- Apple Inc. v. Smart Mobile Technologies LLCSome claims unpatentablePTAB · Jun 3, 2026 · IPR2022-00981 · APJ Jameson Lee · IPR · Remand
On remand, claims 8–11, 13, 17, and 19 were held unpatentable over Rautiola, Regnier, and Sainton; claim 15 was not shown unpatentable.
RulingsRemand decision- RemandMixed
“8–11, 13, 15, 17, and 19, and remanded “for consideration of the patentability of those claims.” Id. at 14. We understand both the reversal and vacature are with respect to Ground 1 of alleged unpatentability, not Ground 2, because the Federal Circuit’s decision did not discuss anything relating to Ground 2. Paper 43. The parties agreed. Paper 44. In this remand proceeding, neither party requested the filing of additional briefing or evidence. In a telephone conference call, both parties expressed agreement with the Board (1) that “there is no issue regarding collateral estoppel or issue preclusion with respect to dependent claims 8– 11, 13, 15, 17, and 19, and (2) that the remand proceeding would not involve the Board revisiting any matter or issue concerning alleged obviousness of claims 1, 8, 9, 11, 13, 17, and 19 over Ground 2.4 Papers 43, 44. The parties also agreed that the remand proceeding would only involve the Board reviewing the alleged obviousness of dependent claims 8–11, 13, 15, 17, and 19 as obvious over Rautiola, Regnier, and Sainton. Id. We have authority to conduct this inter partes review under 35 U.S.C. § 6. This Final Written Decision on Remand is issued pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 318(a) and 37 C.F.R. § 42.73. On the record before us, which is the same as the record before us at the time we issued the first final written decision (Paper 34), we determine that Petitioner has proved by a preponderance of the evidence that claims 8– 11, 13, 17, and 19, but not claim 15, of the ’936 patent are unpatentable over Rautiola, Regnier, and Sainton.” slip op. at 3
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedDecided for patent owner
“5. Petitioner’s Request to Discredit Dr. Cooklev’s Declaration Petitioner makes several arguments discrediting Dr. Cooklev’s declaration (Ex. 2031) and asserts that Dr. Cooklev’s declaration should be accorded little to no weight. Reply 13–14. We have already considered and rejected this request in the Final Written Decision issued on November 7, 2023. Paper 34, 21–23. Our reasoning need not be reiterated here. Petitioner does not persuade us that Dr. Cooklev’s declaration testimony should be accorded little to no weight.” slip op. at 15
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Patent Owner does not dispute Petition’s definition of level of ordinary skill. See generally PO Resp. Patent Owner’s expert, Dr. Cooklev, accepts Dr. Kotzin’s proposed level of ordinary skill in the art. Ex. 2031 ¶ 24. We adopt Petitioner’s proposal regarding the level of ordinary skill in the art. This level of ordinary skill in the art is supported by the testimony of Dr. Kotzin (Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 20–22) and is consistent with the level reflected in the ’936 patent and the prior art of record. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001).” slip op. at 9
- Obviousness (§103) › Analogous artAnalogous artDecided for petitioner
“only when it is analogous to the claimed invention.” Airbus S.A.S. v. Firepass Corp., 941 F.3d 1374, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2019). A prior art reference constitutes analogous art if it is “from the same field of endeavor” or “reasonably pertinent to the particular problem with which the inventor is involved.” In re Bigio, 381 F.3d 1320, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2004). The petitioner bears the burden of establishing that a reference is analogous art. See Sanofi-Aventis Deutschland GmbH v. Mylan Pharms. Inc., 66 F.4th 1373, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2023).” slip op. at 16
Patent outcomesUS 8,472,936 mixed§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 8,472,936 - Reolink Innovation Inc. / Shenzhen Reolink Technology Co., Ltd. v. Throughtek Co. Ltd.Adverse judgmentPTAB · May 19, 2026 · IPR2025-01327 · APJ Sheila F Mcshane · IPR · Adverse judgment
The Board entered adverse judgment against Throughtek on claims 1–19 after finding it abandoned the contest by failing to file mandatory notices or respond to the show-cause order.
RulingsAdverse judgment- Adverse judgmentAdverse judgmentGranted
“The Order to Show Cause explained that under 37 C.F.R. § 42.73(b), “[a]ctions construed to be a request for adverse judgment include . . . [a]bandonment of the contest.” Paper 8, 3. The Order to Show Cause also explained that failure to participate in a proceeding, such as failure to file mandatory notices as required under 37 C.F.R. § 42.8, may be considered abandonment of the contest and result in adverse judgment against Patent Owner under 37 C.F.R. § 42.73(b). Id. (citing Cellpak, Inc. v. Mambate USA Inc., IPR2021-00007, Paper 4 at 2 (PTAB Mar. 23, 2021)). The Order to Show Cause gave Patent Owner ten calendar days to show cause why adverse judgment should not be entered against it. Id. Patent Owner did not respond to the Order to Show Cause. More than ten calendar days have elapsed since the date the Order to Show Cause was entered, and Patent Owner has not filed mandatory notices. In view of Patent Owner’s failure to file mandatory notices within the specified time period, we determine that Patent Owner has abandoned the contest. Pursuant to 37 C.F.R. § 42.73(b)(4), we construe Patent Owner’s abandonment of the contest as a request for adverse judgment. Under these circumstances, we determine that entry of judgment against Patent Owner is appropriate.” slip op. at 3
NonePatents in suitUS 9,727,655 - PTAB · May 13, 2026 · IPR2025-01444 · APJ George R Hoskins · IPR · Adverse judgment
The Board granted Patent Owner’s request for adverse judgment after it disclaimed the entire patent term, entering judgment against claims 1–6.
RulingsAdverse judgment- Adverse judgmentAdverse judgmentGranted
“A party may request entry of adverse judgment against itself at any time during an inter partes review proceeding. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.73(b). In addition, “[a]ctions construed to be a request for adverse judgment include: (1) Disclaimer of the involved application or patent; [and] (2) Cancellation or disclaimer of a claim such that the party has no remaining claim in the trial.” Id. Because Patent Owner has explicitly requested adverse judgment against itself pursuant to Rule 42.73(b), and has disclaimed the entire term of the ’584 patent, Patent Owner’s request for adverse judgment is granted. ORDER In consideration of the foregoing, it is hereby: ORDERED that Patent Owner’s Request for Adverse Judgment is granted; and FURTHER ORDERED that adverse judgment is entered against Patent Owner with respect to claims 1–6 of the ’584 patent.” slip op. at 3
NonePatents in suitUS 7,547,584 - PTAB · May 13, 2026 · IPR2025-01082 · APJ David C Mckone · IPR · Adverse judgment
The Board granted Patent Owner’s request for adverse judgment after it disclaimed the entire patent term, entering judgment against claims 1–10.
RulingsAdverse judgment- Adverse judgmentAdverse judgmentGranted
“A party may request entry of adverse judgment against itself at any time during an inter partes review proceeding. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.73(b). In addition, “[a]ctions construed to be a request for adverse judgment include: (1) Disclaimer of the involved application or patent; [and] (2) Cancellation or disclaimer of a claim such that the party has no remaining claim in the trial.” Id. Because Patent Owner has explicitly requested adverse judgment against itself pursuant to Rule 42.73(b), and has disclaimed the entire term of the ’181 patent, Patent Owner’s request for adverse judgment is granted.” slip op. at 3
NonePatents in suitUS 6,888,181 - Ford Motor Company v. Autoconnect Holdings LLCInstitution deniedPTAB · May 12, 2026 · IPR2025-01524 · APJ John A Squires · IPR · Director review
Director Review was granted, institution was vacated, and IPR was denied because Petitioner advanced broader indefiniteness arguments in related litigation.
RulingsDirector review decision- Director reviewDirector review, grantedGranted
“As I recently explained, it is appropriate to deny institution when a Petitioner’s conduct demonstrates that the dispute “is less about a litigation alternative and more about inconsistent positions to gain an upper hand in the overall litigation.” Terumo BCT Inc. v. Haemonetics Corp., IPR2025- 01374, Paper 20 (Director May 12, 2026). Here, as in Terumo, Petitioner advanced indefiniteness contentions in the co-pending district court litigation at its first opportunity to do so after institution was granted. See Paper 15, 1–2 (listing seven allegedly indefinite terms and phrases impacting all challenged claims). Although Petitioner contends that its unpatentability arguments for the “and/or” and “one or more” claim limitations fit within the Tesla framework, i.e., that the prior art discloses the claimed features regardless of how those limitations are construed, Petitioner’s indefiniteness contentions are broader than those two limitations. See, e.g., Paper 15, 1–2; IPR2025-01383, Paper 9 at 8–10. Thus, it is appropriate to deny institution of these IPRs for the same reasons as articulated in Terumo.” slip op. at 3
- Other 314aInstitution denied discretionary otherInstitution denied
“As I recently explained, it is appropriate to deny institution when a Petitioner’s conduct demonstrates that the dispute “is less about a litigation alternative and more about inconsistent positions to gain an upper hand in the overall litigation.” Terumo BCT Inc. v. Haemonetics Corp., IPR2025- 01374, Paper 20 (Director May 12, 2026). Here, as in Terumo, Petitioner advanced indefiniteness contentions in the co-pending district court litigation at its first opportunity to do so after institution was granted. See Paper 15, 1–2 (listing seven allegedly indefinite terms and phrases impacting all challenged claims). Although Petitioner contends that its unpatentability arguments for the “and/or” and “one or more” claim limitations fit within the Tesla framework, i.e., that the prior art discloses the claimed features regardless of how those limitations are construed, Petitioner’s indefiniteness contentions are broader than those two limitations. See, e.g., Paper 15, 1–2; IPR2025-01383, Paper 9 at 8–10. Thus, it is appropriate to deny institution of these IPRs for the same reasons as articulated in Terumo. In its briefing, Petitioner states that it will stipulate to withdraw all indefiniteness arguments against the challenged patents from the related litigation if the Board agrees to maintain and not vacate institution of these IPRs. Paper 16, 2. This stipulation, which Petitioner offered only after Petitioner’s actions ran afoul of Revvo and Tesla and only after Patent Owner brought those actions to the Office’s attention, is insufficient.” slip op. at 3
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied discretionary otherInstitution denied
“Accordingly, the appropriate course of action is to grant Director Review, vacate the Notices granting institution, and deny institution.3 It is: ORDERED that Director Review is granted; FURTHER ORDERED that the Notices granting institution of inter partes review (Paper 11; IPR2025-01383, Paper 12; IPR2025-01524, Paper 10) are vacated; and FURTHER ORDERED that the Petitions are denied, and no trials are instituted.” slip op. at 4
Discretionary denialPatents in suitUS 9,123,186 - Ford Motor Company v. Autoconnect Holdings LLCInstitution deniedPTAB · May 12, 2026 · IPR2025-01383 · APJ John A Squires · IPR · Director review
Director review was granted, the institution notices were vacated, and institution was denied because Petitioner advanced inconsistent claim positions in parallel litigation.
RulingsDirector review decision- Other 314aInstitution denied discretionary otherInstitution denied
“As I recently explained, it is appropriate to deny institution when a Petitioner’s conduct demonstrates that the dispute “is less about a litigation alternative and more about inconsistent positions to gain an upper hand in the overall litigation.” Terumo BCT Inc. v. Haemonetics Corp., IPR2025- 01374, Paper 20 (Director May 12, 2026). Here, as in Terumo, Petitioner advanced indefiniteness contentions in the co-pending district court litigation at its first opportunity to do so after institution was granted. See Paper 15, 1–2 (listing seven allegedly indefinite terms and phrases impacting all challenged claims). Although Petitioner contends that its unpatentability arguments for the “and/or” and “one or more” claim limitations fit within the Tesla framework, i.e., that the prior art discloses the claimed features regardless of how those limitations are construed, Petitioner’s indefiniteness contentions are broader than those two limitations. See, e.g., Paper 15, 1–2; IPR2025-01383, Paper 9 at 8–10. Thus, it is appropriate to deny institution of these IPRs for the same reasons as articulated in Terumo. In its briefing, Petitioner states that it will stipulate to withdraw all indefiniteness arguments against the challenged patents from the related litigation if the Board agrees to maintain and not vacate institution of these IPRs. Paper 16, 2. This stipulation, which Petitioner offered only after Petitioner’s actions ran afoul of Revvo and Tesla and only after Patent Owner brought those actions to the Office’s attention, is insufficient.” slip op. at 3
- Director reviewDirector review, grantedGranted
“Accordingly, the appropriate course of action is to grant Director Review, vacate the Notices granting institution, and deny institution.3 It is: ORDERED that Director Review is granted; FURTHER ORDERED that the Notices granting institution of inter partes review (Paper 11; IPR2025-01383, Paper 12; IPR2025-01524, Paper 10) are vacated; and FURTHER ORDERED that the Petitions are denied, and no trials are instituted.” slip op. at 4
Discretionary denialPatents in suitUS 9,290,153 - Ford Motor Company v. Autoconnect Holdings LLCInstitution deniedPTAB · May 12, 2026 · IPR2025-01342 · APJ John A Squires · IPR · Director review
Director Review was granted, the institution notices were vacated, and institution was denied because Ford advanced broader indefiniteness positions in related litigation.
RulingsDirector review decision- Other 314aInstitution denied discretionary otherInstitution denied
“As I recently explained, it is appropriate to deny institution when a Petitioner’s conduct demonstrates that the dispute “is less about a litigation alternative and more about inconsistent positions to gain an upper hand in the overall litigation.” Terumo BCT Inc. v. Haemonetics Corp., IPR2025- 01374, Paper 20 (Director May 12, 2026). Here, as in Terumo, Petitioner advanced indefiniteness contentions in the co-pending district court litigation at its first opportunity to do so after institution was granted. See Paper 15, 1–2 (listing seven allegedly indefinite terms and phrases impacting all challenged claims). Although Petitioner contends that its unpatentability arguments for the “and/or” and “one or more” claim limitations fit within the Tesla framework, i.e., that the prior art discloses the claimed features regardless of how those limitations are construed, Petitioner’s indefiniteness contentions are broader than those two limitations. See, e.g., Paper 15, 1–2; IPR2025-01383, Paper 9 at 8–10. Thus, it is appropriate to deny institution of these IPRs for the same reasons as articulated in Terumo. In its briefing, Petitioner states that it will stipulate to withdraw all indefiniteness arguments against the challenged patents from the related litigation if the Board agrees to maintain and not vacate institution of these IPRs. Paper 16, 2. This stipulation, which Petitioner offered only after Petitioner’s actions ran afoul of Revvo and Tesla and only after Patent Owner brought those actions to the Office’s attention, is insufficient.” slip op. at 3
- Director reviewDirector review, grantedGranted
“Accordingly, the appropriate course of action is to grant Director Review, vacate the Notices granting institution, and deny institution.3 It is: ORDERED that Director Review is granted; FURTHER ORDERED that the Notices granting institution of inter partes review (Paper 11; IPR2025-01383, Paper 12; IPR2025-01524, Paper 10) are vacated; and FURTHER ORDERED that the Petitions are denied, and no trials are instituted.” slip op. at 4
Discretionary denialPatents in suitUS 9,020,697 - Terumo BCT Inc. v. Haemonetics Corp.Institution deniedPTAB · May 12, 2026 · IPR2025-01391 · APJ John A Squires · IPR · Director review
Director Review was granted, the institution notice vacated, and institution denied because Petitioner took inconsistent claim-construction positions in the IPR and district court.
RulingsDirector review decision- Director reviewDirector review, grantedGranted
“For the reasons below, Patent Owner’s requests for Director Review are granted.” slip op. at 3
- Other 314aInstitution denied discretionary otherInstitution denied
“Petitioner’s conduct, which ensued following institution, demonstrates that this dispute is less about a litigation alternative, as Congress intended, and more about inconsistent positions to gain an upper hand in the overall litigation. See, e.g., H.R. Rep. No. 112-98, at 48 (2011) (explaining that IPRs were intended to provide “quick and cost effective alternatives to litigation”). Such conduct has negative consequences: It multiplies litigation expense, reduces patent value, discourages innovation, diminishes the integrity of the patent system, and depletes the Office’s resources. Discretion is afforded to the USPTO Director to ensure fairness, efficiency, and predictability in patent disputes in a focused inter partes context—as Congress envisioned—as distinct from the broad adversarial context in district court litigation. The Office’s review under Article I is ultimately regulatory; proceedings under Article III are adjudicatory. I would not have instituted these IPRs in the first instance had Petitioner engaged in this strategic litigation-style behavior before institution. Accordingly, the appropriate course of action is to grant Director Review, vacate the Notice granting institution of these IPRs, and deny institution.” slip op. at 4
- Strike new argumentOther
“Petitioner’s assertion that the term “controller” is not in controversy in these IPRs and so it was not required to construe the term in the Petitions is an inadequate justification for the different positions. As I have stated repeatedly, a petitioner should present a single construction and apply that construction consistently before the Board and the district court. See, e.g., Infineon Techs. Am. Corp. v. Mosaid Techs. Corp., IPR2025-01456, Paper 27 at 3–4 (Director Mar. 17, 2026) (“[A] petitioner should pick one [construction], and one consistent with its asserted District Court position.”). Failure to do so detracts from the Office’s goal of “providing greater predictability and certainty in the patent system.” Revvo, Paper 20 at 4–5. I also disagree with Petitioner’s assertion that these IPRs do not implicate Rule 42.104(b)(3). Rule 42.104(b)(3) requires a petition to “[p]rovide a statement of the precise relief requested for each claim challenged,” and to identify how each challenged claim is to be construed. The rule continues to state that “[w]here the claim to be construed contains a means-plus-function or step-plus-function limitation as permitted under 35 U.S.C. 112(f), the construction of the claim must identify the specific portions of the specification that describe the structure, material, or acts corresponding to each claimed function.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.104(b)(3). Petitioner’s position in the district court that the term “controller” is a means-plus-function limitation undercuts its position that Rule 42.104(b)(3) does not apply here. Further, Petitioner’s citation to Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) as support for its position is inapposite, as the holding in that case addresses when the Board is required to construe a claim term, not when a party is required to follow Board rules. DR Response 7–8.” slip op. at 3
Discretionary denialPatents in suitUS 10,758,652 - Terumo BCT Inc. v. Haemonetics Corp.Institution deniedPTAB · May 12, 2026 · IPR2025-01374 · APJ John A Squires · IPR · Director review
Director Review was granted, the institution notice was vacated, and institution was denied because Petitioner took inconsistent claim-construction positions.
RulingsDirector review decision- Other 314aInstitution denied discretionary otherInstitution denied
“Petitioner’s conduct, which ensued following institution, demonstrates that this dispute is less about a litigation alternative, as Congress intended, and more about inconsistent positions to gain an upper hand in the overall litigation. See, e.g., H.R. Rep. No. 112-98, at 48 (2011) (explaining that IPRs were intended to provide “quick and cost effective alternatives to litigation”). Such conduct has negative consequences: It multiplies litigation expense, reduces patent value, discourages innovation, diminishes the integrity of the patent system, and depletes the Office’s resources. Discretion is afforded to the USPTO Director to ensure fairness, efficiency, and predictability in patent disputes in a focused inter partes context—as Congress envisioned—as distinct from the broad adversarial context in district court litigation. The Office’s review under Article I is ultimately regulatory; proceedings under Article III are adjudicatory. I would not have instituted these IPRs in the first instance had Petitioner engaged in this strategic litigation-style behavior before institution. Accordingly, the appropriate course of action is to grant Director Review, vacate the Notice granting institution of these IPRs, and deny institution.” slip op. at 4
- Director reviewDirector review, grantedGranted
“Petitioner knew that, consistent with Board precedent, it cannot take different positions on claim construction in the district court and at the Board without an adequate explanation. Nonetheless, Petitioner did not heed that caution. Instead, at its first opportunity after institution was granted in these IPRs, Petitioner—whom I note is represented by the same counsel here and in district court—advanced indefiniteness contentions in the district court litigation that are different from Petitioner’s proposed “plain and ordinary meaning” constructions in these IPRs. See, e.g., DR Request 1; Ex. 2022, 21–42; Paper 2, 2 (counsel information); IPR2025- 01391, Paper 19, 1. Specifically, Petitioner argued in its district court contentions that “‘at least claims 11–20 of the ’124 patent are indefinite’ because the ‘controller [is/further] configured to’ terms are governed by means-plus-function interpretation pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 112(f) and fail to recite sufficient structure.” DR Request 1 (quoting Pet. 20 and Ex. 2022 (Joint Disputed Claim Chart), 21–42); see also IPR2025-01391, Paper 19, 1 (“Petitioner now argues that ‘at least claims 11–19 of the ’652 patent are indefinite.’”).” slip op. at 3
Discretionary denialPatents in suitUS 11,738,124 - Tableau Software, LLC v. Icharts LLCAll claims unpatentablePTAB · May 7, 2026 · IPR2024-01387 · APJ Iftikhar Ahmed · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–16 are unpatentable under the instituted obviousness grounds, including Becerra, the QlikView Manuals, and combinations with other references.
RulingsFinal written decision- ExcludeMotion to exclude, grantedMotion to exclude, deniedGranted in part
“why it is trustworthy and how it archives dates by which the webpages were accessible, as this is an information resource on which librarians reasonably rely. See FED. R. EVID. 703. We agree with Petitioner that Dr. Hall-Ellis does have personal knowledge of the facts stated in the remaining testimony (e.g., what she actually downloaded from websites), and that FEDERAL RULE OF EVIDENCE 602 is inapplicable to her testimony offered as an expert. See Pet. Opp. 5–6 (citing Ex. 1030 ¶¶ 26, 29–32, 35, 37–39). We find her testimony to be relevant to the issues presented and specifically to whether the QlikView documents were publicly accessible. We also find no danger that the testimony would confuse the issues or mislead the Board or present unfair prejudice to Patent Owner. Accordingly, we deny Patent Owner’s Motion as to the remaining portion of Dr. Hall-Ellis’s declaration.” slip op. at 92
- Strike new argumentNew argument disregardedGranted
“FURTHER ORDERED that Petitioner’s Motion to Strike portions of Patent Owner’s Reply on its Motion to Exclude (Paper 32) is granted; and” slip op. at 102
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundUnpatentable
“1. Motivation to Combine Becerra and Couckuyt Petitioner argues that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to combine the teachings of Becerra and Couckuyt because such a person would have recognized that Couckuyt discloses useful techniques of assigning data to Becerra’s charts, including assigning data to each axis. Pet. 34 (citing Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 19, 52, Fig. 5; Ex. 1003 ¶ 224). Petitioner contends that Couckuyt discloses associating data from a “spreadsheet document” with a chart, such as a “bar graph.” Id. at 35 (citing Ex. 1006, 6:1–37; Figs. 3a, 3c). below. Petitioner’s annotations to Figure 4 identify “Drop Zones” in red and “Data Fields” in Blue. Id. at 36. Petitioner contends Couckuyt discloses a “drag-and-drop user interface (DDUI) . . . associated with a data source, such as the two-dimensional data source 300,” and Figure 4 illustrates the DDUI permitting “value data fields and the characteristic data fields . . . to be dragged and dropped into drop zones.” Id. at 35–36 (citing Ex. 1006, 7:10–13). Petitioner contends that a “primary benefit of the charting DDUI is that the user can quickly change the data that is being presented in the chart,” and using Couckuyt’s techniques, a user can “quickly change the data” and see the desired effects. Id. at 36 (citing Ex. 1006, 1:18–19; Ex. 1003 ¶ 228). Petitioner contends that when Becerra’s control panel includes multiple charts, Couckuyt’s techniques would allow dragging-anddropping data from a data source to multiple charts, and would simplify the process of assigning data to multiple control panel components. Id. at 36–37 skill in the art would have also had a reasonable expectation of success combining Becerra with Couckuyt because the combination would amount to nothing more than incorporating Couckuyt’s well-known drag-and-drop techniques into Becerra’s system. Id. at 37 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 229–231). Patent Owner responds that Couckuyt focuses on selecting a data icon that corresponds to dragging and dropping data fields, not dragging and dropping data, while Becerra teaches that selecting various data ranges from the spreadsheet is desirable. PO Resp. 36–37 (citing Ex. 1004 7:48–52; Ex. 2001 ¶ 146). According to Patent Owner, a person of ordinary skill in the art would not have been motivated to merely select data fields that do not limit the selected data in any way. Id. Patent Owner further argues Becerra’s method of binding components to a spreadsheet range and extracting formulas from a spreadsheet teaches away from the multiple chart generation scheme of Couckuyt that uses drag and dropping of data fields. Id. at 37. According to Patent Owner, Couckuyt is directed to the need for a charting DDUI that can generate multiple charts at the same time and such a need does not exist in Becerra which in turn is focused on creating a control panel that is an interactive graphics simulation. Id. (citing Ex. 1004, 1:66–67, 2:5–8; Ex. 1005 ¶ 11; Ex. 2001 ¶ 148). Based on our review of the complete record, we determine that” slip op. at 31
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Prior-art status of a reference › Printed publication / public accessibilityPrinted publication establishedDecided for petitioner
“2. Whether QlikView Manuals Qualify as Prior Art Petitioner argues that “the QlikView Manuals describe a well-known system and are printed publications available to the public at least by July 8, 2008.” Pet. 7–9. Petitioner offers ample evidence to demonstrate the QlikView Manuals were publicly accessible by July 8, 2008. See id. (citing Ex. 1008; Ex. 1009; Ex. 1014–1023; Ex. 1003 ¶ 129–140; Ex. 1030;11 Ex. 1068 ¶¶ 4–7; Ex. 1032; Ex. 1033). Petitioner contends in 2008, QlikView was a well-known software product sold by QlikTech International AB (“QlikTech”). Id. at 8 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 129; Ex. 1030 ¶ 23; Ex. 1068 ¶¶ 4–7). Petitioner asserts that QlikTech announced that QlikView version 8.50 was scheduled for release on June 30, 2008, and QlikTech’s website added the “QlikView 8.50” hyperlink by July 8, 2008. Id. (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 129–131; Ex. 1022, 1; Ex. 1068 ¶ 7). Petitioner contends that, as of July 8, 2008, a person of ordinary skill in the art would have understood that they could view the QlikView Manuals in the installation package. Id. (citing Exs. 1014–1017; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 131–132; Ex. 1068 ¶ 7). Petitioner further contends that the QlikView Manuals were also available on QlikTech’s website as of this 11 As discussed below (see infra § IV.A), we grant Patent Owner’s Motion to Exclude as to certain portions of Exhibit 1030 and do not give them any weight. However, we deny Patent Owner’s Motion as to the remaining portions of Dr. Hall-Ellis’s testimony as well as Ms. Lofton’s testimony and various other exhibits proffered by Petitioner to show public accessibility of the QlikView manuals as of July 8, 2008. QlikView 8.50 was published on July 8, 2008. Id. at 8–9 (citing Exs. 1008, 1009, 1017, 1059, 1060; Ex. 1030 ¶¶ 29, 37). In its Patent Owner Response, Patent Owner does not contest that the QlikView Manuals were published and publicly available by July 8, 2008. PO Resp. 50 n.2 (noting only that Patent Owner intends to move to exclude evidence Petitioner relies on to establish the publication date for QlikView Manuals); Tr. 45:3–19. We are persuaded that Petitioner has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that the QlikView Manuals were publicly available as of July 8, 2008.12” slip op. at 50
Patent outcomesUS 8,271,892 unpatentable§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 8,271,892
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.