- Black Swamp IP, LLC v. Virnetx Inc.Rehearing deniedPTAB · Jul 24, 2017 · IPR2016-00693 · APJ Stephen C Siu · IPR · Rehearing
The Board denied VirnetX’s rehearing request, leaving intact its determination that claims 27 and 51 are anticipated by Kiuchi.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied
“path to address the claimed ‘first location’” and relies on In re Magnum Oil Tools Int’l., Ltd., 829 F.3d 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2016) to support Patent Owner’s implied contention that the Final Decision may not address new arguments raised by Patent Owner in Patent Owner’s Preliminary Response and/or Patent Owner’s Response. Req. Reh’g. 6. We disagree. In the present matter and in accordance with Magnum Oil, the ultimate burden of proof remained with Petitioner and was never shifted to Patent Owner at any time during the proceedings and, as discussed above, at no time was an “entirely new path to address the claimed ‘first location’” introduced in the Decision.” slip op. at 3
- BurdenDecided for petitioner
“path to address the claimed ‘first location’” and relies on In re Magnum Oil Tools Int’l., Ltd., 829 F.3d 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2016) to support Patent Owner’s implied contention that the Final Decision may not address new arguments raised by Patent Owner in Patent Owner’s Preliminary Response and/or Patent Owner’s Response. Req. Reh’g. 6. We disagree. In the present matter and in accordance with Magnum Oil, the ultimate burden of proof remained with Petitioner and was never shifted to Patent Owner at any time during the proceedings and, as discussed above, at no time was an “entirely new path to address the claimed ‘first location’” introduced in the Decision.” slip op. at 3
NonePatents in suitUS 7,418,504 - Apple Inc. v. Virnetx Inc.All claims unpatentablePTAB · Jun 22, 2017 · IPR2016-00332 · APJ Karl D Easthom · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–11, 14–25, 28, and 30 are unpatentable based on the instituted grounds.
RulingsFinal written decision- ExcludeMotion to exclude, deniedMixed
“Petitioner’s argument is persuasive. Patent Owner has not met its burden of explaining why Exhibits 1064 and 1065 must be excluded as hearsay. The statements are offered to show that skilled artisans believed the RFC 2401 document and other RFC documents were available at the time of publication. Patent Owner does not challenge the publication dates of the magazines as hearsay. As noted above, Patent Owner does not state what aspects of the documents are hearsay. See Paper 20, 7–10; Paper 24, 4 n.1 (Patent Owner “disagrees” with Petitioner about the documents status as hearsay). In any event, Petitioner shows that the documents also satisfy the residual hearsay exception. They have circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness as written prior to litigation by disinterested parties in periodical trade magazines that almost qualify as ancient documents. Both magazine articles bear specific volumes and issue numbers along with the publication dates. See Ex. 1064 (Aug. 16, 1999, vol. 21, iss. 33); Ex. 1065 (March 15, 1999, vol. 16, no. 11); Paper 23, 3–8; Fed. Rule Evid. 803 (16) (ancient authentic documents of 20 years old are not hearsay). In addition,” slip op. at 84
Patent outcomesUS 8,504,696 unpatentableNonecites Phillips · KSRPatents in suitUS 8,504,696 - Apple Inc. v. Virnetx Inc.All claims unpatentablePTAB · Jun 22, 2017 · IPR2016-00331 · APJ Karl D Easthom · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–11, 14–25, and 28–30 are unpatentable as obvious over Beser and RFC 2401.
RulingsFinal written decision- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner
“Patent Owner’s contentions are not persuasive. Patent Owner fails to explain sufficiently why the notion of “performing an additional evaluation” constitutes an implicit part of the claimed intercept clause. Addressing similar arguments by Patent Owner, a Board panel made a similar determination in the ’237 FWD relied upon by Petitioner. ’237 FWD 11 (“the record show[s] that the additional functionality urged by Patent Owner should not be imported into the intercepting phrase”).” slip op. at 8
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed petitioner constructionOther
“broadest reasonable interpretation in light of the specification. 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b); Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2144–46 (2016) (upholding the use of the broadest reasonable interpretation standard under 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b)). Under this standard, absent any special definitions, claim terms or phrases are given their ordinary and customary meaning, as would be understood by one of ordinary skill in the art, in the context of the entire disclosure. In re Translogic Tech., Inc., 504 F.3d 1249, 1257 (Fed. Cir. 2007). For the purposes of this Decision, only the claim terms or clauses below need express construction. See Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (only those terms in controversy need to be construed and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy).” slip op. at 7
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Prior-art status of a reference › Printed publication / public accessibilityPrinted publication establishedDecided for petitioner
“We find Dr. Tamassia’s testimony as to public accessibility of RFCs in general to be credible, especially given the independent support of RFC 2026 (Ex. 1036), the contents of which Patent Owner does not challenge.7 As part of routine discovery, see 37 C.F.R. § 42.51(b)(1)(ii), Patent Owner had the opportunity to cross-examine Dr. Tamassia, but does not point us to any discussion of this issue. Moreover, RFC 2401’s contents are consistent with the publication process described by RFC 2026 and Dr. Tamassia, including the inclusion of a date “November 1998” on the top right corner of the first page of the document. Ex. 1008, 1. In addition, this document—a request for suggestions and improvements for an Internet standards protocol, 7 As addressed below, Patent Owner objects and moves to dismiss a number of Exhibits based on hearsay and relevancy. See Paper 20 (Motion to Exclude). having no indication of being a mere draft or internal paper—is precisely the type of document whose very purpose is public disclosure, including on the Internet. Both of the magazine articles, Exhibits 1064 and 1065, further corroborate the indicia of availability on the face of RFC 2401, although they are not necessary to our finding of public accessibility. We do not rely on the testimony of Sandy Ginoza, Exhibits 1060 and 1063, which Patent Owner seeks to exclude as discussed further below.” slip op. at 12
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedDecided for petitioner
“Patent Owner does not articulate a persuasive reason for giving Dr. Tamassia’s declaration, as a whole, little or no weight in our analysis. We agree with Petitioner that experts are not required to opine on every relevant factual and legal issue in order to be accorded substantial weight. The cases upon which Patent Owner relies do not show otherwise. For example, Patent Owner cites Schumer v. Laboratory Computer Systems, Inc., 308 F.3d 1304, 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2002), for the proposition that “[expert] testimony . . . ‘must identify each claim element, state the witnesses’ interpretation of the claim element, and explain in detail how each claim element is disclosed in the prior art reference.’” PO Resp. 52–53. Patent Owner’s quotation, however, mischaracterizes Schumer by omitting introductory words necessary to the meaning of the quoted sentence. In its entirety, the quoted portion of Schumer states the following: Typically, testimony concerning anticipation must be testimony from one skilled in the art and must identify each claim element, state the witnesses’ interpretation of the claim element, and explain in detail how each claim element is disclosed in the prior art reference. The testimony is insufficient if it is merely conclusory. Schumer, 308 F.3d at 1315–16. The Federal Circuit then adds that it is not the task of the courts to “attempt to interpret confusing or general testimony to determine whether a case of invalidity has been made out” and “if the testimony relates to prior invention and is from an interested party, as here, it must be corroborated.” Id. at 1316. So, instead of laying out a specific, required format for the content of all testimony regarding invalidity, as asserted by Patent Owner, this portion of Schumer confirms the unremarkable proposition that conclusory, overly general, confusing, and self-interested testimony should not be relied upon. Id.; see also Koito Mfg. Co., Ltd. v. Turn-Key-Tech, LLC, 381 F.3d 1142, 1152 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (“General and conclusory testimony, such as that provided by Dr. Kazmer in this case, does not suffice as substantial evidence of invalidity.”). Patent Owner does not show that the whole of Dr. Tamassia’s testimony suffers from any of these failings. Under 35 U.S.C. § 316(e), the preponderance of the evidence standard governs in determining whether Petitioner establishes unpatentability. We exercise discretion to determine the appropriate weight to accord the evidence presented, including expert opinions, based on the underlying facts supporting the opinion. We accord relevant portions of Dr. Tamassia’s testimony the appropriate weight based on that particular testimony and supporting evidence.” slip op. at 14
Patent outcomesUS 8,504,696 unpatentableClaim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites KSRPatents in suitUS 8,504,696 - Black Swamp IP, LLC v. Virnetx Inc.All claims unpatentablePTAB · Jun 12, 2017 · IPR2016-00693 · APJ Stephen C Siu · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1, 2, 5, 6, 15, 16, 27, 33, 36, 37, 39, 40, 51, 57, and 60 are unpatentable as anticipated by Kiuchi under § 102.
RulingsFinal written decision- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableUnpatentable
“configured to “comprise an indication that the domain name service system supports establishing a secure communication link.” Patent Owner argues that “it is improper to equate establishing a secure communication link with indicating whether the domain name service system supports establishing a secure communication link” because claim 1 “separately recit[es] ‘establishing a secure communication link,’ . . . and ‘an indication that the domain name service system supports establishing a secure communication link.’” PO Resp. 22, 30 (citing Ex. 2015 ¶ 34, 46). Patent Owner does not explain sufficiently how a system that establishes a secure link somehow does not “indicate” that it supports doing so if the system establishes the secure link. One of skill in the art would have understood a system that establishes a secure link would support doing so at least as a matter of common sense. If the system did not support establishing a secure link, one of skill in the art would have expected such a system not to actually establish a secure link (the system not supporting such an action). This is contrary to Kiuchi’s system, for example, in which a secure link is established (thereby “indicating” that it supports doing so). For example, the “domain name service system” is recited in claim 1 as “establishing a secure communication link,” and comprising “an indication that the . . . system” may support the recited function of “establishing a secure communication link.” We do not observe, nor does Patent Owner point out in a meaningful way, any conflicts between a recited system comprising an “indication” that the system supports a recited function by performing the function that it supports and a recitation that the system is designed to perform that function.” slip op. at 6
- Strike new argumentNew argument consideredDecided for petitioner
“(“New Issue #1” and “New Issue #2”) in Petitioner’s Reply Brief. PO Identification 1–5. After careful consideration of Patent Owner’s arguments and for reasons set forth below, we determine that Patent Owner’s arguments regarding alleged New Issue #1 are moot because we do not rely upon Petitioner’s arguments regarding that issue in this opinion. We also determine that alleged New Issue #2 was responsive to arguments raised by Patent Owner.” slip op. at 14
Patent outcomesUS 7,418,504 unpatentable§ 102 anticipationPatents in suitUS 7,418,504 - Black Swamp IP, LLC v. Virnetx Inc.All claims unpatentablePTAB · Jun 12, 2017 · IPR2016-00957 · APJ Stephen C Siu · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1, 2, 5, 6, 15, 16, 23, 27, 36, 37, 39, 40, 47, 51, and 60 are unpatentable as anticipated by Kiuchi under § 102.
RulingsFinal written decision- Strike new argumentNew argument consideredDecided for petitioner
“Given that Patent Owner raises this issue (that the claim terms “indicating” and “establishing” are separate and distinct) for the first time in Patent Owner’s Response, even assuming that Patent Owner is correct that Petitioner argues in the Reply Brief “that ‘the ‘indicate’/’indicating’ claim elements and the alleged ‘establishing’ claim elements are not separate claim elements’” (PO Identification 4 (citing Pet. Reply 14, 17)), such an argument by Petitioner would merely be responsive to Patent Owner’s arguments presented in Patent Owner’s Response and, therefore, would not “go beyond properly responding to VirnetX’s Patent Owner Response,” as Patent Owner alleges. PO Identification 1.” slip op. at 17
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableUnpatentable
“communication link.” Patent Owner argues that “it is improper to equate establishing a secure communication link with indicating whether the domain name service system supports establishing a secure communication link” because claim 1 “separately recit[es] ‘establishing a secure communication link,’ . . . and ‘an indication that the domain name service system supports establishing a secure communication link.’” PO Resp. 22, 30 (citing Ex. 2015 ¶¶ 34, 46). Patent Owner does not explain sufficiently how a system that establishes a secure link somehow does not “indicate” that it supports doing so if the system establishes the secure link. One of skill in the art would have understood a system that establishes a secure link would support doing so at least as a matter of common sense. If the system did not support establishing a secure link, one of skill in the art would have expected such a system not to actually establish a secure link (the system not supporting such an action). This is contrary to Kiuchi’s system, for example, in which a secure link is established (thereby “indicating” that it supports doing so).” slip op. at 6
- BurdenDecided for petitioner
“communication link.” Patent Owner argues that “it is improper to equate establishing a secure communication link with indicating whether the domain name service system supports establishing a secure communication link” because claim 1 “separately recit[es] ‘establishing a secure communication link,’ . . . and ‘an indication that the domain name service system supports establishing a secure communication link.’” PO Resp. 22, 30 (citing Ex. 2015 ¶¶ 34, 46). Patent Owner does not explain sufficiently how a system that establishes a secure link somehow does not “indicate” that it supports doing so if the system establishes the secure link. One of skill in the art would have understood a system that establishes a secure link would support doing so at least as a matter of common sense. If the system did not support establishing a secure link, one of skill in the art would have expected such a system not to actually establish a secure link (the system not supporting such an action). This is contrary to Kiuchi’s system, for example, in which a secure link is established (thereby “indicating” that it supports doing so).” slip op. at 6
Patent outcomesUS 7,921,211 unpatentable§ 102 anticipationPatents in suitUS 7,921,211 - PTAB · Oct 20, 2016 · IPR2015-01047 · APJ Stephen C Siu · IPR · Rehearing
The Board denied VirnetX’s rehearing request, rejecting its real-party-in-interest arguments and finding the challenged claims remained unpatentable based on the Petition and Kiuchi.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied
“The applicable standard for a request for rehearing is set forth in 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d), which provides in relevant part: A party dissatisfied with a decision may file a request for rehearing, without prior authorization from the Board. The burden of showing a decision should be modified lies with the party challenging the decision. The request must specifically identify all matters the party believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked, and the place where each matter was previously addressed in a motion, opposition, or a reply.” slip op. at 2
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Real party in interest / privityRpi dispute resolved for petitionerDecided for petitioner
“Paper 82, 8. We are not persuaded by Patent Owner’s argument. Even assuming that Petitioner, in fact, “admitted that the US Feeder and the Cayman Feeder are ‘controlling shareholders’ of the Mangrove Petitioner,” as Patent Owner asserts, Patent Owner does not demonstrate persuasively that Petitioner also “admitted” that the “US Feeder and the Cayman Feeder” exerted control over the filing or preparation of the Petition. Nor does Patent Owner provide sufficient evidence demonstrating such control.” slip op. at 2
- Expert testimonyDecided for petitioner
“1003 is entitled to no weight and reverse its findings of unpatentability that improperly rely on Exhibit 1003.” Paper 82, 14. Reference to Exhibit 1003 in the Decision was made in conjunction with the Petition in describing the Kiuchi disclosure with respect to claim features. Decision 5. We note that Exhibit 1003 merely confirms what is already apparent in the Petition and/or the Kiuchi reference itself (both of which are also relied upon in consideration of the Kiuchi reference with respect to claim features). Hence, to the extent that any modifications might have been made to the relevant portions of Exhibit 1003, we conclude that such alleged potential modifications (if any) are of insubstantial relevance in view of the fact that analysis of the Petition and the Kiuchi reference itself (without reliance on Exhibit 1003 in this regard) indicate that Petitioner has met its burden by a preponderance of the evidence that claims 1, 2, 6–8, and 12–14 of the ’151 patent are unpatentable, as indicated in the Decision. See, e.g., Decision 1-4, 6-24, and 26-38. Reference to Exhibit 1003 in the Decision was also made in the Petition as corroboration that RFC documents are “publications [that] are prepared and distributed,” “published and widely distributed” for “a period for others to provide comments on the document,” “can be obtained from a number of Internet hosts using . . . document-retrieval systems,” and contain a date “in the top right corner of the first page of the document.” Decision 25. Such testimony merely corroborates what is already clear on its face. For example, the fact that RFC documents are prepared and distributed, are for others to provide comments, are published on a specific date, and that the top right corner of such documents specify a date is clear on simple inspection of the RFC document itself. Therefore, we determine that the importance of any alleged modifications to Dr. Guerin’s testimony confirming what is already apparent on its face is of insubstantial importance. Also, Patent Owner does not demonstrate sufficiently that any modifications were, in fact, made to Dr. Guerin’s testimony that RFC documents are published on a specific date and that the top right corner of such documents specify a date.” slip op. at 6
NonePatents in suitUS 7,490,151 - The Mangrove Partners Master Fund, Ltd. / Apple Inc. et al. v. Virnetx Inc.All claims unpatentablePTAB · Sep 9, 2016 · IPR2015-01047 · APJ Stephen C Siu · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1, 2, 6–8, and 12–14 are unpatentable as anticipated by Kiuchi; the Board also addressed obviousness grounds but did not need to rely on the additional references.
RulingsFinal written decision- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableUnpatentable
“Claim 1 recites a DNS request. The DNS request is “sent by a client,” potentially “corresponds to a secure server,” and may result in any one of a return of an IP address of a nonsecure computer or the initiation of an encrypted channel between the client and the secure server. Claim 1 does not appear to recite any other specific features of the DNS request.” slip op. at 6
- Obviousness (§103) › Objective indicia / secondary considerations › NexusObjective indicia no nexusDecided for petitioner
“We are cautioned by the Federal Circuit that, with respect to secondary considerations alleged by Patent Owner in response to a prima facie showing of obviousness, “the obviousness inquiry centers on whether ‘the claimed invention as a whole’ would have been obvious.” WBIP, LLC v. Kohler Co., Appeal Nos. 2015-1038, 2015-1044, slip op. at 15 (Fed. Cir., July 19, 2016). Looking at the “claimed invention as a whole,” we note that claim 1, for example, recites a data processing device that determines whether an intercepted DNS request corresponds to a secure server, forwards the DNS request to a DNS function that returns an IP address of a nonsecure computer (when the intercepted DNS request does not correspond to a secure server), and automatically initiating an encrypted channel between the client and the secure server when the intercepted DNS request corresponds to a secure server. As previously discussed in the record, Kiuchi discloses these features, either taken separately or as a “whole.” Patent Owner does not indicate a portion of the “whole” of the claimed invention that Kiuchi supposedly does not disclose. Not having identified sufficiently a part of the “whole” of the claimed invention that Kiuchi does not disclose, we conclude that Kiuchi discloses the “whole” of the claimed invention. Therefore, Patent Owner fails to show a nexus to its evidence of secondary considerations. While Patent Owner argues that DARPA-sponsored entities were supposedly unable to provide “the ease of use of the solutions provided in the claimed inventions of the ’151 patent,” Patent Owner does not demonstrate persuasively and with credible evidence that Kiuchi, for example, was also unable to provide “the ease of use of the solutions provided in the claimed inventions of the ’151 patent.” As previously discussed, Kiuchi appears to have succeeded in providing such solutions.” slip op. at 18
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Prior-art status of a reference › Printed publication / public accessibilityPrinted publication establishedDecided for petitioner
“preponderance of the evidence that RFC 1034 or [Rescorla] qualifies as a ‘printed publication.’” PO Resp. 40. The determination of whether a given reference qualifies as a prior art “printed publication” involves a case-by-case inquiry into the facts and circumstances surrounding the reference’s disclosure to members of the public. In re Klopfenstein, 380 F.3d 1345, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2004). On its face, RFC 1034 is a dated “Request for Comments” from the “Network Working Group,” discussing generally known methods for responding to a query from a client. Ex. 1005, 4. On its face, Rescorla is a dated “Internet-Draft” from the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) and described as a “draft document[] valid for . . . six months.” Ex. 1004, 1. Moreover, RFC 1034 explicitly states that “[d]istribution of this memo is unlimited.” Ex. 1005, 1. These indicia suggest that it is more likely than not that both documents were made available to the public (over the Internet). To bolster its showing, Petitioner provides evidence suggesting that RFC 1034 and Rescorla would have been accessible to the interested public. For example, Petitioner provides testimony of Dr. Roch Guerin who explains that “Request for Comment” documents or “RFCs’ or ‘Internet- Drafts’ are “publications [that] are prepared and distributed” and “can be obtained from a number of Internet hosts using . . . document-retrieval systems.” Ex. 1003, 46. Dr. Guerin also testifies that such documents are “published and widely distributed” for “a period for others to provide comments on the document” and that the “publication date of each RFC is contained in the RFC, . . . in the top right corner of the first page of the document [which is] the date it was released for public distribution on the Internet.” Ex. 1003, 44. Ex. 1003 47–48.” slip op. at 24
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Joinder §315(c) / SAS all-or-nothingDecided for petitioner
“Patent Owner argues that “Petitioner Black Swamp was improperly joined to the 01047 proceeding” because “[e]xpert testimony was required in this case given the complexity of the technology at issue” and Black Swamp supposedly failed to file this allegedly “required” expert testimony. This argument was previously raised by Patent Owner and previously addressed. IPR2016-00167 Prelim. Resp. 7–10; IPR2016-00167 Dec. Inst. 4–5; Paper 38, 3–4; Paper 42, 2–3. We remain unpersuaded by Patent Owner’s re-iterated arguments for at least the reasons previously provided. In response to the question of whether Petitioner is required to rely on expert testimony for purposes of institution, Patent Owner now states that “the Federal Circuit” has held that “Petitioner has both the ‘initial burden of production’ and ‘the burden of persuasion to prove unpatentability by a preponderance of the evidence.” PO Resp. 40. Patent Owner, however, does not explain the relevance of this statement, even if assumed to be true, to whether or not a Petitioner is required to rely on expert testimony for purposes of institution. We remain unpersuaded by Patent Owner.” slip op. at 26
Patent outcomesUS 7,490,151 unpatentable§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialPatents in suitUS 7,490,151 - PTAB · Feb 26, 2016 · IPR2015-01047 · APJ Stephen C Siu · IPR · Rehearing
The Board denied Patent Owner’s rehearing request, leaving institution of IPR2016-00167 and its joinder with IPR2015-01047 in place.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied
“because “the ’167 IPR is entirely devoid of any supporting expert testimony” but expert testimony was supposedly submitted in IPR2015-01047. Req. Reh’g 3–4. As previously explained, however, the record reflects that Petitioner has demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of prevailing and Patent Owner fails to demonstrate sufficiently that the absence of expert testimony alone indicates the failure to demonstrate a reasonable likelihood of prevailing in proving unpatentability of a challenged claim. See, e.g., Decision 4.” slip op. at 2
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Joinder §315(c) / SAS all-or-nothingOther
“(“Req. Reh’g” or “Request”), seeks reversal of the Board’s Decision granting institution in IPR2016-00167 and joining IPR2016-00167 with IPR2015-01047. See Req. Reh’g 1. The Board denies the requested relief.” slip op. at 2
NonePatents in suitUS 7,490,151 - PTAB · Feb 26, 2016 · IPR2015-01047 · APJ Stephen C Siu · IPR · Rehearing
The Board denied Patent Owner’s rehearing request, leaving institution of IPR2016-00063 and its joinder with IPR2015-01047 in place.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied
“We have considered Patent Owner’s arguments in the Request but find them unpersuasive to demonstrate that we misapprehended or overlooked any points.” slip op. at 3
- PTAB / AIA Trials › §315(b) time barNot time barredDecided for petitioner
“Patent Owner argues that we incorrectly granted institution of IPR2016-00062 under 35 U.S.C. § 315(b). See, e.g., Req. Reh’g 6–10. Contrary to Patent Owner’s contention, our granting of institution of IPR2016-00063 is in accordance with 35 U.S.C. § 315(b) for at least the reasons previously discussed. Decision 4. Patent Owner reiterates that an alternative interpretation of 35 U.S.C. § 315(b) should be adopted to permit denial of institution of IPR2016-00063. See, e.g., Req. Reh’g 6–10. In support of this contention, Patent Owner continues to cite the dissent in Target Corp. v. Destination Maternity Corp., Case IPR2014-00508, dissent slip op. at 18 (PTAB Feb. 12, 2015) (Fitzpatrick, Bisk, & Weatherly, A.P.JJ., dissenting) (Paper 28) but does not explain why a dissent in this cited matter should compel us to adopt an alternate interpretation of 35 U.S.C. § 315(b). We therefore continue not to do so.” slip op. at 2
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsInstitution denied 325dDenied
“Patent Owner argues that “Apple’s past conduct and the numerous challenges to the ’151 patent nonetheless compel that the Petition be denied under § 325(d).” Req. Reh’g 10. According to 35 U.S.C. § 325(d), “the Director may take into account whether, and reject the petition or request, because the same or substantially the same prior art or arguments previously were presented to the Office.” Having carefully considered Patent Owner’s arguments (Req. Reh’g 10–12), we decline to exercise our discretion to reject the petition or request because the same or substantially the same prior art or arguments previously were presented (allegedly) to the Office, even assuming that the same or substantially the same prior art or arguments were, in fact, previously presented to the Office.” slip op. at 2
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Joinder §315(c) / SAS all-or-nothingJoinder, grantedDecided for petitioner
“DISCUSSION In the Decision dated January 25, 2016, Paper 29 (“Decision”), we granted institution of IPR2016-00063 (filed by Apple Inc.) and joined IPR2016-00063 with the instant matter (i.e., IPR2015-01047). Decision 7.” slip op. at 2
Discretionary denialPatents in suitUS 7,490,151 - PTAB · Feb 26, 2016 · IPR2015-01047 · APJ Stephen C Siu · IPR · Rehearing
The Board granted Patent Owner limited additional discovery about Ward Dietrich’s involvement in preparing or controlling the Petition and denied discovery of other requested materials.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, grantedGranted in part
“We have considered Patent Owner’s arguments in the Request but, with the exception noted below, find them unpersuasive to demonstrate that we misapprehended or overlooked any points. For example, we disagree with Patent Owner that “[t]he Motion certainly met this standard [of showing beyond speculation that something useful would be uncovered as to RPI issues]” for at least the reasons previously detailed in the Decision. See Decision 1–5. However, Patent Owner argues that “Ward Dietrich is Chief Operating Officer of the Mangrove Partners Master Fund” and “has no public role in petitioner” (Motion 3 (citing Ex. 2002 at 2)) and that “Ward Dietrich held himself out as an ‘authorized person’ to sign the Power of Attorney on behalf of Petitioner” (Req. Reh’g 6 (quoting Motion 3)). Petitioner does not appear to refute this contention. Patent Owner further requests “[c]ommunications and documents or things . . . including assistance with identification of prior art, filing, funding, compensation, and/or preparation of any papers related to the Mangrove IPRs” and the identification of “persons and entities . . . involved in the preparation and filing of the petitions” and “persons and entities . . . who controlled or had the ability to control the preparation and filing of the petitions in the Mangrove IPRs.” Ex. 2034, 3; Ex. 2035, 3. In view of Ward Dietrich’s alleged role as an officer of Mangrove Partners and the named Petitioner, we grant Patent Owner’s motion for additional discovery for the limited purpose of providing communications and/or agreements pertaining to Ward Dietrich’s involvement in the preparation and filing of the Petition and/or control or ability to control the preparation and filing of the Petition.” slip op. at 2
- Additional discoveryAdditional discovery, grantedAdditional discovery, deniedGranted in part
“However, Patent Owner argues that “Ward Dietrich is Chief Operating Officer of the Mangrove Partners Master Fund” and “has no public role in petitioner” (Motion 3 (citing Ex. 2002 at 2)) and that “Ward Dietrich held himself out as an ‘authorized person’ to sign the Power of Attorney on behalf of Petitioner” (Req. Reh’g 6 (quoting Motion 3)). Petitioner does not appear to refute this contention. Patent Owner further requests “[c]ommunications and documents or things . . . including assistance with identification of prior art, filing, funding, compensation, and/or preparation of any papers related to the Mangrove IPRs” and the identification of “persons and entities . . . involved in the preparation and filing of the petitions” and “persons and entities . . . who controlled or had the ability to control the preparation and filing of the petitions in the Mangrove IPRs.” Ex. 2034, 3; Ex. 2035, 3. In view of Ward Dietrich’s alleged role as an officer of Mangrove Partners and the named Petitioner, we grant Patent Owner’s motion for additional discovery for the limited purpose of providing communications and/or agreements pertaining to Ward Dietrich’s involvement in the preparation and filing of the Petition and/or control or ability to control the preparation and filing of the Petition.” slip op. at 2
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Other PTAB motions (exclude, strike, seal, additional discovery, rehearing)Denied
“Patent Owner requests an “expanded panel that includes the Chief Judge” because, according to Patent Owner, an expanded panel “is necessary to secure and maintain uniformity” and to “clarify the standard for additional discovery.” Req. Reh’g 1–2, 8–9. Discretion to expand a panel rests with the Chief Judge, who, on behalf of the Director, may act to expand a panel on a suggestion from a judge or panel. AOL Inc. v. Coho Sicensing LLC, Case IPR2014-00771, slip op. at 2 (PTAB Mar. 24, 2015)(Paper 12)(informative). Patent Owner’s suggestion was considered by the Acting Chief Administrative Patent Judge, who declined to expand the panel.” slip op. at 3
NonePatents in suitUS 7,490,151
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.