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  • PTAB · Sep 11, 2024 · IPR2024-00631 · APJ Susan L C Mitchell · IPR · Institution

    The Board instituted review of claims 1–10 on all petitioned grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood of unpatentability, and granted Apotex’s motion to join the Mylan IPR.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Decided for petitioner

      “discretionary. See Harmonic Inc. v. Avid Tech., Inc., 815 F.3d 1356, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2016); see also 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). In Apple Inc. v. Fintiv, Inc., IPR2020-00019, Paper 11 (PTAB Mar. 20, 2020) (precedential), the Board set forth six non-exclusive factors for determining “whether efficiency, fairness, and the merits support the exercise of authority to deny institution in view of an earlier trial date in the parallel proceeding.” Id. at 6. These factors are as follows: 1. whether the court granted a stay or evidence exists that one may be granted if a proceeding is instituted; 2. proximity of the court’s trial date to the Board’s projected statutory deadline for a final written decision; 3. investment in the parallel proceeding by the court and the parties; 4. overlap between issues raised in the petition and in the parallel proceeding; 5. whether the petitioner and the defendant in the parallel proceeding are the same party; and 6. other circumstances that impact the Board’s exercise of discretion, including the merits. Id. at 5–6. In evaluating these factors, we take a holistic view of whether efficiency and integrity of the system are best served by denying or instituting review. Id. at 6. The Director has also issued interim guidance to the Board on applying the factors. See Katherine K. Vidal, Interim Procedure for Discretionary Denials in AIA Post-Grant Proceedings with” slip op. at 6

    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

      “review under 35 U.S.C. § 314 and 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a). To institute an inter partes review, we must determine that the information presented in the Petition shows “a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a).” slip op. at 2

    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Joinder §315(c) / SAS all-or-nothingJoinder, grantedGranted

      “Under 37 C.F.R. § 42.5(b), we “may waive or suspend a requirement of [part 42 of the Board’s rules] and may place conditions on the waiver or suspension.” Here, we agree with Petitioner that it has shown sufficient reason for us to waive the one-month from institution joinder motion deadline. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.122(b). Petitioner waited until it had a sufficient business reason to file this Petition, and subsequently promptly filed its Petition and Motion for Joinder. Most critically, Petitioner raises no new unpatentability grounds, the trial schedule for the Mylan IPR need not be adjusted, and Petitioner agrees to serve in a silent understudy role. We determine that joinder with the Mylan IPR is appropriate under the circumstances. Accordingly, we grant Petitioner’s Motion for Joinder.” slip op. at 13

    Discretionary denial
    Patents in suitUS 10,335,462
  • PTAB · May 28, 2024 · IPR2024-00107 · APJ Susan L C Mitchell · IPR · Institution

    The Board instituted review of claims 1–10 on all petitioned grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood of unpatentability, and granted Sun’s motion to join the Mylan IPR.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Decided for petitioner

      “The Director set forth in the Interim Procedure that “the PTAB will not discretionarily deny institution of an IPR or PGR in view of parallel district court litigation where a petitioner stipulates not to pursue in a parallel district court proceeding the same grounds as in the petition or any grounds that could have reasonably been raised in the petition.” Interim Procedure, 7, 9. This guidance does not condition or otherwise qualify the effect of a Sotera stipulation on our exercise of discretion to deny the Petition based on any remaining defendants in the parallel litigation that are not subject to the stipulation or any alleged “behind the scenes” participation by Petitioner such as paying for experts, participating in expert reports or deposition preparation “in connection with any of the stipulated grounds.” See Paper 14, 1. Petitioner has filed such a stipulation. See Ex. 1099. Therefore, we will not exercise our discretion to deny the Petition. We also find that with the change of the district court trial date to over two months after the original statutory due date for the Mylan IPR, the Mylan IPR should be completed before a trial in the district court begins. See Mylan IPR, Ex. 1098. This change in trial date, in addition to the lack of complete overlap in the claims asserted here and in the Delaware Litigation, provide further reason for us to refrain from exercising our discretion to deny the Petition under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) regardless of remaining defendants in the Delaware Litigation that are not bound by any estoppel arising from the Mylan IPR.9” slip op. at 9

    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

      “For the same reasons set forth in our institution decision in the Mylan IPR, we determine that Petitioner has shown a reasonable likelihood that at least one claim is unpatentable. Mylan IPR, Paper 10, 17–29 (PTAB Oct. 4, 2023). We therefore institute trial as to all challenged claims on all grounds stated in the Petition.” slip op. at 11

    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Joinder §315(c) / SAS all-or-nothingJoinder, grantedGranted

      “entitled to the requested relief. 37 C.F.R. § 42.20(c). A motion for joinder should: set forth the reasons joinder is appropriate; identify any new grounds of unpatentability asserted in the petition; and explain what impact (if any) joinder would have on the trial schedule for the existing review. See Kyocera Corp. v. Softview LLC, IPR2013-00004, Paper 15 at 4 (PTAB Apr. 24, 2013).” slip op. at 12

    Discretionary denial
    Patents in suitUS 10,335,462
  • PTAB · Apr 25, 2024 · IPR2024-00009 · APJ Susan L C Mitchell · IPR · Institution

    The Board instituted review of claims 1–10 on all petition grounds, declined discretionary denial, and granted joinder with IPR2023-00724.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Decided for petitioner

      “Director Vidal set forth in the Interim Procedure that “the PTAB will not discretionarily deny institution of an IPR or PGR in view of parallel district court litigation where a petitioner stipulates not to pursue in a parallel district court proceeding the same grounds as in the petition or any grounds that could have reasonably been raised in the petition.” Interim Procedure, 7, 9. This guidance does not condition or otherwise qualify the effect of a Sotera stipulation on our exercise of discretion to deny the Petition based on any remaining defendants in the parallel litigation that are not subject to the stipulation. Petitioner has filed such a stipulation. Reply 2 (“Petitioners stipulate that, if instituted, they will not pursue in the parallel district court proceeding the same grounds as in the Petition or any grounds that could have reasonably been raised therein”). Therefore, we will not exercise our discretion to deny the Petition. We also find that with the change of the district court trial date to over two months after the current statutory due date for the Mylan IPR, the Mylan IPR should be completed before a trial in the district court begins. See Ex. 1098. This change in trial date, in addition to the lack of complete overlap in the claims asserted here and in the Delaware Litigation, provide further reason for us to refrain from exercising our discretion to deny the Petition under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) regardless of remaining defendants in the Delaware Litigation that are not bound by any estoppel arising from the Mylan IPR.10” slip op. at 9

    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

      “For the same reasons set forth in our institution decision in the Mylan IPR, we determine that Petitioner has shown a reasonable likelihood that at least one claim is unpatentable. Mylan IPR, Paper 10, 17–29 (PTAB Oct. 4, 2023). We therefore institute trial as to all challenged claims on all grounds stated in the Petition.” slip op. at 11

    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Joinder §315(c) / SAS all-or-nothingJoinder, grantedGranted

      “response under section 313 or the expiration of the time for filing such a response, determines warrants the institution of an inter parties review under section 314. As the moving party, Petitioner bears the burden of proving that it is entitled to the requested relief. 37 C.F.R. § 42.20(c). A motion for joinder should: set forth the reasons joinder is appropriate; identify any new grounds of unpatentability asserted in the petition; and explain what impact (if any) joinder would have on the trial schedule for the existing review. See Kyocera Corp. v. Softview LLC, IPR2013-00004, Paper 15 at 4 (PTAB Apr. 24, 2013).” slip op. at 12

    Discretionary denial
    Patents in suitUS 10,335,462
  • PTAB · Mar 19, 2024 · IPR2024-00181 · APJ Timothy G Majors · IPR · Institution

    The Board instituted inter partes review of claims 1–29 and granted Inari’s contingent motion to join the Bayer 1038 IPR.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

      “Petition, and has not otherwise addressed Inari’s contentions. Inasmuch as Patent Owner raised counterarguments to the grounds in the preliminary response that it filed in the Bayer 1038 IPR, we addressed those arguments in our Institution Decision in that proceeding. Bayer 1038 IPR, Paper 12. From our review of the preliminary record, we are persuaded that Inari’s Petition challenges the same claims of the ’745 patent, based on the same grounds and substantially the same evidence, compared to the challenge in the Bayer 1038 IPR.” slip op. at 5

    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Joinder §315(c) / SAS all-or-nothingJoinder, grantedGranted

      “Furthermore, a motion for joinder should (1) set forth reasons why joinder is appropriate; (2) identify any new grounds of unpatentability asserted in the petition; (3) explain what impact (if any) joinder would have on the trial schedule for the existing review; and (4) address specifically how briefing and discovery may be simplified. See Kyocera Corp. v. Softview LLC, IPR2013-00004, Paper 15, 4 (PTAB Apr. 24, 2013); Patent Trial and Appeal Board, Consolidated Trial Practice Guide, 76 (Nov. 2019), https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/ documents/tpgnov.pdf. Inari addresses these considerations in its Motion, and we generally agree with Petitioner’s assertions in favor of joinder. Mot. 3–10. We discuss below.” slip op. at 7

    • Other 314aOther

      “prevailing, as it is substantively identical to the successful petition upon which we instituted the Bayer 1038 IPR. However, institution of an inter partes review is discretionary. See 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) (authorizing institution of an inter partes review under particular circumstances, but not requiring institution under any circumstances); Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 579 U.S. 261, 273 (2016) (“[T]he agency’s decision to deny a petition is a matter committed to the Patent Office’s discretion.”); SAS Inst. Inc. v. Iancu, 138 S. Ct. 1348, 1356 (2018) (“[Section] 314(a) invests the Director with discretion on the question whether to institute review . . . .” (emphasis omitted)); Harmonic Inc. v. Avid Tech., Inc., 815 F.3d 1356, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“[T]he PTO is permitted, but never compelled, to institute an IPR proceeding.”). I would exercise that discretion here and deny the Petition. The Bayer 1038 IPR is governed by the petition filed by Bayer. See Facebook, Inc. v. Windy City Innovations, LLC, 973 F.3d 1321, 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2020) (“The already-instituted IPR to which a person may join as a party is governed by its own petition and is confined to the claims and grounds challenged in that petition.”). However, “[t]he instant Petition is substantively identical to the petition filed by Bayer, challenging the same claims of the ’745 patent on the same grounds and relying on substantively identical expert testimony.” Pet. 3. Thus, institution based on the instant Petition creates a second inter partes review that is duplicative of the Bayer 1038 IPR. As we are already granting Inari’s request to join the Bayer 1038 IPR as a petitioner, I see no benefit to granting Inari’s Petition to institute a second inter partes review. I would deny Inari’s Petition.” slip op. at 11

    Discretionary denial
    Patents in suitUS 11,299,745
  • PTAB · Mar 19, 2024 · IPR2024-00180 · APJ Timothy G Majors · IPR · Institution

    The Board instituted IPR of claims 1–29 based on a reasonable likelihood of success and granted Inari’s motion to join the Bayer 1037 IPR.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

      “Petition, and has not otherwise addressed Inari’s contentions. Inasmuch as Patent Owner raised counterarguments to the grounds in the preliminary response that it filed in the Bayer 1037 IPR, we addressed those arguments in our Institution Decision in that proceeding. Bayer 1037 IPR, Paper 12. From our review of the preliminary record, we are persuaded that Inari’s Petition challenges the same claims of the ’283 patent, based on the same grounds and substantially the same evidence, compared to the challenge in the Bayer 1037 IPR.” slip op. at 5

    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Joinder §315(c) / SAS all-or-nothingJoinder, grantedGranted

      “Furthermore, a motion for joinder should (1) set forth reasons why joinder is appropriate; (2) identify any new grounds of unpatentability asserted in the petition; (3) explain what impact (if any) joinder would have on the trial schedule for the existing review; and (4) address specifically how briefing and discovery may be simplified. See Kyocera Corp. v. Softview LLC, IPR2013-00004, Paper 15, 4 (PTAB Apr. 24, 2013); Patent Trial and Appeal Board, Consolidated Trial Practice Guide, 76 (Nov. 2019), https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/ documents/tpgnov.pdf. Inari addresses these considerations in its Motion, and we generally agree with Petitioner’s assertions in favor of joinder. Mot. 3–10. We discuss below.” slip op. at 7

    None
    Patents in suitUS 11,149,283
  • PTAB · Mar 19, 2024 · IPR2024-00179 · APJ Timothy G Majors · IPR · Institution

    The Board instituted review of claims 1–34 on all four asserted grounds and granted Inari’s motion to join the Bayer 1036 IPR.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

      “Petition, and has not otherwise addressed Inari’s contentions. Inasmuch as Patent Owner raised counterarguments to the grounds in the preliminary response that it filed in the Bayer 1036 IPR, we addressed those arguments in our Institution Decision in that proceeding. Bayer 1036 IPR, Paper 11. From our review of the preliminary record, we are persuaded that Inari’s Petition challenges the same claims of the ’555 patent, based on the same grounds and substantially the same evidence, compared to the challenge in the Bayer 1036 IPR.” slip op. at 5

    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Joinder §315(c) / SAS all-or-nothingJoinder, grantedGranted

      “joinder is appropriate; (2) identify any new grounds of unpatentability asserted in the petition; (3) explain what impact (if any) joinder would have on the trial schedule for the existing review; and (4) address specifically how briefing and discovery may be simplified. See Kyocera Corp. v. Softview LLC, IPR2013-00004, Paper 15, 4 (PTAB Apr. 24, 2013); Patent Trial and Appeal Board, Consolidated Trial Practice Guide, 76 (Nov. 2019), https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/ documents/tpgnov.pdf. Inari addresses these considerations in its Motion, and we generally agree with Petitioner’s assertions in favor of joinder. Mot. 3–10. We discuss below.” slip op. at 7

    None
    Patents in suitUS 10,947,555
  • PTAB · Feb 5, 2024 · IPR2023-00958 · APJ Michael J Fitzpatrick · IPR · Rehearing

    Rehearing was granted and IPR instituted on claims 1–28 because the petition showed a reasonable likelihood that claim 1 was obvious over Linnarsson, McCloskey, and ordinary skill.

    RulingsRehearing decision
    • RehearingRehearing, grantedGranted

      “III. WHETHER REHEARING IS WARRANTED Petitioner argues that we misconstrued the claims “as requiring one to add tags in a way that can provide a distinction based on a ‘polynucleotide sequence.’” Req. 6 (quoting Dec. 14 (Petitioner’s emphasis)). Petitioner is correct. More specifically, we implicitly construed the claim language reciting “a second tag sequence distinguishing said sample polynucleotide from other sample polynucleotides from said cell,” as requiring said “distinguishing” to be based on the sequences of the sample polynucleotides. See, e.g., Dec. 14 (“[E]ach strand of cDNA that is tagged in Linnarsson is tagged regardless of the polynucleotide sequence of the cDNA or its corresponding mRNA. Thus, Linnarsson’s tags do not distinguish between ‘sample polynucleotides,’ whether cDNA or mRNA, of different sequences.”). Based on that misunderstanding, we erroneously determined that the proposed modification could not achieve the claim language, stating the following: Petitioner’s proposal appears to defeat satisfaction of another portion of claim 1, namely a “second tag sequence distinguishing said sample polynucleotide from other sample polynucleotides from said cell.” Ex. 1001, 30:62–64. For if the second tag is “added to the CDS or TSO after extension,” as opposed to the sample polynucleotide, as Petitioner argues (Pet. 39 (emphasis added)), it would appear that the second tag would be incapable of distinguishing any sample polynucleotide from other sample polynucleotides. Rather, the second tag would be ligated to each and every extension product bearing a CDS or TSO without regard to the sequence of any sample polynucleotide. Dec. 16. We now reconsider whether to institute.” slip op. at 2

    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsDecided for petitioner

      “Cited”). Because we find that the same or substantially the same art was previously presented to the Office, we proceed to part two of the analysis. 2. Advanced Bionics Part Two Patent Owner argues that the Petition “fails to show any error in the Examiner’s application during prosecution of the prior art teachings Petitioner now purports to invoke from . . . McCloskey.” Prelim Resp. 23; see also id. at 24–25 (“Revisiting the same art and arguments already overcome during prosecution is a waste of the Board’s limited resources and would unfairly burden PO.”). However, Petitioner argued that “the Examiner committed major error in Examination by erroneously stating that the prior art fails to teach a dual tagging approach when, in fact, this approach is plainly taught in both McCloskey and McCloskey II.” Pet. 67. The record supports Petitioner’s position, and we agree that the error was material to patentability. See Ex. 1005, 131 (Notice of Allowance). Accordingly, and having considered all of the Becton, Dickinson factors, we do not exercise discretionary denial.” slip op. at 12

    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

      “We are persuaded there is a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail in demonstrating that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had a reasonable expectation of success in combining the teachings of Linnarsson and McCloskey with the knowledge of a person of ordinary skill in the art to obtain the claimed subject matter. 8. Conclusion as to Claim 1 There is a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail in proving that claim 1 is unpatentable.” slip op. at 21

    • Obviousness (§103) › Analogous artNot reached

      “the three references is analogous art to the ’013 patent as opposed to each other. Prelim. Resp. 46 (citing Pet. 35; Sanofi-Aventis Deutschland GmbH v. Mylan Pharms. Inc., 66 F.4th 1373, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2023)). As Sanofi- Aventis holds, a petitioner bears the burden of persuasion to establish that an asserted prior art reference is analogous art to the claimed invention. See Sanofi-Aventis, 66 F.4th at 1377 (“We agree with [the patent owner] that [the petitioner] did not carry its burden to argue that de Gennes is analogous to the [challenged] patent.”); id. (“In evaluating whether a reference is analogous, we have consistently held that a patent challenger must compare the reference to the challenged patent.”); id. at 1378–79 (“We have routinely held that the petitioner has the burden of proving unpatentability.”). However, the Petition should not be denied for failing to state explicitly that the cited prior art references are analogous art to the ’013 patent. Rather, as Sanofi-Aventis further held: “A petitioner is not required to anticipate and raise analogous art arguments in its petition; instead a petitioner can use its reply to ‘respond to arguments raised in the corresponding opposition, patent owner preliminary response, patent owner response, or decision on institution.’” Sanofi-Aventis, 66 F.4th at 1379 (quoting 37 C.F.R. § 42.23). Accordingly, we need not address this issue for purposes of deciding whether to institute trial.” slip op. at 15

    § 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denial
    Patents in suitUS 10,697,013
  • PTAB · Feb 5, 2024 · IPR2023-00955 · APJ Michael J Fitzpatrick · IPR · Rehearing

    Rehearing granted and IPR instituted on claims 1–26; the Board found a reasonable likelihood that claim 1 would have been obvious over Linnarsson and McCloskey.

    RulingsRehearing decision
    • RehearingRehearing, grantedGranted

      “III. WHETHER REHEARING IS WARRANTED Petitioner argues that we misconstrued the claims “as requiring one to add tags in a way that can ‘provide a distinction based on a polynucleotide’s sequence.’” Req. 6 (quoting Dec. 15 (Petitioner’s emphasis)). Petitioner is correct. More specifically, we implicitly construed the claim language reciting “a second tag sequence distinguishing said sample polynucleotide from other sample polynucleotides from said cell,” as requiring said “distinguishing” to be based on the sequences of the sample polynucleotides. See, e.g., Dec. 14 (“[E]ach strand of cDNA that is tagged in Linnarsson is tagged regardless of the polynucleotide sequence of the cDNA or its corresponding mRNA. Thus, Linnarsson’s tags do not distinguish between ‘sample polynucleotides,’ whether cDNA or mRNA, of different sequences.”). Based on that misunderstanding, we denied the Petition because “adding a second tag sequence to Linnarsson’s CDS and/or TSO would do nothing to achieve such a distinction,” i.e., “a distinction based on a polynucleotide’s sequence.” Id. at 15. That was error. We now reconsider whether to institute.” slip op. at 2

    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsInstitution denied 325dDecided for petitioner

      “the ’197 patent. See Ex. 1001, code (56) (listing McCloskey II under “References Cited”). Because we find that the same or substantially the same art was previously presented to the Office, we proceed to part two of the analysis.” slip op. at 11

    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

      “We are persuaded there is a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail in demonstrating that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had a reasonable expectation of success in combining the teachings of Linnarsson and McCloskey to obtain the claimed subject matter. 6. Conclusion as to Claim 1 There is a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail in proving that claim 1 is unpatentable.” slip op. at 18

    • Obviousness (§103) › Analogous artNot reached

      “GmbH v. Mylan Pharms. Inc., 66 F.4th 1373, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2023)). As Sanofi-Aventis holds, a petitioner bears the burden of persuasion to establish that an asserted prior art reference is analogous art to the claimed invention. See Sanofi-Aventis, 66 F.4th at 1377 (“We agree with [the patent owner] that [the petitioner] did not carry its burden to argue that de Gennes is analogous to the [challenged] patent.”); id. (“In evaluating whether a reference is analogous, we have consistently held that a patent challenger must compare the reference to the challenged patent.”); id. at 1378–79 (“We have routinely held that the petitioner has the burden of proving unpatentability.”). However, the Petition should not be denied for failing to state explicitly that the cited prior art references are analogous art to the ’197 patent. Rather, as Sanofi-Aventis further held: “A petitioner is not required to anticipate and raise analogous art arguments in its petition; instead a petitioner can use its reply to ‘respond to arguments raised in the corresponding opposition, patent owner preliminary response, patent owner response, or decision on institution.’” Sanofi-Aventis, 66 F.4th at 1379 (quoting 37 C.F.R. § 42.23). Accordingly, we need not address this issue for purposes of deciding whether to institute trial.” slip op. at 15

    § 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denial
    Patents in suitUS 10,240,197
  • PTAB · Jan 31, 2024 · IPR2024-00298 · APJ Ryan H Flax · IPR · Institution

    Instituted IPR on claims 1–30 of the ’572 patent on all asserted grounds and granted Biocon’s motion to join IPR2023-00884.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

      “We explained in our Institution Decision in IPR’884 why we conclude that Samsung demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of prevailing at trial in showing that the challenged claims are unpatentable. See generally IPR’884 DI. The present Petition advances identical arguments, challenging the same claims over the same combinations of prior art. We consequently adopt the same reasoning here as in our IPR’884 Institution Decision, and conclude that Petitioner is likely to prevail in demonstrating the unpatentability of the same challenged claims. Id. We incorporate our previous analysis regarding the asserted grounds of unpatentability and conclude that Petitioner demonstrates a reasonable likelihood of prevailing at trial with respect to at least one claim of the ’572 patent challenged in the Petition for the same reasons as in IPR’884. See id. Therefore, we determine that the Petition warrants institution of inter partes review on all claims and all grounds asserted in the Petition. 37 C.F.R. § 42.108(a) (“When instituting . . . review, the Board will authorize the review to proceed on all of the challenged claims and on all grounds of unpatentability asserted for each claim.”); see also SAS Inst. Inc. v. Iancu, 138 S. Ct. 1348, 1359–60 (2018).” slip op. at 9

    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Joinder §315(c) / SAS all-or-nothingJoinder, grantedGranted

      “joinder is discretionary. See 35 U.S.C. § 315(c); 37 C.F.R. § 42.122. We determine whether to grant joinder on a case-by-case basis, taking into account the particular facts of each case, substantive and procedural issues, and other considerations. When exercising that discretion, we are mindful that patent trial regulations, including the rules for joinder, must be construed to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive resolution of every proceeding. See 35 U.S.C. § 316(b); 37 C.F.R. § 42.1(b). As the moving party, Petitioner bears the burden of proving that it is entitled to the requested relief. 37 C.F.R. § 42.20(c). A motion for joinder should: (1) set forth the reasons joinder is appropriate; (2) identify any new grounds of unpatentability asserted in the petition; and (3) explain what impact (if any) joinder would have on the trial schedule for the existing review. See Kyocera Corp. v. Softview, LLC, IPR2013-00004, Paper 15 at 4 (PTAB Apr. 24, 2013); see also, USPTO, America Invents Act (AIA) Frequently Asked Questions,” available at: uspto.gov/patents/laws/americainvents-act-aia/america-invents-act-aia-frequently-asked#type-inter-partesreview_3244 (last visited February 2, 2022). B.” slip op. at 10

    None
    Patents in suitUS 11,253,572
  • PTAB · Jan 30, 2024 · IPR2024-00260 · APJ Ryan H Flax · IPR · Institution

    Instituted review of claims 1–30 on all asserted grounds and granted Celltrion’s motion to join IPR2023-00884.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

      “We explained in our Institution Decision in IPR’884 why we conclude that Samsung demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of prevailing at trial in showing that the challenged claims are unpatentable. See generally IPR’884 DI. The present Petition advances identical arguments, challenging the same claims over the same combinations of prior art. We consequently adopt the same reasoning here as in our IPR’884 Institution Decision, and conclude that Petitioner is similarly likely to prevail in demonstrating the unpatentability of the same challenged claims. Id. We incorporate our previous analysis regarding the asserted grounds of unpatentability and conclude that Petitioner demonstrates a reasonable likelihood of prevailing at trial with respect to at least one claim of the ’572 patent challenged in the Petition for the same reasons as in IPR’884. See id. Based on the record before us, we determine that the Petition warrants institution of inter partes review on all claims and all grounds asserted in the Petition. 37 C.F.R. § 42.108(a) (“When instituting . . . review, the Board will authorize the review to proceed on all of the challenged claims and on all grounds of unpatentability asserted for each claim.”); see also SAS Inst. Inc. v. Iancu, 138 S. Ct. 1348, 1359–60 (2018).” slip op. at 11

    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Joinder §315(c) / SAS all-or-nothingJoinder, grantedGranted

      “Petitioner certifies and we agree that the Petition is substantively identical to that of IPR’884, where we found Samsung had met its burden to show a reasonable likelihood it would prevail at trial in establishing at least one challenged claim unpatentable under the asserted grounds. Mot. 5; see generally IPR’884 DI. Petitioner also certifies, and we agree, that it relies on the same evidence here as in IPR’884. Mot. 5. Patent Owner waives its right to file a preliminary response in this proceeding, for the sake of efficiency. See Paper 7, 2. Petitioner also certifies that it will be a “silent understudy” to Samsung in IPR’884 if the proceedings are joined, thus, there will be no impact to the schedule of that instituted trial. Mot. 5–6. Moreover, Petitioner asserts that, structured in this way, the joined proceeding will simplify briefing and discovery (i.e., they will be singular, rather than occurring in two proceedings). Id. at 6–7.” slip op. at 12

    None
    Patents in suitUS 11,253,572
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