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  • PTAB · Jan 29, 2025 · IPR2024-00842 · APJ Michael L Woods · IPR · Institution

    The Board instituted review of claims 1–29 based on a reasonable likelihood of prevailing and granted EndyMed’s motion to join the ’386 IPR.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

      “For the foregoing reasons, the underlying premise of Serendia’s arguments here and in the ’386 IPR remains substantially the same. Thus, for the same reasons discussed in our decision instituting the ’386 IPR, we find that EndyMed demonstrates a reasonable likelihood of prevailing with respect to at least one of challenged claims 1–29 of the ’836 patent. See ’386 IPR, Paper 18. That is not to say, however, that Serendia may not ultimately persuade us at trial of the deficiency of EndyMed’s showing based on a preponderance of the evidence.” slip op. at 13

    • Obviousness (§103) › Objective indicia / secondary considerations › NexusObjective indicia no nexusDecided for petitioner

      “evidences nonobviousness for four different patents. In this situation, a presumption of nexus is appropriate only if patent owner demonstrates that the claims of all four patents “generally cover the same invention.” See Fox Factory, 944 F.3d at 1377 (“Where a product embodies claims from two patents, a presumption of nexus can be appropriate only if the claims of both patents generally cover the same invention.”). “The same evidence of secondary considerations cannot be presumed to be attributable to two different combinations of features.” Id. at 1378 (citation omitted). “In such situations, the patentee retains the burden of proving the degree to which evidence of secondary considerations tied to a product is attributable to a particular claimed invention.” Id. (citation omitted). Here, Serendia does not demonstrate that the four different patents cover the same invention. See Prelim. Resp. 59–74. Indeed, Serendia does not address U.S. Patents 9,775,774, 9,320,536, and 10,869,812 at all. See id. That Serendia separately sought patent protection for each of these four patents suggests that these patents do not generally cover the same invention. Cf Fox Factory, 944 F.3d at 1378 (“The same evidence of secondary considerations cannot be presumed to be attributable to two different combinations of features.”). We made a similar determination in the ’386 IPR. See, e.g., ’386 IPR, Paper 18 at 38 (“Patent Owner fails to set forth which patents ‘generally cover’ the Sylfirm X device.” (citations omitted)).” slip op. at 12

    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Joinder §315(c) / SAS all-or-nothingJoinder, grantedGranted

      “We disagree with Serendia. EndyMed need not justify its delay where, as here, EndyMed satisfies the joinder requirement of filing the petition within one month of our institution of trial in the ’386 IPR. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.122(b); see also 37 C.F.R. §§ 1.7(a), 42.1(a). Indeed, by rule, EndyMed could not have filed the instant petition prior to institution of the IPR it was seeking to join. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.122(b) (“Any request for joinder must be filed . . . no later than one month after the institution date of any inter partes review for which joinder is requested.”) (emphasis added). And, although there is a one-year statutory bar from the date of service of a complaint alleging infringement for requesting inter partes review, that bar does not apply to a request for joinder. See 35 U.S.C. § 315(b). Thus, despite being filed more than one year from the service date of Serendia’s complaint alleging infringement of the ’836 patent, EndyMed’s petition and motion are nonetheless timely. Serendia also argues that joinder should be denied due to duplicative efforts with the parallel Delaware litigation, which involves the same parties and patent as here. See PO Opp. 3–4. That argument fails for the simple reason that EndyMed submits a Sotera stipulation, agreeing not to pursue in the Delaware litigation the same grounds that are asserted in the petition here or any grounds that reasonably could have been raised here. See Pet. Reply 1–2. A Sotera stipulation mitigates concerns of duplicative efforts, and we decline to discretionarily decline institution where a petitioner makes such a stipulation. See Katherine K. Vidal, Interim Procedure for Discretionary Denials in AIA Post-Grant Proceedings with Parallel District Court Litigation (June 21, 2022) (“Director Memo”), at 3, 7–8. Thus, we will not discretionarily deny the petition or motion for joinder on the basis of the parallel Delaware litigation.8” slip op. at 14

    • PTAB / AIA Trials › §315(b) time barNot time barredDecided for petitioner

      “the joinder requirement of filing the petition within one month of our institution of trial in the ’386 IPR. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.122(b); see also 37 C.F.R. §§ 1.7(a), 42.1(a). Indeed, by rule, EndyMed could not have filed the instant petition prior to institution of the IPR it was seeking to join. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.122(b) (“Any request for joinder must be filed . . . no later than one month after the institution date of any inter partes review for which joinder is requested.”) (emphasis added). And, although there is a one-year statutory bar from the date of service of a complaint alleging infringement for requesting inter partes review, that bar does not apply to a request for joinder. See 35 U.S.C. § 315(b). Thus, despite being filed more than one year from the service date of Serendia’s complaint alleging infringement of the ’836 patent, EndyMed’s petition and motion are nonetheless timely.” slip op. at 14

    § 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denial
    Patents in suitUS 9,480,836
  • PTAB · Jan 15, 2025 · IPR2024-01108 · APJ Kevin W Cherry · IPR · Institution

    The Board instituted IPR on claims 1, 2, 5–8, 10–15, 17, 18, 20, and 21 under § 103 and granted BRP’s motion to join the Foil Boarding IPR.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

      “At this stage of the proceeding and based on our preliminary review, we find Petitioner has demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of showing the unpatentability of the Challenged Claims for the same reasons discussed in our Decision on Institution in the Foil Boarding IPR. Granting the Petition and joining Petitioner to the Foil Boarding IPR will provide us with the opportunity to more fully consider Patent Owner’s arguments—first raised in response to the petition in the Foil Boarding IPR—in the context in which they were first raised. Those common arguments will be fully considered in the Foil Boarding IPR, with the benefit of a complete record.8 Accordingly, for the reasons discussed above, we are persuaded Petitioner has demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of showing the unpatentability of the Challenged Claims of the ’044 patent. We therefore grant the Petition, and institute inter partes review of the Challenged Claims.” slip op. at 6

    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Joinder §315(c) / SAS all-or-nothingJoinder, grantedGranted

      “challenges the same claims on the same grounds using the same prior art, Kyocera factor (2) favors joinder. See Kyocera, IPR2013-00004, Paper 15 at 4. Indeed, the Board “routinely grants motions for joinder where the party seeking joinder introduces identical arguments and the same grounds raised in the existing proceeding.” Samsung Elecs. Co. v. Raytheon Co., IPR2016- 00962, Paper 12 at 9 (PTAB Aug. 24, 2016). Moreover, because the issues to be decided are the same and Petitioner avers that it will take an “understudy” role to Foil Boarding in the Foil Boarding IPR by consolidating all filings, refraining from advancing new arguments, binding itself to any discovery agreements, and limiting its deposition time to the time already allotted, Kyocera factors (3) and (4) also favor joinder. See Mot. 4–6; Kyocera, IPR2013-00004, Paper 15 at 4. For the reasons explained above, we find that joining Petitioner to the Foil Boarding IPR is appropriate under the present circumstances. We, therefore, grant Petitioner’s Motion.” slip op. at 8

    None
    Patents in suitUS 9,359,044
  • PTAB · Jan 15, 2025 · IPR2024-01107 · APJ Kevin W Cherry · IPR · Institution

    The Board instituted IPR on claims 1, 2, 4, 5, 7–11, 13, and 15 under § 103 and granted BRP’s motion to join IPR2024-00085.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

      “At this stage of the proceeding and based on our preliminary review, we find Petitioner has demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of showing the unpatentability of the Challenged Claims for the same reasons discussed in our Decision on Institution in the Foil Boarding IPR. Granting the Petition and joining Petitioner to the Foil Boarding IPR will provide us with the opportunity to more fully consider Patent Owner’s arguments—first raised in response to the petition in the Foil Boarding IPR—in the context in which they were first raised. Those common arguments will be fully considered in the Foil Boarding IPR, with the benefit of a complete record.8 Accordingly, for the reasons discussed above, we are persuaded Petitioner has demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of showing the unpatentability of the Challenged Claims of the ’659 patent. We therefore grant the Petition, and institute inter partes review of the Challenged Claims.” slip op. at 6

    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Joinder §315(c) / SAS all-or-nothingJoinder, grantedGranted

      “Patent Owner does not oppose Petitioner’s Motion. We are persuaded by Petitioner’s arguments. Because the Petition challenges the same claims on the same grounds using the same prior art, Kyocera factor (2) favors joinder. See Kyocera, IPR2013-00004, Paper 15 at 4. Indeed, the Board “routinely grants motions for joinder where the party seeking joinder introduces identical arguments and the same grounds raised in the existing proceeding.” Samsung Elecs. Co. v. Raytheon Co., IPR2016- 00962, Paper 12 at 9 (PTAB Aug. 24, 2016). Moreover, because the issues to be decided are the same and Petitioner avers that it will take an “understudy” role to Foil Boarding in the Foil Boarding IPR by consolidating all filings, refraining from advancing new arguments, binding itself to any discovery agreements, and limiting its deposition time to the time already allotted, Kyocera factors (3) and (4) also favor joinder. See Mot. 4–6; Kyocera, IPR2013-00004, Paper 15 at 4. For the reasons explained above, we find that joining Petitioner to the Foil Boarding IPR is appropriate under the present circumstances. We, therefore, grant Petitioner’s Motion.” slip op. at 8

    None
    Patents in suitUS 9,586,659
  • PTAB · Aug 9, 2024 · IPR2024-00385 · APJ Michael L Woods · IPR · Institution

    The Board instituted inter partes review of claims 1–4, 6, and 7 on all asserted grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail on at least one claim.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsDenied

      “Director may take into account whether, and reject the petition or request because, the same or substantially the same prior art or arguments previously were presented to the Office.” 35 U.S.C. § 325(d). The Board evaluates discretionary denial under § 325(d) using a two-part framework: first, the Board considers whether the same or substantially the same art or arguments were previously presented to the Office; and if so, second, the Board considers whether the petitioner has demonstrated that the Office erred in a manner material to the patentability of the challenged claims. Advanced Bionics, LLC v. MED-EL Elektromedizinische Geräte GmbH, IPR2019- 01469, Paper 6 at 8 (PTAB Feb. 13, 2020) (precedential). In determining whether the same or substantially the same art or arguments were previously presented to the Office, the Board considers the following nonexclusive factors: (1) the similarities and material differences between the asserted art and the prior art involved during examination; (2) the cumulative nature of the asserted art and the prior art evaluated during examination; and (3) the extent of the overlap between the arguments” slip op. at 9

    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

      “Under 35 U.S.C. § 314 and 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a), we have authority to institute an inter partes review if “the information presented in the petition . . . and any response . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). After considering the Petition, the Preliminary Response, the Reply, the PO Sur-reply, and the evidence of record, we determine the information presented shows a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail in establishing the unpatentability of at least one of the Challenged Claims of the ’332 patent. Accordingly, we institute an inter partes review of claims 1–4, 6, and 7 of the ’332 patent on the grounds asserted in the Petition.” slip op. at 2

    • Skill levelSkill level board ownOther

      “A person of ordinary skill in the art (POSITA) would have had: (i) a B.S. degree in Chemical Engineering, Petroleum Engineering, or an equivalent field and (ii) two or three years of academic or industry experience in chemical processing systems, oil and gas production and/or refining; or comparable experience. Additional work experience can substitute for educational or research experience, and vice versa. Pet. 8 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 26–29); see also Prelim. Resp. 16 (agreeing with Petitioner’s proposed definition of a POSITA). For purposes of this Decision, we adopt the parties’ assessment of the level of ordinary skill in the art.” slip op. at 13

    • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached

      “At this stage of the proceeding, we decline to adopt Patent Owner’s interpretation that cryogenic conditions occur only below 50°F. See Prelim. Resp. 19 (citing Ex. 2001 ¶ 55). For purposes of this Decision, we need not and do not formally determine the temperature at which cryogenic conditions occur, as our construction would not affect our decision to institute. See Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’”) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). We agree with Petitioner that “[e]xplicit construction of terms is unnecessary because it is not dispositive—the art teaches the claims under any reasonable construction.” Pet. 8 (citing Vivid Techs., 200 F.3d at 803). As explained below, for purposes of institution, Petitioner has shown a reasonable likelihood that Aycaguer does not disclose subjecting the recited streams to “cryogenic conditions” at any temperature, as recited in Limitation 1.6. See Pet. 34–36; see also infra § IV.D.2.g.” slip op. at 15

    Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 8,505,332
  • PTAB · Jul 22, 2024 · IPR2024-00386 · APJ Michael L Woods · IPR · Institution

    The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–29, finding a reasonable likelihood that claims 1–29 are unpatentable on the asserted obviousness grounds.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › General Plastic (serial petitions)Institution denied general plasticDenied

      “D. Analysis The Director’s recent Videndum decision provides that where no “significant relationship [exists] under Valve, General Plastic factor one necessarily outweighs the other General Plastic factors.” See Videndum, Paper 12 at 6. Moreover, the Director’s decision in Ford clarified that “court-ordered” coordination alone between parties having different accused products does not establish a significant relationship absent “other relevant or extenuating facts or circumstances” that might evidence a significant relationship, such as “interactions or agreements regarding the implementation of the accused [technology] into their respective accused products.” Ford, Paper 28 at 10–11. We do not find a significant relationship exists between the prior and current petitioners so as to warrant discretionary denial under General Plastic. First, like the parties in Ford, the prior and current petitioners are competitors selling different products, and there is no evidence of agreements regarding the implementation of the claimed technology into their respective accused products. See Ford, Paper 28 at 10; cf. Valve, Paper 11 at 10 (“Valve represented that ‘HTC’s VIVE devices incorporate certain Valve technologies under a technology license from Valve,’ and that ‘Valve employees did provide HTC with technical assistance during the development of the accused VIVE devices.’”). Second, and also like in Ford, the “Ground Rules” for the ITC Investigation required that “[p]arties with similar interests should coordinate and consolidate motion practice to the extent practicable” (Ex. 1041 § 2) and “must coordinate and consolidate depositions and all other discovery” (id. § 3.1). Indeed, we understand that all fourteen co-respondents in the ITC Investigation submitted the joint expert report of Dr. Jean Woloszko. See Ex. 2004, 1; see also Ford, Paper 28 at 3. Third, we do not find the current Petitioner’s mere knowledge of litigation—either in the ITC or district court—against competitors in RF microneedling to establish a significant relationship with those competitors. Cf. Ford, Paper 17 at 3 (noting that where the patent at issue had been asserted against multiple competitors regarding their respective accused products, “merely engag[ing] in court-ordered pretrial coordination” is by itself insufficient to establish a “significant relationship” between the parties). Fourth, we do not find the current Petitioner to have engaged in improper gamesmanship through “tactical delay.” As Petitioner explains, the Prior Petition was filed in response to a district court action filed by Patent Owner against the prior petitioners, but not Petitioner, while the current Petition was filed in response to an ITC Investigation initiated after the denial of the Prior Petition. Patent Owner’s remaining arguments are directed to other factors in the General Plastic analysis and do not evidence a significant relationship between the prior and current Petitioners. Accordingly, we do not exercise our discretion to deny institution under General Plastic.” slip op. at 13

    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

      “Under 35 U.S.C. § 314 and 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a), we have authority to institute an inter partes review if “the information presented in the petition . . . and any response . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). After considering the Petition, the Preliminary Response, and the evidence of record, we determine the information presented shows a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail in establishing the unpatentability of at least one of the Challenged Claims of the ’836 patent. Accordingly, we institute an inter partes review of claims 1–29 of the ’836 patent on the grounds asserted in the Petition.” slip op. at 2

    • Skill levelSkill level board ownOther

      “IV. ANALYSIS A. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art The parties agree that a person of ordinary skill in the relevant art (“POSITA”) would have had (1) 7–10 years of experience with developing and/or using treatment systems for delivery of electromagnetic radiation energy to skin or other tissues, and (2) a related graduate engineering degree or M.D. and may have worked as part of a multidisciplinary team and drawn upon not only his or her own skills, but also would have taken advantage of certain specialized skills of others on the team when solving a technical problem. Ex. 1028, 14–15; see also Pet. 9 (citing Ex. 1028, 15; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 50, 51); see also Prelim. Resp. 29. For purposes of this Decision, we adopt the parties’ assessment of the level of ordinary skill in the art, as it is consistent with the prior art of record and the ’836 patent.” slip op. at 15

    • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

      “Neither Petitioner nor Patent Owner expressly construe any term. See Pet. 9; see also Prelim. Resp. 30. For purposes of this Decision, we need not and do not formally construe any claim term. See Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’”) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)).” slip op. at 15

    Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 9,480,836
  • PTAB · May 28, 2024 · IPR2024-00085 · APJ Michael L Woods · IPR · Institution

    The Board instituted IPR on claims 1, 2, 4, 5, 7–11, 13, and 15 on all asserted grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that at least one challenged claim is unpatentable.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

      “Under 35 U.S.C. § 314 and 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a), we have authority to institute an inter partes review if “the information presented in the petition . . . and any response . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). After considering the Petition, the Preliminary Response, the Preliminary Reply, the Preliminary Sur-reply, and the evidence of record, we determine the information presented shows a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail in establishing the unpatentability of at least one of the Challenged Claims of the ’659 patent. Accordingly, we institute an inter partes review of the Challenged Claims on the grounds asserted in the Petition.” slip op. at 2

    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Denied

      “We disagree with Patent Owner. Our analysis under Fintiv is guided by the USPTO Director’s Memorandum issued on June 21, 2022, titled “Interim Procedure for Discretionary Denials in AIA Post Grant Proceedings with Parallel District Court Litigation.”8 The Director’s Memorandum explains that, when a petitioner makes a Sotera-type stipulation, “it mitigates concerns of potentially conflicting decisions and duplicative efforts between the district court and the PTAB” and “[w]ith such a stipulation, if an IPR or PGR is instituted, the grounds the PTAB resolves will differ from those present in 8 https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/interim_proc_discretio nary_denials_aia_parallel_district_court_litigation_memo_20220621_.pdf (“Director’s Memorandum”). the parallel district court litigation.” Director’s Memorandum 7 (citing Sotera, IPR2020-01019, Paper 12 at 18–19). Pursuant to the Director’s Memorandum, we “will not discretionarily deny institution of an IPR or PGR in view of parallel district court litigation where a petitioner stipulates not to pursue in a parallel district court proceeding the same grounds as in the petition or any grounds that could have reasonably been raised in the petition.” Id. Because Petitioner provides a Sotera-type stipulation, we do not exercise our discretion to deny institution under Fintiv.” slip op. at 8

    • Skill levelSkill level patent owner adoptedDecided for patent owner

      “Upon review of the prior art of record and the parties’ arguments, we adopt Patent Owner’s definition of the person of ordinary skill in the art for purposes of this Decision as it appears consistent with the prior art of record. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (holding that the prior art itself can reflect the appropriate level of ordinary skill in the art). Petitioner’s proposed definition appears overly restrictive, as it requires a graduate degree in a narrow field of engineering or equivalent experience. We find that a bachelor’s degree with the accompanying experience proposed by Patent Owner more closely aligns with the prior art of record and the ’659 patent. We note, however, there is some overlap in the proposed levels of ordinary skill in the art because Patent Owner’s proposal includes “at least” a bachelor’s degree, which would encompass Petitioner’s master’s degree as well. Prelim. Resp. 19. Nonetheless, our determination herein would be the same under either party’s definition.” slip op. at 9

    • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner

      “We disagree with Patent Owner’s claim construction. By using the word “or,” the plain and ordinary meaning of “prone, kneeling, or standing” is that only one must be satisfied to meet the claim. See, e.g., SkinMedica, Inc. v. Histogen Inc., 727 F.3d 1187, 1199 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (“The disjunctive ‘or’ plainly designates that a series describes alternatives.”). Furthermore, and although claims are read in light of the specification, limitations in a specification are not read into a claim. In re van Geuns, 988 F.2d 1181, 1184 (Fed. Cir. 1993). Even if the Specification describes embodiments in which the user can begin in a prone position and then transition to a kneeling or standing position, as Patent Owner points out (see Prelim. Resp. 20), the claim does not recite the term “transitioning,” and we do not read the terms “each of” or “substantially flat surface” into this claim limitation. For example, the claim does not recite a “substantially flat” top surface and Patent Owner’s attempt to infer this structure into the claim is not supported under the law. See id. at 29–30. For purposes of this Decision, we agree with Petitioner and construe “prone, kneeling, or standing” in accordance with its plain and ordinary meaning as alternatives, and the prior art need only show one to satisfy this aspect of the claim.” slip op. at 12

    Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · KSR
    Patents in suitUS 9,586,659
  • PTAB · May 28, 2024 · IPR2024-00086 · APJ Kevin W Cherry · IPR · Institution

    The Board instituted IPR on claims 1, 2, 5-8, 10-15, 17, 18, 20, and 21 on all asserted grounds after finding a reasonable likelihood of success and declining Fintiv denial.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

      “In an [inter partes review], the petitioner has the burden from the onset to show with particularity why the patent it challenges is unpatentable.” Harmonic Inc. v. Avid Tech., Inc., 815 F.3d 1356, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (citing 35 U.S.C. § 312(a)(3) (requiring inter partes review petitions to identify “with particularity . . . the evidence that supports the grounds for the challenge to each claim”)). This burden of persuasion never shifts to Patent Owner. See Dynamic Drinkware, LLC v. Nat’l Graphics, Inc., 800 F.3d 1375, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (discussing the burden of proof in an inter partes review). slip op. at 10

    • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITAPlain and ordinary meaningDecided for petitioner

      “1. “wherein a user can be disposed on the top surface of the flotation device in a prone, kneeling, or standing position” With respect to the claim term “wherein a user can be disposed on the top surface of the flotation device in a prone, kneeling, or standing position,” Patent Owner points to passages of the Specification, arguing that all three positions are possible. Prelim. Resp. 19–21 (citing Ex. 1001, Abstr., 4:13–17, 4:33–40; Ex. 2006 ¶ 18). We do not agree with Patent’s Owner proposed construction because even if the Specification discloses that all three positions are possible, that is not what the plain language of the claim requires. Claim 1 recites “or,” which means that a user can be disposed on the top surface of the flotation device in any one of the three positions. See, e.g., SkinMedica, Inc. v. Histogen Inc., 727 F.3d 1187, 1199 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (“The disjunctive ‘or’ plainly designates that a series describes alternatives.”). Patent Owner does not identify any definition or disclaimer that would modify this plain meaning. See Thorner v. Sony Computer Entm’t Am. LLC, 669 F.3d 1362, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2012). Thus, we agree with Petitioner and apply the plain and ordinary meaning of the phrase “wherein a user can be disposed on the top surface of the flotation device in a prone, kneeling, or standing position,” to construe “prone, kneeling, or standing” as alternatives, and the prior art need only show one to satisfy this aspect of the claim.” slip op. at 13

    • Skill levelSkill level patent owner adoptedDecided for patent owner

      “Neither party explains how or why its particular proposal impacts the issues before us in this proceeding. We find that a bachelor’s degree with the accompanying experience proposed by Patent Owner more closely aligns with the prior art of record and the ’044 patent. We note, however, there is some overlap in the proposed levels of ordinary skill in the art because Patent Owner’s proposal includes “at least” a bachelor’s degree, which would encompass Petitioner’s master’s degree as well. Prelim. Resp. 10. Nonetheless, our determination herein would be the same under either party’s definition.” slip op. at 12

    • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Prior-art status of a reference › Printed publication / public accessibilityPrinted publication establishedInstituted

      “As the Board has held in a precedential decision, “at the institution stage, the petition must identify, with particularity, evidence sufficient to establish a reasonable likelihood that the reference was publicly accessible before the critical date of the challenged patent and therefore that there is a reasonable likelihood that it qualifies as a printed publication.” Hulu, LLC v. Sound View Innovations, LLC, IPR2018-01039, Paper 29 at 13 (PTAB Dec. 20, 2019) (precedential).” slip op. at 23

    Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 9,359,044
  • PTAB · Apr 15, 2024 · IPR2024-00029 · APJ Amee A Shah · IPR · Institution

    The Board instituted IPR on claims 1, 3–5, 7–8, 10–14, and 16–25 on all grounds in the Petition, finding a reasonable likelihood of unpatentability on at least one claim.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsDenied

      “It is not disputed that Sim, Doi, and Herz were not previously presented to the Office. And, the prosecution record indicates that Sim and Doi were not listed on an Information Disclosure Statement by Application nor in a List of References or in an Office Action by the Examiner. See Ex. 1002, 9–10, 20–25, 69–74, 196–197, 346–347. Petitioner’s asserted Grounds 1 and 2 rely substantially on Sim and Doi to teach the steps of the claimed system and method. Petitioner’s asserted Grounds 4, 5, and 6 substantially rely on Herz. Sim, Doi, and Herz are meaningful to the prior art combinations set forth in the Petition. Therefore, the asserted combinations regarding Sim and Doi, Sim, Doi, and Waytena, and Waytena and Herz were not previously presented to the Office. It is also not disputed that Waytena was previously presented to the Office and considered by the Examiner. The prosecution history shows that throughout prosecution, the Examiner heavily considered and relied on Waytena for rejections under 35 U.S.C. §§102 and 103 in evaluating the application of the ՚983 patent. See, e.g., Ex. 1002, 9–10, 20–24, 69–73. At this point and based on the present record, we do not discretionarily deny under 35 U.S.C. § 325(d) because Petitioner has 7 The terms “POSITA,” “PHOSITA” or “skilled artisan” refer to a person of ordinary sill in the art. reasonable likelihood that at least one of the Challenged Claims is unpatentable. PGS Geophysical, 891 F.3d at 1360. However, based on the record before us, and because we reach the same conclusion as the Examiner regarding Waytena’s teachings, we find that Patent Owner has, on this record, sufficient support for its contentions that Waytena was previously presented to the Office and the Examiner’s evaluation on the merits regarding Waytena’s teachings was not in error.” slip op. at 14

    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

      “an inter partes review may not be instituted unless the information presented in the Petition and any response thereto shows “there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” Moreover, a decision to institute under 35 U.S.C. § 314 may not institute on fewer than all claims challenged in the petition. SAS Inst., Inc. v. Iancu, 138 S. Ct. 1348, 1359–60 (2018); see also 37 C.F.R. § 42.108(a) (2023) (“When instituting . . . review, the Board will authorize the review to proceed on all of the challenged claims and on all grounds of unpatentability asserted for each claim.”). The Board determines whether to institute a trial on behalf of the Director. 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a). Considering the Petition, the Preliminary Response, and the evidence of record, for the reasons set forth below, we determine that, at this stage based on the evidence presented, Petitioner has demonstrated that there is a reasonable likelihood that at least one of the Challenged Claims is unpatentable. Accordingly, we institute an inter partes review of all challenged claims and on all grounds asserted in the Petition. PGS Geophysical AS v. Iancu, 891 F.3d 1354, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (stating that” slip op. at 2

    • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

      “Patent Owner does not contest or comment on Petitioner’s definition of the level of ordinary skill in the art or offer Patent Owner’s own definition of the level of ordinary skill. Prelim. Resp. 2. that the ’983 patent and the cited prior art references reflect the appropriate level of skill at the time of the claimed invention and that the level of appropriate skill reflected in these references and in the ’983 patent is consistent with the level of skill proposed by Petitioner. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001). Accordingly, for purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s proposed definition for a person of ordinary skill in the art.” slip op. at 17

    • Claim Construction › Functional claiming / §112(f) means-plus-function › Whether §112(f) applies (Williamson, nonce words)§112(f) appliesTerm construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner

      “Petitioner contends the claimed “presentation means” is a means-plus- function term under § 112, ¶ 6, that “can perform the function of (a) ‘receiv[ing] said itinerary from said computer’ and (b) ‘present[ing] said itinerary to said party.’” Pet. 8–9. Petitioner further contends the corresponding structure for performing the recited functions is display screen 130. Pet. 9. Patent Owner presents no argument against this contention. We agree that “presentation means” is a means-plus-function claim term. Because it is necessary to know what the structure and function are encompassed by the claim term in order to make a determination that the disagreement, we adopt Petitioner’s construction. Should either party believe that a different construction should apply in the instituted trial, it should explain the proposed construction, how the construction is supported by the record, and how the construction affects our unpatentability analysis.” slip op. at 18

    Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 7,212,983
  • PTAB · Feb 9, 2024 · IPR2023-01233 · APJ Michael L Woods · IPR · Institution

    The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–18, finding a reasonable likelihood that the challenged claims would have been obvious over the asserted combinations.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Denied

      “the following six factors when determining whether to use our discretion to deny institution: 1. whether the court granted a stay or evidence exists that one may be granted if a proceeding is instituted; 2. proximity of the court’s trial date to the Board’s projected statutory deadline for a final written decision; 3. investment in the parallel proceeding by the court and the parties; 4. overlap between issues raised in the petition and in the parallel proceeding; 5. whether the petitioner and the defendant in the parallel proceeding are the same party; and 6. other circumstances that impact the Board’s exercise of discretion, including the merits. Fintiv, Paper 11 at 5–6. In evaluating these factors, we “take[] a holistic view of whether efficiency and integrity of the system are best served by denying or instituting review.” Id. at 6.” slip op. at 9

    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsDenied

      “[a] two-part framework: (1) whether the same or substantially the same art previously was presented to the Office or whether the same or substantially the same arguments previously were presented to the Office; and (2) if either condition of first part of the framework is satisfied, whether the petitioner has demonstrated that the Office erred in a manner material to the patentability of challenged claims. Advanced Bionics, LLC v. MED-EL Elektromedizinische Geräte GmbH, IPR2019-01469, Paper 6 at 8 (PTAB Feb. 13, 2020) (precedential) (“Advanced Bionics”) (footnote omitted); see also Becton, Dickinson & Co. v. B. Braun Melsungen AG, IPR2017-01586, Paper 8 at 17–18 (PTAB Dec. 15, 2017) (precedential as to Section III.C.5, first paragraph) (listing factors to consider in evaluating the applicability of § 325(d)) (“Becton Dickinson”).” slip op. at 15

    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

      “institute an inter partes review if “the information presented in the petition . . . and any response . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). After considering the Petition, the Preliminary Response, and the evidence of record, we determine the information presented shows a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail in establishing the unpatentability of at least one of the Challenged Claims of the ’574 patent. Accordingly, we institute an inter partes review of claims 1–18 of the ’574 patent on the grounds asserted in the Petition.” slip op. at 2

    • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

      “Although Petitioner’s and Patent Owner’s proposed definitions are similar, Petitioner’s definition is more flexible, as it provides that “[a]dditional work or research experience can substitute for less or different education, and vice-versa.” Compare Pet. 13, with Prelim. Resp. 15. For purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s assessment of the level of ordinary skill in the art. We are not persuaded that a skilled artisan would necessarily require at least a Master’s Degree in Mechanical Engineering or at least three or more years of experience in either engine systems or engine control systems, as Patent Owner proposes. See Prelim. Resp. 15. We find Petitioner’s definition, which applies a more flexible approach, is consistent with the ’574 patent and the asserted prior art. Pet. 13; see Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001).” slip op. at 18

    Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · KSR
    Patents in suitUS 6,581,574
  • PTAB · Nov 29, 2023 · IPR2023-00918 · APJ Robert J Silverman · IPR · Institution

    The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–29 and all asserted grounds, finding at least Grounds 7–13 met the reasonable-likelihood threshold.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • Other 314aDenied

      “The present Petition identifies thirteen Grounds, which employ a total of seven prior art references. See Pet. 1–2. Patent Owner contends that the Petition’s use of alternative combinations, within particular Grounds, results in “over twenty (20)” distinct bases for the invalidity of one or more claims. Prelim. Resp. 6. As Patent Owner concedes (id.), this is a far cry from the situation in Adaptics, where the Board confronted “hundreds of possible combinations.” Adaptics, 2019 Pat. App. LEXIS 4775, *25–*26. In addition, although the use of alternative prior art bases and string citations, in a petition, may present various challenges, we do not regard the present Petition as exceeding reasonable limits of particularity and specificity. Further, the alleged discrepancies in how the Petition “pars[es] the elements” of claim 28 (Prelim Resp. 7) do not appear to have impaired Patent Owner’s analysis thereof. See id. at 19–26, 39–43.” slip op. at 11

    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

      “For the reasons provided below, we determine that Petitioner demonstrates a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail with respect to at least one claim of the ’620 patent challenged in the Petition. Specifically, at least Grounds 7–13 of the Petition satisfy this standard for instituting inter partes review.” slip op. at 20

    • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundDecided for petitioner

      “However, Petitioner, with reference to the Goldberg Declaration (Ex. 1002), argues that a sufficient reason exists, for combining Felt (Verizon) with Kerr, because “Kerr’s interfacing allows registration of the assets, and provides ease and control in human-machine interfacing,” which would have supported the distribution of targeted content. Pet. 14–15 (citing Ex. 1005 ¶ 96, Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 107–109). At the present stage of the proceeding, it appears that Petitioner has identified a sufficient reason to combine Felt (Verizon) with Kerr.” slip op. at 26

    • Obviousness (§103) › Analogous artAnalogous artDecided for petitioner

      “As to the issue of whether Muhire constitutes non-analogous art, Patent Owner identifies the proper inquiries, either of which would establish a reference as analogous art: (1) whether the reference is from the same field of endeavor as the claimed invention; and (2) whether the reference is reasonably pertinent to the problem faced by the inventor. Prelim. Resp. 33–34 (citing Bigio, 381 F.3d at 1325). However, Patent Owner does not analyze either inquiry, but merely states: “The Petition provides no evidence why a POSITA would look to making such a combination with the location tracking of Verizon; rather only a discussion of using separate layers is provided.” Id. at 34 (citing Pet. 35, Ex. 1002 ¶ 163). By contrast, Dr. Goldberg regards Muhire as being “focused in [sic] similar sector of technology” as the ’620 patent. Ex. 1002 ¶ 163. Further, Muhire addresses the delivery of customized advertising media content to online electronic devices (see Muhire ¶¶ 32–46) — a subject that could be regarded as the field of endeavor of the ’620 patent, which “relates to an online platform . . . for managing and/or delivering location and time based advertisements” (Ex. 1001, 1:20–24). Therefore, at this stage of the proceeding, we are not persuaded on the current record that Muhire constitutes non-analogous art.” slip op. at 30

    Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 10,621,620
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Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.