- Shenzhen Apaltek Co., Ltd. v. Asetek Danmark A/SAll claims unpatentablePTAB · Jan 22, 2024 · IPR2022-01318 · APJ Jason W Melvin · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1, 2, 6 are unpatentable as obvious over Duan; claims 5, 8 are unpatentable as obvious over Duan and Wu.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“II. ANALYSIS A. LEVEL OF ORDINARY SKILL IN THE ART Petitioner proposes that a person of ordinary skill would have been knowledgeable regarding liquid cooling systems for computer systems, would have had a Bachelor of Science (B.S.) in electrical or mechanical engineering, or similar advanced post-graduate education in this area, or would have possessed at least 2–3 years of experience in liquid cooling systems for computer systems or similar systems. A POSITA would be knowledgeable of the concepts, components, and their functions described as “prior art” in the ’355 patent such as, e.g., pumps, radiators, fans, reservoirs, and other techniques of heat dissipation and liquid cooling. (Ex- 1001,1:11–47.) In addition, a POSITA would be knowledgeable about electric motors and their components (e.g., electromagnetic coils, rotors, stators, AC/DC motors, etc.) Pet. 6–7 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 13–18). Patent Owner has not proposed a level of ordinary skill in the art. We adopt Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill as it appears to be consistent with the level of skill reflected by the specification and in the asserted prior art references.” slip op. at 9
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“Based on our analysis of the proceeding, we conclude that no claim term requires express construction. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017).” slip op. at 9
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)UnpatentableUnpatentable
“disclosures. Pet. 17–45. Petitioner maps the claimed reservoir to Duan’s “structure formed by an accommodation chamber 21, lower cover 225, cap 3, and cooling plate 1.” Id. at 18. Petitioner maps the claimed double-sided chassis to Duan’s accommodation chamber 21 and the claimed impeller cover to Duan’s lower cover 225. Id. at 22–27. Petitioner maps the claimed thermal-exchange chamber to Duan’s cap 3 and cooling plate 1, with heat-absorbing face 11 and cooling plate 1 corresponding to the claimed heat exchanging interface. Id. at 27–36. Petitioner maps the claimed radiator to Duan’s cooling stage 53. Id. at 36–39. Petitioner asserts that Duan’s inlet is “below a center of the impeller” because it is along the axis about which the impeller rotates. Id. at 39–41. Petitioner asserts that Duan’s lower cover 225 defines an outlet tangential to the impeller’s circumference. Id. at 41–45. In summary, Petitioner asserts that Duan, without modification, discloses all of claim 1’s limitations. Patent Owner does not challenge Petitioner’s contentions, as it has filed no Patent Owner Response. We have reviewed Petitioner’s contentions and conclude that they show by a preponderance of the evidence that claim 1’s subject matter would have been obvious over Duan. See Pet. 17– 45. We adopt Petition’s unchallenged contentions as our analysis.” slip op. at 11
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundUnpatentable
“As to claim 5, Petitioner asserts that it would have been obvious to use Wu’s approach to securing chassis and heat-exchanging interface to the heat generating component, because Duan discusses the need to assemble its components but does not provide detailed instruction. Id. Thus, the modification would provide the benefit of securing Duan’s cooling plate module and cooling plate to the CPU. Id. at 72. For claim 8, Petitioner asserts that it would have been obvious to use Wu’s approach to blowing air through the radiator using a fan driven by a motor separate from the pump’s motor. Id. at 72–73. Petitioner reasons that doing so would improve Duan’s performance by increasing heat dissipation. Id. at 74. We agree that Petitioner’s contentions support the modification with rational underpinning.” slip op. at 12
Patent outcomesUS 10,078,355 unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnessPatents in suitUS 10,078,355 - PTAB · Feb 6, 2023 · IPR2022-01318 · APJ Jason W Melvin · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted inter partes review of claims 1, 2, 5, 6, and 8 based on a reasonable likelihood of unpatentability over Duan, and Duan with Wu.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › General Plastic (serial petitions)Denied
“involved two petitioners accused of infringement based on the same product—made by one petitioner and incorporating technology licensed from the other. Valve I, at 9–10 (finding a significant relationship between the two petitioners “with respect to Patent Owner’s assertion” of the challenged patent); Valve II, at 10 (same); see Prelim. Reply 3. Patent Owner has asserted no such relationship here, and we conclude that Patent Owner has failed to establish that Petitioner has a significant relationship with the -522 IPR petitioner. Representation by the same counsel and being accused of infringing the same patent does not create a relationship that justifies discretionarily denying institution. Accordingly, Factor 1 weighs strongly against denying institution.” slip op. at 10
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“presented in the petition . . . and any response . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). For the reasons set forth below, we conclude that Petitioner has shown a reasonable likelihood it will prevail in establishing the unpatentability of at least one challenged claim, and we institute inter partes review.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“B. LEVEL OF ORDINARY SKILL IN THE ART Petitioner proposes that a person of ordinary skill would have been knowledgeable regarding liquid cooling systems for computer systems, would have had a Bachelor of Science (B.S.) in electrical or mechanical engineering, or similar advanced post-graduate education in this area, or would have possessed at least 2-3 years of experience in liquid cooling systems for computer systems or similar systems. A POSITA would be knowledgeable of the concepts, components, and their functions described as “prior art” in the ’355 patent such as, e.g., pumps, radiators, fans, reservoirs, and other techniques of heat dissipation and liquid cooling. (Ex-1001,1:11-47.) In addition, a POSITA would be knowledgeable about electric motors and their components (e.g., electromagnetic coils, rotors, stators, AC/DC motors, etc.) Pet. 6–7 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 13–18). Patent Owner does not dispute this definition of a person of ordinary skill. See generally Prelim. Resp. For purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill as it appears to be consistent with the level of skill reflected by the specification and in the asserted prior art references.” slip op. at 13
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededDecided for petitioner
“Based on our analysis of the issues in dispute at this stage of the proceeding, we conclude that no claim term requires express construction at this time. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017).” slip op. at 14
Claim constructionDiscretionary denialPatents in suitUS 10,078,355 - Arkema Inc. / Arkema France v. Honeywell International Inc.All claims unpatentablePTAB · Aug 25, 2022 · PGR2016-00012 · APJ Sheldon M Mcgee · PGR · Remand
Claims 1–20 are unpatentable under § 102(a) for prior public use; the Board did not reach the remaining anticipation, obviousness, and enablement grounds.
RulingsRemand decision- RemandOther
“On October 1, 2019, the Federal Circuit held that we “abused [our] discretion by assuming the authority that 35 U.S.C. § 255 expressly delegates to the Director: to determine when a Certificate of Correction is appropriate,” and vacated our Final Written Decision. Honeywell Int’l Inc. v. Arkema Inc., 939 F.3d 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2019). The Federal Circuit instructed us to “authorize Honeywell to file a motion seeking leave to petition the Director for a Certificate of Correction.” Id. at 1351. Pursuant to the Federal Circuit’s mandate, we gave our authorization, and Patent Owner filed its Motion for Leave to Request a Certificate of Correction. PGR11 Paper 61; PGR12 Paper 41. After additional briefing from the parties was complete, we granted Patent Owner’s Motion. PGR11 Paper 77; PGR12 Paper 57. Patent Owner filed its Request for a Certificate of Correction, as well as a Petition to Accept [Unintentionally] Delayed Claim to Priority under 35 U.S.C. § 120 and 37 C.F.R. § 1.78. PGR11 Ex. 2174; PGR12 Ex. 2172.” slip op. at 3
- Disclosure Requirements (§112) › Written description (Ariad)Not entitled to earlier dateDecided for petitioner
“Synthes USA, LLC v. Spinal Kinetics, Inc., 734 F.3d 1332, 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2013). And, although there are no bright-line rules for the amount of disclosure needed in an unpredictable art, that amount “necessarily changes with each invention” and “changes with progress in the field.” Ariad, 598 F.3d at 1351. Here, we find that the art of AAC was unpredictable and that a heat-transfer composition for AAC required specific technical features that were unpredictable and unexpected. Thus, we conclude that the ’525 application requires a more-detailed disclosure than would be required in a predictable field to adequately demonstrate possession of a heat-transfer composition consisting essentially of HFO-1234yf and PAG for use in AAC. (iii) Disclosure in the ’525 Application With these background findings in mind, we now turn to the four corners of the ’525 application—and we find that the ’525 application does not contain the detailed disclosure needed in this case to reasonably convey possession of a heat-transfer composition consisting essentially of HFO- 1234yf and PAG for use in AAC.” slip op. at 37
- Skill levelSkill level board ownDecided for patent owner
“develops new refrigerants for use as heat transfer fluids. Ex. 1002 ¶ 149. Such a person would have had a Ph.D. in Chemistry, Chemical Engineering, Mechanical Engineering, Material Science, or a related field or discipline and at least 3 to 5 years of experience, or alternatively an M.S. degree and 5 to 10 years of experience. Id. Patent Owner’s Declarant, Dr. Bivens, provides a similar description of the person of ordinary skill in the art, stating that such a person would have a B.S. degree in Chemical Engineering or Chemistry, and five years of work experience, or a Ph.D. or M.S. degree and 2–3 years of experience. Ex. 2001 ¶ 23. Based on these descriptions, we find that the parties’ definitions of ordinary skill in the art are substantially the same, and agree with the parties that an ordinarily skilled artisan would be educated in the Chemical and Chemical Engineering arts or related disciplines. We also agree with the parties that a person having less formal education, such as a B.S. or M.S. degree, would require more years of experience than a person with more formal education, such as a Ph.D., to qualify as an ordinarily skilled artisan. We also find that neither party states how any difference in the parties’ articulated levels of skill impacts this proceeding. Thus, our analysis would be the same regardless of any minor differences between the parties’ respective articulations. Finally, we note that the level of ordinary skill in the art is reflected by the prior art of record. Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (the prior art itself can reflect the appropriate level of ordinary skill in the art).” slip op. at 20
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Prior-art status of a reference › On-sale bar (Pfaff, Helsinn)UnpatentableUnpatentable
“Tr. 114:15–115:18 (emphases added). Thus, we find that Patent Owner does not contest that a heat-transfer composition consisting essentially of HFO- 1234yf and PAG for AAC was in public commercial use before the March 26, 2014, filing date of the ’017 patent. Accordingly, we find that Petitioner’s evidence, together with Patent Owner’s concessions, demonstrates by a preponderance of evidence that the claimed subject matter of the ’017 patent was in commercial use before its March 26, 2014, effective filing date. See Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 399–409. In particular, as to claims 1, 3–10, 12, 13, and 15–20, we credit Dr. Brown’s uncontested testimony that the refrigerant-lubricant AAC composition of the Ford Transit Custom Bus, the Mazda CX 5 (2.0i and 2.2D), and the Opel Mocca used HFO-1234yf and a PAG lubricant as early as 2012. Ex. 1002 ¶ 399 (citing Ex. 101324, 2, 38, 55, 70). We also credit Dr. Brown’s 24 Behr Hella Services, Refrigerant and Oil Filling Quantities Passenger Cars & Commercial Vehicles 2014–15. PGR12 Ex. 1013. (“Service Guide”). PGR12 Ex. 1013. The Service Guide provides tables setting forth specifications for refrigerant type, refrigerant quantity, vehicle manufacturers’ original equipment compressor oil type, and oil filling quantity for the air-conditioning system of each vehicle listed in the tables. Id. at 2–3. Petitioner and Dr. Brown direct us to the Sevice Guide’s entries calculations, which show that the Ford Transit Custom Bus had an AAC refrigerant-lubricant composition of 26.7% of PAG lubricant and 73.3% of HFO-1234yf (Ex. 1002 ¶ 401 (citing Ex. 1013, 38)); the Mazda CX 5 2.0i had 16.7% PAG lubricant and 83.3% HFO-1234yf (Ex. 1002 ¶ 402 (citing Ex. 1013, 55)); the Mazda CX 5 2.2D had a 17.5% PAG lubricant and 82.5% HFO-1234yf (id.); and the Opal Mocca had 11.6% PAG lubricant and 88.4% HFO-1234yf (Ex. 1002 ¶ 402 (citing Ex. 1013, 70)). As to dependent claims 2, 11, and 14, which all require that the lubricant is present “in an amount from about 30% to about 50% weight,” we credit Dr. Brown’s uncontested testimony that the refrigerant-lubricant composition of the Ford Transit Custom Bus recited lubricant amount. Ex. 1002 ¶ 403. In particular, we agree with Dr. Brown that, because the lubricant accounts for 26.7% of the AAC refrigerant-lubricant composition in the Ford Transit Custom Bus, the lubricant makes up “about 30%” of the refrigerant-lubricant composition as claimed. Id. For these reasons, we find that Petitioner has met its burden to show that claims 1–20 are unpatentable for anticipation under § 102(a)(1).” slip op. at 55
Patent outcomesUS 9,157,017 unpatentable§ 102 anticipation§ 112 disclosurePatents in suitUS 9,157,017 - Arkema Inc. / Arkema France v. Honeywell International Inc.All claims unpatentablePTAB · Aug 25, 2022 · PGR2016-00011 · APJ Grace Karaffa Obermann · PGR · Remand
Claims 1–20 are unpatentable under § 102(a) for prior public use; the Board did not reach the other anticipation, obviousness, and enablement grounds.
RulingsRemand decision- RemandOther
“On October 1, 2019, the Federal Circuit held that we “abused [our] discretion by assuming the authority that 35 U.S.C. § 255 expressly delegates to the Director: to determine when a Certificate of Correction is appropriate,” and vacated our Final Written Decision. Honeywell Int’l Inc. v. Arkema Inc., 939 F.3d 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2019). The Federal Circuit instructed us to “authorize Honeywell to file a motion seeking leave to petition the Director for a Certificate of Correction.” Id. at 1351. Pursuant to the Federal Circuit’s mandate, we gave our authorization, and Patent Owner filed its Motion for Leave to Request a Certificate of Correction. PGR11 Paper 61; PGR12 Paper 41. After additional briefing from the parties was complete, we granted Patent Owner’s Motion. PGR11 Paper 77; PGR12 Paper 57. Patent Owner filed its Request for a Certificate of Correction, as well as a Petition to Accept [Unintentionally] Delayed Claim to Priority under 35 U.S.C. § 120 and 37 C.F.R. § 1.78. PGR11 Ex. 2174; PGR12 Ex. 2172.” slip op. at 3
- Skill levelSkill level board ownDecided for petitioner
“develops new refrigerants for use as heat transfer fluids. Ex. 1002 ¶ 149. Such a person would have had a Ph.D. in Chemistry, Chemical Engineering, Mechanical Engineering, Material Science, or a related field or discipline and at least 3 to 5 years of experience, or alternatively an M.S. degree and 5 to 10 years of experience. Id. Patent Owner’s Declarant, Dr. Bivens, provides a similar description of the person of ordinary skill in the art, stating that such a person would have a B.S. degree in Chemical Engineering or Chemistry, and five years of work experience, or a Ph.D. or M.S. degree and 2–3 years of experience. Ex. 2001 ¶ 23. Based on these descriptions, we find that the parties’ definitions of ordinary skill in the art are substantially the same, and agree with the parties that an ordinarily skilled artisan would be educated in the Chemical and Chemical Engineering arts or related disciplines. We also agree with the parties that a person having less formal education, such as a B.S. or M.S. degree, would require more years of experience than a person with more formal education, such as a Ph.D., to qualify as an ordinarily skilled artisan. We also find that neither party states how any difference in the parties’ articulated levels of skill impacts this proceeding. Thus, our analysis would be the same regardless of any minor differences between the parties’ respective articulations. Finally, we note that the level of ordinary skill in the art is reflected by the prior art of record. Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (the prior art itself can reflect the appropriate level of ordinary skill in the art).” slip op. at 20
- Disclosure Requirements (§112) › Written description (Ariad)Not entitled to earlier dateNot shown unpatentable
“We agree with Petitioner that the ’525 application’s statement that the compounds are “adaptable for use” weighs against a finding of adequate written description. First, “adaptable for use” is vague, as Dr. Bivens acknowledges. See Ex. 1177, 151:15 (testifying that “adaptable for use can have a wide range of meaning”). Second, the ’525 application gives no direction on how a skilled artisan would need to adapt any particular composition for use in AAC, or even if any “adaptation” was necessary. We find that such a teaching is important in this case to show that the inventors had possession of the claimed invention, given our findings above that the art of AAC was unpredictable and that a heat-transfer composition for AAC required specific technical features that were unpredictable and unexpected. For completeness, we again reject Patent Owner’s argument that “[t]o show the inventors possessed claim 1 requires no more” than the statement in the written description that “‘the compositions of the present invention are believed to be adaptable . . . with or without system modification.’” PGR12 Resp. 27–28 (quoting Ex. 1001, 7:4–8). Regardless of the exact wording of claim 1, the inventors “still [had to have] describe[d] some way of performing the claimed methods.” Ariad, 598 F.3d at 1355. And here, with merely a passing reference to AAC, the ’525 application fails to provide any credible “technologic knowledge” to demonstrate to an ordinarily skilled artisan that Patent Owner “was in possession of the invention that is claimed.” Id.” slip op. at 43
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Prior-art status of a reference › On-sale bar (Pfaff, Helsinn)UnpatentableUnpatentable
“unless . . . the claimed invention was . . . in public use . . . before the effective filing date of the claimed invention.” 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)(1). “The proper test for the public use prong . . . is whether the purported use was accessible to the public or was commercially exploited.” Delano Farms Co. v. Cal. Table Grape Comm’n, 778 F.3d 1243, 1247 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (quotation omitted). “Commercial exploitation is a clear indication of public use . . . .” Invitrogen Corp. v. Biocrest Mfg., L.P., 424 F.3d 1374, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2005).” slip op. at 53
Patent outcomesUS 9,157,017 unpatentable§ 102 anticipation§ 112 disclosurePatents in suitUS 9,157,017 - PTAB · Dec 28, 2021 · IPR2021-01195 · APJ Jason W Melvin · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1, 6, 7, 11, and 12, finding a reasonable likelihood that the Batchelder-based obviousness grounds would prevail.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Real party in interest / privityNot reached
“Under the Board’s precedential decision in SharkNinja Operating LLC v. iRobot Corp., when no time-bar or estoppel would apply once determining Petitioner did not name all RPIs, the Board need not address the issue. IPR2020-00734, Paper 11 (Oct. 6, 2020) (precedential); see also Lumentum Holdings, Inc. v. Capella Photonics, Inc., IPR2015-00739, Paper 38 at 6 (PTAB Mar. 4, 2016) (precedential) (“[O]ur jurisdiction to consider a petition does not require a ‘correct’ identification of all RPIs in a petition.”); Mayne Pharma Int’l Pty. Ltd. v. Merck Sharp & Dohme Corp., 927 F.3d 1232, 1240 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“[I]f a petition fails to identify all real parties in” slip op. at 8
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Denied
“the ’354 patent, the overlap in the asserted prior art, and our prior determination of unpatentability regarding the ’354 patent, we conclude that the merits of Petitioner’s case in this proceeding are substantively strong. Thus, this factor weighs strongly in favor of institution. 7. Holistic assessment of factors and conclusion We consider the above factors and take “a holistic view of whether efficiency and integrity of the system are best served by denying or instituting review.” Fintiv, Paper 11 at 6. In weighing the totality of the evidence, we decide not to exercise discretion under § 314(a) to deny institution.” slip op. at 14
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“C. LEVEL OF ORDINARY SKILL IN THE ART Petitioner proposes that a person of ordinary skill would have been knowledgeable regarding liquid cooling systems for computer systems, would have earned at least a bachelor’s degree, such as a B.S. (bachelor of science), or equivalent thereof, in electrical or mechanical engineering or a closely related field, and would have possessed at least two or three years of experience in liquid cooling systems for computer systems or in similar systems. Pet. 7–8 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 23–26). Patent Owner does not dispute this definition of a person of ordinary skill. See generally Prelim. Resp. For purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill as it appears to be consistent with the level of skill reflected by the specification and in the asserted prior art references. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (the prior art itself can reflect the appropriate level of ordinary skill in the art).” slip op. at 14
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction needed
“construe claim terms “using the same claim construction standard that would be used to construe the claim in a civil action under 35 U.S.C. 282(b).” 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b) (2019). The parties stipulated to constructions of “reservoir” and “chamber” in the district-court litigation. Ex. 1005, 2. Petitioner proposes additional constructions for “impeller” and “radiator.” Pet. 8–10. Patent Owner does not dispute those constructions. See generally Prelim. Resp. Based on our analysis of the issues in dispute at this stage of the proceeding, we conclude that none of the claim terms identified by the parties require express construction at this time. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017).” slip op. at 15
Claim constructionDiscretionary denialPatents in suitUS 10,613,601 - Apple Inc. v. Voip-Pal.Com, Inc.Rehearing deniedPTAB · May 24, 2019 · IPR2016-01201 · APJ Scott R Boalick · IPR · Rehearing
The Board denied Apple’s rehearing request, leaving intact the finding that the challenged claims were not shown obvious over the asserted Chu and Chen combinations.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied
“At the outset, we note that in a request for rehearing we do not review the merits of the Final Written Decision de novo. Instead, we consider whether Petitioner has met its burden of showing that a matter has been misapprehended or overlooked in the Final Written Decision. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d) (“The burden of showing a decision should be modified lies with the party challenging the decision. The request must specifically identify all matters the party believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked, and the place where each matter was previously addressed in a motion, an opposition, or a reply.”). We conclude that Petitioner has not met this burden in its Request for Rehearing.” slip op. at 2
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot reached
“view of Chu ’684. See Reh’g Opp’n 7–10 (relying on its declarant to argue that Chu ’684 does not operate as asserted by Petitioner, undermining Petitioner’s justification for the combination); PO Resp. 70 (citing Ex. 2016 ¶ 66). Petitioner contends that Dr. Mangione-Smith’s testimony did not address the asserted combination and therefore provided no need for a reply declaration. Reh’g Reply 7–8. We do not agree with Petitioner’s position, for the reasons stated above. Petitioner does not raise any basis on which we should discount the panel’s reliance on Dr. Mangione-Smith’s testimony regarding the reason to combine.7 We conclude that the panel did not misapprehend Chu ’684’s operation when it concluded that the Petition failed to show Chu ’684 is deficient and ripe for improvement. Instead, it resolved a factual dispute in Patent Owner’s favor based on record evidence.” slip op. at 9
- Expert testimonyPatent owner expert creditedDecided for patent owner
“evidence that, in Chu ’684, users would dial according to the dialing conventions of their geographic area. Reh’g Opp’n 8 (citing Ex. 2016 ¶ 66). Patent Owner’s expert witness, Dr. Mangione-Smith, testified that “in Chu ’684, the users would dial PSTN ‘public numbers’ based on the location of the customer premises.” Ex. 2016 ¶ 66 (citing Ex. 1006, Fig. 2). Figure 2 of Chu ’684 supports Dr. Mangione-Smith’s testimony, in that Figure 2 of Chu ’684 illustrates customer premises 105 (which includes IP phones) as connected to a service provider central office 205. See Ex. 1006, Fig. 2; Reh’g Opp’n 9 (contrasting Petitioner’s assertion” slip op. at 4
§ 103 obviousnessPatents in suitUS 8,542,815 - Apple Inc. v. Voip-Pal.Com, Inc.Rehearing deniedPTAB · May 24, 2019 · IPR2016-01198 · APJ Scott R Boalick · IPR · Rehearing
The Board denied Apple’s rehearing request, leaving intact the finding that challenged claims of the ’005 and ’815 patents were not shown obvious over the asserted combinations.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied
“At the outset, we note that in a request for rehearing we do not review the merits of the Final Written Decision de novo. Instead, we consider whether Petitioner has met its burden of showing that a matter has been misapprehended or overlooked in the Final Written Decision. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d) (“The burden of showing a decision should be modified lies with the party challenging the decision. The request must specifically identify all matters the party believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked, and the place where each matter was previously addressed in a motion, an opposition, or a reply.”). We conclude that Petitioner has not met this burden in its Request for Rehearing.” slip op. at 2
- Expert testimonyPatent owner expert creditedDecided for patent owner
“view of Chu ’684. See Reh’g Opp’n 7–10 (relying on its declarant to argue that Chu ’684 does not operate as asserted by Petitioner, undermining Petitioner’s justification for the combination); PO Resp. 70 (citing Ex. 2016 ¶ 66). Petitioner contends that Dr. Mangione-Smith’s testimony did not address the asserted combination and therefore provided no need for a reply declaration. Reh’g Reply 7–8. We do not agree with Petitioner’s position, for the reasons stated above. Petitioner does not raise any basis on which we should discount the panel’s reliance on Dr. Mangione-Smith’s testimony regarding the reason to combine.7 We conclude that the panel did not misapprehend Chu ’684’s operation when it concluded that the Petition failed to show Chu ’684 is deficient and ripe for improvement. Instead, it resolved a factual dispute in Patent Owner’s favor based on record evidence.” slip op. at 9
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“view of Chu ’684. See Reh’g Opp’n 7–10 (relying on its declarant to argue that Chu ’684 does not operate as asserted by Petitioner, undermining Petitioner’s justification for the combination); PO Resp. 70 (citing Ex. 2016 ¶ 66). Petitioner contends that Dr. Mangione-Smith’s testimony did not address the asserted combination and therefore provided no need for a reply declaration. Reh’g Reply 7–8. We do not agree with Petitioner’s position, for the reasons stated above. Petitioner does not raise any basis on which we should discount the panel’s reliance on Dr. Mangione-Smith’s testimony regarding the reason to combine.7 We conclude that the panel did not misapprehend Chu ’684’s operation when it concluded that the Petition failed to show Chu ’684 is deficient and ripe for improvement. Instead, it resolved a factual dispute in Patent Owner’s favor based on record evidence.” slip op. at 9
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“testimony by Dr. Mangione-Smith—when rejecting Petitioner’s view of the prior art and reason for the combination. See FWD 19 (citing Ex. 2016 ¶¶ 65–67); Reh’g Opp’n 6. Thus, when the panel concluded that Petitioner had not shown that Chu ’684’s method would apply to a number reformatted by the secondary references (see FWD 22–23), it relied on record evidence supporting its conclusion. We determine that the panel did not misapprehend the nature of the proposed combination; rather, based on the record, it resolved a factual dispute and concluded that Petitioner failed to show the proposed combination would operate as asserted.” slip op. at 5
§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnessPatents in suitUS 9,179,005 - Grünenthal GmbH v. Antecip Bioventures II LLCAll claims unpatentablePTAB · Jun 22, 2018 · PGR2017-00008 · APJ Sheridan K Snedden · PGR · Final written decision
Claims 1–17 are unpatentable under § 112(a) for lack of written description because the claimed dosing regimen is not supported by the specification.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level board ownOther
“with regard to claim 17. Nonetheless, we are not persuaded by Petitioner’s contentions. Rather, we find that the ’239 patent contains a sufficient written description of an oral dosage form containing “at least 10% zoledronic acid.” The specification describes a full panoply of zoledronic acid concentrations. Liquid compositions may contain “about 10% (w/v) to about 15% (w/v), about 15% (w/v) to about 20% (w/v), about 20% (w/v) to about 30% (w/v), about 30% (w/v) to about 40% (w/v), or about 40% (w/v) to about 50% (w/v) of zoledronic acid.” Ex. 1003, 10:25–28. Solid dosage forms may contain “at least about 10% (w/w), at least about 20% (w/w) . . .” up to “at least about 80% [w/w]” zoledronic acid. Id. at 10:30–32. Solid dosage forms also are described as containing zoledronic acid in ranges beginning from “about 10% (w/w) to about 30% (w/w), about 10% (w/w) to about 20% (w/w) . . .” all the way up to a range of “about 80% (w/w) to about 90% (w/w).” Id. at 10:32–39. The breadth of zoledronic acid concentration ranges disclosed is more comprehensive than, and therefore distinguishable from, the more limited concentration ranges disclosed in Wertheim (claimed range of “at least 35%” not supported by disclosure of 25% to 60% range disclosed in priority application). In short, we determine that a person of ordinary skill in the art – a medical doctor with experience treating CRPS – would have recognized that the “inventor invented what is claimed” and did not overreach in claiming “at least 10% zoledronic acid” in an orally administered dosage form for treating CRPS. See University of Rochester, 358 F.3d at 928 (Fed. Cir. 2004).” slip op. at 21
- Expert testimonyOther
“Unocal or Wertheim where the specification clearly allowed persons of ordinary skill in the art to recognize the claimed invention despite the absence of literal support. In Unocal, the original disclosure explicitly described the effects of altering the variables, explicitly described the claimed endpoints as preferred, or explicitly recited them in an original claim. Moreover, persuasive expert testimony was offered to support the finding that the specification reasonably conveyed to one skilled in the relevant art that the inventor possessed the later claimed invention. Unocal, 208 F.3d at 993, 998–99. In Wertheim, the CCPA held that the specification supported the claimed range of 35–60% where the specification described the range of 25–60% along with specific embodiments of 36% and 50%. 541 F.2d at 264–65. In this case, the ’239 patent specification does not clearly allow persons of ordinary skill in the art to recognize the “about 80 mg” endpoint as part of invention described in the ’239 patent. There is no disclosure of “about 80 mg” as a preferred endpoint, no disclosure of a specific embodiment including a dose of 80 mg, nor any other description suggesting the importance or criticality of the “about 80 mg” endpoint.” slip op. at 16
- Disclosure Requirements (§112) › Written description (Ariad)Written description inadequateWritten description adequateMixed
“In this case, the ’239 patent specification does not clearly allow persons of ordinary skill in the art to recognize the “about 80 mg” endpoint as part of invention described in the ’239 patent. There is no disclosure of “about 80 mg” as a preferred endpoint, no disclosure of a specific embodiment including a dose of 80 mg, nor any other description suggesting the importance or criticality of the “about 80 mg” endpoint.” slip op. at 16
Patent outcomesUS 9,283,239 unpatentable§ 112 disclosurePatents in suitUS 9,283,239 - Initiative For Medicines, Access & Knowledge (I-Mak), Inc. v. Gilead Pharmasset LLCInstitution deniedPTAB · Jun 13, 2018 · IPR2018-00103 · APJ Lora M Green · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution for claims 1–19 because the Petition did not show a reasonable likelihood that any challenged claim was anticipated by Klecker or Sommadossi, or obvious over Sommadossi and Klecker.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“Institution of an inter partes review is authorized by statute when “the information presented in the petition . . . and any response . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314; see 37 C.F.R. §§ 42.4. Upon considering the Petition and the Preliminary Response, we determine that Petitioner has not demonstrated a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail in showing the unpatentability of any of the challenged claims. Accordingly, we decline to institute an inter partes review for any challenged claim of the ’572 patent.” slip op. at 2
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“reasonable likelihood that claim 1 is anticipated by Klecker. To anticipate a reference must expressly or inherently disclose “within the four corners of the document not only all of the limitations claimed but also all of the limitations arranged or combined in the same way as recited in the claim.” Net MoneyIN, Inc. v. VeriSign, Inc., 545 F.3d 1359, 1371 (2008). Moreover, “anticipation is not proven by ‘multiple, distinct teachings that the artisan might somehow combine to achieve the claimed invention.’” Microsoft Corp. v. Biscotti, Inc., 878 F.3d 1052, 1069 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (internal citation omitted). “[A] disclosed genus may anticipate a claimed species when the genus is so small that one of ordinary skill in the art would ‘at once envisage each member of this limited class.’” Wasica Fin. GmbH v. Continental Auto. Sys., Inc., 853 F.3d 1272, 1285 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (quoting AbbVie Inc. v. Mathilda & Terence Kennedy Inst. of Rheumatology Tr., 764 F.3d 1366, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2014)). In this case, we agree with Patent Owner that Petitioner is improperly using claim 1 as a roadmap to cherry pick teachings of the Klecker reference to arrive at compounds encompassed by the genus of that claim. For example, we acknowledge that Klecker teaches that a fluorine may be placed below the ring at the 2' position of the sugar ring. Ex. 1005, 19:25‒26. Petitioner does not point us to any teaching of Klecker, however, that teaches a compound that has both a methyl group and a fluorine at the 2' position of the sugar ring, regardless of whether the fluorine is in the up position or the down position. That is, although the broad genus of compounds disclosed by Klecker encompasses such compounds, Petitioner does not point us to any teaching, other than the broad disclosure of the genus, wherein “W, X, Y, [and] Z” may be “H, hydroxy, halogen, alkyl (C1- C6), alkoxy (C1-C6)a label containing moiety or a label” (Ex. 1005, 15:3‒5), that would direct the ordinary artisan to choose X and W such that one of X and W is methyl and the other is fluorine, much less pointing to support of X as fluorine and W as methyl.” slip op. at 11
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert discountedDecided for patent owner
“Petitioner relies on the Declaration of Dr. Fortunak in asserting that because Klecker teaches the X position may be substituted with fluorine and teaches that W can be an alkyl (C1 – C6), the ordinary artisan would understand from “general knowledge and common sense that methyl is a preferred lower alkyl in that group.” Pet. 34 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶ 92). Dr. Fortunak, however, merely repeats the statement in the Petition without citing any evidentiary support. See Ex. 1002 ¶ 92; see also id. ¶¶ 93‒95 (discussing choosing other substituents in the structure of Klecker). Conclusory statements by an expert “that does not disclose the underlying facts or data on which the opinion is based is entitled to little or no weight.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.65(a). Furthermore, Petitioner’s conclusory statements (Pet. 34‒35) that because C is the first substituent identified for J, and H and OH are the first two substituents identified for Y and Z and, thus, the ordinary artisan would immediately envisage a compound where J is C, Y is H, and Z is OH, do not sufficiently persuade us that the ordinary artisan would immediately envisage their implementation to arrive at compounds that fall within the genus of claim 1.” slip op. at 12
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element) › Inherent disclosureNot shown unpatentableInherency not foundNot shown unpatentable
“To the extent that Petitioner (Pet. 51‒52) is invoking inherency in arguing that the express teaching of Sommadossi that R7 may be chloro, 6 Britton et al., U.S. Patent 5,420,266, issued May 30, 1995 (Ex. 1011). bromo and iodo, is also an express teaching that R7 may be fluoro, we disagree that the use of fluoro as the R7 group is inherent in the teachings of Sommadossi. “Inherency . . . may not be established by probabilities or possibilities. The mere fact that a certain thing may result from a given set of circumstances is not sufficient.” MEHL/Biophile Int’l Corp. v. Milgraum, 192 F.3d 1362, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 1999), quoting In re Oelrich, 666 F.2d 578, 581 (CCPA 1981). Even though the ordinary artisan may have understood that fluoro is also a halogen and may be substituted for chloro, bromo, or iodo, the fact remains that Sommadossi taught the use of, inter alia, chloro, bromo, or iodo at the R7 position, specifically, rather than a halogen element, generally. Ex. 1006, 13:24‒27. Petitioner’s argument (Pet. 52) that “Sommadossi taught that R6 could be ‘chloro, bromo, fluoro, [or] iodo,’” is actually counter to Petitioner’s assertions. That is, that statement demonstrates that Sommadossi knew that “fluoro” could be included in the list of halogens. Moreover, Sommadossi defined the term “halo” as “chloro, bromo, iodo, and fluoro.” Ex. 1006, 52:31. Thus, to avoid inadvertently excluding a halogen, Sommadossi could have used the term “halo” in listing the possible substituents for the R7 group, but chose not to do so. Accordingly, we determine that Petitioner has not sufficiently established that Sommadossi anticipates the compounds of claim 1. Because, as discussed above in our analysis of the anticipation ground over Klecker, all of the claims require the compound of that claim, or a particular compound that falls within the genus of claim 1, Petitioner has also not sufficiently demonstrated that any of the challenged claims are anticipated by Sommadossi. Accordingly, we decline to institute trial as to any of the challenged claims on the basis that the claim is anticipated by Sommadossi.” slip op. at 17
§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnessPatents in suitUS 7,429,572 - Hamilton Beach Brands, Inc. v. F’Real Food, LLCRehearing deniedPTAB · Apr 25, 2018 · IPR2017-00765 · APJ Lora M Green · IPR · Rehearing
The Board denied Hamilton Beach’s rehearing request and maintained its denial of institution, citing follow-on petition concerns and its discretion under §§ 314(a) and 325(d).
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied
“STANDARD OF REVIEW When reconsidering a decision on institution, the Board reviews the decision for an abuse of discretion. See 37 C.F.R § 42.71(c). “The burden of showing that a decision should be modified lies with the party challenging the decision.” Office Patent Trial Practice Guide, 77 Fed. Reg. 48,756, 48,768 (Aug. 14, 2012). In its request for rehearing, the dissatisfied party must, in relevant part, “specifically identify all matters the party believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d); Office Patent Trial Practice Guide, 77 Fed. Reg. at 48,768. We address Petitioner’s arguments with those principles in mind.” slip op. at 2
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsInstitution denied 325dDecided for patent owner
“The Board has discretion not to institute an inter partes review. 35 U.S.C. § 314(a); Harmonic Inc. v. Avid Tech, Inc., 815 F.3d 1356, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“the PTO is permitted, but never compelled, to institute an IPR proceeding”); see also 37 C.F.R. § 42.108(a) (“When instituting inter partes review, the Board may authorize the review to proceed on all or some of the challenged claims and on all or some of the grounds of unpatentability asserted for each claim.”). When exercising that discretion, the Board may take into account whether “the same or substantially the same prior art or arguments previously were presented to the Office.” 35 U.S.C. § 325(d); see Conopco, Inc. v. The Proctor & Gamble Co., Case IPR2014-00628, slip op. 5– 10 (PTAB October 20, 2014) (Paper 21) (declining to institute because substantially the same arguments previously were presented to the Board). The issue of whether substantially the same arguments were raised previously in IPR2016-01105 arises in the present case. In addition, when determining whether to exercise our discretion not to institute a trial proceeding under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), we seek to balance the equities between the parties, i.e., Petitioner’s desire to be heard against Patent Owner’s interest in avoiding harassment through repeated challenges. 5 Exhibit 1002 in IPR2016-01105. 6 U.S. Patent Publication No. 2002/0189460 A1, filed April 11, 2002, published December 19, 2002, to Brown et al. (“Brown”). Exhibit 1003 in IPR2016-01105. See H.R. Rep. No. 112-98, pt.1, at 48 (2011) (post-grant proceedings conducted under the AIA “are not to be used as tools for harassment or a means to prevent market entry through repeated litigation and administrative attacks on the validity of a patent. Doing so would frustrate the purpose of the section as providing quick and cost effective alternatives to litigation.”). In circumstances such as the present case, the Board considers the potential inequity of a petitioner filing serial attacks against the same claims of a patent, while benefiting from patent owner’s arguments and/or the Board’s decision in prior cases. See, e.g., Nautilus Hyosung Inc. v. Diebold, Inc., Case IPR2017-00426 slip op. at 12–16 (PTAB June 22, 2017) (Paper 17) (citing Xactware Sols., Inc. v. Eagle View Techs., Inc., Case IPR2017-00034, slip op. at 6–11 (PTAB April 13, 2017) (Paper 9); Baker Hughes Inc. v. LiquidPower Specialty Prods., Inc., Case IPR2016-01896, slip op. at 9–11 (PTAB March 31, 2017) (Paper 10); Duk San Neolux Co., Ltd. v. Idemitsu Kosan Co., Ltd., Case IPR2017-00197, slip op. at 4–11 (PTAB March 31, 2017) (Paper 10); NVIDIA Corp. v. Samsung Elec. Co., Case IPR2016-00134, slip op. at 8 (PTAB May 4, 2016) (Paper 9); Toyota Motor Corp. v. Cellport Sys., Inc., Case IPR2015- 01423, slip op. at 8 (PTAB Oct. 28, 2015) (Paper 7)); see also Conopco, Case IPR2014-00628, slip op. at 11–12. Therefore, we must balance the parties’ competing interests when determining whether to exercise our discretion and decline to institute. Id.” slip op. at 5
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › General Plastic (serial petitions)Institution denied general plasticDecided for patent owner
“An important reason for denying institution in the instant proceeding was that Petitioner had the advantage of Patent Owner’s preliminary response in IPR2016-01105, as well as the claim construction and analysis set forth in the decision denying institution in that proceeding. That is, Petitioner had the benefit of that information in crafting the challenges set forth in the instant proceeding, and, thus, was able to address Patent Owner’s arguments made in its preliminary response in IPR2016-01105, as well as address the concerns of the Board set forth in the decision denying institution in IPR2016-01105. Consideration of these factors is consistent with the principles set forth in General Plastic Indus. Co. v. Canon Kabushiki Kaisha, Case IPR2016-01357, 15−19 (PTAB Sept. 6, 2017) (Paper 19) (“General Plastics”) (designated precedential Oct. 18, 2017) (setting forth a non-exhaustive list of factors to be considered in determining whether to institute a follow-on petition, including whether the same petitioner previously filed a petition directed to the same claims of the same patent, and whether, at the time of filing of the second petition, the petitioner already received the patent owner’s preliminary response to the first petition or received the Board’s decision on whether to institute review in the first petition). We noted further that Sato “was published nearly 30 years ago,” and Karkos issued on December 26, 2000. Dec. 11. We determined that Petitioner had not established that those references were not available to Petitioner when it filed the petition in IPR2016-01105. Id. We declined to provide a second chance merely because Petitioner’s “highly experienced searchers” did not find those references before the filing of the petition in IPR2015-01105. Id. (citing Pet. 6). That determination was another factor that informed our decision to exercise our discretion and decline to institute inter partes review in the instant proceeding. See, e.g., General Plastics at 16 (noting that other factors to be considered in granting a follow-on petition are whether at the time of filing of the first petition petitioner knew of the prior art asserted in the second petition or should have known of it, and whether the petitioner provides adequate explanation for the time elapsed between the filings of multiple petitions directed to the same claims of the same patent). Finally, we noted that we were “troubled by the implications of Petitioner’s overarching premise – that it is cost-effective and appropriate to wait for a claim construction and institution decision by the Board, and then launch a follow-on patent challenge in reliance on additional references that challenge the same patent claims already addressed by the Board.” Dec. 13 (citing Pet. 7‒8). As noted in the Decision denying institution, however, “[s]uch tactics increase the costs to Patent Owner and impose unnecessary demands on the finite resources of the Board.” Id.; see, e.g., General Plastics at 16 (noting another factor to be considered is the finite resources of the Board).” slip op. at 7
- Other 314aInstitution denied discretionary otherDecided for patent owner
“The Board has discretion not to institute an inter partes review. 35 U.S.C. § 314(a); Harmonic Inc. v. Avid Tech, Inc., 815 F.3d 1356, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“the PTO is permitted, but never compelled, to institute an IPR proceeding”); see also 37 C.F.R. § 42.108(a) (“When instituting inter partes review, the Board may authorize the review to proceed on all or some of the challenged claims and on all or some of the grounds of unpatentability asserted for each claim.”). When exercising that discretion, the Board may take into account whether “the same or substantially the same prior art or arguments previously were presented to the Office.” 35 U.S.C. § 325(d); see Conopco, Inc. v. The Proctor & Gamble Co., Case IPR2014-00628, slip op. 5– 10 (PTAB October 20, 2014) (Paper 21) (declining to institute because substantially the same arguments previously were presented to the Board). The issue of whether substantially the same arguments were raised previously in IPR2016-01105 arises in the present case. In addition, when determining whether to exercise our discretion not to institute a trial proceeding under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), we seek to balance the equities between the parties, i.e., Petitioner’s desire to be heard against Patent Owner’s interest in avoiding harassment through repeated challenges. 5 Exhibit 1002 in IPR2016-01105. 6 U.S. Patent Publication No. 2002/0189460 A1, filed April 11, 2002, published December 19, 2002, to Brown et al. (“Brown”). Exhibit 1003 in IPR2016-01105. See H.R. Rep. No. 112-98, pt.1, at 48 (2011) (post-grant proceedings conducted under the AIA “are not to be used as tools for harassment or a means to prevent market entry through repeated litigation and administrative attacks on the validity of a patent. Doing so would frustrate the purpose of the section as providing quick and cost effective alternatives to litigation.”). In circumstances such as the present case, the Board considers the potential inequity of a petitioner filing serial attacks against the same claims of a patent, while benefiting from patent owner’s arguments and/or the Board’s decision in prior cases. See, e.g., Nautilus Hyosung Inc. v. Diebold, Inc., Case IPR2017-00426 slip op. at 12–16 (PTAB June 22, 2017) (Paper 17) (citing Xactware Sols., Inc. v. Eagle View Techs., Inc., Case IPR2017-00034, slip op. at 6–11 (PTAB April 13, 2017) (Paper 9); Baker Hughes Inc. v. LiquidPower Specialty Prods., Inc., Case IPR2016-01896, slip op. at 9–11 (PTAB March 31, 2017) (Paper 10); Duk San Neolux Co., Ltd. v. Idemitsu Kosan Co., Ltd., Case IPR2017-00197, slip op. at 4–11 (PTAB March 31, 2017) (Paper 10); NVIDIA Corp. v. Samsung Elec. Co., Case IPR2016-00134, slip op. at 8 (PTAB May 4, 2016) (Paper 9); Toyota Motor Corp. v. Cellport Sys., Inc., Case IPR2015- 01423, slip op. at 8 (PTAB Oct. 28, 2015) (Paper 7)); see also Conopco, Case IPR2014-00628, slip op. at 11–12. Therefore, we must balance the parties’ competing interests when determining whether to exercise our discretion and decline to institute. Id.” slip op. at 5
Discretionary denialPatents in suitUS 7,520,658
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.