- PTAB · Dec 29, 2022 · IPR2022-01078 · APJ Scott B Howard · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted review of claims 1–9 and 11–13 on all asserted grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that claim 1 would be obvious over Pedersen, Visser, and Alves.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“obvious over Pedersen, Visser, and Alves. See Pet. 14–40 and 49–68. Based on the current record, we are persuaded that Petitioner has established a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on this asserted obviousness ground with respect to at least claim 1.” slip op. at 18
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Denied
“date, not the scheduled trial date. Interim Fintiv Guidance at 8–9. Because the Final Written Decision will be due approximately 2 months after the expected trial date, this factor weighs slightly in favor of exercising our discretion to deny the Petition.” slip op. at 14
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“Petitioner argues “that no express constructions of the claims are necessary” and the terms “should be given their plain and ordinary meaning.” Pet. 13–14. Patent Owner agrees that the claim limitations should be given their “plain and ordinary meaning as understood by a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the purported invention of the ʼ701 patent.” Prelim. Resp. 13. Patent Owner also points out that Petitioner advances a different claim construction in the district court proceeding. Id. at 14. For the purposes of this Decision, we need not expressly construe any claim terms at this time. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (noting that “we need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 11
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“(“PHOSITA”)7 “would have had a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer science, or a similar field and two years of experience in the design of earphones and associated signal processing. The PHOSITA could have also obtained similar knowledge and experience through other means.” Pet. 13 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶ 17). Patent Owner “applies the level of ordinary skill in the art that is proposed in the Petition.” Prelim. Resp. 13 (citing Pet. 13). Accordingly, for purpose of this proceeding, we adopt the Petitioner’s proposed level of skill.8” slip op. at 10
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,057,701 - Tesla, Inc. v. Arsus, LLCInstitutedPTAB · Dec 23, 2022 · IPR2022-01216 · APJ Hyun J Jung · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted review of claims 1–21 on all presented grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood of unpatentability based on the Dechamp combinations and Inagaki.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsDenied
“[a] two-part framework: (1) whether the same or substantially the same art previously was presented to the Office or whether the same or substantially the same arguments previously were presented to the Office; and (2) if either condition of first part of the framework is satisfied, whether the petitioner has demonstrated that the Office erred in a manner material to the patentability of challenged claims. Advanced Bionics, LLC v. MED-EL Elektromedizinische Geräte GmbH, IPR2019-01469, Paper 6 at 8 (PTAB Feb. 13, 2020) (precedential); see also Becton, Dickinson & Co. v. B. Braun Melsungen AG, IPR2017-01586, Paper 8 at 17–18 (PTAB Dec. 15, 2017) (precedential as to Section III.C.5, first paragraph) (listing factors (a)–(f) to consider in evaluating the applicability of § 325(d)).” slip op. at 7
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“Under 35 U.S.C. § 314, an inter partes review may not be instituted “unless . . . there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” Upon consideration of the Petition in view of the present record and for the reasons explained below, we determine that Petitioner has shown a reasonable likelihood of prevailing with respect to at least one of the challenged claims. Thus, we institute an inter partes review of claims 1–21 of the ’877 patent on all presented challenges. SAS Inst. Inc. v. Iancu, 138 S. Ct. 1348, 1359–60 (2018).” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner asserts that one of ordinary skill in the art “would have had at least a Bachelor’s of Science in mechanical engineering, electrical engineering, or a related technical field pertinent to automotive control or safety systems, along with two or more years of experience working with automotive control or safety systems.” Pet. 14 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 21). Patent Owner does not propose a level of ordinary skill and does not dispute Petitioner’s proposal. See generally Prelim. Resp. Based on the preliminary record, we adopt Petitioner’s asserted level of ordinary skill only to determine whether there is a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail with respect to at least one of the claims challenged in the Petition.” slip op. at 10
- Claim Construction › Functional claiming / §112(f) means-plus-function › Whether §112(f) applies (Williamson, nonce words)§112(f) appliesDecided for petitioner
“At this stage, Petitioner sufficiently shows that claims 1, 8, and 15 do not recite sufficient structure for performing the recited function. See Pet. 14–15 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 51), 20 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 52–53). Based on the preliminary record, we agree with Petitioner that (1) claims 1, 8, and 15 include functional recitations, (2) the phrase “mode that allows” recited by claims 1 and 8 is equivalent to using the means-plus-function language “means for,” and (3) the “apparatus” recited by claim 15 does not provide sufficient structure to avoid interpreting under § 112(f). See id. at 14–15, 20. Without further argument or supporting evidence from the record, the mere recitations of “vehicle,” “steering wheel,” and “rolling wheel” do not show how these recited components, without others, can perform the recited functions of independent claims 1, 8, and 15. See Prelim. Resp. 16–17, 19. would be required to “prevent[] said vehicle from being steered beyond a rollover threshold of said vehicle,” as recited by claim 1. See, e.g., Ex. 1001, Fig. 1. Patent Owner also does not address at this stage why “mode that allows” should not be considered equivalent to means-plus-function language. See Prelim. Resp. 18. At this early stage, Petitioner sufficiently rebuts the presumption that § 112(f) does not apply. See Pet. 14–21. We, therefore, preliminarily adopt Petitioner’s proposed means-plus- function interpretations for claims 1, 8, and 15. In particular, for claim 1, we agree that the recited function is allows a vehicle to be steered within a maximal non-rollover steering range of motion of said vehicle but prevents said vehicle from being steered beyond a rollover threshold of said vehicle at any rollover capable speed of said vehicle regardless of the source of an oversteer rotational load applied to a steering wheel of said vehicle. Pet. 15–16 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 51); Ex. 1001, 10:7–12. We also agree that the corresponding structure for the asserted function is the first embodiment of the ’877 patent (“Corresponding Structure #1”). Pet. 17–18 (citing Ex. 1001, 2:35–39, 2:48–52, 2:57–3:18, 5:15–21, 5:29–57, 5:63–65, 6:17– 7:38, 7:45–54, Figs. 1–4B). We further agree that the corresponding structure can also be the fourth embodiment of the ’877 patent (“Corresponding Structure #2”). Id. at 18–19 (citing Ex. 1001, 7:45–54, 8:12–17, 8:25–34, 8:58–10:4, Figs. 5–7A; Ex. 1003 ¶ 54).” slip op. at 11
Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,077,877 - PTAB · Dec 21, 2022 · IPR2022-01088 · APJ Bart A Gerstenblith · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–4, 6–15, and 17–21 on all petitioned grounds after finding a reasonable likelihood that Brochure and Blunt rendered the claims obvious.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“presented in the petition . . . and any [preliminary] response . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) (2018). For the reasons below, Petitioner has established a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail in showing the unpatentability of at least one of the Challenged Claims. Accordingly, we institute an inter partes review of the Challenged Claims on all grounds raised in the Petition.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention would have had “at least a bachelor’s degree in physics or engineering and experience with the installation of cable,” and that “[a]dditional education could substitute for professional experience and vice versa.” Pet. 4 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶ 15). At this stage of the proceeding and on the current record, we find that Petitioner’s proposal is consistent with the level of ordinary skill in the art reflected by the ’771 patent and the prior art of record. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001); In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995); In re Oelrich, 579 F.2d 86, 91 (CCPA 1978). Therefore, we adopt it in our consideration of the issues presently before us.” slip op. at 9
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“Additionally, only terms that are in controversy need to be construed, and these need be construed only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy. See Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’”) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). Petitioner contends that “no terms need construction and the plain and ordinary meaning of each term can be applied.” Pet. 4 (citing Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1312–13). On the present record at this stage of the proceeding, we need not construe any claim terms expressly because the meaning of the terms is not in dispute. See Realtime Data, 912 F.3d at 1375.” slip op. at 10
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundInstituted
“Petitioner contends that one of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to “modify Brochure’s cable reel with Blunt’s reel structure or substitute Brochure’s reel with Blunt’s reel 34" to . . . replenish the supply of cable in Brochure’s reel when it is exhausted in an environmentally friendly way.” Pet. 27 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 51–56; Ex. 1004 ¶ 107). Additionally, Petitioner asserts that one of ordinary skill in the art “would have expected success in modifying Brochure’s cable reel with the reel structure of Blunt’s reel 34" or substituting Brochure’s reel with Blunt’s reel 34" because the modification would merely involve using a known technique to improve similar devices in the same way taught.” Id. at 28 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶ 53). We have reviewed Petitioner’s detailed arguments challenging claims 1–4, 6–15, and 17–21 and the evidence on which Petitioner relies (see Pet. 16–83), and we find, on the preliminary record before us, that Petitioner has shown sufficiently that the combination of Brochure and Blunt satisfies the elements of claims 1–4, 6–15, and 17–21, and that one of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to combine the teachings as proposed by Petitioner with a reasonable expectation of success.” slip op. at 14
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSRPatents in suitUS 10,906,771 - PTAB · Dec 20, 2022 · PGR2022-00045 · APJ Grace Karaffa Obermann · PGR · Institution
The Board instituted post-grant review of the sole claim on the Petition’s grounds and granted Samsung’s motion to join PGR2022-00031.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“II. ANALYSIS Before deciding joinder questions, the Board first determines whether the petition “warrants the institution of a post-grant review under section 324.” See 35 U.S.C. §§ 325(c), 324(a) (stating that the petition “would demonstrate that it is more likely than not that at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition is unpatentable”); see also Facebook, Inc. v. Windy City Innovations, LLC, 973 F.3d 1321, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2020) (interpreting joinder requirements in inter partes review under 35 U.S.C. §§ 314(a), 315(c)). When a second petition is a “me-too” or “copycat” petition, the institution analysis may include a General Plastic analysis. See Apple, Inc. v. Uniloc 2017 LLC, IPR2020-00854, Paper 9 (PTAB Oct. 28, 2020) (designated as precedential on December 4, 2020) (“Uniloc”); General Plastic Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Canon Kabushiki Kaisha, IPR2016-01357, Paper 19, at 16 (PTAB Sept. 6, 2017) (precedential as to § II.B.4.i).” slip op. at 6
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › General Plastic (serial petitions)Decided for petitioner
“Although the decision in Uniloc informs that a petitioner’s failure to adequately address these factors may weigh in favor of discretionary denial, this case is distinguishable because Petitioner has not previously filed a petition challenging the validity of the ’702 patent claim. See, e.g., Uniloc, Paper 9 at 11. The Petition is substantively the same as the petition in PGR 031 and includes notice of Petitioner’s intention to file the joinder motion. See Pet. 1; Mot. 1–2. This factor is neutral given Petitioner’s willingness “to proceed solely on the grounds, evidence, and arguments advanced, or that will be advanced, in” PGR 031. Mot. 1– 2.” slip op. at 9
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Joinder §315(c) / SAS all-or-nothingJoinder, grantedGranted
“A motion for joinder must be filed “no later than one month after the institution date of any post-grant review for which joinder is requested.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.222(b). Petitioner timely filed the Motion for Joinder on October 28, 2022, within one month of the Decision of Institution in PGR 031. See Mot. 14; PGR 031, Paper 22. The Petition indicates Petitioner’s intent to file the Motion for Joinder. See Pet. 1. The Petition is substantively identical to the petition in PGR 031 and, accordingly, presents no new grounds. Mot. 6–8. Because Petitioner seeks only to join the first proceeding as a party, and makes no arguments in its Petition that differ from those already being addressed in PGR 031, we grant the Motion for Joinder. In so doing, we take account of Petitioner’s assertions that joinder will not impact the trial schedule because there are no new grounds and, furthermore, Petitioner “consents to any trial schedule adopted in” PGR 031. Mot. 7–8. The Board agrees that joinder should not impact the trial schedule.” slip op. at 11
Discretionary denial - PTAB · Dec 20, 2022 · IPR2022-01138 · APJ Richard H Marschall · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted review of claims 1–19 on all petitioned grounds after finding a reasonable likelihood that claims 1 and 7 would have been obvious based on Goss.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“review. See 35 U.S.C. § 314 (2018); 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a) (2021). Inter partes review may not be instituted “unless . . . the information presented in the petition . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). Upon consideration of the evidence and arguments in the record, we institute inter partes review of the ’397 patent on all challenges set forth in the Petition.” slip op. at 2
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsDenied
“We agree with Patent Owner that both House and Goss were at least considered by the Examiner, even if the Examiner never discussed the references or relied on them in any manner. See Ex. 1001, code (56) (listing both House and Goss among the references cited, and identifying Goss as cited by the Examiner). Under these circumstances, we find the first part of the Advanced Bionics framework satisfied because the prior art before the Examiner and the prior art relied on in the Petition include the same prior art references.” slip op. at 10
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundNot reached
“Petitioner provides very little argument or evidence in support of its motivation to combine argument in the Petition. See Pet. 46. We note that Petitioner does not explain why a “PHOSITA would understand that there is a rational underpinning to combine” Goss and House or cite to any declarant support for its argument. See id. Based on the limited argument, evidence, and explanation provided by Petitioner, on the current record, we question whether Petitioner establishes sufficiently that one of ordinary skill in the art would have had a reason to modify Goss with the teachings of House. Even if Petitioner fails to establish adequately a motivation to combine the references, that does not end our analysis. A “patent can be obvious in light of a single prior art reference if it would have been obvious to modify that reference to arrive at the patented invention.” Arendi S.A.R.L. v. Apple Inc., 832 F.3d 1355, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2016); see also Game & Tech Co. v. Activision Blizzard Inc., 926 F.3d 1370, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2019). For the limitations in independent claims 1 and 7, Petitioner does rely on House, but only as an additional reason why the references disclose a limitation in question. See Pet. 46–61 (relying on Goss for every limitation in claims 1, 3–8, 10–16, and 18). Based on our review of the Petition, Petitioner sets forth an analysis based on Goss alone for at least claims 1 and 7, within the context of its second challenge based on Goss and House. See id. Although Petitioner may not need to rely on a combination of Goss and House for the limitations of independent claims 1 and 7, the additional reliance on House may buttress Petitioner’s arguments as to these and other claims. Consequently, the motivation to combine issue may impact whether Petitioner ultimately prevails as to this challenge. The parties may address the motivation to combine issue further during trial.” slip op. at 17
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Instituted
“adequately that Goss discloses the surface area limitation. We have also reviewed Petitioner’s arguments and evidence as to the remaining limitations of claims 1 and 7. Based on our review of the current record, Petitioner establishes sufficiently that Goss discloses or renders obvious all of the limitations of claims 1 and 7 for the reasons provided by Petitioner. See Pet. 46–51, 53–55. Accordingly, Petitioner establishes a reasonable likelihood that independent claims 1 and 7 would have been obvious based on Goss alone. We have also reviewed Petitioner’s arguments and evidence as to dependent claims 2–6 and 8–19. See Pet. 62–68. Patent Owner does not separately address the dependent claims. Prelim. Resp. 29–36. Because we institute inter partes review as to the independent claims 1 and 7, we also institute inter partes review as to dependent claims 2–6 and 8–19. See SAS Inst., Inc. v. Iancu, 138 S. Ct. 1348, 1359–60 (2018). Because Petitioner relies on Goss for every limitation in dependent claims 3–6, 8, 10–16, and 18, the Petition sets forth a challenge based on Goss alone for these claims as well as claims 1 and 7. See Pet. 49–61. These challenges, as well as the challenge to claims 1–19 based on a combination of Goss and House set forth in the Petition, are part of the instituted grounds at issue during the trial. See id. at 46–61; SAS, 138 S.Ct. at 1359–60. We note that Petitioner relies exclusively on House for dependent claims 2, 9, 17, and 19, and any deficiency in Petitioner’s showing as to the motivation to combine Goss and House may impact whether Petitioner can establish the obviousness of those claims, apart from whether House discloses the limitations in question. See Pet. 51, 53, 55, 60–61 (relying on House as disclosing the limitations in dependent claims 2, 9, 17 and 19).” slip op. at 18
Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,026,397 - PTAB · Dec 19, 2022 · IPR2022-01087 · APJ Bart A Gerstenblith · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–8 and 10–19 on all grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that claims 1–8 and 10–19 would be obvious over Brochure and Blunt.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“An inter partes review may be instituted only if “the information presented in the petition . . . and any [preliminary] response . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) (2018). For the reasons below, Petitioner has established a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail in showing the unpatentability of at least one of the Challenged Claims. Accordingly, we institute an inter partes review of the Challenged Claims on all grounds raised in the Petition.” slip op. at 2
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“Additionally, only terms that are in controversy need to be construed, and these need be construed only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy. See Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’”) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)).” slip op. at 10
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“G. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art Petitioner, supported by Dr. Eldering’s testimony, proposes that a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention would have had “at least a bachelor’s degree in physics or engineering and experience with the installation of cable,” and that “[a]dditional education could substitute for professional experience and vice versa.” Pet. 4 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶ 15). At this stage of the proceeding and on the current record, we find that Petitioner’s proposal is consistent with the level of ordinary skill in the art reflected by the ’016 patent and the prior art of record. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001); In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995); In re Oelrich, 579 F.2d 86, 91 (CCPA 1978). Therefore, we adopt it in our consideration of the issues presently before us.” slip op. at 9
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundInstituted
“Petitioner contends that one of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to “modify Brochure’s cable reel with Blunt’s reel structure or substitute Brochure’s cable reel with Blunt’s reel 34" to . . . replenish the supply of cable in the cable reel installed in the Tote bag when it is exhausted in an environmentally friendly way.” Pet. 26 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 58–63; Ex. 1004 ¶ 107). Additionally, Petitioner asserts that one of ordinary skill in the art “would have expected success in modifying Brochure’s cable reel with the reel structure of Blunt’s reel 34" or substituting Brochure’s cable reel with Blunt’s reel 34" because the modification would merely involve using a known technique to improve similar devices in the same way taught.” Id. at 27 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶ 60). We have reviewed Petitioner’s detailed arguments challenging claims 1–8 and 10–19 and the evidence on which Petitioner relies (see Pet. 17–92), and we find, on the preliminary record before us, that Petitioner has shown sufficiently that the combination of Brochure and Blunt satisfies the elements of claims 1–8 and 10–19, and that one of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to combine the teachings as proposed by Petitioner with a reasonable expectation of success.” slip op. at 15
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSRPatents in suitUS 10,941,016 - PTAB · Dec 19, 2022 · IPR2022-01171 · APJ Elizabeth M Roesel · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–11 and 13–23, finding a reasonable likelihood that the Diggs and Cheng combination renders at least one challenged claim unpatentable.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Denied
“. . . the PTAB will not discretionarily deny institution in view of parallel district court litigation where a petitioner presents a stipulation not to pursue in a parallel proceeding the same grounds or any grounds that could have reasonably been raised before the PTAB.” Interim Procedure, 3 (footnote omitted; citing Sotera). In other words, under the Interim Procedure, a petitioner may avoid discretionary denial of the petition based on a parallel district court litigation by providing a Sotera-style stipulation. The Interim Procedure does not, however, make a Sotera-style stipulation a prerequisite for institution. Under our informative precedent, an inter partes review may be instituted despite the absence of a Sotera-style stipulation. Sand Revolution at 12 n.5 (instituting inter partes review notwithstanding the” slip op. at 11
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“In an [inter partes review], the petitioner has the burden from the onset to show with particularity why the patent it challenges is unpatentable.” Harmonic Inc. v. Avid Tech., Inc., 815 F.3d 1356, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (citing 35 U.S.C. § 312(a)(3) (requiring inter partes review petitions to identify “with particularity . . . the evidence that supports the (requiring a petition for inter partes review to identify how the challenged claim is to be construed and where each element of the claim is found in the prior art patents or printed publications relied upon). A patent claim is unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103 if the differences between the claimed subject matter and the prior art are such that the subject matter, as a whole, would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains. KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 406 (2007). The question of obviousness is resolved based on underlying factual determinations including: (1) the scope and content of the prior art; (2) any differences between the claimed subject matter and the prior art; (3) the level of ordinary skill in the art; and (4) when presented, objective evidence of nonobviousness, i.e., secondary considerations. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17–18 (1966). Additionally, the obviousness inquiry typically requires an analysis of “whether there was an apparent reason to combine the known elements in the fashion claimed by the patent at issue.” KSR, 550 U.S. at 418 (citing In re Kahn, 441 F.3d 977, 988 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (requiring “articulated reasoning with some rational underpinning to support the legal conclusion of obviousness”)). Petitioner cannot satisfy its burden of proving obviousness by employing “mere conclusory statements,” but “must instead articulate specific reasoning, based on evidence of record, to support the legal conclusion of obviousness.” In re Magnum Oil Tools Int’l, Ltd., 829 F.3d 1364, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2016). slip op. at 13
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundInstituted
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 8,966,347 - Apple Inc. v. Jawbone Innovations, LLCInstitutedPTAB · Dec 16, 2022 · IPR2022-01084 · APJ Steven M Amundson · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted review of claims 14–42 on all petitioned grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on the asserted obviousness combinations.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“to institute an inter partes review. We may institute an inter partes review only if “the information presented in the petition filed under section 311 and any response filed under section 313 shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) (2018). The “reasonable likelihood” standard is “a higher standard than mere notice pleading” but “lower than the ‘preponderance’ standard to prevail in a final written decision.” Hulu, LLC v. Sound View Innovations, LLC, IPR2018- 01039, Paper 29 at 13 (PTAB Dec. 20, 2019) (precedential).” slip op. at 2
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Denied
“discretionarily deny institution in view of parallel district court litigation where a petitioner presents a stipulation not to pursue in a parallel proceeding the same grounds or any grounds that could have reasonably been raised before the PTAB.” Interim Procedure at 3 (citing Sotera Wireless, Inc. v. Masimo Corp., IPR2020-01019, Paper 12 (PTAB Dec. 1, 2020) (precedential as to § II.A)); see id. at 7, 9. The Interim Procedure also explains that such a stipulation (a Sotera stipulation) “mitigates concerns of potentially conflicting decisions and duplicative efforts between the district court and the PTAB.” Id. at 7. In this proceeding, Petitioner “stipulates that, unless the Board denies or later vacates institution,” Petitioner “will not seek resolution in the litigation of invalidity based on the specific grounds asserted in” the Petition. Pet. 98–99. Petitioner asserts that its “stipulation prevents overlap because it requires the grounds addressed in each forum to be mutually exclusive, thereby obviating the possibility of inconsistent results.” Prelim. Reply 4.” slip op. at 19
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundDecided for petitioner
“purposes of institution that an ordinarily skilled artisan would have had reasons to combine Visser’s teachings with Avendano’s teachings in the way Petitioner proposes. See Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 101–125, 145–147, 163–164. As Dr. Kenny explains, an ordinarily skilled artisan would have (1) “applied Visser’s cross filter w12 to Avendano’s second signal x2 to further increase speech content in the first virtual microphone Cf” and (2) “applied Visser’s cross filter w21 to Avendano’s first signal x1 to further decrease speech content in the second virtual microphone Cb.” Id. ¶¶ 120, 145, 164. As Dr. Kenny also explains, these modifications would have improved Avendano’s system by “further enhanc[ing] the separation of speech in Avendano’s system,” i.e., “further enhanc[ing] the separation between speech and noise.” Id. ¶¶ 119, 163. Any “need or problem known in the field of endeavor at the time of invention and addressed by the patent can provide a reason for combining” references. KSR, 550 U.S. at 420. At this stage of the proceeding, we are persuaded that improving Avendano’s system by “further enhanc[ing] the separation of speech in Avendano’s system” suffices as a reason for combining Visser’s teachings with Avendano’s teachings. See Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 119–120, 145, 163–164. The “desire to enhance commercial opportunities by improving a product or process is universal . . . .” DyStar Textilfarben GmbH v. C.H. Patrick Co., 464 F.3d 1356, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2006). Because Dr. Kenny explains that combining Visser’s teachings with Avendano’s teachings would have improved Avendano’s system by “further enhanc[ing] the separation of speech in Avendano’s system,” i.e., “further enhanc[ing] the separation between speech and noise,” we disagree with Patent Owner’s assertion that Petitioner provides “no reason” why an ordinarily skilled artisan would have configured “the modified Avendano system in the specific way” Petitioner proposes. See Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 119, 163; Prelim. Resp. 10. Patent Owner’s assertion that Avendano differs from Visser because (1) Avendano subtracts the signals supplied by delay nodes 402 and 404 and (2) Visser sums the signals supplied by cross filters w12 and w21 disregards the principle that “[c]ombining the teachings of references does not involve an ability to combine their specific structures.” See In re Nievelt, 482 F.2d 965, 968 (CCPA 1973); Prelim. Resp. 10–11. Obviousness does not depend on “whether the features of a secondary reference may be bodily incorporated into the structure of the primary reference.” In re Keller, 642 F.2d 413, 425 (CCPA 1981). That Avendano already accounts for “changing acoustic signals” with a “Weiner filter and filter smoothing module,” as Patent Owner asserts, does not undermine modifying Avendano’s system to incorporate Visser’s cross filters w12 and w21 to “further enhance the separation of speech in Avendano’s system,” i.e., “further enhance the separation between speech and noise.” See Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 119–120, 145, 163–164; Prelim. Resp. 12. Visser’s cross filters w12 and w21 would have improved Avendano’s system regardless whether the cross filters adapted during operation. See Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 119–120, 145, 163–164. We are persuaded that Visser’s disclosure about filters adapting during operation and learning to separate speech “according to the specific acoustic environment,” such that the system can accurately separate speech “even in a changing acoustic environment,” provides an independent reason for combining Visser’s teachings with Avendano’s teachings. See, e.g., Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 104, 111–112, 147; Ex. 1006, 7:1–5, 9:8–12, 16:8–19, 16:62–17:4, code (57). (j)” slip op. at 55
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedOther
“Petitioner asserts that a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the alleged invention “would have at least a bachelor of science in electrical engineering, computer engineering, computer science, mechanical engineering, or a related discipline, with at least two years of relevant experience in a field related to acoustics, speech recognition, speech detection, or signal processing.” Pet. 6–7. Petitioner also asserts that “[a]dditional education or industry experience may compensate for a deficit in the other.” Id. at 7. Dr. Kenny’s testimony supports Petitioner’s assertions. See Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 22–23. For purposes of the Preliminary Response, Patent Owner “utilizes Petitioner’s proposed level of skill in the art.” Prelim. Resp. 5 (quoting Pet. 6–7). Based on the current record and for purposes of analysis, we accept Petitioner’s description of an ordinarily skilled artisan as consistent with the ’213 patent and the asserted prior art.” slip op. at 22
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 8,321,213 - PTAB · Dec 15, 2022 · IPR2022-01174 · APJ James A Tartal · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–27 of the ’141 patent, finding a reasonable likelihood that claims 1–16, 20, 21, and 25–27 would be obvious over Olin and ITRC.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“review. 35 U.S.C. § 314(b) (2018); 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a) (2019). An inter partes review may not be instituted “unless . . . the information presented in the petition . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). Moreover, a decision to institute under 35 U.S.C. § 314 may not institute on fewer than all claims challenged in the petition. SAS Inst., Inc. v. Iancu, 138 S. Ct. 1348, 1359–60 (2018).” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“may be considered, including the “type of problems encountered in the art; prior art solutions to those problems; rapidity with which innovations are made; sophistication of the technology; and educational level of active workers in the field.” In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (citation omitted). Petitioner contends that a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention would have had “at least a bachelor’s degree in environmental science or environmental, civil or chemical engineering and 4–5 years of experience working in the field of soil remediation, or an equivalent combination of education and/or experience in related fields.” Pet. 9 (citing Ex. 1065 ¶¶ 24–25).” slip op. at 10
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached
“C. Claim Construction We apply the same claim construction standard that would be used to construe the claim in a civil action under 35 U.S.C. § 282(b). 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b). Under that standard, claim terms “are generally given their ordinary and customary meaning” as would have been understood by a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1312–13. “In determining the meaning of the disputed claim limitation, we look principally to the intrinsic evidence of record, examining the claim language itself, the written description, and the prosecution history, if in evidence.” DePuy Spine, Inc. v. Medtronic Sofamor Danek, Inc., 469 F.3d 1005, 1014 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (citing Phillips v. AWG Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312–17 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc)). Extrinsic evidence is “less significant than the intrinsic record in determining ‘the legally operative meaning of claim language.’” Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1317.” slip op. at 11
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundInstituted
“In support of the asserted combination, according to Petitioner, Olin and ITRC both teach “same physical separation techniques, in the same sequence, using the same well-known equipment for soil washing,” both “recognize variation in contamination sites and describe designing and operating soil washing systems based on site-specific parameters.” Pet. 14– 16 (citing, e.g., Ex. 1004, 3–6, 11–16, 23–56, 58, 62; Ex. 1005, 30, 47–48; ITRC contemplate using soil washing systems in combination with secondary treatment processes, it would have also been obvious to use additional secondary or tertiary remediation technologies because doing so would involve combining known processes and equipment to achieve predictable results,” and that there would have been “a reasonable likelihood of success because it was routine and well within a [person of ordinary skill in the art’s] skill level.” Id. at 17 (citing Ex. 1004, 13; Ex. 1005, 49; Ex. 1065 ¶ 219).” slip op. at 18
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 7,399,141 - PTAB · Dec 14, 2022 · IPR2023-00016 · APJ Michael A Valek · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted review of claims 1–6 on the petition’s unpatentability grounds and granted MSN’s motion to join IPR2022-00722 as a silent understudy.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“IPR2022-00722, challenging the same claims based on the same grounds and relying on the same declarant testimony and other evidence for support. See Pet. 4–5 (stating its grounds are “substantially identical,” “challenge the same claims over the same prior art,” and “rely on the same exhibits, arguments and expert testimony presented with the Mylan Petition”). Patent Owner does not dispute that MSN’s Petition is substantially identical to Mylan’s, nor identify any material distinction between the arguments” slip op. at 3
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Joinder §315(c) / SAS all-or-nothingJoinder, grantedGranted
“agree with the arguments MSN makes for joinder. See Paper 4, 8–12. As discussed above, the Petition raises the same unpatentability grounds as IPR2022-00722, and no others. Thus, this review does not present any ground not already at issue in IPR2022-00722. Efficiency favors addressing these challenges in a joined proceeding.” slip op. at 4
NonePatents in suitUS 7,041,786
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.