- Netskope, Inc. v. Fortinet, Inc.All claims unpatentablePTAB · Aug 19, 2024 · IPR2023-00459 · APJ James P Calve · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–7 and 10–31 are unpatentable under §103 over the asserted combinations involving Chandra or Keohane.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level patent owner adoptedDecided for patent owner
“II. DISCUSSION A. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art The parties substantially agree on the level of ordinary skill in the art. Petitioner asserts that a skilled artisan “would have had at least a B.S. degree in computer science, computer engineering, or electrical engineering (or equivalent experience) and . . . at least two years’ practical experience with computer networking and computer security.” Pet. 19. Patent Owner asserts that a skilled artisan “would have had a Bachelor of Science degree in electrical engineering and/or computer science, and two years of work or research experience in the fields of network and data security, or a Master’s degree in electrical engineering and/or computer science and one year of work or research experience in related fields.” PO Resp. 3. Patent Owner asserts that its positions would be the same under either proposal. Id. We adopt Patent Owner’s proposal as more consistent with the prior art and the ’825 patent, but our decision would be the same under either formulation.” slip op. at 8
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed board ownOther
“claims 1, 15, 21, and 27 recite methods in which a first network security appliance of a CSF receives network traffic to inspect, determines whether the traffic was transmitted from a second network security appliance that executed security operations on the traffic, determines network security operations for the first network security appliance to execute based on any security operations executed by the second network security appliance, and executes operations on the traffic. Ex. 1001, 10:58–11:17, 12:31–60, 13:20– 47, 14:13–37. As claimed, network traffic may travel in one direction from a second network security appliance to a first network security appliance. The ’825 patent describes unidirectional traffic as “one embodiment” of the CSF. A first network security appliance receives incoming network traffic and determines if the incoming network traffic is transmitted from a second network security appliance based on the source address of the traffic and determines operations that the second network security appliance executed. Ex. 1001, 2:48–56. In this embodiment, traffic travels in a single incoming direction between network security appliances. Tr. 30:22–31:18. The ’825 patent also describes the “cooperation” in a CSF as “[t]he network packet carrying the flag is transmitted to another member node at the next hop.” Ex. 1001, 6:28–34 (emphasis added); id. at 8:3–8. Traffic always flows from one hop to a next hop along the same path between root 220 at the edge of the network and each particular endpoint (leaf) shown in Figure 2 below. Traffic does not flow along different interconnected paths when it travels from root 220 to an endpoint leaf 240a–240d, 250 as Patent Owner asserts is required of a CSF. PO Resp. 13–15. Figure 2 is “an exemplary topology of a cooperative security fabric (CSF)” with Patent Owner’s annotation of network traffic paths. Ex. 1001, 2:29–31; PO Resp. 16. Traffic travels along a single path from root 220 to branch 230a to leaf 240a to the blue end node. Traffic travels along a single path from root 220 to leaf 250 to the red end node. Traffic from the green node travels along a single path to leaf 240d to branch 230b to root 220. Network security appliances only cooperate along a single red, green,” slip op. at 10
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)UnpatentableUnpatentable
“(3) Analysis We agree with Petitioner that “the claims only require two appliances and traffic to go from one appliance to the other.” Reply 11. Nothing in the claims or element 1[a] requires network traffic to originate from outside the private network or the CSF. Dr. Black testifies that the background of the ’825 patent describes a need for a CSF to coordinate operations performed on network traffic that is “transmitted to/from the network” to avoid or reduce redundant operations among members of the CSF” (Ex. 2004 ¶¶ 44, 50), but Dr. Black describes the claimed network fabric and CSF entirely in the context of controlling network traffic transmitted within the enterprise network topology 200 as illustrated in Figure 2 of the ’825 patent (id. ¶ 52), which we discussed in Section II.B.1. supra and reproduce again below. In Figure 2, Patent Owner annotates paths taken by network traffic within network topology 200 comprising root 220, branches 230a, 230b, and leaves 240a–d, 250 within network 200. PO Resp. 16–17; Ex. 2004 ¶ 52. In addition, Chandra’s network 102 is “a collection of individual networks, interconnected with each other and functioning as a single large network.”7 Ex. 1004 ¶ 21. Network 102 can include LANs, WANs, and/or MANs. Id. As a result, network devices 104 located in different networks of network 102 transmit to one another via edge network links 218 within this internetwork of networks 102. Id. ¶¶ 8, 9, 21–30, Figs. 1, 2; Pet. 22–26. Transmitting and receiving CEs 208, 214 are security-based devices at the edges of different networks in network 102 to control incoming network traffic sent between transmitting and receiving network devices 206, 212 located in different networks. Ex. 1004 ¶ 30. A plurality of CEs can be associated with a single PE to receive incoming network traffic from a transmitting CE. Ex. 1004 ¶ 28. Thus, network traffic is transmitted from network devices 104 connected to a plurality of CEs that connect to other CEs via edge network link 218 and to other network devices 104 connected to those CEs “along multiple interconnected paths” (see id. ¶¶ 28–30) that satisfies Patent Owner’s definition of CSF (PO Resp. 13). The sending and receiving CEs “constitute multiple cooperating network security appliances” contrary to Patent Owner’s arguments (PO Resp. 38), as do CEs 208, 214.” slip op. at 17
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundDecided for petitioner
“Buruganahalli’s topology of devices 50, 52, 54 coordinates security operations that they perform on network data 58 sent from network device 54 to network device 52 to network device 50 from one hop to the next hop. Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 30–32, 34–36, 38–40, 46–48, Fig. 3. We agree with Petitioner that it would have been obvious to update Chandra’s metadata tag for a multi-CE path to indicate actions taken, as Buruganahalli teaches, to reduce latency and resource waste. Pet. 53–54 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 122, 125 (citing Ex. 1004 ¶ 28)). Dr. Franz testifies it would have been obvious to arrange Chandra’s different network security appliance CEs in series so that traffic passed through multiple CEs that performed different security functions in a CSF before reaching a receiving PE, as Chandra and Buruganahalli teach or suggest. Ex. 1019 ¶ 60 (citing Ex. 1004 ¶¶ 28, 30; Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 122, 125). Patent Owner’s argument that the CEs are not in series does not address Petitioner’s contention that it would have been obvious to place them in series, as Buruganahalli discloses, to perform different security operations on network traffic. Pet. 54; Ex. 1019 ¶ 60; Cf. Sur-reply 20–21. Petitioner contends that Chandra’s system also transmits data packets with updated labels to devices in an extended virtual private network (VPN) shown in Figure 8. Pet. 54. Petitioner asserts it was well known to connect a private network of a remote company site to another network such as an enterprise network using a VPN tunnel, and it would have been obvious to attach the VPN in Figure 8 to a private network as an extension of Figure 2’s private network. Pet. 54–56. Petitioner contends that, in such instances, a receiving CE would transmit data packets with the updated label to a receiving device in an extended network using the transmitting and receiving end configurations shown in Figures 2 and 8 of Chandra. Id. at 54. We agree with Petitioner that a skilled artisan would have been motivated to connect Chandra’s Figure 2 private network to Chandra’s Figure 8 VPN network to extend enterprise network communications so the next device in the extended VPN network would be “a next network appliance participating in the CSF” as claimed. Pet. 54–56; Reply 26–27 (citing Ex. 1019 ¶ 61). We also agree with Dr. Franz who testifies: Contrary to the PO’s assertion that “Petitioner…provides no rationale for why a POSITA would modify Chandra by combining Figures 2 and 8, or explain why a POSITA would reasonably expect it to succeed (POR, 45),” I provided ample reasons why a POSITA would have found it obvious that the VPN in Chandra’s Figure 8 could be attached as an extension to the private network in Chandra’s Figure 2 as illustrated below. In fact, I provided an example of a widely circulated official publication by the U.S. National Security Agency containing a reference architecture that recommended cascading multiple VPN solutions for added security. (Franz. Decl. ¶126-130.) Ex. 1019 ¶ 62 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 126–130).” slip op. at 30
Patent outcomesUS 10,084,825 unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,084,825 - Netskope, Inc. v. Fortinet, Inc.All claims unpatentablePTAB · Aug 12, 2024 · IPR2023-00458 · APJ James P Calve · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–3, 6, 8–17, and 21–27 are unpatentable under § 103 over the five asserted combinations of prior art.
RulingsFinal written decision- BurdenFwd all claims unpatentableUnpatentable
“Final Written Decision under 35 U.S.C. § 318(a) (2018) and 37 C.F.R. § 42.73 (2020) as to the patentability of the claims on which we instituted trial. Petitioner bears the burden of proving unpatentability of the challenged claims. Dynamic Drinkware, LLC v. Nat’l Graphics, Inc., 800 F.3d 1375, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2015). To prevail, Petitioner must prove unpatentability by a preponderance of the evidence. See 35 U.S.C. § 316(e); 37 C.F.R. § 42.1(d). For reasons that follow, we determine that Petitioner has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that claims 1–3, 6, 8–17, and 21–27 of the ’678 patent are unpatentable.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelOther
“II. DISCUSSION A. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art Petitioner asserts that a skilled artisan “would have had a B.S. in computer science, computer engineering, or electrical engineering, with at least two years’ experience in computer networking/security.” Pet. 15. Patent Owner asserts that a skilled artisan “would have had a Bachelor of Science degree in electrical engineering and/or computer science, and two years of work or research experience in the fields of network and data security, or a Master’s degree in electrical engineering and/or computer science and one year of work or research experience in related fields.” PO Resp. 16–17 (the positions in the PO Response would be the same under either parties’ proposal). The parties’ proposals are substantially the same. Our decision and analysis would be the same under either party’s proposal.” slip op. at 6
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner
“c. Analysis The ’678 patent describes storage containers as “directories, directory structures, web directories, folders, . . . files and namespaces of the same.” Id. at 6:44–47; id. at 10:12–15. However, it discloses that data is “stored in the namespaces, directories, folders, files or other storage containers of one or more cloud platforms,” which seems to equate namespaces with storage containers. Id. at 9:23–25. In claim 6, “the step of configuring the namespaces comprises storing content of the file as filenames.” Id. at 20:20–22. One definition of “namespace” is a “grouping of one or more names that represent individual objects within the group in a shared computing environment, such as a network.” Microsoft Computer Dictionary, Fifth Edition 130 (Microsoft Press 2002) (Ex. 3001). “The names within a namespace are unique, are created according to the same rules, and can be resolved into a particular identifying item of information, such as an IP address or a network device.” Ex. 3001.” slip op. at 7
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner
“set of names available for naming things.’” Reply 1 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶ 101; Ex. 1014 (Dictionary of Computer and Internet Terms)); Tr. 5:18–20, 7:21– 8:1. This definition is consistent with the extrinsic evidence cited above. Patent Owner largely agrees with this proposed definition. Dr. Black testifies that “to the extent a namespace is applied to object identifiers, it will define the set of allowable identifiers within a particular context.” Ex. 2003 ¶ 69 (cited in PO Resp. 19). Dr. Black agrees with Dr. Lee’s testimony “that a directory named ‘documents’ is a namespace for the files within that directory––within that ‘documents’ namespace, files can be identified by simply referring to the file name, such as ‘foo.’” Id. ¶ 68. Patent Owner however, asserts that “a name itself (such as an identifier that identifies an object) is not a namespace.” PO Resp. 19. Patent Owner asserts that the ’678 patent provides “an example of creating a namespace for file chunks as part of the encryption process” as “each chunk can be encrypted based on public and private/secret keys defined by the encryption module 210” “where keys are managed based on user-assigned policies.” PO Resp. 20. Patent Owner asserts that “[t]hese policies therefore create a namespace that defines the naming convention for the file chunks (e.g. encryption based on a particular key).” Id. Patent Owner asserts that “storing the file chunks in a folder creates a namespace scope for the file chunks” and namespaces are configured by storing file content as file names. Id. (citing Ex. 2003 ¶ 71); see Tr. 8:5–11, 11:2–12:11. d. Conclusion In view of the foregoing, we adopt Petitioner’s proposed interpretation of “namespace” as “a set of names available for naming things.” Consistent with various exemplary embodiments described in the ’678 patent, the set of names available for naming things may be based on a policy that defines the naming convention for files or file chunks, and a namespace may be created by storing files or file chunks in a folder to create a namespace scope for the files or file chunks.” slip op. at 8
Patent outcomesUS 9,280,678 unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · GrahamPatents in suitUS 9,280,678 - Hum Industrial Technology, Inc. v. Amsted Rail Company, Inc.Some claims unpatentablePTAB · Aug 7, 2024 · IPR2023-00538 · APJ Kevin W Cherry · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1, 5–10, 13–18, 20–22, 24, 31, and 32 are unpatentable; claims 2–4, 23, and 25–30 were not shown unpatentable. The revised motion to amend was granted in part and denied in part.
RulingsFinal written decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Motions to amend / substitute claimsMotion to amend granted in partGranted in part
“d. Summary For the above reasons, we determine that Patent Owner has not shown” slip op. at 100
- ExcludeMotion to exclude, deniedOther
“IV. PATENT OWNER’S MOTION TO EXCLUDE Patent Owner seeks to exclude Exhibit 1034 and page 10 of the Reply” slip op. at 86
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner
“A. “housing” Patent Owner proposes that we construe the term “housing” to mean” slip op. at 15
- Obviousness (§103) › Objective indicia / secondary considerationsObjective indicia no nexusDecided for petitioner
“suggested to one skilled in the art, objective evidence of non-obviousness (“secondary considerations”) may lead to a conclusion that the challenged claims would not have been obvious. In re Piasecki, 745 F.2d 1468, 1471–72 (Fed. Cir. 1984). Objective evidence of non-obviousness “may often be the most probative and cogent evidence in the record” and “may often establish that an invention appearing to have been obvious in light of the prior art was not.” Transocean Offshore Deepwater Drilling, Inc. v. Maersk Drilling USA, Inc., 699 F.3d 1340, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (citation omitted). For us to give substantial weight to objective evidence of nonobviousness, a proponent must establish a nexus between the evidence and the merits of the claimed invention. ClassCo, Inc., v. Apple, Inc., 838 F.3d 1214, 1220 (Fed. Cir. 2016). Nexus is a legally and factually sufficient connection between the objective evidence and the claimed invention, such that the objective evidence should be considered in determining non-” slip op. at 21
Patent outcomesUS 9,365,223 mixedClaim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 9,365,223 - Hum Industrial Technology, Inc. v. Amsted Rail Company, Inc.All claims unpatentablePTAB · Aug 6, 2024 · IPR2023-00540 · APJ Kevin W Cherry · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1, 21–30, 36, and 37 are unpatentable as obvious; the Revised Motion to Amend is denied, and the Motion to Exclude is dismissed as moot.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelDecided for petitioner
“G. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art We consider the asserted grounds of unpatentability in view of the” slip op. at 10
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached
“B. Other Claim Terms The parties do not dispute the construction of any other claim terms and we find that no other terms require express construction to resolve the controversy between the parties. Accordingly, we do not construe any other claim terms expressly. See Realtime Data, 912 F.3d at 1375 (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’”) (quoting Vivid Techs., 200 F.3d at 803).” slip op. at 13
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundUnpatentable
“Accordingly, we find that Petitioner has shown sufficiently that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to combine the teachings of Armitage and Barone in the manner suggested. ix. Summary as to Claim 1 We find that Petitioner has shown sufficiently that the combination accounts for the limitations of claim 1, and that a person of ordinary skill would have been motivated to combine Armitage and Barone with a reasonable expectation of success. Accordingly, we find that Petitioner has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that claim 1 would have been obvious over Armitage and Barone.” slip op. at 35
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedPatent owner expert discountedDecided for petitioner
“include selection of data along certain axes or combinations of axes measured by the accelerometer and ignoring unselected data, well-supported and entitled to substantial weight. See Ex. 1025 ¶¶ 4–6. We find Dr. Shamos’s testimony to the contrary, Ex. 2006 ¶¶ 40–42, inconsistent with the disclosure of the challenged patent, and entitled to little weight. Patent Owner argues that Armitage does not monitor all of the axes, like the ’915 patent. See Sur-reply 1–3. However, the ’915 patent, just like in Armitage, isolates the data from a single axis for further analysis. See Ex. 1001, 13:17–24. Thus, we do not find Patent Owner’s distinction to be persuasive. Accordingly, we find that Petitioner has shown that Armitage accounts for this limitation.” slip op. at 24
Patent outcomesUS 10,137,915 unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosurecites Phillips · KSR · Graham · NautilusPatents in suitUS 10,137,915 - Hum Industrial Technology, Inc. v. Amsted Rail Company, Inc.All claims unpatentablePTAB · Jul 18, 2024 · IPR2023-00539 · APJ James P Calve · IPR · Final written decision
The Board held original claims 1–18 and 20–22 unpatentable over the asserted obviousness grounds, denied the revised motion to amend, and held substitute claims 23–43 ineligible and unpatentable.
RulingsFinal written decision- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)UnpatentableUnpatentable
“f. Conclusion We determine that Petitioner has established by a preponderance of” slip op. at 27
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundUnpatentable
“2. Motivation to combine a. Petitioner’s contentions Petitioner contends that a skilled artisan would have combined the teachings of LeFebvre and Barone to monitor the condition of railcar wheels and bearings using sensors connected over a wireless mesh network and to analyze collected data to determine if a wheel bearing failure is imminent and issue an alert to the locomotive or central station. Pet. 42–43 (citing Ex. 1007, code (57), Abstr., ¶¶ 45, 86, 201–220; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 157–162). b. Patent Owner’s arguments Patent Owner does not contest these assertions regarding a motivation to combine LeFebvre and Barone. See generally PO Resp.; Sur-reply. c. Conclusion We determine a skilled artisan would have combined the teachings of” slip op. at 51
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Priority / effective filing date / continuation supportReference is prior artDecided for petitioner
“(4) Conclusion We determine that Patent Owner has demonstrated that the inventors” slip op. at 59
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Motions to amend / substitute claimsMotion to amend, deniedDenied
“(4) Conclusion We determine that the above-described lack of clarity in the meaning” slip op. at 72
Patent outcomesUS 9,981,673 unpatentable§ 101 eligibility§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Enfish · Electric Power · Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 9,981,673 - Netskope, Inc. v. Fortinet, Inc.All claims unpatentablePTAB · Jul 9, 2024 · IPR2023-00456 · APJ James P Calve · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–28 are unpatentable under § 103 over Burdett and FortiSandbox, Sharpe, Seese, and Kamalapuram, or Sharpe, Seese, Kamalapuram, and Dods.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level patent owner adoptedDecided for patent owner
“II. DISCUSSION A. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art Petitioner asserts that a skilled artisan “would have had at least a B.S. in computer science, computer engineering, or electrical engineering (or equivalent experience) and at least two years’ practical experience with computer networking and computer security.” Pet. 15. Patent Owner asserts a skilled artisan “would have had a Bachelor of Science degree in electrical engineering and/or computer science, and two years of work or research experience in the fields of network and data security, or a Master’s degree in electrical engineering and/or computer science and one year of work or research experience in related fields.” PO Resp. 14–15. Patent Owner asserts that its proposal is almost the same as Petitioner’s, and its positions would be the same under either party’s proposal. See id. at 15. The two formulations differ mainly in the levels of experience. We adopt Patent Owner’s proposal as more consistent with the ’856 patent and the prior art. Our decision and analysis would be the same under either party’s proposal.” slip op. at 10
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededDecided for patent owner
“that would be used to construe the claim in a civil action under 35 U.S.C. 282(b).” 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b). Under that standard, words of a claim are generally given their ordinary and customary meaning as understood by a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). We construe the claims only to the extent necessary to reach our decision. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017). The parties assert that claim terms should receive their plain and ordinary meaning and that no claim terms require construction. Pet. 16; PO Resp. 15. Having considered the record, we determine that no express claim construction of any claim term is necessary to reach our decision.” slip op. at 10
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundDecided for petitioner
“c. Analysis We determine that natively mounting Burdett’s cloud data store 306 on a FortiSandbox device to implement Burdett’s malware scanning services would improve network security. It would preserve the privacy of files in cloud file stores and protect the enterprise network from malware by using a FortiSandbox network security device at an enterprise network (rather than in a public cloud store) to scan files for malware. Files would be scanned on schedules and criteria optimized to the security of the enterprise rather than schedules or criteria of a third-party cloud-based service provider and doing bulk scans not taught in Burdett. Pet. 30; Ex. 1013 ¶ 37; Ex. 1002 ¶ 88. We agree with Dr. Franz’s testimony that performing scans on a device located in an enterprise network would enhance controllability and privacy by allowing an enterprise to perform bulk scans on schedule or on demand and more advanced scans that a cloud service provide cannot do. Ex. 1013 ¶ 37; Tr. 21:20–23:22. An enterprise could scan files according to scanning schedules and criteria that most effectively improve its network security rather than using a cloud storage provider’s criteria and schedules. Indeed, Patent Owner asserts that scanning files in cloud storage on virtual machines is inefficient. PO Resp. 6 (citing Ex. 1001, 1:67–2:3); see KSR, 550 U.S. at 416 (“The combination of familiar elements according to known methods is likely to be obvious when it does no more than yield predictable results.”); see DyStar Textilfarben GmbH & Co. Deutschland KG v. C.H. Patrick Co., 464 F.3d 1356, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (an implicit motivation to combine exists when an “improvement” makes a product more efficient). Burdett teaches that its scanning service 304 may be managed by security manager 316 implemented outside cloud infrastructure service 302. Ex. 1004, 24:1–3, 24:32–41. Burdett’s scanning service may copy files from the cloud data store to a local data store. Id. at 30:57–62; Reply 22. Burdett uses local data storage to perform security scans. Ex. 2004 ¶ 65. We find that natively mounting a cloud data store on a FortiSandbox device for scanning files would give an enterprise greater control over the scanning of enterprise files for malware while storing the files in cloud data store 306. Ex. 1013 ¶ 37; Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 70, 88, 89. We agree with testimony of Dr. Franz that an enterprise scanner is easier to supervise, and it ensures that scans are performed and completed properly, and the encrypted network connections protect transmitted files. Ex. 1013 ¶ 38; see Tr. 23:23–24:10.” slip op. at 16
Patent outcomesUS 11,036,856 unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,036,856 - BMW Of North America, LLC / Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC v. Michigan Motor Technologies, LLCAdverse judgmentPTAB · Jun 12, 2024 · IPR2023-01032 · APJ Scott B Howard · IPR · Adverse judgment
The Board denied Patent Owner’s motion to terminate and entered adverse judgment against Patent Owner on claims 1–7 because it disclaimed all claims in the trial.
RulingsAdverse judgment- Adverse judgmentAdverse judgmentGranted
“unobjected to. See Mot. 1 (Patent Owner not objecting to entry of adverse judgment); Opp. 2 (Petitioner not opposing entry of adverse judgment). The Board construes an action cancelling or disclaiming claims such that no challenged claims remain in the trial as a request for adverse judgment. 37 C.F.R. § 42.73(b)(2) (“Actions construed to be a request for adverse judgment include: . . . [c]ancellation or disclaimer of a claim such that the party has no remaining claim in the trial.”); see also McAfee, Inc. v. CAP Co., Ltd., IPR2016-00211, Paper 19 (PTAB Apr. 5, 2017) (entering adverse judgment based on motion to amend seeking cancellation of claims remaining in the trial). In this case, the Board instituted trial on claims 1–7 of the ’565 patent, none of which remains in the trial following Patent Owner’s statutory disclaimer. Ex. 2002, 3 (disclaiming claims 1–7). Accordingly, we construe Patent Owner’s disclaimer as a request for adverse judgment, and we grant that request.” slip op. at 3
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Other PTAB motions (exclude, strike, seal, additional discovery, rehearing)Denied
“We agree with Petitioner. A motion to terminate is governed by 37 C.F.R. § 42.72 (2023). Under 37 C.F.R. § 42.72, “[t]he Board may terminate a trial without rendering a final written decision, where appropriate, including where the trial is consolidated with another proceeding or pursuant to a joint request under 35 U.S.C. [§] 317(a) or 327(a).” In this case, there is no “consolidat[ion] . . . or . . . a joint request under 35 U.S.C. [§] 317(a) or 327(a),” so the application of § 42.72 here is unclear.” slip op. at 3
NonePatents in suitUS 6,581,565 - BMW Of North America, LLC v. Michigan Motor Technologies, LLCAdverse judgmentPTAB · Jun 11, 2024 · IPR2023-01031 · APJ Scott B Howard · IPR · Adverse judgment
The Board denied Patent Owner’s motion to terminate and entered adverse judgment against it on claims 1, 2, 4–7, and 9–13 because it disclaimed all claims in the trial.
RulingsAdverse judgment- Adverse judgmentAdverse judgmentGranted
“However, application of section 42.73 is straightforward and unobjected to. See Paper 23, 3 (Patent Owner not objecting to entry of adverse judgment). The Board construes an action cancelling or disclaiming claims such that no challenged claims remain in the trial as a request for adverse judgment. 37 C.F.R. § 42.73(b)(2) (“Actions construed to be a request for adverse judgment include: . . . [c]ancellation or disclaimer of a claim such that the party has no remaining claim in the trial.”); see also McAfee, Inc. v. CAP Co., Ltd., IPR2016-00211, Paper 19 (PTAB Apr. 5, 2017) (entering adverse judgment based on motion to amend seeking cancellation of claims remaining in the trial). In this case, the Board instituted trial on claims 1, 2, 4–7, and 9–13 of the ’482 patent, none of which remains in the trial following Patent Owner’s statutory disclaimer. Ex. 2005, 5 (disclaiming claims 1, 2, 4–7, and 9–13). Accordingly, we construe Patent Owner’s disclaimer as a request for adverse judgment, and we grant that request.” slip op. at 4
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Other PTAB motions (exclude, strike, seal, additional discovery, rehearing)Denied
“Patent Owner’s request as a motion to terminate pursuant to 37 C.F.R. § 42.72 (2023). Under 37 C.F.R. § 42.72, “[t]he Board may terminate a trial without rendering a final written decision, where appropriate, including where the trial is consolidated with another proceeding or pursuant to a joint 2 Patent Owner did not state that it met-and-conferred with Petitioner. Nor did Patent Owner request authorization to file a motion to terminate the proceedings. request under 35 U.S.C. 317(a) or 327(a).” In this case, there is no “consolidat[ion] . . . or a joint request under 35 U.S.C. 317(a) or 327(a),” so the application of § 42.72 here is unclear.” slip op. at 3
NonePatents in suitUS 8,909,482 - PTAB · May 20, 2024 · IPR2024-00208 · APJ Terrence W Mcmillin · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–20, finding a reasonable likelihood of success on the asserted obviousness grounds and declining discretionary denial under § 325(d).
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsInstitution denied 325dDecided for petitioner
“Office conducted any analysis or evaluation of Wu. There is no mention of Wu by the Examiner and no articulated consideration of Wu by the Office. As noted above, Advanced Bionics provides that “[a]t bottom, this framework reflects a commitment to defer to previous Office evaluations of the evidence of record unless material error is shown.” Advanced Bionics, Paper 6 at 9 (emphasis added). Here, despite Wu (or more precisely, the substantially identical Wu. Publ.) having been previously presented to the Office, we are not directed to, and we cannot find, any analysis or evaluation by the Office of Wu in the file history. See generally Ex. 1002.” slip op. at 12
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“(“Petitioner”) filed a Petition for inter partes review of claims 1–20 of U.S. Patent No. 11,010,709 B2 (Ex. 1001, “the ’709 patent”). Paper 2 (“Pet.”) at 1. SES-Imagotag Inc. (“Patent Owner”) filed a Preliminary Response. Paper 11 (“Prelim. Resp.”). With our authorization, Petitioner filed a Preliminary Reply (Paper 12, “Prelim. Reply”) and Patent Owner filed a Preliminary Sur-reply (Paper 13, “Prelim. Sur-reply”). We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 314, which provides that an inter partes review may not be instituted unless the information presented in the Petition “shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.”” slip op. at 2
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction needed
“necessary to resolve the controversy involved in this IPR, and the terms of the ’709 Patent should be given their ordinary and customary meaning.” Pet. 4. Patent Owner does not propose any claim constructions. See generally Prelim. Resp. At this stage, no need exists to expressly construe any claim terms to resolve the parties’ disputes. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“[W]e need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 18
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Instituted
“planogram” (id. at 37). We determine that these contentions lack merit and Petitioner has sufficiently shown that Wu discloses these limitations.” slip op. at 24
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,010,709 - PTAB · May 20, 2024 · IPR2024-00188 · APJ Terrence W Mcmillin · IPR · Institution
Instituted IPR of claims 1–15 on both §103 grounds because Petitioner showed a reasonable likelihood of prevailing.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“review. See 35 U.S.C. § 314 (2018); 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a) (2022). Under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), we may not authorize an inter partes review unless the information in the Petition, the Preliminary Response, the Reply, and the Sur-reply “shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” For the reasons that follow, we institute an inter partes review as to claims 1–15 of the ’669 patent on all grounds of unpatentability presented.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“systems, or an equivalent field with two or more years of work experience in electrical engineering, wireless telecommunication systems, computer engineering, or an equivalent field.” Pet. 8–9 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 33). Petitioner further notes that “[a]dditional education in a relevant field or relevant industry experience may compensate for a deficit in one of the other aspects of the requirements stated above.” Id. at 9. Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill in the art at this time. Prelim. Resp. 18 n.5 (“For purposes of this [Preliminary Response] only, Patent Owner applies Petitioner’s articulation of the level of skill in the art.”). For purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s definition of the level of ordinary skill in the art.5 It is supported by the testimony of Dr. Tentzeris and not disputed by Patent Owner. Further, it appears consistent with what is reflected by the content of the applied prior art references. Cf. Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1354–55 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (the applied prior art may reflect an appropriate level of skill).” slip op. at 9
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededDecided for petitioner
“the ‘communication stage’ recited in element [1.3] is simply a ‘communication module or unit’ that communicates data.” Reply 8 (citing Ex. 1001, 1:49–50, 2:19–20, 3:24–28, 3:63–65; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 75–76). In response, Patent Owner argues that “Petitioner offers a brand-new claim construction for ‘communication stage,’” which “the Petition never offered,” and also that “Petitioner offers its new construction based exclusively on attorney argument without the benefit of evidence in support.” Sur-reply 6, 9. To the extent necessary to determine whether to institute trial, we address these arguments as part of our unpatentability analysis below. See infra § II.D.3. For purposes of this Decision, we determine that no claim terms require express construction. See, e.g., Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 10
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundInstituted
“supposed well-recognized need in synchronizing video displays and that “[t]he only evidence Petitioner offers to explain why a POSITA would have modified Swafford with Masumoto relies on hindsight and two references besides Swafford and Masumoto—Yamada (Ex. 1010) and Kipp (Ex. 1006).” Prelim. Resp. 34–35. At least at this stage, as Petitioner’s contentions are supported by evidence including an expert declaration and Patent Owner’s contrary arguments are unsupported attorney argument, we give more weight to Petitioner’s contentions and find them sufficient to support the asserted combination of teachings. However, we do agree with Patent Owner that Petitioner’s contention that the cited combination of teachings is supported “because of the structural similarity between Swafford’s and Masumoto’s devices” (Pet. 54– 55) does not provide a motivation to combine. Prelim. Resp, 35–36. The only structural similarity relied on by Petitioner in support of this argument is that Swafford and Masumoto both disclose use of LCDs. See Pet. 54–55. Petitioner provides an inadequate explanation as to how or why the use of LCDs which are a common form of video displays would motivate the combination of the relied-upon teachings. But, this deficiency does not undermine the persuasiveness of Petitioner’s overall showing of motivation to combine. We determine that Petitioner shows sufficiently, for the purpose of institution, that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to combine the relied-upon teachings of Swafford and Masumoto with a reasonable expectation of success.” slip op. at 41
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,405,669
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.