an opportunity to prove nexus by showing that the evidence of secondary considerations is the ‘direct result of the unique characteristics of the claimed invention.’” Id. (quoting Fox Factory, 944 F.3d at 1373–75).” slip op. at 62

    Patent outcomesUS 11,336,832 mixed
    Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 11,336,832

Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.