- Askeladden, L.L.C. v. Jabaa, L.L.C.InstitutedPTAB · Dec 10, 2024 · IPR2024-00916 · APJ Hyun J Jung · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR of claims 7–20 on all petitioned grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that claim 7 would be shown unpatentable over Rescorla and Mathiassen.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“b) Petitioner Shows a Reasonable Likelihood of Prevailing Based on the present record, Petitioner shows a reasonable likelihood of prevailing in its challenge to claim 7 as unpatentable over Rescorla and Mathiassen.” slip op. at 16
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successInstituted
“Petitioner argues that one of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to combine Rescorla’s SSL/TLS handshake functions with Mathiassen’s portable device “to enhance security through biometric authentication,” “for increased interoperability,” and for the “security, Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 61–72), 16–17 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 70; Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 4, 12, 15, 47, 48; Ex. 1015, xvii), 19 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 76), 25–26 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 84), 27 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 91–92). Petitioner also argues that one of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to use Mathiassen’s portable device for website authentication as described by Rescorla, for requesting the Certificate and CertificateVerify messages, and for biometrically controlled access to a secure key for authenticating a user to a server. Pet. 29 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 98; Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 12, 50, 82), 32–33 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 63, 108; Ex. 1015, 153), 34 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 111; Ex. 1015, 153). In the proposed combination, Mathiassen’s biometric authentication would be implemented after a client receives Rescorla’s Handshake: Certificate Request message and before the client sends a Handshake: Certificate message; the response to the Certificate Request would include biometric authentication of the user; and Rescorla’s Certificate and CertificateVerify messages would be encrypted as described by Mathiassen. Pet. 13–14 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 65; Ex. 1015, 98, Fig. 4.2), 33 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 110), 35 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 116; Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 77–83). Petitioner argues that the proposed combination would not require specialized equipment and would not be limited to any specific protocol. Id. at 17 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 71; Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 65, 95).” slip op. at 14
§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 7,480,637 - Askeladden, L.L.C. v. Jabaa, L.L.C.InstitutedPTAB · Dec 10, 2024 · IPR2024-00915 · APJ Hyun J Jung · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–6 and 21–24 for all asserted grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that claim 1 is unpatentable over Mathiassen and Ryan.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“Under 35 U.S.C. § 314, an inter partes review may not be instituted “unless . . . there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” Upon consideration of the Petition and for the reasons explained below, we determine that Petitioner has shown a reasonable likelihood of prevailing with respect to at least one of the challenged claims. Thus, we institute an inter partes review of claims 1–6 and 21–24 of the ’637 patent on all presented challenges. 37 C.F.R. § 42.108(a) (“When instituting . . . review, the Board will authorize the review to proceed on all of the challenged claims and on all grounds of unpatentability asserted for” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner argues that a person of ordinary skill in the art “would have had a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering, computer science, or a related subject, and one to two years of work experience in electronic device design, secure electronic communications, or a related field” and that “[l]ess experience may be necessary with additional education, and likewise, less education may be necessary with additional work experience.” Pet. 6 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 40–41). Based on the preliminary record, we adopt Petitioner’s asserted level of ordinary skill to determine whether there is a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail with respect to at least one of the claims challenged in the Petition.” slip op. at 7
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed petitioner constructionOther
“Petitioner proposes interpreting “resident within” recited by claims 1 and 21 to mean “temporary storage of the software while the software is being executed” with citations to the Specification, declaration, and other prior art. Pet. 8–11. Petitioner also proposes that other terms should be given their plain and ordinary meaning. Id. at 8 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 42–44). At this stage, the language of the claims and the cited portions of the Specification and declaration support Petitioner’s proposed interpretation of “resident within.” Pet. 8–9; Ex. 1001, 5:12–20, 7:63–65, 8:57–58; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 45–54. We, therefore, adopt Petitioner’s proposed interpretation of “resident within” to mean “temporary storage of the software while the software is being executed.” Pet. 8. We also determine that express claim interpretation of other terms is not necessary to determine whether Petitioner shows a reasonable likelihood of prevailing. Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms that . . . are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’”) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)).” slip op. at 8
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successInstituted
“Petitioner argues that Mathiassen and Ryan are analogous art because they are in the same field of endeavor and reasonably pertinent to a problem of the ’637 patent. Pet. 18–19 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 72–74). According to Petitioner, one of ordinary skill in the art “would have been motivated to modify Mathiassen’s portable device to conduct and authenticate transactions, as taught by Ryan.” Pet. 18 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 72); see also id. at 19–21 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 74–77; Ex. 1005, code (57), ¶¶ 50, 65–98; Ex. 1006 ¶¶ 105, 223–225, 232, 235, 238, 249, 368). Petitioner also argues that one of ordinary skill in the art “would have been motivated to modify Mathiassen’s portable device to conduct transactions using a wireless interface, as taught by Ryan, to enable Mathiassen’s portable device to communicate wirelessly with external devices.” Id. at 18; see also id. at 21–22 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 78; Ex. 1005, code (57); Ex. 1006 ¶¶ 151, 223– 225, 235, 248). Petitioner further argues that the proposed combination would have merely been prior art elements combined according to known methods to yield a predictable result. Pet. 22–23 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 79). Petitioner additionally argues that the proposed combination would have been modifying a similar device in a same way. Id. at 24 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 81; Ex. 1005 ¶ 50, Fig. 2b; Ex. 1006 ¶ 175). In Petitioner’s view, the proposed combination also represents a mere substitution of one known element in the field for another known element. Id. at 24–25 (citing Ex. 1001, 6:50–54; Ex. 1003 ¶ 81; Ex. 1006 ¶¶ 223, 235). Petitioner contends that one of ordinary skill in the art would have had a reasonable expectation of success in making the proposed combination.” slip op. at 13
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 7,480,637 - Uber Technologies, Inc. v. Enovsys LLCInstitution deniedPTAB · Nov 22, 2024 · IPR2024-00825 · APJ Andrew L Nalven · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution because the petition did not show a reasonable likelihood of proving any challenged claim unpatentable under the asserted obviousness grounds.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), an inter partes review may not be instituted “unless . . . there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” For the reasons that follow, we determine that Petitioner has not demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of prevailing in demonstrating the unpatentability of at least one of the challenged claims. Accordingly, we decline to institute an inter partes review.” slip op. at 2
- Claim Construction › Functional claiming / §112(f) means-plus-function › Corresponding structure / algorithm (indefinite if none)Term construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner
“Step 1 of Figure 7 begins by obtaining the geographic information of the area to search for possible remote targets. Id. at 8:57–59. In step 2, the next geographic region where a possible search for a PRU is estimated. Id. at 8:64–66. In step 3, a page is sent out to that geographic region for remote units in the region to reveal their location. Id. at 9:2–4. In steps 4 and 5, if remote units are identified in the paged area, that information is forwarded to the network and the process continues to step 7 where the process is aborted. Id. at 9:4–6. Step 6 is performed if no units are identified in the paged area. Id. at 9:6–9. There, a check is done to establish if there are any remaining cells or grids higher up in the chain to be searched, and if so, the process returns to step 2 to search additional geographic areas. Id. at 9:9–12. The iterative process described in Figure 7 is consistent with Patent Owner’s proposed construction requiring forwarding a notification to only one or more PRUs currently located in a specific geographic boundary. Ex. 2001 ¶ 55; see also Ex. 1001, 8:32–54 (describing a grid search technique that may be implemented by the process of Figure 7).” slip op. at 13
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“(“POSITA”) would have had “a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering, computer science, or a related field, and at least two years of experience in the research, design, development, and/or testing of GPS and related location tracking techniques, or the equivalent.” Pet. 8 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 28–30). Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s proffered definition as to the level of ordinary skill in the art. Prelim. Resp. 6. For purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s assessment, which is consistent with the level of skill reflected in the Specification and asserted prior art.” slip op. at 16
- Expert testimonyPatent owner expert creditedDecided for patent owner
“We are further not persuaded by Petitioner’s argument that forwarding notifications to the PRUs only within a specified geographic region renders element 12[D]’s step of verifying whether the PRUs exists within said region unnecessary. Pet. 35 n.8. Rather, we credit Mr. McAlexander who testifies that forwarding notifications to individually pollable geographic boundaries “does not obviate the need for the PRU to identify that the notification has been received or verify its location within the individual geographic boundary before responding.” Ex. 2001 ¶ 155.” slip op. at 15
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 7,199,726 - Uber Technologies, Inc. v. Enovsys, LLCInstitution deniedPTAB · Nov 22, 2024 · IPR2024-00827 · APJ Thomas L Giannetti · IPR · Institution
Institution was denied because Petitioner did not show a reasonable likelihood of proving claims 1, 2, 15, or 22 unpatentable on any asserted obviousness ground.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“To institute an inter partes review, we must determine “that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) (2018). For the reasons stated below, we determine that Petitioner has not established a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail with respect to any claim challenged in the Petition. We, therefore, deny institution of inter partes review.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“alleged invention “would have had a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering, computer science, or a related field, and at least two years of experience in the research, design, development, and/or testing of GPS and related location tracking techniques, or the equivalent, with additional education substituting for experience and vice versa.” Pet. 6 (citing Andrews Decl. ¶ 25). At this stage, Patent Owner does not dispute this contention. Prelim. Resp. 5. For the purpose of determining institution, we adopt Petitioner’s definition of a person of ordinary skill in the art because it is consistent with the level of skill reflected by the ’918 patent specification and the asserted prior art.” slip op. at 20
- Claim Construction › Functional claiming / §112(f) means-plus-function › Whether §112(f) applies (Williamson, nonce words)§112(f) appliesDecided for petitioner
“means.” See Ex. 1001, 11:60–12:4, 12:6–8, 15:30–37. The use of the word “means” in a claim element creates a rebuttable presumption that 35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶ 63 applies. See Williamson v. Citrix Online, LLC, 792 F.3d 1339, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (en banc in relevant part). 3 Section 4(c) of the AIA re-designated 35 U.S.C. § 112, sixth paragraph, as 35 U.S.C. § 112(f). Because the ’918 patent has a filing date before the We must first identify the claimed function. Then, we must determine what structure, if any, disclosed in the specification corresponds to the claimed function. Id. at 1351 (citation omitted). The parties do not dispute that 35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶ 6 applies to those “means” elements recited in claims 1, 2, and 22. See Pet. 7–12; Prelim. Resp. 9–21. slip op. at 10
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction needed
“Having reviewed Patent Owner’s position on claim limitation 1[C], we determine that we do not need to expressly construe this claim term to effective date of the relevant amendment, we refer to the pre-AIA version of § 112. Owner acknowledges that the asserted network “includes control units programmed to obtain the locations of the offender and victim devices,” and does not base its arguments on the construction of this limitation. Id. at 42.” slip op. at 11
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 6,756,918 - Uber Technologies, Inc. v. Enovsys, LLCInstitution deniedPTAB · Nov 22, 2024 · IPR2024-00826 · APJ Thomas L Giannetti · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution because Petitioner did not show a reasonable likelihood of proving any challenged claim unpatentable on the asserted obviousness grounds.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsDenied
“To institute an inter partes review, we must determine “that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) (2018). For the reasons stated below, we determine that Petitioner has not established a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail with respect to any claim challenged in the Petition. We, therefore, deny institution of inter partes review.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“alleged invention “would have had a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering, computer science, or a related field, and at least two years of experience in the research, design, development, and/or testing of GPS and related location tracking techniques, or the equivalent, with additional education substituting for experience and vice versa.” Pet. 8 (citing Andrews Decl. ¶¶ 25–26). Patent Owner does not dispute this contention or offer an alternative formulation. See Prelim. Resp. 6. For the purpose of institution, we adopt Petitioner’s definition of a person of ordinary skill in the art because it is consistent with the level of skill reflected by the ’752 patent specification and the asserted prior art.” slip op. at 19
- Claim Construction › Functional claiming / §112(f) means-plus-function › Whether §112(f) applies (Williamson, nonce words)§112(f) appliesDecided for petitioner
“1. Means-Plus-Function Terms Challenged claims 14 and 15 recite elements using the word “means.” See Ex. 1001, 13:6–18, 13:20–22. The use of the word “means” in a claim ’752 patent has a filing date prior to the effective date of the applicable AIA amendment, we refer to the pre-AIA version of §103. See Williamson v. Citrix Online, LLC, 792 F.3d 1339, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (en banc in relevant part). Construing a means-plus-function claim term is a two-step process. We must first identify the claimed function. Then, we must determine what structure, if any, disclosed in the specification corresponds to the claimed function. Id. at 1351 (citation omitted). The parties do not dispute that 35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶ 6 applies to those “means” elements recited in claims 14 and 15. See Pet. 8–12; Prelim. Resp. 11–19.” slip op. at 10
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner
“geographic region.” The ’752 patent describes polling specific sub-regions of the network for a PRU. Ex. 1001, 2:12–15, 7:22–34. As Mr. McAlexander testifies, “[a] PRU may choose to instruct the network to relay certain information to mobile units in a specific geographic region. That information would then be appended to the geographic boundary information and beamed in the specified geographic region.” McAlexander Decl. ¶ 49 (quoting Ex. 1001, 10:19–23) (alteration in original). For example, a nearby boundary can be polled for the locations of nearby wireless customers within proximity of a distressed wireless customer. As described in the ’752 patent, a distressed mobile user M1 may need to find where another party might exist in that geographic region. The user could initiate a page from their PRU for the closest available PRUs that could be found in that geographic jurisdiction. Looking at FIG. 3, mobile user M1 will provide its location, latitude and longitude (x0,y0) to the closest available ground station serving area C1 or grid G1. As stated earlier, appropriate terrestrial technology will be scattered in that region to serve the PRUs in that area as shown in FIG. 1. Once a ground station picks up this signal, it sends a page for all location reporting devices in the specified boundary surrounding mobile unit M1, FIG. 3 to disclose their location. Ex. 1001, 7:22–34 (emphasis added). slip op. at 18
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 6,441,752 - Dental Imaging Technologies Corporation v. 3shape A/SInstitution deniedPTAB · Oct 29, 2024 · IPR2024-00849 · APJ James J Mayberry · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution of review for claims 1, 2, 4, 5, 9, 10, and 12–17 under General Plastic discretion and denied joinder; it did not reach the merits.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › General Plastic (serial petitions)Institution denied general plasticInstitution denied
“g. Summary and Conclusion In summary, we determine that factors 1, 3, and 6 weigh in favor of discretionary denial, factors 2, and 4 weigh against discretionary denial, and factors 5 and 7 are neutral. Considering these factors as a whole, and on this record, we determine that the facts here weigh in favor of exercising discretion under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) to deny institution. Significant to our analysis is that the similarities in the facts in the instant proceeding and Uniloc outweigh the differences. Specifically, the primary difference between the facts here and the facts in Uniloc is that Petitioner explained its knowledge of the prior art and, as to Lehmann II, Petitioner demonstrated that it was not aware of Lehmann II prior to filing the first petition. In Uniloc, Apple made no such showing. As we discuss above, however, the significance of Lehmann II in this proceeding may be limited, given our initial determination of the merits of Patent Owner’s arguments against Lehmann II in the Medit IPR. As such, the lack of knowledge of Lehmann II is insufficient to counter the similarities between this proceeding and Uniloc.” slip op. at 24
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“2. Merits Analysis Having decided to exercise discretion to deny institution, we need not turn to the merits of the Petition and Motion. III. CONCLUSION We determine that exercising our discretion to not institute this proceeding is warranted based on our precedential decisions in General Plastic and Uniloc. Accordingly, the Petition and Motion are denied.” slip op. at 24
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Joinder §315(c) / SAS all-or-nothingJoinder, deniedDenied
“(c) JOINDER.—If the Director institutes an inter partes review, the Director, in his or her discretion, may join as a party to that inter partes review any person who properly files a petition under section 311 that the Director, after receiving a preliminary response under section 313 or the expiration of the time for filing such a response, determines warrants the institution of an inter parties review under section 314. “To join a party to an instituted [inter partes review (IPR)], the plain language of § 315(c) requires two different decisions.” Facebook, Inc. v. Windy City Innovations, LLC, 973 F.3d 1321, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2020). “First, the statute requires that the Director (or the Board acting through a delegation of authority) . . . determine whether the joinder applicant’s petition for IPR ‘warrants’ institution under § 314.” Id. “Second, to effect joinder, § 315(c) requires the Director to exercise h[er] discretion to decide whether to ‘join as a party’ the joinder applicant.” Id. As the moving party, Petitioner bears the burden of proving that it is entitled to joinder. 37 C.F.R. § 42.20(c). A motion for joinder should: (1) set forth the reasons joinder is appropriate; (2) identify any new grounds of unpatentability asserted in the petition; and (3) explain what impact (if any) joinder would have on the trial schedule for the existing review. See Kyocera Corp. v. Softview LLC, IPR2013-00004, Paper 15 at 4 (PTAB Apr. 24, 2013).” slip op. at 14
Discretionary denialPatents in suitUS 10,695,151 - Comcast Cable Communications, LLC v. Touchstream Technologies, Inc.Rehearing grantedPTAB · Oct 9, 2024 · IPR2024-00324 · APJ Michelle N Wormmeester · IPR · Rehearing
Patent Owner’s rehearing request was granted; the Petition was denied and no trial instituted because the challenges did not meet the compelling-merits standard under Fintiv.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, grantedGranted
“abuse of discretion. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(c). An abuse of discretion occurs when a “decision [i]s based on an erroneous conclusion of law or clearly erroneous factual findings, or . . . a clear error of judgment.” PPG Indus., Inc. v. Celanese Polymer Specialties Co., 840 F.2d 1565, 1567 (Fed. Cir. 1988). “The burden of showing that a decision should be modified lies with the party challenging the decision.” Office Patent Trial Practice Guide, 77 Fed. Reg. 48,756, 48,768 (Aug. 14, 2012). In its request for rehearing, the dissatisfied party must (1) “specifically identify all matters the party believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked” and (2) identify the place “where each matter was previously addressed.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d); Office Patent Trial Practice Guide, 77 Fed. Reg. at 48,768.” slip op. at 3
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Prosecution history disclaimer / disavowalTerm construed board ownDecided for patent owner
“Our reviewing court has explained that “[t]he prosecution history modifies the scope of a claim term if ‘the patentee distinguished that term from prior art on the basis of a particular embodiment, expressly disclaimed subject matter, or described a particular embodiment as important to the invention.’” Sentry Protection Prods., Inc. v. Eagle Mfg. Co., 400 F.3d 910, 915 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (quoting CCS Fitness, Inc. v. Brunswick Corp., 228 F.3d 1359, 1366–67 (Fed. Cir. 2002)).” slip op. at 8
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Institution denied fintivInstitution denied
“discretion to deny institution due to the advanced state of parallel litigation, taking into consideration the six factors identified in Apple Inc. v. Fintiv, Inc., IPR2020-00019, Paper 11 (PTAB Mar. 20, 2020) (precedential), as well as applying guidance set forth in a Memorandum regarding the “Interim Procedure for Discretionary Denials in AIA Post-Grant Proceedings with Parallel District Court Litigation” issued by the Director of the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (hereinafter, “Guidance Memo”).5 Inst. Dec. 6–43. We determined that the first five Fintiv factors favor discretionary denial,6 and that the Petition presents compelling evidence of unpatentability as to independent claims 1, 12, and 17 under the sixth Fintiv factor. Id. at 15–16, 23–43. Because “the PTAB will not deny institution based on Fintiv if there is compelling evidence of unpatentability,” we declined to exercise our discretion to deny. Guidance Memo 5; Inst. Dec. 15–16.” slip op. at 4
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot shown unpatentableMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentable
“those arguments. See Inst. Dec. 45–47. As to Petitioner’s arguments on the claimed first and second formats of limitation 1D in particular, we found the record provided “some support” for Petitioner’s position that “it would have been obvious to a [person of ordinary skill in the art] that one or more RTS Media Abstraction Modules could operate at a server, such as in [Aldrey’s] Service Provider Network 103,” even though Petitioner asserted that Mahajan teaches command conversion at the client. Id. at 45–46 (citing Pet. 66–67). Yet assuming Mahajan’s RTS Media Abstraction Module could have operated at a server, as Petitioner argued, it is not readily apparent why an ordinarily skilled artisan would have considered locating the RTS Media Abstraction Module at a server based on Mahajan’s disclosure of command conversion at a client. See also Pet. 66 (“[I]t would have been obvious to a [person of ordinary skill in the art] that the RTS Media Abstraction Module could be located on the client or server.” (emphasis added)). Nor did Petitioner adequately explain why an ordinarily skilled artisan would have considered locating Mahajan’s RTS Media Abstraction Module at a server. We note Petitioner further argued that combining Mahajan and Aldrey would have provided a system where “Aldrey’s end terminal would translate commands associated with a first type of media playing application to a command associated with a second type of media playing application on a STB.” Pet. 68; see also id. at 67 (“Mahajan’s server-command teachings could be implemented on Aldrey’s end terminal remote control.”). Arguing that Aldrey’s end terminal would translate commands seems inconsistent with Petitioner’s earlier argument for locating command conversion at Aldrey’s network service provider. See id. at 66–68. Moreover, it is not readily apparent how command translation by Aldrey’s end terminal––rather than Aldrey’s network service provider––teaches or suggests the format of a command sent from the end terminal to the network service provider is different from the format of a command sent from the network service provider to the STB. Petitioner did not close these logical gaps, leaving its case short of compelling.” slip op. at 18
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialPatents in suitUS 11,048,751 - Comcast Cable Communications, LLC v. Entropic Communications, LLC.Institution deniedPTAB · Oct 8, 2024 · IPR2024-00434 · APJ Frederick C Laney · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution on claims 1–20 because Petitioner did not justify a third parallel petition after instituting its first-ranked petition.
RulingsInstitution decision- Parallel petitionsInstitution denied discretionary otherInstitution denied
“Based on the Board’s experience, one petition should be sufficient to challenge the claims of a patent in most situations. . . . In addition, multiple petitions by a petitioner are not necessary in the vast majority of cases. To date, a substantial majority of patents have been challenged with a single petition. Practice Guide 59 (emphasis added). The Practice Guide provides examples of “circumstances in which more than one petition may be necessary.” Id. None of these examples are pertinent here. For example, a second petition might be justified “when the patent owner has asserted a large number of claims in litigation or when there is a dispute about priority date requiring arguments under multiple prior art references.” Petitioner does not argue that the number of claims in the parallel litigation is “large.” And while Petitioner does argue that the prior art relied upon on might be antedated, “Patent Owner stipulates that if the Board were to institute only Comcast’s second ranked petition (IPR2024-00433), and deny IPR2024-00432 and IPR2024-0434 as improper parallel petitions, then, in the IPR2024-00433 proceeding, Patent Owner will not challenge the status of Petrovic and Eidson as prior art.” Prelim. Resp. 41.” slip op. at 10
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied discretionary otherInstitution denied
“CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, we are not persuaded that the facts presented by Petitioner justify a second petition challenging the same claims of the ’362 patent as the petition in IPR2024-00432. We therefore exercise our discretion under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) to deny institution of inter partes review. ORDER Accordingly, it is: ORDERED that, pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), the Petition is denied and inter partes review of claims 1–20 of the ’362 patent is not instituted on the grounds asserted in the instant Petition.” slip op. at 11
Discretionary denialPatents in suitUS 9,210,362 - Comcast Cable Communications, LLC v. Entropic Communications, LLC.Institution deniedPTAB · Oct 8, 2024 · IPR2024-00433 · APJ Frederick C Laney · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution on claims 1–20 because Petitioner did not justify a second parallel petition challenging the same claims.
RulingsInstitution decision- Parallel petitionsInstitution denied discretionary otherDenied
“Our Practice Guide provides guidance on handling situations involving multiple petitions by a single petitioner challenging the same patent claims: Based on the Board’s experience, one petition should be sufficient to challenge the claims of a patent in most situations. . . . In addition, multiple petitions by a petitioner are not necessary in the vast majority of cases. To date, a substantial majority of patents have been challenged with a single petition. Practice Guide 59 (emphasis added). The Practice Guide provides examples of “circumstances in which more than one petition may be necessary.” Id. None of these examples are pertinent here. For example, a second petition might be justified “when the patent owner has asserted a large number of claims in litigation or when there is a dispute about priority date requiring arguments under multiple prior art references.” Petitioner does not argue that the number of claims in the parallel litigation is “large.” And while Petitioner does argue that the prior art relied upon on might be antedated, “Patent Owner stipulates that if the Board were to institute only Comcast’s second ranked petition (IPR2024-00433), and deny IPR2024-00432 and IPR2024-0434 as improper parallel petitions, then, in the IPR2024-00433 proceeding, Patent Owner will not challenge the status of Petrovic and Eidson as prior art.” Prelim. Resp. 41. Petitioner’s remaining argument is no more persuasive. Responding to Petitioner’s argument that different prior art has different strengths with respect to different claims, Patent Owner points out that Petitioner “fails to show why any difference between the primary references would justify instituting more than one petition.” Prelim. Resp. 43. We agree. As our Practice Guide cautions, “[t]wo or more petitions filed against the same patent at or about the same time . . . may place a substantial and unnecessary burden on the Board and the patent owner and could raise fairness, timing, and efficiency concerns.” Practice Guide 59. This is especially concerning here, where the instituted trial in IPR2024-00432 will involve five references and eight grounds. Adding an additional six grounds and five references from this Petition to the mix would create an “unnecessary burden.” In sum, in the words of our Practice Guide, Petitioner fails to show “why the Board should exercise its discretion to institute additional petitions if it identifies one petition that satisfies petitioner’s burden under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a).” Practice Guide 60.” slip op. at 10
Discretionary denialPatents in suitUS 9,210,362 - PTAB · Oct 8, 2024 · IPR2024-00432 · APJ Frederick C Laney · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted review of claims 1–20 on all petitioned grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that Comcast would show at least one claim unpatentable over Zhang.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“In an [inter partes review], the petitioner has the burden from the onset to show with particularity why the patent it challenges is unpatentable.” Harmonic Inc. v. Avid Tech., Inc., 815 F.3d 1356, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (citing 35 U.S.C. § 312(a)(3) (requiring inter partes review petitions to identify “with particularity . . . the evidence that supports the grounds for the challenge to each claim”)). This burden of persuasion never shifts to Patent Owner. See Dynamic Drinkware, LLC v. Nat’l Graphics, Inc., 800 F.3d 1375, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (discussing the burden of proof in inter partes review). slip op. at 12
- Parallel petitionsDenied
“petitions, Petitioner filed a Petition Ranking and Explanation of Material Differences Between Petitions, ranking its three petitions directed to the ’362 patent in accordance with the guidance with respect to parallel petitions in the Board’s November 2019 Consolidated Trial Practice Guide. Paper 3; see Patent Trial and Appeal Board Consolidated Trial Practice Guide (Nov. 2019, “CTPG”), at 59–60 (available at Available at https://www.uspto.gov/ TrialPracticeGuideConsolidated). In that Paper, Petitioner ranked the instant Petition first. Paper 3, 1.” slip op. at 10
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art Petitioner asserts that a person of ordinary skill in the art (“POSITA” or “skilled artisan”) “would have had a degree in electrical engineering or a similar discipline, along with three-to-four years of experience with digital signal processing and RF tuning systems for satellite and/or cable communications,” and that “[a]dditional education may substitute for professional experience, and significant work experience may substitute for 8 Patent Owner does not present objective evidence of nonobviousness at this stage of the proceeding. See generally Prelim. Resp. formal education.” Pet. 20 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 30–32). Patent Owner does not address level of ordinary skill in the art. See generally Prelim. Resp. For purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s proposal as reasonable and consistent with the prior art. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (the prior art may reflect an appropriate level of skill in the art).” slip op. at 12
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“Claim Construction We apply the same claim construction standard used in district court actions under 35 U.S.C. § 282(b), namely that articulated in Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). See 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b) (2021). In applying that standard, claim terms generally are given their ordinary and customary meaning as would have been understood by a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention and in the context of the entire patent disclosure. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1312–13. “In determining the meaning of the disputed claim limitation, we look principally to the intrinsic evidence of record, examining the claim language itself, the written description, and the prosecution history, if in evidence.” DePuy Spine, Inc. v. Medtronic Sofamor Danek, Inc., 469 F.3d 1005, 1014 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (citing Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1312–17). Petitioner states that “[a]ll claim terms herein should be given their” slip op. at 13
Claim construction§ 102 anticipationDiscretionary denialcites PhillipsPatents in suitUS 9,210,362
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.